[G.R. No.

174346, September 12, 2008]

FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA AND JOHNNY OCO, JR., PETITIONERS,

VS. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BY PEDRO LEGASPI,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals,[1]
which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, of Tangub City in Civil Case
No. TC-97-001, ordering the defendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de
Barrera and Johnny Oco. Jr. to return possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs-
herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.

On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. (Oco), said to be a "peace officer
connected with the PNP," accompanied by "unidentified CAFGU members," forced his
way into respondents' 0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio,
Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of the property, Oco and company
used a tractor to destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had since
tended it.[2]

Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
of Tangub City for Reconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and Damages[3] against petitioners.

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part of a three-hectare
property described in OCT No. P-447 issued on February 10, 1956 in the name of Andrea
Lacson who sold a 2-hectare portion thereof to Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold
1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera (Fernanda).[4]

Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was occupied, possessed and
cultivated by their predecessor-in-interest Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since
1935;[5] after a subdivision survey was conducted in November 30, 1976, it was found
out that the land formed part of the titled property of Andrea Lacson;[6] and despite this
discovery, they never filed any action to recover ownership thereof since they were left
undisturbed in their possession,[7] until October 1, 1996 when petitioners forced their
way into it.

Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative defense.[8] In their

Memorandum, however, they questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject
matter of the complaint, the assessed value of the land being only P11,160,[9] as
reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565.[10]

By Decision of November 27, 1998, the trial court found for respondents, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents]
and against the defendants [-herein petitioners]:
 1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs
and

2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and disturbing plaintiffs'
peaceful possession thereof, unless there be another court judgment to the
contrary.

SO ORDERED.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court, maintaining that it
had, held:
The Court is not persuaded by [the defendants'] arguments. What determines the nature
of the action as well as the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt are the facts alleged in the
complaint and not those alleged in the answer of the defendants.

xxxx

In [p]ar. 2 of plaintiffs' complaint, the land in question was described as a riceland

"situated at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occ. and declared under [T]ax [D]eclaration No.
7564 in the name of Vicente Legaspi and bounded on the north by a creek, on the east
Sec. 12, on the south Lot No. 007 and on the west also by Lot No. 007 which tax
declaration cancels former [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 12933 under the name of Lorenza
Bacul Legaspi which likewise cancels [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger
portion of the land under which the land described under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7565 is
part and parcel thereof [sic]; the present estimated value being P50,000."[11]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's
disposition of the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

On the merits, the appellate court affirmed too the trial court's decision, finding that
"both testimonial and documentary evidence on record established that appellees,
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in peaceful, continuous, public and
actual possession of the property in dispute even before the year 1930."[12]

The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the only issue involved is
the determination of possession de jure.[13]

Hence, the present petition for review which raises the following issues:
I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO DETERMINE WHO HAS
A BETTER RIGHT [TO] THE PORTION LITIGATED; AND

II. WHETHER . . . THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS WELL AS THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT DEPEND ON THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.[14]
For obvious reasons, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be first
considered.

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691 provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial
courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts, to wit:
xxxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value
of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action of
accion publiciana was to be brought before the regional trial court.[15] With the
modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level
courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro
Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does
not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the
assessed value of the property.

Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property established by taxing

authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not
represent the true or market value of the property."[16]

The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax Declaration No.
7565, a common exhibit of the parties. The bare claim of respondents that it has a value
of P50,000 thus fails. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court.

It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation
that "the present estimated value [of the land is] P50,000," which allegation is, oddly,
handwritten on the printed pleading. The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair
market value,[17] is entirely different from the assessed value of the property.

Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a
claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in
a motion to dismiss.[18] That the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only
in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them in estoppel.

En passant, the Court notes that respondents' cause of action - accion publiciana is a
wrong mode. The dispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was
filed four months thereafter or on February 7, 1997. Respondents' exclusion from the
property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of accion
publiciana.

In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, all the
proceedings therein as well as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The
complaint should perforce be dismissed. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the
first issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged July 31, 2006 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001 is declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 155178, May 07, 2008]

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ANGEL C. PONTILLAS,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 March 2002 Decision[1] and the
20 August 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50680.

The Antecedent Facts

On 24 October 1980, San Miguel Corporation (petitioner) employed Angel C. Pontillas

(respondent) as a daily wage company guard. In 1984,[3] respondent became a monthly-
paid employee which entitled him to yearly increases in salary. Respondent alleged that
his yearly salary increases were only a percentage of what the other security guards
received.

On 19 October 1993, respondent filed an action for recovery of damages due to

discrimination under Article 100[4] of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), as
amended, as well as for recovery of salary differential and backwages, against petitioner,
Capt. Segundino D. Fortich (Capt. Fortich), Company Security Commander and head of
the Mandaue Security Department, and Director Francisco Manzon, Vice President and
Brewery Director. During the mandatory conference on 23 November 1993, respondent
questioned the rate of salary increase given him by petitioner.

On 6 December 1993, Ricardo F. Elizagaque (Elizagaque), petitioner's Vice President and

VisMin Operations Center Manager, issued a Memorandum ordering, among others, the
transfer of responsibility of the Oro Verde Warehouse to the newly-organized VisMin
Logistics Operations effective 1 January 1994. In compliance with Elizagaque's
Memorandum, Capt. Fortich issued a Memorandum dated 7 February 1994 addressed to
Comdr. Danilo C. Flores (Comdr. Flores), VisMin Logistics Operations Manager, effecting
the formal transfer of responsibility of the security personnel and equipment in the Oro
Verde Warehouse to Major Teodulo F. Enriquez (Major Enriquez), Security Officer of the
VisMin Logistics Operations, effective 14 February 1994. Simultaneously, Capt. Fortich
gave the same information to his Supervising Security Guards for them to relay the
information to the company security guards.

Respondent continued to report at Oro Verde Warehouse. He alleged that he was not
properly notified of the transfer and that he did not receive any written order from Capt.
Fortich, his immediate superior. Respondent also alleged that he was wary of the
transfer because of his pending case against petitioner. He further claimed that two
other security guards continue to report at Oro Verde Warehouse despite the order to
transfer.

Petitioner alleged that respondent was properly notified of the transfer but he refused to
receive 14 memoranda issued by Major Enriquez from 14-27 February 1994. Petitioner
also alleged that respondent was given notices of Guard Detail dated 9 February 1994
and 15 February 1994 but he still refused to report for duty at the VisMin Logistics
Operations.

In a letter dated 28 February 1994, petitioner informed respondent that an

administrative investigation would be conducted on 4 March 1994 relative to his alleged
offenses of Insubordination or Willful Disobedience in Carrying Out Reasonable
Instructions of his superior. During the investigation, respondent was given an
opportunity to present his evidence and be assisted by counsel. In a letter dated 7 April
1994, petitioner informed respondent of its decision to terminate him for violating
company rules and regulations, particularly for Insubordination or Willful Disobedience in
Carrying Out Reasonable Instructions of his superior.

On 15 June 1994, respondent filed an amended complaint against petitioner for illegal
dismissal and payment of backwages, termination pay, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees.

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In a Decision dated 25 October 1996,[5] the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's

complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter recognized the management prerogative to
transfer its employees from one station to another. The Labor Arbiter found nothing
prejudicial, unjust, or unreasonable to petitioner's decision to merge the functions of the
Materials Management of the Mandaue Brewery and the Physical Distribution Group
which resulted to the forming of the VisMin Logistics Operations. The Labor Arbiter ruled
that as a consequence of the merger, the instructions and orders to all security
personnel should necessarily come from the security officer of the new organization.
Hence, respondent's allegation that his transfer order should come from Capt. Fortich
and not from Major Enriquez was misleading. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent
was informed of the impending merger, verbally and in writing, as early as 6 December
1993.

The Labor Arbiter further ruled that petitioner did not violate Article 100 of the Labor
Code. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent's claim that giving him a day-off twice a
month resulted to diminution of his monthly take-home pay was an erroneous
interpretation of the Labor Code, which even required employers to give their employees
a rest day per week. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that there was no basis for the
allegation that respondent was discriminated against in the annual salary increases.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was accorded due process before his
termination from the service. He was investigated with the assistance of counsel, and he
was able to confront petitioner's witnesses and present evidence in his favor.

Respondent appealed from the Labor Arbiter's Decision.

The Ruling of the NLRC

In its 23 May 1997 Decision,[6] the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside
the Labor Arbiter's Decision. The NLRC ruled that respondent was not informed of his
transfer from Oro Verde Warehouse to VisMin Logistics Operations. The notices allegedly
sent to respondent did not indicate any receipt from respondent. The NLRC also ruled
that the notations in the notices stating "Refused to sign" appeared to be written by the
same person on just one occasion. The NLRC found that respondent was waiting for a
formal notice from Capt. Fortich, who only instructed his Supervising Security Guard,
Rodrigo T. Yocte, to remind respondent of his transfer and new assignment. The NLRC
declared that the notices sent by Major Enriquez had no binding effect because he was
not respondent's superior. The NLRC held that it was premature to charge respondent
with insubordination for his failure to comply with the order of someone who was not his
department head. The NLRC stated that respondent had good reason to continue
reporting at Oro Verde Warehouse.

The NLRC further ruled that respondent was a victim of discrimination. The NLRC
declared that petitioner failed to justify why respondent was not entitled to the full rate
of salary increases enjoyed by other security guards.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is hereby VACATED and SET
ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the dismissal of complainant to be without any just cause and, therefore,
illegal;

2. Ordering respondent San Miguel Corporation to reinstate the complainant to his

former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from April 8, 1994 up to his actual reinstatement. However,
should reinstatement be no longer feasible, respondent San Miguel Corporation
shall pay to complainant, in addition to his full backwages, separation pay of one
(1) month pay for every year of service, a period of six (6) months to be considered
as one (1) whole year;

3. Ordering respondent San Miguel Corporation to pay to complainant moral damages

of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00; and
 4. Ordering respondent San Miguel Corporation to pay to complainant the sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award, for and as attorney's
fees.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 27 February 1998 Resolution,[8] the
NLRC partially granted the motion by deleting the award of moral and exemplary
damages. The NLRC ruled that there was no showing on record that the discrimination
against respondent was tainted with bad faith. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED only with respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages which are hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 26 March 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
NLRC's Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, an
employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct or willful disobedience
by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in connection
with his work. However, disobedience requires the concurrence of at least two requisites:
(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, and the
willfulness must be characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no sufficient evidence that would show that
respondent's failure to report to his new superior was willful and characterized by a
perverse and wrongful attitude. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent was waiting
for his former superior to formally inform him of his new assignment. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that respondent was suspicious of petitioner's intention to transfer
him in view of the pendency of the case he filed against petitioner. The Court of Appeals
ruled that there was a clear indication that respondent was a victim of retaliatory
measures from petitioner.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that, in lieu of reinstatement, private
respondent should be paid separation pay, equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 20 August 2002 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

 The Issue

The issue in this case is the legality of respondent's dismissal from employment.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Validity of Notice of Appeal

We first discuss a side issue which petitioner raises before the Court. Petitioner alleges
that there was no valid substitution of respondent's counsel. Petitioner alleges that Atty.
Vigilius M. Santiago (Atty. Santiago) filed a notice of entry of appearance as respondent's
counsel of record and filed an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision without
complying with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Since there was no valid
substitution of counsel, the appeal filed by Atty. Santiago was ineffective. Petitioner
alleges that since Atty. Ricardo Cipriano (Atty. Cipriano), the counsel of record, did not
appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision, the Decision became final and executory.

The contention has no merit.

A party may have two or more lawyers working in collaboration in a given litigation.[11]
Substitution of counsel should not be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of
appearance of a new lawyer.[12] The fact that a second attorney enters his appearance
for the same party does not necessarily raise the presumption that the authority of the
first attorney has been withdrawn.[13] The entry of appearearance of Atty. Santiago
should not give rise to the presumption that Atty. Cipriano withdrew his appearance as
counsel in the absence of a formal withdrawal of appearance. Atty. Santiago should only
be treated as collaborating counsel despite his appearance as "the new counsel of
record." Petitioner even observed that the NLRC's Decision was not sent to Atty.
Santiago but to Atty. Cipriano. Even in its petition before the Court, petitioner sent copies
of the petition not only to Atty. Santiago but also to Atty. Cipriano, thus acknowledging
that Atty. Cipriano remains as respondent's counsel.

