rCittitiENJ DttiECnONS :nsf J'SYCHOLOGICAL SQENCE
stand nonliteral speech, such as
Understanding Metaphors
Sam Glucksberg^
Department of Psychology, Princetoti University, Princeton, Nevv^ Jersey
Current Directions is a gold mine.
You may or may not agree with
this statement, but chances are you
had no problem understanding it.
How ditl you arrive at that under-
standing? In figurative language,
the intended meaning does not co-
incide with the literal meanings of
the words and sentences that are
used. Because literal and figurative
meanings do not coincide, figura-
tive language has traditionally
been considered derivative from
and more complex than ostensibly
straightforward literal language.
How might it be more complex?
In general, people use two kinds
of operations in vmderstanding lan-
guage. One kind is purely linguis-
tic, and includes such operations as
lexical access (getting the meariings
of words) and syntactic analysis
(determining the grammatical re-
lations among the words of a
sentence). The second kind of op-
eration, pragmatic, is less well de-
fined, but it is just as important for
understanding language as are the
purely linguistic operations. For
example, if someone tells you that
Recommended Reading
• Gibbs, R.W., Jr. (1994). The poetics of
mind: Figurative thought, language ••
and understanding. Cambridge, En- :
gland: Cambridge University
Press,
Glucksberg, S. (1991). Beyond Eteral '
meanings: The psychology of allu-
sion. Psychological Science, 2, 146-
152.
Kittay, E.V. (1987). Metaphor: Its cog-
nitive force and linguistic structure.
Oxford, England: Clarendon :
Press.
Ortony, A. (Ed.). (1993). Metaphor and \
thought (2nd ed.). Cambridge, En-
gland: Cambridge University ;
Press. ' speech, this implication is fortu-
"dogs are animals," you would
probably go beyond the literal
meaning of this assertion to try
and understand what the speaker
meant by telling you something
that you know full well, and that
he knows you know full well. The
utterance must be relevant some-
how, and so you must go beyond
the literal to figure out the rel-
evance and intent of his remark
(Grice, 1975),
Understanding metaphors such
as "Currertt Directions is a gold
mine" also requires going beyond
the literal. Everyone in the lan-
guage business, from philosophers
to linguists to psycholinguists,
agrees on what people must do:
understand a speaker's meaning,
not just sentence mearung (i,e., they
must understand what the speaker
intends listeners to understand).
There are, however, deep disagree-
ments about how people go about
doing this. At one extreme is stan-
dard pragmatic theory, which
holds tiiat people must first derive
the literal meaning of an utterance.
Once this is done, then that literal
meaning is assessed as to whether
it makes sense in the context. If it
does not make sense in context,
then, and only then, alternative
nonliteral meanings are considered
(Searle, 1979).
This view has at least three test-
able implications. First, metaphor
understanding will necessarily be
more difficult and take longer than
, CAN PEOPLE IGNORE
literal understanding, because lit-
eral meanings are always com-
puted before any nonliteral mean-
ings, and the latter will always
require more inferential work.
Given the ubiquity of nonliteral
nately not true. People can under-
Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
metaphors and idioms, as rapidly
and as easily as comparable literal
expressions (Gibbs, 1980; McGlone,
Glucksberg, & Cacciari, 1994;
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & An-
tos, 1978),
The second implication is that
metaphor understanding is op-
tional—unless the literal meaning
of a sentence makes no sense in
context, people will not go beyond
the literal. The third implication is
that the ground of a metaphor—the
relation between the metaphor
topic, X, and vehicle, Y—is arrived
at via a comparison process. Meta-
phors of the form "X is a Y" are
literally false—after all. Current Di-
rections is not really a hole in the
ground where gold can be found.
Therefore, people cannot under-
stand them directly. Instead, meta-
phors are implicitly converted into
true comparison statements (e.g..
Current Directions is "like" a gold
mine) and then interpreted just as
any literal comparison might be in-
terpreted. In our research, my col-
leagues and I have shown that both
of these implications are unequivo-
cally wrong. Metaphor under-
standing is not an option, and
metaphors are understood directly,
not via an implicit comparison.
When someone asserts that Current
Directions is a gold mine, he does
not mean that it is Uke a gold mine,
but that it really is one—a special
kind of gold mine, to be sure, but a
gold mine nonetheless. Let us con-
sider each of these issues in turn.
ON THE OPTIONALITY OF
FIGURATIVE MEANINGS:
METAPHORS?
People cannot ignore meta-
phors, even when literal meanings
make perfect sense in context. This
conclusion derives from a series of
experiments in which people
39
would have performed optimally if
they had attended exclusively to
literal meanings while ignoring
metaphorical ones (Glucksberg,
Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Keysar,
1989). The experiments were mod-
eled after Stroop's (1935) classic
demonstration that people cannot
ignore literal meanings. As every
introductory psychology student
knows, Stroop presented words
printed in various colors and asked
people to name the color of the ink,
not to read the words themselves.
