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IV.

DISPOSITION OF LANDS BY PUBLIC GRANT; declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal
1. Regalian Doctrine; basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
a. Collado vs CA Oct 4, 2002; Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration.
Facts: Edna T. Collado (Collado) filed with the land registration court an On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial
thereafter ensued.
application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they
120.0766 hectares situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal. Attached acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio
to the application was the technical description of the Lot which stated that, who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed
"[tJhis survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." The Republic, through of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Provincial possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947.
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to Collado, et al.'s application. In due course, Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious,
the land registration court issued an order of general default against the uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the
applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, whenoppositor
whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which
compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft
Issue: Whether Collado, et al. have registrable title over the lot. against Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners'
SC decision: Collado, et al. did not acquire private rights over the parcel of application for registration of the subject property.Petitioners filed a motion
land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
reservation. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden petition.
of proving that he meets the requirements of CA 141. He must overcome the ISSUE:WON the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and the public domain.
HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. This rule,
arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may have been derived from
however, is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings
old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial
of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. Due to the
or special grant, a composition con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-
compra or title through purchase. Or, that he has had continuous, open and
examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years
Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known
preceding the filing of his application as provided by CA 141. Clearly,
as the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the
Collado, et al. were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title
land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
whether under CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073. There is no proof that prior to the
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from
issuance of EO 33 in 1904, Collado, et al. had acquired ownership or title to
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as
for instance by acquisitive prescription. Verily, Collado, et al. have not
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in
possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the number of years
question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title. Second, assuming that
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider
1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became
the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on the
nondisposable and inalienable public land. At the time Collado, et al. filed
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject
their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed
thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners' application. The
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be
counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. CA 141,
applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. c. Hermoso vs CA Apr 24, 2009;
Forestlands, including watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic
that the possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands cannot FACTS: Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted.
ripen into private ownership. The tenants filed an application for the coverage of the landholding under PD
27. The said application was granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the
applicants was suspended because a separate case for the declaration of
tenancy relationship was filed by the said applicants with the DARAB. In the
b. Valiao vs Republic Nov 28, 2011; latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy relationship existed.
Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in their favor.
The OSEC approved the same. However, upon review by the OP where the
FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for
owners raised the issue that the landholding was not within the ambit of PD
registration of a parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog,
27, it having been previously reclassified by the OSEC as suited for
Negros Occidental.
residential, commercial, industrial and urban purposes.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the
application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been
Rulings/Principles: 2. Lands of the Public Domain;

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS; a. Republic vs Herbieto May 26, 2005;


The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e., primary
classification and secondary classification. The primary classification Summary: The applicants for judicial title was challenged by the government
comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. for failing to comply with the length of ownership required by law of two
These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the parcels of land just recently classified as alienable and disposable.
Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states Rule of Law: A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and
that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further seizure of the land through publication and service of notice.
classification of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification.
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of
government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural Facts: The Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, filed with the MTC a
lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses. single application for registration of two parcels of land located in
Consolacion, Cebu. They claimed to be owners having purchased the lots
COVERAGE UNDER PD 27; from their parents.
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage
The government opposed the registration arguing that: (1) the Herbieto's
of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is
failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required by law; (2)
agricultural. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as
their evidence were insufficient to prove ownership; and (3) the Subject Lots
follows: (c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
subject to private appropriation.
residential, commercial or industrial land. And Section 3 (b) specifies
agricultural activity as: (b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or
The MTC set the initial hearing on September 3, 1999. All owners of the land
Agricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.
growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
A copy of the Notice was also posted on July 27, 1999 in a conspicuous
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
building of Consolacion, Cebu. Finally, the Notice was also published in
juridical.On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land
the Official Gazette on August 2, 1999 and The Freeman Banat News on
cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering
December 19, 1999.
that the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before
Issues: Did the MTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?
petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389;
Ruling: No. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having
implement the conversion of the agricultural land to non-agricultural the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the
purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to
amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
the conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural purpose within thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment ordering the registration and
a certain period was deleted. The remedy left available to the tenant is to confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David as well as the
claim disturbance compensation. MTC Order declaring its Judgment of final and executory, and directing the
LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are
d. Cariño vs Insular Gov’t Mar 25, 1907; both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction
Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cariño went to the Court of Land b. Omandam vs CA Jan 18, 2001;
Registration (CLR) to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare
land he’s been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only FACTS: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State patent in favor of Camilo Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling,
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also issued an Original Title
reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo Certificate in his name.
averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous cases Cansino vs Valdez and Tiglao vs
On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the land from a certain Dolores
Government; and that the right of the State over said land has prescribed.
Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land.
possession of it for some time. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead
patent before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for the cancellation of the
HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from Lasola,
government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9,
Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as to 1989, Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title.
require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years.
It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for
portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional
not been used by Cariño for any purpose. Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one
officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained Godofredo Sela who have been in possession for almost twenty years. After
the absolute owner. the parties were duly heared, the RTC issued a decision on November 15,
1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor their predecessor-in-
interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the Trabasas On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the
and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of the petitioners. petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted ownership
over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale,
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs
DENR dismissed Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of of one Rafael Bautista.[9] The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the
Lands. It said that Omandan failed to prove that Lasola committed fraud and DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal investigation. The DENR
misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there is no ground for the Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates
revocation and cancellation of its title. the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents].[10]

On October 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the
decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject land
petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this
and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals
declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
respondents' accion publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent 1. [The respondents to] file their appropriate public
had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D
action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of xxx;
Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of 2. [The petitioners free patent application] be
possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D,
but was subsequently denied. as included in Lot No. 258;
3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact
Hence, this petition for review. area as indicated in [the parties] respective
technical description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and
ISSUE: What is the effect of the trial court's decision in a possessory action 322, Pls-541-D.[11]
on the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional
decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent? Office
denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot,
RULING: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are
Public Land Act, gives in its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in
and to the Secretary of the DENR ultimately the authority to dispose public the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258,
lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the
of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only the erroneous description of the lot sold as Lot322.[12] On appeal,
Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal the DENR Secretary affirmed[13] the ruling of the DENR Regional
of the RTC of the award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error. Office. After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the
parties respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that
courts of justice to resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that
in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public based on the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision
land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit -
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the
prevails. petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed. was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.[14] The petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA).

c. Bagunu vs Aggabao Aug 15, 2011 COURT OF APPEALS RULING


The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as
affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177 finality.[15] The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Civil Case No. 751
Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the
petitioners free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the
in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the
respondents protest), Atty. Binag filed a complaint for reformation of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office). The subject land was previously instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and the
owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo Bautista
(Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court
Atty. Samson Binag. On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free
patent[3] over the subject land with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands (RTC). Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive
Management Bureau).[4] On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject sale of the subject land correctly identified the boundaries of the land sold,
land (third sale) to the petitioner,[5] who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free
patent applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot 322,
petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent
application.[6] The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, instead of Lot 258.[16]
the Bureau of Lands survey,[7] and the free patent applications uniformly
identified the subject land as Lot322. The deeds covering the second and
third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.[8]
ocular investigation. The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss of the respondents claim of ownership over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags
testimony during the hearing on the respondents protest. According to the
with the RTC, citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of
petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot
Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to dismiss.[17] 322 from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one
Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979, the respondents
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, were already aware of Atty. Binags free patent application over Lot 322. Yet,
they filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the
the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by filing a complaint-in- petitioner had already substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the
respondents inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.
intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention captioned

the respondents causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents
favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient evidence to
and Damages.[18] The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over Lot prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests) title. In our April 13,
2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also reversible error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially
alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public and adverse factual issues. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his
arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the
possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until primary jurisdiction doctrine.

sometime in August of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and


THE RULING
strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring his possession

from Lot 258.[19] The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners We deny the motion for reconsideration.
of Lot 322. Questions of fact
generally barred
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged error of the
on the respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the DENR and the CA in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought
an error that adversely affected his right to apply for a free patent over the
civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys ruling.[20] In their subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took
prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to: a cue from our April 13, 2009Resolution, denying his petition, since his
present motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs
1. [Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of
action xxx for reformation of contracts be The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
granted; generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of
Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity
2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in
his [Free Patent Application] be amended to accordance with the parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan,
exclude Lot 322 xxx. among others. While there are instances where the Court departs from the
3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not
the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.] even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized
exceptions.[21] On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the
Director of Lands[22] on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR
THE PETITION Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,[23] and even on this Court,
when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR consequently confine our discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.
Secretarys jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims
of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending The determination
with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) of the identity of a
from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR public land is within
effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of ownership over a the DENRs
real property matters beyond the DENRs competence to determine. The exclusive
petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since jurisdiction to
the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the manage and
specialized technical expertise of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue dispose of lands of
involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the the public domain
application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within The petitioner insists that under the law[24] actions incapable of pecuniary
the competence of the courts. The petitioner claims that the DENR estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts belong, and those
Secretarys factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the evidence. involving ownership of real property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before
property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in the RTC, the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in
his free patent application; that the area of Lot 322, as previously determined excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners free patent application and ordering
in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322
since 1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the
cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office during its parties written agreement reflects their true intention.[25] In the present case,
this intention refers to the identity of the land covered by the second and
third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its
the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiffs entitlement to
mandate, the RTC must defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues
recover its full possession. In this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not
only his ownership, but also the identity of the real property he seeks to on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,[33] such as the distinct
recover.[26]
cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note
While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of that the contracts refer to the same property, identified as Lot 322, - which
real property extends only to private lands. In the present case, neither
the DENR Regional Office, DENR Secretary and the CA found to actually
party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents
acknowledged the public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is conferred
administrative findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention,
instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of
Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his application is a pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its
public land[27] whose management and disposition belong to the DENR jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of jurisdiction[34]
Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter
1, Title XIV of Executive Order No. 292[28] reads:
The argument that only courts of justice can
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the
[of Environment and Natural Resources] shall: Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times.
There are hundreds of administrative bodies now
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, performing this function by virtue of a valid
alienable and disposable public lands, mineral authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
resources and, in the process of exercising such function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an
control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such regulating certain activities falling under their particular
revenues for the exploration, development, utilization expertise.[35]
or gathering of such resources;

xxx The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting


claims of title over public lands
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of
lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who has a better right
(Underscoring supplied.)
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, [29] the Director of over Lot 322) does not require the specialized technical expertise of the
the Lands Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts,
assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)[30] by having direct appreciation of evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other forms of concession or disposition and management of the provisions, which are all within the competence of regular courts.
lands of the public domain.
We disagree.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain
the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners free
patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through from determining a controversy involving a question which is within the
the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot
claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land requires jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter,
a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the
administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and
dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicants administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact[36]
entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the
Regional Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the
to the issuance of a free patent[31] in their favor since it merely special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that the Court
ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that
application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such
respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in
Director of Lands,[32] unless grave abuse of discretion exists. an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts
even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, Regalian doctrine enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Further, no public land
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied
in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
issues to the administrative body for its view.[37] from the State. Gordula did not acquire title to the said land prior to its
reservation under Proc. . He filed his application 3 years after said
The application of the doctrine of primary Proclamation was issued in 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the
jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
case below. It need only be suspended until after the ownership as it has been classified as “public forest reserve for public good.”
matters within the competence of [the Lands Management
Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the 3. Classification of Public Lands;
principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is salutarily served.[38] (Emphases added.) a. Republic vs Fabio Dec 23, 2008

