Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v.

Manila Railroad Company

GR L-25316, 28 February 1979 (88 SCRA 616)

Second Division, Fernando (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: There are no antecedent facts available for this case.

The union seeks reversal of decision of the lower court dismissing its petition for mandamus.
The court determined Republic Act 2023 was enacted only to compel the employer to make the
deduction of the employees’ debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’
credit union; but which does not convert the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit.

Issue: Whether, indeed, the law does not give first priority in the matter of payments to the
obligations of employees in favor of their credit unions.

Held: Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do
except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.
The express provisions of the New Civil Code, Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the
legislative intent on preference of credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of
Republic Act 2023 speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the
legislative intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give first
priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor of their credit
unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared. There is nothing in the provision of
Republic Act 2023 which provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit
unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

Abellana vs Marava GR no. 27760 May 29 1974

Facts: Francisco Abellana was charged with the City Court of Ozamis City with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized
pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers, namely, Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea,
Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeño. Abellana was found guilty as charged, damages in
favor of the offended parties likewise being awarded.

Abellana appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, Lamason et.al. filed with another
branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages
allegedly suffered by them from the reckless driving of Abellana. In such complaint, Crispin
Abellana, the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the
dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing
thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the
stage where the criminal case was already on appeal. The judge in the latter CFI ordered on 28
April 1967 that the City Court judgment is vacated and a trail de novo be conducted. He noted
that the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civil action or reserved their right to
institute it separately in the City Court; but which they filed in the CFI. In view of the waiver
and reservation, the Court would be precluded from judging civil damages against the accused
and in favor of the offended parties. the motion to dismiss is denied. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the petition.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition with costs against petitioners.

1. Appeal of judgment in municipal trial court, new trial as if originally instituted in

the CFI
The rule in the jurisdiction of the Court is that upon appeal by the defendant from a judgment
of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealed case
shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in that court
(Section 7 of Rule 123, People v. Jamisola). So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40.
An interpretation that an independent civil action is barred absent a reservation under Section
1 of Rule 111 is a non-sequitur, as the inference does not per se arise from the wordings of the
rule and ignores what is explicitly provided in Section 7, Rule 123.

2. A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional doubt

A court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional doubt. The grant of power to the Court, both in the present Constitution and
under the 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantive right. Thus, substantive right cannot to be frittered away by a construction that
could render it nugatory, if through oversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to
seek recovery for damages in a civil suit. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear when it
provides that in cases of . physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

3. Assurance of parties justice according to law must not be ignored in the pursuit of
serving the interest of a client; Construction should be based on legal norm, not
literalness
A counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice
according to law, in serving the interest of his client. He is not to fall prey to the vice of
literalness. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule,
there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged
right.

PAFLU vs BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429
votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations
implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification
of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes
cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought
to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred,
would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in
determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the
submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.
Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The
conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to
the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a
statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by
Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the
present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1 May 1974,
although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that
there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory
rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot
ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903
decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to
execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the
statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be
cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in
Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since
then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by Chief
Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing
the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Philippine apparel workers union vs NLRC

Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the
Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held
thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor
praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the
complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties
signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees,
retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted
to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance
ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by
the company. The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of
the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22
per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay
only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of
the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were
made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules
Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance
under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80.

On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the
CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in
accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this
order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering
a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the
Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting
P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided
for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but
the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the
exceptions.

Held: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD
1123 was already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to
1 April 1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted
or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in
paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an
actual payment of said increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary
opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter
was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had
declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for
employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil
price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic
and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977).

The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules
implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be
given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement
between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation
and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and
scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor
Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but
also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law.

The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the
commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided
for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all
other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered
employees; with costs against the company.
IBAA Employees Union v Inciong

Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of
holiday pay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties,
the case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte
T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner’s complaint for
payment of holiday pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it
complied with the order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January 1976.

On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the
provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by
authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor)
promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The
controversial section thereof reads as “Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees
who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with
a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be
paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.” On 23 April 1976, Policy Instruction 9
was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule.
The bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor
Code and by Policy Instruction 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On 30 August 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s
decision of 25 August 1975, which the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter,
instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its
employees their regular holiday pay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order
of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en
banc dismissing the bank’s appeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution.
On 21 February 1979, the bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC
issued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute
the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the
Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor,
through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en
banc of the NLRC dated 20 June 1978, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the
petition for certiorari charging Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.

Held: From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article
82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits
of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then
Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting, under
Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: “employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary
of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for
all days in the month whether worked or not.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed
upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the
courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.
So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are
valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of
the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. A rule is binding on the
Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within
the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with
the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law
is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Minister of Labor,
and reinstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.