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Companion to Kant
The Bloomsbury Companions series is a major series of single volume companions to key
research fields in the humanities aimed at postgraduate students, scholars and libraries. Each
companion offers a comprehensive reference resource giving an overview of key topics, research
areas, new directions and a manageable guide to beginning or developing research in the field. A
distinctive feature of the series is that each companion provides practical guidance on advanced
study and research in the field, including research methods and subject-specific resources.
The BLOOMSBURY
Companion to Kant
Edited by
Gary Banham(†)
Dennis Schulting
and Nigel Hems
L ON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W Y OR K • SY DN EY
Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
www.bloomsbury.com
© Gary Banham, Dennis Schulting, Nigel Hems and Contributors 2012, 2015
Gary Banham, Dennis Schulting and Nigel Hems have asserted their right
under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as
the Editors of this work.
Preface ix
Preface to the Second Edition xi
List of Abbreviations of Kant’s Works xiii
List of Contributors xvii
INTRODUCTION 1
J. G. Herder 96
Francis Hutcheson 98
Königsberg 99
J. H. Lambert 101
Moses Mendelssohn 102
Physical influx 105
Pietism 106
Prussia 108
School Philosophy 110
Adam Smith 112
Baruch de Spinoza/Spinozism 114
3. SOURCES AND INFLUENCES 121
Aristotle 121
Francis Bacon 124
A. G. Baumgarten 126
Cicero 128
C. A. Crusius 129
René Descartes 130
Epicurus and Epicureanism 133
Leonhard Euler 135
Marcus Herz 136
David Hume 137
G. W. Leibniz 139
John Locke 141
G. F. Meier 142
Isaac Newton 144
Plato 145
Jean-Jacques Rousseau 147
Emanuel Swedenborg 151
J. N. Tetens 154
Christian Wolff 156
vi
Contents
PART V: BIBLIOGRAPHY
6. KANT BIBLIOGRAPHY 351
Index 421
vii
Preface
There are few philosophers whose influence is more widely felt across the range of the subject
in the contemporary world than is the case with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Despite the
breadth of Kant’s influence on contemporary philosophy, it can be extremely difficult to get
a grip on the nature of Kant’s own work. One of the central reasons why this can be so dif-
ficult is precisely because of the range of Kant’s own philosophical contributions. To make a
major impact on the understanding of metaphysics would be sufficient reason for a thinker to
be regarded as a ‘major’ philosopher. But Kant’s ethics are surely as central to debates in con-
temporary moral philosophy as the Critique of Pure Reason is in contemporary metaphysics
and epistemology. Nor does Kant’s importance end there since, as is widely recognized, the
Critique of Judgment is foundational for the modern discipline of aesthetics (in addition to
raising questions about teleology that have, if anything, gained in resonance in recent years).
Finally, the comprehension of the status of scientific laws and the way science itself is philo-
sophically understood are topics that often lead thinkers to read or re-read The Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural Science. When these points are put together, it becomes evident that
Kant ‘ s influence is not only broad in range on contemporary philosophy but comprehending
the nature of this influence is itself something that requires extended reflection and for such
reflection to be effective, there is a need for guidebooks that clearly map all the central ele-
ments of Kant’s philosophy.
It is the point of this Companion to fill this need, something that many guides to Kant’s
philosophy only partially do. In order to meet this requirement we have assembled a wid-
eranging, international team that can together help general readers to find their way around
both the specific parts of Kant’s philosophy and the inter-relations between them. Whilst
the work of each of us as editors of this volume has been considerable, the effect of the
Companion would be without doubt that much less were it not for the many contributions
we solicited and received. For the work provided here, we would like to thank Lucy Allais,
Tom Bailey, Steven M. Bayne, Karin de Boer, Kees Jan Brons, John Callanan, Luigi Caranti,
Howard Caygill, Martin Davies, Katerina Deligiorgi, Corey Dyck, Wolfgang Ertl, Richard
Fincham, Samuel Fleischacker, Brett Fulkerson-Smith, Ido Geiger, Gregory Johnson, Johan de
Jong, Christian Krijnen, Beth Lord, Michela Massimi, Giuseppe Motta, Ernst-Otto Onnasch,
Christian Onof, Marcel Quarfood, Aviv Reiter, Yaron Senderowicz, Marco Sgarbi, Scott
Stapleford, Rudi te Velde, Jacco Verburgt, Falk Wunderlich and Job Zinkstok.
Preface
Dennis Schulting also wants to thank both Daniel Lopatin of Oneohtrix Point Never and
Mark McGuire for delivering the viscerally stirring goods in the form of their respective
‘kosmische’ music albums Rifts and A Young Person’s Guide to Mark McGuire, which along-
side copious amounts of Bruckner he played on repeat whilst copy-editing this Companion.
The Editors
Gary Banham
Dennis Schulting
Nigel Hems
x
Preface to the second edition
For this paperback edition, revisions were carried out and several more entries were added.
In the Section ‘Philosophical and Historical Context’ there is now also an essay on Herder,
an important erstwhile student and later tough opponent of Kant, and an article on School
Philosophy, which provides more insight into the philosophical background of Kant’s
thought. The lemma on Rousseau, in the Section ‘Sources and Influences’, has been rewritten
and expanded. In the Section ‘Key Themes and Topics’, four more entries on ‘Appearance’,
‘Intuition’, ‘Postulates of Empirical Thought in General’, and ‘Thing in Itself’ have been
added, which, although dealt with in other entries in the first edition, merited a separate treat-
ment. In the Section ‘Reception and Influence’, an essay on Schopenhauer’s interpretation of
Kant adds to the topic of the reception of Kant’s work in post-Kantian philosophy. Lastly, the
bibliography has been improved and updated with the newest literature. I am very pleased
that Robert Clewis, Wolfgang Ertl, Christian Onof, Sandra Shapshay and John Zammito have
contributed to the new edition of the Companion.
Sadly, slightly over a year after the publication of the first edition of the Companion, Gary
Banham, the originator of the project for this Companion, died suddenly when on holiday in
Rome in March 2013. This expanded edition is dedicated to his memory. The Section ‘Key
Works’, which was singlehandedly written by Gary, is left largely unchanged.
The Editor
Dennis Schulting
xi
List of Abbreviations
OF KANT’S WORKS
Throughout the Companion the following abbreviations are used followed by the page
numbers only of the respective volume in the Academic edition of Kant’s work (AA) (Kant’s
gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1900–). So, for example, a reference to the Critique
of Judgment, say, is provided thus: CJ 284. The Reflexionen are cited by means of the abbre-
viation Refl followed by the Akademie Adickes number.
For the first Critique the standard way of referring to the original pagination is adhered to,
by means of the A/B citation, where A stands for the first or so-called A-edition, published in
1781, and B for the second or B-edition, published in 1787.
Quotations are in almost all cases from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel
Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992ff.), which contains English translations
of almost all of Kant’s published works and many of the lectures, correspondence, unpub-
lished manuscripts and so-called Reflections.
Where available, for each specific work in translation the volume number of The Cambridge
Edition (CE) is given after the AA volume number according to the following list of volumes
already published:
xiii
List of Abbreviations OF KANT’S WORKS
xiv
List of Abbreviations OF KANT’S WORKS
xv
List of Contributors
xvii
List of Contributors
Dr Gregory Johnson
Dr Yaron Senderowicz
San Francisco
Tel Aviv University
USA
Israel
Johan de Jong
University of Amsterdam Dr Marco Sgarbi
The Netherlands University of Venice
Italy
Dr Christian Krijnen
VU University Amsterdam
Dr Sandra Shapshay
The Netherlands
Indiana University
Dr Beth Lord USA
University of Aberdeen
UK Dr Scott Stapleford
St Thomas University
Dr Michela Massimi Canada
University of Edinburgh
UK Professor Dr Rudi te Velde
Dr Giuseppe Motta University of Amsterdam
University of Graz The Netherlands
Austria
Dr Jacco Verburgt
Dr Ernst-Otto Onnasch Amsterdam
University of Utrecht The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Dr Falk Wunderlich
Dr Christian Onof University of Mainz
Imperial College London Germany
UK
xviii
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, at the conclusion of his presiden- concerns. One of the ways in which Kant’s
tial address to the Eastern meeting of the philosophy has to be approached is clearly
American Philosophical Association, Wilfrid in relation to the historical context of the
Sellars wrote that there was not an earlier Enlightenment and eighteenth-century
time at which Kant had been taken so seri- Germany in particular. Foremost among the
ously as today, particularly in the English- responses to this kind of historical concern
speaking world as ‘a whole new generation with Kant’s philosophy is work of a bio-
of commentators is coming into existence’.1 graphical character.2 However, while a bio-
Sellars’ words ring, if anything, even more graphical focus gives important information
true today and, as always, there is ‘a whole concerning the formation of Kant’s ideas and
new generation of commentators’ who are helps us to comprehend something of the
presenting new vantage-points upon the way the Critical philosophy emerged, it is of
work of Kant. As a result, one of the objec- less help in comprehending the manner of the
tives of this Companion is to help introduce reception of Kant’s philosophy and how that
to a wider philosophical public some sense of reception may in turn have prompted Kant to
the debates and currents within contempo- revise and rearticulate his philosophy.3 The
rary Kantian philosophy in addition to pro- relationship between the context from which
viding resources enabling an introduction to Kant arose and the context of his reception
the broad themes of Kant’s philosophy and is one that raises a number of philosophical
the reasons why it remains such a fertile area and historiographical questions which have
for philosophical research. received extensive treatment in recent years.4
Before setting out some reasons for view- There has been a noted turn toward such
ing this companion as a useful addition to historical studies of Kant, particularly in
the reference literature that exists on Kant, relation to his reception of and relationship
it is first worth taking some time to mention to the subsequent movement of German
the important existent texts of similar type, Idealism, in recent years.5 A number of
partly in order also to make clearer to the recent companions to Kant are also influ-
general reader the geography of the work enced by this ‘historical turn’ including,
that exists in connection with Kant and invariably, essay-length pieces that focus
how it intersects with broader philosophical on either Kant’s original context of writing,
1
Introduction
tracking his development, or, conversely, on priori, the nature and extent of his reply to
the reception of his work.6 However, the Hume’s scepticism, particularly in relation to
essay-length pieces featured in these com- causation, the justification of the categories,
panions are quite different from the kinds of the understanding of transcendental ideal-
contributions that are featured in this com- ism and the problematic ‘defence’ of free will.
panion. What is standard in the current run This list is one that arises purely from think-
of companions to Kant is the provision of ing through the topics of the Critique of Pure
largely single-author essay-length pieces that Reason, undoubtedly the work of Kant’s that
provide overviews to the areas in question. has had widest philosophical influence despite
By contrast, this companion is intended to its evident difficulty. The Critique is generally
be a genuine handbook, including sections understood to have changed the landscape of
devoted to both the historical background modern philosophy, as it helped both to bring
of Kant’s work and to the reception of it. a certain style of philosophy to an end in
These sections are written by many hands addition to promoting the formation of new
and are presented here as short guides to the styles of philosophy. The importance of the
areas in question, often including reviews of former has been widely recognized with the
areas complete with bibliography for further conception of Kant as ‘all-destroying’ in rela-
reading. Thus, by contrast to the model of tion to traditional arguments for the exist-
‘companions’ now current, this one is aimed ence of God and, indeed, the general role of
at providing information that provides an philosophy that was promoted at least since
easy guide to both areas and sub-areas and Descartes, challenged and overturned.9
presents a plurality of voices with regard to However, this image of Kant as an ‘all-
the questions covered. The fact that such an destroyer’ is itself capable of promoting a
approach is possible within this handbook is view of his achievement that makes it harder
a tribute to the work previously done but it to comprehend him as having contributed to
also enables a divergence from that work by the reformation of metaphysics, rather than
providing shorter, more succinct entries that to its destruction. Among earlier generations
cover more discrete topics.7 of Kant interpreters, for example, a broadly
Philosophical work on Kant has tended, deflationary view of Kant’s own metaphysi-
for obvious reasons, to split between its cal views had the effect of popularising an
three clear poles. Some, that is, has focused image of Kant as being a philosopher who
exclusively on Kant’s theoretical philosophy was ‘opposed’ to metaphysics.10 More recent
and its relationship to the previous history commentators have, in response, sought
of metaphysics, other works just on Kant’s to restore the notion that Kant is indeed a
practical philosophy and its relationship to contributor to metaphysics and not merely
predominant schools of ethics and political a critic of it.11 This ‘turn’ in the interpreta-
philosophy, while, finally, a third group has tion of Kant’s theoretical philosophy has
focused more or less exclusively upon Kant’s been accompanied by a much greater degree
aesthetics.8 These distinct foci have provided of attention to Kant’s lectures on metaphys-
much work of value and stimulated a series ics and to the interplay between the Critique
of important debates. and Kant’s subsequent works on theoretical
The key topics of Kant’s theoretical phi- philosophy.12 I don’t mean to suggest here
losophy include the status of the synthetic a that a new ‘consensus’ view has thereby
2
Introduction
emerged in relation to Kant’s metaphysics as Conflict of the Faculties.14 This general ten-
it remains an area of lively contention. But dency has, however, been a main focus in new
what such contention involves, increasingly, concentration on the work the Groundwork
is a sense that the resources of metaphysics was intended to prepare the way for: The
in Kant are broader than was previously sug- Metaphysics of Morals.15 In addition to pro-
gested and that techniques of research that viding such a broader vista, this concentra-
have had success in relation to other figures tion has suggested that the attempt to deny
in early modern philosophy also have perti- Kant a ‘comprehensive’ conception in the
nence with regard to Kant. area of practical philosophy is doomed to
If the area of Kant’s theoretical philoso- failure and that such a failure is likely to be a
phy has been the site of much controversy good thing in promoting an integrated read-
concerning the relation this philosophy has ing of Kant’s practical philosophy. Part of the
to the general area of metaphysics, the inter- point of such an integrated reading would
pretation of his practical philosophy, by further be to suggest that the understand-
contrast, has been determined largely by an ing of the ‘unity of reason’ requires relating
overly reductive response to his intervention Kant’s practical philosophy more carefully to
in this area. Until comparatively recently, his theoretical philosophy.
the response to Kant’s practical philosophy If both the theoretical and practical phi-
was overwhelmingly oriented by a view of losophy of Kant are areas in which there is
it based on a reading of his initial Critical considerable debate concerning the nature
work in the area, the Groundwork for the of his legacy, this is likewise true in response
Metaphysics of Morals. However, such a view to the work that has come to seem to some
of Kant’s ethics has been strongly challenged the most important part of his Critical phi-
in recent years. On the one hand, the upsurge losophy, namely, the Critique of Judgment.
of interest in Kantian ethics that flowed Concentration on this has traditionally been
from Rawlsian work in the area has given concerned with the first half of the book, the
rise to the general conception of ‘Kantian ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’, a concen-
constructivism’.13 This reading of Kant pro- tration that has, however, tended to have the
moted an understanding of the ‘categorical effect of ensuring that it has become obscure
imperative procedure’ that highlighted the to contemporary readers why it is that Kant
importance of Kant’s appeal to the univer- also treated the topic of teleology in the same
sal law of nature and aimed to show that book. This has not been helped by treat-
consistency of willing is a more substantive ments of the Third Critique that downplay
conception than some critics of Kant have the topic of ‘reflective judgment’.16 The effect
tended to think. of such readings of the Third Critique has
In contrast to the ‘constructivist’ reading been wide-ranging, not least in the areas of
of Kant’s ethics, there has been a resurgence art criticism and art theory.17 The arrival of
of interest in the wider setting of Kant’s writ- challenges to such a conception of the Third
ings, going beyond the Groundwork and Critique has taken a number of forms. One
looking in addition at Kant’s wider writings element of the arrival of new readings of the
on practical philosophy. This has included work has been the increased attention given
assessing his work on religion, both Religion in recent years to Kant’s view of the sublime,
within the Limits of Reason Alone and the something long marginalized by works that
3
Introduction
concentrated largely on his account of the previously available and the rise of an histor-
beautiful.18 This shift in focus has helped to ical sense that was often lacking in previous
complicate the understanding of Kant’s phil- generations of Anglo-American philosophers.
osophical aesthetics although the integration Alongside this scholarly challenge has come
of his treatment of aesthetics in the Third a philosophical one as the interplay between
Critique with that provided elsewhere in his philosophers in different countries has grown
Critical philosophy is a broader challenge.19 wider and a result of this has been the under-
A broad reading of the whole of the Third mining of the conception that there is only
Critique bringing out both the relationship one philosophical method that is respectable.
between the logic and the aesthetic of reflec- The rise of such philosophical pluralism has
tive judgment and the rationale for Kant’s led to the revival of Kantian studies as it has
discussion of teleology has been a focus of the promoted new insights into areas of Kant’s
most important recent works on the area.20 works that were previously unexplored or
There has also been a resurgence of historical underexplored.23 This has included attention
work on the Third Critique that has argued being finally given both to Kant’s final torso
for revisionist conceptions of its composi- of a work, the Opus Postumum24 and to his
tion21 and for revisions of understanding of early, so-called, ‘pre-Critical’ works.25
his view of teleology.22 As is the case with the Putting together the result of these chal-
new work being undertaken in other areas lenges is to make clear the need for a survey
of Kantian philosophy, so also with the new of Kant’s work in a form that is accessible
work on the Third Critique the result has to the general philosophical public and yet
been both a challenge to the received image which includes a sense of the transition
of the work and a resulting greater complex- through which the reception of this work is
ity in the idea of Kant’s contributions both undergoing. The ‘Key Works’ section of this
to the areas investigated in the work and his companion is intended to provide part of this
relationship to the history of both aesthetics service, giving, as it does, an account of each
and teleology. of the major works Kant wrote and render-
Across the areas of Kantian philosophy, ing, in the process, a comprehensible and yet
there has thus arisen in recent years a series succinct treatment of the major points of
of challenges to the received conceptions these works. Alongside this treatment, the
both of the import of Kant’s own principles ‘Themes and Topics’ section is meant further
and methodology and of the relationship to orient the reader to the key areas in Kant’s
between Kant’s works and contemporary works. It is also important that a general bib-
philosophy. It was, for a time, easy to view liography be made available which enables
Kant as being a major figure in the history of works on each of the major areas of Kant’s
philosophy without necessarily assenting to philosophy to be brought together and the
the idea that his work was of importance to companion concludes with this.
ongoing philosophical work. The challenge The importance of Kant’s philosophy for
to this complacent view has come about contemporary philosophers does indeed, as
through a combination of scholarly atten- Wilfrid Sellars wrote 40 years ago, continue
tion to the range of Kant’s works, something to grow. It is the hope of the editors of this
that has been assisted by a range of trans- companion that we have provided a map to
lations of works into English that were not navigate the terrain of Kant’s philosophy,
4
Introduction
5
Introduction
6
Introduction
7
PART I:
KEY WRITINGS
1
KEY WORKS
The objective of this chapter is to set out an review by Moses Mendelssohn, a review that
analysis of the contents of all of Kant’s major began the process of establishing Kant’s reputa-
works. The works are assessed in a way that tion as a major philosopher. In some respects,
enables the reader to gain a general overview this work gathered together thoughts Kant had
of Kant’s arguments in specific sections and the published in earlier writings. For example, the
chronological order in which they are presented piece includes the claim that existence is not a
should further help the reader to see the means predicate, which, in its reiterated form in CPR,
by which Kant’s work developed. In the proc- was influential as a response to the Cartesian
ess of seeing the general rationale of the works ontological argument.
examined, the reader will also discover some- However, it is not here that Kant first
thing about the types of controversies that exist published this criticism as it appeared earlier
with regard to the interpretations of the works in ND in 1755 (ND 394). Similarly, in this
in question though it is not intended that these work Kant publishes a detailed statement of
entries should do more than indicate these con- a mechanistic account of the origins of the
troversies. The views expressed on the works solar system though in so doing he essen-
in this chapter will not always coincide with tially presents a digest of the account given
those found elsewhere in this Companion as is in his earlier NH, published in 1755. Despite
to be expected with a work that incorporates a these points, there are some substantial rea-
commitment to pluralism. Unlike the other sec- sons why this piece attracted the attention of
tions of this Companion, the present chapter is Mendelssohn although to explain what they
entirely composed by one hand, so as to facili- are requires a detailed description of the con-
tate the formation of an overall view of Kant’s tents of the piece.
philosophical achievement. – GB The ‘Preface’ indicates that the intention
of the piece had been to provide a rough
outline of a main draft and that some of the
arguments considered have not been demon-
THE ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT IN strated to have a distinct connection with the
SUPPORT OF A DEMONSTRATION OF conclusion. The work contains three main
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (OPD) sections, which are uneven in terms of length
and importance.
This piece was first published in December 1762 The first section is devoted to providing
and was given a substantial and favourable the argument promised in the title of the
11
KEY WORKS
piece. Here Kant demonstrates why exist- there exists a God as in demonstrating that
ence is not a real predicate, in the proc- the notion of possibility has to be understood
ess arguing against positions of Wolff and in a different sense to the logical one if it is to
Baumgarten. We are asked to conceive of a relate to actuality.
subject and draw up all the predicates that The second main section purports to show
may be thought to belong to it and, once we how the mode of proof of the first section is
have done this, we should be able to see that useful but does not really do this. Instead, in
the subject in question could either exist with this section, Kant surveys a posteriori argu-
these determinations or not exist. When we ments for the existence of God, which he pur-
are considering any ordinary subject, it is evi- ports to take seriously but in which instead
dent that God could know all the attributes other matters are manifested. For example,
that belong to it without it following that the the unity in the manifold of the essence of
being in question existed. Since this is so it things is shown by reference to the properties
follows that existence is not a predicate of of space and this shows the extent to which
the thing. space is already pictured by Kant as an intui-
Kant’s explanation is that when we use the tive construction.
term ‘existence’, we are predicating some- Similarly, the discussion of demonstrating
thing not of a thing but only of our thought the unity of the manifold by reference to laws
of it. Ordinary language appears to possess of motion shows a commitment to seeing
the surface characteristic of treating exist- these laws as having something necessary in
ence as a kind of predicate but this is not them. Kant here also discusses Maupertuis’
what is really taking place when we use the principle of the greatest economy of action,
term ‘existence’. Existence is itself, when con- a principle he takes here to demonstrate the
sidered in an absolute sense, a concept whose need to link the laws of motion to the very
characteristic marks are only marginally thought of matter.
more simple than the concept itself. Hence Subsequent discussions include the pro-
it is hardly possible to analyse the concept of pensity of adaptation in nature, the need to
‘existence’. understand events in nature in a way that
After stating this point, Kant moves on removes references to miracles and the refor-
to showing that the internal possibility of mulation of ‘physico-theology’ to ensure that
all things presupposes that there must exist universal laws of nature are always sought
something as without this there would be no behind each phenomenon. A short digest of
grounds for anything. This leads to a connec- the mechanistic account of the solar system
tion between possibility and actuality and is also provided.
the point of this is to show that there is a The concluding third section shows that
notion of possibility that is ‘real’. the a posteriori arguments apparently taken
Kant moves next to absolutely necessary seriously in the second section are none of
existence as the ground of the possibility of them possible grounds for an argument
anything actual as without there being some- showing the existence of God. Kant here
thing necessary there would be no grounds concludes the point concerning existence and
for there being something at all. The real predication raised in the first section, dem-
importance of the argument consists not so onstrating from it the impossibility of the
much in its being a ground for thinking that Cartesian ontological proof. Kant now treats
12
Key Works
the argument of the first section as the basis as a whole which is not a part as opposed to
of a revised ontological proof and shows a simple which is a part that is not a whole.
that a posteriori arguments, by contrast, can Subsequently, however, he moves from this
attain only probability at best and are insuf- analysis to a concern with the genesis of the
ficient to establish the existence of a supreme concepts in question describing the differ-
being even probabilistically. ence between ‘ideas of the understanding’
The final section also includes a wry com- and the ‘laws of intuition’. The former are
ment that suggests that Kant does not take the governed by processes of analysis, and the
proof of the first section even that seriously. latter by synthesis. The introduction of this
The real weight of the piece concerns the need difference requires reference to time in the
to see possibility differently from the way it latter case and to the point that it is possible
is approached in logic, on the one hand, and for the mind to entertain ideas which cannot
the right way for philosophy to approach the be made concrete in intuition.
investigation of nature on the other.
The Concept of the World
13
KEY WORKS
The Sensible and the Intelligible concepts and it is never possible to move,
by combination alone, from the sensible to
The second section concerns the distinction the intelligible. So the most universal empiri-
between sensible and intelligible things in cal laws are still sensory concepts as are the
general, a distinction which certainly appears most exact rules of geometry. Kant sketches a
to require further discussion given the con- process of concept formation that shows that
clusion of the first section. This section begins sensible concepts become more general by a
with a description of sensibility as involving process of comparison and combination. As
the receptivity of a subject, namely, their these concepts increase in generality so we
capacity to be affected by some object. By arrive at a sense of ‘experience’ while Kant
contrast, intelligibility is the capacity to rep- contends that prior to this stage we only have
resent something that cannot come before the ‘appearances’.
senses. The object of sensibility is classed as The concepts that have a ‘real’ use arise
phenomenon, that of intelligibility, the nou- from the nature of the understanding itself
menon. We appear here to have arrived at a and do not include any form of sensitive ele-
cardinal Critical distinction but that it is not ment. For this reason, Kant refers to them as
this yet becomes clear when Kant glosses this ‘pure ideas’ and distinguishes them from the
difference further. In so doing, Kant presents abstract concepts that arise in experience.
the thinking that is involved with phenom- Having made these distinctions, Kant can
ena as a representation of how things appear, now explain his opposition to the rational-
while that of representations of noumena is ist conception that the sensible is a ‘confused’
how things are. form of the intelligible by pointing out that
In sensory cognition, there is a distinc- while geometry is sensible in genesis it is exact
tion between form and matter where the and distinct whereas metaphysics, which is in
latter refers to sensation as evidence for the principle the pure science, is often character-
presence of something whereas the former ized by confusion. Kant uses the term ‘meta-
provides a law that is inherent in the mind physics’ here to stand for an enquiry into the
by means of which it co-ordinates together, first principles of the use of pure understand-
or synthesizes, that which has been sensed. ing. What is carried out in ID is distinguished
After making this distinction, Kant follows from ‘metaphysics’ so understood, as what
up with a different one, concerning this time this work does is merely a propaedeutic for
the use of the understanding. Concepts of the metaphysics.
understanding are now divided in terms of The concepts of the understanding have
their use between ‘real use’ and ‘logical use’ (a two basic uses, the first of which is negative,
distinction reminiscent of both the earlier Inq namely to keep the distinction between the
and OPD). The ‘real’ use gives the concepts sensible and the intelligible clear. The second
of the things or relations ‘themselves’ while use is to describe the pure concepts of under-
the ‘logical’ use defines the means by which standing in pure sciences. In our cognition,
concepts are presented in relation to each we can only relate to the understanding by
other (through hierarchical combinations). symbols and not through singular concepts.