The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real Facts: The heirs of Juan Fabio filed an application for registration of title to
property is within the regular courts area of competence and, concededly, a Lot which they claim to have been in the possession of their
this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no predecessors-in-interest for more than 100 years. One of the documents
power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public they presented as evidence is an approved survey plan which
character of the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive contained a notation that reads "this survey falls within the Calumpang
Order No. 192,[39] the disposition and management of public lands fall within Point Naval Reservation xxx." Conversely, the Republic of the Philippines
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the opposed the application, claiming that the Lot sought to be registered falls
DENR Secretary.[40] within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of as placed under the exclusive use of the military through three
Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of presidential proclamations. The heirs, on the other hand, maintain that they
jurisdiction over possessoryactions instituted by occupants or applicants (to have acquired a vested right over the Lot by acquisitive prescription.
protect their respective possessions and occupations), [41] the respondents
complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession Issue: Whether a lot under military reservation may be acquired through
whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as acquisitive prescription.
basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for
declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to Ruling: No. Being a military reservation, the Calumpang Point Naval
defer its ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final Reservation, to which the Lot is a part of, cannot be subject to
determination by the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the occupation, entry or settlement. Public lands not shown to have
respondents entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of the
jurisdiction. inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient e v i d e n c e
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322 from the s h o wi n g t h a t i t w a s a l re a d y c l a s s i f i e d a s a l i e n a b l e a n d
petitioners free patent application and his consequent directive for the d i s p o s a b l e , t h e L o t a p p l i e d f o r b y respondents is inalienable land
respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretarys of the public domain, not subject to registration.
exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente
Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,[42] which involves the decisions of the Director of b. Yngson vs Sec. of DENR Jul 20, 1983
Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the
rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
on the identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a Occidental which upheld the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands. Since this issue precludes Natural Resources and the Office of the President regarding the disposition
prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when they of swamplands for conversion into fishponds. Originally taken to the Court of
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary Appeals, the case was elevated to this Court on a finding that only a pure
jurisdiction of the administrative agency. question of law was involved in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration.
There is no dispute over the facts. The Court of Appeals adopted the
No costs. SO ORDERED. statement of facts in the Solicitor-General's brief. We do the same:

d. Gordula vs CA Jan 22, 1998; The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with
an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio
Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view
FACTS: Petitioner Gordula filed an application for a free patent over a land,
of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes,
which he had been in possession since 1949, in January, 1973. The Free
several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize
patent was issued on January 01, 1974. The subject land in 1973 was still
the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila Longno de
part of the Caliraya- LumotRiver Forest reserve and was no longer open to
Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio
private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the
Doromal who filed his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected,
public good. Thereafter, on November 18, 1987, the REPUBLIC, thru the
however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest
NAPOCOR, filed an action for annulment of petitioner’s Free Patent,
and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes.
cancellation of titles and The CA also held that the petitioners could not claim
ownership by acquisitive prescription since 1969; Gordula had been in
possession of the property for only 25 years. The period of Gordula’s On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar
occupancy after 1969 should not be tacked to the period from 1944 since by application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those
then the property was not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who
or alienation. filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and
April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in
HELD: Forest lands/reserves are incapable of private appropriation and the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and
possession thereof however long can not convert them into private the same was only released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The
properties. (Director of Lands vs. CA). This ruling is premised on the conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant and rejecting the
claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Did the administrative agencies having jurisdiction over leases of public
Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director lands for development into fishponds gravely abuse their discretion in
of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where interpreting and applying their own rules? This is the only issue in this case.
their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3,
Rec. on Appeal).
The pertinent provisions of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 14 read:
In an order dated April 5, 1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of SEC. 14. Priority Right of Application-In determining the priority of application
the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into or right to a permit or lease the following rules shall be observed:
three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area
covered by their respective applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). Appellant (a) When two or more applications are filed for the same area, which is
filed a petition for review dated July 6, 1955 from the aforesaid order of the unoccupied and unimproved, the first applicant shall have the right of
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources but the same was preference thereto.
dismissed by the Office of the President of the Philippines on December 20,
1955 (pp. 5-8, Rec. on Appeal). A motion for reconsideration filed by the xxx xxx xxx
appellant on February 15, 1956 was likewise denied on August 3, 1956. A
second and third motion for reconsiderations filed by the appellant was also
denied on August 5, 1958 and October 26, 1960, respectively (p. 18, Rec. on (d) A holder of fishpond application which has been rejected or cancelled by
Appeal). the Director of Fisheries by reason of the fact that the area covered thereby
has been certified by the Director of Forestry as not available for fishpond
purposes, SHALL NOT LOSE his right as a PRIOR APPLICANT therefore, if
Not satisfied with one-third of the 66 hectares, Mr. Yngson filed a petition for LATER ON, the area applied for is certified by the Director of Forestry as
certiorari with the Court of First Instance against the Executive Secretary, available for fishpond purposes, provided that not more than one (1) year
Office of the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has expired since the rejection or cancellation of his application, in which
Anita V. Gonzales, and Jose M. Lopez. case, his fishpond application which was rejected or cancelled before, shall
be reinstated and given due course, and all other fishpond applications filed
The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be for the same area shall be rejected.
declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries
awarding the entire area to him be reinstated. The five applicants for the 66 hectares of swampland filed their applications
on the following dates:
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissed the petition on
the ground that plaintiff had not established such "capricious and whimsical 1. Teofila L. de Ligasan — January 14, 1946.
exercise of judgment" on the part of the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President of the Philippines as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion justifying review by the courts in a 2. Custodio Doromal — October 28, 1947
special civil action.
3. Serafin B. Yngson — March 19, 1952
The plaintiff-appellant made the following assignments of errors:
4. Anita V. Gonzales — March 19, 1953
I
5. Jose M. Lopez — April 24, 1953
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS
NOT ESTABLISHED SUCH 'CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL EXERCISE The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond
OF JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANTS- APPELLEES purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AS TO permits and c•nversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their
CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUSTIFYING REVIEW applications.
THEREOF IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION BY THE COURT.
After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries
II inexplicably gave due course to Yngzon's application and rejected those of
Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngzon's
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RULE OF THE priority of application.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES IN EFFECT
ITSELF HOLDING THAT THE 'PRIORITY RULE' ESTABLISHED IN We see no error in the decision of the lower court. The administrative
PARAGRAPHS (a) AND (d), SECTION 14, FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE authorities committed no grave abuse of discretion.
ORDER NO. 14 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO FISHPOND APPLICATIONS
FILED PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTRY
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public
THAT THE AREA APPLIED FOR IS AVAILABLE FOR FISHPOND
domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
PURPOSES; IN TREATING THE APPLICATIONS OF THE APPELLANT
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
AND THAT OF THE APPELLEES LOPEZ AND GONZALES ON EQUAL
authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
FOOTING ONLY AND IN ORDERING THE DIVISION OF THE AREA
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
INVOLVED IN THESE APPLICATIONS INTO THREE EQUAL PARTS
leases, and other modes of utilization. (Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil.
AWARDING ONE-THIRD SHARE EACH TO THESE APPLICANTS.
175; Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10; Vda. de
Alfafara v. Mapa, 95 Phil. 125; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA
III 1184).
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of factual considerations including boundaries and geographical locations more
swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such proper for a trial court.
lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for
fishery or other purposes. We have held that contempt of court presupposes contumacious and
arrogant defiance of the court. (De Midgely v. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23;
All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to Matutina v. Judge Buslon, 109 Phil. 140,142)
have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of
Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of court which we can take
opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of cognizance of and punish. If any of his property or other rights over his one-
one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. third's share of the disputed property are violated, he can pursue the correct
Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an action before the proper lower court.
administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity of paragraph
"d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered
by the provision. His application was filed almost two years before the WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The
release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
their applications within the one-year period, do not object to sharing the petitioner-appellant.
area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has
apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the SO ORDERED.
respondent Secretary's order states that all three applications must be
considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was c. Republic vs CA, Carag Aug 6, 2008
released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the 66 hectares
among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order.
They pray that the decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto. The Case

