G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014 was 70 years old.
10chanrobleslaw
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing
of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all
instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the
other spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified through
personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through
constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for annulment of
judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul
the judgment of the trial court that granted respondents' decree of
adoption.3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio
(Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is
the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne
Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria
Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag City.
Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was
born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days.
Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities
between them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a
year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if
she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila
during weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged
that Jose had homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained
friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional Trial Court
of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), 8 whom Rosario
alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing of the petition, Jose
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the
trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three
children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report mentioned
that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any
children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth
was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March
1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to
fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate
children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship
and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily
in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his custody since
Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o
opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the
government which was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General." 19 A
certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V. Saguisag, filed
a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing
support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even
went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and
Joanne's knowledge and consent.23She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the
trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Larry's
wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being remiss in
his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always offered
help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina
because they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any of the
falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998
that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because
several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. 26 He then implored
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. 28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's
adoption.29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption
sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked by the trial
court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of their mother,
Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states
the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows
the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. 33 It was further alleged that Jed
and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of
Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. 34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that
the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by [Jose] in
obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of
the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial
court decision that had already attained "finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in
the different sets of birth certificates required the determination of the identities of
the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and
could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment
of judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 10,
2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the
petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its application of
the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment. 40 They argue that because
of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in
the birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial court, 41 they were not
given the opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and misapplied the law
on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice, and non-inclusion of
indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires
the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of
the adopter, and such consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not have been
deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply protected by the
participation and representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized public
prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through publication for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not
only notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption proceedings. 46 They
argue that since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said
to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because
adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
state.48chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action
with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order
or final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or
through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so
easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the
annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1
of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that
ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order
or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored
doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in
the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and
unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that
rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. 51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by
which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be
brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought
before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. 53 Extrinsic fraud, on
the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was
obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption
on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings.
The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of
wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain
the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of
wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of
Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance,
joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose,
however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of
the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she
would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years
old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After being properly counseled
and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption,
the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s)
and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among
the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they
will have to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes, with
another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was
over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent,
therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he
and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the
proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic Act No.
8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not
enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have been
committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is
erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented
from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise
of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within four years
from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of the adoption only
in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by
the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any of the
parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte. 62 Larry and Lilibeth were
residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition
for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his
petition that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home
Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City. 68chanrobleslaw
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure birth
certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent certificates were
procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in
Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at
all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office,
however, show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in
clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in
support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his motivation for
adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were childless, 74 to the prejudice of
their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by
Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from participating in
the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on
the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies" 76 presented
during the trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic
when the other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in the
proceedings when such instrument or testimony was presented in court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just
determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification
and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or
adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of
his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means,