So if we are dealing with sensible concepts, The common principle of what belongs to
these are combined together and their com- the sensible, by contrast, is its representa-
bination is distinct from that of intelligible tion by means of singular concepts, those of
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Key Works
space and time. Through these singular con- determine how it is that the principle of rela-
cepts, we can attain to a science that is based tions between substances, which we under-
only on quantity, namely pure mathematics stand as their mutual interaction, holds. Kant
including under this heading geometry, pure immediately rejects any suggestion that this
mechanics and arithmetic. can be grounded in the mere existence of the
substances, thereby distinguishing his view
Principles of the Sensible World from ‘vulgar’ forms of physical influx theory.
Since the world also cannot consist of neces-
The third section discusses the principles of sary beings as no one necessary being would
the form of the sensible world. This section have any relation of dependence on anything
importantly anticipates the Transcendental else it follows that the world is composed of
Aesthetic of CPR though there are some dif- contingent beings. These contingent beings
ferences. A minor one is that time is treated are also suggested to depend upon a being
prior to space, a more important difference which is necessary and a unique cause, a ver-
being the lack of distinction between meta- sion of the cosmological argument already
physical and transcendental expositions. discussed in OPD. The dependence of the
Seven arguments are presented with regard substances on the necessary being is described
to time and only five with regard to space. as a universal interaction by means of a true
Common to both are the arguments aiming physical influence or real (rather than merely
to show that they are not notions derived ideal) whole.
from the senses, that they are singular and
not general, that they are intuitions, that they Metaphysics
are not ‘objective and real’ and yet that they
are indisputably true conditions of sensitive The fifth and final section concerns method
cognition. Additionally with regard to time, in metaphysics and returns to the distinction
Kant here seeks to show that it is a continu- between what is sensitive and what belongs
ous magnitude and connects this argument to the understanding. This section is a rudi-
to a discussion of Leibniz’s principle of con- mentary form of the Transcendental Dialectic
tinuity. Further, Kant asserts that time is an in which Kant argues for the importance of
absolutely first formal principle of the sen- marking this distinction and the inevitable
sible world, something not stated of space. problems that will arise if we do not. The gen-
Although very similar arguments are pre- eral character of the illusions that will ensue
sented in CPR Kant does not, in ID, explic- if this distinction is not followed are charac-
itly argue that space and time are a priori terized by Kant as the metaphysical fallacy
cognitions. of subreption and the reduction of all such is
provided by keeping concepts of the under-
Principles of the Intelligible World standing distinct from relations of space and
time. After outlining the illusions that emerge
The fourth section concerns the principle of from contravening the distinction in question,
the form of the intelligible world. Here Kant Kant concludes the work by laying out two
points out that since we have only thus far principles of harmony which are required
concerned ourselves with the subjective con- as without them we would hardly be able to
ditions of sensitive cognition, we still have to make any judgments about objects at all. The
15
KEY WORKS
first such principle is that the naturalist one movement away from the stance of ID since
that all things in the universe take place in it includes a reflective question that requires
accord with the order of nature. The second an investigation of ‘representation’.
is Occam’s Razor, that we ought not to multi- Stress on this notion also formed part of
ply principles beyond necessity and the third the horizon of the first generation of inter-
is that nothing material comes into being or pretations of CPR following the precedent of
passes away. In concluding with these princi- Reinhold. Allied with the question raised in
ples, Kant again anticipates part of the argu- the so-called Herz letter is Kant’s remark in
ment of the Dialectic, namely, that touching P that it was considering ‘Hume’s problem’
upon regulative ideas of pure reason. that awoke him from his previous ‘dogmatic
It can be seen when the work is examined slumber’. As with the question in the let-
with care that there are important differences ter to Herz so also the nature of what Kant
between the views expressed in it and what took ‘Hume’s problem’ to consist in has been
is to come in CPR. The suggestion that intel- variously interpreted. In the passage in P in
ligible principles describe what really is, as which Kant refers to this ‘problem’, however,
opposed to what appears, indicates a residue he gives a clear statement of what he took it
of rationalism here that CPR later renounced. to reside in when he remarks: ‘We cannot at
However, the arguments concerning sensible all see why, in consequence of the existence
cognition are the principal part of the work of one thing, another must necessarily exist,
and already contain much that is to become or how the concept of such a combination
cardinal in the Critical philosophy. can arise a priori.’ (P 257; trans. Ellington)
Despite Kant’s stress on this question in P,
there is considerable debate as to whether
CPR offers any kind of sustained response
Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) to it and responses to CPR, from as early as
Salomon Maimon, have denied that it does
After completion of ID, Kant passed a decade present a serious reply to Hume. The combi-
without publishing, which is often referred nation of the question Kant arrived at in the
to as his ‘silent decade’. During this period so-called ‘Herz letter’ with ‘Hume’s problem’
he reflected on ID in his correspondence and will be suggested here to provide the basis for
raised a question concerning it in a letter to interpreting Kant’s most famous work.
Marcus Herz that has often been taken to be CPR was initially published in 1781 and,
significant in relation to the formation of the despite the length of its germination, there is
horizon that led to the publication of CPR. some suggestion it was written hastily. One
This was in a letter dated 21 February 1772 of the recurrent themes of interpretation of
in which Kant refers to the ‘key to the whole it has concerned whether there are various
secret of metaphysics’ as residing in the ques- strata contained within its text. Norman
tion: ‘What is the ground of the relation of Kemp Smith and Hans Vaihinger both pro-
that in us which we call “representation” to moted the conception of a ‘patch-work’ view
the object?’ (Corr-I 130) This question, gen- of CPR based on the suggestion that it con-
erally known as the question of the ‘Herz let- tained ‘pre-Critical’ elements that Kant never
ter’ (although Kant also wrote many other got around to excising. This suggestion was
significant letters to Herz) does mark a presented initially on the basis of the claim
16
Key Works
that different passages refer to different peri- preference for the views on time allegedly
ods of Kant’s development but contemporary expressed there. Analytic philosophers, by
adherents of the ‘patchwork’ view no longer contrast, have followed the lead of the neo-
present it in this way. Following the lead of Kantians, in stressing the alleged ‘objectivity’
Dieter Henrich, both Howard Caygill and of the second edition. While these disputes are
Paul Guyer have argued that the ‘patchwork’ not without importance it is not obvious that
notion is a way of presenting a certain kind they have contributed to greater clarity con-
of hermeneutic approach that stresses prob- cerning either the central views expressed in
lems and tensions in the text rather than res- CPR or much understanding of the rationale
olutions.1 H. J. Paton’s commentary is often for the changes Kant made in its structure.
presented as opposed to the principle of this
reading but careful reading of Paton shows The Structure and Content of
that he also often manifests it (for exam- the‘Critique of Pure Reason’
ple, in his account of the Transcendental
Deduction).2 The ‘patchwork’ reading is, The organization of CPR elaborates and
nonetheless, rightly controversial and many reflects Kant’s growing passion for ordered
contemporary writers reject both early and exposition. The penultimate chapter of the
late versions of it in favour of stress on a uni- whole work discusses ‘architectonic’ and
tary conception of the work. the work exhibits continuous concern with
A further element that produces difficulty it. Many critics allege that this concern is to
in interpreting the work is the history of its the detriment of Kant’s discussion but with-
publication. After first being published in out attention being paid to it much that is
1781, CPR was subjected to a hostile recep- important gets lost. The work is formally
tion in the shape of the notorious Garve-Feder divided into two large and asymmetrical
review, which treated the central doctrines of parts, the first of which, the Transcendental
the work as essentially of a piece with those Doctrine of Elements, being much the largest
of George Berkeley, a view that incensed and being itself subdivided. The other part of
Kant. In response, Kant worked at revising the work concerns the Doctrine of Method
CPR and he rewrote substantial parts of it, and has been rarely accorded the empha-
especially the Transcendental Deduction and sis it deserves. The Doctrine of Elements is
the Paralogisms. Elsewhere in CPR he added again divided into two asymmetrical parts,
important sections, changed titles and formu- the first part of which, the Transcendental
lations of principles and deleted much. The Aesthetic, is much briefer than the second, the
fact that two distinct editions hence exist Transcendental Logic. The Transcendental
has further divided critics who have tended Logic is the major part both of the Doctrine
to stress one edition rather than another. of Elements and of the whole work, incorpo-
Schopenhauer famously argued that the ide- rating both the Transcendental Analytic and
alism of the first edition was compromised the Transcendental Dialectic.
in the second and hence favoured the first
edition. Conversely, twentieth-century phi- The Prefaces to the ‘Critique’
losophers from the phenomenological tradi-
tion have favoured the first edition, following Prior to encountering this intensive pattern
the lead of Husserl and Heidegger, due to a of divisions, the reader first comes to the
17
KEY WORKS
prefaces to the two editions of the work and about. In this ‘Preface’, however, the stress
its ‘Introduction’. All of these are important of the problem with ‘metaphysics’ is more
in manifesting stresses on key elements of the sharply defined since now it is alleged that
work as a whole. The ‘Preface’ to the second this problem concerns its lack of ‘scientific’
edition is more than twice the length of the status, a point not raised in the ‘Preface’ to
‘Preface’ to the first and it is in the second edi- the first edition. Concomitant with this stress
tion ‘Preface’ that some of the most famous on ‘science’ is an extended analysis of how
formulations of CPR’s general point, method various other disciplines have attained a ‘sci-
and problem are given. However, the ‘Preface’ entific’ status.
to the first edition opens with a general claim The first ‘science’ so investigated is math-
concerning human reason and its predilec- ematics and the conception of its formation
tion for asking questions that it is unable to that Kant presents is significant in terms of
answer but feels compelled to ask (Avii). how he will later present the task for philoso-
This already foreshadows the general task phy. The ‘true method’ that put mathemat-
of the Transcendental Dialectic and leads ics on the path of a science, Kant alleges,
Kant to bemoaning the state that metaphysics was demonstrated with regard to how to
has fallen into. In response, Kant announces determine the properties of an isosceles tri-
the need for reason to come to a reflective angle and this consisted in attending to the
awareness of itself, much as he appeared to ‘construction’ of the object (Bxii). Similarly,
be articulating in the so-called ‘Herz letter’ ‘natural science’ generally is said to have
(Corr-I 132–139). This call is now presented been capable of its breakthroughs by fol-
as requiring a critique of pure reason in the lowing the clue that ‘reason has insight only
sense that it is necessary to discover what can into that which it produces after a plan of its
be asserted that is independent of experience: own’ (Bxiii). Given that these are the ways
‘[B]ecause the chief question always remains: that these other disciplines have attained
“What and how much can understanding the status of a ‘science’, it is less surprising
and reason cognize free of all experience?”’ than many have been inclined to think that
(Axvii). At the same time as raising this as the Kant presents the requisite procedure for
key question, Kant also does admit that there metaphysics to reside in a mimetic relation
is a second side to his enquiry that concerns to these other ‘sciences’. This again involves
the possibility of pure understanding itself but relating to the need for reason to have a plan
which he indicates is of less importance to its of its own and to determine what is given to
outcome, an assertion of questionable status. it in relation to this plan. As Kant puts this,
Kant also uses the vocabulary of the ‘tribunal in relation to the problem announced in the
of reason’ in terms of assessing the claims of ‘Preface’ to the first edition, ‘we can know
parties in disputes, a metaphor that returns a priori of things only what we ourselves put
subsequently both in the Transcendental into them’ (Bxviii). This is often referred to as
Deduction and in the Antinomies. Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ though this is
The ‘Preface’ to the second edition opens not a phrase used by Kant who instead refers
with a lamentation over the state of meta- to operating in accord with Copernicus’ ‘pri-
physics and a suggestion of a need for its mary hypothesis’. This consists in altering
reformation, something that the work being the perspective concerning what we regard
presented is evidently intended to help bring as stable and what as moving with the result
18
Key Works
that ‘objects’ (the concern of the ‘Herz letter’) pure speculative reason and practical rea-
be now treated as required to conform to our son and also a discussion of the difference
‘intuition’. between thinking and knowing, none of
That the change in point of view that which are, from the standpoint of the reader
enables science and mathematics to have of the ‘Preface’, as yet very clear. Kant also
attained their altered status is not only due here alludes to the need for metaphysics to
to Copernicus is, however, later stated in a address problems concerning the existence
footnote in which Kant refers to Copernicus’ of God, the nature of the soul and the status
change as only having been a hypothetical of freedom. Kant refers to the changes in the
one by contrast to the discovery of the cen- text from the first edition while denying that
tral laws of motion of the heavenly bodies any of his key views have been. It should be
carried out by Newton who demonstrated added that a footnote included towards the
by means of such laws what binds the uni- close of the ‘Preface’ to this second edition
verse together. So it is not that there was a also includes changes to the ‘proof’ of the
once-and-for-all Copernican ‘revolution’ that Refutation of Idealism (Bxxxix–Bxli), which
Kant wishes to follow but rather that the pri- a number of commentators have judged to be
mary thought-experiment or hypothesis that very important.
Copernicus advocated of turning the perspec-
tive around is similarly taken in the ‘Preface’ The ‘Introduction’ to the ‘Critique’
to the second edition of CPR to draw atten-
tion in this prefatory statement to the need The ‘Introduction’ to CPR is the place where
for a transformation to first get adopted as Kant defines a number of key terms. Firstly,
a hypothesis though CPR itself, Kant states, the point is made that to determine the ‘a
will show ‘apodictically’, not hypotheti- priori’ we have to uncover whether there is
cally, the point of viewing space and time in knowledge that is independent of the senses
a different way than has been done by phi- and the second edition even refers to cogni-
losophers hitherto. Hence the Copernicus tion that is ‘absolutely independent of all
reference, when seen in general context, is experience’ (B3). Two criteria are determined
meant to show that the Critical philosophy for something’s being a priori: that it is neces-
carries out not a ‘Copernican revolution’ but sary (and if it is derived only from something
rather a ‘Newtonian’ one. else that is necessary then it is absolutely a
Kant’s aim of altering the procedure of priori [B3]) and, secondly, that it has ‘strict’
metaphysics is now said to be the basis of universality. Having determined the a priori
metaphysics subsequently becoming scien- in this way, Kant moves to distinguishing
tific so that CPR itself is not taken to present between analytic and synthetic judgments –
a system of metaphysics but only a treatise with the key criteria concerning the principle
on its method (Bxxii), which accords with the of contradiction (B12) – in order to arrive at
insertion at the front of the second edition his revolutionary notion of the synthetic a
of an epigraph from Bacon. From this point priori.
about method Kant derives a first discus- The claim is subsequently made (again
sion of the need for the distinction between an innovation of the second edition) that all
appearances and things in themselves, the theoretical sciences of reason include syn-
distinction between the possibilities of thetic a priori judgments as principles. This
19
KEY WORKS
20
Key Works
conceptions. So the two distinct criteria of time. The formation of concepts is taken to
the a priori are argued to attach to space and require a hierarchical relation between parts
time, albeit by means of different types of and wholes while intuitions, by contrast, are
argument. taken to involve a connection between parts
Kant next provides claims for the intuitive and wholes that is of a holistic not an aggre-
nature of space and time. Whereas the initial gative character.
account of intuition stressed immediacy and These arguments, when combined with the
receptivity however, Kant now introduces first set for the a priori status of space and
a different understanding of intuition that time, are intended to convince us that with
allows for seeing it as distinct from conceptu- space and time we have a priori intuitions
ality. This second determination of intuition that supply the a priori basis of sensibility.
requires describing it as ‘singular’ in contrast The success of the arguments is controver-
to the universality of concepts. Interestingly, sial but the point of them is at least clear.
since the universality of intuition itself has Certain synthetic a priori judgments are also
only been accounted for negatively (through suggested to be grounded on space and time
showing lack of particularity), Kant here being conceived in this way and not to be
mainly seeks to show that intuition cannot explained otherwise with the examples given
be described through the forms of universal- being (Euclidean) geometry and ‘the concept
ity that are appropriate for concepts thus of motion’ (B48). The discussion of geometry
maintaining the sense that, while singular, has taxed much later commentary given the
intuitions are also, in a peculiar sense of their rise of non-Euclidean geometries in the course
own, ‘universal’. of the nineteenth century though the ques-
The two arguments for the intuitive status tion of how the latter relate to ‘space’ is less
of space and time follow the arguments for clear than many critics allege. The account of
their a priori status in being both negative ‘motion’ is less commonly discussed though,
and positive in form. The negative arguments in some respects, more fruitful for Kant’s
present reasons for rejecting attribution to general philosophy.
them of conceptual status while the posi- Regardless of the success of the arguments
tive arguments are meant to provide a more of the Transcendental Aesthetic up to this
direct rationale for thinking of them as intui- point, they are restricted in scope. However,
tive. The first argument is to the effect that Kant now turns to what he describes as a set
the representations of space and time are of ‘conclusions’ from the concepts of space
unitary in themselves, not formations from and time given but which are, in fact, distin-
component elements. With regard to space, guishable as claims from such concepts and
this is supported by a proposition from introduce us for the first time to arguments
geometry. The second argument concerns the in favour of a version of transcendental ide-
claim that representation of space and time alism, a version specifically concerned, as is
presuppose an infinite given magnitude, the natural given their place in the Transcendental
infinitude of the givenness in question being Aesthetic, with sensibility.
the ground of all finite determinations. In Two ‘conclusions’ are given with regard
the case of time, there is only a single dimen- to space, but three with regard to time. The
sion and Kant argues that the representa- first ‘conclusion’ concerns the subjectivity of
tion of this shows the necessary character of space and time and the argument is parallel
21
KEY WORKS
in the two cases. Essentially Kant here claims claim asserts that everything connected to
that space and time are not ‘properties’ of intuition concerns relations and that ‘a
things in general or of ‘relations’ of such thing in itself cannot be known through
things (thus denying the specific claims of mere relations’ (B67) (a significant claim for
both Newton and Leibniz). The reason why Schopenhauer). Thirdly, Kant denies that
they are not such ‘properties’ or ‘relations’ is the result of his discussion is the view that
that abstraction from the conditions of intui- ‘objects’ are only illusions but rather asserts
tion, conditions that apply to our sensibility, that we only reach this result if we treat space
will leave no determinations of space or time. and time as properties of things in them-
These determinations have been shown to selves (an anticipation of the argument of
condition our sensibility’s a priori form and the Refutation of Idealism). Fourthly, Kant
are not appropriate to anything distinct from argues that if space and time were conditions
this. This negative claim is then re-stated in a of things in general, they would also be condi-
positive form as Kant goes on to claim that tions of God (an anticipation of Kant’s char-
space is only the form of outer sense, time the acterization of ‘Spinozism’ in CJ). The general
form of inner sense. These points are said to result of the argument of the Aesthetic is pro-
establish the empirical reality of space and posed by Kant to be that synthetic a priori
time and their transcendental ideality. Time judgments ‘can never extend beyond objects
is argued to be more universal than space as of the senses; they are valid only for objects
it is the immediate form of inner sense and of possible experience’ (B73).
the mediate form of outer sense. Kant also The position of the Transcendental
includes a specific section added to the dis- Aesthetic in CPR and its conclusions are
cussion of time meant to reply to the objec- both controversial. Its conclusions are con-
tions to the theory given when it was first troversial principally due to the survival of
stated in ID in correspondence. the alleged ‘neglected alternative’ objection.
Finally, Kant adds four ‘general observa- Initially stated by F. A. Trendelenburg in his
tions’ on the whole argument of the Aesthetic nineteenth-century controversy with Kuno
(three of which are added in the second edi- Fischer, this objection has proved surpris-
tion). The first restates the point that intui- ingly durable. The claim is to the effect that
tion only represents appearances and that Kant has neglected to investigate the view
such have no existence in themselves and that space and time might be both conditions
that what ‘objects’ may be, apart from the of our sensibility and also have an independ-
conditions of our sensibility, is something we ent reality. The assertion that Kant ‘neglected’
cannot know. Having re-stated this point, this alternative is correct in the sense that it
Kant goes on to distinguish this view from is not one he explicitly considers. It is not
the Leibniz-Wolff conception that sensibil- ‘neglected’ if what is meant is that Kant has
ity gives a confused representation of things no conceptual resources with which to deal
describing the latter view as giving a ‘com- with it. The basic response Kant can make
pletely wrong’ direction to investigations here is that for space and time to be inde-
into cognition (A44=B61). pendently ‘real’ in addition to being the forms
Kant also argues for the exhaustiveness of of sensibility would require some means to
the distinctions between intuitions and con- be available for us to make sense of it. This
cepts, a priori and a posteriori. The second would have to either be through intuition or
22
Key Works
concepts given the exhaustiveness of this divi- the distinction of ‘infinite’ judgment from
sion of our cognition. But since he has shown affirmative and negative or the separate
that the forms of intuition are distinct from consideration of ‘singular’ from universal
anything conceptual and that these forms are and particular). There is some confusion
essential to sensibility no such further means concerning whether the ‘table’ is part of
of knowledge is available to us. Paul Guyer ordinary or, as Kant terms it, ‘general’ logic
presents a slight variation on this position or is part of transcendental logic though the
when he claims that Kant does not merely justification given for ‘infinite’ judgments
deny knowledge of things in themselves but makes plain that these are part of ‘transcen-
makes positive dogmatic assertions concern- dental’ logic (A71–72=B97).
ing the nature of the latter but there is no evi- However, it is only after describing the
dence, within the argument of the Aesthetic, parts of the table that Kant introduces the
for the latter claim being made by Kant.3 key notion of ‘synthesis’, the central term of
‘transcendental logic’, and thus it is at this
The Transcendental Logic point that logic appears to become transcen-
dental. Synthesis involves combination of
The second and much longer part of the different representations such that they are
Doctrine of Elements is taken up by the capable of being grasped in a single mani-
treatment of Transcendental Logic, a treat- fold and it is the origin of ‘real’ cognition
ment itself divided into two substantial (A77=B103). It is first stated that pure syn-
parts – the Transcendental Analytic and the thesis is the work of imagination here though
Transcendental Dialectic. Given that the Kant immediately adds that for cognition to
Transcendental Aesthetic concerned the a pri- attain unity we require concepts, a point that
ori elements of sensibility, it would be natural leads him to distinguish between the logical
to expect the Transcendental Logic to discuss forms of judgments, already given, and the
the a priori elements of thought. However, transcendental content of representations.
only a very small portion of the Transcendental The latter are described by the pure concepts
Analytic is directly devoted to this although of the understanding and Kant provides
the result of the whole of the argument of the a list of them in a Table of Categories that
Analytic does enable a return to the discussion corresponds to the earlier Table of Judgment
of the limits of conceptuality. though there is some controversy over how
The specific account of a priori concepts the second table has been derived from the
is provided through the claim, made in the first.
context of the Metaphysical Deduction, Once the Table of Categories has described
that the function of concepts is to for- the pure a priori concepts the rest of the work
mulate judgments. Given this claim, Kant of the Transcendental Analytic is intended to
proceeds to describe a Table of Judgment show, firstly the justification for assuming
that gives, on his view, a description of the these concepts are at work in our experience,
different types of functions of unity avail- and, secondly the procedure whereby they
able for judgment. The table does depend articulate this experience for us. The latter
on a response to Aristotelian logic but occurs in the Analytic of Principles where
creatively amplifies some of its elements a series of synthetic a priori judgments are
including moments that are novel (such as articulated and argued for.
23
KEY WORKS
24
Key Works
The Analytic of Principles is the division between the first two set of
principles and the second set.
Assuming that the argument of the Kant describes the principles of the Axioms
Transcendental Deduction succeeds in jus- and the Anticipations as ‘mathematical’
tifying the need for a priori concepts in the in nature while those of the Analogies and
articulation of experience, Kant next turns Postulates are, by contrast, termed ‘dynami-
to the procedure by means of which they cal’. This distinction is meant to indicate the
are connected to intuition. That such con- diverse things made possible by the principles
nection takes place was the burden of the as the ‘mathematical’ principles are not prin-
emphasis on synthesis in the argument of the ciples of mathematics but are rather principles
Transcendental Deduction but the mechan- that make mathematics (in a certain sense)
ics of how this connection happens was possible (and similarly with the dynamical
not explicated there. In the chapter ‘On the principles). So the division between them is
Schematism’, Kant accounts for this in gen- essentially that the mathematical principles
eral terms by stressing a relationship between are principles of intuition while the dynami-
a priori concepts and a priori intuition cal ones are rather principles that relate to
through the form of time. Time is as univer- the existence of things for us.
sal as the concepts and yet, also, as part of the
conditions of sensibility, is meant to mediate The Analogies of Experience
the connection of concepts to sensibility. In
some respects, the absence of discussion of By far the lion’s share of commentary on
space in the account of transcendental sche- these principles has, however, been taken up
matism is surprising (particularly given that responding to the principles of the Analogies
Kant does, independently, describe a ‘pure of Experience and there are a number of rea-
sensible’ schema that does involve space) and, sons why this is so. The most obvious one is
indeed, this want later has to be made good that it is here that Kant formulates a view of
when Kant goes on to ‘apply’ the schema in causality which has been often presented as
the subsequent argument of the Analytic. his ‘reply’ to ‘Hume’s problem’ and it is also
Placing the categories under the conditions with the ‘analogies’ that we get something
of a priori intuition essentially produces the like a clear view of ‘objects’ and their relation
specific principles of the rest of the Analytic, to ‘representations’ (thus a response to the
which is organized in accordance with the question of the so-called Herz letter).