The Office of the President holds the view that the only purpose of the This is a petition for review1 of the 21 May 20012 and 25 September
provision in question is to redeem a rejected premature application and to 20023 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The
consider it filed as of the date the area was released and not to grant a
premature application a better right over another of the same category. We 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
find such an interpretation as an exercise of sound discretion which should (petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
not be disturbed. In the case of Salaria v. Buenviaje (81 SCRA 722) we cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002
reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should be given
controlling weight. Similarly, in Pastor v. Echavez (79 SCRA 220) we held
that in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, the discretion of the The Facts
appropriate department head must be respected. The records show that the
above rulings should also apply to the present case. On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court)
issued Decree No. 3819284in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
During the pendency of this petition, petitioner Yngson filed a motion to have Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents
Patricio Bayoborda, Rene Amamio, and nine other respondents, declared in Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering
contempt of court. Petitioner charged that Bayoborda and Amamio entered a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of
the property in controversy and without petitioner's consent, laid stakes on 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao,
the ground alleging that the same were boundaries of the areas they were Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds
claiming; that the other respondents likewise entered the property on of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585)
different dates and destroyed petitioner's hut and the uppermost part of his in the name of spouses Carag.
fishpond and started to build houses and to occupy the same. In their
comment, the respondents in the contempt motion denied petitioner's On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the
charges. Bayoborda and Amamio stated that they were bona-fide applicants encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer
for fishpond purposes of areas outside the 22 hectares alloted for the certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
petitioner and that they were authorized to place placards in the areas they 1277,6 issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B
applied for. As evidence the respondents attached a copy of the resolution of consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) showing 1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A
that their applications have been duly received and acknowledged by the consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
latter and in compliance with government regulations, they placed markers
and signs in their respective boundaries. The resolution likewise stated that On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with
these markers and signs were subsequently destroyed and later on Mr. the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural
Yngson started development by building dikes in the area applied for, which Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the
he has no authority to do so due to the present conflict. The resolution further DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No.
prohibited Yngson from constructing any improvements in any area outside 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
his 22 hectares and also prohibited Bayoborda and Amamio from entering adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified
and making constructions in the applied for areas pending the issuance of as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
their permits.
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team
The petitioner has failed to show that the acts committed by the respondents to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property.
were a direct disturbance in the proper administration of justice and
processes of the law which constitutes contempt of court. If there were any
violations of petitioner's rights, he should resort to PACLAP which issued the The investigating team reported that:
resolution between him and respondents or file, as he alleged he did, a
criminal complaint or other action before the courts. The motion also raises
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square
prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag
area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No.
spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively;
only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a
as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of
1994. the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as
have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed
predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered out in the proper trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land
by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time immemorial.8 Act.14 (Citations omitted)

Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002
was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Hence, this petition.
Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action
for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed The Issues
with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of
judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles9 on the ground that 1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the
in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters appropriate remedies are no longer available;
(disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as
timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of
not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed lack of jurisdiction;
portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised
On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. 10 Private in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss;
respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had
jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of
have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan;
or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added
that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the
decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the 5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the
complaint was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted
and by Section 38 of Act No. 496.11 Private respondents also stated that not jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land;
all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for
an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed that 6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and
the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who
had an ax to grind against private respondents.12
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case.

On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion,


The Ruling of the Court
annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles.13

While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural


The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment
of decree has no merit.
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
declared:

First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the
The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions
grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for
in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the
annulment of decree.15
"ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended
Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated:
neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations.
Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive
two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither Branch of the Government had the authority and power to
ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did
Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in
favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151,
at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to
Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims
and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not
null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In
and 1987 Philippine constitution. effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the
subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the
of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to
thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either
patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court and/or the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction matter of the claim.20 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law
to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the
consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force and effect action.21
whatsoever.16 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was v. Insular Government,22 we ruled:
seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which
petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is
and disposable. deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the
mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
sovereign nation are public in character, and per se
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the
petitioner’s failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x
x x23 (Emphasis supplied)
In Ancheta v. Ancheta,17 we ruled:
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by
In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded were deemed alienable.
on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been
the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in
remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no classification maps24 petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show
fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and
may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.18 land.25

Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No.
subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of 2874,26 which provides:
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner.
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioner’s time to time classify the lands of the public domain into -
complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper
trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.19
(a) Alienable or disposable
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
(b) Timber and
SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall
be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of (c) Mineral lands
evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a
Regional Trial Court. and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another, for the purposes of their government
Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the and disposition.
complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the
However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to
further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits. Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of
which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the
classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the
the Government, nor in any manner become private property, decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the
nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision
by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized in Section 1,
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides:
before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis
with law. supplied)

Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and
Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that
parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private established under this Constitution."29 When the Commonwealth
right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag
had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,27 the Republic sought to portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.
annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a
land registration court, because when the application for land registration WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of
was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The the Philippines’ complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation
Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority
to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act d. Republic vs Iglesia ni Cristo Jun 30, 2009
Nos. 92628 and 2874. The Court ruled:
Republic v Iglesia ni Cristo G.R. No. 180067 June 30, 2009
We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally
doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands FACTS:
as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have The subject of the case is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre located in
become private property or lands that have been impressed with Ilocos Norte.
a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid On November 19, 1998, Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), represented by Erao G.
law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is Manalo, as corporate sole, filed its Application for Registration of Title before
quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, the MCTC in Paoay Currimao. Appended to the application were the Sepia
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural or tracing cloth of plan Swo 1001047, the technical description of subject lot,
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition the Geodetic Engineers Certificate, Tax Declaration No. (TD) 5080261
of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the covering the subject lot, and the September 7, 1970 Deed of Sale executed
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located by Bernardo Bandaguio in favor of INC. The Republic, through the Office of
for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its appearance and deputized the
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on its behalf. It also filed an
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a Opposition to INCs application. Cadastral Court and Court of Appeals =
certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a Rendered in favor of INC.
decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of
an original certificate of title to the land, the court had ISSUE:
already made a determination that the land was agricultural May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject
and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and property has been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed
number of years. It was the land registration court which had HELD: No.
the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons
agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is
evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that
their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport
has already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell
May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application for registration at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
was filed by INC.
real estate tax delinquency.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing
the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport
sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of Lands and Buildings.
the application for registration of title is filed. In declaring that the correct The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government
interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned
the Court ruled that and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government
the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely
Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed exempt from real estate tax.
. MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic.
The possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public
1959 when it purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in
tacked on to the possession of its predecessors In interest, Badanguio and such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
Sabuco, the latter possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as Issue: Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy
he inherited the bigger lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his
against and auction for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
parents. These possessions and occupation from Sabuco, including those of
his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC had been in
the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious Held: MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The
possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of acquisition of Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
property. therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can
These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s witnesses dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the
Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
4. Non-Registrable Properties;
by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports
a. Chavez vs Public Estates Authority Jul 9, 2002; and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State.
Facts: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to
Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore public use because they are used by the public for international and
lands are concerned. domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it
areas of Manila Bay to Amari. is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance
alienable land of the public domain. or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.
of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the
the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of estate tax.
the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
c. Ramos vs Director of Lands Nov 19, 1918;
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Facts:In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija.
natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking
advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1994) and
registered the land in 1896. In 1907, the part of the land was sold by Ponce
to petitioner Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca. Ramos instituted
b. MIAA vs CA Jul 20, 2006; appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. The Director of Lands
and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the following grounds:
Facts: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and such
City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax parcel was forest land. RTC and CA ruled against Ramos. It has been seen
however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of
delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through
land under color of title.
117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land? Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to
have said lot registered in his name.
Held: YES. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
in the adverse possession of another. A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in O.P.N. contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private
possession; persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the
possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the
of the law on the supposition that he premises consisted of agricultural public deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs
land. of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s
decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners
Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of
amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows: the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare
said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of registration in the names of the private applicants.
July, nineteen hundred and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
provisions of this chapter. actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
a forest land other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
forest purposes. Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed
Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable
by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney- The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
Ruling: Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section 54, of Act No. as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime
926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and Ponce’s possessory appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
information. RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A. license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
d. Amunategui vs Director of Forestry Nov 29, 1983; classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
FACTS: Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
for registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition
to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing e. Sta. Rosa Realty Dev’t Corp vs CA Oct 12, 2001
527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said
Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title decision of the Court of Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Department of
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board[2] (hereafter DARAB) ordering the
forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio compulsory acquisition of petitioners property under the Comprehensive
Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB
SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at for summary proceedings to determine just compensation under R. A. No.
Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, 6657, Section 16.
with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of
land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders
community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now located in the area.[3] previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of BLAD
mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding due to some
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the deficiencies.
property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December 1985,
respondents filed a civil case[4] with the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez wrote
seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile. By way Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two (2) claim folders
of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB for it to conduct summary
respondents. proceedings to determine the just compensation for the land.

In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the
Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible entry against Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were
respondents.[5] exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as
watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the conversion.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory acquisition of the
SRRDC property under the CARP. On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned over
the two (2) claim folders (CACFs) to the Executive Director of the DAR
On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation.Acting on the CACFs,
of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its on September 10, 1990, the Board promulgated a resolution asking the office
officials or representatives to a conference on August 18, 1989.[6] During the of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues
meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land before it proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.[13]
Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna,
the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some potential farmer The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1) whether
beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the Compulsory
was the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether the petition for land
landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition. conversion of the parcels of land may be granted.

