THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALDECOA AND COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS The Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the CFI of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging that the
defendant, a mercantile copartnership company with a branch office in Surigao, continues to operate as such mercantile
copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa & Co.,; that the said defendant, knowing that it had no title or right
whatever to two adjoining parcels of land has been occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years, more or less, having
constructed on the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and built warehouses of light material for the storage of coal — all
for its exclusive use and benefit. These lands, situated in Surigao, belonged to the late Spanish Government in the Philippines
and are now the property of the Government of the United States and were placed under the control of the Insular
Government Since the year 1901, the defendant has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in representation of
the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the same and to deliver to it the said property, and
that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co. agreed to return the land, but that later, after several delays, it concluded by
persisting in its attempt illegally to continue occupying the said land and refused to return it to the Insular Government. The
defendant alleged that it held and possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the lands claimed by the
plaintiff. CFI rendered judgment and found that the land in question was public land and belonged to the State, and ordered the
defendant to return it to the plaintiff.

ISSUE Whether the subject lands as claimed by the defendant is a part of the public dominion.

RULING Yes. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the State, inasmuch as at the
present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land formed by the action of the sea. On the
supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced to occupy the land and shore herein concerned, prior to the enforcement of the
Civil Code in these Islands, it is unquestionable that the issue must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Law
of Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the shores, as well as the lands united thereto by the accretions and alluvium
deposits produced by the action of the sea, are of the public use and domain. All this said land, together with the adjacent
shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for public uses. Thus, the defendant, in construction on the two
aforementioned parcels of land a retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for the storage of coal, for its
exclusive use and benefit, did all this without due and competent authority and has been illegally occupying the land since
1901. Aldecoa & Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of the two united parcels, belonged to them in fee simple,
on account of their having begun to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then politico-military governor of Surigao. The
said permit was a verbal authorization to occupy the land on condition that the defendant should later on prepare title deeds
thereto, and that this authorization was granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and benefiting the merchants of
Surigao, in view of the backward condition of things in those regions at the time. It is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did
not obtain or solicit permission from the Government to establish themselves there and erect thereon their buildings and
works, nor did they endeavor to obtain any title of ownership to the said land. Defendant has not proven that it obtained for
itself, in conformity with the provisions of the said Law of Waters. The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on
December 7, 1889, confirms the provisions of the said Law of Waters. The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while
they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons,
remain a part of the public domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State.
Inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the
provision of the Civil Code. The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of the
Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which they now claim to be the owners.
Wherefore, the occupation or possession which the allege they hold is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no
protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession.

Cristobal v Melchor

Facts: Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office. He is a third grade civil service
eligible. On Jan 1962, then Executive Secretary Mutuc informed him that his services were terminated effective that day. Similar
letters were addressed to some other employees in said Office. The dismissed employees appealed to the President for a
reconsideration of their separation from the service. But Sec. Mutuc denied their request. Thus, five of the other employees
filed a civil action before the CFI. This case was entitled " Ingles v Mutuc". The said reached the SC w/c declared that the 5
employees’ removal as illegal, ordering their reinstatement. But it is worth mentioning that when the said civil case was still
pending in the CFI, the other 5 dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the
President, without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who were not
reinstated, efforts were exerted by Sec Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañang so that they may be re-employed.
Cristobal was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications.
He waited for Sec Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until Sec. Mutuc was replaced by
other executive secretaries who likewise assured him of assistance to be reemployed at "the opportune time." So after the SC
decided the case of Ingles v Mutuc, Cristobal addressed the Office of the President, requesting reinstatement to his former
position, in accordance with the decision of the SC in the aforementioned case. This request, however, was denied repeatedly.
Hence, he filed a complaint in the CFI. Answering the complaint, the defendants represented by the Office of the SolGen alleged
that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper
proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he
having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation. The CFI
dismissed his complaint thus this appeal to the SC.

Issue

1. WON his dismissal was illegal?

2. WON he was barred by laches for having failed to file his complaint within the one-year period provided for in Sec 16, Rule 66
of the Rules of Court?

