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Core classification theory: a reply to Szostak

Birger Hjørland,
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Core
Core classification theory: classification
a reply to Szostak theory
Birger Hjørland
Royal School of Libray and Information Science, Copenhagen, Denmark 333
Received 7 January 2008
Abstract Revised 9 January 2008
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide an answer to a critique put forward by Szostak Accepted 14 January 2008
against a paper written by the present author.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a literature-based conceptual analysis
based on Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen and Szostak. The main points in a core theory of classification
are outlined and Szostak’s criticism is examined and answered.
Findings – The paper demonstrates theoretical differences between the views adduced by Hjørland
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and Nissen Pedersen on the one side and by Szostak on the other.
Practical implications – Theoretical clarification is important for the future development of the
field.
Originality/value – The paper should be seen as one among others developing an argument for a
theoretical foundation of classification informed by the theory of knowledge.
Keywords Classification, Knowledge organizations
Paper type Conceptual paper

Introduction
This paper is an answer to Szostak (2008), who discuss claims put forward in Hjørland
and Nissen Pedersen (2005). Szostak’s points of view correspond to what he has
expressed in other publications (Szostak, 2004; Szostak et al., 2007). One of his main
points is that disciplinary classifications are obsolete and should be replaced by
interdisciplinary classifications of phenomena, theory and method. We both agree in
the value of classification (contrary to the view expressed by Sparck Jones (2005)). This
paper outlines the two positions and provides further arguments to my own position.
Among the claims made by Szostak (2008) are:
.
That interdisciplinarity is important but ignored by Hjørland and Nissen
Pedersen (2005).
.
That the distinction between a positivist and a pragmatic approach to
classification made by Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen is important, and that
interdisciplinarity may be seen as the pragmatic objective, that can define
classification criteria.
.
Concepts should refer to specific phenomena or sets of phenomena, or theories or
methods or components thereof. Journal of Documentation
Vol. 64 No. 3, 2008
.
That Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen (2005) suggest an inductive methodology, pp. 333-342
but that a combination of both inductive and deductive methods should be used q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0022-0418
to develop classification. DOI 10.1108/00220410810867560
 JDOC .
That scholarly works should be classified in terms of the phenomena studied and
64,3 theory and method used by these works.

Summarizing the theoretical position made in Hjørland and Nissen

Pedersen (2005)
Before discussing Szostak’s (2008) points, a summary of what is regarded core
334 classification theory by Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen (2005) will be given. The main
claims in our paper may be summarized by way of the following rules:
(1) Classification is the ordering of objects (or processes or ideas, whatsoever,
including documents) into classes on the basis of some properties of those
objects.
(2) The properties of objects are not just “given” but are only available to us on the
basis of some descriptions and pre-understandings of those objects (i.e. the
principle of the hermeneutic circle). It is normally not possible to enumerate all
properties of an object in a description, why any given description must be
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understood as incomplete.
(3) Description (or every other kind of representation) of objects is both a reflection
of the thing described and of the subject doing the description. Descriptions are
more or less purposeful and theory-laden. They are made from a perspective,
whether or not this is recognized. Pharmacologists, for example, in their
description of chemicals, emphasize the medical effects of chemicals, whereas
“pure” chemists emphasis other things such as their structural properties.
(4) The selection of the properties of the objects to be classified must reflect the
purpose of the classification. There is thus no “neutral” or “objective” way to
select properties for classification. Example: Whether to classify by form or
color. The figures shown in Figure 1 may be classified according to color or
shape. None of those properties are “objectively” more important than the other.
For some purposes the two squares are most alike and should be classified
together. For other purposes the two black figures (a square and a triangle) are
most alike and should be classified together.
(5) The (false) belief that there exist objective criteria for classification may be
termed “empiricism” (or “positivism”), while the belief that classifications are
always reflecting a purpose may be termed “pragmatism”. Hjørland and Nissen
Pedersen (2005) is thus an argument for the pragmatist way of understanding
classification.
(6) We saw that different domains (chemistry and pharmacology) may need
different descriptions and classification of objects to serve their specific purpose
in the social division of labor in society. The criteria for classification are thus
generally domain-specific. Different domains develop specific languages (LSPs)
that are useful to describe, differentiate and classify objects in their respective
domain. As the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey wrote:

Figure 1.
Classification criteria
 Core
Cherry trees will be differently grouped by woodworkers, orchardists, artists,
scientists and merry-makers. To the execution of different purposes different ways of classification
acting and re-acting on the part of trees are important. Each classification may be theory
equally sound when the difference of ends is borne in mind (Dewey, 1948, pp. 151-4).
(7) In every domain different theories, approaches, interests and “paradigms” exist,
which also tend to describe and classify the objects according to their views and 335
goals. For example, psychoanalysis and biological psychiatry disagree on how
mental illness should be classified and they disagree about the value of a
particular classification scheme such as the DSMIV. (The documentation for this
claim is collected and continuously updated in the descriptions of the different
domains in the Epistemological Lifeboat (Hjørland and Nicolaisen, 2005)).
(8) Any work on any subject is always made from a point of view, which may be
uncovered by analysis (e.g. a feminist point of view or a “traditional” or an
eclectic point of view). The same is the case with any classification. Ørom (2003)
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uncovered underlying points of view in major library classification schemes

with regard to arts. Although it is often difficult to uncover the underlying point
of view, it is meaningless to claim that is does not exists. “Objectivity” and
“neutrality” are not attainable and are also problematic goals from the
pragmatic point of view. Any given classification will always be a reflection of a
certain view or approach to the objects being classified. For example,
Ereshefsky (2000) argues that Linnaean classification is based on criteria that
are pre-Darwinian and thus problematic.
Sometimes, however, a given classification seems to be independent of
human goals. This seems to be the case with the Periodical System of Chemistry
and Physics. According to Dupré (2006, p. 30):
Classifications are good or bad for particular purposes, and different purposes will
motivate different classifications. It may be that there is such an ideal classification
for chemistry, but if so it is because of the specific aims implicit in the history of that
discipline. Chemistry aims at the structural analysis of matter and if, as appears to be
the case, all matter is composed of a small number of structural elements, a
classification based on those elements will be best suited to these purposes.
(9) A given literature to be classified by information specialists is always – more or
less – a merging of different domains and approaches/theories/views. Such
different views may be explicit or implicit. If they are implicit they can be
uncovered by theoretical and philosophical analysis.
(10) Classification systems that do not consider the different goals and interest
reflected in the literature of a given domain are “positivist”. Two documents
may “resemble” each other in many different ways, and there is no neutral
ground on which to choose, for example, “a proximity measure”.
This claim seems supported by Schneider and Borlund (2007), who writes:
As a result, the choice of a proximity measure is largely subjective and often based on
tradition or on posterior criteria such as the “interpretability” of the results, rather
than theory, mathematical validity, or comparative empirical investigations. As
Gordon (1987, p. 127) suggests, “. . . human ingenuity is quite capable of providing a
post hoc justification of dubious classifications”.
 JDOC
64,3 The criteria for classification should be based on an understanding of the
specific goals, values and interest at play. They are not to be established a
priory, but, for example, by “literary warrant”: by examining the literature.
(This cannot either be done in a “neutral” or “objective” way, but may be done
more or less qualified by considering the different arguments).
336 (11) Classification is a necessary requirement in Information Retrieval and cannot be
replaced by techniques such as, for example, relevance feedback. The listed
principles are not just connected to “manual” classification but also to any
deeper understanding and improvement of computer based retrieval systems.
In her reply Sparck Jones (2005) acknowledged the pragmatic point of view.
Her final suggestion is, however:
At the same time, one of the most important techniques developed in retrieval
research and very prominent in recent work, namely relevance feedback, raises a more
fundamental question. This is whether classification in the conventional, explicit
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sense, is really needed for retrieval in many, or most, cases, or whether classification
in the general (i.e. default) retrieval context has a quite other interpretation. Relevance
feedback simply exploits term distribution information along with relevance
judgements on viewed documents in order to modify queries. In doing this it is
forming and using an implicit term classification for a particular user situation. As
classification the process is indirect and minimal. It indeed depends on what
properties are chosen as the basic data features, e.g. simple terms and, through
weighting, on the values they can take; but beyond that it assumes very little from the
point of view of classification. It is possible to argue that for at least the core retrieval
requirement, giving a user more of what they like, it is fine. Yet it is certainly not a big
deal as classification per se: in fact most of the mileage comes from weighting. And
how large that mileage can be is what retrieval research in the many experiments
done in the last decade have demonstrated, and web engines have taken on board
(Sparck Jones, 2005).
We agree that classification criteria are implicit in the literature to be retrieved,
as outlined above. Spark Jones asks “whether classification in the conventional,
explicit sense, is really needed for retrieval”? Our answer to this question is that
no retrieval mechanism (and also no definition of “relevance”) is ever neutral,
but is always considering some interests at the expense of other interests. To
make a distinction between such views is to make a kind of classification, which
is thus always necessary. To believe in a technical solution employing
“relevance feedback” is a fallback to the positivist failure. The vision of
automated feedback and value-free systems is temptation but based on
problematic philosophical assumptions.
Suppose, for example, a person is searching information about “Sweden”.
Some references are retrieved by using search terms (or otherwise). The user
indicates which references are relevant and the system is supposed to find
“more like this”. In a traditional classification may all Swedish place names be
classified (e.g., Borås, Lund, Malmö, Stockholm). Can such a classification be
replaced by mechanisms providing relevance feedback? One problem might be
that the user does not know which place names are Swedish and which are not
Swedish. He may provide incorrect feedback (e.g. by stating that a reference
 about “Bagsværd” is relevant). A possibility may therefore be that users are not Core
able to retrieve the relevant documents and to avoid the non-relevant classification
documents by systems based on relevance-feedback. In other words:
Classification in the traditional sense is still needed. theory
These 11 points constitute a fundamental theory of classification. We shall now
compare these principles with Szostak’s points of view. 337
Discussion of the points of view put forward by Szostak (2008)
(1) Interdisciplinarity
Szostak opined that “ Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen (2005) end their recent paper in this
Journal with a claim that ‘a theory of classification is especially connected to science
studies’ (594). They do not make a similar claim regarding ‘interdisciplinary studies’”
There is, however, a very important difference between the way we believe Science
Studies are important for KO compared to the way Szostak believes interdisciplinary
studies are important to the same field. Different disciplines serve different purposes
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and according to our classification rules (3)-(6) are different classifications developed to
serve each discipline and reflect the particular needs of each discipline. Szostak, on the
other hand, seems to suggest that one overall interdisciplinary classification is what is
needed, why classifications do not reflect their different purposes. This leads us to his
next point.