Table of Categories. Schematizing the cat- There is a general principle of all the anal-
egories produces Kant’s Principles. From the ogies in addition to there being principles for
schematization of the categories of quantity each of the three specific analogies. The sec-
we arrive at the Axioms of Intuition, sche- ond edition version of the general principle
matizing the categories of quality produces states that experience is possible only through
the Anticipations of Perception, schematiz- ‘the representation of a necessary connection
ing the categories of relation produces the of perceptions’ (B218) and this makes more
Analogies of Experience and, finally, sche- precise the first edition formulation that
matizing the categories of modality produces referred to a priori rules of time (A177). The
the Postulates of Empirical Thought. All of specific argument for the general principle
these parts are worth examining in detail as includes an attempt to disambiguate distinct
25
KEY WORKS
senses of ‘experience’ in order to justify the of the most extensive treatment in the sec-
specifically Kantian notion announced in the ondary literature (only the Transcendental
second edition formula. The argument also Deduction being ahead in this regard). The
relates the necessary unity of apperception formulation of the principle changes some-
to the empirical consciousness of percep- what between the two editions with the
tion by means of connecting it to the three first edition emphasizing that what happens
modes of time. Kant here also indicates the begins to be according to a rule (A189) while
reason for talking of ‘analogies’ by discuss- the second, much more explicitly, states that
ing qualitative relations and how, from them, alteration takes place in conformity with
we gain a priori cognition of a relation with- cause and effect (B232). Since the argument
out it being the case that we have the deter- of the First Analogy had treated the notion
minate sense of what this is a relation with of ‘alteration’, the second edition treat-
(A179–180=B222). ment effectively begins from where the First
The three analogies are schemas of the cate- Analogy left off.
gories of relation with the first relating the cat- While the argument of the Second Analogy
egory of substance to time. The unschematized is, by the standards of CPR, fairly long, and
notion of substance is as a subject of predica- appears to involve a number of elements,
tion while the schematized form of it gives us most contemporary commentary focuses
the notion of sempiternality or ‘permanence’. on trying to unravel the general argument
While the first edition formula describes the rather than, like the classic commentaries
permanent as the ‘object itself’ (A182), the of Kemp Smith and Paton, subdividing into
second edition, controversially, states a conser- sets of sub-arguments. The major dispute
vation principle (B224). This analogy, like the concerning the Second Analogy is between
other two, includes as part of its argument the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ readings of its claim. The
assertion that time itself cannot be perceived ‘strong’ reading focuses on claiming that the
and that, in the absence of time, something argument must commit Kant to showing that
analogous to it has to be given which, in this if we have the same cause we will have the
case, is substance in the field of appearance same effect (SCSE), the ‘weak’ reading, by
(B225). The general argument that there must contrast, suggests that all Kant need show
be something persistent that enables the recog- is that for every effect there is some cause
nition of change is at least as old as Aristotle (EESC). The dispute between these readings,
but is here applied only to the sphere of appear- despite having the character of a local tex-
ances. Alteration is, by this means, indicated to tual argument, has some large implications
be something that only affects the determina- for how the Critical philosophy is viewed.
tions of substances and not these substances Alongside the contention over which prin-
themselves. Kant refers to an ‘empirical crite- ciple Kant is aiming to prove in the Second
rion’ of necessary permanence in his conclu- Analogy, there are also disputes over which
sion of the argument (A189=B232) but does argument is the one which will have to sus-
not supply it within the argument itself, a first tain the main premise. For reasons which are
signal that the arguments for the three analo- somewhat obscure, since at least the reading
gies are interdependent. of Peter Strawson4 there has been a tendency
The Second Analogy is by the far most to emphasize the first of the arguments Kant
famous of the three and has attracted some considers in the text of the Second Analogy,
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Key Works
the so-called ‘irreversibility argument’. The and ‘objective’ succession and that the former
consensus on this is surprising, not least since must be parasitic upon the latter as without
Strawson’s own emphasis on it was intended the sense of ‘objective succession’ being pri-
to show the failure of the argument. mary there would be no settled permanence
However, what few other than Paul for ‘subjective succession’ (whose manifold is
Guyer and Gary Banham5 have attempted only that of ‘inner sense’) to attach to. This
to emphasize is that the argument must not leads to the provisional conclusion that the
only be about the notion of causality but also rule referred to in the principle of the Second
be connected to the sense that Kant is gen- Analogy is one that asserts that events have a
erally giving to the ‘object of representation’ necessary order of appearance (A194=B239).
(or, otherwise put, to an intentional sense ‘[T]he occurrence, as the conditioned, yields
of objectivity). Kant does, however, raise a secure indication of some condition, but it
this point explicitly early in the argument is the latter that determines the occurrence.’
(A189–190=B234–235). After restating the (A194=B239) This view is contrasted with
point that we need the distinction between the Humean one that sees the notion of cau-
appearances and things-in-themselves, Kant sation arising genetically from perception and
goes on to point out that this raises a specific comparison, as on Kant’s view no such per-
question: ‘What, then, am I to understand by ception and comparison of particulars could
the question: how the manifold may be con- take place without a pre-existing rule which
nected in the appearance itself, which yet is distinguished them from one another. Kant
nothing in itself?’ (A191=B236). is explicit in viewing this point as requir-
Assuming that the manifold united in the ing a sense of ‘continuity’ (A199=B244 and
representation gives us what we term an A209=B254), a point that ‘weak’ readings of
‘object’, then there is required a rule which the principle generally do not refer to.
enables us to distinguish any given such par- The Third Analogy schematizes the cate-
ticular one from every other one. ‘The object gory of community or coexistence in order to
is that in the appearance which contains the connect mutual interaction with the notion
condition of this necessary rule of apprehen- of simultaneity. The second edition version of
sion.’ (A191=B236) The discussion of this the principle is, again, sharper than the first
point, directly relevant to the problem of the edition version including, as it does, a refer-
‘Herz letter’, immediately precedes the ‘irre- ence to space. As in the other two analogies,
versibility argument’. In this, Kant stresses Kant makes much of the point that time itself
the need for appearances to be presented cannot be perceived and thus for a temporal
in continuity as, without this, there would notion such as simultaneity to make sense
be times that were empty of content. This for us, something in our experience has to
point is meant to show that it is a necessary ‘stand in’ for time. Since simultaneity could
requirement that perceptions are related to not be revealed by reference to the synthesis
each other. of imagination, as this would be insufficient
Kant subsequently introduces a contrast to establish when things were co-existent, we
between a ‘house’ and a ‘ship’, a contrast require a pure concept and this is the one of
widely misinterpreted. Kant here uses these mutual interaction of substances.
empirical examples to reach the point that Subsequent to the treatment of the three
we need a distinction between ‘subjective’ analogies, Kant discusses first the Postulates,
27
KEY WORKS
which schematize the principle of modality which I cognize the particular in the univer-
and then the distinction between phenomena sal through concepts’ (A300=B357). This
and noumena, in which latter Kant articu- definition leads to viewing the procedure of
lates a difference between positive and nega- reason as typically taking place by means of
tive references to noumena in preparation syllogisms.
for the Transcendental Dialectic. Finally, the The next key point is that reason, unlike
‘Appendix’ to the Transcendental Analytic understanding, is not concerned with the
explicitly introduces the notion of ‘concepts unification of appearances by means of
of reflection’ although there is a good case for rules but rather with the unification of the
thinking they were implicitly being referred rules of understanding under principles
to earlier in the work. These concepts are (A302=B358). Pure reason, by contrast to a
four paired groups that effectively describe limited empirical reason, is concerned with
conditions for formulation of how other con- relating all conditioned claims to cognition
cepts are possible (which must surely include to something that is unconditioned. On the
the categories). The explicit purpose for their basis of this general account of reason, Kant
introduction is to provide a Critical riposte determines the ‘concepts’ of reason to be
to the debate between Locke and Leibniz ‘ideas’ and describes these as concepts that
showing ways in which both failed to respect transcend the possibility of experience and
the transcendental distinction but the discus- thus as not being capable of being given in
sion of the concepts of reflection is one that intuition (A327=B383). The subsequent dis-
has large potential implications for under- cussion of specific problems and illusions is
standing the argument of the Transcendental all guided by this general account.
Deduction.
The Paralogisms
The Transcendental Dialectic
The first part of Kant’s discussion of illusions
The second part of the Transcendental Logic is the account of the Paralogisms of pure
is taken up by the Transcendental Dialectic. reason, a section elaborately reconstructed
This concerns, as Kant states at the outset, a in the second edition of CPR. A ‘paralogism’
‘logic of illusion’ (A293=B349) which traces is a pseudo-syllogism, which is, however,
the destructive effect of crossing the tran- grounded in the nature of human reason,
scendental distinction and is hence termed as follows from the general account of the
‘transcendental illusion’. One of the dif- procedure of the Dialectic. The paralogisms
ficulties of discussing transcendental illu- discussed concern the pretensions to a purely
sion is that detection of it is not sufficient ‘rational’ psychology, that is, one not based
to cease its operation (as would be the case on empirical data. As such, it is built, states
with logical illusion). In order to explain Kant, ‘on the single proposition I think’
this, Kant finally arrives at his discussion (A342=B400).
of ‘reason’, something that comes relatively There are four paralogisms, which are
late in a book apparently concerned with related to the Table of Categories, though
its critique! Reason is initially described as the table is not approached in its normal
concerned with ‘principles’, and ‘principles’ order, since the First Paralogism concerns
are then defined as involving cognition ‘in substance. Each Paralogism connects the
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Key Works
category to a view about mind so the First idealism of Berkeley and the ‘problematic’
Paralogism states that the mind is a sub- idealism of Descartes, has attracted consider-
stance. The other three discuss the quality of able commentary. The revision of this argu-
the soul (that it is simple), its quantity (uni- ment in the second edition has substantially
fied) and its relation (to possible objects in added to this debate, although there are few
space). The first edition discusses each of the who have pointed to the wealth of Kant’s
paralogisms in great detail while, in the sec- earlier and later discussions of idealism.7
ond edition, Kant compresses his treatment The basic distinction Kant seeks to make
greatly and moves much of the discussion here is to the effect that both the forms of
of the fourth Paralogism to an appendix to idealism he wishes to distance himself from
the Postulates (in the form of a Refutation are ‘empirical’ while his view of idealism is
of Idealism). Despite the fascination of this ‘transcendental’. The thrust of this is that
alteration there is remarkably little discus- while Berkeley and Descartes arrive at a
sion of this transformation in the second- problem with ‘empirical’ objects by testing
ary literature (with the singular exception of them against standards that would be appro-
Karl Ameriks6). priate for things in themselves (and thus in
In treating the Paralogisms, Kant first accord with a postulate of transcendental
gives them their form as presented in stand- realism), Kant, by contrast, takes empirical
ard treatments and later indicates the rea- objects to be ‘real’ in their own terms once
son why the argument is given as well as we have affirmed a postulate of ignorance
detecting a fallacious move within them by with regard to things in themselves.
which the supporter of the argument hopes The language of the first edition version
to pass off a formal point as a substantive of CPR casts this argument in terms of ‘rep-
one. So the First Paralogism presents the soul resentations’ and this has often been viewed
as substance on the basis of the predicative as creating a problem for Kant’s argument,
criterion of substance and then pretends this one that is suggested by some to have been
establishes the permanence of substance. The removed in the re-cast argument of the sec-
Second Paralogism treats the soul as sim- ond edition though others are sceptical as
ple and hopes thereby to establish that it is to whether the argument succeeds at all.
incorporeal. The Third Paralogism is a vari- There is considerable misunderstanding of
ation on the first as here it is hoped to show the argument as is evidenced by Heidegger,
that since there is numerical identity at each for example, who assumes that Kant here
point of a mind’s self-consciousness that it is attempting to ‘prove’ the existence of the
must therefore be permanent. Finally, and external world while he is rather aiming to
most controversially, the Fourth Paralogism show instead that we cannot adopt a pos-
aims to show that since there is required an tulate of being ‘beyond’ it and always find
inference to move from the mind to external ourselves within it.
objects that the latter are thereby doubtful.
While few commentators have attended in The Antinomies
great detail to the responses Kant makes to
the first three paralogisms, the fourth, which After the Paralogisms, Kant turns to the
involves Kant in distinguishing his own Antinomies. As the former were concerned
transcendental idealism from the ‘dogmatic’ with a supposed ‘rational’ psychology, the
29
KEY WORKS
latter are interested in the claims of a sup- There are a number of debates about
posed ‘rational’ cosmology. However, while the Antinomies, not least the relation they
paralogisms were merely faulty syllogisms, possess to the principles of the Analytic.
antinomies involve competing claims of argu- Recently, some writers have suggested,8
ments, both of which appear compelling but in contradiction of established readings,
which are mutually incompatible. As with that the argument of the Third Antinomy
the Paralogisms, Kant sets these out in rela- bears no specific connection to the Second
tion to the Table of Categories and, indeed, Analogy, a view that depends in its turn on
the antinomies could be elaborately related how the latter is viewed. The Antinomies
to the discussion of the schematized catego- have also received uneven treatment as the
ries in the Transcendental Analytic. Third Antinomy has received much greater
All the antinomies are concerned with a attention than the others. Kant’s general
problem about how to complete a series ‘solution’ to the antinomies involves invoca-
with two forms of completion competing tion of the transcendental distinction. Kant
with each other. The first kind of completion basically suggests that in the cases of the first
involves an infinite regress so that the series two antinomies there is no ground at all for
is, in principle, incapable of being completed determining a solution and that the problem
while the second, by contrast, finishes with arises by treating appearances as things in
a first member taken to complete the whole themselves. By contrast, the Third Antinomy
series. This distinction between two kinds of does have a solution since freedom turns out
completion is then run through each of the to be negatively available as something that
categories so that we see the basis of certain is not inconceivable and need not be in con-
impossible conflicts. The first, concerning flict with the operation of nature. The Fourth
quantity, is whether the world has a begin- Antinomy reference is, similarly, a possible
ning in time or is limited in space, with the one though no determinateness could be
thesis being in favour, the antithesis argu- given to any such ‘necessary’ referent.
ing against. The second, concerning quality,
concerns whether the world is made up of Kant’s Critique of Theology
simple parts, again, with the thesis arguing in
favour, the antithesis against. These first two The discussion of the Fourth Antinomy is a
antinomies, concerning the world, are ‘math- preliminary to the following account of the
ematical’ antinomies as they correspond to ‘ideal’ of pure reason, which is a reference to
the mathematical principles of the Analytic. the individuation of an idea (A568=B596).
The second two antinomies are ‘dynamical’ The transcendental ideal describes some-
with the third concerning relation in terms thing that is the ‘sum total of all possibility’
of origin with the thesis arguing for an origin (A573=B601) and Kant goes on to discuss
of natural causality in a different causality the speculative proofs that have been given
of freedom and the antithesis denying this. of the existence of this being. This discussion
Finally, the Fourth Antinomy is an antinomy is one of the most famous parts of CPR and
of modality and discusses whether nature is certainly one of its most influential. Kant
depends on something that is a necessary argues that there are three such proofs: the
cause with the thesis arguing in favour and ontological, the cosmological and the phys-
the antithesis against. ico-theological (or argument from design).
30
Key Works
Kant’s objection to the ontological argument has been the source of some debate in recent
repeats the point already made in OPD that years. The basic point concerning it is that
existence is not a predicate and it is now here Kant denies constitutive employment of
added that the argument appears to involve ideas but then introduces a regulative use of
a petitio principii since it assumes all along them. This latter is complicated in its deploy-
the being whose existence is apparently only ment since Kant distinguishes here between
hypothetical. Kant also objects to the view the hypothetical employment of reason and
that there is some special status attached the transcendental regulative principles of
to propositions concerning the existence reason. This distinction is often overlooked
of God, referring to his cardinal distinction with the effect that considerable confusion
between synthetic and analytic judgments, ensues. The former principles describe a
showing thereby that the former cannot be generic form of unity but do not introduce
true by definition and that the latter can the criteria for empirical truth that emerges
introduce no new information. from the latter and which are essentially
The cosmological proof apparently related to a series of principles, foremost
appeals to experience but only in terms of among which are the principles of parsimony,
the most general predications (existence and continuity and specification that had a first
causation) but then seeks to ground these on appearance in the ‘principles of harmony’ of
something necessary where the concept of ID. These principles appear to be as neces-
the latter is, in fact, surreptitiously borrowed sary for experience as the more famous ones
from the ontological argument. Since causa- of the Transcendental Analytic.9
tion cannot be used beyond the level of expe-
rience there is already a different problem The Doctrine of Method
with the argument, an argument that also
confuses logical and transcendental possibil- The final section of CPR, after the closure
ity. Finally, the physico-theological argument of the Doctrine of Elements is the Doctrine
is one that appeals to the notion of purpo- of Method. This part of CPR has been much
siveness, a procedure that renders this the overlooked although it contains ‘the formal
most popular of all the arguments. Unlike the conditions of a complete system of pure rea-
previous two, it would not, even if successful, son’ (A708=B736). It is divided into four
prove a supreme being but only an artificer chapters of very uneven length with the
of products. Like the cosmological argument majority of pages devoted to the ‘discipline’
it pretends to rest on empirical grounds but of pure reason where this concerns not the
secretly smuggles in the supreme being as content of pure reason, which has already
defined by the ontological argument. been dealt with, but only its ‘method’. In the
course of this discussion, Kant elaborates
The Regulative Use of Ideas of Reason further his distinction between philosophi-
cal and mathematical method, the distinc-
After dispatching ‘rational’ theology, Kant tion first clearly introduced by him in Inq.
concludes the treatment of the dialectic with Kant here shows that the exactness of math-
an ‘appendix’ that discusses the positive ematics is not attainable by the philosopher
use ideas of pure reason can be put to. This through an examination of definitions, axi-
argument was for long much neglected but oms and demonstrations. The necessity for
31
KEY WORKS
32
Key Works
element of the review and the general recep- division of the work is four-fold in accord-
tion of CPR that annoyed and surprised Kant ance with the four elements treated as so
was the attack on its style and lack of popular- given which concern pure mathematics, pure
ity. In response, in the ‘Preface’ to this work, natural science and a two-fold inquiry into
Kant attacks the ‘common sense’ philosophy metaphysics, namely, first ‘in general’ and,
but proceeds to present P as a popular pres- secondly, ‘as a science’.
entation of the main doctrines of CPR. Also in
this ‘Preface’, Kant makes the famous remark Pure Mathematics
about having been awoken from his ‘dogmatic
slumbers’ by remembering Hume’s ‘problem’ The treatment of ‘pure mathematics’ aims to
with the notion of causality, a ‘problem’ Kant show that its possibility depends on its reliance
here specifically states to concern the origin of on pure intuitions which concern only the form
the concept. of sensibility. So, pure mathematics depends on
the pre-given intuitions of space and time. In
The Method of the ‘Prolegomena’ responding to the general objection that space
and time are qualities of things in themselves,
The ‘Preamble’ that follows the ‘Preface’ is Kant introduces the argument from incon-
where Kant makes clearer both the specific gruent counterparts, an argument not used in
method of P and the difficulties of metaphys- CPR but which he had previously used, to very
ics that have occasioned his general critical different effect in his early essay on regions of
work. It is here that Kant first makes manifest space (DS). Kant also points out that treating
his emphasis on metaphysics attaining a ‘sci- geometry as dependent on the pure intuition
entific’ form as becomes key to the treatment of space resolves the ‘problem’ of its applica-
of the second edition of CPR. Kant proceeds tion to space and rejects the confusion of his
to distinguish between analytic and synthetic transcendental idealism with the idealism of
judgments and to make the principle of con- Berkeley, even suggesting a new title for his
tradiction key to the former though, in his own idealism, namely, ‘critical’ idealism.
discussion of the syntheticity of mathematics,
he has to point out that synthetic judgments Pure Natural Science
might accord with the principle of contradic-
tion without being generated by it. The treatment of pure natural science identi-
Kant goes on to present the method of fies ‘pure natural science’ as concerned with
P to be an ‘analytic’ one in contrast to the universal laws of nature, which are completely
‘synthetic’ method of CPR but, again, distin- a priori. So, in this section, Kant treats the
guishes this method from the sense of ‘ana- universal conditions of the possibility of expe-
lytic’ at work in analytic judgments. In the rience, or, put another way, rehearses several
case of the ‘analytic’ method, we begin by of the central doctrines of the Transcendental
treating something as given and then work Analytic of CPR. In the course of doing so,
out the conditions under which it is possible Kant introduces a novel and controversial
for it to be given. So the general question of distinction between judgments of perception
synthetic a priori judgments is now treated and judgments of experience. The distinction
in relation to certain cognitions of pure rea- is intended to correspond to the positive and
son that are already given. The subsequent negative uses of ‘experience’ in CPR itself
33
KEY WORKS
with judgments of perception being the kind described as a device for rousing philosophy
of judgments that arise purely from a relation ‘from its dogmatic slumber’, a less famous
to the sensory manifold in contradistinction use of this phrase. Kant’s treatment of the
to the principles that enable cognizance of the positive regulative use of ideas is here very
manifold, which latter are termed judgments compressed.
of experience. At this point, the divisions in the treatment
The distinction has caused some contro- of the material become more confusing since a
versy and confusion10 since Kant includes ‘conclusion’ is inserted prior to the discussion
the notion that there are some judgments of of the possibility of metaphysics as a science
perception that are intrinsically incapable of and this ‘conclusion’ concerns the ‘bounds’
becoming judgments of experience due to their of pure reason. Here Kant includes remarks
ineliminable subjectivity. However the distinc- on Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural
tion in general is less novel than many have Religion as part of his distinction between
claimed and is preliminary to a restatement ‘limits’ and ‘bounds’. Mathematics and nat-
of the derivation of the Table of Categories ural science are said to have ‘limits’ but not
from the Table of Judgment as in CPR. The bounds where limit indicates that there is
main point of it appears to be a critical one, something beyond their inquiries but ‘bounds’
to the effect that judgments of perception are would be something internal to them that cur-
incapable, by themselves alone, of leading to tailed their means of operation. If mathemat-
justification of the universal laws that are nec- ics and natural science have such limits but not
essary if there is to be a ‘pure natural science’. bounds, the case is different with metaphysics
Kant proceeds to give, in very summary form, as the latter does have ‘bounds’ and these are
a statement of the central principles of CPR revealed in the antinomies. In the course of
including his response to Hume’s doubt con- making this argument, Kant suggests ways in
cerning causality, which is treated as arising by which Hume’s scepticism could be avoided
trying to find something in experience that is in without making dogmatic assertions through
fact a necessary condition for experience (P 313). an appeal to an analogical use of reason. In
the course of making this point, Kant suggests
Metaphysics that the transcendental ideas help to lead us
past pure naturalism but he here really points
The treatment of the general possibility of forwards to practical philosophy. The ‘solu-
metaphysics reprises many of the key argu- tion’ of the question concerning the possibility
ments of the Transcendental Dialectic of of metaphysics as a science is revealed to be
CPR. In discussing the pure rational concepts that it must first be subjected to critique.
or ideas, Kant refers to the treatment of them
as constituting the ‘essential end’ of meta-
physics and again discusses the ideas as aris-
ing from a need for completeness. Treatments THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE
of the Paralogisms, the Antinomies and the METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (G)
Transcendental Ideal all follow with the first
of these given in a compressed form that Published in 1785, this is the first work
anticipates the briefer account of the sec- exclusively devoted to practical philosophy
ond edition of CPR. The antinomies are also in the Critical period. It is also the single most
34
Key Works
influential contribution Kant made to moral ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ in the manner in
philosophy. The point of it is clearly demar- which they work with regard to judgments,
cated in the ‘Preface’ where Kant makes clear rather than methods of exposition as sug-
the need for a pure moral philosophy that is gested in P.
cleansed of all reference to the empirical and There is, in fact, something of a combina-
hence does not depend on anthropological tion of uses in Kant’s reference here to ‘ana-
data. The argument supporting the need for lytic’ and ‘synthetic’ since, on the one hand,
such an enquiry consists in the claim that all he will show how certain kinds of connec-
moral philosophy generally rests upon the tions are ‘analytic’ in the meaning of ‘ana-
pure element. The reason supporting this lytic judgments’ while, on the other, he will
view is that there exists a moral law and the develop his exposition after first an ‘analytic’
nature of this moral law will itself be dem- and then a ‘synthetic’ method. The distinc-
onstrated by means of a pure enquiry. This tion between these methods, as made in P,
work is, however, specifically and clearly is that an ‘analytic’ method assumes some-
stated by Kant, not merely in its title but also thing as given and then demonstrates the
in the argument of the ‘Preface’ to provide conditions under which it is given while a
only a preliminary work on the foundations ‘synthetic’ method, by contrast, attempts to
of the metaphysics of morals and not to give build something up by means of reference to
the metaphysics in question itself. In order its first conditions. As will become apparent,
to provide this foundation, there is only one the first two sections of G operate accord-
task the work is devoted to and this is seek- ing to an ‘analytic’ method, in addition to
ing out and establishing the supreme princi- demonstrating ‘analytic’ types of connection
ple of morality (G 392). The application of in judgments while the third section operates
this principle to a system of ethics is deferred in a ‘synthetic’ way to show the basis of a
though this has not prevented many readers ‘synthetic’ judgment.
of this work from trying to discern it here.