Held & Rationale

1. Yes. In the case of Ingles, it was clarified that positions primarily confidential in nature are subject to the removal at the
pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of
the appointing power and when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" but his
term merely "expires”.

In this casem Cristobal, is a civil service eligible with eight (8) years of service in the government. He was Private Secretary with
annual compensation of P4,188.00. No evidence was adduced by the government to show that Cristobal's position was
"primarily confidential". As stated in the case of Ingles, "officers or employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in the
classified service" are protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution). In this case, there was no
cause for his removal.

2. Yes. The circumstances surrounding this particular case shows that: (a) Jose Cristobal consistently pressed for a
reconsideration of his separation from the service; (b) he was give n assurance that would be recalled at the opportune time;
and (c) that he sudden termination of his employment without cause after eight years of service in the government is contrary
to law following the ruling Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the benefit of Cristobal who is similarly situated as the plaintiffs in
said case and who merely desisted from joining the suit because of the assurance given him that he would be recalled to the
service - with all these factors, We repeat, there is justification for not applying existing jurisprudence to his case.

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law, but rather its action should
conform to the conditions or exigencies to a given problem or situation in order to grant a relief that will serve the ends of
justice.

6. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS,
Petitioners

-versus-
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents

G.R. No. 179334 July 01, 2013

By Grace

Facts:

Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 7,268 square meters
located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43006 of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the owners’
consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.

In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land.
Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of DPWH, offered to pay the
subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the
current fair market value.

As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject parcel of land and that they be paid attorney’s fees.

Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the suit is
against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents
have no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation,
they should be paid only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941.

On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of state immunity from suit.

The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and consequently remanded the case to the trial court for the
purpose of determining the just compensation because the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable and the
recovery of compensation is the only relief available. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner.

The trial proceeded in the RTC with the Branch Clerk of Court appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the Chairman
of the Committee that would determine just compensation.

Later the case was referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation report on the value of the subject property.
The PAC recommended the amount of P1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property per PAC
Resolution No. 99- 007 dated December 19, 2001.

On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision directing DPWH to pay the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P1,500.00) per square meter for the subject lot in accordance with PAC Resolution.

The CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation stated above should earn interest of six
percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on March 17, 1995 until full payment.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting just compensation to respondents considering the highly
dubious and questionable circumstances of their alleged ownership of the subject property.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in awarding just compensation to respondents because their complaint for
recovery of possession and damages is already barred by prescription and laches.

3. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court’s decision ordering the payment of just
compensation based on the current market value of the alleged property of respondents.

Held :

It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the
possession of their property.

Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use. There is a
long-standing rule that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.

For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have
waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation.

Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell fixed as of the
date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the proceedings. The owner of private property should be compensated
only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. The fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was
P0.70/square meter. Hence, it should therefore be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher
value which is P1,500.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified. The
valuation of the subject property owned by respondents shall be P0.70 instead of Pl,500.00 per square meter, with interest at
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.

[G.R. No. 131803. April 14, 1999]

SOTERA PAULINO MARCELO, GABRIELA M. ANGELES, SIMEONA CUENCO, EMILIA MARCELO and RUBEN MARCELO,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FERNANDO CRUZ and SERVANDO FLORES,respondents.

DECISION

The reversal of the 28th November 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals setting aside that of the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”), Branch 19, of Malolos, Bulacan, is sought in this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners seek the reinstatement of
the RTC decision which has ordered respondents Fernando Cruz and Servando Flores to return the ownership and possession of
a portion of unregistered and untitled land located in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan, to herein petitioners.

It would appear that on 06 October 1982, herein petitioners, heirs of the deceased Jose Marcelo, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, an action for the recovery of a portion of unregistered land in Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan. The
complaint, later amended on 12 October 1983, averred that two parcels of land in Sta. Lucia, declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declarations No. 2880 and No. 2882, owned by the late Jose Marcelo and his spouse, Sotera Paulino-Marcelo, had
been encroached, to the extent of 7,540[2] square meters thereof, by respondents Fernando Cruz and Servando Flores.