When a color word was printed in
some other color (e.g., the word red
was printed in green), people had
difficulty saying the name of the
color of the ink ("green"), indicat-
ing response competition from the
color word {red) itself. This color-
word interference effect was taken
to mean that people cannot inhibit
reading words that are attended to,
even when such inhibition would
improve task performance.
My colleagues and I applied this
logic to literally false but meta-
phorically true sentences such as
some roads are snakes and some offices
are icebergs (Glucksberg et al., 1982).
Our experimental participants
were shown sentences one at a
time on a screen and instructed to
judge whether each sentence was
literally true or false. We used four
types of sentences: literally true
sentences (e.g., some birds are rob-
ins), literally false sentences (e.g.,
some birds are apples), metaphors
(e.g., some jobs are jails, some flutes
are birds), and scrambled meta-
phors (e.g., some jobs are birds, some
flutes are jails). The metaphors were
literally false category-membership
assertions, but they were readily
interpretable if taken nonliterally.
The scrambled metaphors were
also literally false, but not readily
interpretable.
If people ignore metaphorical
meanings, then the metaphors
would take no longer to reject than
the scrambled metaphors. If, how-
ever, people automatically register
any metaphorical meanings that
are available, then the metaphor
sentences would take longer to
judge as false than their scrambled
counterparts because of the re-
sponse competition between the
"true" nonliteral meanings and the
"false" literal ones of the metaphor
sentences. Our results were clear-
cut. People had difficulty in reject-
ing metaphors as literally false. The
mean response time to reject meta-
phor sentences (1,239 ms) was reli-
ably longer than the time to reject
either literally false sentences
(1,185 ms) or scrambled metaphors
(1,162 ms). Furthermore, this effect
was not due to mere associations
between metaphor topics and ve-
hicles, but to an appreciation of
metaphorical meaning itself. If an
association between topic and ve-
hicle is sufficient for the interfer-
ence effect, then it would make no
difference what quantifier {all vs.
some) is used, but it does. For ex-
ample, people tend to agree that
some surgeons are butchers but do
not agree that all surgeons are butch-
ers. We ran a second experiment to
see if quantifiers make a difference
for metaphor interference. Not sur-
prisingly, some surgeons are butchers
produced the metaphor interfer-
ence effect, but all surgeons are
butchers did not. We interpreted
this metaphor interference effect in
the same way that Stroop inter-
preted his color-word interference
effect: People could not inhibit
their understanding of metaphori-
cal meanings, even when literal
meanings were acceptable in the
context of our experiment.
People also apprehend meta-
phorical meanings even when they
are only potentially available, as in
noun-noun compounds. Many
noun-noun compounds can be in-
terpreted either metaphorically or
literally (Wisniewski, 1997). For ex-
ample, if the compound shark law-
yer is interpreted as a lawyer who
is predatory and aggressive, then
the noun shark is used to refer to a
Published by Cambridge University Press
metaphorical rather than literal
shark. If the same compound is in-
terpreted as a lawyer who repre-
sents sharks (as in, perhaps, a legal
matter involving protection of
sharks as endangered species),
then shark refers to the literal shark
(i.e., the marine creature). Simi-
larly, compounds such as movie life
can be interpreted either meta-
phorically {his life is a movie) or lit-
erally (the life of people who work
in movies). Goldvarg and I pre-
sented noun-noun combinations to
college students and asked for their
interpretations. People over-
whelmingly chose to interpret
combinations as metaphorical
rather than literal whenever meta-
phorical interpretations were avail-
able (Goldvarg & Glucksberg, in
press). Clearly, people are finely at-
tuned to finding metaphorical
meanings, even when such mean-
ings are not the only alternative
and even when they are presented
implicitly in noun-noun compound
form rather than explicit metaphor
or simile form.