(2) The distinction between a positivist and a pragmatic approach

I recognize that what was concluded above is directly in conflict with what Szostak
writes:
I, like Sparck Jones (2005) to whom their paper is a response, respect their preference for a
pragmatic approach [note omitted]: Classifications can only be judged in terms of the
objectives of those who utilize them, and are thus best constructed with careful attention to
those objectives. Indeed, the main contention of this paper is that as scholarly research
becomes increasingly interdisciplinary, a – perhaps “the” – key purpose of systems of
classification is to facilitate interdisciplinary research and information sharing.
In my interpretation Szostak suggests what we described as the “positivist” ideal in
spite of his explicit endorsement of the pragmatic view. Consider John Dewey’s quote
above: “Cherry trees will be differently grouped by woodworkers, orchardists, artists,
scientists and merry-makers.” How should this be dealt with if interdisciplinarity
should set the criteria? In my opinion can this only be done by disregarding some
interests and either make a classification that is a compromise or by selecting one view
at the expense of other views. I believe that Szostak has not realized the necessary
conflict implied by the pragmatic view. When he does so, he has to give up either the
pragmatic theory or the view that one classification can serve all needs.

(3) Concepts should refer to specific phenomena or sets of phenomena, or theories or

methods or components thereof
We agree in this. However, what Szostak ignores is that different theories “see”
different phenomena in the world and uses different methods as well. Szostak seems to
suggest that there is a neutral position from which the world can be observed
objectively. I believe this is wrong. In the philosophy of science have an “interpretive
 JDOC turn” taken place and the hermeneutic circle is now acknowledged as a fundamental
64,3 condition. This turn implies that all interpretations are circular, indeterminate, and
perspectival. This is also the case when describing and classifying phenomena in the
world. I do not believe this leads to skepticism or antirealism, because some theories do
a better job than others (this decision is, of course, also subject to the conditions of the
hermeneutical circle). We have to give up the naı̈ve belief that we can directly describe
338 reality. The recent example of Pluto may be illuminative. Pluto used to be classified as
a “planet”, but in August of 2006 the International Astronomical Union redefined it
along with some asteroids as dwarf planet. We must therefore conclude that concepts
of phenomena (etc.) are theory dependent and interest-dependent. We have to face that
the world is divided differently by different conceptions, which have to be considered
when methods of classifying phenomena are discussed. What conception should be
used? Who’s conception?