In their answer, respondent Cruz and Flores denied the allegations of petitioners, assailing at the same time the jurisdiction of
the trial court to act on the complaint which, it was claimed, had effectively asserted a cause of action for ejectment (unlawful
detainer).
The appellate court adopted the summary of evidence made by the trial court; thus:

“Evidence adduced by the plaintiffs through the testimony of plaintiff Gabriela Angeles showed that the parcel of land subject
of litigation covering Lot 3098 and embraced under Tax Declaration No. 2882 (Exh. A) was originally owned by spouses Jose
Marcelo and Sotera Paulino and they had been in continuous possession of said property since 1939. Following the death of
plaintiff’s father in 1965, they discovered in 1967 that a portion of said property had been encroached by defendant Fernando
Cruz. Plaintiffs caused the relocation survey of said property and per plan of Lot 3096 and Lot 3098 of the Angat Cadastre as
surveyed for the heirs of Jose Marcelo (Exh. B), 7540 square meters of Lot 3098 had been encroached by defendant Fernando
Cruz as indicated in the shaded portion of said plan (Exh. B-1).

“Defendant Fernando Cruz sold his property with an area of 13,856 square meters to defendant Servando Flores pursuant to a
deed of sale (Kasulatan ng Bilihan) dated November 3, 1968 (Exh. C) which sale, includes the encroached portion (7,540 square
meters of plaintiffs’ property) Defendant Fernando Cruz heretofore purchased the said property from Engracia dela Cruz and
Vicente Marta and Florentino all surnamed Sarmiento, pursuant to a ‘Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang
Patulayan’ dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D) covering an area of 6,000 square meters. The Tax Declaration No. 4482 (Exh. E)
covering the property in the name of Jorge Sarmiento and Engracia Cruz covered an area of 6,800[3] square meters. As soon as
the said property was sold to Fernando Cruz, the adjoining property described and classified as ‘parang’ with an area of 7,856
square meters was declared by said Fernando Cruz in his name which circumstance, increased his landholding to 13,856 square
meters (Exh. F). The said property was subsequently sold by defendant Fernando Cruz to defendant Servando Flores.

“According to Gabriela, they attempted to cultivate the disputed portion sometime in 1968, but were barred from doing so by
defendant Servando Flores who claimed that the area was part of the land he bought from co-defendant Fernando Cruz.

“On the other hand, both defendants testified to refute plaintiffs’ evidence. They invariably declared that the portion sought to
be recovered by plaintiffs is part of the land which defendant Fernando Cruz acquired in 1960 from the Heirs of Jorge
Sarmiento; that as stated in their document (Exh 2), the land sold to defendant Fernando Cruz contained 6,000 square meters
of ‘palayero’ or riceland and 7,856 square meters of ‘parang’ or pasture land; that defendant Fernando Cruz caused the entire
parcel to be surveyed sometime in 1967 (Exhs. 3 & 4), which he then declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
8505 (Exh. F); that on November 3, 1968 defendant Fernando Cruz sold the whole lot to defendant Servando Flores (Exh. I),
who thereupon occupied and cultivated it.”[4]

Evaluating the evidence of the contending parties, the trial court found and ratiocinated:

“The crux of the matter at issue apparently resolves on the so-called pasture land (parang) supposedly sold by the Sarmientos
and Engracia de la Cruz to defendant Fernando Cruz. The said 'parang' was never included and/or embraced in the Tax
Declaration No. 4882 (Exh. E) of the Sarmientos at the time of the said sale in favor of defendant Fernando Cruz pursuant to an
extrajudicial partition with sale dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D). This is evident as indicated by the fact that the same was
only declared by Fernando Cruz in his name in 1961 as evidenced by the tax declaration issued in his favor (Exh. F). On the
other hand, the said ‘parang’ is a part and parcel of plaintiffs’ property to which they had been in possession thereof prior to
World War II and evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 2882 (Exh. A). The plan of Lot 3096 and Lot 3098 of the Angat Cadastre
(Exhs. B and B-1) inevitably indicated that what has been encroached by defendants refers to the ‘parang’ of 7,540 square
meters which defendant Fernando Cruz declared the same in his name in 1961. This explains the unnecessary increase of his
property from 6,000 square meters which he purchased from the Sarmientos pursuant to extrajudicial partition with sale and
embraced under Tax Declaration No. 4882 (Exh. E), to 13,856 square meters.”[5]