Since a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he

appears,[14] Atty. Santiago is presumed to be acting within his authority as collaborating
counsel when he filed the appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision. For as long as Atty.
Santiago filed the notice of appeal within the reglementary period, reckoned from the
time Atty. Cipriano received the Labor Arbiter's Decision, the NLRC did not abuse its
discretion in entertaining the appeal.

Validity of Dismissal from Employment

Respondent was dismissed for a just cause.

An employer may terminate an employment for serious misconduct or willful

disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work.[15] Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of two
elements: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge.[16]

The records show that respondent was not singled out for the transfer. Respondent's
transfer was the effect of the integration of the functions of the Mandaue Brewery -
Materials Management and the Physical Distribution group into a unified logistics
organization, the VisMin Logistics Operations. The 6 December 1993 Memorandum of
Elizagaque showed the transfer to the VisMin Logistics Operations of the following
functions:

1. Bottle Yard Operations (including direct loading of route/overland truck and

Remuco forklift operations); and

2. Transporation Management (car/service pick-ups, dump trucks, flatbed and

firetruck)[17]

The Memorandum also showed that the following assets were also transferred to the new
VisMin Logistics Operations:

1. Oro Verde Warehouse

2. Raw Sugar Warehouse
3. ARMS Bldg. & Training Center
4. Malt Bagging Plant
5. Weigh Bridge
6. Planters' Warehouse, Wharf & Offices
7. Cars/Service Pick-ups
8. Dump Trucks
9. Flat Bed
10. Fire Truck
11. Gas Station
12. B. Yeast Tanker[18]

In other words, the entire Oro Verde Warehouse, to which unit respondent belonged, was
affected by the integration.

We do not agree that respondent was not formally notified of the transfer. The
Memorandum dated 7 February 1994 of Capt. Fortich to Comdr. Flores states:

2. This is to formalize the transfer of security operations and control of all security
personnel and equipment at subject warehouses, effective 14 Feb 94.

3. Security personnel involved will be verbally informed of the transfer for smooth
transition and proper coordination will be made to the Secutiy Officer of VISMIN
Logistics Operations.[19]

As early as 9 February 1994, Major Enriquez, the head of the VisMin Logistics Operations
and thus, respondent's new superior, issued a guard detail for 14-20 February 1994.[20]
All agency guards signed the detail, except respondent who refused to sign.[21] On 15
February 1994, Major Enriquez again issued a guard detail for 21-27 February 1994.[22]
Again, all security guards concerned signed the detail except respondent who refused to
sign. Major Enriquez issued successive memoranda[23] to respondent officially informing
him of his transfer to the VisMin Logistics Operations but respondent refused to sign all
the notices.

The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons and
according to the requirements of its business, provided the transfer does not result in
demotion in rank or diminution of the employee's salary, benefits, and other privileges.
[24]
In this case, we found that the order of transfer was reasonable and lawful
considering the integration of Oro Verde Warehouse with VisMin Logistics Operations.
Respondent was properly informed of the transfer but he refused to receive the notices
on the pretext that he was wary because of his pending case against petitioner.
Respondent failed to prove that petitioner was acting in bad faith in effecting the
transfer. There was no demotion involved, or even a diminution of his salary, benefits,
and other privileges. Respondent's persistent refusal to obey petitioner's lawful order
amounts to willful disobedience under Article 282 of the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 26 March 2002 Decision and
the 20 August 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50680. We
REINSTATE the 25 October 1996 Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 169425, March 04, 2008]

ROBERTO LICYAYO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, [1] petitioner
Roberto Licyayo prays for the reversal of the Decision dated 6 May 2005[2] and
Resolution dated 12 August 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27359,
affirming with modification the Decision[4] dated 20 February 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao, Branch 14, in Criminal Cases No. 819 and 820, convicting
petitioner of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No.
819 while dismissing Criminal Case No. 820 for Direct Assault as regards him.[5]

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On 1 February 1993, an Information[6] in Criminal Case No. 8a was filed before the RTC
charging petitioner, his brother Aron Licyayo (Aron), Paul Baguilat (Paul) and Oliver
Buyayo (Oliver) with Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code quoted as
follows:
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses ROBERTO LICYAYO, OLIVER
BUYAYO, ARON LICYAYO, and PAUL BAGUILAT, of the crime of HOMICIDE and committed
as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan, Ifugao,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, DID then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault Rufino Guay, stabbing him with
the use of a double bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the victim several stab
wounds which directly caused his death.
On 11 May 1993, an Amended Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 820 was filed before
the RTC accusing petitioner of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:
That on or about the 16th of February 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan, Ifugao, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, DID then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault PO3 Miguel Buyayo with the
use of a bladed weapon while the victim was in the performance of his official duties as a
policeman which fact was known to the accused.
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. In Criminal Case No. 819,
petitioner, Aron and Paul pleaded ‘Not Guilty’ﾝ to the charge of homicide,[8] while the
other accused, Oliver, was not arraigned.[9] With respect to Criminal Case No. 820,
petitioner was not arraigned.[10] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses three members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Kiangan, Ifugao, namely, Joseph Danglay (Officer Danglay), Miguel Buyayo (Officer
Buyayo) and Alfonso Baguilat (Officer Baguilat); and three other persons namely, Jeffrey
Malingan (Jeffrey), Jimmy Guay (Jimmy), and Jose Guay (Jose). Their testimonies, woven
together, bear the following:

On 16 February 1992, victim Rufino Guay (Rufino), along with his friends, Jeffrey and a
certain Joel Dumangeng (Joel) attended a wedding at Mabbalat, Kiangan, Ifugao.
Petitioner, together with his friends, Paul and Oliver, were also present at the same
wedding. After the wedding reception, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel went to Natamaa’s Store
at the Kiangan Public Market and ordered two bottles of gin. While the three were
drinking gin at the said store, petitioner, Paul and Oliver arrived and likewise ordered
bottles of gin. Later, petitioner, Paul and Oliver left the store. Subsequently, Rufino,
Jeffrey and Joel likewise adjourned their drinking session and left the store.[11]

Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel dropped by at Famorca’s Store. Petitioner and his brother, Aron,
as well as Paul and Oliver, were also present therein. While Jeffrey was talking to the
store’s owner, Larry Famorca (Larry), a brawl suddenly occurred between Rufino and
Aron. As a consequence thereof, Rufino fell to the ground. Aron thereafter placed himself
on top of Rufino and punched the latter several times. Jeffrey approached the two and
tried to pacify them. Paul entered the scene and punched Jeffrey on the head.
Thereupon, a scuffle followed.[12]

Officers Danglay, Buyayo and Baguilat were on their way home from the Kiangan Police
Station when they heard some individuals calling for police assistance regarding the
commotion. The three officers rushed to the scene. Upon arriving thereat, they saw
petitioner holding a six-inch double-bladed knife and walking towards Rufino and Aron
who were then wrestling with each other. Officer Buyayo, then wearing only civilian
clothes and unarmed, approached petitioner and held the latter’s back collar to prevent
him from joining the fray. Petitioner turned around, faced Officer Buyayo, and tried to
stab the latter but he missed. Officer Buyayo retreated. The officers introduced
themselves to petitioner as policemen and pleaded with him to put down the knife.
Petitioner ignored the officers’ pleas.[13]

Afterwards, petitioner approached Rufino, who was then wrestling with Paul, and stabbed
Rufino in different parts of the body.[14] Officer Baguilat fired a warning shot while Officer
Danglay immediately pounced on petitioner and disarmed the latter.[15] Petitioner was
brought to the Kiangan Police Station while Rufino was taken to a nearby hospital where
he later died due to stab wounds.[16]

The prosecution also presented documentary and object evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statements of Officer Danglay, Officer
Buyayo, Officer Baguilat, Jeffrey, Jimmy, Jose and Arsenio;[17] (2) death certificate of
Rufino;[18] (3) certification from the Ifugao General Hospital stating that Rufino sustained
several stab wounds which directly caused his death;[19] and (4) the knife used by the
petitioner in stabbing Rufino.[20]

For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of petitioner and his corroborating
witnesses -- Daniel Cayong (Daniel), Aron, and Paul -- to refute the foregoing
accusations. Their version of the incident is as follows:

On the morning of 16 February 1992, petitioner attended a wedding at Mabbalat,

Kiangan, Ifugao. After the wedding, petitioner met Paul and they proceeded to the
Kiangan Public Market where they chanced on Oliver, a certain Kimayong and Fernando
who invited them for a drink in one of the stores near the market. Later, Rufino, Jeffrey
and Joel entered the store where petitioner’s group was drinking and occupied a
separate table. Jeffrey and Joel approached petitioner’s group and sat at their table.
Jeffrey shook and pressed hard the hand of Oliver. The storeowner signalled petitioner’s
group to pay its bills and leave. Petitioner brought out his wallet to pay their bills but
Jeffrey, who was still holding and pressing Oliver’s hand, told him to buy another bottle.
Petitioner pleaded with Jeffrey to let go of Oliver’s hand because the latter is his friend.
Jeffrey, however, warned him not to interfere if he did not want to get involved.
Petitioner glanced at the store’s door and saw Rufino standing therein. Thereafter, Jimmy
passed by in front of the store and made a signal to Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel. Petitioner,
Paul and Oliver paid their bills, left the store and proceeded to Sakai Store.[21]

Subsequently, Jeffrey and a companion went to Famorca’s Store and saw Aron and
Daniel seated in one of the benches outside the store. Jeffrey then told his companion
‘Can you tackle his brother?’ﾝ Sensing that he was the brother being referred to by
Jeffrey and a trouble might occur, Aron went inside the store but Jeffrey followed him.
Thus, Aron went outside the store and sat on one of the benches nearby. Afterwards,
Rufino arrived at the store and approached Aron. Rufino held the collar of Aron’s shirt
and punched the latter on the left cheek. Jeffrey also approached Aron and grabbed the
latter’s arm. Aron fought back but he fell to the ground.[22]

Daniel immediately proceeded to Sakai Store and told petitioner that Aron was being
mauled. Petitioner went to the scene and saw Rufino and Jeffrey punching Aron who was
sprawled on the ground. Petitioner pushed Jeffrey away but the latter’s other
companions suddenly arrived and started hitting him. Petitioner fought back but he was
overpowered. Petitioner cannot recall anymore the subsequent events that transpired.[23]

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 20 February 2003, finding petitioner guilty
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 819. It acquitted Aron and Paul because the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. It did not rule on the liability of
Oliver because he was not arraigned in the said case. Further, it dismissed Criminal Case
No. 820 for direct assault because petitioner was not arraigned therein.[24]

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. 819 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Roberto Licyayo is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being
no aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of
prision mayor as minimum to 15 years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim’s heirs the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Rufino Guay. “Per prevailing
jurisprudence, death indemnity is fixed in the sum of P50,000.00. This kind of civil
indemnity is separate and distinct from other forms of indemnity for damages and is
automatically awarded without need of further proof other than the fact of death and
that the accused is responsible therefore.” (People v. Julius Kinok, G.R. No. 104629,
November 13, 2001; Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).

Likewise, accused is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs another P50,000.00 as moral
damages. “This award is mandatory and does not require proof other than the death
of the victim.” (People v. Mariano Pascua, Jr., G.R. No. 130963, November 27, 2001;
Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).

But the Court cannot award actual damages as testified to by the victim’s father,
Jose Guay, in the amount of P12,000.00 since the same were not covered by receipts.
The same goes true with the alleged annual income of the deceased in the amount of
P30,000.00. “Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and
consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be presumed.” (Ibid.).[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 6 May 2005, the appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC decision. In addition to the
civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC, the appellate court also ordered
petitioner to pay for the loss of earning capacity of Rufino in the amount of P580,050.00
and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14
of Lagawe, Ifugao in Criminal Cases Nos. 819 and 820 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the award of damages, in that accused- appellant is also ordered to
pay the victim’s heirs the following:
(a) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and

(b) the amount of P580,050.00 for lost earnings.[26]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied. Hence,
petitioner elevated the instant case before us on the following grounds:
I.
THE INFORMATION FILED IS NOT SUFFICIENT AS IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CHARGED
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF “HOMICIDE” DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 249 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; HENCE, PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VALIDLY
CONVICTED FOR SAID CRIME.

II.