On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the
Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a Protest and Objection to the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations)
compulsory acquisition of the property on the ground that the area was not and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a report answering the two
appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with issues raised. According to them, firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the
slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of acquisition on
who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.[7] December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory
acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the BARC D also supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said
chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the property. During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no
land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the parcels of
economically viable for agricultural purposes, as evidenced by the land in question.
Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of Cabuyao,
Laguna.[8] On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all the
parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a summary subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991. However, on February 22, 1991,
investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory Acquisition Folder Atty. Ma. Elena P. Hernandez-Cueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board
Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (hereafter, requesting for its assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case
PARO).[9] because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC and had possession
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his of all the records of the case was on indefinite leave and could not be
endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of Agrarian contacted. The Board granted counsels request and moved the hearing to
Reform. April 4, 1991.
On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of the On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded two (2) latter to resolve SRRDCs petition for exemption from CARP coverage before
Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the landholding of SRRDC, any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891 to the President, Land Bank of
the Philippines for further review and evaluation.[10] On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and
subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without objection from
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991 hearing, the subdivision plan of
Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition[11] to petitioner, stating subject property at Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as
that petitioners landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, Exhibit 5 for SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked
containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning
Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification issued on
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two letters [12] separately September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land subject of the case were
addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land classified as industrial Park per Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89
Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting not only the dated March 29, 1989.[14]
amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2)
notices of acquisition.
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the lands to G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of
the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed a petition[15] with Appeals, et. al.) Considering the compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed
DARAB to disqualify private respondents as beneficiaries. However, DARAB by counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8, 1993 which
refused to address the issue of beneficiaries. required petitioner to post a cash bond or surety bond in the amount of
P1,500,000.00 Pesos before issuing a temporary restraining order prayed
In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, for, manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same amount with
Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision,[16] finding that private respondents the Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the attached official receipt no.
illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered them evicted. 315519, the Court resolved to ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order
On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a prayed for.
memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust
account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as valuation for the SRRDC The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the Department of Agrarian
property. Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated December 19,
1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the decretal Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered,
portion of which reads: among others, the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
through its Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Board hereby orders: possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall have been
transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to distribute
the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the
1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory
farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of
coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation
Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the
(Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is hereby affirmed; for and in their behalf and under their authority from entering the properties
involved in this case and from introducing permanent infrastructures thereon;
and (c) the private respondents from further clearing the said properties of
2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees and other vegetation,
Development Corporation the amount of Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty- effective today until further orders from this Court.[22]
One Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two (2) Transfer
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is covered
Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should there be a rejection of the
by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed
payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for
said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation; area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of
3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the Department of
Transfer certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory acquisition of subject property under
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and R. A. No. 6657, Section 16, to wit:
encumbrances;
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of
4 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources either through its acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
Provincial Office in Laguna or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a
final segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer certificate of Title a.) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can be transferred by the Register of beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the
Deeds to the name of the Republic of the Philippines; land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place
5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place
Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to take immediate where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the
possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been transferred to offer of the DAR to pay corresponding value in accordance
the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as pertinent provisions hereof.
determined by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna.[17]
b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the receipt of written
notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch 24, landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-2333[18] ruling that respondents were the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
builders in bad faith.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within
petition for review of the DARAB decision.[19] On November 5, 1993, the thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of transfer in favor of the government and other muniments of
DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads: title.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB decision dated September d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
19, 1991 is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty summary administrative proceedings to determine the
Development Corporation ventilating its case with the Special Agrarian Court compensation for the land requiring the landowner, the
on the issue of just compensation.[20] LBP and other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above
period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The
Hence, this petition.[21] DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which reads:
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding 2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for
payment, or, in case of rejection or no response from the each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in have already filed applications to avail of other modes of
LBP bonds in accordance with this act, the DAR shall make land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following
immediate possession of the land and shall request the duly accomplished forms:
proper Register of Deeds to issue Transfer Certificate of
Titles (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation report findings and
f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the evaluation
matter to the court[23] of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation. c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information sheet
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by
personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the PARO
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is
located.
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his are true and correct.
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer 3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the
(30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner conference meeting shall also be sent to the prospective
accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representatives, the Land
government and surrenders the certificate of title.Within thirty days from the Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and the other
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of
pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DARs offer the property.
or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the views,
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from landowner shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the
submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form
decision and the amount of just compensation. an integral part of the CACF.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case
of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the 4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR Reform Officer (PARO).
shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The B. The PARO shall:
land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts (provisionally 1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him by
the Supreme Court designated branches of the regional trial court as special his MAROs.
agrarian courts) for final determination of just compensation.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF
Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and and all the personnel who participated in the
the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification accomplishment of these forms.
process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued
Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating 3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO
procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows: through ocular inspection and verification of the
property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with the assistance of the mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000
pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder,
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and
the CARP in his area of responsibility; the masterlist should his recommendations, to the Central Office.
include such information as required under the attached
CARP masterlist form which shall include the name of the
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy
landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax
each of his report.
declaration number.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and
and Distribution (BLAD), shall: the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise
PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent
valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are
directly participating in the review and final valuation. deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights
Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary.
landowner personally or through registered mail within
three days from its approval. The notice shall include In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in
among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance
and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR. with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP
bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the
BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of
approval the order of acquisition. However, in case of Agrarian Reform, we held that The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
to determine just compensation, in accordance with the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs ownership is contemplated either.[24]
decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals
submit to the Secretary for approval the required order of DARABs decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioners
acquisition. property.[25] Here, petitioner pressed the question of whether the property
4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of was a watershed, not covered by CARP.
acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067)
bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary provides:
shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural
take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated
beneficiaries. by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or
occupants thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such
agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all waters.
the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition
Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends Watersheds may be defined as an area drained by a river and its
the landowner a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/ tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
meeting over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the adjacent watersheds. Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay man, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) answer is simple. At the time of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and
and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the Natural Resources had not declared the property as watershed area. The
property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as PARK by a Zoning
parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area. Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the
Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution[26] voiding the
inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring
when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon that the land is now classified as agricultural land.
determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning
with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
representative, a notice of acquisition of the subject property. From this point, subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
the provisions of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply. needs.[27]
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform[28] we held
required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL
conference sent to the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No.
12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is
under Section 16 of the CARL. the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land
in question form a vital part of a watershed area.[29]
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a It is the opinion of this office that the area in question must be maintained for
watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes. Ecological watershed purposes for ecological and environmental considerations, among
balances and environmental disasters in our day and age seem to be others. Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP beneficiaries
interconnected. Property developers and tillers of the land must be aware of will be affected, it is important that a larger view of the situation be taken as
this deadly combination. In the case at bar, DAR included the disputed one should also consider the adverse effect on thousands of residents
parcels of land for compulsory acquisition simply because the land was downstream if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for
allegedly devoted to agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and watershed purposes.
alienable land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study, survey The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if possible, an alternate
and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of area be allocated for the affected farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates
land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed be mandated to protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent
purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau watershed reserved.[31]
(ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
that: watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water which is one
of the most important human necessity. The protection of watersheds
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the control
heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of
Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
with proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger needs to be answered now.
the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge
detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has
Kabanga-an side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of
recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs. Considering that the people CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
have little if no direct interest in the protection of the Matang Tubig structures
they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed. Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding
support system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and
it. From these watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
water. x x x x x schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot
production centers, church sites and convents appurtenent thereto,
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and
building and erection of permanent infrastructures.Unless the pernicious quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and
agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would over, except those already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this
not be long before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact Act.
of watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that
watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens. acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land
Hence, the following are recommended: involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-
evaluation of the issue.
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate
rehabilitation. In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-
evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform
program be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in Program.
coordination with pertinent government agencies.[30] In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to
supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by Dr. restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect
Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate degree in water until final decision on the case. No costs.
resources from U.P. Los Banos in 1987; Dr. Medel Limsuan, who obtained
his doctorate degree in watershed management from Colorado University SO ORDERED.
(US) in 1989; and Dr. Antonio M. Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in f. Palomo vs CA Jan 21 1997;
Soil and Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in 1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for the FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by
President dated September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI Ref.: 933103 Executive Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands
Presidential Instructions on the Protection of Watersheds of the Canlubang and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months
Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna) which reads: before his death in April 1937. Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates
of title were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a
petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on May
1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title
sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon The Republics recourse in G.R. No. 156951 is cast against the
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by
Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the following backdrop:
control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
Proclamation No. 423[5] establishing a military reservation known as Fort
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable
William McKinley later renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio Military
under the Land Registration Act. The Palomos, however, continued in
possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and introduced Reservation (FBMR). The proclamation withdr[ew] from sale or settlement
improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8,
1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and and reserve[d] for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of
Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Staff of the [AFP] the [certain] parcels of the public domain [indicated in plan
ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in Psu-2031] situated in the several towns and a city of what was once
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the
public domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land the Province of Rizal. On its face, the proclamation covers three (3) large
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless parcels of land, to wit: Parcel No. 2 (portion), Parcel No. 3 (or 3-A) and
such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There
is no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not Parcel No. 4 (or 4-A). Parcel No. 3 with an area of 15,912,684 square meters
alienable lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements
and Parcel No. 4 with an area of 7,660,128 square meters are described in
introduced by petitioners, the fact that the government failed to oppose the
registration of the lots in question is no justification for petitioners to plead
the proclamation as situated inside Fort McKinley, Rizal. Specifically
good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
mentioned as excluded from Parcel No. 4 albeit within its boundaries are
g. Republic vs Southside Homeowners Association Inc. Sep
22, 2006 the American Battle Monument Cemetery (606,985 sq. m.), the Traffic

Before the Court are these two petitions having, as common denominator, Circle (7,093 sq. m.) and the Diplomatic and Consular area (100,000 sq.m.).
the issue of ownership of a large tract of land.

In the first, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Several presidential proclamations would later issue excluding
and docketed as G.R. No. 156951, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines
seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision[1] dated January 28, 2003 of the certain defined areas from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59454, affirming the dismissal by
declaring them open for disposition. These are Proclamation No. 461[6] and
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, of the
Republics complaint for declaration of nullity and cancellation of a land title Proclamation No. 462,[7] both series of 1965, excluding portions of the
against the herein private respondent, the Southside Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SHAI). \ reservation and declaring them the AFP Officers Village and the AFP EMs

In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 173408, petitioners Rene Saguisag and Village, respectively, to be disposed of under Republic Act (R.A.) 274 [8] and
five (5) retired military officers pray that Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, R.A. 730[9] in relation to the Public Land Act (C.A. 141, as amended).
Jr., the present Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
be asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for having Excluded, too, under Proclamation No. 172 dated October 16, 1987 and to
announced time and again that the military officers and their families in the
be disposed pursuant to the same laws aforementioned, save those used or
contempt action would be ousted and evicted from the property subject of the
main petition even before the issue of ownership thereof is finally resolved by earmarked for public/quasi-public purposes, are portions of the reservation
the Court.
known as Lower and Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and the Signal Village,
After the private respondent SHAI had filed its Comment[2] to the petition in
G.R. No. 156951, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), all in Taguig, Metro Manila.
followed by the Department of National Defense (DND) and the AFP, joined
causes with the petitioner Republic and thus sought leave to intervene. The
Court, per its Resolutions dated September 3, 2003,[3] and September 29, In 1992, Congress enacted the Bases Conversion and
2003,[4] respectively, allowed the intervention and admitted the
Development Act (R.A. 7227, as amended), investing the BCDA the power to
corresponding petitions-for-intervention.
own, hold and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may
Per Resolution of the Court dated August 09, 2006, both petitions were
ordered consolidated. be transferred to it by the President[10] and to dispose, after the lapse of a

number of months, portions of Fort Bonifacio.[11]


PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION:
At the core of the instant proceedings for declaration of nullity of To determine whether or not the questioned
and sample/specimen signatures ABELARDO G.
title are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, PALAD, JR. were written by one and the same person.
known as or are situated in what is referred to as the JUSMAG housing area
FINDINGS:
in Fort Bonifacio. As may be gathered from the pleadings, military officers,
both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have Scientific comparative examination and
analysis of the specimens, submitted, under
been occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lens, with the
on the JUSMAG area. aid of photographic enlargement reveals that there
exist fundamental, significant differences in writing
characteristics between the questioned and the
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized standard/sample signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD,
JR." such as in:
mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to
secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title Transfer - The questioned signatures show slow,
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 15084[12] - in its name to the bulk of, if not the drawn, painstaking laborious manner in execution of
strokes; that of the standard/sample signatures show
entire, JUSMAG area. TCT No. 15084 particularly describes the property free, rapid coordinated and spontaneous strokes in the
covered thereby as follows: manner of execution of letters/elements.
Furthermore, the questioned signature
"ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-961" is a
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76057, product of TRACING PROCESS by CARBON-
being a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated OUTLINE METHOD.
in Jusmang (sic) CONCLUSION: Based on the above
Area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an FINDINGS, the questioned and the standard/sample
area of (398,602) SQUARE METERS. xxx. signatures "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." were not
written by one and the same person. The questioned
A parcel of land (Lot 3-Y-2, Psd-76057 as signature "ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR." marked "Q-
shown on subdivision Plan Psd 76057, being a portion 961" is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process.
of parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031, LRC Rec. No.) situated
in Jusmang (sic) REMARKS: The other questioned Deeds of
Area, FortBonifacio, Province of Rizal. containing an Sale containing the signatures of "ABELARDO G.
area of (1,320) SQUARE METERS xxx.. PALAD, JR." are still in the process of examination.[15]
(Underscoring added.)
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173[16] directing the Office of the
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991 on Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT
the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale[13] purportedly executed on the same No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officers Village Association
date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. (Palad, for brevity) of the Lands (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG,
Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase price as in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City the
written in the conveying deed wasP11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private
meter. respondent SHAI. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 63883 and
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by eventually raffled to Branch 71 of the court, the Republic alleged that fraud
the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of attended SHAIs procurement of TCT No. 15084. In paragraph No. 5 of the
the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred complaint, the Republic alleged that TCT No. 15084 is void owing, inter
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of alia, to the following circumstances: a) the conveying deed is spurious as the
the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records
Constantino are embodied in his Questioned Documents Report (QDR) No. with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of
815-1093.[14] Its highlights: the purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part

QUESTIONED SPECIMENS: of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.[17]


1. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of In its ANSWER with counterclaim, respondent SHAI denied the material
the Navy Officers Village Association (NOVA)
containing the signature of ABELARDO G. PALAD, allegations of the complaint and countered that the impugned title as well as
JR. designated as Q-961 . the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale are valid documents which the Republic
is estopped to deny.[18] SHAI also alleged paying in full the purchase price
2. Original copy of the Deed of Sale issued in favor of
SHAI containing the signature of ABELARDO G. indicated in the deed as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 6030203-C
PALAD, JR. ... designated as Q-962. dated October 29, 1991.
On October 19, 1994, the case was heard on pre-trial in the course of which In its COMMENT To Petition, private respondent SHAI parlays the what-can-
the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence) the
be-raised line. It urges the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A," and TCT No. 15084
as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and issues raised therein, particularly those bearing on the authenticity of Exhibit
B as its Exhibits "1" and 2, respectively. As the pre-trial order was written, it A/1, are mainly questions of fact, adding that the matter of the inalienability
would appear that the parties agreed to limit the issue to the due execution
of the area purportedly sold is outside the issue agreed upon during the pre-
and genuineness of Exhs. A and B.[19]
trial stage.

During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI The desired dismissal cannot be granted on the bases of the
Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No.
reasons proffered above. While the Court, in a petition for review
815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit A is a forgery.
of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits
For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same
document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from
public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[25] citing Floro v.
stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it
Llenado,[26] for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:
did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the
LMBs jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place. The testimony of other xxx There are, however, exceptional
circumstances that would compel the Court to review
witnesses revolved around the absence of bureau records respecting SHAIs
the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in and
application to acquire, payment of the purchase price and Psd-76057, the subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference
plan described in TCT No. 15084. [20] made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who brought or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are
based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the
with him PNP QDR No. 001-96 and testified that Palads signature in Exhibit findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ; 7) ; 8) ; 9) when the
A (same as Exh. 1) is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which if properly
likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10)
filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis,[21] followed by the payment in when the findings of facts are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
full of the contract price. Atty. Vicente Garcia, the then Register of Deeds
evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.)
of Rizal, also testified about his having endorsed to Palad a letter-inquiry he
received from SHAI respecting the authenticity of TCT No. 15084. Palads
response-letter dated January 23, 1992 (Exh. 10), according to Atty. Garcia, To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least
is to the effect that TCT No. 15084 must be genuine as it emanated from the three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9.
Registrys office on the basis of the October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale. [22] On
Private respondent SHAIs stance about the petitioner Republic being barred
rebuttal, Palad would deny authorship of Exhibit 10 and an LMB official
would disclaim transmitting the same to Atty. Garcia. Eventually, in a from raising the issue of inalienability since it failed to plead or assert the
decision[23] dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment same at the pre-trial proceedings is, to a degree, correct. For the general
dismissing the Republics complaint, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the
rule, as articulated in Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro,[27] is
foregoing, the Complaint dated November 15, 1991 is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to costs. that the determination of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the

The counterclaims are also DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. consideration of others on appeal. It should be pointed out, however, that the
In not so many words, the trial court considered the parcels covered by the
rationale for such preliminary, albeit mandatory, conference is to isolate as
deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic
far as possible the trial out of the realm of surprises and back-handed
went on appeal to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 59454. maneuverings. And lest it be overlooked, the adverted rule on the procedure
In the herein assailed Decision[24] dated January 28, 2003, the appellate to be observed in pre-trials is, as Bergano v. Court of Appeals[28] teaches,
court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Hence, this petition of the
citing Gicano v. Gegato,[29] subject to exceptions. And without meaning to
Republic on the threshold abstract submission that the CA completely
ignored, overlooked and/or grossly misappreciated facts of substance which, diminish the importance of the same rule, the Court is possessed with
if duly considered, will materially affect the outcome of this case.
inherent power to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the

its operations whenever the demands of justice so require.[30] Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes.[35] Such

tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be
Given the foregoing considerations, the rule to be generally
subject to sale or other disposition until again declared
observed in pre-trial conferences hardly poses an insurmountable obstacle to
alienable.[36] Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches
tackling the question of inalienability which, under the premises, is an issue
that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to
more legal than factual. As it were, the element of surprise is not really
private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable,[37] unless it
present here. For the issue of inalienability, which is central to the Republics
is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable
cause of action, was raised in its basic complaint, passed upon by the CA
public land.[38] And until a given parcel of land is released from its
and, before it, by the trial court[31] and of which at least one witness (Palad)
classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law
was examined as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness you stated that the parcel of or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part
land in question at the time of the land alleged sale
was part of the [FBMR]. Now as part of the [FBRM] do of a military reservation remains,[39] even if incidentally it is devoted for a
you know whether the said parcel of land can be the
subject of disposition? purpose other than as a military camp or for defense. So it must be here.

There can be no quibbling that the JUSMAG area subject of the


A: If it is part of the reservation it cannot be
sold and it is already part of those government lands
questioned October 30, 1991 sale formed part of the FBMR as originally
that has been assigned to other government agencies
that is no longer within my jurisdiction. Meaning to say established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI
I have no more say on that because the proclamation
to the effect was reserving this for particular purpose would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented
under the DND .[32] (Words in bracket added.)
evidence that subject land is within military reservation,[40]and even dared to

state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
At any rate, Palads testimony drew nary an objection from private
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se,[41] its own
respondent SHAI. It even cross-examined said witness.[33] The rule obtains
evidence themselves belie its posture. We start with its Exhibit 2 (petitioners
that the introduction of evidence bearing on an issue not otherwise included
Exh. B), a copy of TCT No. 15084, which described the area covered thereby
in the pre-trial order amounts to implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the
measuring 399,922 square meters as a portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-
court to try such issue.[34]
2031 situated in Jusmang (sic) area Fort Bonifacio. Complementing its