The trial court thereupon ruled in favor of petitioners; the dispositive portion of its decision concluded:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants ordering the following:

“a. To return the ownership and possession of 7,540 square meters to the plaintiffs as indicated in the relocation survey plan;
and

“b To pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00;

“No actual and/or moral damages (sic) is awarded for lack of factual evidence.

“The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of factual and/or legal basis.”[6]

Respondents Cruz and Flores went to the Court of Appeals; in its now assailed decision, the appellate court reversed the
judgment of the court a quo. Petitioners moved for a consideration; the motion, however, was denied.

In this latest recourse, petitioners assail the holding of the Court of Appeals that the action initiated in 1982 by petitioners
against respondent Flores would not prosper on the theory that Flores already has acquired ownership of the disputed land by
ordinary acquisitive prescription. Petitioners argue that –

“1. The respondent court erred in not applying the doctrine laid down by this Honorable Court in Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 105
considering that respondents never acquired the 7,540 square meters lawfully, as the respondent court already stated that
what was sold to respondent Cruz was the 6,800 square meters which he then sold to respondent Flores, hence respondents
can not account as to how they acquire said lot, whereas the petitioner proved the 7,540 square meters formed part of 19,231
square meters of their parents in their possession since 1939.

“2. The respondent court erred in disregarding the findings of facts of the trial court, and substitute its own perception of the
facts contrary to the incontrovertible evidence.”[7]

Petitioners assert that the property sold by the Sarmientos to respondent Cruz on 19 November 1960, under a “Kasulatan ng
Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan,” covers only the “palayero” or riceland, which measure about 6,000
square meters, and that the “parang,” containing 7,856 square meters, has not been included.

The petition must be denied.

Contrary to the insistence of petitioners, the “Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan.” executed
on 19 March 1960 by Engracia dela Cruz (widow of Jorge Sarmiento) and her children Vicente Sarmiento, Maria Sarmiento and
Florentino Sarmiento, pertained not only to the “palayero” but also to the “parang” as well; this agreement provided thus:

“1. Na akong si Engracia de la Cruz at ang aking yumao ng asawang si Jorge Sarmiento (nuong nabubuhay ito) ay nakapagpundar
ng isang lupa na ang buong description ay gaya ng sumusunod:

“Isang parselang lupang PALAYERO na may kasamang PARANG (Cogonales) na matatagpuan sa Barrio Ng Santa Lucia, Angat,
Bulacan, P.I.

“Ang Palayero ay may sukat na 6,000 metros cuadrados, klasipikado 2-b, amillarado P270.00 Tax No. 4482; at ang parang ay
may sukat na 7,856 metros cuadrados. Humahangga sa Norte, kay Antonio de la Rosa; Este, kina Fabian Garcia at Juan
Geronimo; Sur, Kina Miguel Illescas, Ciriaco Reyes, y Juan de la Cruz; Oeste, Juan de la Cruz hoy Jose Marcelo y Mariano de la
Cruz hoy Felip de Leon. Walang mejoras at ang hangganan sa paligid ay makikilala sa pamamagitan ng matutuwid na sikang o
pilapil na buhay.