GRANTING THAT THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND INTOXICATION. [27]
Anent the first issue, petitioner points out that the Information does not specifically
mention the law which he allegedly violated and for which he was charged. Although the
information accuses him of the crime of homicide, it does not categorically state that he
is being charged with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. According to him, the information should have been more explicit
by stating that he is being indicted for homicide as defined and penalized under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. He argues that the specification in the information of the
law violated is necessary to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense, and that
to convict him under such defective information would violate his constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28]

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

With particular reference to the designation of the offense, Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely directs that the information must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

The information in the instant case contains the foregoing required statements. The
information mentions the name of petitioner as the accused, the name of Rufino as the
offended party, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and designates the
crime committed by petitioner as homicide. It also alleges the act of petitioner
constituting homicide which is the unlawful stabbing of Rufino with the use of a bladed
weapon.[29]
The fact that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make it defective.
There is nothing in the afore-quoted Rules which specifically requires that the
information must state the particular law under which the accused is charged in order for
it to be considered sufficient and valid. What the Rules merely require, among other
things, is that the information must designate the offense charged and aver the acts
constituting it, which in this case, were obviously done. People v. Gatchalian[30]
categorically stated that there is no law which requires that in order that an accused
may be convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned
in the information.

Besides, it should be stressed that the character of the crime is determined neither by
the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the information. [31] The sufficiency of an information
is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or
other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which
adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.[32]

Although the information herein does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, it, nonetheless, narrates
that petitioner stabbed Rufino with a bladed weapon during the incident which caused
the latter’s death. The foregoing allegation unmistakably refers to homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code which is the unlawful killing of any person without
any attendant circumstance that will qualify it as murder, parricide or infanticide.

Apropos the second issue, petitioner alleges that Rufino started the scuffle by punching
Aron on the left cheek; that by such act, Rufino had given him sufficient provocation; and
that it was the pitiful sight of Aron lying on the ground and being beaten by Rufino and
Jeffrey which caused him to stab Rufino.[33] Petitioner further claims that he was
intoxicated during the incident; that this fact was affirmed by Officers Danglay and
Baguilat in their court testimonies; that his intoxication was not subsequent to any plan
to commit a felony because the encounter between him and Rufino was merely
accidental and there was no previous agreement to harm Rufino; that prior to the
incident, he met old friends and had a drink with them; that such is a mere custom or
practice among Filipinos; and that his intoxication is not habitual.[34]

Under paragraph 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a criminal liability may be
mitigated if there was sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party which
immediately preceded the act complained of. To avail oneself of this mitigating
circumstance, it must be duly proven that the alleged provocation originated from the
offended party.[35]

The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl
which resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. What is evident is that Rufino and
Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the incident.[36] As aptly observed by
the RTC:
From the facts of the case earlier discussed, the fight between Rufino Guay and Aron
Licyayo was so sudden. In his defense, Aron Licyayo in his direct examination testified
though self-serving, that it was victim Rufino Guay who punched him first and so he
fought back.

Nevertheless, this claim of unlawful aggression is belied during his cross-examination:

Q. You claim, Mr.Witness, that on February 16, 1992, you

did not know the late Rufino Guay?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You therefore cannot imagine why he should assault you

since you did not know each other?

A. None.

Q. You never had any misunderstanding or altercation prior

to February 16, 1992?

A. None.

Q. And all of a sudden, in the afternoon of February 16,

1992 you fought each other and you being bigger than
Rufino Guay, you are on top of him, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you delivered several blows when you were on top

of him?

A. No because they were already many and they held me.

Q. How many blows did you deliver when you were on top
of him before the others came?

A. I do not know how many.

Q. Was it more than ten?

A. No.

Q. Was it more than fifteen?

A. I do not know.
Q. Why do you not know, Mr. Witness, were you drunk at
that time?

A. No, I was not. (TSN, pp. 82-83, Crim. Case No. 820).

Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it is
obvious that immediately he became the underdog, literally even. He was easily
overpowered by the bigger and sober Aron Licyayo, who unfortunately, does not know
how to count. With this development, the situation changed. The aggressor became the
attacked and the attacked, the aggressor.

But even from the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses, the former (prosecution) prevailed in convincing this Court that
unlawful aggression was not started by any of the protagonists but that a
sudden fight was started by Rufino Guay and accused Aron Licyayo. This is
verifiable from the testimony of the fourth prosecution witness, Jeffrey
Malingan.

Defense on the other hand, tried to show that it was the victim who started the unlawful
aggression through witnesses Daniel Cayong and accused Aron Licyayo. They failed
miserably, however, to show this. Daniel Cayong, in his direct examination narrated that
it was not only Rufino Guay who started the trouble but rather he and his two
companions Joel Dumangeng and Jeffrey Malingan took hold of Aron Licyayo and started
punching him. The latter witness, as shown earlier, showed his bias by inculpating the
deceased only to contradict himself that the fight suddenly started when he and the
deceased grappled.[37]
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true
if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.[38]

Since it was not convincingly shown that the alleged provocation originated from Rufino,
the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation should not be appreciated in favor
of petitioner. We have held that where there is no evidence as to how the quarrel arose,
the accused is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.[39]

For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the

intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused and that he did not know what he was
doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.[40] The person pleading
intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the
commission of the crime, as would blur his reason.[41]

In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor
taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On the
contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after
his drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during
the incident. His vivid narration that he had a confrontation with Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel
during the drinking session; that Daniel approached and told him that Aron was being
mauled; that he immediately went to the scene and saw Aron being beaten by Rufino
and Jeffrey; that he pushed Jeffrey away from Aron; that he was allegedly beaten by the
companions of Jeffrey; and that he fought back but was allegedly overpowered --- all
point to the conclusion that petitioner had complete control of his mind during the
incident.[42]

Petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication merely on

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk during the incident.[43]
Such testimonies do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of petitioner’s
intoxication had affected his faculties.[44] There must be convincing proof of the nature
and effect of his intoxication which petitioner failed to adduce in the present case.[45]

We now go to the propriety of the sentence imposed on petitioner and the damages
awarded to the heirs of Rufino.

Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.[46] There being no mitigating or

aggravating circumstance proven in the case at bar, the penalty should be applied in its
medium period of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.[47] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty will be selected from the above
range, with the minimum penalty being selected from the range of the penalty one
degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor (six years and one day to
12 years). We found the indeterminate sentence of eight years of prision mayor as
minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, sufficient.

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and
moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[48]

As to actual damages, Jose testified that his family incurred expenses for the
hospitalization and funeral of Rufino.[49] However, since no documentary evidence was
proffered to support this claim, it cannot be awarded.[50] Nonetheless, the award of
P25,000.00 in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of the said expenses is presented in the trial court.[51] Under Article 2224 of the
Civil Code,[52] temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[53]
Thus, the award of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals is in order.

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of Rufino should be indemnified
for loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code[54] in the
amount of P580,050.00. In accordance with current jurisprudence,[55] the formula for the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income
– Living (GAI)
Expenses

= 2/3(80 – age of deceased) x (GAI –

50% of GAI)
Generally, documentary evidence is necessary for the purpose of proving the
victim’s annual income. As an exception, testimonial evidence suffices if the victim
was either: (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[56]

Rufino falls under these exceptions. Jose testified that Rufino was earning an average
annual gross income of P30,000.00 from gardening and cultivating ricefields.[57] Rufino
was 22 years old at the time of his death.[58]

We have held that in the absence of proof as regards the victim’s living expenses, his
net income is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income.[59]

Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of
Rufino is P580,050.00, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 (58) x (30,000.00 – P15,000.00)
= 38.67 x P15,000.00
= P580,050.00
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 6 May 2005 and
Resolution dated 12 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27359 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

AGULLANO V. CHRISTIAN PUBLISHING (LABOR)

The Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence uniformly mandate that NO WORKER

SHALL BE DISMISSED EXCEPT FOR A JUST OR VALID CAUSE PROVIDED BY LAW, AND
ONLY AFTER DUE PROCESS IS PROPERLY OBSERVED. In recent decisions, the SC said that
dismissals have two facets: (1) the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes
substantive due process; and (2) the legality of the manner of dismissal, which
constitutes procedural due process.

Though petitioner's habitual unexplained absences and tardiness constitute habitual and
gross neglect of duties in compliance with the first facet of a valid dismissal (just cause),
on the second requisite, i.e., procedural due process, the SC found employer's
compliance with the twin-notice requirement sadly wanting and inadequate.

To reiterate, under the twin-notice rule, the employees must be given two (2) notices
before employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice containing the specific causes
or grounds for termination against them and a directive that the employees are given
the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period (5days or
72 hours); and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that grounds have
been established to justify the severance of their employment.

The dismissal from employment was attended by a violation by the employer of

procedural due process.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal or render it illegal or ineffectuall. The employer is to indemnify in the
form of NOMINAL DAMAGES the employee for violations of his statutory rights and the
indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer TO DISCOURAGE THE ABHORRENT PRACTICE
OF "DISMISS NOW, PAY LATER.

[G.R. No. 164850, September 25, 2008]

REYNALDO Q. AGULLANO, PETITIONER, VS. CHRISTIAN PUBLISHING AND

CATALINA LEONEN PIZARRO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court filed by petitioner Reynaldo Q. Agullano seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated October 29, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its Resolution of July 28, 2004,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The assailed CA decision reversed the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decision of January 22, 2003 which, in turn,
affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) finding the respondent liable for having
illegally dismissed the petitioner.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 15, 1999, respondent Christian Publishing, a single proprietorship engaged

in the business of publishing books and printing in general, and owned by Catalina
Leonen Pizarro, hired petitioner Reynaldo Q. Agullano as printing manager, with a
monthly salary of P11,000.00. It was part of petitioner's duties to meet with prospective
clients and to attend meetings of printing organizations.
On March 30, 2000, petitioner failed to attend a pre-bidding meeting at the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) over certain DECS projects to which respondent
had pre-qualified. On the same day, petitioner also missed the general membership
meeting of the Printing Industries Association of the Philippines (PIAP). The following day,
respondent's Human Resources Department (HRD) Coordinator, Ms. Venus F. Barnuevo,
sent to petitioner a memorandum which reads:
Please be informed that you have been negligent in attending business meetings
designated by the Management that needs your presence. You are required to submit an
explanation letter within 24 hrs. upon receiving this memo regarding your absence at
DECS Meeting and PIAP General Membership meeting last March 30, 2000.[2]
On the same day, petitioner submitted his explanation through a letter, wherein he
apologized to respondent saying that he forgot about these engagements. Petitioner
explained that he arrived at the office in short pants and had to return home to change
his attire, but that there was an on-going transport strike which caused his inability to
keep the appointments.

On July 25, 2000, respondent, through the HRD Coordinator, sent petitioner a
memorandum which reads:
Your habitual absences and tardiness has been noticed but you continue to exhibit such
despite verbal warnings. You have been absent for one (1) week from July 3-8, then July
12, 22 & 24, 2000 and several days for the month of May and June. Brought about by the
present financial situation of the company, we regret to inform you that the company
can't tolerate employees who post a burden more to the situation.[3]
On July 26, 2000, respondent terminated petitioner's employment. The termination letter
reads:
Please be informed that your function as Printing Manager is terminated effective this
date due to multiple violations made against company rules and regulations as listed
below:

1. Habitual absences the following dates:

July 3-8, 2000

July 12, 22 & 24

2. Several Saturday absences and tardiness for the month

of May & June 2000;

3. Absences on DECS and PIAP meeting you are delegated to

attend on March 20, 2000.

You continued to exhibit such, despite verbal warnings. We regret to inform you that the
company cannot tolerate such behavior.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint[5] with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and damages.
After hearing, LA Salimathar V. Nambi, on February 28, 2002, rendered a Decision, the
decretal portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the dismissal of complainant is hereby declared illegal.
However, in view of the strained relationship between complainant, instead of
reinstatement, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant separation pay of
one (1) month salary for every year of service from the date of employment to the date
of termination.

In addition, respondents are also ordered to pay complainant a service incentive leave
pay of five (5) days from date of employment to date of dismissal and pro-rated 13th
month pay.

The Computation and Examination Unit of this Office is hereby directed to compute
complainant's entitlements which shall form part of this decision.

All other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied with the LA's decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, and on January 22,
2003, the NLRC decided the case, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of 28 February 2002 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense
that respondents-appellees are Ordered to pay the complainant-appellant his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of this decision.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Respondents sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[8] dated May 6, 2003.

Respondents then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC for
its modification of the LA decision.

On October 29, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated January 22, 2003 of the Honorable Commission
as well as the decision dated February 28, 2002 of the Honorable Labor Arbiter are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The dismissal of private respondent Reynaldo
Agullano from employment is hereby declared valid and in accordance with law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in a
Resolution[9] dated July 28, 2004.