BEYOND SIMILARITY:
METAPHORS ARE
UNDERSTOOD DIRECTLY
According to the comparison
view, metaphors of the form "X is a
Y" are understood by converting
them into simile form, "X is like a
Y." The simile is then understood
by comparing the properties of X
and Y. This view has been chal-
lenged on both theoretical and em-
pirical grounds. One finding is par-
ticularly telling: Metaphors take
less time to understand in class-
inclusion form, such as my lawyer is
a shark, than in simile form, such as
my lawyer is like a shark Qohnson,
1996). That metaphors can be un-
derstood more easily than similes
argues that metaphors are exactly
what they seem to be, namely,
class-inclusion assertions (Glucks-
berg & Keysar, 1990). In this ex- metaphor vehicles such as Vietnam
ample, the metaphor vehicle {shark) can be used as names for categories
is used to refer to the superordinate that have no names of their own
category of predatory creatures in (Brown, 1958).
general, not to the smaller, concrete Metaphors are thus attributive
category of marine creatures that is assertions, not comparisons. To say
also named shark (see Fig. 1). This that someone's job is a jail is to at-
dual reference function of meta- tribute salient properties of the cat-
phor vehicles is clear in metaphors egory "jail" to a particular job
such as Cambodia was Vietnam's (Ortony, 1979). That particular job
Vietnam. Here, the first mention of is thereby included in the general,
Vietnam refers to the nation of Viet- abstract category of "jail," and as a
nam. In contrast, the second men- consequence of that categorization
tion of Vietnam does not refer to is deemed similar in relevant re-
that nation, but instead to the spects to literal jails (Glucksberg,
American involvement in Vietnam, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997). Pred-
which has come to epitomize the icative metaphors, in which verbs
category of disastrous military in- are used figuratively, function
terventions. That intervention has similarly (Torreano, 1997). The
become a metaphor for such disas- verb to fly literally entails move-
ters, and so the word Vietnam can ment in the air. Flying through the
be used as a metaphor vehicle to air epitomizes speed, and so ex-
characterize other ill-fated military pressions such as he hopped on his
actions, such as Vietnam's invasion bike and flew home are readily un-
of Cambodia. More generally. derstood via the same strategies
Superordinate Category Level:
M-shark properties: Vicious
Predatory
Aggressive
Tenacious
Basic Category Level:
L-shark properties: Vicious
Predatory
Aggressive
Tenacious
Fast swimmer
Has fins
Has sharp teeth
Has leathery skin
Has gills
Fig. 1. Properties associated with the metaphorical meaning of shark (M-shark), at
the superordinate-category level, and the literal meaning of shark (L-shark), at the
basic-category level.
Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
that nominal metaphors, such as
his bike was an arrow, are under-
stood. Arrows are prototypical
members of the category of speed-
ing things; flying is a prototypical
member of the category of fast
travel. For both nominal and pred-
icative metaphors, prototypical
members of categories can be used
as metaphor vehicles to attribute
properties to topics of interest.
The categorization view of
metaphor provides a natural expla-
nation for a number of metaphor
phenomena. For example, it ac-
counts for the fact that metaphors
are, in principle, nonreversible. It
makes sense to say that my job is a
jail, but it does not make sense to
say that my jail is a job. When meta-
phors can be reversed, as in my sur-
geon is a butcher and my butcher is a
surgeon, the grounds of the meta-
phor change. In the former, nega-
tive properties of butchers are at-
tributed to my surgeon, but in the
latter, positive properties of sur-
geons are attributed to my butcher
(Glucksberg, McGlone, & Man-
fredi, 1997).
The categorization view also ex-
plains why metaphorical compari-
sons can be paraphrased as cat-
egory statements and vice versa,
whereas literal comparisons can-
not. Similes (e.g., my lawyer was like
a shark) can be converted into the
categorical form {my lawyer was a
shark) without an appreciable
change in meaning. However, a lit-
eral comparison (e.g., barracudas are
like sharks) does not make sense if
converted into the categorical form
{barracudas are sharks). Metaphoric
comparisons can be expressed as
categorical statements because the
simile is an implicit category state-
ment (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990).
As mentioned earlier, in my lawyer
was a shark, the metaphor vehicle,
shark, refers to the superordinate
category of predatory creatures ex-
emplified by the literal shark, not
to the basic level, the fish called a
shark (see Fig. 1).
 If metaphor vehicles refer to ab-
stract superordinate categories,
then calling attention to the basic-
level, literal meaning of a metaphor
vehicle should make metaphor
comprehension more difficult.
However, bringing to mind the lit-
eral meaning of a metaphor topic
should have no deleterious effect
because the topic is used literally.
My colleagues and I tested this pre-
diction of our categorization view
by preceding (i.e., priming) meta-
phors with either an irrelevant lit-
eral property of the topic or an ir-
relevant literal property of the
vehicle. People read metaphors
such as my lawyer was a shark, pre-
ceded by (a) neutral control sen-
tences, such as some tables are made
of wood; (b) irrelevant topic-prop-
erty sentences, such as some lawyers
are married; and (c) irrelevant ve-
hicle-property sentences, such as
sharks can swim. People took more
time to understand a metaphor
when it was preceded by an irrel-
evant vehicle-property sentence
than when it was preceded by ei-
ther a neutral control sentence or
an irrelevant topic-property sen-
tence (Glucksberg, Manfredi, &
McGlone, 1997; McGlone & Man-
fredi, in press). Apparently, calling
attention to the basic-level, con-
crete category of a metaphor ve-
hicle interferes with its intended
function, that is, to refer to the su-
perordinate category.