The First Part of the ‘Groundwork’
Philosophical Method in the ‘Groundwork’
The first part of the work heralds a ‘transi-
The work is divided into three parts, each of tion’ from ordinary rational moral claims to
which signals a ‘transition’ from one type of philosophical ones. It begins with a famous
claim to another and Kant indicates that the discussion of the ‘good will’, which is hailed
work has a double type of method since ini- as that which is good without qualification or
tially he will proceed ‘analytically’ from ordi- is an unconditional good. It is suggested that
nary moral claims to a determination of the ordinary reason admits this notion, a point
supreme principle of morality and then work that Kant derives from his analysis of this
back ‘synthetically’ from an examination ordinary reason (thus operating analytically
both of the principle itself and its sources with regard to ordinary reason). This is done
to ordinary moral claims ‘in which we find by connecting the ‘good will’ to duty where it
it used’ (G 392). Surprisingly little has been is shown that acting in accord with the good
made of this dual methodology, and where will requires no reference to inclination, and
it has been commented on it has tended to it is later suggested that actions done from
be assumed that Kant is using the terms duty have their work in the maxim according
35
KEY WORKS
to which they are determined. Reference to that there even exists such a moral law as he
the ‘necessity’ of acting out of respect for the discovered in the first section. In addition, if
law is also introduced but this notion is not there is a moral law, such a law could not,
here clearly defined since ‘moral worth’ is in any case, apply only to human beings but
clearly stated not to follow from any effect must, instead, apply to all rational beings.
expected from an action. Kant also adds a word of caution concerning
Kant does here arrive at an initial statement examples since he points out that morality
of the categorical imperative (G 402) as the cannot be derived from them.
law that arises when reference to expected In discussing ‘popular moral philosophy’,
effects is removed from the will. An initial Kant clearly has in view the claims of ‘com-
example is also introduced to illustrate what mon sense’ as articulated by philosophers
it means to act in accord with such a law with of the day as he similarly did when argu-
the case of promising introduced (G 402– ing against it in P. Such ‘common sense’ it
403). Kant admits, however, that while he is now suggested cannot arrive at purity of
takes himself to have analytically derived this insight in moral matters but must eclecti-
law from ordinary rational moral claims, ordi- cally ground its principles on a number of
nary reason does not think this law abstractly sources. In opposition to this tendency, Kant
in its universal form. Further, Kant suggests affirms again the need for a method of iso-
that the problem for ordinary moral claims is lation that will permit the exposition of a
that it is possible to be led astray from this metaphysics of morals unmixed with anthro-
implicit universality as it is led into a ‘natural pology (or theology or anything else). After
dialectic’ with the demands of inclination. In making this declaration, Kant proceeds to
order to escape this dialectic, such reason is make the argument for moving towards such
led to practical philosophy, not on speculative a pure enquiry. In doing so, Kant examines
grounds, but on practical ones. the structure of moral claims and describes
them as imperatives that describe something
The Argument of ‘Groundwork II’ as good to do. Having made this point, Kant
proceeds to distinguish between hypothetical
The second section begins from the type of and categorical imperatives where the first
philosophy that ordinary practical claims are sort indicates that something is good for a
led to, namely ‘popular’ moral philosophy, purpose that is either possible or actual. Such
and seeks to show how, analytically, there is imperatives are distinct from categorical ones
a need to move from such grounds towards as the latter claim something to be necessary
a metaphysics of morals. In opening this without reference to any further end.
section, Kant states that while the purpose The discussion of hypothetical imperatives
of the first part had been to show that ordi- is divided into two kinds with the point made
nary use of practical reason was sufficient to that everything technical is accomplished by
demonstrate that there is a moral law, that describing something as possible with regard
it does not thereby follow that this law was to the adoption of certain ends. These types
derived from ‘experience’. In showing that of hypothetical imperatives are termed by
this is the case, Kant points out that there are Kant ‘imperatives of skill’ and have a prob-
many complaints to the effect that there is no lematic modality according to the Table of
basis, in reference to experience, for thinking Categories of CPR. By contrast, if we assume
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happiness as an actual end (even if we do not categorical imperative quite simply as a for-
know in what this consists), then the adop- mula of universal law (G 421).
tion of means to it gives us imperatives of Despite Kant’s claim for the formula of uni-
prudence which have an assertoric modality. versal law there is considerable controversy
Finally, the categorical imperative commands in the interpretation of this section concern-
something without reference to any further ing formulas of the categorical imperative
purpose and is the imperative of morality with Herbert Paton classically claiming that
whose modality is one of necessity. Kant gives five formulas of it while others
After describing these kinds of impera- have been content to find only three.11 The
tive, Kant enquires after their possibility solution to this question is found by look-
and describes the two forms of hypothetical ing at Kant’s method of procedure after stat-
imperative as involving analytical connec- ing the categorical imperative as a formula
tions between means and end. By contrast, of universal law. After stating this Kant adds
the categorical imperative involves a syn- that all imperatives of duty (specific moral
thetic connection as the willing of action is claims) can be derived from the categorical
connected immediately with the will of a imperative as this will tell us the principle
rational being even though there is no ana- of all such duties. However, prior to giving
lytic relation between the two elements. his first set of ‘examples’ of application of
Hence, the problem of the possibility of the the law, Kant first follows the procedure of
categorical imperative concerns how a prac- CPR and treats the formula of universal law
tical imperative can take the form of a syn- as he there treated the categories. That is,
thetic a priori connection. Having raised this Kant proceeds to schematize the categorical
problem, Kant proceeds to defer its solution imperative by connecting it to the conditions
and to concentrate instead on the question of under which causal connections are gener-
whether there is not a different kind of ana- ally given. These were determined in CPR
lytic connection in the categorical impera- as essential for arriving at the conception
tive. This is a connection between the mere of ‘nature’ or a whole of universal laws and
concept of the categorical imperative and the Kant now takes this conception of ‘nature’
formula of such an imperative. This cannot and reformulates the formula of the categori-
exist for a hypothetical imperative as the end cal imperative in order to arrive at what he
must be given before we know in what it terms a ‘universal imperative of duty’. This
consists. But since the categorical imperative latter is stated as the view that we should act
contains no reference to an end other than as if the maxim of our action were to become
the one involved in its own formulation there through our will a universal law of nature
is, Kant suggests, an ‘immediate’ connection (an interestingly regulative statement of law).
between thinking it and cognizing what it It is only after so re-formulating the categori-
must state. In the thought of the law stated cal imperative that examples are then given
in such an imperative we have the conception in order to test it.
that maxims must accord with it necessarily The examples are said to be taken from
and no restriction on the condition of the the ‘usual division’ of duties into duties to
law. If the law is unrestricted, however, this ourselves and others and perfect and imper-
is as much as to say that it must be given as fect duties though these divisions are not here
universal. This leads Kant to formulate the explained or accounted for. The examples
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are divided into two classes as the first two, (just as hypothetical imperatives required a
concerned with suicide and (once again) certain pre-given end). By contrast, objec-
promising involve cases where to take a cer- tive principles would be formal only, not
tain maxim as giving the rule to ‘a system of requiring a pre-given matter to be given to
nature’ would produce a direct contradiction them. Similarly, ends which require a certain
into such a system. matter to be given are relative to those ends
The second two examples, concerned with and take their worth only from the worth of
the cultivation of talents and beneficence, do the ends in question. By contrast, if there is
not produce such a direct contradiction into something whose worth is not relative but
the ‘system of nature’ but the reasons for not absolute then it would provide the ground
adopting certain maxims now are stated to of the categorical rather than merely hypo-
instead reside in a contradiction in willing thetical imperative.
certain types of end universally. This division That which is taken to have such an abso-
is complex and controversial though Kant’s lute worth by Kant is the existence of rational
general point is stated simply as requiring beings themselves precisely because, in their
consistency in willing with reference to the possession of reason, they possess something
standpoint of reason. which does not have a merely relative worth
After having examined these points, Kant but is rather the ground of all else having
confesses that he has not as yet shown that worth. So the rational being is an end-in-
the categorical imperative really exists. In itself and not merely a means to something
order to press further on with his enquiry, else. This leads to Kant formulating what
Kant now assesses the question of whether he terms the ‘practical imperative’, which is
it is necessary for all rational beings to generally known as the formula of humanity
judge actions according to maxims in such and from which he states all laws of the will
a way that the maxims in question serve as must be able to be derived. It follows from
universal laws. Such a law, if it exists, would this claim that it should coincide in applica-
have to have an a priori connection with tion with the schematized formula of uni-
the concept of the will of rational beings. versal law and the same four examples are
In order to discover the connection between used as were given for the previous formula.
the law and the will, however, Kant moves One difference in the application of this for-
decisively into the terrain of the metaphys- mula is that while the first two examples are
ics of morals. treated as conflicting with the end of human-
As with his earlier discussion of types of ity directly, the second two forms are argued
imperatives, Kant now discusses types of only ‘not to harmonize’ with it. This distinc-
motivation of the will, discarding empiri- tion has, somewhat surprisingly, drawn sig-
cal motivations and looking for objective nificantly less attention than the division in
laws and describing ends as either ‘sub- the treatment of duties arising from the sche-
jective’ in being based on inclination or matized formula of universal law.
‘objective’ in being based on something After stating the formula of humanity and
that would be valid for all rational beings. describing the examples in relation to it, Kant
Having made this distinction, Kant also goes on to discuss the distinction between
points to the ground of subjective princi- them is that the first formula gave the rule
ples as requiring a matter of a certain kind according to universality and then describe
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the means of rendering it as a law (through accord with CPR, Kant describes freedom as
reference to the type of nature) while the sec- a spontaneous causality and connects such a
ond, by contrast, describes the subject of all notion to the categorical imperative.
ends in the form of an end-in-itself. The third Kant confesses a certain circularity of rea-
principle is then described as a combination soning in getting the categorical imperative
of the first two, namely, a rational being that supported by freedom as freedom is a recip-
wills universal law and by this means Kant rocal idea with autonomy and thus not able
arrives at the notion of the autonomy of the to support it. In response, Kant develops the
will, which is contrasted with principles of notion that we look at ourselves from two
heteronomy. The total vision of beings gener- different points of view on the basis of the
ally acting in accord with the law provides distinction between appearances and things
us with the image of a ‘kingdom of ends’ in themselves. Reason, as a pure form of
where each rational being is sovereign and spontaneity, as is expressed in its formation
all laws derive from the same single source of ideas, appears to go well beyond anything
of reason. offered to the mind by sensibility. In looking
Kant schematically presents maxims as at our power of reason, we view ourselves
having a form, which is universal, a matter, from the standpoint of intelligence rather
which is an end and a complete determina- than that of sensibility. So when we think of
tion in the notion of the kingdom of ends ourselves as free we look at ourselves on the
where this latter is clearly an analogue to pattern of our reason and it is also from this
the transcendental ideas discussed in CPR. that we arrive at the notion of autonomy.
Having reached this point, Kant can now The synthetic a priori proposition that is
descend back to the notion with which he the categorical imperative is based on con-
began the first section, the notion of the necting the will, viewed as something capa-
‘good will’ and describe the good will as that ble of being affected, with the idea of the will
which takes maxims whose universality are as something intelligible with the sense that
willable as the ground of its laws. However, the latter can determine the former through
this section closes with the question arising reason. The law is hence something like a cat-
again of how the synthetic practical a priori egory of reason which may well explain the
proposition whose content has been thus process of schematization of it in accord with
uncovered is itself possible. the general idea of unity taken from under-
standing (nature). The world into which we
The Argument of ‘Groundwork III’ move when we think reason, the intelligible
world, is not one that can be thought in any
The third and final section of the work has way except through the nature of its formal
been one of the most controversial parts with adherence to law, so we cannot explain how
wide misunderstanding of its argument and it is possible that pure reason can be practi-
rejection of its results. Here Kant makes the cal. The intelligible world is rather only what
last ‘transition’, this time from a metaphys- remains when we have excluded from moti-
ics of morals to a critique of pure practical vation all that comes from the law of sense.
reason. The section opens where the previous Kant closes the work with a confession of
section closed, with the notion of the will but the impossibility of seeking further for the
examines it now in terms of its causality. In ground of possibility of morality.
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‘applied’, a division that other accounts which such movement can be grasped and
often cannot meet so well. the basis of thinking movement as such
The investigation of a pure doctrine of which requires a distinction between rela-
body thus emerges as the province of the work tive and absolute space. The space in which
with this notion based on an analysis of ‘the all movement is given requires reference to a
concept of a matter in general’ (MFNS 472). space that can be thought as enabling move-
This notion of ‘matter’ is itself taken from ment to be given and this latter would not
experience but it is now isolated in relation itself be movable but would be absolute and
to pure intuition and this method of isolation hence an object of thought, not of intuition.
enables Kant to produce a metaphysics of cor- Movement, understood in abstraction
poreal nature. In referring to the dependence from quality, is something purely external
of his exposition on the Table of Categories, and is hence equivalent to a point which can
Kant also adds a famous footnote promising have velocity and direction. Space in which
a recasting of the Transcendental Deduction there is movement must itself be capable also
on the basis of ‘a single conclusion from the of movement in order to be sensed as other-
precisely determined definition of a judgment wise our senses would not be affected by it.
in general’ (MFNS 475–476n.), which points Further, there is the distinction of levels of
again to the second edition of CPR. However, movement where something is seen moving
in relation to the application of this table to in relation to something else of similar scale
the concept of matter, Kant next argues that but to be at rest relative to something of a
matter must be seen in motion as only thereby different scale and this requires a distinction
are the senses affected. So natural science is of spaces that are given in movement. So we
now concisely defined as ‘either a pure or an assume absolute space as a fixed reference
applied doctrine of motion’ (MFNS 477) with point for all the movable spaces though such
this work providing the former. Effectively, absolute space is not itself an ‘object’ but
in introducing the notion of motion in this only a ‘logical’ universal (MFNS 482).
way, Kant immediately schematizes the bare Motion involves changes of external rela-
concept of matter and does so in accord with tions though, Kant suggests, it is only with
the programme of mechanist philosophers at points that we can truly say that motion is
least as early as Descartes. The four headings always a change of place as larger bodies
of the work relate matter in motion to the can move without changing place or change
four titles of the Table of the Categories. place without moving. Kant also uses the dis-
cussion of incongruent counterparts that was
The Foundations of Phoronomy mentioned in P to illustrate what is meant by
the claim that with some different motions
The first part, phoronomy, relates motion to the only distinction is ‘internal’ without hav-
pure quantity without consideration of qual- ing recourse to any concepts of quality. In the
ity and corresponds to the treatment of the case of two circular motions that differ only
Axioms of Intuition in CPR. Matter, under- in direction we have incongruent counter-
stood as movable, requires reference to space parts and the difference here is not concep-
as space is the intuitive basis of the claim of tual but only intuitive.
movement. Kant opens the discussion, how- Kant next provides a purely phoronomic
ever, by distinguishing between the space in sense of permanence as rest or endurance
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(MFNS 485). As with the discussion of move- insofar as it fills a space, that is, in relation to
ment, so also the account of rest has to typi- quality, which corresponds to the treatment
cally revise the naïve sense given to the term of sensation in the Anticipations of Perception
since rest, if interpreted as lack of motion, will of CPR. Filling a space involves resistance
not be capable of being intuitively constructed to other parts of matter that ‘strive’ to fill the
and so, in place of it, Kant substitutes the space in which the current matter is present.
sense of a motion ‘with infinitely small speed This dynamical sense of matter is based upon
throughout a finite time’ (MFNS 486). the phoronomic one but, in its reference to a
After making these points, which do not capacity of resistance, builds in a further feature
immediately require a sense of motion being that could not be considered at the level of pho-
produced by relations between points, Kant ronomy alone. The ‘resistance’ in question at
turns to the more difficult case, which he the level of dynamics is still restricted since we
terms ‘composite motion’ (MFNS 486), where work here not with the notion of a resistance
we intuitively present a movement as arising persisting after movement has taken place but
from the effect of two conjoint movements rather only the resistance that would prevent
being united. Since we are only dealing with diminution of the extension of matter in space.
movement as quantitative alone we cannot, in The filling of space does not take place just
consideration of this conception, include as yet due to the existence of matter since, on that
any reference to forces. So motion, in a general basis alone, we would only have phoronomic
sense, when we are at the level of phoronomy, considerations. Rather, what is required for
is equivalent to the description of a space. such filling to take place is a special moving
However, this is distinct from a merely geo- force. If matter enters a space, it does so by
metrical consideration as we refer not merely moving but resistance to such entry dimin-
to the space but also to the time and velocity ishes movement or even requires rest. But
with which the point describes the space. the only thing capable of resisting movement
Cartesian investigation of motion was hence would itself be movement and this requires
entirely carried out at the level of phoronomy. that such latter movement must itself be forc-
In accounting for composition of motions at ing the first movement. So matter fills space
this level, we merely reduce them to condi- by means of moving force. In making this
tions under which a motion is compounded claim, Kant opposes the view of Lambert
from two others and built up from there. Two (and Locke) that the principle by which space
motions can be considered in one of three pos- is filled is solidity. The problem with viewing
sibilities: either as in the same direction; in the property of filling space as being merely
opposite directions; or in an angle. These three solidity is that it seems to imply that there is
possibilities are subsequently constructed something conceptually involved in matter
in intuition by Kant and then related to the being resistant, a view Kant ridicules by say-
three moments of quantity from the Table of ing that the concept of contradiction does not
Judgment of CPR. force matter back. In other words, we have to
include in the conception of matter something
The Foundations of Dynamics that enables repulsion to take place before we
could claim that there was a contradiction
The second chapter of the work concerns involved in non-resistant matter. We cannot
dynamics where Kant considers the movable just postulate this force in matter: we have to
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intuitively demonstrate its existence, not sim- space are filled with matter and adopt the addi-
ply attempt to derive it from a concept. tional assumption that matter cannot be broken
Having opened with this point, Kant goes down into something that is not matter. We can
on to distinguish between attractive and see this in the following way. If space is filled
repulsive force, with the former being a mov- with matter and matter cannot be broken down
ing force of matter that leads other matter into something that is not matter then, in filling
to be drawn towards it. The latter force, by all the parts of space, it has to fill all the parts
contrast, leads other matter to retreat from of its division. In filling all the parts of the divi-
the vicinity. All extension into space has a sion it also indicates that a force of resistance
degree, however, and can be envisioned as belongs to each part of matter. However, due to
greater or smaller to an infinite degree. the transcendental distinction between appear-
The filling of space occurs through the ances and things in themselves, we cannot say
expansion of matter and such expansion is that it therefore follows that there is actual
also termed by Kant ‘elasticity’ and is an origi- divisibility to infinity since we deal only with
nal property of matter that cannot be derived appearances and do not have an actual division
from anything else. Although matter can be to work with. Further division is indefinite and
compressed to infinity, therefore, it cannot be possible only and belongs only to appearances
penetrated by any other matter as this would without in itself being able to lead us to reject
require an infinitely compressive force which the notion of monads. However, the monads are
is impossible. The sense of impenetrability not available physically but only intelligibly.
involved is relative to the degree of compres- Kant moves on to argue specifically for the
sion while an absolute notion of impenetra- need of the notion of attractive force as part
bility would not permit compression at all of matter. Impenetrability has been shown to
without positing empty space within matter. make extension possible but not only does it
The mathematical notion of impenetrability do this but it also allows the continued expan-
does not reach the notion of physical proper- sion of matter. If impenetrability were matter’s
ties while the dynamical one determines the only force, then there would be no bounds to
possibility of extension existing at all and the the extension of any given part of matter so we
means by which it can be diminished. would be unable to assign any particular quan-
The dynamical conception of substance is tity of it to any assignable space. Due to this, we
that it is that in space which, without refer- require the notion of a force that is opposed to
ence to anything existing outside it in space, the extensive one, a force that compresses mat-
is nonetheless movable. Kant also postulates ter and hence operates against repulsion, which
the infinite divisibility of matter with all the would be to operate in a way that was attrac-
parts of matter being themselves forms of mat- tive. However, attractive force likewise could not
ter and not of something else. In making this exist alone as its effect is only to compress and
claim, Kant repudiates the position he adopted if it existed alone the universe would shrink to a
in PhM where he had denied the infinite divis- single point. The nature of attraction in matter
ibility of matter and he here replies to his own is that it acts as an immediate action ‘through
earlier argument (MFNS 504–508). Kant now empty space’ of one matter upon another.
points out that infinite divisibility of matter, In addressing this point, Kant attempts to
while not following from the infinite divisibility answer the basis of attractive force by means
of space, does follow if we assume all parts of of metaphysics, a basis Newton sought to
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equal and opposite reactions states a genuine of the motion of matter. The general notion
law of inertia as it does not tell us what mat- that is here explicated is matter in motion as
ter is prevented from doing, and to posit the an object of experience. Motion is given as
law of inertia in a positive form suggests that an appearance like everything represented
matter is endowed with positive striving to through sense and thus here Kant merely
conserve its state. To do the latter is to move draws together the doctrines of the work,
towards the view that matter contains life, finally indicating a modal status to some
the view Kant calls ‘hylozoism’ and which he determinations of matter. This is done in
terms ‘the death of all natural philosophy’ three propositions. In the first, Kant describes
(MFNS 544). rectilinear motion as merely possible and
The third law of mechanics is then stated as shows that even as possible it can only be
the rule concerning action and reaction being relative. This possible motion is equivalent
always equal in communication of motion. As to that analysed in phoronomy. Circular
with the previous two laws so with this one motion, by contrast to rectilinear, is an actual
Kant refers first to the generic principle taken predicate of matter and is equivalent to what
from CPR, namely, in this case, the Third was expressed in dynamics. Finally, the equal
Analogy. The main point now is to show and opposite motion of a body in regard
that reciprocal action is best understood as to another body, is a necessary predicate
reaction. This is shown by building on the of matter in experience, equivalent to the
arguments given so far in mechanics, namely, notion analysed in mechanics. In the ‘general
by referring to the claim that all changes of remark’ on phenomenology, Kant also dis-
matter are changes of motion and that all cusses absolute space and shows that it is an
changes of motion are reciprocal and equal idea of reason, connecting it thereby to the
(based on the conservation of motion). If we regulative ideas of pure reason discussed in
add to this the point that every change of the Transcendental Dialectic of CPR.
matter has an external cause as just shown in
the second law, then the cause of the change
of motion of one body entails an equal and
opposite change of the other, which is suf- CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL
ficient to show that action must be equal to REASON (CPrR)
reaction. In his remarks on this law, Kant
refers to Newton as failing to bring this law Published in 1788, a year after the second
out of a priori concepts and Kepler’s view- edition of CPR, this work is often simply
ing it as based on a force of inertia (of the termed the ‘second Critique’ though Kant
sort ruled out in the discussion of the second himself only used the name ‘Critique’ to
law). In his ‘general observation’ on mechan- refer to CPR. This work appears three years
ics, Kant refers also to the mechanical law of after G and many commentators have been
continuity as based on the inertia of matter. confused about the relationship between
these two works. It has also confused
The Foundations of Phenomenology some with its title since the contrast with
that of CPR suggests to them that practi-
The fourth and final chapter is concerned cal reason is not pure. Kant’s view, however,
with phenomenology or the modal experience as stated explicitly in the first sentence of
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the ‘Preface’, is quite the opposite. The rea- of it (in the sense of not relying upon the
son for writing the book is to show, on the earlier work’s demonstrations). Kant also
basis of a criticism of practical reason in states that in this work he has responded to
general, that there is such a thing as pure an objection raised against G by showing a
practical reason. On the basis of this dem- reason why the notion of the ‘good’ arises
onstration, Kant seeks to show, further, the from the consideration of the law and not
reality of transcendental freedom. The rela- the other way around (often referred to in
tion between freedom and the moral law contemporary philosophy as the priority of
is somewhat complicated since, on the one the right over the good).
hand, freedom is the condition of the moral The organization of this work is partially
law and, on the other hand, the relation- modelled on that of CPR but with some
ship is also the reverse. The essence of the important changes, only some of which Kant
moral law is explicated as consisting fun- is explicit about. It is divided, as was the
damentally in freedom and so in this sense earlier Critique, into a doctrine of elements
freedom is the condition of the moral law. and a doctrine of method though the latter
On the other hand, the way in which one is very short and is less significant than was
comes to know about freedom is through the case with CPR. The doctrine of elements
the moral law and so in this sense the moral includes a division between an analytic and
law is the condition of freedom. a dialectic but there is no separate ‘aes-
In this work, Kant also finally cashes out thetic’ though there are reasons for think-
his claim that metaphysics ultimately deals, ing that there is a chapter on an ‘aesthetic’
in a positive way, with the immortality of of practical reason within the Analytic (as is
the soul and the existence of God though partially admitted by Kant). Kant himself is
these notions, unlike freedom, despite being clear about the changes in the organization
said to have ‘practical-objective reality’, do of the Analytic as with this work we have an
not have the same type of ‘reality’ as free- analytic of principles prior to an analytic of
dom. In making these claims, Kant also concepts with the reason given that we have,
here presents his claim for the primacy of in the area of practical reason, to deal with
practical reason, a claim that was of some the will and its causality. So we have to start
significance to the German Idealists. Of fur- with the conditions of general causality of
ther significance is the way this work cor- the will and purify them to reach the form
roborates the argument of CPR that there is fit for our enquiry prior to applying this will
a dual aspect to the self and, indeed, further first to objects and secondly to the subject (in
provides its own argument for the impor- terms of the conditions of the ‘aesthetic’ of
tance of the ideality of space and time. These practical reason).
specific points are stressed by Kant himself The Analytic opens with a definition of
as reasons why this work had to be written practical principles as ‘propositions that
(CPrR 6–7) and do relate it closely to CPR contain a general determination of the will’
(something that is not the case for G). The (CPrR 19). If we have principles that would
specific relationship to G that Kant states hold for any rational being then they will be
is that this work relates to the formula of ‘laws’ (as opposed to ‘maxims’ which are
the principle of duty provided by the earlier merely subjective). Practical rules generally
work but that it is otherwise independent involve prescription of means to given ends.
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of presenting this, Kant refers to the differ- reason thus appears to extend cognition
ence of procedure of this Critique to the first beyond what is possible for theoretical rea-
one. Whereas CPR proceeded by means of a son. This requires relating practical reason
contrast between concepts and intuitions and to theoretical reason in order to think again
then arrived at synthetic a priori principles about the boundaries of cognition. Kant
CPrR, on the basis of the moral law, points reverts back to the case of Hume’s doubts
to a pure world of the understanding that is concerning causation, first mentioned in P
determined positively. as the basis of critique starting work. The
The point now is to show that the sensible result of this, as summarized again here,
world can be contrasted with a supersensible was the transcendental distinction between
one and the latter has its basis in terms of the appearances and things in themselves and
autonomous laws of pure reason. This law is that the problem of causal connection was
the moral law which transfers us, in thought, resolvable if seen as a question of appear-
into a nature governed by pure reason. ances and their condition in temporality.
Again, the nature of ‘testimony’ is adduced The reason why all this is invoked again
to demonstrate the way in which such a law here, however, becomes clearer when we
can determine us. recall that the causality of the will is the
The problem of how pure reason can be starting point of CPrR. The objective real-
an immediate determining ground of the will ity of the pure will is given a priori by the
requires no reference to a priori intuition but moral law and the causality of this will
only to the concept of freedom. This is suf- involves freedom. The notion of causation
ficient to give an exposition of the supreme in the most general sense was shown by the
principle of practical reason. The deduction ability to think causality as a pure category
concerns the justification of the objective and and we have now connected this thought to
universal validity of the synthetic a priori that that of the moral law.
is stated in the law. But there is no ‘deduction’
of the law itself as it is rather the case that the The ‘Objects’ of Practical Reason
law is the basis of the deduction of freedom.
The moral law is, as has been shown, a law Kant now turns to the Analytic of Concepts
of causality by means of freedom and so it of CPrR where ‘a concept of an object of
fills in the blank merely problematic possibil- practical reason’ means ‘the representation of
ity of freedom that was bequeathed by CPR. an object as an effect possible through free-
This law is a determinate law of causality in dom’ (CPrR 57). The type of possibility in
an intelligible world. question is clearly moral possibility and the
only objects of it are ‘the good’ and ‘the evil’.