Thus, the instant petition.

The core issue in this controversy is whether petitioner was illegally

dismissed.

The Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence uniformly mandate that no worker shall be
dismissed except for a just or valid cause provided by law, and only after due process is
properly observed. In a recent decision,[10] this Court said that dismissals have two
facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due
process; and, second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes
procedural due process.

The just causes for termination of employment are enumerated in Article 282 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines. In upholding the validity of Agullano's dismissal from
employment, the CA relied on the aforesaid article, more specifically paragraphs (b) and
(c) thereof, viz.:
ART. 282. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

xxxx

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative;
Agreeing with respondent's position that the petitioner's acts amounted to these two just
causes for termination, the CA expounded, thus:
Generally, tardiness and absenteeism, like abandonment, are a form of neglect of duty.
In one case, acts of insubordination, coupled with habitual tardiness, were found
sufficient causes for dismissal, especially considering the fact that the employees
involved were not mere rank and file employees but supervisors who owed more than
the usual fealty to the organization and were therefore expected to adhere to its rules in
an exemplary manner.

Clearly, [petitioner's] unexplained absences and tardiness constitute habitual and gross
neglect of duties. x x x

It must also be remembered that [petitioner] is a managerial employee, and as such, he

enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer. The basic premise for dismissal on the
ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and
confidence. It is the breach of this trust that results in the employer's loss of confidence
in the employee.[11]
On the basis of this exposition, there is, ostensibly, compliance with the first facet of a
valid dismissal as there appears a just cause therefor.

However, on the second requisite, i.e., procedural due process, we find the respondent's
compliance with the twin notice requirement sadly wanting and inadequate.

In R.B. Michael Press v. Nicanor C. Galit,[12] this Court had occasion to reiterate that under
the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before their
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their
fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment
is being terminated. To this, we added:
Not to be taken lightly, of course, is the hearing or opportunity for the employee to
defend himself personally or by counsel of his choice.
The procedure for this twin notice and hearing requirement was thoroughly explained in
King of Kings Transport v. Mamac,[13] in this wise:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific
causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are
given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.
"Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that
management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for
their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from
receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on
the defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should
contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for
the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice.
Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated
and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing
or conference wherein the employees will be given an opportunity to (1) explain and
clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their
defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend
themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice.
Moreover, the conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to
come to an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances
involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have
been established to justify the severance of their employment.
A careful examination of the disciplinary procedure adopted by the respondent which led
to the dismissal of petitioner shows that the respondent merely paid lip service to the
foregoing procedural due process requirement.

First, the March 31, 2000 memorandum of respondent issued to the petitioner, after the
latter failed to attend the DECS and the PIAP meetings, obviously did not satisfy the first
written notice requirement. Albeit this memorandum required the petitioner to explain
his absence in those two important meetings, there was clearly no intimation that the
petitioner would be terminated from employment for this singular offense. No such
intention to dismiss the petitioner can be inferred from the memorandum because this
one infraction cannot be equated with "gross or habitual neglect," nor can it be
characterized as "fraud or willful breach" by the petitioner of the respondents' trust
reposed in him. This was even borne out by subsequent events, as it was not until four
months later in the July 25, 2000 memorandum that respondents alluded to petitioner's
termination from employment.

Second, even if we assume that the March 31, 2000 memorandum was already intended
to serve as the first written notice, there would still be a breach of the procedural due
process requirement, because no hearing or conference was called by the respondent at
which petitioner could have presented his defenses. The absence of a hearing or
conference likewise vitiates the July 25, 2000 memorandum. As we said in R.B. Michael
Press:[14]
(T)here is still a need to comply with the twin notice requirement and the requisite
hearing or conference to ensure that the employees are afforded due process even
though they may have been caught in flagrante or when the evidence of the commission
of the offense is strong.
Third, if the July 25, 2000 memorandum is to be considered the first notice, it would
suffer from patent infirmities, and not just from the lack of a hearing or conference. It
does not grant the petitioner an opportunity to answer the charges of absenteeism and
tardiness; it does not give him time to seek the assistance of counsel; and most tellingly,
it was to be followed the very next day with the notice of termination, effective
immediately.

The respondents lamely proffer the hypothesis that there was substantial compliance
with the twin notice and hearing requirement. Unfortunately, the records are bereft of
any proof of compliance, much less substantial compliance, with the procedure outlined
in King of Kings Transport.[15]

In sum, we hold that the dismissal of petitioner from employment was attended by a
violation, by the respondents, of procedural due process.
Given these findings, we find apropos our ruling in Agabon v. NLRC,[16] in which this Court
made the following pronouncement:
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights x x x.
The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
"dismiss now, pay later" x x x.

Under the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.

xxxx
The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the
relevant circumstances. x x x.
Applying this principle in the light of the circumstances surrounding the case at bench,
we deem it appropriate to fix the amount of nominal damages at P30,000.00. We
likewise note as proper the petitioner's entitlement to the money equivalent of the five-
day service incentive leave for the one year period of his employment, as found by the
LA.

With this disquisition, we find no necessity to discuss the other issues raised in the
pleadings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated October 29, 2003 and the
Resolution of July 28, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that respondents failed to comply with procedural due process in the
termination of petitioner. Accordingly, respondents are ordered to pay petitioner the sum
of P30,000.00, by way of nominal damages, and the money equivalent of the five-day
service incentive leave to which he is entitled.

SO ORDERED.
 AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE
MARLENE GONZALES SISON, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH 85 OF THE QUEZON CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AND MARIA TERESA
FERNANDO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

American Express International, Inc. (Amex) questions the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71987, dated December 19, 2005, insofar as it ruled that
Amex was not able to prove that it had paid the appeal docket fees within the
reglementary period thereby warranting the trial court's denial of its notice of appeal,
and the appellate court's Resolution,[2] dated June 1, 2006, denying its motion for partial
reconsideration.

The records disclose the following antecedent facts:

Celia A. Silang-Cruz (Cruz) filed a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages
against Ma. Teresa S. Fernando (Fernando) and Enrico Pineda (Pineda) arising from
Fernando's use of an Amex supplementary credit card to obtain accommodations for a
certain Alejandra Rodriguez (Rodriguez) at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel (Mandarin). Cruz
alleged that Fernando did not seek her prior authority for the use of the Amex card, of
which Cruz was the principal cardholder, before charging Rodriguez's bill, which
amounted to $17,318.94, to her account. Fernando allegedly admitted having incurred
the charges and even issued a check to answer for the account which, however, was
dishonored by the drawee bank.

As a consequence of the foregoing, Cruz's Amex card was cancelled, prompting her to
file suit against Fernando and Pineda before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 85, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-16680.

Pineda and Fernando were initially declared in default but the trial court ultimately
admitted their answers.
Fernando claimed that she and Cruz were business partners engaged in the supply of
construction materials. In one of their business transactions, Fernando and Cruz earned
an aggregate net income of P1,878,221.00 which they were supposed to divide equally,
with each of them receiving P939,110.50. Cruz allegedly refused to give Fernando her
share in the income of their venture and even filed the collection case against her in
order to evade having to pay the sum.

Fernando professed that she had not authorized the use of her supplementary credit
card to pay for Rodriguez's accommodations at the Mandarin and even filed a third party
complaint against the hotel, Amex and Rodriguez. Mandarin was allegedly grossly
negligent in charging Rodriguez's bill to Fernando's supplementary card without
authority from the latter and without asking Fernando to sign the required credit card
stencil or credit authorization form as is the standard practice in such transactions. Amex
was also allegedly grossly negligent when it settled the account amounting to
P438,169.18 and charged the same against Cruz's credit.

In answer to the third party complaint, Mandarin insisted that the supplementary card
was charged for Rodriguez's accommodations with Fernando's knowledge and
authorization.

Amex, for its part, claimed that its responsibility in the questioned transaction was
limited to verifying whether the card was valid and had not exceeded its charging limit. It
had allegedly performed its responsibility in this case.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment[3] in favor of Fernando. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff MA. TERESA FERNANDO and against
CELIA SILANG CRUZ, Third Party Defendants MANDARIN, AMEX and RODRIGUEZ, as
follows:

1. Ordering plaintiff to pay defendant MA. TERESA FERNANDO the amount of

P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the foregoing amount;

2. Ordering Third Party Defendants MANDARIN, AMEX and RODRIGUEZ to pay Third
Party Plaintiff MA. TERESA FERNANDO the amount of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00)
PESOS each as moral damages;

3. Ordering Third Party Defendants MANDARIN, AMEX and RODRIGUEZ to pay Third
Party Plaintiff MA. TERESA FERNANDO the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS each as and for exemplary damages;

4. Ordering plaintiff and Third Party Defendants MANDARIN, AMEX and RODRIGUEZ
jointly and severally to pay attorney's fees in the amount of thirty per cent (30%)
of the foregoing amount;

5. Ordering plaintiff and Third Party Defendants MANDARIN, AMEX and RODRIGUEZ
similarly to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]
The motions for reconsideration filed by Amex[5] and Mandarin were denied by the RTC in
its Order[6] dated January 15, 2001.

Amex filed its Notice of Appeal[7] on January 29, 2001, which was promptly opposed by
Fernando on the ground of non-payment of the appeal, docket and other legal fees
within the reglementary period. In an Order[8] dated March 4, 2002, the trial court denied
the Notice of Appeal and declared its decision dated December 1, 2000 final and
executory with respect to Amex. It denied reconsideration in its Order[9] dated June 27,
2002.

Amex assailed the March 4, 2002 and June 27, 2002 Orders as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. It claimed that it had paid the prescribed docket fee twice; the
first time by registered mail within the reglementary appeal period. The trial court
allegedly ignored the well-entrenched principle of subserving technicalities in the
interest of substantial justice. Amex further averred that the trial court should not have
denied its appeal in view of the fact that the appeal filed by Mandarin, its co-judgment
debtor, had been duly perfected and given due course.

Ruling on the issues raised by Amex, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated
December 19, 2005, declared that the non-receipt by the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC) of the letter in which Amex supposedly enclosed payment of the appeal docket
fees produced the effect of non-payment thereof. The appellate court noted that Amex
failed to discharge its burden to prove that the letter was mailed and received by the
OCC as it did not present any certification from the postmaster as to how, when and to
whom delivery of the registry notice of the subject mail was made; whether said notice
was received by the OCC; or whether the letter was in fact received by the OCC.

However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court can not yet execute its decision
with respect to the judgment against Amex pending Mandarin's appeal.

The appellate court denied reconsideration in its Resolution[10] dated June 1, 2006.

Insisting that it actually sent the payment for docket fees by registered mail on January
29, 2001, Amex argues in its Petition for Review on Certiorari[11] dated July 17, 2006, that
the non-receipt by the OCC of its letter dated January 29, 2001 with the enclosed
payment of docket fees does not produce the effect of non-payment of such fees. Amex
also avers that the Court of Appeals should have liberally construed the rules in the
interest of substantial justice.

In her Comment[12] dated October 4, 2006, Fernando contends that the petition should be
denied because it erroneously impleads Hon. Marlene Gonzales Sison[13] (Judge Sison) in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the RTC in contravention of Sec. 4, Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court). The petition also raises factual
issues which have already been passed upon by the appellate court.

Fernando suggests that if the Notice of Appeal and the letter in which the payment of
docket fee was supposedly enclosed were mailed simultaneously as Amex claims, the
registry receipts of these mail matters would have been consecutively numbered.

Amex filed a Reply[14] dated November 3, 2006, insisting that Judge Sison was properly
impleaded because the petition is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
ruling on Amex's petition for certiorari where Judge Sison was required to be joined as a
respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Amex further argues that the question
to be resolved in this case is not whether it had sent the payment of the docket fees
within the reglementary period, but whether the non-receipt of the OCC of Amex's
payment produced the effect of non-payment of docket fees.

As regards the purported irregularity in the mailing of the docket fee payment, Amex
contends that it has no control over the numbering of registry receipts and no conclusion
adverse to it can be gathered merely from the fact that the mail matters were not
receipted consecutively.

Amex filed a Motion for Leave to File Memorandum[15] dated August 21, 2007, attaching
therewith its Memorandum[16] of even date. However, Amex filed, on February 7, 2008, a
Motion to Defer Resolution and/or Suspend Proceedings[17] dated February 5, 2008, based
on information that Mandarin's appeal is now pending resolution before the Court of
Appeals.