If metaphor vehicles do indeed
refer to superordinate categories
and not to their basic-level exem-
plars, then understanding a meta-
phor would be comparable to un-
derstanding any polysemous
utterance. When people under-
stand a polysemous w^ord in con-
text, such as the word bank in the
context of money, then the contex-
tually inappropriate meanings of
the word are irihibited (Simpson &
Kang, 1994). If understanding a
metaphor also involves activating
appropriate meanings and inhibit-
ing inappropriate ones, then un-
derstanding a metaphor should in-
volve inhibiting the basic-level
meaning of the metaphor vehicle.
Gemsbacher, Keysar, and Robert-
son (1995) asked participants to
read either metaphors (e.g., my law-
yer was a shark) or literal statements
(e.g., the hammerhead is a shark) and
then to verify statements related to
the literal meaning of the metaphor
vehicles (e.g., sharks are good swim-
mers). People were much slower to
verify literal-property statements
following metaphors than follow-
ing literal assertions, suggesting
that literal meanings of metaphor
vehicles are, indeed, inhibited dur-
ing metaphor comprehension. My
colleagues and I replicated this
finding and, in addition, demon-
strated that the effect may be due
to active inhibition of irrelevant, lit-
eral meanings, not just to strategic
retrieval strategies (Glucksberg,
Newsome, & Goldvarg, 1997). In
this respect, metaphor comprehen-
sion involves the same comprehen-
sion mechanisms that are used for
comprehension of literal language
(see, e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust,
1991).
CONCLUSION
Our work has enabled us to
draw two major conclusions about
metaphor comprehension. First, it
is not optional. People apprehend
metaphorical mearungs as quickly
and as automatically as they appre-
hend literal meanings. Second,
people understand metaphors ex-
actly as they are intended, as cat-
egorical assertions. In a sense, this
is reassuring. People often mean
what they say and say what they
mean. When I say that my surgeon
was a butcher, in a sense I mean it
literally. I do not mean that my sur-
geon was merely like a butcher, but
that he actually is a member of the
category of people who botch jobs
in reprehensible and often appall-
ing ways.
Published by Cambridge University Press
With continued and repeated
use, once-novel metaphors become
conventionalized; their metaphori-
cal senses become dictionary en-
tries. The term butcher is a case in
point: It can be taken to mean a
meat purveyor, a bungler, or a vi-
cious murderer, depending on the
context. But even though these
mearungs of butcher are now in the
dictionary, they are metaphorical
nonetheless, and are understood as
such by fluent speakers of idiom-
atic American English. The critical
test is that a metaphorical assertion
can be paraphrased in either the
categorical or simile form: X is like a
butcher can be expressed as X is a
butcher with no loss of meaning.
Whether or not such conventional-
ized metaphors are understood via
the same processes as are novel
metaphors remains a controversial
issue (see Gentner & Wolff, 1997),
to be resolved by futtire research.
Acknowledgments—^I am grateful for
research support from the Public Health
Service, Grant No. HD25826-01, and the
National Science Foundation, Grant
Nos. BNS 8519462 and SBR 9712601. I
thank Kay Deaux, Zachary Estes, Genya
Goldvarg, and Mary R. Newsome for
helpful comments on the manuscript.
Note
1. Address correspondence to Sam
Glucksberg, Department of Psychol-
ogy, Princeton University, Princeton,
NJ 08544; e-mail: samg@pucc.princeton.
edu.
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Assessments of Children's Credibility
in Forensic Contexts
Michael E.
Section on Social and Emotional Development, National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development, Bethesda, Maryland
Consider the following hypo-
thetical case. Alarmed that her 11-
year-old daughter arrived home on
foot 4 hr after school ended rather
than on the school bus, Susan an-
grily demanded an explanation.
Rebecca responded that she had
decided to go briefly to a friend's
house, and had then been accosted
by an unfamiliar and strangely be-
having man while walking home.
Under questioning by her mother,
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made lewd advances and at-
tempted to grab hold of her. This
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in terror until she was sure the man
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Recent and continuing increases
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Copyright © 1998 American Psychological Society
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that have been fabricated or imag-
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Recommended Reading ;
Ceci, S.J., & Bmck, M. (1995). Jeop-
ardy in the courtroom: A scientific •
] analysis of children's testimony, i
• Washington, DC: American Psy- '
; chological Association. :
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: Poole, D.A., & Lamb, M.E. (1998). In-
• vestigative interviews of children: A
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