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of
discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and
evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not
preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore,
constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the
fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during the trial.
allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to SO ORDERED.
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial
court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions. Under
Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed
on any person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper
material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the
name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his criminal
liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the status of
adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.
Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552 79 since
rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are
left with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is reason to
believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the love and care of a
father, her parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never even
benefited from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these adversities,
Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the University of the Philippines
College of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These
accomplishments, however, are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is
 G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural
parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this
interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would have to be reached, not
solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but also the hard reality presented by
the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,2 in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB,
"In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano,
petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27,
1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation with alimonypendente lite 3 with the then Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a decision5 approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and
apart or from bed and board." They further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be
entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from
the date of the filing of the complaint. This shall
constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the
house and lot jointly owned by the parties
situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into
any contract or agreement with any person or
persons, natural or juridical without the written
consent of the husband; or any undertaking or
acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent as
the parties are by this agreement legally
separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie
before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the
divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna
Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month8a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines
for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his
children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and
Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie,
filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of
then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed
an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to
support" his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had
been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to
the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a
problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and that her
husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children for the following
reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into
any contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the
United States and had been transferring from one place to another
to avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting
the children while his finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in
conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved
children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire
custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United
States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On January
11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding
that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore,
such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the
Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree
of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of
the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed
Cang, by the petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These
children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano,
Charmaine D. Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano
respectively. Moreover, this Decree of Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same
rights and duties as though they were in fact the
legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents
by nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a
copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed
"close filial ties with the Clavano family,
especially their maternal uncle," petitioner
Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
childless and, with their printing press, real
estate business, export business and gasoline
station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California,
U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna
Marie, nicknamed "Menchu," approved of the
adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal
accident in 1981, and the fact that she could not
provide them a secure and happy future as she
"travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children
moral and spiritual direction as they would go to
church together and had sent the children to
Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their
desire to be adopted by the Clavanos — Keith
had testified and expressed the wish to be
adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger
ones were observed by the court to have
"snuggled" close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on
"a very shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father
of his children" on account of his being "an
improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based
on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother
of his two sons and close friend of Anna Marie,
Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner
lived as husband and wife in the very house of
the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that
were of "comparatively recent dates" were
"attempts at verisimilitude" as these were joint
deposits the authenticity of which could not be
verified.
 (3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility be considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases,
of his reconciliation with Anna Marie was "dim if abandonment connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to
not nil" because it was petitioner who "devised, forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child,
engineered and executed the divorce proceedings or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
at the Nevada Washoe County court." obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.
Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's presence, his
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, care and the opportunity to display voluntary affection. The issue
petitioner "is now an alien from the standpoint of of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first
Philippine laws" and therefore, how his "new error.
attachments and loyalties would sit with his
(Filipino) children is an open question." Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social names. His duty to provide support comes from two judicial
Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows: pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra,
obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is
mandated by the divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his
Court which orders him to pay monthly support of US$50.00 for
children. And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is
each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to show
commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his
compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted
consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann.
22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the children's
[As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed
names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance was on October 6,
not only without the consent of the parent, but even against his
1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support commenced
opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80;
under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6,
Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v.
1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a
Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa,
total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to have been
561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67
made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date, oppositor was
N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439,
woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And
93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20
since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the
L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) 9
inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing
his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in
holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts
by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the
in different banks, as follows —
petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental
authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never
abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the ———— —————— ———— ——————
case study report required by law.
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however 2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
that the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may
 Virginia, U.S.A. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have
3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family
Code.
Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,

Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides —

U.S.A.

Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the

The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
name as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang,
respectively. In other words, the accounts are operated and the
amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
that they belong to the minors. The second is an "or" account, in the age or, over;
names of Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in
the Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the (2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
funds withdrawable by him alone. guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or
any duly licensed child placement agency under
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in whose care the child may be;
his offer of evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better
future and security of his family."10 (3) The natural children, fourteen years and
above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized supplied)
that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was
based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare
United States was borne out by the fact that prior to his departure to the United Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
States, the family lived with petitioner's parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate
the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce. Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. — The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children
was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of
He took exception to the appellate court's findings that as an American citizen he age or over;
could no longer lay claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would
not take away the fact that he "is still a father to his children." As regards his alleged
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal
illicit relationship with another woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil
guardian after receiving counselling and
Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco
appropriate social services from the Ministry of
was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue
Social Services and Development or from a duly
City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu City.
licensed child-placement agency;
Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given
weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose
Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan (3) The Ministry of Social Services and
City to convince her to be a witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner Development or any duly licensed child-
averred that it would be hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the placement agency under whose care and legal
children much more than he could. 11 custody the child may be;
 (4) The natural children, fourteen years and
above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of
the court. 12 As such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on
September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family
Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of
the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As
amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now
reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall
be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age
or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten
years of age or over, of the adopting parent or
parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or
over, of the adopting parents, if living with said
parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or
to be adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to
the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years
of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if
any, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if the child is
in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate
and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the
adoption shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent
has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of
the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance
with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thus, the Court declared:
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently
applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important
that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its
parents, which may give information to those interested, than that
it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is
generally held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it
substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts
necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 14
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to
the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.
Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors
for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V.
CLAVANO, has given her express consent to this adoption, as
shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written
consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page 2 of
this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang,
had already left his wife and children and had already divorced the
former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the DECREE OF
DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada,
U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not
long after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an
illegal immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under
which our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written
consent to the adoption of their minor children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his
consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the
oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However, although this Court is
not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of
the lower courts if it that these do not conform to the evidence on record. 19
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children,
thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or
renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a
ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he
was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:
1. Exh. 1 — a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie)
addressed to "Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp.
stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had been "a long time
since the last time you've heard from me excluding that of the
phone conversation we've had." She discussed petitioner's intention
to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks
that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the
"last phone conversation" she had with petitioner on the birthday of
"Ma," she forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he
had become a "bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent
him Valentine's cards. She told him how Charmaine had become
quite a talkative "almost dalaga" who could carry on a conversation
with her angkong and how pretty she was in white dress when she
won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after she had
prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was
worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as
she loved clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told
petitioner that the boy was smart for his age and "quite spoiled"
being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton was
mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep
anytime. She admitted having said so much about the children-
because they might not have informed petitioner of "some
happenings and spices of life" about themselves. She said that it
was "just very exciting to know how they've grown up and very
pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters." She
ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at the best of
health." After extending her regards "to all," she signed her name
after the word "Love." This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from
Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson,
West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 — letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden
print of "a note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie
stated that "we" wrote to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith
and Joeton were very excited when petitioner "called up last time."
She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from Keith just so
petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who
was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioner's call
because she also wanted something that petitioner should buy.
Menchu told petitioner that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener,
light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts and a (k)nap sack.
Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up and
so were their needs. She told petitioner to be "very fatherly" about
the children's needs because those were expensive here. For herself,
Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue
magazines and that whatever expenses he would incur, she would
"replace" these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that Keith
wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 — an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that
reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful
one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to be
thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.
4. Exh. 4 — a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose
Clavano, Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that
they tried to tell their mother "to stay for a little while, just a few
weeks after classes start(s)" on June 16. He informed petitioner that
Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the motorbike, he had
told his mother to write petitioner about it and "we'll see what
you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for chocolates, nuts,
basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some
clothes for outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they had
been going to Labug with their mother picking them up
after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her
aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or
10:00 o'clock in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the best
of health" and that they prayed for him and their other relatives.
The letter was ended with "Love Keith."
5. Exh. 5 — another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his
father for the Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and
the "card of Joeton with $5.00 inside." He told petitioner the
amounts following his father's instructions and promise to send
money through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter
directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season —
that they enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their
mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule and that their
mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold
their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that
Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also
smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother
was leaving for the United States on February 5, they would be
missing her like
S they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
"things" and i $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about
Joeton like hen would make the sign of the cross even when they
would pass by c the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
Aquino was enot dead because he had seen him on the betamax
machine. For rKeith, Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was
not always satisfied
e with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of
surprises. Hel ended the letter with "Love your son, Keith." The
letter was mailed
y on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
,
6. Exh. 6 — an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for
the bathing suit, key M chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil
sharpener and $50.00.e She reminded him of her birthday on
January 23 when she would
n turn 9 years old. She informed him that
she wore size 10 and the
c size of her feet was IM. They had fun at
Christmas in Lahug but h classes would start on January 9 although
Keith's classes had started
u on January 6. They would feel sad again
because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner
would keep writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 — an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner
that they had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed
him of their trip to Manila — they went to Malacañang, Tito Doy
Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the executive house,
Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed him
that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had
excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon
and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked
for his "reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton.
He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told
petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them.
He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added
that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 — a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently
written by the latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy
something for the school and "something else." She, promised not
to spend so much and to save some. She said she loved petitioner
and missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner. After ending the
letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her prize
for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 — undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he
had been writing him; that he would like to have some money but
he would save them; that he learned that petitioner had called them
up but he was not around; that he would be going to Manila but
would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar boy."
He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 — Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He
told petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was
proud because he was the only one in his group who saved in the
bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty and would
claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a
pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he
was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would
drive for his group. He asked him to call them often like the father
of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they
could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown
bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the
letter that had taken him so long to write because he did not want
to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume
(Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter
should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 — a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated
October 8, 1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 — another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the
year '83 written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page,
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 — a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written
him even when their Mom "was there" where she bought them
clothes and shoes. Keith asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his
mother would not agree to buy him a motorbike, he wanted a
Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed petitioner
that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their
grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence.
Keith wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He
expressed his desire that petitioner would come and visit them
someday.
14. Exh. 14 — a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing
the date January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received
the package that the latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however,
fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and Joeton who had both
grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more clothes.
He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress
to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make her
look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and
that he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the
grocery even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited
amounts for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by
petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the
courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial
support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his
family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent
to his children and the fact that, as regards the bank deposits, these were
"withdrawable by him alone." Simply put, the courts below attached a high premium
to the prospective adopters' financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the
children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However,
his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by
his feelings towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all
farfetched to conclude that Keith's testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the
petition for adoption that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young
mind as to the capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the children.
This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children
were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young
ones' act of snuggling close to private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative
of their emotional detachment from their father. Private respondents, being the uncle
and aunt of the children, could not but come to their succor when they needed help
as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted
to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material
comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court
awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere
secretary and market vendor instead of to his affluent father who was a married man,
not solely because the child opted to go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that
private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is
enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is
able to support her children according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to
award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having
deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender,
imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent
and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity
of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice
due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be
able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her
sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of
her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If
the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster
parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and
appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with
regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they
committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and
their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the
cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations
with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and
blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the welfare
and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into
account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the
father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at
least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a, result of her character being made a
key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best
interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody.
One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the
other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be
the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs
of the child. 30 The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his
family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the
material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be
proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he received
from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could
cater to their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their
daily activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioner's
"meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had
in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why
the children were subjected to the process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven
ties that bound them to their father. To our consternation, the record of the case bears
out the fact that the welfare of the children was not exactly the "paramount
consideration" that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally
hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter
of convenience for her because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of
supporting her children. 31 In his testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that
Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and came home twice or three
times, 32 thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her children to
the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when
he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the
situation worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the
family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective
adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However, because he had children of
his own, the family decided to devolve the task upon private respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and
Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight
stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he could "take care
of the children while their parents are away," 35 thereby indicating the evanescence of
his intention. He wanted to have the children's surname changed to Clavano for the
reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult for
them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also
testified that he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken
home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his
sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that
they just wanted to keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding
considerations for the adoption was allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health — she
was a victim of an almost fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However,
she herself admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still
take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically care for
them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles 38 — she could
not have been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the
Clavanos' attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed
from their notion that he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed
fear that her children would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and
father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40 As to whether he was telling the truth is beside
the point. Philippine society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside
from being Catholic in orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part
of a family man, considering the baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his
family. Neither may the Court place a premium on the inability of a man to
distinguish between siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality
that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis
for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. 41 Conventional
wisdom and common human experience show that a "bad" husband does not
necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not,
strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to
parental authority over the children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and
concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the
lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after
learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the
United States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the
agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien
in the United States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment.
Private respondents failed to refute petitioner's testimony that he did not receive his
share from the sale of the conjugal home, 45 pursuant to their
manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. Hence, it can be
reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his
family, particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is
ample evidence to show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement
with his wife and sent his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it
carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of
the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration
is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its
proper context and perspective. The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the
natural rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which
became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents'
counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as
a result of the legal separation was "all embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving
her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong
premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into agreements
leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis
as private respondents' apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing
away with petitioner's consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of
legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of parental authority for the
purpose of placing the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code
states: ". . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised
by the parent designated by the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into
account "all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the
"exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse
shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The
innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right
to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education,
health and religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise
of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental authority,
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them
in their custody and company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely
deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie
in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court
on the basis of the agreement of the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a
compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner
was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his
children or that there are grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental
authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer
of custody over the children from Anna Marie back to petitioner. The order was not
implemented because of Anna Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The
Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner,
such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for
a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the
instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his
children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of
parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a
valid decree of adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has
demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's
abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to
non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled
in Tenchavez v. Escaño 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the
effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to
State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who
has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, 57 a case
involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court
expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty,
to care for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard
their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility
may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced
by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection
for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings
invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow
this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has
been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on
the need of childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a child who
needs the love and care of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code and the Family Code, the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic
adoption of Filipino children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the
following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
 (a) To ensure that every child remains under the
care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be
provided with love, care, understanding and
security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and
adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary
separation from his/her biological parent(s). 62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with
its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the following provisions:
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are
now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority.
For sure, they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their
parents. This is not to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for
their welfare and best interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of
the time that the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it
was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts
of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of