Digressing from the procedural aspects of this case, we now Exhibit 2 is its Exhibit 1 - the deed of sale - which technically described the

consider the clashing assertions regarding the JUSMAG area. Was it, during property purportedly being conveyed to private respondent SHAI as follows:

the period material, alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and,
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 3-Y-1, Psd-76067, being a
therefore, can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance? portion of Parcel 3 of plan Psu-2031) situated in Jusmag (sic)
area, Fort Bonifacio, Province of Rizal. Xxx (Emphasis added)
As the Court distinctly notes, the disputed property, as described
in private respondents Exhibits 1 and 2, formed part of that wide expanse
Petitioner Republic, as do the intervenors, asserts the inalienable under Proclamation No. 423 which lists, as earlier stated, three (3) parcels of
land of the public domain as falling within its coverage. These include, inter
character of the JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been
alia, the entire 15,912,684-square meter area constituting Parcel No. 3 of
Plan Psu 2031 located inside the now renamed Fort Mckinley which, to a
separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and
redundant point, was declared a military reservation.
disposable. The Court has, on the issue of inalienability, taken stock of the Compilation
Map of Approved Surveys Plan inside Parcels 1, 2, 3 and 4, of plan Psu
The Republics and the intervenors parallel assertions are correct. 2031[42] prepared in September 1995 and certified by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It indicates in colored ink the
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of outlines of Parcels 2, 3 and 4 covered by Proclamation No. 423. As there
also shown, the 399,992-square meter area embraced by SHAIs TCT
Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any No. 15084, defined in the legend by red-colored stripes, is within the violet-
colored borders of Parcel No. 3 and Parcel No. 4 of Proclamation No. 423.
own Exhibit 5,[47] a letter dated March 19, 1991 of then PA Commanding
Indubitably, the area covered by SHAIs TCT No. 15084 was and is still part General, M/Gen Lisandro Abadia, to one Mrs. Gabon, then President of the
of the FBMR, more particularly within the 15,912,684- square meter Parcel SHAI, cannot but be viewed as a partys judicial admission that the disputed
No. 3 of the reservation. The petitioner Republic, joined by the intervenors land has yet to be excluded from the military reservation. The Abadia letter,
BCDA, DND and AFP in this appellate proceedings, has maintained all with its feature dis-serving to private respondent SHAI, reads in part as
along this thesis. Towards discharging its burden of proving that the follows:
disputed property is part of the reservation, the petitioner Republic need
only to demonstrate that all of the 15,912,684 square meters of Parcel No.
3 of Plan Psu 2031 have been reserved for military purposes. The
evidence, however, of the fact of reservation is the law or, to be more Dear Mrs. Gabon:
precise, Proclamation No. 423 itself, the contents and issuance of which This is in connection with your move to
courts can and should take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of make a petition to President Aquino regarding
the Rules of Court.[43] the possible exclusion of Southside Housing Area from
the military reservation and for its eventual allotment to
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked the military officers presently residing thereat. Allow
Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to me to state that I interpose no objection . I find it
the proclamations specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No. helpful to our officers to be provided a portion of
15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered the Fort Bonifaciomilitary reservation . (Underscoring
inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. In this regard, the added.)
appellate court seemed to have glossed over, if not entirely turned a blind
eye on, certain admissions made by the private respondent, the most basic
Owing to the foregoing considerations, the Court is hard put to
being those made in its answer to the Republics allegations in paragraph 5
(e) and (g) of its complaint. To the Republics allegations that the property understand how the CA could still have found for SHAI.. The
covered by TCT No. 15084 was and remains part the FBMR, SHAIs answer
thereto reads: appellate court, apparently swayed by what SHAI said in its Brief for the

Appellees[48] that:
2. It specifically denies the allegations in
paragraphs 5 of the complaint, the truth of the
matter being that in the Deed of Sale , the Director of Appellant [petitioner Republic] is probably unaware that , then
Lands Certificate (sic) that he is authorized under the President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation 461 when he
law to sell the subject property and that the lots were excluded from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 an area of
duly awarded by the [LBM] to the vendee.[44] ( 2,455,810 square meters more or less. Likewise on October 16,
Emphasis and word in bracket added.) 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No.
172 excluding five (5) parcels of land from the operation of
In net effect, private respondent SHAI admitted what the Proclamation No. 423 also located at Fort Bonifacio containing an
petitioner Republic alleged in par. 5 (e) and (g) of the complaint, the formers area of 4,436, 478 . So if we deduct the 6,892,288 [2,455,810 +
denial to such allegations on the inalienable nature of the property covered 4,436,478 = 6,892,288] square meters covered by Proclamation
by TCT No. 15084 being in the nature of a general denial. Under the rules on Nos. 461 and 172 of the areas reserved for military purposes of
pleadings, a specific, not a general, denial is required; a denial is not specific 7,053,143 square meters, what is only left is 160,857 square
because it is so qualified or termed specific by the pleader.[45] The defendant meters or more or less 16 hectares .[49]
must specify each material factual allegation the truth of which he absolutely
denies and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the justified its holding on the alienability of the disputed land with the
matters upon which he will rely to support his denial.[46] Else, the denial will following disquisition:
be regarded as general and will, therefore, be regarded as an admission of a
given material fact/s stated in the complaint. The foregoing admission aside, appellants [now petitioners]
What private respondent SHAI did under the premises was to reliance on Proclamation No. 493 [should be 423] in insisting that
enter what, under the Rules, is tantamount to a general denial of the the land in litigation is inalienable because it is part of the [FBMR]
Republics averments that what SHAIs TCT No. 15084 covers is part of the is too general to merit serous consideration. While it is true that,
military reservation. In the process, private respondent SHAI is deemed to under the said July 12, 1957 Proclamation, then President Carlos
admit the reality of such averment. P. Garcia reserved the area now known as FortBonifacio for
To be sure, the petitioner Republic, as plaintiff below, had more military purposes, appellee [now respondent] correctly calls our
than sufficiently established its claim on the inalienability of the parcels of attention to the fact, among other matters, that numerous
land covered by TCT No. 15084. In fine, it had discharged the burden of exceptions thereto had already been declared through the years.
proof on the issue of inalienability. Be that as it may, the burden of evidence The excluded areas under Proclamation No. 461,
to disprove inalienability or, to be precise, that said parcels of land had, for dated September 29, 1965 and Proclamation No. 172,
settlement purposes, effectively been withdrawn from the reservation or dated October 16, 1987 alone already total 6,892,338 square
excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423, devolves upon the meters. (Figures in bracket added.)
private respondent. This is as it should be for the cogency of SHAIs claim
respecting the validity of both the underlying deed of sale (Exh. A/1) and its The CAs justifying line does not commend itself for
TCT No. 15084 (Exh. B/2) rests on the postulate that what it purportedly concurrence.
bought from the LMB had ceased to be part of the reserved lands of the
public domain. Elsewise put, SHAI must prove that the JUSMAG area had For one, it utilizes SHAIs misleading assertion as a springboard to
been withdrawn from the reservation and declared open for disposition, justify speculative inferences. Per our count, Proclamation 423
failing which it has no enforceable right over the area as against the State. reserved for military purposes roughly a total area
Private respondent SHAI has definitely not met its burden by of 25,875,000 square meters, not 7,053,143. On the other hand,
reason of lack of evidence. To be sure, it has not, because it cannot even if it Proclamation Nos. 461 and 172 excluded a combined area
wanted to, pointed to any presidential act specifically withdrawing the of 6,892,338 square meters. Now then, the jump from an
disputed parcels from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423. Worse still, its acknowledgment of the disputed parcels of land having
been reserved for military purposes to a rationalization that they
must have been excluded from the reservation because
6,892,338 square meters had already been withdrawn from 3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to
Proclamation 423 is simply speculative. Needless to stress, purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act.[56] There is also
factual speculations do not make for proof. no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an
application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property
Corollary to the first reason is the fact that private respondent valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
SHAI - and quite understandably, the appellate court - had not November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records
pointed to any proclamation, or legislative act for that matter, Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial
segregating the property covered by TCT No. 15084 from the court[57] attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then
reservation and classifying the same as alienable and disposable Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having
lands of the public domain. To reiterate what we earlier said, personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining to
lands of the public domain classified as a military reservation SHAI.[58]
remains as such until, by presidential fiat or congressional act, the
same is released from such classification and declared open to 4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the deed of
disposition.[50] The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203C dated 29 October
executed by Palad, assuming for the nonce its authenticity, could 1991, (sic) as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price.. An
not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the official receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While
JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent it kept referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required
SHAIs unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel payment,[59] it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence.
to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG A Certification under date September 15, 1993 of the OIC Cash Division,
area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not LMB, states that OR # 6030203 in the amount of P11,977,000.00 supposedly
usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials paid by [SHAI] is not among the series of [ORs] issued at any time by the
or agents.[51] National Printing Office to the Cashier, LMB, Central Office.[60] A copy of the
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private OR receipt is not appended to any of the pleadings filed before the Court.
respondent are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction We can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its
were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily presentation would be adverse to SHAI.
void ab initio A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document
as paid has, in fact, never been paid.[61]
The Court can hypothetically concede, as a matter of fact, the withdrawal of
the JUSMAG area from the ambit of Proclamation No. 423 and its 5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for
reclassification as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Still, SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount
such hypothesis would not carry the day for private respondent SHAI. The apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit
reason therefor is basic: Article XII, Section 3[52] of the 1987 Constitution plausible, SHAIs witnesses account taxes credulity to the limit.
forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, except through lease for a limited period. While Fr. Bernas A final consideration in G.R. No. 156951. This case could not have come to
had stated the observation that the reason for the ban is not very clear under pass without the participation of a cabal of cheats out to make a dishonest
existing jurisprudence,[53] the fact remains that private corporations, like buck at the expense of the government and most likely the members of
SHAI, are prohibited from purchasing or otherwise acquiring alienable public SHAI. No less than its former president (Ms. Virginia Santos) testified that a
lands. facilitator did, for a fee, the necessary paper and leg work before the LMB
and the Registry of Deeds that led to the execution of the Deed of Sale and
Even if on the foregoing score alone, the Court could write finis to this issuance of the certificate of title in question. [62] Ms. Santos identified
disposition. An appropriate closure to this case could not be had, however, Eugenia Balis, a geodetic engineer, as the facilitator[63] who facilitated all
without delving to an extent on the issue of the validity of the October 30, these presentation of documents,[64] and most of the time, directly
1991 Deed of Sale which necessarily involves the question of the authenticity transacted with the LMB and the Register of Deeds leading to acquisition of
of what appears to be Palads signature thereon .With the view we take of the title.[65] Engr. Balis was, in the course of Ms. Santos testimony, directly
case, the interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible mentioned by name for at least fifteen (15) times. Not surprisingly, Engr.
therefrom, would, as a package, cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, Balis did not appear in court, despite SHAIs stated intention to present her as
if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious. Consider: witness.[66]