The Cognition of Pure Practical Reason The ‘good’ however, if thought as the basis
of law, can only mean some form of pleas-
To think the moral law is however to relate ure and that would be to take the good to
the form of law of the intelligible world to be equivalent to the agreeable. The ‘paradox
the sensible world in a causative way and of method’ of this work is thus explained,
this requires extending cognition beyond the namely, the reason why the concepts of
sensible world, something that was denied good and evil are not determined prior to
as possible in CPR. The practical use of pure the notion of the moral law but only as a
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good’. Kant distinguishes first between two thus presented here in a different way to G
types of notion of the ‘good’ distinguishing as it is now in the form of a kingdom of God
the ‘supreme’ good (which is the moral law) (CPrR 128) rather than merely as a kingdom
from the ‘highest’ which refers to a world in of ends.
which all that is desirable is brought together After stating the postulates, Kant returns a
so that there is harmony between the law and second time to the question of how an exten-
happiness. The two elements of the highest sion of pure reason for practical purposes
good are heterogeneous to each other and yet can be granted without extending this to the
have to be combined if there is a thought of cognition of theoretical reason. The point
such a world possible. is here made that pure practical cognition
Kant refers to the antinomy between ways requires reference to a priori purposes. The
of relating happiness and the good together postulates are required in order to think the
through a rendition of the doctrines of the highest good but this does not give us any
Epicureans and the Stoics. If the Epicurean intuitions that correspond to the thought
doctrine is understood as suggesting the given so there is no theoretical cognition sup-
good will results from happiness, the Stoic, plied here. God is thus adopted as a notion
on the contrary, suggests happiness will result not of physics but only of morals.
from acting in a way that is good. Neither The last part of CPrR concerns the doc-
describes what occurs in the world for us trine of method which is understood here
though there is some conditional truth in the as the way in which the laws of pure practi-
Stoic claim since overcoming the inclinations cal reason are to be given access to the mind
for the sake of the law is capable of produc- so that they can influence the nature of our
ing contentment. maxims. Here Kant provides some elemen-
Kant next introduces the thesis of the tary remarks on moral education attacking
primacy of practical reason over theoretical in particular the reference to noble or supere-
using it to show a necessary basis for arriving rogatory ideas to spur on moral conduct. The
at a sense of the unity of reason as a whole. general point is that morality is best presented
It is then possible to introduce the ‘postu- as an incentive in education the more purely
lates’ of pure practical reason, freedom, the it is shown and separated from all feelings.
immortality of the soul and the existence of
God. Attainment of the highest good is not
possible unless the soul is immortal since it
is only viewed as such that the attainment of CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (CJ)
the state described of a harmony between the
law and the will could be achieved. However This work was published in 1790 and is the
for nature to correspond with the will in the third and final work that is titled with the
way pictured in the postulate of the immor- term ‘critique’. It is, of the three ‘critiques’,
tality of the soul is for there to be an inner the most complicated in terms of its textual
ground of connection between the two. The organization. This is for a couple of reasons.
basis of this thought requires a causality that Firstly, it has not one but two ‘introductions’.
could be the ground of such connection and What has become generally referred to as
this is in the thought of God. Kant’s rendition the ‘First Introduction’ (FI) was the first one
of the possibility of such a virtuous world is Kant wrote but it was not included in the
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first published edition of CJ. Kant officially really only with cognition and hence with
rejected it because of its length although he the faculty of the understanding as only it
appears to have been working on it as late could provide us with constitutive a priori
as the early months of 1790 and referred to principles. CPrR, by contrast, demonstrated
it in correspondence as a useful entry into that the constitutive a priori principles of the
the work. It was first published in 1833 faculty of reason could only exist in relation
and became part of the Akademie edition of to the capacity of desire. CJ investigates the
Kant’s writings in the twentieth century. question of whether judgment, which medi-
The second introduction, published in CJ, ates between understanding and reason, also
does to an extent parallel the first one but is has a priori principles of its own and, if it
also different from it. Students of CJ do tend does, whether they are constitutive.
to discuss both and there is much controversy As part of the general ‘critique of pure rea-
about the relationship between them. The sec- son’ (as opposed to what is carried on under
ond, even more important textual difficulty, that name in the book of that title) it is nec-
concerns the fact that CJ contains within its essary to address this question. In order to
covers two distinct works, which are appar- investigate it, the principle of judgment, if it
ently also united in the book as a whole. The has one, must be distinguished from the a pri-
first half of the book is entitled a ‘Critique of ori concepts that are the province of under-
Aesthetic Judgment’ while the second part is standing and hence it must be something that
titled a ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’. serves as a rule for the power of judgment
Both the two halves of the work include the itself. Kant indicates a link of this question
division between analytic and dialectic and to the investigation of judgments concerning
method that was given in CPrR though the the beautiful and the sublime as these judg-
discussion of method is very extended in ments do not provide us with cognition but
the Critique of Teleological Judgment but still belong to the cognitive power and relate
only very brief in the case of the Critique of this power to the feelings of pleasure and dis-
Aesthetic Judgment. The question of why two pleasure. This is different from a logical judg-
apparently distinct works are joined together ment of nature that relates to a lawfulness
in the cover of one book has often puzzled that sensible concepts appear unable to reach
commentators, though some have neglected and which relates in some sense to the super-
the discussion of teleology altogether (this sensible. The latter type of judgment has no
is particularly true for Anglo-American direct relation to pleasure and would, alone,
philosophers). just be a kind of appendix to CPR. Kant also
These two complicated textual questions announces the completion of his critical
are related as the two introductions both enterprise with the publication of this book
contain detailed discussions of the nature of and indicates he will now proceed to the doc-
the Critical system and the reason there is a trinal one though this makes little sense of
need for an independent critique focused on his previous publication of MFNS.
the faculty (or ‘power’) of judgment and so
give pointers to how to understand the rela- The First Introduction
tionship between the two halves of the book.
There is, in addition, a ‘Preface’ in which FI opens with a discussion of philosophy as
Kant points out that CPR was concerned a system, which appears to relate back to the
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In FI, Kant describes the division of CJ as the sense of the purposiveness in question is
a distinction between the aesthetic of reflec- not due to response to features of objects but
tive judgment and its logic (where the latter rather to our mode of viewing them.
is provided by teleology). Kant adds to this Judgments of taste are judgments in which
a distinction between intrinsic and relative the pleasure that is expressed is one that
purposiveness where the former is based in claims universal validity. Kant clearly dis-
the presentation of the object and the latter tinguishes these judgments of taste from the
on some kind of use of the object’s way of other form of aesthetic judgment, the judg-
being given. This division relates the sense ment of sublimity as the latter is concerned
of intrinsic purposiveness to beauty and the with ‘intellectual feeling’ connecting imagi-
relative sense to sublimity whereas intrinsic nation to reason rather than understanding.
teleological purposiveness concerns perfec- The second introduction is clearer than the
tion and relative purposiveness use. first both in terms of the distinction between
the beautiful and the sublime and in terms of
The Second Introduction the need for reference to the supersensible.
53
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Key Works
products of taste are exemplary and grounds of the sublime that follows also differs from
this on the view that the models of taste are the account of the beautiful as it is divided
ideas which have been presented to sensible between the ‘mathematical’ and the ‘dynami-
exhibition. However, the Ideal of beauty is cal’ sublime (following the division of the
not an object of an entirely pure judgment of Table of Categories in CPR).
taste since it includes a reference to a basis Kant opens the account of the mathemati-
for taste in something intellectual and Kant cal sublime by describing the sublime as
suggests it only really refers to humanity involving what is absolutely large, a point
itself as the appropriate object of such ideali- that ensures that the mathematical sublime
zation. This Ideal basically expresses some- is not a quantity as it exceeds all measure.
thing moral and is the first explicit point of Largeness is a notion that normally involves
connection between taste and morality. The comparison but in this case we are not oper-
modal status of judgments of taste expresses ating with a standard that is one of deter-
necessity and refers to another Idea, the Idea minate magnitude but only with an aesthetic
of Common Sense. This idea seeks to give a one. The aesthetic relation to such a notion
further basis to the normative claims involved of largeness involves a kind of liking and
in judgments of taste and Kant returns later since nothing fits the standard of absolute
to this idea. largeness it follows that this is not a standard
that describes objects of sense themselves but
The Aesthetics of the Sublime rather the way our mind expands in relation
to such. For this to arise we have a connec-
The Analytic of the Sublime opens with a tion to our intuition in terms of whether it is
contrast between judgments concerning the possible to take something in, which requires
beautiful and those expressing sublimity. The our apprehension to match an ability of
former are now suggested to require indeter- comprehension. This meets limits as when
minate concepts of understanding while the we are faced with something that as we try
latter, by contrast, require indeterminate con- to measure its extent before us exceeds our
cepts of reason. However the two judgments ability to combine moments of its presenta-
are also distinguished in terms of the fact tion together and then we have an aesthetic
that while judgments of beauty arise directly experience of largeness.
and immediately, judgments of sublimity are This checking of our power runs up
indirect and mediated. There is some sort against the endeavour to think the entirety
of check on us before we assert that we are of the exhibited in concepts as is required by
faced with something sublime, something reason. In order even to be able to think of
that holds us back before allowing us to go something as large to the extent that such
forward and, due to this, Kant defines the notions as the infinite can arise there must be
pleasure that accompanies sublimity as a a supersensible power within us and it is to
‘negative’ form of pleasure. This ‘negative’ this that the surpassing power of the exhibi-
element of sublimity is further accentuated tion must be related (which is a connection
when Kant describes the arising of the feel- of imagination to reason). The feeling that is
ing that accompanies this judgment as one aroused in us by the sense that there are exhi-
that is ‘violent’ and ‘incommensurate’ with bitions that defeat our measuring power is a
our capacity to exhibit things. The discussion feeling of respect. Our inability to determine
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the absolutely large proves both the inade- cognitive. Since it is not cognitive, its univer-
quacy of our mind to deal with all phenom- sality is not a result of established agreement
ena and yet also shows a sense of it that is but rests in some way on the autonomous
admirable since it aims to meet an ideal that powers of subjectivity.
is beyond it. So the feeling of the mathemati- Judgments of taste are peculiar in that they
cal sublime is a kind of displeasure arising make a claim to universal assent as if they
from our inadequacy combined with a pleas- were objective and yet are only subjective.
ure in our possession of rational ideas. However, there is no apparent way of prov-
The discussion of the dynamically sub- ing a judgment of taste to be correct, despite
lime opens with a discussion of the might of this claim they possess to universal validity.
nature where ‘might’ means something supe- Kant goes on to argue that judgments of taste
rior to all obstacles. Nature, when related to are synthetic a priori judgments and thus
as possessed of dynamic sublimity, is under- connects the problem concerning them to the
stood to contain such power. Kant provides general problem of Critical philosophy. The
examples of the way nature appears thus to liking expressed in the judgment of taste is
us and then represents us as not directly con- argued to be grounded on the purposiveness
fronted with nature’s power but as contem- of the form of an object for the capacity of
plating it. It is by this means that we arrive at judgment. If there is such a connection for
the dynamically sublime. Again, it is by being us then we have to work on the assumption
raised above nature that we arrive at the sense that it is possible also for others. We simply
of sublimity. This does require the sense that make this assumption in the deduction as we
we are receptive to ideas, however, and due do not have to show the ‘objective’ reality of
to the need for this, judgments of dynami- the judgment of taste. Despite this being the
cal sublimity require culture. Kant’s discus- case, we can make the assumption due to the
sion of the sublime is much briefer than his point that the capacities assumed as opera-
account of judgment though it has produced tive were shown in CPR to be required for
some of the most creative commentary.13 cognition. This leads Kant into the extended
discussion of ‘common sense’ that proved so
Aesthetic Deduction important for Hannah Arendt14 and in which
Kant discusses the procedure of comparing
After the discussion of the Analytic of the our judgment with the possible standards of
Sublime, Kant returns to the question of judg- others in order to arrive at a merely formal
ments of taste in order to provide a ‘deduc- basis for our statements.
tion’ of pure aesthetic judgments. The reason
this deduction is provided for pure aesthetic Kant’s Account of Art
judgments and not for judgments concerned
with sublimity is due to the claim that a At this point, Kant begins the final part of the
deduction is needed if the liking in question Analytic of the Beautiful but does so without
concerns the form of the object (since judg- formally announcing the opening of a new
ments of sublimity suppose something ‘form- part. In the remainder of the Analytic, he
less’). Further, the reason for the deduction in concerns himself with an enquiry that hinges
question is that the pure aesthetic judgment primarily on a discussion of art. It opens,
has a form of necessity despite not being however, with a discussion of something
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Key Works
ruled out of account earlier as part of the has no place in science, since science would
Analytic of the Beautiful, namely, an inves- require precisely the determinate rules that
tigation of empirical interest in the beautiful. are missing in the productions of genius.
This interest is something that, we are now The principle of genius is subsequently
told, can be considered after we have dis- argued to be the ability to exhibit aesthetic
cussed the pure aesthetic judgment. It arises ideas where these ideas are presentations of
in society where we expect communication imagination to which no concept is adequate
of pleasures to take place and where it can (the reverse of rational ideas). So the mental
become refined. Kant next considers ‘intel- powers that are brought into connection by
lectual’ interest in the beautiful, which he genius are imagination and understanding.
relates to the beauty of nature rather than to For fine art to exist, both genius and taste are
the beauty of art. The reason for this claim is required as genius alone will give something
then argued to be that in the case of interest in that is inspired but not refined while taste
the beautiful in nature we concern ourselves alone would give refinement but not neces-
with a connection between the mind and that sarily inspiration. Taste is thus presented as
which in nature seems to accord with it and not merely necessary for judging but also for
this is taken by Kant to be grounded on a producing aesthetic art even though such art
‘moral’ interest. This even leads him to mak- is not judged by pure judgments of taste.
ing claims about the connection of the colour Kant subsequently divides the fine arts into
spectrum to moral qualities (CJ 302). three classes, those of speech (rhetoric and
Interestingly, it is after these two discus- poetry), visual arts (plastic and painting) and
sions of different kinds of ‘interest’ that can beautiful play of sensations (music and the
be attached to the beautiful that Kant turns art of colour). Subsequently to this is added
to discussing art, a discussion that fills the an account of how the different arts can be
rest of the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment. combined together in such mixed forms as
First, Kant gives a generic account of art dis- drama, dance and opera. Kant concludes
tinguishing it from nature, science and craft. his discussion of art by a consideration of
After this generic description has been given, the respective aesthetic value of the differ-
Kant then turns to a specific discussion of ent fine arts ranking poetry the foremost art
‘fine’ art, which intends to arouse feelings of and indicating that music has less value than
pleasure in relation to cognition and so has a other arts due to its greater dependence on
standard in reflective judgment and not sen- sensation and to its inability to produce more
sation. The basis of such art is next shown to than a transitory impression. The final ‘com-
reside in ‘genius’ as this ‘gives the rule’ (CJ ment’ section of the Analytic expands the
307) to art. Genius is presented as a talent discussion to include laughter and even an
to produce something that transcends deter- account of jokes.
minate rules and is original but also exem-
plary. Since genius has, however, no specific Aesthetic Dialectic
‘science’ by which it operates it cannot be
said to be grounded on a theory but is rather The second division of the Critique of
expressive of a ‘nature’. Given this account Aesthetic Judgment concerns the dialectic
of genius, it is not surprising that Kant con- of it. The Dialectic is carefully stated not to
cludes that genius is only operative in art and be a dialectic of taste itself but rather of the
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critique of taste and to be concerned with the of ‘methodology’ in which Kant argues that
principles of this critique. Kant now presents there can be no ‘science’ of the beautiful.
an antinomy that concerns whether or not
taste is based on concepts since, on the one Kant’s Critique of Teleology
hand, it appears there is no disputing con-
cerning taste, while, on the other hand, we The Critique of Teleological Judgment fol-
can and do quarrel about it. Resolving this lows immediately after the discussion of why
antinomy requires showing that the parties there can be no independent ‘method’ of pure
to it have different senses of a ‘concept’ in aesthetic judgment. By far, the lion’s share
question. In agreement with those who sug- of attention given to CJ has concerned the
gest that taste does depend on a concept, Critique of Aesthetic Judgment though there
Kant points to the claims of such judgments are now studies that are beginning to chal-
of taste to necessary validity. However, in lenge this.15
agreement with those objecting to the claim Kant opens this discussion by arguing
that taste is based on concepts, Kant points for the need for an account of ‘objective’
to the inability to prove claims about taste. purposiveness in nature albeit understood
In indicating this, Kant points to the differ- as a regulative and not a constitutive prin-
ence between concepts of the understanding ciple. Kant begins by distinguishing formal
and concepts of reason where the first are purposiveness from material purposiveness,
determinate and the second are not. The con- describing now the former as manifested
cept on which a judgment of taste depends is in geometry and as not requiring teleology.
hence not susceptible to proof as it is not a Relative purposiveness is next distinguished
concept of understanding. But there is a con- from intrinsic where the latter is imputed to
cept that enables quarrelling to happen and the object itself rather than merely something
this is a concept of reason. The indeterminate concerning its use. Finally, Kant refers to
concept on which taste depends is the super- ‘natural purposes’, which are the real subject
sensible substrate of appearances. of the rest of his investigation and which pos-
Having stated and ‘resolved’ this antinomy, sess recursive causality giving the example of
Kant proceeds to connect it to the antinomies a tree (CJ 371–372). Such natural purposes
that were the concern of the dialectics of the have parts whose possibility depends on the
two earlier Critiques and does so by suggest- whole due to being reciprocally causes and
ing that the theoretical antinomies point to effects of the form in question, a claim that
the undetermined supersensible of nature, leads Kant to distinguish the ‘force’ of organ-
the practical antinomy to the supersensible ized beings from that of beings that are only
as the principle of our cognitive power and ‘machines’ (CJ 374).
the antinomy of reflective judgment as the Having given this account of ‘natural pur-
principle of the harmony of the two preced- poses’, Kant discusses next the principle by
ing forms of the supersensible. The Critique which nature in general is approached as a
of Aesthetic Judgment then reaches a conclu- system of purposes, which involves an eco-
sion with a discussion of how beauty can be nomical approach to nature as an integrated
a symbol of morality in which an analogy whole (CJ 379). Teleology is next described
is presented between the beautiful and the as having a place in natural science only as
good. Finally, there is a very brief discussion providing us with a method of approach and
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not as justifying the postulate of a separate motion alone (ancient materialistic systems
causality for explanation so the necessity are mentioned) or on fatalistic principles
attaching to teleology is not one suggested (where Spinoza is mentioned). Realistic
to be present in the physical character of accounts of purposiveness, by contrast, see
things. it either as physically realistic (hylozoism) or
The Dialectic of Teleological Judgment as realistic in relation to an intelligent being
is unusual in being slightly longer than the (theism). Kant proceeds to argue against all
Analytic. In introducing the Dialectic, Kant these systems stating that the ancient mate-
points out that determinant judgment has rialisms failed to distinguish the technic of
no concepts of objects and no antinomy of nature from mechanism and had to call in
its own but that reflective judgment is dif- chance as an ultimate basis of law while the
ferent in this regard. However, when he goes fatalistic form of account deprives the world
on to present this antinomy, he suggests the of contingency and makes all necessary. The
difference between an antinomy that con- hylozoistic view is denied since Kant can give
cerns regulative principles and one which no sense to the idea of living matter and the
concerns constitutive ones with regard to theistic account presupposes an earlier deter-
empirical laws of nature. The antinomy that minative judgment about the need for the
concerns regulative principles arises natu- intelligent being to explain nature.
rally from reflective judgment and has to be This survey of dogmatic solutions to the
answered by means of its examination while problem of teleology leads Kant to reas-
a constitutive antinomy here is not plausi- sert the point that natural products contain
ble since reason could not, in this province, natural necessity while also having contin-
prove either of the two possible conflicting gent form. It is due to this combination that
maxims. Hence it is false to claim, as is often they form a problem for reflective judgment.
done, that Kant resolves the antinomy of tel- We are required, in order to address this,
eological judgment by merely showing both to examine our cognitive powers even to
assertions in it to be regulative. Rather, it is the extent of seeing that there is no deter-
as an antinomy of regulative maxims that he minate way (as theism supposes) of proving
examines it. The antinomy broadly concerns the existence of God but only of showing
the question of whether merely mechanical the cognitive reasons we are led to suppose
laws are sufficient to account for nature or such an existence as required in the system
whether we also require the invocation of of nature. Kant next reverts to the point that
final causes. understanding and intuition are necessarily
Reflectively considered, it is necessary to heterogeneous for us and that this, combined
consider final causes as something distinct with the need of reason to reach totality, cre-
from mechanism; that much is also shown ates the basis of the antinomy of teleological
by the Analytic of Teleology. Kant goes on judgment. But a different understanding to
to consider the various systems that have ours would not have the same characteris-
been proposed in response to the problem tics and an intuitive understanding is con-
of accounting for teleology and distinguishes ceivable. Not only is such an understanding
them as consisting either in idealistic or conceivable but we have already been led to
realistic interpretations of purposiveness. suppose that nature has a supersensible sub-
The former either base nature on laws of strate by earlier inquiries. We can further see
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how, for such an understanding, there could work which from this point on becomes
be a common higher principle of nature’s more concerned with practical rather than
laws beyond both mechanism and teleology. theoretical questions about teleology.
For ourselves we cannot explain organized Kant provides a miniature description of
beings in terms of mechanism though this his view of human historical development
is only a point for reflective judgment on including the need within it for war as part of
organized beings. This leads to the conclu- this development. After this interlude, Kant
sion that all we can do is subordinate the returns to the basis for viewing humanity as
mechanistic production of organisms to the ‘ultimate purpose’ of nature and suggests
the teleological one without requiring, in it is humanity considered as noumenon that
so doing, a scientific ground for the use of is such a purpose. After making this claim,
teleology. The two principles are assumed Kant describes the reasons why physical tel-
to be reconciled entirely in the supersensible eology has always tended to be the primary
substrate but in ways we cannot know. All form that is presented and yet discounts the
explanation has to follow the mechanistic view that moral claims can be founded on it
model although the production of organized stating that a purely physical teleology could
beings cannot be so accounted for. at best be the basis of a demonology. By con-
The ‘methodology’ of teleological judg- trast, an ethical teleology can be presented
ment is one of the longest methodologies in on the basis of the idea, first broached in G,
the Critiques. It opens with Kant reiterating of a ‘kingdom of ends’. Kant also provides
that teleology does not belong to natural sci- here a further statement of the ‘moral proof’
ence but only to critique and indicating that of the existence of God which was first
we should use the principle of mechanism given in CPrR. It is given greater vividness
as far as we possibly can. Kant also here here and the status of the postulate of God
considers and counters Hume’s objections is more clearly defined as one that can be
to teleological discussions as Hume fails to subjectively understood to be ‘constitutive’
understand the extrinsic character of purposes (CJ 457). The properties of God are only
to nature. Kant also flatly rejects Leibnizian presented by means of analogy and God is
pre-established harmony, occasionalism and denied to be a possible object of cognition.
what he terms ‘the theory of evolution’ (CJ Considering God in only such a practical role
423), which is a form of theory of pre-for- prevents theology from either soaring too
mation of matter and which is contrasted high or sinking too low and leaves God as an
with epigenesis. The latter theory, derived in object of ‘faith’ in the sense of being beyond
part from Blumenbach, sees organization as theoretical cognition.
original and as having a force separate from
that of matter as Kant had argued earlier in
the Analytic.
Kant next turns to the ‘ultimate purpose’ of RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES
nature as a teleological system and describes OF MERE REASON (R)
humanity as the ‘ultimate purpose’ of nature
and gives an argument for seeing human The complication in the textual history of
culture as more important than human hap- this work concerns Kant’s engagements with
piness. This discussion marks a turn in the the censorship of his time. Kant originally
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intended to write a series of essays on reli- while morality needs nothing further for the
gion for the Berlinische Monatsschrift and ground of its maxims it has a necessary refer-
submitted the initial one (on the topic of ence to an ‘end’ in terms of its consequences.
radical evil) without problem but had the What is meant by this is that the result of our
second essay refused the right to publication. conduct is not something indifferent to us
Kant therefore took back the second essay and he refers again to the notion of the high-
and decided he would re-publish the first est good mentioned in the Dialectic of CPrR.
essay (first published in 1792) with the fol- This notion of the ‘highest good’ is referred
lowing three he had intended to accompany to as a special point of unification for our
that essay in book form. Since the second ends (or as a ‘final end’) and related to the
essay had been rejected by a theology censor, question (prominent in the examples in G)
Kant now took the trouble to assess whether of the kind of world we would create. These
the works really merited being considered ideas are now connected (as they were in the
as belonging under the heading of theology. postulates of practical reason) to ‘religion’ or
So it was submitted to the theology faculty ‘the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside
at Königsberg who declared it to be outside the human being’ (R 6).
their remit as it was a philosophical work. It Having introduced the concept of reli-
was then submitted to the philosophy faculty gion, Kant proceeds to distinguish between
at Jena who declared it fit for publication two kinds of theology, ‘biblical’ and ‘philo-
and it was duly published in 1793. However, sophical’, though he does little here to make
in October 1794 a royal rescript accused clear the province of the former. The dis-
Kant of having abused his philosophy for tinction is markedly introduced to discuss
the purpose of ‘distorting and disparaging the question of censorship and the need
several principal and fundamental doctrines for philosophical theology to be based and
of Holy Scripture and of Christianity’ includ- judged on the criterion of reason alone. The
ing within this book. Further, Kant was ‘Preface’ to the second edition discusses the
enjoined not to publish further on this area pure religion of reason as something that
and, while defending his book from these could be regarded as ‘part’ of revealed reli-
accusations, Kant agreed to comply with this gion and as the ‘part’ the philosopher (who
directive until King Frederick William II died ‘abstracts’ from experience) is concerned
in November 1797 after which Kant deemed with. Kant also indicates in the ‘Preface’
himself released from the rescript and pub- that if we begin with a given historical reli-
lished all the details of it in CF. gion it may well be possible to hold up frag-
After being published in 1793 this work ments of it in such a way that we can be led
quickly went through a series of reprints and back to the rational system of pure reason.
new editions and Kant adds a series of addi- In making this claim, Kant also makes a dis-
tional notes to the second edition of 1794 and tinction between ‘religion’ and ‘cult’ where
a new preface. In addition to the two prefaces, the latter has no reference to reason. Kant
it is divided into four parts. In the ‘Preface’ to also claims here that no special reference to
the first edition, Kant declares that morality his moral system is needed to read the work
is complete so long as it is based only on free- but only the standpoint of ‘common moral-
dom and the moral law so that it does not ity’ (though this surely means at least the
need religion for these purposes. However, position of G part I).
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Kant’s Conception of Evil it requires respect for the moral law as a sole
incentive of choice and so is effectively iden-
The work is then generally presented as tical to personality itself.
concerned with the ‘philosophical doctrine Kant then moves on to talking about the
of religion’ and the first part concerns the ‘propensity’ to evil where ‘propensity’ is
radical evil of human nature. This part opens taken to mean a subjective ground of the
with the observation that the claim that the possibility of an inclination and is distin-
world lies in evil is a very old complaint and guished from a predisposition in the sense
that the view that the world is progressing is that it can be understood as freely adopted.
a much newer claim. A first determination of Kant distinguishes three different levels of a
evil follows shortly after. It is to the effect that propensity to evil in terms of frailty, impu-
someone is evil in allowing the ‘interference’ rity and depravity where the last means a
of evil maxims. Kant discusses the inference determination to adopt evil maxims. After
of an underlying evil maxim as the ground of considering this area, Kant reaches the con-
all particular evil conduct. This ground does clusion that the human being is, by nature,
not lie in anything directly sensible but in a evil and further substantiates this by refer-
specific kind of decision to allow the sensi- ence to the inductive reference spoken of
ble sway over the intelligible. The conflict earlier. The basis of this evil is the subor-
mentioned at the opening of this part is then dination of intelligible incentives to sensi-
reduced to a claim concerning whether we are ble ones. Given the deep-rooted nature of
‘by nature’ (that is, in terms of the underlying this failing, there is a sense to thinking of
maxim of conduct) disposed to good or evil. the propensity to evil as something inher-
Kant goes on to look at the ‘original ited. The reason for presenting it this way
predisposition’ to good in terms of three is that the origin of a free movement can-
headings, namely in relation to ‘animality’, not be explicated. Kant further presents this
‘rationality’ and ‘personality’. In relation to point as the basis of the view that we were
‘animality’, there is desire for self-preserva- originally tempted by an evil spirit. The first
tion, propagation of the species and com- part then closes with a ‘general remark’ (the
munity with others. Each of these is shown first of four) that concerns the restoration of
to have vices concomitant to them (gluttony, power to the original predisposition to good
lust and wild lawlessness, all termed ‘bes- (or effects of grace). Here Kant discusses the
tial’ vices). The predispositions to humanity rational basis of the claim that there remains
involve a comparison that involves reason a ‘germ’ of goodness in our evil nature but
(so are distinct from the predispositions to that a ‘revolution’ in our mode of thought
animality). Here Kant discusses a kind of is necessary in order to restore the original
self-love that involves an inclination to gain predisposition to goodness. This requires
worth in the opinion of others and describes a ‘decision’ to reverse the supreme ground
this as originally being a desire for equal of our maxims and examples of good peo-
worth that becomes distorted into a striving ple are a helpful way to achieve this. The
for ascendancy and produces the ‘diabolical’ ‘remark’ concludes with another distinction
vices of envy, ingratitude and joy in others’ between types of religion with moral reli-
misfortune. Finally, the predisposition to per- gion compared to cult again and the former
sonality is the only really purely good one as enjoining that we do all in our power to be
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good while the latter is depicted as requiring of having started out from evil for which we
morally unnecessary measures. surely continue to deserve punishment. In
The second part of the work concerns the response to this, Kant argues that the conver-
battle between the good and evil principles sion to the moral law is not a separate act
and focuses on the need to view our moral from the punishment for the evil disposition
situation as consisting in such a fight. Kant which previously reigned and that the pure
again points out that natural inclinations disposition that thus emerges bears as vicari-
are, in themselves, good and, in doing so, ous substitute the debt of the original evil.
contrasts his approach to that of the Stoics. This idea involves taking the pure disposition
In contrast to them, Kant sides with the to be personified as the ‘Son of God’ earlier
Christian view that there is an evil spirit that mentioned. The struggle of the good and
it is necessary to engage in combat. After the evil dispositions is also presented in this
mentioning this idea, Kant discusses the per- part through a symbolic interpretation of the
sonified idea of the good principle and says notion of Satan presented in the Scriptures
it is our duty to elevate ourselves to the ideal and the struggle of this with Christ, includ-
of moral perfection, an act that amounts, on ing a symbolic interpretation of the story
his view, to a practical faith in the ‘Son of of the virgin birth (through a notion of pre-
God’ (R 62). The prototype of such a ‘Son’ formation [R 80n.]).
resides only in reason and the use of this The discussion of Christ involves the
ideal is defended by means of a discussion of presentation of moral religion irrupting in
the procedure of formulating a ‘schematism the presence of cults. The ‘general remark’
of analogy’. that closes the second part concerns mira-
Kant also considers a series of ‘difficulties’ cles which are presented as something with
that stand in the way of us realizing the idea which moral religion is adorned on its first
of a humanity that could be well-pleasing to appearance. The point is made that rational
God. The first difficulty concerns the problem human beings do not subscribe to the view
of adopting the position of a ‘new man’ who that miracles can occur now, even if they do
has become converted to the law when all our not rule out their possibility as such in the-
maxims appear at root to be corrupted. This ory. The point is also made that any apparent
difficulty resides in our necessarily temporal message from God can always be judged in
means of representing our moral state but can terms of its accord with moral teaching.
be met by imagining God’s representation as
viewing not our moment-by-moment state A Society of Virtue
but rather the totality of our disposition. The
second difficulty concerns our moral happi- The third part concerns the manner in which
ness, i.e. what assurance we have of attaining the good principle could be victorious over
a constant disposition that always advances the evil one. This part opens by tracing the
in goodness. In relation to this problem, Kant presence of what was termed in the first
sets out a representation of our general con- part as ‘diabolical vices’ and which are now
duct in life as a motivation for our ability termed ‘passions’ in human sociality. In
to either stay constant or to seek to become response to this, the picture is now drawn of
so. The third, and most important, difficulty the establishment of a society in accordance
concerns how we wipe out the original debt with virtue.