parents . . . to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the
exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention. 63

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated
from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary
to the child's best interests. 64

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right
to maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances
personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . 65

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 66

Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic
statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should
be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in
derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority
over him. The rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent
possible.
 G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the
Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
"Balalong," respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the
document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its
subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by
extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution
dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it
being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged
Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is
AFFIRMED in toto.2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of
[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract"
excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said
Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of
the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of
injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son
of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose
Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene
therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son
and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a
complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning
appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and
deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of
deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,
Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the
original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document
was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence
a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil
registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that
there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record
existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely
placed his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16
September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn
Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day
before the alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975
attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for
five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the
trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was logically "not
genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;
3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the
circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr.
Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And as
admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly
acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since
he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin Molina" who signed on
top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim
that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage
Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported
marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church
where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in
Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein
Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of
Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's
signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of
Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the
facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he
was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was
suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the
authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI
Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature.
He pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
"standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature,
appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui
who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive
of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report,
Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious
habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics
between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the
signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting
the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the
findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and
non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be
set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses
and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be
established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of
the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3)
copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also,
appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
original document.
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya
in the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro
Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya
in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was
subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates
the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis,
the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a
relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness
of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court
will not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial
court in determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably
supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight
and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts
were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might
vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would
warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established
by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)
Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this
Court.6
The Issues
In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob
and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.
Jacob.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption
has not been sufficiently established.
First Issue:
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable
one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental
distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob
and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a
marriage ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because
the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and
petitioner.11Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not
require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. 12 The Civil Code
governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took
place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses." 13 Upon a showing that the
document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the
part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1)
excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and
(2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b)
documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had
solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop
of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at
the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
authorization issued by the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino — ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and
(d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence
of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not
be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible.
Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence
of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the
contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.
Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if
at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the
most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue
by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties;
or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.18 The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who
[knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost." 19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party
to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract
were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. 20 Even if
we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage
contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union
between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
 Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as
an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote
ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We
reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the
marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place. 25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining
to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the
National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for
petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage. 27 On both
counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy
of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. 28 In the
second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate
to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer. 29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they
would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 32 Given the undisputed, even
accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 we
find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the
signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of
Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular
performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of
respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . " 35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great
weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a
testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was
Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two
expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an
exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions
under Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the
questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert
witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial
court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge
Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that
the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember
whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof: 39
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A: I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony
out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's
statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in
the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
 A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.40
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of
what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent
exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please
recall whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the
signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the
signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the
name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it
was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the
request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we
find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the
Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your
examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the
difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital
letter "J".43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been
sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even
by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. 44
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order
was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya
declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he
made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was
always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not
contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and
other acts that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented
that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of
Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances
inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented
by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa
Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared
VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED
NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - With regard to the second
assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and
the trial court erred in granting private respondents prayer for the correction of
the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court
thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this- case and because its
provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or
effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable
only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. This case
falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to implement
which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 - covers those
harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled. Thus, in Yu v. Republic (21 SCRA 1018 [1967]) it was held that to
change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel
i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic (168 SCRA 294 [1988]) it was held that the
change of petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate. Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE CIVIL REGISTRAR AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND TO GIVE NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF
THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY RENDERS THE
PROCEEDING OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID; CASE AT BAR. -
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding.He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given
notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of-an indispensable party
in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for correction
of entry published as required by Rule 108, 4 which reads: 4. Notice and
publication. - Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. While there was notice given by publication
in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with
Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was
stated. Nothing was, mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in
the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar -was thus
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The
necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an
indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as
to party and as to the subject matter.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Encarnacion, De Guzman & Associates Law Office for respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch XVI
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private respondents petition for
the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minors first
name Midael to Michael.
The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B.
Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married on
January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private respondents prayed that judgement be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by
service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the
Office of the Solicitor General.
 The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of
the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that although the correction
sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because
the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondents Zenaida
Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor testified. Also
presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor, being of the opinion that the
same was in the best interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the
opposition of the Solicitor General. on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies only to the
correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited Rule 108, 1, which
provides that any person interested in an act, event, order or decree concerning the
civil status of the persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto. It held
that the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated
in Rule 108, 2 as entries subject to cancellation or correction. According to the trial
court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and
declaring that:
1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by
adoption of petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minors name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his
original name of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his
record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is
hereby directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate,
of said minor; and
4. This judgement shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of
the herein petition.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot be affected in the same proceeding for
adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the Case for adoption because in the notice published in the
newspaper, the name given was Michael, instead of Midael, which is the name of the
minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23,1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic,[2] invoked by the
petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case, was inapplicable because that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial
court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of
name would entail additional time and expenses for them as. well as for the
Government and the Courts.
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to comment.
Despite opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
the private respondents petition for adoption. Petitioners contention is that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because the notice by
publication did not state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the
ruling in Cruz v. Republic.[3] There the petition for adoption and the notice published
in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of
her name in the record of birth (Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that this was a
substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed there
was a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a
different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of
the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the
substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears as Midael as given
name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a
plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael
C Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been
served by publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption
of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of
the trial court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both
the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents prayer
for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies
to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and
without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to
the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, 2 plainly
states:
2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it has been
the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to implement which
Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers those harmless and
innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled. [4] Thus,
in Yu vs. Republic[5] it was held that to change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves
the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely
to the righting of a clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[6] it was held that the
change of petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an
indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of
entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry
was concered, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the
subject matter.[9]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the
local civil registrar to change the name MIDAEL to MICHAEL in the birth certificate
of the child. In other respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule provides:

3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,

the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the

proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of
the case can be had.[7] As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of
the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the
correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indenpensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all the proceeding subsequent to the filling of the complaint including the
judgment.[8]

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by
Rule 108, 4 which reads:

4. Notice and publication. - Upon filling of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the
prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition
the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil
registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be
heard.
 G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S.
REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners,
vs.
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 August 2006
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July 1998 and Resolution
dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo,
Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527)
square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the
name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was
adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos,
Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her
alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio
(Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May
1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements
consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other
permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful
means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan
dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the
same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that
Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took
undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other
handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents
from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the
Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded
payment of damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract
executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.3
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents.
He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based on the
former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy
agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained
that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the
Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover,
Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the
Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the
principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which
jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no
legal personality to file the present suit. 4
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial
Adjudicator5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada,
being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and order is
hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff
Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.6
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB, namely: (1)
Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties; and (2) whether or not
the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB held
that the Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses
Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject
property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
"obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding
tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of
Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared
the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial
Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a contract. 7
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on 28
September 2004.8
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution regarding the
status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died
during the pendency of the case.9 On 10 August 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It sustained the factual findings of the
DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes
and the nullity of the Kasunduan.10
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no tenancy
relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and Susana in 1993
giving the former the right to occupy and cultivate the subject property is
unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into without his knowledge and
consent. Eugenio further asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio
with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed between the
parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being agricultural.
Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into between him and
Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was
voluntarily entered into and the contents thereof were mutually understood by the
parties.11
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for failure to
show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its challenged decision
and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as factual. However, upon
filing of a motion for reconsideration by Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition
and required respondent Leonida to comment on the petition.12
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of facts.13
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be
raised.14 Absent any of the obtaining exceptions15 to this rule, the findings of facts of
the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and
the Mauricio’s came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that the
Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein Defendant-Appeallant. A
perusal of Exhibit "H" which is the Tax Declaration of the property in controversy
proves that upon the death of the parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was
the subject matter of their extra-judicial partition/settlement and this property was
initially under the ownership of the appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes
until the same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-
Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the Mauricios are really the
tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the Leasehold Contract with
Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and to prove that she (Susana
Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x
x. The "Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy relationship
began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further
revised.16
This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of tenancy.
Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since 1936 until
his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan dated 26 May
1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy
over the subject land. On the other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and
presented another Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28 September
1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter allegedly
agreed to vacate the subject premises in exchange of monetary considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its disquisition, the
DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
x x x Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the transcript of the
testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board is convinced that indeed
the purpose of the document was to eject her from the farmholding but that Librada
Mauricio wanted to return the money she received because the contents of the
document was never explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read or write.
This Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies
that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary
Public was not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity of the contents
of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio
had really understood the contents thereof. This Board further adheres to the
principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses
with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar,
had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio
while testifying on the circumstances relevant to the execution of the alleged
"Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in all contractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of
his moral dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap, the courts
(and in the case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New
Civil Code). In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old
who can neither read nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her
thumbmark.17
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court,
we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB
and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the
witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our
conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship
cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract;
or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. Section
9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished
by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant,
but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work
the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the
contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does not of
themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the
tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his
rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period,
etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding,
the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted
to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by
Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the
death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida
is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir. 18
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot
collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. 19
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. 20 Well-known civilista
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries
and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral
issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband
or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the
action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 22 the Court
stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. 23
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida
from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’
cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2that her mother
is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her
mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as
an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate
the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further
holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant
to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by
her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name
as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted
child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3)
the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the
benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her
mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
"Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if
any, will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both
of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents
for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a
previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as ‘Mrs.’
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name –
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their
Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. In the
Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of
the surname and that of the child because the father’s surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the father’s
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but
that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the
father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article
364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname
is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family
name is Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames
since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate
children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they
even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use
of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname
of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child –
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also
as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21 of the Family Code
and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname
it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately "GARCIA" as her middle name.
precede the surname of the father.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her decree of adoption.
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It
is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24, Article V of RA SO ORDERED.
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from
her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal
happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle
name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will
also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests
and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law." 28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking
to set aside the Decision1 dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of
Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23
June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children
to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children 2 were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His
date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records
and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty 5 given
under Republic Act No. 85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth
of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption
of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months
old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was
denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled
that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III
of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice
was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as
residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even
made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is
merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint
adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not
petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the
duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the
child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary
in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the
adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines
for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee
to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. 12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply
being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity
to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s
country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is
untenable.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give
adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness
and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and
well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent
shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints
another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption,
thus:
ARTICLE
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled
in Republic v. Vergara:24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must
also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact
V that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-
spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and
support in keeping with the means of the family.
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of
his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner
and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage.
Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint
adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September