(4) That Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen (2005) suggest an inductive methodology, but
that a combination of both inductive and deductive methods should be used to develop
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classification
Szostak is right in claiming that a combination of inductive and deductive methods
should be used in classification. I shall not here trace how Szostak reached the
conclusion that Hjørland and Nissen Pedersen (2005) expressed a different view. What
is important is to clarify the methods of classification. I believe induction and
deduction are both necessary, but not sufficient, even in combination. The use of the
inductive method may be termed empiricism, the use of the deductive method may be
termed rationalism, and their combination may be termed positivism. My main
argument has been for years that more than these two methods is needed. Historicism
is a third method (e.g. recommended by Ereshefsky, 2000, in biological taxonomy). The
fourth needed method is pragmatic analysis (pragmatism), already mentioned. It is
important to realize that historicism and pragmatism are different kinds of necessary
methods. Many people, including Szostak, believe that only induction and deduction
are proper methods, that these two methods cover the whole field. I shall not try to
provide the technical argument here, but maintain that historicism and pragmatism
cannot be reduced to induction or deduction (see Table I).
It is also important to consider that classification is made in the sciences as well as
in information science/knowledge organization. The first kind of classification may be
termed “scientific classification”, the last one “bibliographic classification”. Any theory
of bibliographical classification should reveal how it is related to scientific
classification. Today are principles of scientific classification almost totally ignored
by information scientists. Szostak seems to believe that when we claim the importance
of scientific classification for bibliographic classification are we suggesting an
“inductive method”.

(5) That scholarly works should be classified in terms of the phenomena studied and
theory and method used by these works
This principle is contrasted to classification by discipline. These two ways of
classification have a history in knowledge organization and a body of literature and
arguments. Classification by phenomenon has also been termed “entity” or “one place”
classification, while classification by discipline has also been termed “aspect”

“Scientific classification”
Empiricism
(Observations and
Classification provided by statistical
generalizations (e.g. factor analysis)
inductions) based in “similarity”
Examples: Classifications of mental
illness in psychiatry (DSMIV) kinds of
intelligence in psychology based on
statistical analysis of test scores
Rationalism Classification based on logical,
(Principles of pure universal divisions
reason. Deductions) Examples: Frame based systems in
Artificial Intelligence. Chomsky’s
analysis of the deep structure in
language
Historicism Classification based on historical or
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Core
“Bibliographic classification”
classification
Documents clustered on the basis of
some kind of similarity, e.g.
theory
common terms in traditional IR or
bibliographical coupling
Examples: “Atlas of science” and 339
visualizations (White and McCain,
1998). “Research Fronts” I SCI and
algorithms for information retrieval
Facet analysis built on logical
divisions and “eternal and
unchangeable categories”
Examples: Ranganathan, Bliss II
and Langridge. Semantic networks.
According to Miksa (1998) the DDC
has increasingly used this approach
Systems based on the study of the

(Study of context and evolutionary development development of knowledge and

development- Examples: Biological taxonomies based knowledge producing communities
Explicating on evolutionary theory. Classification of (the social division of (scientific)
pre-understanding) the sciences on the basis of their history labor)
and organizational structures Examples: Wallerstein (1996) The
feature of the DDC that it distributes
subjects by discipline
Pragmatism Classifications based on specific values, Systems based on “cultural
(Analysis of goals, policies and goals, e.g. feminist warrant” or “critical classification”
values and epistemology Examples: The French
consequences in both encyclopaedists, the Marxists,
subject and object) classifications serving feminist
collections Table I.
Fundamental methods of
Source: From Hjørland (2003, p. 107) classification

classification. In considering these two forms of classification should Hjørland and