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The precondition of such a society ever some type of ‘revealed’ (or, as he now terms
existing is, as Kant is careful to point out, a it, ‘historical’) faith rather than simply being
political community but the society of virtue grounded on pure religious faith as drawn
has a distinct principle of its own. However, from reason. In discussing this point, Kant
there is an analogy between these types of describes again the distinction between reli-
community so that Kant feels he can discuss gion and cult and now distinguishes the latter
the ‘ethical state of nature’ even though he as dependent on the forms of historical rev-
rules out the view that we could leave this by elation at the cost of a priori reason. Further,
political means. In discussing how to leave the type of ‘church’ that can be formed as a
this ethical state of nature, Kant introduces a cult is here described as one that depends on
new conception of the ‘highest good’ that is ‘temples’ (outward forms of public service)
different from the one that was referred to in and ‘priests’ (who practice piety rather than
the first part of the work (as the earlier con- pure moral religion). Kant also argues that
ception drew entirely on the view of CPrR). the majority of people have no sense of ‘reli-
This new sense of the ‘highest good’ is an gion’ but only of statutory faith (and are thus
idea of reason as a common end of human- engaged in ‘cults’).
ity and is pictured as the formation of the
ethical community. However, the point of Kant’s Hermeneutics
origin of the laws of this ethical community
is not presented (as was the case with the At this point Kant also explicitly presents his
kingdom of ends of G) as arising purely from hermeneutic principles for the interpretation
humanity itself but instead as having, as its of Scripture which has, as he freely admits,
law-giver, God as ‘moral ruler of the world’ a ‘forced’ character since it always views
(R 99). Having made this point, Kant pro- its text in light of pure moral demands due
ceeds to convert his conception of a moral to the claim that the reading of these texts
community into a form of church and thus should always have in view making human
gives next a rational ecclesiology. beings better. This moral improvement is the
true end of the religion of reason and is the
Kant’s Ecclesiology key to Kant’s exegesis of Scripture.
By contrast to this hermeneutic approach
The notion of the church is differentiated is set the figure of a scriptural scholar whose
between an invisible one and a visible one. task is mainly to preserve the authority
The invisible church is the mere idea of the of a church but who should really have a
union of all ethical human beings under a broad culture at hand. The latter is clearly
divine world-governance while the visible intended to be guided by the former and
church is the ‘actual’ union in accord with both are opposed to the view of one who
such an idea. Kant then sets out the marks reads Scripture according to the dictates of
of such a church in accordance with the ‘feeling’.
Table of Categories of CPR, describing it as
universal in quantity, pure in quality, having The Antinomy of Faith
free relations and an unchanging modality
of constitution. However, as Kant goes on to Kant next looks at the question of the gradual
discuss, every ‘visible’ church has its basis in transition of ecclesiastical faith towards pure
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religious faith and, in the course of doing a possibility in itself the reference to pure
so, explores an antinomy. This is between rational faith, and this is Christianity. Prior
a notion of faith that finds satisfaction by to giving his ‘history’ of Christianity however,
means of reparation for guilt on the one Kant first describes the ‘Jewish faith’, which
hand and faith in the ability to become well- he states is ‘not a religion at all’ but a forma-
pleasing to God by future good conduct on tion of a political community (R 125). Even
the other. The first is presented as including the Ten Commandments are here described
the problem that if reparation depends only as having only been given to help the forma-
on faith then it would appear to make good tion of a political community and the lack of
conduct unnecessary. But the second, by con- reference of Judaism to a future life is taken
trast, appears to make the conversion to the as further evidence of its lack of religious
moral law something available to someone character. Christianity is presented as based
who is depraved without making clear how on a total abandonment of Judaism and as
this can be possible. So there appears a dif- introducing a pure moral religion, which is
ficulty either way in reconciling faith and supported by means of some of Kant’s rather
good works (the classic argument between ‘forced’ exegesis of the New Testament.
Protestant and Catholic Christians). In However, the history of Christianity is
responding to this antinomy, Kant points out admitted to include little that is uplifting
that faith alone is something only necessary with Kant describing in deprecatory terms
in a theoretical sense while the need for good the Great Schism between East and West and
works is practically required. Ecclesiastical concluding with an epigraph from Lucretius
faith begins from historical faith alone but concerning the evil deeds of religion. So it is
this is only a vehicle for the promotion of really the Christian present that Kant uses as
rational faith. The faith that resides in such a model, not its historical record.
ecclesiastical forms alone tends toward The ‘general remark’ with which the third
superstition and takes the ideal of humanity part closes concerns mysteries and Kant
as presented in the ‘Son of God’ as an empiri- points out that there is no way of determin-
cal historical appearance. However, the sense ing objectively whether mysteries exist but
of the ‘Son of God’ that is religiously required even the Trinity is here discussed only in
cannot be the reference to an appearance of practical terms and not in theoretical ones.
the senses but must rather be to the proto- However, this practical idea of the Trinity
type of our reason and faith in that it must is presented as the basis of a mystery in the
be the same as the faith in our ability to act sense that it gives us something practically
in accord with such an ideal (which is good that we can make no sense of theoretically
works). So the antinomy is only an appar- and the practical sense of it is determined in
ent one. The point raised from this antinomy three respects. Firstly, by means of the idea of
is the need to free faith from empirical his- the ‘call’ of us to become members of a virtu-
torical determination so that it can become ous community, based on the mystery of how
purely rational. we can have moral powers at all, something
Kant next gives an historical sketch of the that refers us to God as creator. Secondly, in
gradual arrival of pure religion which is con- terms of the mystery of satisfaction, namely
centrated only on one religion, namely that of how we can find reparation for our evil,
which he takes to have always included as something that we earlier saw involved the
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KEY WORKS
notion of vicarious substitution or God as So far does Kant go in this analysis that he
‘Son’. Thirdly, the mystery of election, of how renders equivalent the practices of a shaman
we can attain a state of being well-pleasing and the way of life of some contemporary
to God, which refers to the sense of God as ‘Christians’ (R 176). Such a service is further
Holy Spirit. described as a form of fetishism and ‘priest-
craft’ to be fetish-service.
Illusory Religion The ‘general remark’ at the end of this
section concerns ‘means of grace’ and Kant
The fourth and final part of the work dis- maintains the point here that the only means
cusses false religion or ‘priestcraft’. In begin- in our power to attain grace is endeavouring
ning this section, Kant again refers to the to improve our moral nature. Faith in mira-
distinction between visible and invisible cles, mysteries and means of grace, consid-
church and speaks about the form of the ered theoretically, are all forms of delusory
former as including within it much that is faith. Similarly, prayer, viewed just as a ritual,
inessential to pure religion. In further pre- is a superstitious delusion and would, viewed
senting this contrast, Kant speaks about ‘nat- correctly, be only a means to enliven our aim
ural’ religion as something that is apparent towards acts that would be ‘well-pleasing’ to
to reason and suggests that such could also God. Church-going, likewise, as an external
be spoken of as ‘revealed’ if by this is meant worship, has no direct use but should only
that its formulas appear through the prism of be seen as a means of the community gener-
a chosen historical form. Such ‘natural’ reli- ally working towards moral progress. Kant’s
gion is a pure practical concept of reason and general message is summarized by the final
Kant presents Christianity as including it, by sentence in which he argues that we should
means, once again, of his peculiar method of not attempt to move from grace to virtue but
biblical hermeneutics. rather from virtue to grace.
By contrast to this ‘natural’ religion, Kant
presents a ‘learned’ religion as one that
requires dogmas that are not apparent to
reason and which he relates as dependent on TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE (PP)
a certain history. The ‘counterfeit’ service of
religion is one that requires unconditional This work was first published in 1795, the
faith in such dogmas and is, in its form, ‘slav- year Prussia signed the Peace of Basel with
ish’. Such religion is full of ‘delusion’ where France but refers, in its title, to a long-stand-
a delusion involves mistaking a certain kind ing debate on the nature of peace. It is one
of representation of a thing as equivalent to of Kant’s most-cited writings outside the area
the possession of the thing. Such delusion is of philosophy, having been used to main-
discussed in terms of anthropomorphism and tain quite a variety of positions in the area
distinguished from rational faith as concerned of International Relations theory. It is some-
with outward performances rather than with what elaborately structured, despite its rela-
the disposition of the heart towards good tive brevity. The main parts of the work are
works. The view that performance of cult presented as a division of two sections but to
acts is in itself pleasing to God is declared these Kant added two supplements and an
the basis of cults and to be a superstition. appendix. The work is also formulated in a
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style that mimics the form of treaties between However, while half of the preliminary
states. articles are not strict, Kant is firm in the
The work opens with Kant making a refer- view that this does not entail that they could
ence to the expression ‘perpetual peace’ that be postponed for good. This leads Kant to
accompanied a picture of a graveyard on a also insert a lengthy note on the notion of
Dutch innkeeper’s signboard. Awareness of a ‘permissive law’, which is here directed ‘only
censorial climate is also here indicated with to the future way of acquiring a right’ but
Kant stating that the attitude of the worldly- which explains his view of the second arti-
wise statesman towards the philosopher is cle (concerning inheritance of another state)
often one of taking the latter to be irrelevant more than his views of articles three and four
with Kant adding that, if this view is con- (concerning standing armies and national
sistently held, then there can be no occasion debt).
for viewing philosophical works as posing a
danger to the state. The Definitive Articles
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KEY WORKS
they would themselves have to bear the hard- the unwritten code of the rights of states and
ships. Kant contrasts a republican constitu- nations.
tion with a ‘democratic’ one though he clearly After the statement of the third defini-
thinks of the latter in terms of ancient models tive article, Kant introduces the first of two
of democracy and not in terms of representa- ‘supplements’ to the treatise, which concerns
tive government. Republicanism is identified what he terms a ‘guarantee’ of perpetual
here with a separation of executive power peace. This ‘guarantee’ focuses on a discus-
from legislative power and contrasted with sion of providence and is connected to Kant’s
despotism in which the laws are effectively account of history in UH. The sense of ‘provi-
decrees of a private purpose rather than laws dence’ invoked here is distinguished from the
of a public will. Non-representative govern- religious one. Kant presents it in naturalistic
ments are taken by Kant to be wholly mate- terms but the reference to ‘nature’ is itself to
rial and without form. be understood in a practical and not a theo-
The second definitive article declares that retical sense.
the right of nations shall be based on feder- Kant focuses on the way that human
alism and includes an extended comparison beings have spread to every corner of the
between the formation of a rightful state from earth, even into inhospitable regions and
the state of nature and the existing antagonis- connects this to the need for lawful relations
tic relations between states. The prosecution between peoples in order to prevent war. The
of war is something that needs to be over- suggestion, in anticipation of Hegel, made
come and the formation of a pacific league here is that there are certain ends that are
is taken to be the best means to achieve this. effectively prosecuted even when we have
The league is distinguished from a state and not wished them. So, war forces constraint
includes no provision for public laws of its on public laws even if we would not wish to
own. Kant appears here to prefer a state of be governed by them. Even those who act in
nations to the pacific league but to advocate ways that are exclusively self-seeking require
the latter as more likely to be adopted. a state in order to organize their affairs so
The third definitive article describes cos- that even a nation of devils would form one
mopolitan right as limited to conditions of (assuming they had understanding). The
universal hospitality. Hospitality is here point here is that it does not require any
defined as the right a foreigner has not to desire for moral improvement to see the
be treated with hostility on landing in a pol- need for a state but that there are mecha-
ity not his own. This notion of hospitality is nisms of action that bring it about regardless
hence treated as a right to visit and to seek of our wishes or ends. Similarly, Kant argues
commerce. However, this view is contrasted that the distinction of peoples into separate
with the colonial behaviour of European pow- states is preferable to a universal despotism
ers, which is roundly condemned, with some and this separation is enforced by distinction
sympathy evinced for the Japanese exclusion of languages and religion. The spirit of com-
of foreigners. It is in the context of the dis- merce is also upheld as the best means for
cussion of this article that Kant makes the ensuring that there is peace.
key claim that a violation of right anywhere The second ‘supplement’ contains a ‘secret
is now felt everywhere and that this ensures article’ for perpetual peace to the effect that
that cosmopolitan right is a ‘supplement’ to the maxims of philosophers concerning the
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Key Works
conditions for public peace should be con- basing state conduct on principles of happi-
sulted by states that are readying for war. The ness and welfare condemned. Kant argues for
reason this ‘guarantee’ is presented as ‘secret’ the need for politics to be governed by right
is so that states need not feel that they need and to abandon the standpoint of prudence.
to take advice from their subjects as a ‘pub- The second part of the appendix describes
lic’ matter. Kant stresses here the need to give the agreement of politics with morals in
philosophers a hearing in addition to lawyers accord with the transcendental concept of
to whom states have tended to refer. public right and opens with Kant abstracting
The ‘appendix’ that closes the treatise is from the matter of public right in order to
divided into two sections. The first concerns arrive at the form of publicity. By this means,
the grounds for disagreement between mor- Kant arrives at the transcendental formula
als and politics when it comes to perpetual of public right which is that all actions
peace. Politics is here distinguished between relating to the rights of others are wrong if
the view of it that emerges from considera- their maxim is incompatible with publicity
tion of right (which should not conflict with (PP 381). This maxim is also argued to be not
morals) and that which comes from a doc- merely ethical but also juridical. Any maxim
trine of prudence (which may well come into that has to be kept secret to be successful
conflict with morals). must involve injustice.
Kant goes on to look at the attitude of those The consequences of this formula are then
who take it that human beings will never be followed through the three areas of the right
able to adopt ends leading to the goal of per- of a state, the right of nations and cosmo-
petual peace. The reason is taken to be that politan right. In regard to the right of a state,
power will not allow laws to be prescribed Kant attacks the view that there could be a
to it. In response Kant invokes the figure of ‘right’ to rebellion since, if the maxims in
a moral politician who would try to reform favour of rebellion were publicly formulated,
the practices of state in conformity with the they could not be successful. With regard
concept of right. However, the practice that to the rights of nations, Kant formulates a
is adopted by those who oppose the views more intricate account giving three separate
of the moral politician are then described examples, which concern international acts
and the core of them taken to be ‘deal[ing] of promising, acts of states operating with
in machinations’ (PP 373). The maxims of regard to the divide and rule formula and
such dealings are then summarized as three- the attempt of larger states to incorporate
fold: seize favourable opportunities for tak- smaller states within themselves.
ing possession; always deny the guilt is your Cosmopolitan right is merely mentioned
own; divide and rule. These maxims are iden- but not discussed since Kant claims the max-
tified as those of an immoral doctrine of pru- ims of it would be easy to formulate and
dence and as necessarily requiring to be held evaluate. Kant compares the spurious politics
in secret. In reply to them, Kant distinguishes that would try and avoid the consequences
between basing practical reason on material that attach to the formula of publicity to the
principles or on formal ones with the latter maxims of Jesuits. A further principle is then
formulated in accord with the categorical added which is stated in an affirmative form
imperative (PP 377). The uncertainty attach- as if we adopt only maxims that require pub-
ing to all maxims of prudence is alleged and licity in order not to fail in their end then we
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KEY WORKS
can be assured that such maxims must also one specific to the Doctrine of Right. The gen-
be in accord with the right of the public. eral introduction to the metaphysics of mor-
als as a whole distinguishes the method by
which metaphysics relates to natural science
from how it relates to morals. While natu-
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (MM) ral science mixes a priori principles together
with empirical ones the doctrine of morals
This work was published in two separate parts requires that laws be seen to be a priori, espe-
in 1797 as the first part, or Doctrine of Right, cially in the sense of being necessary.
was published first with the Doctrine of Virtue Kant points out that if the doctrine of mor-
following afterwards but the two parts have als were essentially an exposition of happi-
always subsequently been treated as belonging ness, it would be absurd to expect to discern
together in one work. The publication of this a priori principles. With regard to morals,
work was the culmination of Kant’s practical there is no necessary reference to experience
philosophy but it has only recently received due to the fact that there may be no empirical
any serious attention in English-language examples to hand and there is no necessary
scholarship. Until recently, G received the reference to what experience can teach us.
majority of attention without looking at the Kant also refers to ‘principles of application’
book that G was meant to pave the way for. of the higher universal principles indicating
The pioneering work of Mary Gregor took that these involve bringing in references spe-
many years to have influence but has recently cific to the nature of human beings. Further,
been supplemented by Mark Timmons and the empirical counterpart of the metaphysics
Gary Banham,16 all of which have helped to of morals is stated to be moral anthropology
create a situation where this work has begun although this latter could only discuss what
to be seen as key to comprehending a number conditions of human nature help or hinder
of features of Kant’s view of ethics. the fulfilment of the metaphysics of morals.
The ‘Preface’ to the work is really aimed The laws with which the work is con-
primarily at introducing the Doctrine of cerned are moral laws or laws of freedom.
Right. Kant here points out that the work When these are considered as directed only
presented is not a comprehensive treat- to external actions we have juridical laws
ment of right as that would have to include but if they also require consideration of the
a discussion of empirical variety and that determining grounds of action then they are
what is presented here are the metaphysi- ethical laws. Kant describes a number of con-
cal first principles. An explicit comparison cepts that are common to both parts of the
is also drawn between the method used in work and explicitly includes the categorical
the Doctrine of Right and that which guided imperative in this list. The difference between
MFNS. Kant also points out that the earlier the two parts of the work is explained by
parts of the Doctrine of Right are worked means of the way the law relates to incen-
over much more thoroughly than the later tives that are considered. When the law that
parts and concludes with a table of divisions makes an action a duty is the only thing
of the Doctrine of Right. allowed as an incentive then we are deal-
There next follow two introductions, one ing purely with ethics. But when another
to the metaphysics of morals as a whole and ground additional to the law is taken to be
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Key Works
an incentive for action then we are on juridi- only external grounds for determining choice
cal ground. In fact, when we are considering and on this ground right and the authoriza-
juridical action, it is not necessary that the tion to use coercion are presented as identical
law even be taken as part of your motivation to each other. After making this claim, Kant
in acting in accordance with it. All duties, includes an extended analogical connection
as duties, are presented as part of ethics but of right to mathematics and physics.
only because all juridical duties are indirectly Kant presents the second part of the intro-
ethical. duction as an ‘appendix’ though it is much
Kant expanded the introduction to the longer than the first part. Here Kant first
Doctrine of Right when the second edition presents definitions of some terms and then
of the work appeared in 1798. The first part gives a general division of the duties of right.
of the introduction is, however, more fre- This general division includes some state-
quently referred to than the additional mate- ments from Ulpian that have been deemed
rial added. Here Kant addresses the question significant by both Höffe and Byrd and
of what right is by describing it as the ‘sum Hruschka.17
of conditions under which the choice of one Kant next explicates freedom as the only
can be united with the choice of another in original or ‘innate’ right belonging to all by
accordance with a universal law of freedom’ virtue of their very humanity. The introduc-
(MM 230). After stating this general account tion concludes with a number of elaborate
of what right consists in Kant proceeds to accounts of the division of the work, which
state the universal (or supreme) principle of explain its division through a distinction
right, which says an action is right if it can of types of duty, types of obligation and in
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accord- terms of architectonic.
ance with the universal law. If something that
can so coexist is hindered by another then Private Right
the one who so hinders it does a wrong. On
this basis, Kant presents right as connected The Doctrine of Right is itself divided into
with an authorization to use coercion since if two major parts; one part concerned with
whatever hinders that which is right is wrong ‘private’ right and the other with ‘public’
then the former, in so hindering the latter, cre- right. The discussion of private right opens
ates a state that needs to be remedied and this with a discussion of what it means to have
is an external state since right governs that something external as one’s own. This ini-
which is external. So the external state has tially concerns the notion of ‘possession’ and
to be set back into equilibrium and this can Kant opens by distinguishing between ‘intel-
be achieved by removing the check. Hence ligible’ and ‘empirical’ possession, which
to coerce someone to cease acting wrongly enables him to understand the possibility of
is itself right. possession that does not require holding the
The concept of right is also described as thing in question physically. From this slen-
‘the possibility of connecting universal recip- der basis, Kant moves on to distinguishing
rocal coercion with the freedom of everyone’ between types of possession, which requires
(MM 232). Kant describes ‘strict’ right as distinction of different ‘external objects’ that
that which is not mixed with anything ethi- can be possessed. The three types indicated
cal and states that such strict right requires are corporeal things, another’s choice and
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KEY WORKS
another’s status. Included under the second that the possibility of this form of possession
heading is someone’s promise to act in certain requires something further to be given real-
ways and in the latter relations to others, such ity. This further element is the existence of
as the relation to a wife, a child or a servant. a rightful condition, which means the exist-
The general notion of external objects that ence of a civil society. The reason for this is
are possessed involves a sense that one would that without the existence of the civil condi-
be wronged by being disturbed in one’s pos- tion there is lack of assurance of the mutu-
session even though one does not hold it. So ality of respect for possession. A unilateral
it is intelligible possession that poses the key will cannot produce this mutuality, only an
question for Kant and it is only with regard omnilateral will can do so. Outside the realm
to such that we are dealing with synthetic a of the civil constitution, the rightful claim to
priori judgments (empirical possession being possession does still exist, however, and with
merely analytic). it comes the authorization to coerce others to
From this start, Kant states a ‘postulate’ respect such a claim even without the exist-
of practical reason with regard to rights that ence of the civil power. What we have in such
asserts the possibility of intelligible possession conditions is a ‘provisionally rightful’ posses-
on the grounds of the view that it would be sion while possession in a civil condition is
contrary to right that objects of choice should conclusively rightful possession.
belong to no one. The brief argument given Kant’s initial argument concerned how
for this postulate concerns the consistency of to have something external as one’s own
external freedom with itself. The ground for and the next stage examines how to acquire
this claim is that we require removal of con- something external in the first place. In
ditions of intuition with the practical princi- explicating this second point, Kant uses the
ples. This is required to be able to uncover postulate of practical reason to show that
the basis of claims to possession in a general bringing something under one’s control in
sense and is in accord with the procedure of order to use it has to be combined with
the typic in CPrR. To relate the notion of intel- an act of will where the latter has to con-
ligible possession to objects of experience, we form to the structure of a possible united
have to apply it not to the concept of ‘hold- (or omnilateral) will. Acquiring something
ing’ but only to that of ‘having’ and we con- as one’s own involves a matter, a form and
nect this concept to the sense of externality a basis. The matter of the object concerns
where something is distinct from us. At this the kind of thing that can be acquired and
point, Kant introduces an antinomy concern- this is either the thing as a substance, anoth-
ing possession in view of the conflict between er’s performance of an action (causality) or
those who take it to be possible to have some- the status of another person (coexistence),
thing external as one’s own even though it is which shows that matter of the object is
not held by one and those who deny this pos- connected to the categories of relation. The
sibility. Kant now resolves this antinomy by form of what can be acquired divides the
showing that the claim to validity here is right rights in question to either right to a thing,
if we mean intelligible possession and wrong right against a person and right to a per-
if we mean empirical possession. son similar to a right to a thing. Finally, the
Having given this statement of the basis of basis of the acquisition is given unilaterally,
intelligible possession, Kant goes on to claim bilaterally or omnilaterally.