The extent of the misappropriation of the Fort Bonifacio land involved in this
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a and the NOVA area litigations is, as described in the Report of the
forgery. The Court perceives no reason why he should lie, albeit respondent FactFinding Commission,[67] so epic in scale as to make the overpricing of
states, without elaboration, that Palads declaration is aimed at land complained of in the two hundred AFP [Retirement and Separation
avoiding criminal prosecution.[54] The NBI signature expert corroborated Benefits System] RSBS cases (P703 million) seem like petty shoplifting in
Palads allegation on forgery.[55] Respondent SHAIs expert witness from the comparison.[68] The members of private respondent SHAI may very well have
PNP, however, disputes the NBIs findings. In net effect, both experts from paid for what they might have been led to believe as the purchase price of
the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out. the JUSMAG housing area. The sad reality, however, is that the over P11
Million they paid, if that be the case, for a piece of real estate contextually
2. Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB outside the commerce of man apparently fell into the wrong hands and did
office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, not enter the government coffers. Else, there must be some memorials of
Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to PasigCity to appear such payment.At bottom, this disposition is nothing more than restoring the
before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry petitioner Republic, and eventually the BCDA, to what rightfully belongs to it
and there stamped Received by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or in law and in fact. There is nothing unjust to this approach.
at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991 to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was
issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was With the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for contempt in G.R. No.
done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. 173408 need not detain us long. As it were, the question raised by the
Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as petitioners therein respecting the ownership of the JUSMAG area and,
the bureaus authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to accordingly, of the right of the petitioning retired military officers to remain in
have a deed notarized. the housing units each may be occupying is now moot and academic.
However, contempt petitioners expressed revulsion over the efforts of the have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify
military establishment, particularly the AFP Chief of Staff, to oust them from the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
their respective dwellings, if that really be the case, even before G.R. No. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121,
156951 could be resolved, is understandable as it is justified. We thus end as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
this ponencia with a reminder to all and sundry that might is not always right; been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
that ours is still a government of laws and not of men, be they in the civilian therefore ultra vires and null and void.
or military sector. Accordingly, the Court will not treat lightly any attempt to
trifle, intended or otherwise, with its processes and proceedings. A becoming i. Almagro vs Kwan Oct 20, 2011 CARPIO, J.
respect to the majesty of the law and the prerogatives of the Court is a must
for the orderly administration of justice to triumph.
FACTS
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 156951 is GRANTED and the
appealed CA Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the This case involves a 17,181 square meter land which is known as
Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 (Exh. Lot No. 6278-M located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and inherited by
A/1) purportedly executed in favor of private respondent SHAI and TCT No. respondents from their parents who died in 1976 and 1986respectively.
15084 (Exh. B/2) of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on
the basis ofsuch deed are declared VOID. The Register of Deeds of Pasig On September 18, 1996, respondents filed with the MTC an
or Taguig, as the case may be, is hereby ordered to CANCEL TCT No. action for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners as well as
15084 in the name of SHAI and the area covered thereby those who are occupants within the boundary of the land in controversy.
is DECLARED part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, unless the
same has, in the interim, been duly excluded by law or proclamation from During the pre-trial, the Court and the parties designated geodetic
such reservation. Private respondent SHAI, its members, representatives engineer Suasin to perform the task of verification and relocation survey of
and/or their assigns shall vacate the subject parcels of land immediately said lot and which was accordingly executed on September 12-13, 2000.
upon the finality of this decision, subject to the provisions of Republic Act No.
7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act . In the written report of Engr. Suasin, it contained, inter alia, that
Cost against the private respondent SHAI. the big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and a small portion
Having said our piece in G.R. No. 173408, we need not speak any further remain as dry land, and that some of the defendants have constructed
buildings or houses inside the dry land.
thereon other than to deny as we hereby similarly DENY the same. SO
ORDERED. In the Court’s judgment dated May 11, 2001, the MTC dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M
has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
h. Republic vs CA and Republic Nov 25, 1998(see J. Puno
concurring opinion); Respondents appealed to the RTC, which subsequently
concluded upon conducting two ocular inspections, that the disputed
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all remaining portion is not foreshore land because it remained dry even during
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own high tides.
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied. They also
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, filed separate petitions for review withthe Court of Appeals.
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with ISSUE
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Whether or not the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is still
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay private land or has become foreshore land which forms part of the public
for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into domain, as contended by petitioners
an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the HELD
agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of
the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore The SC held that the disputed portion is private land and is
land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within rightfully owned by respondents, in contravention to the claim of petitioners
the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the that is has become foreshore land and therefore owned by the public
term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
domain, and that they have foreshore lease permits from the DENR on
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision
was affirmed by the CA with modifications. claimed foreshore land, albeit failing to present evidence to prove validity of
ISSUEs: Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged such claim.
area and Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area are within
the commerce of man. j. Republic vs Alagad Jan 26 1989
HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the
opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: two orders of the defunct Court of First Instance of Laguna 2 dismissing its
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is petition for "annulment of title and reversion.3 The facts appear in the
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. decision appealed from:
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-
tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration
a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International Dictionary) of their title over a parcel of land situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which was
we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an
intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected hundred (100) families is no longer reached and covered by the waters of the
in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2. Laguna de Bay; and

The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that (d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio
applicants and their predecessors have not been in possession of the land people, the land in question would not have been fit for
openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of human habitation, so much so that defendants and
ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of their predecessors-in-interest could not have acquired
the public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed the application. an imperfect title to the property which could be
(LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 4922 of the Court of First Instance of judicially confirmed in a registration case, as in fact
Laguna). said defendants and their predecessors-in-interest
have never been in actual possession of the land in
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16, 1956, question, the actual occupants thereof being the barrio
supplemented by orders issued on March 21, 1956 and August 13, 1956, people of Aplaya; 6
defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot
2, was declared public land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and Original In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under Section 20,
Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1, dated October 18, 1956, was issued in the of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper upon failure of the
names of defendants. Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the judgment, dated
January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No. 189 has long become final, titles to
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna, the properties had been issued (in favor of the private respondents), and
was filed by defendants to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. that res judicata, consequently, was a bar.
On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case ordering the
defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained the
defendants, as plaintiffs therein. The defendants therein did not appeal. lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition for failure of the Republic to appear
for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant case. On
October 6, 1970, as prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary I.
injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his
deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals has been
the defendants from selling, mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is well-established that the State cannot
any transaction affecting the area. be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or
agents, 7 much more, non-suited as a result thereof.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the pre-trial,
Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau of Lands, This is so because:
representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the court a
quodismissed the complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,
was set for hearing, and finally denied by the court a quo, hence, this appeal. ... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity,
which is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that the Constitution as well as the present charter. It is
appeal was dismissed by this Court for failure to show in the record on charged moreover with the conservation of such
appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to the Supreme patrimony. There is need therefore of the most
Court on a petition for review on the action of this Court. On November 19, rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions
1982, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of this Court and thereof are judicially accorded recognition, especially
ordered Us to reinstate and give due course to plaintiffs appeal.4 so where the matter is sought to be raked up anew
after almost fifty years. Such primordial consideration,
In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the decree and not the apparent carelessness, much less the
title [rendered and issued in LRC Case No. 189, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] acquiescense of public officials, is the controlling norm
insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1, Psu- ...8
116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are void ab initio, 5 for the following reasons:
The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines 9 and Nilo v.
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Romero, 10 cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision, are not
Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of the same survey plan containing 2.8421 applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the
hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore land reached and part of the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its promises.
covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L- In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground
20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., that the defendant had been "erroneously' represented in the complaint by
L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965); the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a holding that
the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the City (Davao
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of Barrio City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were
Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga, Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by the voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it could not be said
barrio people since the American occupation of the country in the early that the Government had been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.
1900's where they established their houses;
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment to
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early 1900's reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 11 this Court stated:
have filled up and elevated the land to its present condition of being some
feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-116971 and the rest of ... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya (Republic v Animas, et al., . supra), and the
where there are now sixty-eight (68) houses occupied by more than one cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary
action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the (4) Lakes and lagoons formed by
prior judgment of the land registration court, since the Nature on public lands, and their
said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. beds;
And if there was no such jurisdiction, then the principle
of res judicata does not apply. For it is a well-settled (5) Rain waters running through
rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a ravines or sand beds, which are
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; also of public dominion;
(1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment (6) Subterranean waters on
on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first public lands;
and second actions, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action (7) Waters found within the zone
(Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza of operation of public works,
vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)...12 even if constructed by a
contractor;
In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private
respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court could not have (8) Waters rising continuously or
validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the authority to do intermittently on lands belonging
so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands had failed to appeal from the decree of to private persons, to the State,
registration could not have validated the court's decision, rendered without to a province, or to a city or
jurisdiction. municipality from the moment
they leave such lands;
II.
(9) The waste waters of
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of fountains, sewers and public
private ownership ." 13 Property is of public dominion if it is: establishments.20

(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public
character; 14 or if it: lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public
domain.
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or the
the development of the national wealth. 15 State or provinces, belong to the respective owners of such lands, and those
situated upon lands of communal use belong to their respective pueblos.21
All other property of the State, it is provided further,
which is not of the character mentioned in ... article Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands subject of
[4201, is patrimonial property,16 meaning to say, the Republic's reversion efforts are foreshore in nature, the Republic has
property 'open to disposition17 by the Government, or legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that case, res judicata or
otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, estoppel is no defense.22
or public lands.18 Property of the public dominion, on
the other hand, refers to things held by the State by Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore
regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature lands is the core of controversy. According to the trial court, the
and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to
under the present Constitution, [w]ith the exception of the Republic of the Philippines, 23 and hence, available disposition and
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and
be alienated.'19 that as foreshore laud, it is not registerable.