Fernando promptly opposed Amex's motion in its Comment[18] dated April 18, 2008.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. One who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply strictly with
the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.[19]

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for appeals to the Court of Appeals
from judgments or final of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Sec. 4
thereof, which particularly applies to the instant case, provides:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.--Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with
the original record or the record on appeal.
As stated, the payment of the docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory. In
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[20] however, we qualified this rule, and declared, first, that
the failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period warrants
only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal; and second, that the
court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.

In that case, the postal money orders which were intended for the payment of the
appellate docket fees were actually sent to the trial court within the reglementary period
and received by the latter. Thus, although the money orders were made payable to the
clerks of court of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and not the clerk of court
of the trial court, we held that the defect was minor and should not be construed as a
failure to pay the docket fees.

In contrast, the OCC of the trial court in this case did not receive the docket fee payment
within the reglementary period. To reiterate, it was only on March 29, 2001, two months
beyond the 15-day reglementary period for taking an appeal, that the clerk of court of
the RTC finally received payment of the docket fee, and not even because the letter with
the enclosed payment had finally found its way to the OCC. That would have at least lent
credibility to Amex's contention that it had indeed sent the letter containing the docket
fee payment within the prescriptive period.

There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court prescribing the manner by which
docket or appeal fees should be paid. However, as a matter of convention, litigants
invariably opt to use the postal money order system to pay such fees not only for its
expediency but also for the official nature of transactions coursed through this system.
The controversy spawned by the question of whether Amex had, in fact, paid the appeal
fees within the reglementary period could have been avoided entirely had it chosen to
pay such fees through postal money order and not by enclosing its payment in a letter.
After all, Amex's counsel's messenger could easily have procured a postal money order
while he was already at the Ayala Post Office filing the Notice of Appeal by registered
mail.

A discussion of the insufficiency of the evidence presented by Amex to prove the

payment of the docket fee within the reglementary period is in order. In this regard, Sec.
12, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is applicable because the payment of the docket fee is
intertwined with the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The section provides:
Sec. 12. Proof of filing.--The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence
in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed
personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgement of its
filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the
registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full
statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed
envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if not delivered.
Amex professed that it had paid the docket fee on the same day that it filed a Notice of
Appeal. It presented as proof of payment a photocopy of the January 29, 2001 letter in
which was supposedly enclosed the docket fee of P600.00, with the superimposed
photocopy of Ayala Post Office Postal Registry Receipt No. 1860, under which the letter
was allegedly mailed. Based on the proof required under Sec. 12 above, the registry
receipt presented by Amex does not suffice as proof of payment of the docket fee in this
case. For one, filed with the Court are mere photocopies of the letter and the registry
receipt and even if the original of the registry receipt was submitted, there is no
indication therein that it refers to the letter or the alleged docket fee payment. For
another, Amex should have also submitted in evidence the affidavit of the person who
did the mailing, containing a full statement of the details of mailing. As the party to
whom the burden of proof to show that the letter was mailed and received by the
addressee lay, Amex could have easily presented the affidavit of its messenger to satisfy
the requirement of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, Amex offered no explanation for its
failure to discharge its burden.

Thus, we agree with the appellate court that no grave abuse of discretion attended the
trial court's denial of Amex's Notice of Appeal. The Court acknowledges that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and every party litigant must be afforded the
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause. However, the force and
effect of procedural rules, such as those that prescribe the period and manner by which
appeals should be perfected, or those that detail the means by which the filing of
pleadings, notices or similar papers is proved, should not be undermined without the
most compelling of reasons. We find no such compelling reason to warrant a liberal
application of the rules.

As a final note, we find that impleading the trial court judge in the present petition is
improper. Sec. 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically states that the lower courts or
judges thereof shall not be impleaded either as petitioners or respondents in a petition or
review on certiorari. Amex's explanation that the trial court judge was impleaded in the
petition because the same is an appeal from the appellate court's decision in Amex's
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the judge was required
to be joined as a respondent is not only circuitous but also an obvious misapprehension
of the rules. Nonetheless, we do not find this error sufficient to warrant the outright
denial of the petition, considering that it raises a question of law worthy of review.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71987 dated December 19, 2005 and its Resolution dated June 1, 2006 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119068. July 31, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANTE CASTRO, RITO

CASTRO, JOEL CASTRO, GEORGE CASTRO and OSCAR CASTRO, accused-
appellants.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

An information, dated 14 November 1991, was filed by Provincial Prosecutor Alejandro A.

Pulido of Cagayan charging Dante, Oscar, Rito, Joel, George, all surnamed Castro,
Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring and Genesia Garcia y Castro with the crime of
murder, allegedly committed as follows:

“The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses Dante Castro, Oscar Castro, Rito
Castro, Joel Castro, George Castro alias Jong, Caridad Menor y Castro alias Caring, and
Genisia Garcia y Castro alias Jining of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1991, in the Municipality of Amulung, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Dante Castro, Oscar
Castro, Rito Castro, Joel Castro, Caring and Genesia Garcia y Castro alias Jining, armed
with long handled bolos (tabas), spear and gun, conspiring together and helping one
another with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab, hack and shoot one, Alfonso Sosia, inflicting upon him several injuries on the
different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.”
On 10 February 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Defense counsel waived pre-trial for the accused and moved for
continuous trial which commenced on 2 March 1992 and terminating on 15 February
1994 when both prosecution and defense submitted the case for resolution.

On 10 May 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02 of Tuguegarao, Cagayan rendered
a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused Oscar Castro, Dante Castro, Rito Casro, Joel Castro
and George Castro guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
penalized under Art. 248, of the Revised Penal Code, they are hereby sentenced
separately of [sic] the following penalties:

1. To Oscar, an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to

18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal medium;

2. To Dante Castro, Rito Castro, Joel Castro and George Castro, reclusion
perpetua;

3. Genecia Castro and Caridad Castro are aquitted of the murder charge.

4. All the accused except Caridad and Genecia Castro are hereby ordered to pay
the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.”

The facts, as summarized by the Solicitor General in his brief, are as follows:

“In the morning of August 22, 1991, Clodualdo Escobar went to Barangay Bacring,
Amulung, Cagayan to supervise the cultivation and preparation of his agricultural
property, consisting of 25 hectares (TSN, March 2, 1992, pp. 14-15).

Escobar and his tenant and overseer Alfonso Socia, who was carrying a harrow borrowed
from Romulo Garcia, were on their way to the farm when they met appellants Oscar
Castro, Joel Castro, Rito Castro, Dante Castro and George Castro. Genecia Castro and
Caridad Castro were also with the group(pp. 17-18, Ibid.).

Escobar was ahead of Socia by a distance of four (4) to five (5) meters. Appellant Oscar
Castro, the leader of the group asked Escobar and Socia where they were going (Ibid.).
Fear gripped Escobar, because appellants Oscar, Rito and Joel were all carrying boloes.
Without waiting for an answer, appellant Oscar hit the left hand of Socia who was behind
Escobar. Escobar was at that time moving backward, facing the appellants (p. 19, Ibid.).
After Socia was hit, he tried to shield himself with the harrow he was carrying. Then
came a series of stab and hacking blows from appellants Dante and George. George
hacked the shoulder of Socia, while Dante stabbed the right forearm of Socia with a long
bolo (Ibid., p. 20).

Appellant George was at the back of Socia at the left side of Dante when he delivered
the stab blow. Dante and George came from the back of the house of Ernesto Garcia
when they hit Socia. George was carrying a yellow sack, where he got a handgun which
he gave to his uncle Rito, who immediately fired it and shot the lying Socia (p. 21, Ibid.).
All the appellants triumphantly shouted “nangabak kamin (meaning: We won.) (Ibid, p.
22). For fear that Rito might shoot him, Escobar retreated twenty-five (25) meters away.
On the other hand, Caridad Castro used a spear to block Lourdes Castro [sic] who was
calling for help. Genecia Castro meanwhile was shouting, "Adda pay ni Lakay Escobar,
patayen yo pay” (meaning: Here is oldman Escobar, kill him also (Ibid., pp. 23-25).

After Socia fell, he was placed in a hammock and brought to Tuguegarao, Cagayan for
treatment but died on the way. The body was brought to the house of one Rodolfo
Farinas at Bayabat, Cagayan. The incident was reported to the 111th Philippine
Constabulary detachment at Bayabat, Cagayan (Ibid., pp. 29-30).”

In their brief, appellants attempted to show that the testimony of Lourdes Sosia*
(victim’s wife) during the trial and the affidavit she executed on 27 August 1991 were
contrived and devised. Appellants aver that in an interview by SPO1 Pedrito Catil of
Lourdes Sosia on 22 August 1991, right after the incident in question took place, the
latter informed the police investigator that it was only Oscar Castro who was the
assailant of her husband Alfonso Sosia. According to appellants, such statement which
was made on the same day the incident happened, should have been regarded by the
trial court as part of the res gestae for it was made after stratling occurrence before she
had time to concoct lies or to fabricate an account.

According to appellants, all the requisites for the admission of said statement as part of
the res gestae under the Rules of Court are present in this case, to wit:

“(a) That the principal fact, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;

(b) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and

(c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.”

Appellants further allege that the testimony in court of Lourdes Sosia implicating all the
appellants in the crime charged is not the product of a natural and spontaneous reaction
or response.

It is then argued by appellants that while admittedly all the appellants (except Oscar
Castro) invoked the defense of alibi – usually a weak defense – the same should not be
looked upon with disfavor in this case, as the same was amply corroborated on material
points by the defense’s witnesses. In short, according to appellants, the presumption of
innocence standing in their favor has not been adequately overcome by the prosecution.

Appellants’ arguments are not impressed with merit.

The testimony of Lourdes Sosia, the victim’s widow, during the trial that all the
appellants killed her husband prevails over the affidavit she executed after the incident.
It has been held that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. Moreover,
affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
The record is replete with evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused-appellants. Two (2) other prosecution witnesses – Clodualdo Escobar and Elon
Farinas – declared that the appellants committed the gruesome crime. Clodualdo
Escobar was with the victim and witnessed the whole incident from the moment Oscar
Castro hit the victim with a bolo up to the the victim was shot by Rito Castro.

The defense of alibi put up by the appellants is not worthy of belief and fails to convince
us. We agree with the trial court’s finding, to wit:

“Now, coming to the individual alibi put up by Dante Castro, Rito Castro, Joel Castro and
George Castro, suffice it to state, that the defenses of alibi put up by the four male
accused are unconvincing and unworthy of belief. Take the case of Dante Castro and Rito
Castro. These two accused alleged that they went to Barangay Unag, Amulung, Cagayan,
in the morning of August 21, 1991. True it is , that Eduardo Tabbu declared thathesaw
the two accused in the morning of August 21, 1991, at the house of Anita Tabbu and
Ricardo Aglibar, but there is no proof that they slept in the house of the Aglibars on the
night of August 21, 1991. Even granting that Dante Castro and Rito Castro really went to
Barangay Unag in the mornign of August 21 to plow the field of Ricardo Aglibar who was
sick, but this does not prove that they slept in the latter’s house on August 21, 1991.
Anita Tabbu or Ricardo Aglibar should have been called upon to testify that said accused
did not go home to Bacring in the afternoon or night of August 21, and stayed in said
barangay up to August 24, when the two accused allegedly went home.

The alibi put up by Dante Castro and Rito Castro was shattered to pieces and blown to
oblivion when Loreto Garcia and Escobar testified as rebuttal witnesses declaring that
Dante Castro was seen by these two rebuttal witnesses in the afternoon of August 21,
1991 near the premises of Loreto Garcia’s house, when Escobar was about to fetch water
from the artesian well. Dante Castro and Rito Castro failed to refute these declarations of
Escobar and Garcia.

Loreto Garcia’s testimony carries great weight considering that Dante Castro, Rito Castro
and Oscar Castro are the nephews of Loreto Garcia, because Genecia Garcia-Castro,
mother of Dante, Oscar and Rito, is the sister of Loreto Garcia.

The alibi of Joel Castro that he was sick, suffering from cold and fever on August 22,
1991, would not also hold water. If really Joel Castro was sick, then Laboreto Peana, the
councilman in their place, should not have sent Joel Castro to call for barangay captain.
Neither Laboreto Peana or Jose Peana stated that Joel Castro was sick. Even assuming
that Joel Castro was sick and he forced himself to report the incident to the barangay
captain, what would prevent said accused from being at the scene of the crime where
Alfonso Socia was killed since he could walk and roam around.