Hartel (2003) differentiation between ontological dimensions and social dimensions of
domains also be included.
Mills and Broughton (1977, p. 37) wrote:
5.55 Disciplines and phenomena
5.551 It should be clear from the last section (5.542) that although the disciplines reflect
discrete systems of knowledge they yet share to some degree the same phenomena studied.
The implication of this for a general classification is that the basic organization of
information will subordinate material on a given phenomenon to the discipline or
subdiscipline from whose viewpoint it is being regarded. So documents on the subject of the
phenomenon “Color” for example, will not be kept together insofar as they will be assigned to
the different disciplines (Physics, Art, etc.) their treatment reflects.
5.552 However, it should be recognized that there is, theoretically, a quite different way of
organizing a general classification. This would be to make the first division of the field of
knowledge into phenomena (from subatomic particles to planetary bodies and stars, from
single cells to particular organisms and particular societies, and so on) and to subordinate to
each phenomenon the disciplinary aspects from which it may be treated;, e.g. Color – in Optics,
 JDOC in biology, in Art, etc.; or, Food , in Agriculture, in Nutrition, in Cookery, in Economic resources,
etc.; or, Water – in Chemistry, in Geology, in Biology, in Engineering, in Transport, etc.
64,3 5.553 Such an arrangement would run counter to the way we usually study things and the
way most information is marketed, which reflects the division of labor by discipline. There are
relative few persons, if any, specializing in a given phenomena from all its aspects. Indeed, such
a specialized study would require a training, which is at present hard to envisage.
5.554 Nevertheless, a growing number of documents do reflect a multi-disciplinary
340 approach, although authorship of such works is usually, and not surprisingly, also multiple, as
in the case of symposia. Such material poses a special problem for the older general
classifications, which are sometimes called “aspect” classifications in that their basis of
arrangement is by aspect or “discipline”, not by phenomena. This does not, however, invalidate
the general correctness of the decision they all reflect, which is to treat classification by
discipline as being on the whole more helpful to users. It may be noted that the factual literature
for children has always shown a strong tendency to concentrate on phenomena rather than
discipline – e.g., “the big book of trains” which considers most aspects of the railway system.
Perhaps the best argument against Szostak and followers’ preference for phenomena
classification is that this principle has been proven useful for childrens’ books. (While
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disciplinary classification seems to have been the most useful alternative for scholarly
literature). The idea to classify by phenomena is certainly not new. What kind of new
evidence or arguments do Szostak put forward in favor of his preference? As far as I
can see is the answer “none”, because increased interdisciplinarity has also formerly
been used as argument.
We may also ask: Why choose between these two kinds of classification? Why not
produce both? They may supplement each other in a fruitful way. In the new digital
environment we do not have the same limitations as when the classical systems like the
DDC were developed. Toulmin (1972) differentiates between the content-knowledge of
a science and the institutional aspects of science, such as the professional forums. He
suggests that science is generally continuous because either the content or the
institution will remain stable while the other changes. In response then the first will
adapt, in an iterative process of constant change and constant stability. There is
continuity because each generation is always taught by the preceding generation of
scientists and also because the research questions in which a community is interested
are predicated on the current concepts they hold, even when the results of such
research might indicate that changes are needed to better adapt the concepts in
response to other concepts or other facts about nature. Toulmin’s differentiation
between content-knowledge and institutional aspects corresponds to Hjørland and
Hartel’s (2003) ontological versus social dimension of a domain. Both dimensions
should be studied by information scientists.

Conclusion
Szostak is arguing for an interdisciplinary classification of phenomena, theory and
method. I believe that implicit in this goal are points of view which are in disagreement
with the pragmatic theory of classification, which I find most fruitful for information
science.
Szostak’s position seems to be based on what we termed the positivist view: That
we can describe and list all properties of objects independent of our theories and
interests, that different purposes need the same classification and that the classification
 of phenomena, theories and methods are classifications of independent dimensions. I Core
believe that the phenomena to be classified are discovered by, for example a science classification
such as chemistry, why these phenomena cannot be and should not be separated from
the fields of human activity to which they belong. The understanding of why, for theory
example, biological species are classified the way they are, can only be understood by
considering the development of biological systematics. Classification theory in Library
and Information Science (as well as in Philosophy) should be understood as a 341
metascience. One cannot study metascience by ignoring the sciences you are studying.
Metascience is an interpretation of what good science is, based on the history of
science. It cannot offer a priori principles on how science should be performed.
In spite of these theoretical differences are Szostak’s contributions most welcome.
We need dedicated scholars to engage in this important area, and science advances
through discussion.

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Further reading
Toulmin, S. (1977), Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Human Concepts,
paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Corresponding author
Birger Hjørland can be contacted at: bh@db.dk
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