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Key Works
After making these divisions, Kant next view, preparatory and constitutive acts of
looks at the three forms of right, beginning choice. The preparatory rightful acts are the
with the right to a thing that leads us to manner of negotiating which refer to means
the notion of property right. The right to a of offering something and means of assent-
thing is a right to the private use of some- ing to the offering. By contrast, the consti-
thing even though the original possession tutive elements are the means by which the
of it would have been common. This basis conclusion of the transfer is brought about
of the original right is not directly over the and involve promising and accepting. Before
thing itself but rather to the possession of a promise of transfer can be made, it is first
the right to claim the thing as distinct from necessary to establish that what is promised
others having such a right. Kant proceeds is something that is desired. But the act of
to give an a priori genesis of such property transfer only takes place through the uniting
rights by describing original acquisition as of the will of both. The problem that has to
involving land (a claim that, again, invokes be addressed in contract concerns how the
the postulate of practical reason). The pos- united will of both is to be manifested when
sibility of such possession is related to the temporally they make distinct and distin-
notion of an original community where this guishable acts.
notion refers not to a primitive condition but In reply to this problem, Kant introduces
rather to an a priori claim. What Kant really a ‘transcendental deduction’, which again
means by this is that the original community requires the acts involved in the transfer to
is effectively to be understood as the possi- be seen as intelligible rather than empirical.
ble civil condition under which the right is What is acquired is the causality of another’s
conclusively authorized. However, although choice or another’s promise and involves
such actual conclusive authorization requires tacit acquiescence in a law of continuity
the civil condition, it is the mere idea of the (MM 274). The contract is only honoured
possibility of such that is sufficient to act as when the thing in question is delivered.
justification of possession and is hence the The third kind of right, the right to a per-
ground, in private right, for first possession son akin to a right to a thing, is divided into
of land. Provisional right to hold property three separate parts but governs what Kant
is justified according to a permissive law of generally terms ‘domestic right’. This area
reason on which something that will be right is not governed just by a deed on one’s own
if actual can be grounded in terms of its mere initiative as property right was and nor is it
possibility. There is much detailed investiga- just a contract but involves rather the right of
tion of this opening section of the Doctrine humanity in our own person and is governed
of Right.18 by what is termed a ‘natural permissive law’
The next form of right, the right against and concerns ‘most personal’ rights (MM
a person, is dealt with under the heading of 276–277). The three-fold division of the area
contract right. Unlike property right, this is between marriage right, parental right and
is not an original right and is not acquired the right of a head of a household.
by another acting in a way that is wrong. It In discussing marriage right, Kant distin-
requires rather an act of united choice of (at guishes natural sexual union from such union
least) two whereby something passes from in accordance with law and in the process
one to the other. Contract requires, in Kant’s dismisses Catholic natural law arguments,
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KEY WORKS
which view marriage right as grounded on Parental right follows next as emerging
procreation alone. The connection between from the procreation allowed for as a ‘natu-
the right to a person and the right to a thing ral’ element of marriage right. Children are
is made in the case of marriage right by the related to as other persons over whom there
way in which sexual union is understood as is right that is akin to the right to a thing.
divided between animal union and lawful This ‘right’ over the children is not without
union. Merely sensual or ‘animal’ union is obligation since the child has the right to
pursued exclusively for the sake of enjoy- be cared for until it is able to care for itself.
ment and Kant views this as taking the Since the child is a person who has emerged
other merely to be a thing for the sake of from acts of the parents to which the child
one’s pleasure. This purely sensuous relation did not consent, the obligation of the parents
is transformed if there is an act of mutual to the child is part of the condition of pro-
acquisition as this enables recognition of duction of the child and is hence original. On
the personality of each to be incorporated these grounds, Kant has a simple argument
into the act of union. On these grounds, against infanticide.
Kant somewhat strictly views sexual union The obligations of the parents to the
as only permissible under the conditions child encompass the education of the child
of marriage. Not only is this so but Kant’s both pragmatically and morally and while
conception of the sexual union as a lawful the child is still in its minority they have no
transformation of a ‘natural’ sexual urge obligation with which they can charge him
rules out extension of marriage beyond het- other than the duty of gratitude, which is
erosexual union although the strict resources not a matter of right. The right held over the
of his argument are hardly sufficient to sus- child, as a right over a person, is not aliena-
tain this. The simple leaving of one partner ble although, as in the case of marriage right,
of a marriage is also ruled out by Kant on the parent has the right to retrieve the child
the basis that, since we are dealing with a should the child run away. Contemporary
right to a person akin to that to a thing, work on children’s rights in a Kantian vein
either partner could retrieve the other and has moved away from the strictly paternalist
bring them back under control, just as they form Kant himself gave it and can be seen in
could with a thing. This seems to involve an the work of Onora O’Neill.19
overextension of his analogy. Formally, the The final part of domestic right concerns
marriage partners are taken to be equal in the right of a head of the household and this
their possession of each other though this is the briefest part of Kant’s discussion. It
does not prevent Kant from assuming that covers the kind of right that is at work in the
the husband could be ‘master’ of the wife holding of domestic servants which involves
on the grounds of a greater capacity to pro- a contract between the head of the household
mote the common interest of the household and free persons who may be employed either
(MM 279). Finally, despite parting from the to help with the children or in the running
Catholic tradition of assuming procreation of the household. Again, as with the exam-
to be the essential end of marriage, Kant ples of marriage right and parental right,
views a marriage which involves tacit or Kant assumes that this involves the right to
expressed wish to avoid sexual union as only recover the servant if they depart from the
a simulated marriage. possession of the head without the head’s
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Key Works
permission. However, despite this somewhat his own to the public but discourses of the
alarming provision, Kant is clear that serv- author and so has to have the authority of
ants are not owned by the head of the house- the author to present them to the public. On
hold and so he distinguishes the servant’s these grounds, Kant indicates a basis in right
place from that of either a slave or a serf. for authorization of copyright and indicates
Contract is required to govern the relation objections to such right are based on treating
and its frame must be temporally limited. the produced object as if it were independ-
This part of Kant’s discussion of domestic ent of its producer. Hence those who violate
right has not received general discussion this right are not respecting the personality
although, given that the relations discussed expressed in the thing.
persist, albeit altered in certain ways, there Kant next treats the topic of ‘ideal acqui-
are certainly grounds for thinking it needs to sition’ by which he means something that
be as extensively responded to as the other involves no causality in time and states that
elements of domestic right have been. such forms of acquisition are at issue when
After the discussion of domestic right, we are dealing with prolonged possession,
Kant returns to the account of contract right inheritance and merit after one’s death (repu-
and provides a general division of its possi- tation). The first of these involves the claim
bilities in relation to unilateral or gratuitous that is made when someone has long laid
contracts (which include acts of lending and undisputed control over something and dis-
gifting), mutual acquisition (including such covers eventually that another has the status
alienation as buying and selling and con- of being its true owner. In response, Kant
tracts of letting and hiring) and those which argues that without continuity of possession
guarantee what belongs to someone (as when being exerted the claim to ownership even-
we vouch for something). These forms of tually lapses. Inheritance involves transfer
division of contract right are organized in a of possession to someone else by virtue of
table. cessation of empirical existence and willing
Kant next discusses the nature of money of possession after this has occurred. Since,
distinguishing the nominal definition of it as however, the transfer requires the cessation
a means of alienation from the real definition of the original owner, there is a sense in
as the means of exchanging industriousness. which this is not a real transfer but is an ideal
This account of money assumes that money one and Kant justifies its possibility outside
is something distinct from bank notes and the civil condition on the grounds of tacit
takes it rather to be something that it has consent to the inheritance. The question of
taken a great deal of industry to produce. reputation after death is treated as an innate
The empirical concept of money is that which external possession although it is ideal since
determines the price of things but Kant fol- it is independent of the one who holds it. As
lows Adam Smith in seeing its ‘intellectual it is independent of the actuality of the per-
concept’ to involve reference to industry. son in question, it is has to be taken to be a
After discussing money, Kant looks at the right held by the person in their noumenal
nature of books in order to discuss the ques- sense.
tion of the authorization of their publication. The final part of the discussion of pri-
The question of such authorization arises as vate right concerns acquisition that depends
the publisher does not present discourses of on the decision of a public court of justice.
75
KEY WORKS
This can still be treated under the heading includes a lengthy appendix of second edi-
of private right on the grounds that the dis- tion revisions and emendations. The three
tribution of possession must have principles parts are asymmetrical with the discussion
that are in accord with the general grounds of the right of a state much longer and more
of private right. So here Kant treats what detailed than the second two parts.
would be distributively right of itself in rela- Kant opens the discussion of public right
tion to judgment and suggests there are four by describing it generally as a system of
cases that need to be treated here. These are, laws which emerge from an omnilateral will
cases of contract to make gifts, contracts to that, in a constitution, has laid down what
lend things, recovery of things and taking is right. The general term for this condition
oaths. The contract to make gifts is indicated is a civil condition and the totality of per-
to require that only a reservation expressly sons in this condition are said to be in a state.
made can prevent the gift being given. The The point Kant makes in introducing this
contract to lend something discusses risks of notion is that it is not due to some experi-
damage to what is lent and in the case of the ence of malevolence that we can say we need
state of nature it is assumed such risk must the state. Rather, even a state of nature filled
be borne by the borrower whereas in the civil with angels would require supersession since,
condition, by contrast, it falls on the lender. without the formation of a civil condition,
Recovery of something lost concerns what we would always be dependent on subjective
right is held when something I had is discov- agreement concerning what is right. A state
ered by another who does not know of my of nature is a state of dispute concerning
claim and Kant indicates that the reference right and lacks a conclusive judge.
to the notion of a court regulates only the The state is divided between three distinct
means by which something comes to be held. authorities: the sovereign (legislator), the
If the new owner took possession accord- executive and the judicial authority. The leg-
ing to general conditions of right then I can islature is taken to be sovereign as based on
have no further claim on the thing. Finally, the omnilateral will of the people and is the
the discussion of oaths effectively rules out source of all right. The citizens of the state
requirements that people be taken to believe have three attributes, they are free and can be
in religions and tends to rule against oaths as governed only by laws to which they could
a means of ensuring truthfulness. have given their consent, they are possessed
of civil equality and they are independent in
Public Right holding their preservation only to the exist-
ence of the civil condition and are thus not
Kant concludes the discussion of private dependent on the favour of any particular
right by stating a postulate of public right to persons.
the effect that since we cannot avoid living in Citizens are such by being able to vote but,
relation to others we ought to leave the state in explicating this notion, Kant distinguishes
of nature and enter a civil condition. This between active and passive citizens, including
opens the discussion of public right. The dis- under the latter heading apprentices, domes-
cussion of public right is divided into three tic servants, minors and women. The general
parts, discussing the right of a state, the right heading is meant to refer to those who need
of nations and cosmopolitan right and also another to protect and defend them (which
76
Key Works
explains even if it does not exculpate why proprietor of the land of the state, answering
Kant places women in this category). This this question in the affirmative. However, the
discussion is problematic in more than one sovereign has to thereby renounce any claim to
way as Kant’s examples of who falls under land as private property and Kant is opposed
which heading are difficult to take seriously. to hereditary status rights with regard to land
The majority of Kant’s discussion is, how- as in the claims of a landed aristocracy. In dis-
ever, focused not on the account of citizens but cussing taxes, Kant makes an argument for
on the nature of the state. The authorities that an indirect right of the sovereign to support
make the state up are compared to parts of a organizations providing for the poor. This is
syllogism and the ruler of the state is the one very far from anything like a welfare claim for
who possesses executive authority. Kant hence the poor and hence a long way from the type
distinguishes the ruler from the sovereign as of provision discussed by Rawls.20
the latter power is held by the legislature but The rights of the sovereign are also
he does also indicate that the sovereign can assessed as including distribution of offices
depose the ruler. or salaried positions, dignities or estates and
At this point, the discussion broadens into the right of punishment. The first two have
an account of the effects that follow with attracted little attention but there is quite a
regard to rights from the nature of the civil literature on punishment. The central ques-
union. The sovereign is stated to have only tion concerns whether Kant’s view of pun-
rights against his subjects and no duties that ishment is strictly retributivist. Punishment
he can be forced to fulfil. Even if the ruler is described as a categorical imperative and
proceeds in a way that is contrary to law a principle of public equality is referred to
this can only be met with complaints and as governing its operation. This principle of
not resistance. The basic point Kant seems to public equality visits on the punished the evil
be making here is that the constitution can- he wished to inflict on others but it is only
not contain a clause (as in the United States) explained in a general figurative way. For
allowing a ground for revolt and making the quantity and quality of punishment to be
revolt a kind of ‘right’ that can be claimed. determined, Kant refers to the law of retri-
The reason for this is that such a clause would bution. In the course of his discussion Kant
limit the authority of the state itself, which makes a number of intriguing points com-
would undercut the supreme authority of the paring, for example, the status of a prisoner
state and allow an alternative authority to to that of a slave since he now has to endure
be held against it. This discussion includes a forced labour for no more than his subsist-
vivid account of Kant’s opposition to the rev- ence. Kant also advocates capital punish-
olutionary trials of Charles I and Louis XVI ment for murder though with allowance for
and is part of a general argument for reform deportation if reasons of state suggest this. In
rather than revolution in relation to defective defending capital punishment, Kant replies
political set-ups. Despite this argument, Kant to the arguments of Beccaria using the claim
also rules out any legitimist revolt against a that the noumenal self of the punished person
successful revolution as well. would himself subject the phenomenal self to
After discussing the problems with claims the punishment in question. Kant concludes
of a right to revolution, Kant turns to the ques- the account of punishment with a discussion
tion of whether the sovereign is the supreme of the sovereign’s right to grant clemency.
77
KEY WORKS
78
Key Works
Ethics does not give laws for actions as right concerning duties to oneself and the second
does, but only for the maxims of actions. Ethical duties towards others. In introducing the
duties are also stated to be of wide obligation notion of duties to oneself, Kant justifies the
while those of right are narrow. After making notion by means of setting up an antinomy
these claims, Kant returns to expounding the and then resolving it. The problem concerns
ends that are duties further. The discussion of how it is possible to set up a law for oneself
perfection is now divided between an account and this is resolved by means of the distinc-
of ‘natural’ perfection and the cultivation of tion between the self as phenomenon and the
morality. Kant’s most general description of self as noumenon.
virtue is as ‘the strength of a human being’s The division of duties to oneself has two
maxims in fulfilling his duty’ (MM 394) and ways of being described. The first and most
the supreme (or universal) principle of virtue objective is in terms of the division between
consists in acting in accord with a maxim of formal and material. The formal duties are
ends that it can be a universal law for every- negative ones while the material ones are
one to have. The division of duties of virtue is positive. Another way of putting that is that
presented through two different means, firstly the formal duties concern how to main-
through the distinction of formal and material tain one’s moral health while the material
elements, and secondly through ‘internal’ and ones concern how to become more morally
‘external’ duties. The material parts of virtue healthy. But there is also a second way of
concern the ends of myself and others (per- dividing these duties between duties to one-
fection and happiness) while the formal parts self as a moral being and duties to oneself
concern the law. Duties I have to myself are as an animal being. Duties to oneself as an
‘internal’ while those to others are ‘external’. animal being were first mentioned in R and
Kant also discusses subjective conditions include self-preservation, the preservation of
for virtue, including under the heading moral the species and preservation of capacity to
feeling, conscience and respect for oneself. enjoy life. Duties to oneself as a moral being
Under the heading of moral feeling, Kant concern only the formal consistency of the
makes clear the distinction between patho- maxims of the will with one’s humanity.
logical and moral feeling while conscience is Kant begins with perfect duties to oneself
presented as the way practical reason holds and discusses firstly which duties to oneself as
the law before one. Benevolence as a form of an animal being fall under this heading. Here
practical love leads to the duty to act in ways the example of suicide that was used in G is
that are beneficent to others while respect returned to and the problem with suicide is
arises within each of us due to the connec- traced to its manner of using one’s own being
tion between personality and the moral law. as a discretionary end. However, Kant then
Virtue is based on a form of self-governing lists a series of casuistical questions, which are
and is said to presuppose ‘apathy’ meaning repeated hereafter with regard to all the duties
by this a tranquil mind that has firm resolve. discussed and which suggest cases in which
the consideration of suicide is less simple.
Duties to Oneself After the discussion of suicide, Kant con-
siders use of one’s sexual capacity with regard
The doctrine of the elements of ethics to the formulations of humanity. Here Kant
is divided into two parts, with the first considers ‘unnatural’ use of sexual capacity,
79
KEY WORKS
meaning by this masturbation which is sug- of attraction and repulsion in physics with
gested to involve a kind of surrender of one’s love drawing us together as respect keeps
personality by giving oneself over to an ani- us apart. In carrying out duties of love I put
mal use of oneself. The argument for this another under obligation to me while duties
view is less than convincing though surpris- of respect create no obligations but only ful-
ingly few have responded to it.21 The last fil them. The general practical notion of love
part of the discussion concerns gluttony and is beneficence and follows what Kant terms
drunkenness and leads Kant to discuss din- the ‘law of perfection’ that is expressed in the
ner parties and their delights. Gospel as loving your neighbour as yourself
The account of the perfect duties to one- (MM 450). Duties of love are explained as
self as a moral being is stated to be directly duties of beneficence, gratitude and sym-
opposed to the vices of lying, avarice and pathy. The duty of beneficence is what is
false humility. Lying is placed first as it per- expressed in taking others’ happiness as your
verts the medium of communication but own end and was one of the examples in G.
the discussion also foreshadows Sartre’s Gratitude is distinguished as a moral notion
account of bad faith in including an account from prudential action while sympathetic
of lying to oneself. Avarice is discussed as feeling concludes the account of duties of
undue restriction of one’s means of enjoy- love. Vices that are contrary to these duties
ment and helps to balance the account of are subsequently discussed which are envy,
masturbation in the discussion of perfect ingratitude and malice.
duties to oneself as an animal being. Servility Duties of respect are treated after duties
is argued to be problematic in lowering the of love and mutual respect is a basic demand
value of humanity in oneself. Duties to one- that arises from the conception of human-
self are further discussed in relation to one’s ity in general. Having contempt for others is
own ‘innate judge’ or conscience, which is hence a basic violation of the respect all have
here presented as the subjective principle as their due. Respect for the law is identical
of being accountable to God for all one’s with consciousness of one’s duty and failure
deeds. The imperfect duties to oneself are to fulfil duties of respect is to fall directly into
described more quickly and involve the vice. The vices that are contrary to the duty
development and increase of both natural of respect are arrogance, defamation and
and moral perfection. ridicule. Arrogance is a kind of ambition that
requires others to think less of themselves
Duties to Others in relation to us and involves contempt for
others. Defamation is the vice of spreading
Duties of virtue to others are treated mainly abroad matters that undermine others’ hon-
as duties to them merely as human beings. our and ridicule is a form of malice.
Again there are duties that are meritori- The general doctrine of elements concludes
ous and those that are simply owed as such. with an account of friendship as a union of
Feelings of love and respect are here men- love with respect. Rules of such intimacy
tioned but not as pathological feelings. The involve the need to keep certain limits of
discussion of the relationship between love it, not least by means of retaining some ele-
and respect is compared to the action of laws ments of distance from the other. However,
80
Key Works
the problems of friendship are also clear since Transcendental Imagination (Basingstoke/New
Kant discusses the need to explain faults to a York, 2006).
6
K. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind (Oxford,
friend as part of the duties of friendship. The 2
2000 [1982]).
love that is in friendship cannot, in an ideal 7
P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge
case, be pathological but must rather be prac- (Cambridge, 1987) discusses the latter but not
tical. So Kant concludes his account with a the former and R. Langton, Kantian Humility
discussion of moral friendship as an ideal and (Oxford, 1998) the former but not the latter.
8
See e.g., G. Bird, The Revolutionary Kant
distinguishes it from pragmatic friendship.
(Chicago/La Salle, IL, 2006).
The doctrine of the methods of eth- 9
This is, at any rate, in accord with I. Geiger, ‘Is
ics concludes the doctrine of virtue and is the assumption of a systematic whole of empiri-
divided into two parts, a part concerned with cal concepts a necessary condition of knowledge’,
teaching ethics and a part concerned with in Kant-Studien 94 (2003): 273–298, and P.
Abela, Kant’s Empirical Realism (Oxford, 2002),
ethical ascetics. The discussion of teaching
but it is disputed in G. Bird, The Revolutionary
ethics describes a moral catechism as the Kant (Chicago/La Salle, IL, 2006).
most essential element for beginning training 10
See L. W. Beck, ‘Does the Sage of Königsberg
and provides a fragment of such a catechism. have no dreams?’, in L. W. Beck, Essays on
Ethical ascetics, by contrast, cultivates the Hume and Kant (New Haven, 1978), pp.
38–60 ; H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental
disposition of dealing with misfortune and
Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense (New
doing without superfluous pleasures. It is Haven, 1983).
meant to be part of a regime of moral health 11
H. Paton, The Categorical Imperative
and is distinguished from ‘monkish’ ascetics. (Philadelphia, 1947).
Kant concludes the work by ruling out con-
12
See G. Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the
Philosophy of Science (Oxford, 1969) and
sideration of duties to God as lying beyond
M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences
the limits of pure moral philosophy. (Cambridge, MA, 1992).
13
See J.-F. Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of
the Sublime (Stanford, 1994).
Notes
14
See H. Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political
Philosophy (Chicago, 1982).
15
G. Banham, Kant and the Ends of Aesthetics
1
Important here also is the work of Wolfgang (New York, 2000); P. Guyer, Kant’s System
Carl. See a précis in W. Carl, ‘Kant’s first drafts of Nature and Freedom (Cambridge, 2005);
of the Deduction of the Categories’, and also R. Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology
L. W. Beck’s response ‘Two ways of reading (Cambridge, 2007); A. Nuzzo, Kant and the
Kant’s letter to Herz. Comments on Carl’, Unity of Reason (West Lafayette, 2005).
both in E. Förster (ed.), Kant’s Transcendental 16
See respectively M. Gregor, Laws of Freedom
Deductions. The Three ‘Critiques’ and the (Oxford, 1963); M. Timmons (ed.), Kant’s
‘Opus postumum’ (Stanford, 1989), pp. 3–20 Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays
and 21–26 respectively. (Oxford, 2002); and G. Banham, Kant’s Practical
2
H. Paton, Metaphysics of Experience (London, Philosophy (Basingstoke/New York, 2003).
1936), vol. 1. 17
See respectively O. Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan
3
P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge Theory of Law and Peace (Cambridge, 2006)
(Cambridge, 1987), ch. 16. and S. Byrd, J. Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of
4
P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, Right: A Commentary (Cambridge, 2010).
1966). 18
The reader is referred to A. Ripstein, Force
5
P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge and Freedom (Cambridge, MA, 2009);
(Cambridge, 1987) and G. Banham, Kant’s Byrd, Hruschka, Kant’s Doctine of Right: A
81
KEY WORKS
82
PART II:
KANT’S CONTEXTS
2
PHILOSOPHICAL AND
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
This chapter includes a selection of short Academy members. As well as Kant, some of
essays concerned with some of the impor- the other leading figures who put forward
tant ideas, theories and events which helped essays included Lessing, → Mendelssohn,
shape Kant’s life and thought. The essays and → Herder. On average, there were
are diverse in content and include histori- about 12 entries per question, although
cal events that Kant encountered (such as some questions attracted a wider number of
the French Revolution), as well as some of entries. For instance, the question from 1780
the important individuals who stood out as attracted 42 entries. Due to the difficulty of
prominent figures in his cultural and philo- some of the questions, it was necessary for
sophical milieu. The chapter conveys the the Academy to repeat the same question
extent to which Kant’s world – being almost until essays of a sufficiently high standard
entirely confined to the place of his birth, were received.
Königsberg – was illuminated by a wide and The Academy Prize attracted the atten-
varied amount of interests that ventured tion of Kant enough for him to construct
beyond the philosophical sphere in which answers to numerous questions. These were
he made his fame. With some of the entries subsequently published as EAR (1754),
a list of further reading is provided that Opt (1759), Inq (1764) and PE, which was
will enable the reader to undertake further published only posthumously in 1804. The
research. – NH/DS Academy question of 1763 was:
85
Philosophical and Historical Context
Kant only entered the 1763 essay competi- Aristotle’s logical treatises of the Organon.3
tion, which was set by the Royal Academy in Despite the closure of the Athenian schools of
the previous year. Kant’s essay did not win philosophy in 529, and with a longer period
the contest, but it did get recognized by the of continuity in the Eastern Roman Empire,
Academy. Kant received a certificate of merit Aristotelianism, especially in the wake of
for his endeavours, as well as getting his work the Carolingian Renaissance, nevertheless
published alongside Moses Mendelssohn’s remained an important force on the Western
essay, which won the prize. Kant’s essay, European continent.
published as Inq, was designed to oppose the It did so at first only on the rather slim
fundamental tenets of Christian → Wolff’s textual basis of the so-called logica vetus,
rationalist system, by claiming that the meth- consisting mainly of the Categories, de
ods of mathematics and philosophy were Interpretatione, and Porphyry’s Isagoge, an
wholly different, a theme that continued to introductory work to the former two. By vir-
resonate in Kant’s later ‘Critical’ or ‘transcen- tue of translations from Arabic and Greek and
dental’ stage of his career. – NH the dissemination of Averroes’s commentaries
from the twelfth century onwards, the whole
of the Corpus Aristotelicum entered the stage
of debates in scholastic philosophy, most
Aristotelianism notably in Paris where conflicts between, on
the one hand, the integral or neoplatonizing
Representatives of Aristotelianism claim to heterodox school of Aristotelianism and, on
be, or just de facto are, in agreement with → the other, orthodox Aristotelianism developed
Aristotle at least insofar as some of his core quickly.4
doctrines in major areas of philosophy includ- These conflicts centred around doctrines
ing his overall method are concerned, or at taken to be at odds with Christian teach-
any rate what they take those to be, which ings, such as the infinite temporal extension
are, more often than not, highly contentious. of the world, the uniqueness of the active
Aristotelianism spans more than two mille- as well as passive intellect and human free-
nia, from his immediate successors as lead- dom in relation to divine foreknowledge.
ers of the Lyceum, the school he founded in Different movements and various interpreta-
Athens, up to the present, for example in the tions of Aristotle spread, such as Averroism,
movement of virtue ethics. Commentaries Thomism and Scotism, all of which none-
on works of the Corpus Aristotelicum theless integrated Aristotelian doctrines into
emerged swiftly following its compilation larger frameworks together with a number of
in the first century BC, with Alexander of other theological and philosophical sources
Aphrodisias, Porphyry, John Philoponus and such as Augustine.
Simplicius being perhaps the most important During the Renaissance, Aristotelianism
authors, often giving a Neoplatonist tinge to benefited from the dissemination of new
Aristotle’s positions. editions of Aristotle’s original texts and
Aristotelian doctrines came into contact those of the Greek commentators. The pro-
with Christian thought in Patristic philoso- pulsive centre of Aristotle’s philosophy was
phy, not least through Boethius who trans- Italy, especially the schools of Padua and
lated into Latin and commented on (some of) Bologna. Between 1450 and 1550, Thomism,
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Philosophical and Historical Context
Averroism and Alexandrism became the three Calov, Christian Dreier, Melchior Zeidler
major Aristotelian movements. and Andreas Hedio.