2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio
A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving
his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June 2008, she
engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted,
and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if
she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter.
Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would
use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana ₱100,000.00, in installment: (a)
₱10,000.00 on 10 September 2008; (b) ₱50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) ₱40,000.00
on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already
filed the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further
informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently,
Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos,
Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana
claimed that her presence was no longer necessary because the hearing was only
jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the
status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition
filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and
sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said
that he would deduct the filing fee worth ₱12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee
should not be deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter,
Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 from Sampana,
but the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C.
Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer
to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties
were directed to submit their position papers.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, 5 Sampana argued that
Nery’s allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana
admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of
marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed
adoption because of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but
Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter
would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien]
could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including
the marriage contracts and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from
the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract,
but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption
but did not file it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment
case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have
overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the
amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana
guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for
adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus,
Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension
from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera’s report and recommendation, as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a petition for adoption and
made complainant believe that he filed the petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months and ORDERED
to RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice. 7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the
penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the dutyof fidelity to the client’s cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer
deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.9 A
lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and
fair.10Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
thatmay come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both
cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to
file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to
his client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the
petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested
to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended
adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of
the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.11
overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted tohim. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s
mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of
the public confidence in the legal profession.12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v.
Sampana,13 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale
of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal
service after receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper
to increase the penalty for Sampana’s malpractice and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for
THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to
complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per
annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed
Nery of the status of the petition.1âwphi1He then conceded that the annulment case
 G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17,
2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No.
SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS)
[Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the
deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As
such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. 4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a
letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are
no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground
she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather,
petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7 in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the
agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate
parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the
latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested
her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the
adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal
parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to
file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein
appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied
by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
 I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving
due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the
covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus,
entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death
benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not
proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the
ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally
adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant
[petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such,
is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased.
Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social
Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit
legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father
since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of
evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already
passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death
benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this
regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided,
that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o
approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement
of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision
as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and
determined atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of
the employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged
natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not
over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority;
Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child
 shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no
other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from
the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for
regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or
over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable
of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital
or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no
longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As
held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and,
consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates
from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor
Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this
point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or
to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must
always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents"
to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this
Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should
beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a
general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not
make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule
ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin
a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles
1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces
not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless
the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which
as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-
quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general
sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate
or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of
support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not
intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk
of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents
and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it
would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner
by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or
parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in
contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to
the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as
worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation
cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires
isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that
limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented.
We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to
warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale
behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate,
and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure
adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better
served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV,
Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the
ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death
benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority.
Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up
John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate
parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled
under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was
made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries
in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents,
and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner
can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key
detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive
parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor,
at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted
in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 22 (RA 8552),
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted,
the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of
custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s
parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, 23 justifies the retention of vested
rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was
enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant
petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies
behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of
the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his
or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a
time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as
in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to
perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents
are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances,
are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed
by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary
rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants,
his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal
heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the
care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of
petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on
John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it
appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her
late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since
she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she
consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John
repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In
fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in
the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel
boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim
before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it
can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John,
petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one
roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries
for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While
RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly
allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member
unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently,
the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the
restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively
made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis.
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to
a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.