“2. Ayon sa Tax No. 4482 ay lupang palayero lamang ang nakatala, subalit ito’y mayroong kasamang parang na hindi lamang
naipatala niyang nakaraang pasukan ng lupa sa tanggapan ng Assessor Provincial, kaya’t ngayon ay magalang naming hinihiling
na matala ang naturang parang.”[8] (Emphasis supplied)

Shortly after the execution of the deed of sale in his favor, respondent Cruz declared both parcels, i.e., the palayero and the
parang, for taxation purposes in 1960 in the Office of the Provincial Assessor and forthwith a new tax declaration was issued in
his name for the entire 13,856 square meter property. The trial court itself likewise found that the sale by the Sarmientos to
respondent Cruz covered both the riceland and the pasture land; it said:

“x x x. It is worthy to note that the ownership of the adjoining property by defendant Fernando Cruz originated from an
extrajudicial partition with sale (Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang Patuluyan dated November 19, 1960 x
x x. Under the said document, Engracia de la Cruz and her children Vicente, Marta, and Florentino, all surnamed Sarmiento,
sold to defendant Fernando Cruz a rice land containing an area of 6,000 square meters and embraced under Tax Declaration
No. 4482 and a pasture land (parang) containing an area of 7,856 square meters. x x x”[9]

In turn, respondent Cruz sold, on 03 November 1968, the 13,856 square meters of land to respondent Flores under a
“Kasulatan ng Bilihan.” Respondent Flores immediately took possession of the property to the exclusion of all others and
promptly paid the realty taxes thereon. From that time on, Flores had been in possession of the entire area in the concept of
an owner and holding it in that capacity for almost fourteen (14) years before petitioners initiated their complaint on 06
October 1982.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen
into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public peaceful and uninterrupted.[10] Thus, mere possession
with a juridical title,such as, to exemplify, by a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept
of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription,[11] unless the juridical relation is first expressly
repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.[12] Acts of possessory character executed due to
license or by mere tolerance of the owner would likewise be inadequate.[13]Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueno, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse; if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.[14]

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law;[15] without good faith and just title,
acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character.

As regards, real or immovable property, Article 1134 of the Civil Code provides:

“ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through
possession of ten years.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands, as aforesaid, that the possession be “in good faith and with just title.”[16] The good
faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has been the owner
thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership.[17] There is, upon the other hand, just title when the adverse claimant
comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but that the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.[18] In Doliendo vs. Biarnesa,[19] the
Supreme Court has explained the law in Article 1130 of the Civil Code which states that the “title for prescription must be true
and valid.” Thus:

“We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and effect of the provisions of this article of the Code
in its application to ‘ordinary prescription.’ It is evident that by a ‘titulo verdadero y valido’ in this connection we are not to
understand a ‘titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin necesidad de la prescricion’ (a title which of itself is
sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of the prescription period); and we accept the opinion of
a learned Spanish law writer who holds that the ‘titulo verdadero y valido’ as used in this article of the code prescribes a ‘titulo
colorado’ and not merely ‘putativo;’ a titulo colorado’ being one ‘which a person has when he buys a thing, in good faith, from
one whom he believes to be the owner,’ and a ‘titulo putativo’ ‘being one which is supposed to have preceded the acquisition
of a thing, although in fact it did not, as might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that it had been
bequeathed to him.’ (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, p. 541)”[20]

The records of the case amply supports the holding of the appellate court that the requirements for ordinary prescription
hereinabove described have indeed been duly met; it explained:

“In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of the controverted portion in good faith and with just title.
This is so because the said portion of 7,540 square meters was an integral part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from
Fernando Cruz under public document (Exh. I) As explicitly mentioned in the document of sale (Exh. I) executed in 1968, the
disputed portion referred to as “parang” was included in the sale to appellant Flores. Parenthetically, at the time of the sale,
the whole area consisting of the riceland and pasture land was already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Fernando
Cruz (Exh. F) and further surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4). Hence, appellant Flores’ possession of the entire parcel which
includes the portion sought to be recovered by appellees was not only in the concept of an owner but also public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. While it is true that the possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest (Fernando Cruz) may not
have been peaceful as it was indeed characterized with violence which resulted in the death of Jose Marcelo, this cannot be
said of appellant Flores’ possession of the property, in respect of which no evidence to the contrary appears on record.”[21]

This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the above findings of the appellate court and thus gives its affirmance to the
assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.

Elcano vs Hill

77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald
was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill)
for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the
criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened
or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.” Therefore,
Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,
Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.