Specifically:
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is it part
and parcel of the public domain?
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake .24 Thus:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it
(2) Continuous or intermittent contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is
waters of springs and brooks connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the definition
running in their natural beds and just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake. 25
the beds themselves;
And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San Jose further
(3) Waters rising continuously or tells us, "we must resort to the legal provisions governing the ownership and
intermittently on lands of public use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character
dominion; and ownership of the parcels of land in question.26 The recourse to legal
provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he
natural bed or basin of lakes ... is the ground covered by their waters when at the same for military purposes under the administration of the Chief of Staff,
their highest ordinary depth. 27 and in which case, it forms part of the national Philippine Army. On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45
dominion. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth covering the 8 and 10 installment for the 20.6400 hectares, the remaining
has been defined as:
area after the sales application was amended which did not include the
military camp. Thereafter, on May 15, 1948, the Director of Lands ordered
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay the issuance of patent to Eugenio deJesus for the tract of land having an
during the dry season, such depth being the regular,
area of 20.6400 hectares. On the same date, the secretary of Agriculture and
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the
time during the year . . . 28 Natural Resources likewise granted a sales patent to Eugenio de Jesus
containing an area of 20.6400 hectares. On August 11, 1956, President
Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of Ramon Magsaysay revoked the Proclamation No.85 and declared the
nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not disputed lot opens to disposition under the provisions of Public
considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot Land Act for resettlement of the squatters in Davao City. Then on October 9,
therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of the public PresidentRamon Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation and reserved the
dominion, and land capable of registration as private property. same lot for medical center site under the administration of the Director of
Hospital. Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows: Center applied for Torrens registration of the said lot with the Court of First
Instance of Davao, claimed “fee simple” title to the Appellate Court denied
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and the motion on June 17, 1975. Forthwith, the petitioner elevated the matter to
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the the Supreme Court for appeal.
tides... 29
Issue: Whether or not Mindanao Medical Center has a registerable title over
The strip of land that lies between the high and low the whole contested area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of the Proclamation
water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry No. 350 reserving the said land for medical site purposes.
according to the flow of the tide.30
Conclusion: Yes, Mindanao Medical Center had a registerable title over the
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not lot with area of 12.8081 hectares by virtue of Proclamation No. 350 reserving
become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters. such land for medical site purposes. The Supreme Court held that:

The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, 1. Proclamation No. 350 is free from infirmity and it proceeds from the
the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place, because it is not a trier of recognized competence of the President to reserve alienable lands of the
facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in
public for specific public use or service. The law authorizes the President to
arriving at a conclusive disposition 31 We therefore remand the case to the
court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is designate tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the
foreshore. We, consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial commonwealth of the Philippines. A special proprietary right was vested in
court and reinstate the Republic's complaint. Eugenio de Jesus when the sales award was issued to him in 1934 which
was for 22 hectares (later found to be 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey).
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further The privilege of occupying public lands confers no contractual or vested
proceedings. rights and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by public, or to reserve them for public use may defeat the
k. Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical Center vs CA Sep imperfect right of a settler. Such proclamation of the President to reserve
30, 1976; lands terminates any rights previously acquired by persons t not proprietary
right for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent
Facts: On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, father of the respondent and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State
Alejandro deJesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a
33-hectare land situated in barrio Libranon, Davao. On January 23, 1934, the
Bureau of Lands through theDavao Land District Officer accepted the sealed
bids for the purchase of the subjected land. Irineo Jose bidded P20 per 5. Disposition under Public Land Act and other Laws(Page 649
hectare while Dr. Jose Ebro bidded for P100.50 per hectare. The director Agcaoili)
annulled the said auction for the reason that sales applicant Eugenio de
Jesus failed to participate in the bid. Another bidding was held on October 3, 5.1. Reason for the Patent;
1934 and Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equaled the bid
a. Kasilag vs Rodriguez Dec 7, 1939(see Dissenting of J.
submitted by Dr.Jose Ebro at P100.50 and made a deposit of P221 as 10%
Moran);
deposit of the price of the land at P110.50 per hectare. That on November
23, 1934, the Director of Lands issuedan award order to Eugenio de Jesus FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of
with regards to the said lot stating the coverage of the land which is located mortgage of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the
in Davao with an area of 22 hectares at P100.50 per hectare or P2210 for payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated
the whole tract. On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands amended the that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years and
sales application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that a portion of the said land is in such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that
needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes thereby Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within
4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the land. After a year, it turned
excluding 12.8081 hectares which is the land in question. On September 7,
out that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal
1936, President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 thereby agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
declaring the said lot to be withdrawn from sale and settlement and reserving the condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan, would attend
to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would 5.3. Free Patent and Residential Free Patent under RA 10023(Free
introduce improvement thereof. Patent Act);
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the
mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract e. Del Rosario-Igtiben vs Republic Oct 22, 2004
of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance
burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid. 5.4. Sales Patent under CA 141(Public Land Act) and Sales of
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in
Agricultural Residential Land Under RA 730(Sales Patent Act);
good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner
of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we f. Dela Rosa vs Valdez Jul 27, 20011
can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in g. Agura vs Serfino Dec 4, 1991
section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be
premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of 5.5. Reservations(pages 84-96, Agcaoili);
law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance
may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the h. Int’l Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs UP Aug. 13, 1991;
laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not SUMMARY:
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking International Hardwood was the grantee of a License Agreement effective
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as until 1985. On 1961, Proc. 791 segregates from the public domain parcels of
clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are land and reserved them for use by UP. The land subject of
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was Hardwood’s timber concession was covered by said Proclamation.
prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the On 1964, RA 3990 was enacted fully ceding ownership over the land
conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section described in Proc. 791 to UP. UP sought to collect forestry charges
116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. from Hardwood and demanded that the latter subject itself to the control
and supervision of UP. Hardwood resisted and filed a petition for declaratory
5.2. Homestead Patent; relief.

b. Lopez vs CA Mar 5, 2003 The SC held that UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing without
other limitations than those established by law. In this case, that exception is
c. Nieto vs Quines Jan 28, 1961; made for Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has
been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area
SUMMARY: This is a motion to reconsider the decision of January 28, 1961, ceded and transferred to UP until February 1985. However, Hardwood has
declaring appellees' title to the land in dispute as valid, enforceable and the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges or royalties to
superior to that of appellant's title. A study of the facts disclosed that Arturo the new owner, UP
Nieto's predecessor-in-interest, Muriu Florentine) claimed ownership over Lot
No. 3044 of the Abulug Cadastre. During the cadastral proceedings her claim DOCTRINE: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the
was not opposed and the court found no irregularity in the proceedings and area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing
infirmity of Florentine's claim of ownership. Subseqeuntly, it adjudicated the concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this
Lot and ordered a title issued therefor in the name of Maria Florentine. On means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected,
the other hand, Bartolome Quines' Homestead Application filed long before impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the
the cadastral proceedings covers the same tract of land claimed by Maria Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
Florentine In like manner, Quines' application was not opposed, legal effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P Having been effectively
requirements were fully complied, and there being no more impediments, the segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public
Bureau of Lands, pursuant to the Public Land Law ordered the issuance of a forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the
Homestead Patent in favor of Bartolome Quines. Hence, these authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
circumstances of two valid titles registered on the same date, in the name of terminated.
two different persons and were the results of two lawful proceedings, one BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to
judicial and the other administrative. This gave rise to the question of whose collect forestry
title should be recognized. The Supreme Court reversed its decision and charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer.
upheld appellant's title
i. Republic vs Doldol Sep 10, 1998
HELD: Cadastral cases initiated by the Government are judicial in nature
and one in rem. Decisions therein are binding against the whole world, DOCTRINE: Under PD 1073, a person acquires a right to a government rant
including the government. After the finality of the degree, title of ownership over a particular land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
becomes vested upon the adjudicatee and the land could no longer be issued, if: (a) The land is alienable public land (b) The person has open,
disposed of. Tho government had lost its right to convey the land by continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
homestead grant. Homestead patent title issued by the Bureau of Lands wag
which must be for the period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12,
the result of administrative proceedings initiated by the homestead applicant.
The proceedings are under the control and determination of tho Director of 1945, or earlier.
Lands whose decisions on the contest are not final and conclusive. In view
of the nature and manner of acquisition of appellees' title over the disputed FACTS: Sometime in 1959 Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in
land, it must perforce give way to the appellant's title acquired by judicial Barrio Pontacan, Municipalty of Opol, Misamis Oriental. In 1963, he filed an
adjudication. application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the same was rejected
by the Bureau of Forest Development in 1968. While his application was
pending, in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a
d. Flores vs Bagaoisan Apr 15, 2010 resolution reserving Lot 4932 as a school site, which was eventually
occupied by Opol High School in 1970. The reserved lot included the land
area occupied by Doldol. Seventeen years later, or on November 2, 1987, defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
Pres. Corazon Aquino issued a Proclamation still reserving the said area to subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
Opol High School, which was then renamed to Opol National Secondary
Technical School. By virtue of said declaration, the school demanded that 5.6. Friar Lands;
Doldol vacate the land, but he refused. 1991: Opol National School filed a
complaint for accion possesoria with the Cagayan de Oro RTC. The trial j. Pugeda vs Tnias Mar 31, 1962
court ruled in favor of the school and ordered Doldol to vacate. CA reversed
Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot
and held that since Doldol has possessed the land from 1959 up to 1991 or
of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of
for 32 years, he is now entitled to the same by virtue of prescription. the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death
and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the
CA cites as basis for its decision Sec. 48 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act, setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by
as amended by RA 1942: Section 48. The following described citizens of the the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence.
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein,
Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
operation of the Friar Lands Act which at the time of his death were not yet
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name of the widow who
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and thereafter
certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxxxxxxxx the title was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have property not conjugal;
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and (2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals;
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses
of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Movants cited the case of Arayata vs.
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion and
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have declared the decision as final.
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Hence, the
instant petition. Ruling:
ISSUE: Whether Doldol, having occupied the lot for 32 years, acquired a Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar
Lands, said lot ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the
right over the land.
husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after his death and
RULING: No. While the laws provide for prescription as a way for acquiring the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the
ownership over a particular land, the CA erred in applying Sec. 48 of the setting aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by
Public Land Act which is the outdated version of the said law. Sec. 48 has the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered evidence. The doctrine in
now already been amended by PD 1073, which now states that: (b) Those the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of by the husband without the approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not
applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made pro indiviso in a
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the
or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the properties among the heirs.
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be k. Solid State Multi-Products Corp. vs CA May 6, 1991
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Under the
said act, a person acquires a right to a government rant over a particular
land, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued, if: (a) The land
is alienable public land (b) The person has open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same which must be for the
period prescribed by the law, which is since June 12, 1945, or earlier. IN
THIS CASE: The land is alienable and disposable, in accordance with the
District Foresters Certification. However, Doldol had been occupying the land
reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law requires that the
possession of lands of public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier,
for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Thus, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title or a right to the
disputed lot. He cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given
that the President has reserved the said lot as a school site. Having been
reserved in its favor, Opol National School has a better right of possession
over the land in dispute. o The privilege of occupying public lands with a view
of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied
and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the
divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may

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