The pretensions of George Castro that after Alfonso Socia fired at him, he went to the
house of his Auntie Betty Donato y Castro and stayed there up to 3:00 P.M. deserves
scant consideration because Betty Donato was not called upon to testify. The fact alone
that George Castro failed to report to his auntie what happened to him, that is, that
Socia fired at him seriously impaired and weakened his claim of alibi.”

In the defense of alibi put up by Dante and Rito Castro, the court a quo found that the
distance between Bacring and Barangay Unag is seven (7) kilometers and can be
negotiated by hiking or walking in two (2) hours. Moreover, Such alibi was completely
shattered when rebuttal prosecution witnesses Loreto Garcia and Clodualdo Escobar
testified that Dante Castro was seen by them in the afternoon of 21 August 1991 at the
premises of Garcia’s house when Escobar was about to fetch water from the artesian
well. These declarations were not refuted by the appellants Dante and Rito Castro.

The trial court likewise declared that “[t]he claims of self-defense on the part of Oscar
Castro has [sic] no probative value whatsoever. The number of wounds in the body (of
the victim), consisting of eight (8) wounds, three hacked wounds, three incised wounds,
one abrasion, and one gunshot wound, negate the claim of self-defense.” The self-
defense put up by Oscar Castro is likewise unavailing. This pretense was not
substantiated by a medical certificate. The firearm which was used in shooting Alfonso
Sosia was not immediately surrendered to the police authorities but thrown in a cogonal
area. Oscar Castro claims that at first he did not volunteer to surrender the firearm
because of fear that he would be implicated. This claim is devoid of any logic when one
considers that he readily surrendered the bolo which he used in hacking and stabbing
Alfonso Sosia. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that is patently clear that
there was suppression of the handgun as a piece of evidence because if the fingerprints
taken from the firearm were similar to the fingerprints of Rito Castro who, according to
the prosecution’s evidence was the one who fired the gun, then Rito Castro would surely
be charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm.

The trial court found that conspiracy was attendant in the incident. To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a
crime. It is sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.

As aptly observed by the trial court:

“There is proof that the Castros are very closely knit family. They live in the same
barangay and their houses are almost adjacent to each other. Although it may be true
that only Escobar and Oscar Castro are wrangling or quarelling over Lot 30, and this
involves also Alfonso Sosia due to his closeness to Escobar, with the latter intending to
transfer the possession of Lot 30 to Alfonso Socia, nevertheless, the oft-repeated saying:
‘that blood is thicker than water’ applies. In the tagalog adage: ‘Ang sakit ng
kalingkingan ay sakit ng buong katawan,’ equally applies. Simply stated, the problem of
Oscar Castro is the problem of the whole Castro Clan.”

In conclusion, the court below declared:

“Was there conspiracy in the killing of Alfonso Socia? Art. 8, par. 2 of the Penal Code,
defines conspiracy, as when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient
that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. (PP. vs
San Luis, 86 Phil. 485; PP. vs. Timbol, GR No. 47473; PP. vs. Tian, 77 Phil. 1090). In the
following cases there was implied conspiracy where four brothers attacked a victim (PP.
vs Khaw Dy, 109 Phil. 649). Where five defendants converged upon the scene of the
crime at the same time (PP. vs. Licuana, 88 Phil. 789) where the five defendants were
closely related to one another and had a common grievance to redress.
In the case at bar, brothers, nephews and sons converged in one place attacked,
stabbed, hacked and shot Alfonso Socia are clear evidence of implied conspiracy.”

All told, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused–appellants

Dante, Rito, Joel, George and Oscar all surnamed Castro has been overcome by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

However, the trial court failed to required the accused-appellants to indemnify the heirs
of the victim Alfonso Sosia according to settled jurisprudence. We, therefore, order such
indemnity in this decision.

One last observation.

It appears from the wording of the information that the provincial prosecutor was less
than meticulous in preparing the same. It is noted that the names of the accused in the
first paragraph of the information are not the same as those in the second paragraph.
Although the divergence is not material in this case, accuracy is always demanded in
preparation of informations for violation of penal laws since slight errors may, in certain
cases, cause the government to lose its case.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
accused-appellants are ordered, jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Alfonso
Sosia the amount of P50,000.00, with costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MORENO
DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI AND FRANCIS LIAGAO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the November 7, 2003 Decision[1] and April 15, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a domestic juridical entity

engaged in mining, employed Moreno Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and
Francis Liagao, as load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents).[3] All
three were assigned at the 850 level, underground, Victoria Area in Lepanto, Mankayan,
Benguet. This is a known "highgrade" area where most of the ores mined are considered
of high grade content.[4]

In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne Chambers (Chambers),
one of its foreign consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the
Mine, went underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers
and the working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the said level,
he was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to the 8k stope,
he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed to be
"highgrade." Realizing that "highgrading"[5] was being committed, Chambers shouted.
Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of the stope.
[6]
Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office.[7]

After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor (Security
Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit, which reads as follows:
xxxx

At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto Security
Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst. Resident Manager, Mr.
Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several unidentified miners at 8K Stope,
850 level committing Highgrading activities therein;

Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their supervisor and SG
Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security Patrol posted therein as
stationary guard were called to this office for interrogation regarding this effect;

In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the highgrading event
really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope, 850 level at about 2:00 o'clock
PM of September 15, 2000. That the involved participants were all miners assigned to
work at 7K Stope, 8K Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine
level. Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine
supervisors were also directly involved in this activity;

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct participation

then claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel Gumatin, one of the miners
assigned at Panel No.1-est-North, 8K Stope, 850 level to cooperate with them to commit
Highgrading. He revealed his companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K
stope, namely, Joel Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and
Daniel Fegsar. He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS, namely:
Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno Dumapis, and Marolito
Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict Arocod, Samson Damian, and Dionisio
Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively;

Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also positively confirmed
the Highgrading activity. He added that actually he came upon the group and even
dispersed them when he went therein prior to the arrival of Mr. Chambers;

Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo Madao that its was
messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their issued rock drilling machine then
drilled holes and blasted the same at the 8K Stope roadway with the assistance of
Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan, Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and
Francisco Liagao. That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing and
watching the group during the incident;

That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts and to support
any complaint that may be filed against respondents;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our signature this 28th
day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet.[8](Emphasis supplied)
On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding respondents and their co-
accused guilty of the offense of highgrading and dismissing them from their
employment.[9]

On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other miners, filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No.
11-0607-00 against petitioner.[10] On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.

On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the LA to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision,
declaring the dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal of the
nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision insofar as
respondents are concerned, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21, 2001 is hereby
MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein respondents] Moreno
Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal and ordering respondent to pay them
backwages in the total amount of four hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty two
pesos and 63/100 (P480, 182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of four hundred
seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as computed in
the body of the decision.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated on November 22, 2002.[12]

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA assailing the aforementioned decision and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed
the decision of the NLRC[13] and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION'S
DECISION DATED AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE
DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[14]

A. The Court of Appeal's strict application of the hearsay rule under Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case is uncalled for.

B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof beyond

doubt is not required, it being sufficient that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employees are responsible for the
misconduct which renders them unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by their position.[15]

The petition is devoid of merit.

In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the NLRC in considering the
Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore
inadmissible, to wit:
We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of Security
Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and thus, inadmissible.
Their narration of factual events was not based on their personal knowledge but on
disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
defined the nature of hearsay:

Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
[16]

Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner cites Article 221 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which provides:
Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable settlement. In any
proceeding before the Commission or any Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of the Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or
in a suppletory character and effect.[17]

In a number of cases,[18] this Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as
permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other
documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as
observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC.[19]

In Bantolino v. Coca-Coca Bottlers Phils., Inc.[20] the Court ruled that although the affiants
had not been presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined,
their affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were
hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21]
this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be
cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to
negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated
by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.

Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint Affidavit is inadmissible for being
hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an
investigation report.

However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.[22] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.[23] The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission.[24] In finding that the Report of the Chief
Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso,
this Court ruled:
According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that respondent was dismissed
for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, however, refused to give
credence to the Report. They are one in ruling that the Report cannot be given
any probative value as it is uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is
merely hearsay, having come from a source, the Chief Engineer, who did not
have any personal knowledge of the events reported therein.

xxxx

The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:

Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative value. It is not
verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of trusthworthiness. It is
furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced from the personal knowledge of
Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on the perception of "ATTENDING SUPT.
ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH
REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON
DISCIPLINE" who " NOTICED 3/E ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS
JOB AND DUTIES x x x." Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed
up by the affidavit of any of the "Supt." Engineers who purportedly had first-
hand knowledge of private respondents supposed "lack of discipline,"
"irresponsibility" and "lack of diligence" which caused him to lose his job. x x x

The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should
not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The
evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value.[26] Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla.[27] It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[28] Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are
not strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on
evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.[29]

Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the probative weight of the
Joint Affidavit.

An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts alleged therein by the Security
Investigators are not of their own personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts
allegedly relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus, there is a
need to individually scrutinize the statements and testimonies of the four sources of the
Joint Affidavit in order to determine the latter's probative weight.

The Joint Affidavit states that, "Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several
unidentified miners x x x."[30] Chambers simply narrated to the Security Investigators
what he saw but did not indicate herein respondents.

Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of Damoslog wherein he named
respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as his companions in the act of highgrading .[31]

Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In his first statement,[32]
Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the act of highrading, and denied any
involvement therein. However, in his second statement,[33] Damoslog claimed to have
personally witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to wit:
07. Ques - Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?
Ans - On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while
we were at the 8K stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me
that he could not procure some needed amount of money and if
possible we will commit highgrading for that effect to settle his
problem. That because I pity him, I just answered that if they could
manage to do it then they could do it.
08. Ques - Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you?
Ans - He was alone.

09. Ques Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem?
Ans I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an
amount of money badly as I earlier said.

10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading
activity?
Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.

11. Ques - How did it started [sic]?

Ans - They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment.
That while I was near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of
8K Stope, I observed the LHD unit coming from the roadway near the
8K Eating station which was previously parked thereat proceeded to
the roadway of panel 1-West then started cleaning and scraping said
roadway. That after cleaning he parked it at the inner portion of the
roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who was not assigned
therein and I failed to identify his name shove two shovels on the
roadway recently cleaned by the LHD then handed it to us with another
man whom I don't know his name but could recognize and identify him
if I will meet him again then we washed the same in the inner area of
panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the
same, we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we
were busy washing and sorting, Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and
spreading the airhose for rockdrilling machine. That few moments
thereafter, I heard the running engine of the drilling machine but I can
not identify the operator as my line of view was obstructed by the
curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That
afterwhich I heard somebody that they are now going to blast the
drilled holes but we remained in our place continuing washing the
stones. That after the blast Mr. Garcia and one other companion
whom I failed to identify due to foggy condition caused by the
explosive blasting then handed us the additional newly unearth ores
for washing. That while were still busy washing, Gumatin approached
us then told us that he will collect what was already washed and sorted
and start to process the same. That Gumatin took the items then
started to pound the ores atop of an LHD unit parked near the
entrance of panel 2-East which was not used during the shift. That
after that, I stood up then subsequently proceeded to panel 2-West
then observed messrs. Maximo Madao, Benedict Arocod, Brent
Suyam, Daniel Fegsar, Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo, John
Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at the
junction of 240 E, XCS and 8K Stope. The enumerated miners except
Damian were in squatting position in scattered adjacent places busy
sorting ores. Moments later Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived then
went to the place of Gumatin then told us that he will get a portion of
the already proceeded ores for the operator to handcarry so that he
will not need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level then after taking some of
 the loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that he will check
the look out at the outer area of the mainline posted away from the 7K
Stope.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and Tundagui as among the
miners involved in the act of highgrading; neither does he mention respondent Liagao.

The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed the act of highgrading.
However, in his sworn statement,[35] Daguio claims that he did not recognize nor did he
identify any of the miners, to wit:
11. Ques - In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic]
number of this group of miners doing highgrading activities?
Ans - I don't know but obviously they were several as manifested by their
number of cap lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were
hidden at the curved inner access of the roadway enroute to the inner
area.

12. Ques - Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?
Ans - Honestly, no.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao wherein he particularly
named respondent Liagao as one of the miners involved in the act of highgrading.

Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn statement[37] dated September
16, 2000, Madao claimed his innocence. He did not incriminate any of the respondents.
However, in his second sworn statement[38] dated September 20, 2000, Madao claimed to
have knowledge of the act of highgrading and specifically named respondent Liagao as
one of the miners involved, to wit:
09. Ques - Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first
the flooring of that roadway before blasting it?
Ans - Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their
assigned drilling machine at the said roadway and drilled the area with
the company of Garcia, Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao.
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not sufficient to find Liagao guilty
of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit[40] which he executed with respondent Tundagui,
Madao made the following declarations:
When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000, I am being required
to appear at the security investigation office. After quitting time I went to the security
office and was surprised to learn that my name is among those listed persons who were
seen by Mr. Chambers committing acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000. However,
when I quit work on September 20, 2000 I was again called through telephone to appear
at the security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I will give another
statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons assigned thereat with
the promise that I will report for work. With my limited education having not finished
grade 1, I was made to give my statement on questions and answers which are
self-incriminating and knowingly mentioned names of persons who are
innocent. Worst, when I got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by
our legal counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth after
I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-Raffols for swearing.
With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my statement dated September 20,
2000 for being self incriminatory unassisted by my counsel or union
representative and hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated
September 16, 2000.[41](Emphasis supplied)
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the
result would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains added
importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly showing that the
dismissed employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.[42] Accordingly, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard Madao's recantation, as it serves to cast
doubt as to the guilt of respondent Liagao.

Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint Affidavit, being sourced
from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and Madao, has no probative value to support
evidence to warrant the dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not
identify the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition, Damoslog's first and
second sworn statements did not implicate respondents, and Madao recanted his
statement implicating respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements
and joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast doubt as to the
veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.

The second ground is not plausible.

While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners, although generally
described as menial, is nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of
trust and confidence on the part of petitioner,[43] the rule that proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence, and
that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence, is not absolute.
[44]

The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust
and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause.[45] In
order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an
employee's dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on
clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee's separation from work.[46]

In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not substantial to hold
respondents guilty of highgrading so as to warrant the dismissal of respondents.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence

presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in
favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and
his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend
the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits
under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.[47]

Lastly, respondents' prayer in their Comment[48] and Memorandum,[49] that the CA

Decision be modified by ordering their reinstatement to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged dismissal
up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration. Respondents are estopped
from claiming their right to reinstatement. Records show that respondents along with
their co-accused, filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457
questioning the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA. The case
was then elevated to this Court through a petition for review, entitled Thomas Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 162554. However, the same was denied with
finality for having been filed out of time.[50] In effect, it serves to estop the respondents
from praying for their reinstatement in the present case. Under the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "reclusion of issues" or "collateral
estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in
any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.[51]
Applied to the present case, the "former suit" refers to CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein the
CA ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No. 162554 wherein this
Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together with other dismissed
workers. The "future case" is the present case in which the petitioner is Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring the
dismissal of respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by herein
petitioner. Respondents cannot now be allowed to raise the same in the petition filed by
petitioner, for that would circumvent the finality of judgment as to separation pay insofar
as respondents are concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 7, 2003 and its Resolution dated April 15, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860 are
AFFIRMED.

Double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146408 April 30, 2009

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ENRIQUE LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE, JOLITO OLIVEROS, RICHARD
GONCER, NONILON PILAPIL, AQUILINO YBANEZ, BERNABE SANDOVAL, RUEL
GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS, JR., ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES,
LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARISUSA, JEFFREY LLENES, ROQUE PILAPIL,
ANTONIO M. PAREJA, CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS, ROLANDO
TUNACAO, CHERIE ALEGRES, BENEDICTO AUXTERO, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG,
NELSON M. DULCE and ALLAN BENTUZAL, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and respondents’ Motion for
Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the Court’s February 29, 2008 Decision in light of
incidents bearing on the present case which were not brought to light by them before
the Court promulgated said Decision.

The Decision of the Court affirmed with modification the appellate court’s September 29,
2000 Decision and directed petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to:

(a) accept respondents ENRIQUE LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE, JOLITO
OLIVEROS, RICHARD GONCER, NONILON PILAPIL, AQUILINO YBANEZ, BERNABE
 SANDOVAL, RUEL GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS, JR., ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL
BERNARDES, LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARESUSA, JEFFREY LLENOS, ROQUE
PILAPIL, ANTONIO M. PAREJA, CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS, ROLANDO
TUNACAO, CHERRIE ALEGRES, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG, NELSON M. DULCE and
ALLAN BENTUZAL as its regular employees in their same or substantially
equivalent positions, and pay the wages and benefits due them as regular
employees plus salary differential corresponding to the difference between the
wages and benefits given them and those granted to petitioner’s other regular
employees of the same rank; and

(b) pay respondent BENEDICTO AUXTERO salary differential; backwages from

the time of his dismissal until the finality of this decision; and separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service
until the finality of this decision.

There being no data from which this Court may determine the monetary liabilities of
petitioner, the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter solely for that purpose.

SO ORDERED.1

Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) having been found to be a labor-only contractor,

respondents were consequently declared as petitioner’s regular employees who are
entitled to the salaries, allowances, and other employment benefits under the pertinent
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Petitioner prays for a reconsideration of the Decision, maintaining its position that
respondents were employed by Synergy, and to "reinstate" respondents as regular
employees is iniquitous since it would be compelled to employ personnel more than what
its operations require. It adds that the Court should declare that reinstatement is no
longer an appropriate relief in view of the long period of time that had elapsed.

For their part, respondents, deducing from the Decision that their termination was found
to be illegal, posit that the portion of the Decision ordering petitioner to "accept" them
should also mean to "reinstate" them with backwages.2 Respondents additionally pray
for the award to them of attorney’s fees, albeit they admit that they failed to raise it as
an issue.

Both parties point out that the Court’s Decision "presupposes" or "was based on the
erroneous assumption" that respondents are still in the actual employ of petitioner.

Respondents disclose that except for those who have either died, accepted settlement
earlier, or declared as employee of Synergy, the remaining respondents have all been
terminated in the guise of retrenchment. Joining such account, petitioner reveals that 13
out of the 25 respondents filed an illegal dismissal case, which is pending before the
appellate court stationed at Cebu City as CA-G.R. SP No. 00922.3

Respondents add that the appellate court, by Resolution of April 22, 2008, held the
illegal dismissal case in abeyance until after this Court rules on the present case.4

Petitioner also urges the Court to examine the cases of respondents Roque Pilapil
(Pilapil) and Benedicto Auxtero (Auxtero) in light of the following information, viz: Pilapil
entered petitioner’s pool of regular employees on September 1, 19915 but was later
terminated for submitting falsified academic credentials. Pilapil’s complaint for illegal
dismissal was dismissed by the labor arbiter, whose decision was reinstated with
modification by the appellate court by Decision of March 7, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No.
50578. On Pilapil’s appeal, this Court, by Resolution of September 19, 2001 in G.R. No.
147853, declared the case terminated when Pilapil failed to file his intended petition.

Given its information in the immediately foregoing paragraph, petitioner claims that it
already complied with the judgment awarding separation pay representing financial
assistance to Pilapil on September 23, 2003, during the pendency of the present case.6
Respondents do not dispute petitioner’s information.7

Petitioner also informs the Court that Auxtero already secured a favorable judgment
from this Court in G.R. No. 158710 which effectively affirmed the appellate court’s
Decision of February 26, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50480.8 It appears from the "Joint
Declaration of Satisfaction of Judgment"9 with "Release and Quitclaim and Waiver,"10
both dated November 29, 2007, that petitioner already satisfied the judgment rendered
in said G.R. No. 158710 in favor of Auxtero in the amount of P1.3 Million, and that
Auxtero had waived reinstatement. Respondents essentially corroborate this information
of petitioner.11

In light of these recent manifestations-informations of the parties, the Court finds that a
modification of the Decision is in order, the claims with respect to Pilapil and Auxtero
having been deemed extinguished even before the promulgation of the Decision. That
Pilapil was a regular employee yields to the final finding of a valid dismissal in the
supervening case involving his own misconduct, while Auxtero’s attempt at forum-
shopping should not be countenanced.

IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, the Court finds no sufficient reason to deviate from its
Decision, but proceeds, nonetheless, to clarify a few points.

While this Court’s Decision ruled on the regular status of respondents, it must be
deemed to be without prejudice to the resolution of the issue of illegal dismissal
in the proper case. The Decision thus expressly stated:

Finally, it must be stressed that respondents, having been declared to be regular

employees of petitioner, Synergy being a mere agent of the latter, had acquired security
of tenure. As such, they could only be dismissed by petitioner, the real employer, on the
basis of just or authorized cause, and with observance of procedural due process.12
(Underscoring supplied)

Notably, subject of the Decision was respondents’ complaints13 for regularization and
under-/non-payment of benefits. The Court did not and could not take cognizance of the
validity of the eventual dismissal of respondents because the matter of just or authorized
cause is beyond the issues of the case. That is why the Court did not order reinstatement
for such relief presupposes a finding of illegal dismissal14 in the proper case which, as the
parties now manifest, pends before the appellate court.

Respecting petitioner’s allegation of financial woes that led to the June 30, 1998 lay-off
of respondents, as the Court held in its Decision, petitioner failed to establish such
economic losses which rendered impossible the compliance with the order to accept
respondent as regular employees. Thus the Decision reads:

Other than its bare allegations, petitioner presented nothing to substantiate its
impossibility of compliance. In fact, petitioner waived this defense by failing to raise it in
its Memorandum filed on June 14, 1999 before the Court of Appeals. x x x15
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner, for the first time, revealed the matter of termination and the allegation of
financial woes in its Motion for Reconsideration of October 10, 2000 before the appellate
court,16 not by way of defense to a charge of illegal dismissal but to manifest
that supervening events have rendered it impossible for petitioner to comply
with the order to accept respondents as regular employees.17 Moreover, the issue of
economic losses as a ground for dismissing respondents is factual in nature, hence, it
may be determined in the proper case.

All told, the pending illegal dismissal case in CA-G.R. SP No. 00922 may now take its
course. The Court’s finding that respondents are regular employees of petitioner neither
frustrates nor preempts the appellate court’s proceedings in resolving the issue of
retrenchment as an authorized cause for termination. If an authorized cause for
dismissal is later found to exist, petitioner would still have to pay respondents their
corresponding benefits and salary differential up to June 30, 1998. Otherwise, if there is
a finding of illegal dismissal, an order for reinstatement with full backwages does not
conflict with the Court’s declaration of the regular employee status of respondents.

As to the belated plea of respondents for attorney’s fees, suffice it to state that parties
who have not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative reliefs
other than those granted, if any, in the decision of the lower tribunal.18 Since
respondents did not file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision,
much less appeal therefrom, they can advance only such arguments as may be
necessary to defeat petitioner’s claims or to uphold the appealed decision, and cannot
ask for a modification of the judgment in their favor in order to obtain other positive
reliefs.19

WHEREFORE, the Decision of February 29, 2008 is, in light of the foregoing discussions,
MODIFIED. As MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of September 29, 2000 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

Petitioner PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., is ordered to recognize respondents ENRIQUE

LIGAN, EMELITO SOCO, ALLAN PANQUE, JOLITO OLIVEROS, RICHARD GONCER, NONILON
PILAPIL, AQUILINO YBANEZ, BERNABE SANDOVAL, RUEL GONCER, VIRGILIO P. CAMPOS,
JR., ARTHUR M. CAPIN, RAMEL BERNARDES, LORENZO BUTANAS, BENSON CARISUSA,
JEFFREY LLENES, ANTONIO M. PAREJA, CLEMENTE R. LUMAYNO, NELSON TAMPUS,
ROLANDO TUNACAO, CHERIE ALEGRES, EDUARDO MAGDADARAUG, NELSON M. DULCE
and ALLAN BENTUZAL as its regular employees in their same or substantially equivalent
positions, and pay the wages and benefits due them as regular employees plus salary
differential corresponding to the difference between the wages and benefits given them
and those granted to petitioner’s other regular employees of the same or substantially
equivalent rank, up to June 30, 1998, without prejudice to the resolution of the illegal
dismissal case.

There being no data from which this Court may determine the monetary liabilities of
petitioner, the case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter solely for that purpose

LOREA DE UGALDE, Petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 21 November 1996 Decision[2] and
2 September 1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41121.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got
married before Municipal Judge Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1
March 1951,[4] Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San
Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-
nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.

Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957.[5] On 26 May 1964,

respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith)
before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and
Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice
as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income,
profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.

On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal

partnership of gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in
respondent’s inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent’s
parents, Juan Ysasi[6] and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25
February 1979, respectively.[7] Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to
be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver
during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts, agreements, and
documents signed and ratified by respondent with third persons without her consent;
and payment of appearance and attorney’s fees.

Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement
which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed
dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable
Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791[8] then pending before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:
2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) in full satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and all
money and/or property claims she has or may have against the petitioner in the future,
including but not limited to pensions, allowances, alimony, support, share in the conjugal
property (if any), inheritance, etc.;

3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment of THIRTY
THOUSAND pesos (P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged and
confessed by and to the entire satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and
absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over, waive, remise, release and forever
quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors and administrators, any and all rights, claims
and interests which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner
arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were
married on March 1, 1951, including but not limited to any and all money and/or
property claims mentioned in the paragraph immediately preceding;

4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein hereby waive
any and all rights to question the validity and effectivity of the provisions of this
amicable settlement, as well as the right to raise these matters on appeal[.][9]
In its Order[10] dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.

Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before
the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard
Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway’s death, petitioner contracted a third marriage
with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata.

In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent alleged that the marriage between
him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage
license.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 22 November 1991, the trial court[11] rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, after collating the evidence, the evidence for the respondent is
preponderant to prove his affirmative and special defenses that the petition does not
state a sufficient cause of action. On these bases and under the doctrine of res judicata,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without pronouncements as to costs and
attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.[12]
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on
a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no
community of property was formed between them. The trial court further ruled that
assuming that the marriage was valid, the action was barred by res judicata. The trial
court noted that petitioner and respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil
Case No. 4791. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no
longer repudiate it. Finally, the trial court ruled that there was no proof to show that
during their union, petitioner and respondent acquired properties.

Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 21 November 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the absence of a marriage license is fatal and made the
marriage between petitioner and respondent a complete nullity. Hence, the trial court
did not err in finding that there was no conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner
and respondent. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the compromise agreement is a
valid contract between the parties Since the compromise agreement was entered into
freely, voluntarily, and with the full understanding of its consequences, it is conclusive
and binding on the parties. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the action was barred by
laches since it was filed by petitioner 23 years from the time the CFI approved the
additional amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The Court of Appeals sustained
the trial court’s ruling that respondent’s right over the estate of his deceased
parents was only inchoate and there was no evidence that petitioner and respondent
acquired any property that could be considered conjugal.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 2 September 1997 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court, raising the following assignment of errors:
The lower court erred in ruling that since the marriage of the plaintiff and respondent
was void due to the absence of a marriage license, no conjugal partnership arose from
their union.

The lower court erred in ruling that the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 bars
all claims by the plaintiff under the principle of res judicata.

The lower court erred in ruling that respondent’s right to [the] estate of his deceased
parents was merely inchoate, thus, no property devolved to respondent and no conjugal
partnership was formed.

The lower court erred in ruling that the appellant’s petition did not sufficiently state a
cause of action.[13]
The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is without merit.

Validity of Petitioner and Respondent’s Marriage

is the Subject of a Different Court Proceeding

Special Proceedings No. 3330 is an action for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of

Gains. In its 22 November 1991 Decision, the trial court ruled that the existence of
conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. The trial court then
proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent’s marriage. The trial
court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent
failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them.

The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and
respondent’s marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the
action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and
respondent’s marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for
Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, Branch 55. In a Decision[14] dated 31 May 1995, Civil
Case No. 430 was resolved, as follows:
In this jurisdiction it is required, except in certain cases, that the marriage license must
first be secured by the parties and shown to the judge before the latter can competently
solemnize the marriage. In this present case, none was ever secured. Failure to comply
with the formal and essential requirements of the law renders the marriage void ab
initio. Since void marriage can be assailed anytime as the action on assailing it does not
prescribe, the plaintiff is well within his right to seek judicial relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

marriage between JON A. DE YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE as NULL and VOID AB INITIO.
The Local Civil Registrar for the Municipality of Hinigaran is hereby directed to cancel the
entry of marriage between JON A. DE YSASI and LOREA DE UGALDE from the Marriage
register and to render the same of no force and effect.

Lastly, furnish copy of this decision the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, to
make the necessary cancellation of the entry of marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant.

SO ORDERED.[15]
No appeal or motion for reconsideration of the 31 May 1995 Decision in Civil Case No.
430 has been filed by any of the parties, and a Certification of finality was issued on 20
November 1995. Thus, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was already
judicially annulled as of 20 November 1995. The trial court had no jurisdiction to annul
again in Special Proceedings No. 3330 the marriage of petitioner and respondent.

Conjugal Partnership of Gains Dissolved

in Civil Case No. 4791

The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution
of the petitioner and respondent’s conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the
time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.[16] Pursuant to Article
119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal
partnership of gains, thus:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis
supplied)
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties’
separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided
Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and
respondent was already dissolved.

Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement
because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the
parties, as also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate
the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement
has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties
thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.[17]

The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when
it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI’s approval of the Compromise
Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner and respondent on even date.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the result of the 21 November 1996
Decision and of the 2 September 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 41121.
 ANTONIETA LAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ODELON S. MABUTIN AND ACTING
CLERK OF COURT AND INTERPRETER EFREN F. VARELA, BOTH OF MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, CATBALOGAN SAMAR, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a complaint for (1) simple neglect of duty filed by Antonieta Lao (Lao) against
acting clerk of court Efren F. Varela (Varela), Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Judicial Region
VIII, Catbalogan, Samar; and (2) undue delay in transmitting the records of a case filed
by Lao against Judge Odelon S. Mabutin (Judge Mabutin) of the MTC.

Lao was the plaintiff in a civil case[1] for forcible entry against a certain Nimfa Rosal
(Rosal). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 789 and was pending before Judge
Mabutin. On 17 June 2002, Judge Mabutin decided Civil Case No. 789 in favor of Rosal
and, on 16 July 2002, Lao received a copy of the decision.

Feeling aggrieved, Lao filed a notice of appeal[2] with Judge Mabutin on 29 July 2002. In
an order[3] dated 12 August 2002, Judge Mabutin gave due course to the appeal:
Considering that the notice has been filed within the reglementary period, the appeal
sought for is hereby given due course. Let the entire records of [the] case with its pages
numbered together with the transcript of stenographic notes and the exhibits be
forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar for purposes of the appeal.
Despite follow-ups from Lao, Varela and Judge Mabutin failed to transmit the records of
Civil Case No. 789 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for more than one year and four
months. Lao alleged that every time she made a follow-up, Varela told her that the
records of the case were still to be retrieved from the files.

In an affidavit-complaint[4] dated 17 March 2004 and filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Lao charged Varela and Judge Mabutin with simple neglect of duty
and undue delay in transmitting the records of a case, respectively. In its 1st
Indorsement[5] dated 2 June 2004, the OCA directed Varela and Judge Mabutin to
comment on the affidavit-complaint.

In his comment[6] dated 15 July 2004, Varela stated that (1) his workload was heavy; (2)
Lao made the follow-ups only during the latter part of 2003; and (3) the oversight was
unintentional. In his comment[7] dated 15 July 2004, Judge Mabutin stated that (1) the
follow-ups were not made to him; (2) the MTC lacked manpower; (3) the oversight was
unintentional; (4) he was not lacking in his supervision over Varela; and (5) he rendered
work even on days he was on leave.
In its Report[8] dated 14 June 2006, the OCA found Varela and Judge Mabutin liable for the
unjustified and long delay in the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 789. The OCA
recommended that (1) the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2)
Varela be suspended for one month and one day; and (3) Judge Mabutin be fined
P11,000.

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and directed Varela and Judge Mabutin to manifest if they were
willing to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed. In his letter
dated 20 July 2007, Varela adopted his 15 July 2004 comment as his manifestation. In his
manifestation dated 18 September 2006, Judge Mabutin stated his willingness to submit
the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed and reiterated that he was not
lacking in his supervision over Varela and that he rendered work even on days he was on
leave.

The Court agrees with the OCA.

Varela is liable for simple neglect of duty. Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of the clerk of court. -- Within fifteen (15) days from the perfection of the
appeal, the clerk of court or the branch clerk of court of the lower court shall transmit
the original record or the record on appeal, together with the transcripts and exhibits,
which he shall certify as complete, to the proper Regional Trial Court. A copy of his letter
of transmittal of the records to the appellate court shall be furnished the parties.
(Emphasis ours)
Lao's appeal was perfected when she filed the notice of appeal on 29 July 2002.[9]
Following Section 6, Varela should have transmitted the records of Civil Case No. 789 to
the RTC within 15 days from 29 July 2002. Varela transmitted the records of Civil Case
No. 789 to the RTC only on 4 December 2003 and only after Lao made follow-ups. Had
Lao not made any follow-up, Varela would have failed to transmit the records of the case
to the RTC indefinitely.

Even granting that (1) he had a heavy workload; (2) Lao only made the follow-ups during
the latter part of 2003; and (3) the oversight was unintentional, Varela would still be
liable. First, having a heavy workload is not a valid excuse. Otherwise, every government
employee charged with dereliction of duty would proffer such a convenient excuse to
escape liability, to the great prejudice of the public.[10] Second, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court does not require litigants to make any follow-up with the clerk of court. As acting
clerk of court, Varela should have transmitted the records of Civil Case No. 789 to the
RTC within 15 days from 29 July 2002 even without any follow-up from Lao. Third, good
faith or lack of intention to be negligent is a lame, invalid, and unacceptable excuse.[11]
Good faith, at most, is only a mitigating circumstance.[12]

Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task expected of a court
employee. It signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.[13]
It is a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six
months for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense.[14] In Tudtud v. Caayon,
[15]
the Court penalized a clerk of court for failing to transmit the records of a case for
more than one year and five months.

Judge Mabutin is liable for undue delay in transmitting the records of a case. Although
the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 789 was primarily the concern of Varela,
making sure that the 12 August 2002 order was properly and promptly carried out was
the responsibility of Judge Mabutin.[16]

Judicial duties include tasks relevant to the court's operations.[17] Rule 3.08 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates judges to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance
of the administrative functions of court personnel. Rule 3.09 mandates judges to
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business. The records of Civil Case No. 789 were transmitted to the RTC only after
more than one year and four months and only after Lao made follow-ups. Clearly, an
oversight was committed. Being the one charged with the proper and efficient
management of the MTC, Judge Mabutin is ultimately responsible for the mistakes of his
court personnel.[18]

Even granting that (1) the follow-ups were not made to him; (2) the MTC lacked
manpower; (3) the oversight was unintentional; and (4) he rendered work even on days
he was on leave, Judge Mabutin would still be liable. First, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
does not require litigants to make any follow-up. Judge Mabutin should have made sure
that his 12 August 2002 order was properly carried out even without any follow-up from
Lao. Second, even if the MTC was understaffed, Judge Mabutin still had to comply with
the 15-day period in transmitting the records of cases to the RTC. He should have
devised ways of ensuring a prompt and efficient dispatch of business in the MTC.
Moreover, Judge Mabutin failed to show that the transmittal of the records of Civil Case
No. 789 within 15 days was impossible due to lack of manpower. Third, good faith, at
most, is only a mitigating circumstance.[19] It does not exculpate Judge Mabutin from
administrative liability. Fourth, having a heavy workload cannot be used as a convenient
excuse to escape administrative liability.[20]

Undue delay in transmitting the records of a case is a less serious offense[21] punishable
by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[22] In
Bellena v. Perello,[23] the Court penalized a judge for failing to transmit the records of a
case for almost nine months.

The public's faith in the judiciary depends largely on the proper and prompt disposition
of matters pending before the courts.[24] In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-
Blanco,[25] the Court held that any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how
brief, deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case. It undermines
the public's faith in the judiciary. A delay of more than one year and four months in
transmitting the records of a case is unreasonably long.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds acting clerk of court Efren F. Varela, Municipal Trial Court,
Judicial Region VIII, Catbalogan, Samar, GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him for one month and one day and STERNLY
WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

The Court finds Judge Odelon S. Mabutin, Municipal Trial Court, Judicial Region VIII,
Catbalogan, Samar, GUILTY of UNDUE DELAY IN TRANSMITTING THE RECORDS OF
A CASE. Accordingly, the Court FINES him P11,000 and STERNLY WARNS him that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.