Meanwhile, the religious reform- The strength of Aristotelianism was tan-
ers, in particular Luther with regard gible in particular in the field of logic: Calov
to ethics,5 expressed strong hostility to wrote a Methodologia, which is a treatise
Aristotelianism. More moderate thinkers against the philosophy of Francis → Bacon
such as Melanchthon, however, made sure and René → Descartes, whereas Zeidler pub-
that Aristotle also took centre stage in the lished a commentary on Aristotle’s Analytics
early modern Protestant universities after following Zabarella, and Hedio wrote a com-
what they considered to be a purification mentary on Aristotle’s entire Organon.
of his writings and doctrines from distor- The last important exponent of
tions by some of the medieval Scholastics. Königsberg’s Aristotelianism was Paul
At the same time, and in a similar way to Rabe.8 His works were particularly impor-
the situation in the High and Late Middle tant because they were adopted as official
Ages, individual Aristotelian doctrines were manuals of the Collegium Fridericianum and
upheld within all schools of early modern of the Albertina, i.e. at both of the institu-
Scholasticism, for example in Suárez’s con- tions at which Kant himself was educated.9
ception of metaphysics, insofar as he took All the professors at the Albertina in
it to be concerned with ens in quantum ens the first four decades of the eighteenth
(being as being).6 century were Aristotelians or well-read in
In general, both inside and outside the Aristotelian philosophy. For example, two
European universities until the seventeenth of the four professors who were very close
century, Aristotelianism,7 including also to Kant, Johann David Kypke and Georg
political Aristotelianism, particularly in Gottfried Teske, defined themselves as
Germany, remained a major factor and thus Aristotelians, while the other two profes-
constituted a crucial context for → Leibniz, sors, Karl Gottlieb Marquardt and Martin
who attempted to reconcile Aristotelian doc- Knutzen, were very erudite in Aristotelian
trines, such as that of individual forms as doctrines. During the period when Kant was
substances, with principles of mechanistic a student, Wolffianism (→ Wolff) was never
physics. → Königsberg University is a case in a dominant movement at the Albertina.
point: here Aristotelianism was present well In fact, no professor could declare himself
into the eighteenth century. truly a Wolffian and no Wolffian became
Since its foundation in 1544, Königsberg full professor in the chair of logic and
University, the Albertina, was character- metaphysics.10
ized by a strong Aristotelian tradition. The nineteenth century saw the emer-
Melanchthon’s interpretation of Aristotle gence of the Berlin Academy edition of the
dominated until the beginning of the seven- Corpus Aristotelicum, which put the schol-
teenth century, when the works of Jacopo arship and the philosophical engagement of
Zabarella and Giulio Pace became available. Aristotelianism on an unprecedented philo-
During that century, Königsberg became a logically sound footing, which has continued
stronghold of Aristotelianism, establishing to influence various schools of philosophy
itself as one of the most important schools throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
in Germany with authors such as Abraham centuries. – WE/MS
87
Philosophical and Historical Context
88
Philosophical and Historical Context
possibility’ for such judgments was required unties the relation between synthetic a priori
in order to accomplish the two tasks of CPR judgment and sensible intuitions, it can be
in one unified theory, namely, to ascertain shown that the type of judgment character-
the a priori foundations of empirical knowl- ized by Kant as synthetic a priori was in fact
edge, and to challenge the dogmatic preten- known to philosophers and logicians long
sions to knowledge that is based merely on before Kant. Synthetic a priori judgments
pure reason. According to Kant’s definitions, are judgments in which the predicate is an
a synthetic a priori judgment is a judgment attribute of the subject of judgment. The
in which the predicate is not ‘contained’ or predicate of such a judgment is a concept
‘thought’ in the subject term and also a judg- that refers to a property that is necessarily
ment that involves a relation to intuition. related to the property to which the subject
Nevertheless, according to Kant’s own term refers, although it is not a characteris-
theory, it seems that judgments could also tic of the essence of the subject. By contrast,
be characterized as synthetic a priori with- judgments in which the predicates are char-
out involving a relation to intuition, at least acteristics that are part of the essence of the
insofar as the relation ‘not being contained subject are equivalent to Kant’s analytic
or thought in’ is concerned. Moreover, it judgments. The meaning of Eberhard’s sug-
appears that this must be the case, if the pre- gestion can, for example, be understood with
tentions of knowledge that are based merely the help of the theory presented in Arnauld
on pure reason consist in synthetic a priori and Nicole’s Logic or the Art of Thinking,11
judgments. On the one hand, the critique of one of the most influential logic textbooks of
dogmatic metaphysics is based on the con- the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
tention that the condition of possibility of This and related charges were not fatal to
synthetic a priori judgments is the relation the reception of Kant’s ontology and theory
between the concepts involved in such judg- of knowledge. Nevertheless, they exposed the
ments and sensible intuitions. On the other apparent ambiguity inherent in Kant’s offi-
hand, where this kind of synthetic a priori cial formulations regarding the role of intui-
judgment is concerned, it is not possible to tions in syntheticity, as well as the difficulties
establish a relation between the a priori con- related to the possibility of accomplishing the
cepts involved in them and the relevant kind two goals of Kant’s Critical philosophy men-
of intuition. In other words, Kant holds the tioned above in one theory. As a result, phi-
view that the judgments that express the pre- losophers who were exposed to this debate
tentions to knowledge merely based on pure and were inspired by the Kantian revolution
reason are synthetic a priori, although the in metaphysics attempted to reassess the role
concepts involved in them are not and can- of intuition in the vindication of reason with-
not be related to intuitions. Yet, the generic out abandoning what they conceived to be
demand for such a relation regarding all the main tenets of the Kantian legacy. – YS
synthetic a priori judgments is essential for
the feasibility of his critique of dogmatic Further Reading
metaphysics.
These types of concern seem to underlie H. Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy
Eberhard and his allies’ response to Kant’s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
philosophy. Moreover, in their view, if one Press, 1973).
89
Philosophical and Historical Context
90
Philosophical and Historical Context
91
Philosophical and Historical Context
The dialectic of freedom and restraint for a very limited freedom that was already
encapsulated in the motto ‘argue but obey’ under threat.
shapes the German debate about the mean- Still, the question remains of how the free-
ing and limits of ‘enlightenment’, to which dom to make public use of one’s reason fits
Kant is a prominent contributor. The begin- in with the dictum ‘argue but obey’. There is
ning of this ‘reflective phase’ of the German a conceptual ambiguity about the authority
Enlightenment can be dated to the 1778 that has a legitimate claim to our obedience.
essay competition organized by the Royal Where Hamann’s criticisms strike home, in
Academy in Berlin (→ Academy prize essay) other words, is in his claim that, despite his
on a topic suggested by Frederick: ‘whether appeal to the authority of reason, Kant still
it is to the advantage of the common mass leaves intact the authority of one guardian,
of humanity to be deceived, insofar as they the guardian par excellence, namely Frederick
are led into new errors or kept within their II. The authority of the king is not supported
customary ones’.20 by reason, Hamann points out, but rather by
Kant’s, → Mendelssohn’s and Reinhold’s a large and well-disciplined army. He then
essays on the topic appeared towards the concludes that it is this external power that
end of Frederick’s rule, when Enlightenment keeps the immature in their place, and not
was on the wane as an intellectual move- their laziness or intellectual cowardice.
ment. By addressing the potential conflict One may ask to what extent this power
between intellectual and political authority, itself can be the object of critical debate. In
the German Aufklärer flesh out the tensions principle, no subject should be out of bounds
of the uneasy union of knowledge and power to rational criticism, to which, as Kant says,
of enlightened absolutism itself. Johann ‘everything must submit’ (Axii n.). Yet, if the
Georg Hamann (1730–1788), a fierce critic external authority of the king is considered
of Kant’s account of enlightenment, argues independently binding, then, despite Kant’s
that immaturity is a correlate of the absolute claim that the public use of one’s reason
guardianship of Frederick II. By conveniently should be free in ‘all matters’ (E 36), the
‘forgetting’ Frederick II, Hamann argues, authority of the king would still be placed
Kant offers a skewed diagnosis, which outside the legitimate boundaries of critical
renders the public use of reason, the remedy argument. Those who seek to make public
to immaturity, unconvincing.21 use of their reason would still have to negoti-
The fundamental issue that Hamann raises ate between two competing claims to author-
concerns the relation between authority and ity: one issuing from the king, the other from
power in Kant’s essay E. While it is true that reason.
Kant praises the motto ‘argue but obey’, he A hint of how Kant envisages the issue
does so in a historical context where even the being resolved is contained in the conclu-
limited, that is, religious, freedoms granted sion of E where he vigorously defends the
by Frederick were being rescinded and his view that man is more than a machine and
power was declining. If we add to this that should be treated in accordance with his
religious intolerance, which Kant describes dignity (E 40). Only two years before the
as the most pernicious form of all, his publication of this essay, Frederick wrote: ‘I
endorsement of Frederick’s motto acquires regard man as a clockwork machine subject
a different complexion, expressing support to the springs which drive it [. . .] [which] is
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Philosophical and Historical Context
humiliating for our pride, but unfortunately (MM 319). This principle indeed extends to
only too true.’22 – KD a power established by a successful revolu-
tion (MM 323). If a ruler acts against the law,
Further Reading ‘subjects may indeed oppose this injustice by
complaints (gravamina) but not by resistance’
J. Schmidt (ed.), What is Enlightenment? (MM 319). Even in the case of ‘the oppressive
Eighteenth Century Answers and power of a so-called tyrant [. . .] it is still in
Twentieth Century Questions (Berkeley/ the highest degree wrong of the subjects to
Los Angeles: University of California seek their right in this way’ (PP 382).
Press, 1996). It is remarkable that Kant does not hold
even the tyrannical violation of the origi-
nal contract by a ruler to be the dissolution
of the state of right, because no authority
French Revolution could possibly pronounce such a judgment.24
Necessary changes in a constitution can be
According to contemporary reports, Kant ‘carried out only through reform by the sov-
followed closely and discussed with great ereign itself, but not by the people, and there-
interest political events generally and the fore not by revolution’ (MM 322).
French Revolution and its aftermath in par- There is, of course, no logical contradic-
ticular. He responded to the Revolution tion between holding revolutions to be cat-
with great enthusiasm and remained its egorically forbidden and believing that a
staunch supporter even when this position revolution might be a step forward, indeed
was rather unpopular and might occasion a necessary step, towards the moral and
censure. In view of the great hopes he placed political destiny of humanity. Indeed, it is the
in the Revolution and the subsequent politi- central claim of Kant’s philosophy of history
cal events in France, it is striking that Kant that human progress is driven by antagonism
asserts clearly and often that revolutions are and violence. There is, however, a deep ten-
categorically forbidden. sion between these positions, especially when
The argument against revolutions, repeated both the necessity and the impermissibility of
in his published works, is simple. There can such violence are seen with great clarity. This
be no right to revolt, because revolution is the tension is evident in Kant’s writings.
destruction of the state of right. A ‘constitu- In an intriguing Reflexion, Kant suggests
tion cannot contain any article that would that the French Revolution was not, in fact,
make it possible for there to be some author- a revolution. The National Assembly repre-
ity in a state to resist the supreme commander sented the people and possessed the author-
in case he should violate the law of the con- ity to change the constitution, because Louis
stitution’ (MM 319) – an authority higher XVI himself summoned the Estates-General
than the highest authority is ‘self-contradic- and invested it with indeterminate legislative
tory’ (MM 319).23 Indeed, it is a ‘law that is authority (Refl 8055).
so holy (inviolable) that it is already a crime In the Doctrine of Right, he offers again
even to call it in doubt in a practical way [. . .] this analysis of events and claims that for this
that the presently existing legislative author- reason the ‘monarch’s sovereignty wholly dis-
ity ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin’ appeared (it was not merely suspended) and
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Philosophical and Historical Context
passed to the people’ (MM 341). But in the Göttingen, this is one of the very first reviews
same text, not many pages before, he seems of CPR, which appeared in 1781 shortly
to claim that such so-called abdications are in after the publication of the first edition. It
fact extorted from the monarch and calls such is a composite production since, although it
acts crimes (MM 320–322n.). Elsewhere, Kant was originally written by Christian Garve
speaks of revolutions that ‘nature of itself has (1742–1798), it was subsequently edited by
brought [. . .] about’ (PP 373n.), that is, situ- Johann Feder (1740–1821). Feder’s editing
ations in which ‘everything has either of itself was pretty drastic since the final published
become ripe for a complete overthrow or has version was two-thirds shorter than the orig-
been made almost ripe by peaceful means’ inal and a good portion of the published ver-
(PP 373n.). It bears emphasizing that nature sion was in the form of paragraphs inserted
here is human nature. by Feder.
A fascinating passage in the second part of The published version of the review pro-
CF (CF 79–94) seems to express well Kant’s vides an overview of the content of CPR but
personal position in relation to the French opens with a description of the argument
Revolution. He discusses a contemporary of the Transcendental Aesthetic that explic-
event that demonstrates, so he claims, the itly compares Kant’s view of sensation with
moral disposition of humanity. This event, it Berkeley’s form of idealism. This compressed
is important to emphasize, is not a political form of the review moves directly from the
act, but the ‘mode of thinking of the specta- Transcendental Aesthetic to the Amphiboly
tors’ (CF 85) in view of it. Kant writes: ‘The with only minimal discussion of most of the
revolution of a gifted people which [we] argument of the Transcendental Analytic. The
have seen unfolding in our day may succeed focus subsequently shifts to the Dialectic but
or miscarry; it may be filled with misery and expresses disbelief in Kant’s solution to the
atrocities to the point that a right-thinking problems raised there. The final paragraph
human being, were he boldly to hope to exe- repeats the accusation that Kant’s idealism,
cute it successfully the second time, would as based on an account of ‘representation’,
never resolve to make the experiment at such has failed to differentiate itself from what has
cost – this revolution, I say, nonetheless finds previously been understood as ‘idealism’.
in the hearts of all spectators (who are not The publication of this review angered
engaged in this game themselves) a wishful Kant and he replied to it in the ‘Appendix’
participation that borders closely on enthu- he wrote for P. Kant here pointed out that
siasm the very expression of which is fraught the published review, in confusing his posi-
with danger; this sympathy, therefore, can tion with that of Berkeley’s, failed to take
have no other cause than a moral predisposi- account of the point that Berkeley’s view is
tion in the human race.’ (CF 85) – IG Platonic (→ Plato) in attributing true reality
only to ideas, not to the data of the senses. By
contrast, Kant’s own view is that cognition
by means of pure reason or understanding
Garve-Feder review alone is illusory and it is only in experi-
ence that there is truth, the opposite of the
Also known as the ‘Göttingen Review’ as Berkeleyan view (P 374). Kant follows this
it was published in a journal based out of point up through reference to the argument
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Philosophical and Historical Context
in the Transcendental Aesthetic that there are Garve also expresses dissatisfaction with
a priori conditions for sensible perception, Kant’s account of practical reason and
something Berkeley does not recognize. On demotes a priori intuition to being only ‘a sen-
the basis of these points, Kant suggests that sible image of a concept of understanding’.25
his own doctrine should be termed ‘formal’ He also essentially rejects Kant’s attempt to
or ‘critical’ idealism (P 375), even, at one recast the understanding of ‘idealism’ albeit
point, retracting the term ‘transcendental not quite so harshly as in the published review.
idealism’ (P 293). It must have been evident to Kant, on reading
Kant further accuses the reviewer of Garve’s original, that the basic problems he
adopting a superior tone of alleged insight, had with the published review did apply in
an accusation he later repeats in disputes equal measure to Garve’s original, which like-
with Platonists (cf. PTS) (→ Plato). The wise did not discuss the problem of the syn-
key point that the review neglects even to thetic a priori or present its own resolution of
mention the problem of the synthetic a pri- the difficulties set out in the Antinomies.
ori is supplemented by a suggestion that if The influence of this review on both Kant
the reviewer found Kant’s solution of the himself and the general reception of the Critical
Antinomies unconvincing perhaps he might philosophy were considerable. The recast-
offer one instead. Kant concludes by asking ing of the Paralogisms chapter in the second
the reviewer to shed his anonymity (P 379). edition of CPR and the provision of the new
Garve, who knew Kant, was embarrassed Refutation of Idealism as part of the Postulates
when he read Kant’s response and revealed to are clearly responses to the review’s attack on
Kant, in a letter dated 13 July 1783 (Corr-I Kant’s idealism. The stress the review put on
328–333), that he had originally composed the role of representation in Kant’s view also
the review but added that it had been changed influenced some of Kant’s advocates, however,
out of recognition by the editor of the jour- since Karl Reinhold makes this stress key to
nal. The original form of Garve’s review his work Letters on the Kantian Philosophy.26
was subsequently published unedited. In The suggestion made by the review that Kant’s
this much longer response, Garve is explicit idealism is close to that of Berkeley has been
about translating Kant’s thoughts into more repeated many times since it was published.27
popular idiom, which also involves setting Kant’s decision to write P at all, not just
the task of the Critical philosophy in empiri- the appendix, may well have been due to his
cist terms. conception that a popular presentation of
Garve’s version still says little about either the doctrine of CPR was necessary to coun-
the deductions or the schematism but does ter that contained in the review and this need
(albeit very briefly) survey the Analogies and for a popular presentation also spurred on
the Postulates. As with the published review, the work of Reinhold.28 – GB
however, it spends much more time deal-
ing with the Dialectic and explicitly argues Further Reading
that the Fourth Paralogism does no more
than abolish the Cartesian conception of F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German
privileged access to our own consciousness Philosophy from Kant to Fichte
without proving the existence of bodies (→ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Descartes). Press, 1987), ch. 6.
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Philosophical and Historical Context
M. Kuehn, ‘Kant’s critical philosophy and Hamann and Herder represented a ‘Counter-
its reception – the first five years (1781– Enlightenment’ utterly opposed to the ration-
1786)’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge alism and secularism of Kant and the wider
Companion to Kant and Modern European → Enlightenment, with long-term
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge consequences for the rise of German right-
University Press, 2006), pp. 630–663. wing nationalism.29 While the latter move-
ment did invoke Herder along these lines,
the consensus of current scholarship is that
this was a misappropriation of Herder’s
Herder, Johann Gottfried thought, which belongs quite clearly in the
Enlightenment context. The best judgment is
A Lutheran clergyman, historian of culture, that of the nineteenth-century scholar Rudolf
aesthetic theorist, and philosophical anthro- Haym, who termed Herder ‘a Kantian of
pologist, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744– the year 1765’, that is, a disciple of the pre-
1803) was born in the East Prussian town of Critical Kant.30 In particular, this meant
Mohrungen (→ Prussia) to a family with lim- that Herder chose to pursue anthropology,
ited means. By the good offices of a medical as against philosophy, as his guiding frame-
officer in the occupying Russian army during work for understanding cultural experience.
the Seven Years War (1756–63), he came to His favourite works of Kant were Obs and,
study at the University of → Königsberg from even more, NH, but he never accepted Kant’s
1762 to 1764. There he came to the atten- ‘Critical turn’. Herder’s most important
tion, and became the favourite student, of work would seek a physiological psychology
Immanuel Kant. Herder’s notes from Kant’s linked to aesthetic form and a cultural his-
courses of this period represent some of the tory which articulated the unique expressions
earliest and most important sources we have of the various peoples primarily of Europe.
for the study of the pre-Critical Kant. Even His rubric for this was anthropology or ‘the
after Herder left the university, Kant stayed natural history of human consciousness’.
in close contact with him, sending him the After a journey to France in 1769, Herder
segments of his new book, DSS (published returned to Germany and became the friend
in 1765), as each set left the printer (→ and mentor of the young Johann Goethe
Swedenborg). Herder wrote an enthusiastic (1749–1832), and together they launched
review of the finished book as one of his ear- the Sturm und Drang movement in the early
liest publications. 1770s. Herder published two works in 1774,
While a student in Königsberg, Herder Oldest Documents of the Human Race and
befriended and came under the influence of Yet Another Philosophy of History, which
Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88), through gave vent to a brash sense of personal gen-
whom he learned English and was drawn ius characteristic of this Sturm und Drang
into aesthetic and literary criticism. Kant mood. All this alarmed Kant, who expressed
and Hamann became the two polar forces his displeasure first in correspondence with
in Herder’s intellectual development, and Hamann, and then privately in a set of harsh
a great controversy has ensued over which unpublished Reflexionen (Refl) over the course
of the two proved dominant. The noted of the later 1770s. When Herder published
scholar Isaiah Berlin has contended that On Knowledge and Feeling in the Human
96
Philosophical and Historical Context
Soul in 1778, articulating a critique of fac- his friend Goethe, who secured him a posi-
ulty psychology along lines that appeared tion there as General Superintendent of the
directly hostile to Kant’s own philosophical Lutheran clergy. Goethe sided with Herder
endeavours over the so-called ‘silent decade’ in the Pantheism Controversy, just as he had
of the 1770s, Kant’s hostility to Herder hard- been Herder’s most eager companion and
ened still further. When his CPR appeared in reader as Herder composed the Ideas. But
1781 to poor reception, Kant held Herder after an interval in Italy in the late 1780s
personally responsible for changing the intel- Goethe returned to Weimar with a different
lectual temper of German reception toward orientation, and this climaxed after 1792, in
a reckless and self-indulgent aestheticism, his new and defining friendship with the poet
as against the dry rigour that Kant believed Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), who had
essential for effective thought. become an enthusiastic Kantian.
When Herder published the first volumes Herder lost his strongest alliance and
of his masterwork, Ideas for a Philosophy became increasingly isolated and embit-
of the History of Mankind, in 1784, Kant tered. The upshot was the publication, near
took advantage of an invitation to review the end of his life, of two book-length dia-
the work to make public his distaste for tribes against Kant: first, Metacritique of
Herder’s writings. The review, appearing in the Critique of Pure Reason (1799), against
the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung in 1785, Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and then
had a wide public impact and led to far more Kalligone (1800), against Kant’s aesthetics.
overt hostilities between the two figures. In The dominant Kantian culture of the end of
subsequent volumes of his work, Herder the eighteenth century accepted the master’s
counterattacked, and in a second review, judgment that these works demonstrated
Kant continued his criticism. Their conflict that ‘unreason and deliberate deception are
widened in the context of the concurrent Herder’s trademark’ (OP-I 225). However,
‘Pantheism Controversy’, triggered by the a just balance in the appraisal of these two
revival of Spinoza’s philosophy in Germany major figures of the German Enlightenment
(→ Spinoza/Spinozism). While Herder wel- has yet to be achieved. – JZa
comed this in his God: Some Conversations
(1787), Kant sharply repudiated the revival. Further Reading
A letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–
1819) in 1789 showed Kant willing to reach J. Zammito, ‘ “Method” versus “manner”?
out even to those he did not fully respect in Kant’s critique of Herder’s Ideen in the
order to build alliances against Herder. light of the epoch of science, 1790–1820’,
One of the defenders of Herder in the in H. Adler, W. Koepke (eds), Herder
context of Kant’s reviews of the Ideas, Karl Jahrbuch/Herder Yearbook 1998
Reinhold (1757–1823), converted in 1786 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998), pp. 1–25.
to become Kant’s decisive popularizer in J. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth
Germany. As Kant became the most famous of Anthropology (Chicago/London:
and influential philosopher of the balance of University of Chicago Press, 2002).
the century, he organized his disciples actively J. Zammito, E. Menze, K. Menges, ‘Johann
in opposition to Herder. The latter had moved Gottfried Herder revisited: The revolution
to Weimar in the 1780s at the invitation of in scholarship in the last quarter century’,
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Philosophical and Historical Context
Journal of the History of Ideas 71,4 Ultimately, this insight shapes the criti-
(2010): 661–684. cal conception of our peculiar interest in or
feeling of respect for morality. But Kant was
also motivated by Hutcheson’s criticism of
Hutcheson, Francis rationalist ethics to draw his own conclusions
about the reigning, theoretically oriented
Kant mentions Hutcheson by name but sel- conception of reason. This influence eventu-
dom and only twice in his major works in ally led Kant to his original conception of the
moral philosophy. In these texts and in lec- will – a notion Hutcheson employs, but can
tures on ethics in the 1780s (G 442n.; CPrR only think of as affective – as pure practical
40; LE 253; LE-M 621; see also ID 396), he reason.33
seems to dismiss Hutcheson rather curtly as Kant’s conception of the feeling of respect
an adherent of the theory of moral sense, for the moral law is a subject of consider-
classified as a misguided attempt to offer an able controversy (CPrR 71–89). According
inner empirical grounding of morality. Yet to one interpretation, we act morally when
according to contemporary reports, Kant consciousness of the law incites a sufficiently
held Hutcheson in high esteem from the mid- strong feeling of respect. But this view seems
dle of the 1750s and recommended his works plainly to contradict the claim that reason
for intensive study.31 This interest clearly did alone is the objective determining ground of
not wane in the next decade. In the announce- moral action. Kant may well have Hutcheson
ment of his winter lectures for 1765/66, Kant in mind when he asserts that we do not act
says that his course on ethics will follow → morally if the ‘determination of the will
Baumgarten, but adds that the ‘attempts of takes place conformably with the moral law
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, although but only by means of a feeling, of whatever
incomplete and defective, have nonetheless kind, that has to be presupposed in order for
penetrated furthest in the search for the fun- the law to become a sufficient determining
damental principles of all morality’ (AL 311; ground of the will’ (CPrR 71). According
see also Inq 300). to other views, the feeling of respect either
This survey has led many to the view that necessarily accompanies moral action or is
Kant’s earlier thinking was influenced by its phenomenological effect. On both views,
Hutcheson and moral sense theories more Kant’s mature theory remains indebted to
generally, but that his mature moral philos- the insight that moral consciousness has an
ophy contains hardly a trace of these early essential affective aspect.
lessons. In a seminal paper, Dieter Henrich Yet another view holds that while the
argues against this view and indeed calls moral law is the objective determining
Hutcheson the → Hume of Kantian eth- ground of the will, it is the feeling of respect
ics.32 According to Henrich, Kant came to it evokes that is the effective force driving
believe early on that the universality and action. According to this view, Kant’s mature
categorical obligation of moral laws are sure theory of moral motivation is indebted to
evidence of the fact that their origin is rea- Hutcheson’s insight that ‘affections’ alone
son. Nevertheless, he remained indebted to can serve as ‘exciting reasons’.
Hutcheson’s insight that moral conscious- No investigation of the role of feelings in
ness has an essential affective aspect. Kant’s theory of moral agency is complete
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Philosophical and Historical Context
without examining his later and rather Since its foundation, Königsberg
neglected discussion of it (MM 399–403). University was characterized by a strong
Two points are crucial to its assessment: Aristotelian tradition. The great success of →
First, in contrast to his earlier claim that Aristotelianism was probably partly due to the
respect is the one moral feeling, Kant seems intimate relationship between the first dean,
here to name four more: ‘moral feeling, con- Georg Sabinus, and Philip Melanchthon:
science, love of one’s neighbor, and respect Sabinus was Melanchthon’s son-in-law. The
for oneself (self-esteem)’ (MM 399). Second, early Aristotelianism in Königsberg was
these feelings are neither mere accompani- therefore characterized by the Philippistic
ments of moral action nor phenomenological interpretation of → Aristotle that also
responses to it. They are necessary conditions enjoyed the esteem of the political authori-
of moral agency: ‘every human being has ties. In the seventeenth century, Königsberg
them, and it is by virtue of them that he can became a stronghold of Aristotelianism
be put under obligation’ (MM 399). and Scholasticism with important figures
What precisely are these four affective like Abraham Calov, Christian Dreier, and
conditions of moral agency, what are the sys- Melchior Zeidler. Königsberg was one of
tematic connections between them and how the first centres to introduce and comment
are they related to the feeling of respect, are on Jesuit philosophy in Germany in the first
questions that demand intensive attention. two decades of the seventeenth century, even
Also important to ask is what accounts for though Aristotelianism extended its legacy
the affective detail that colours the discus- also to the first decades of the eighteenth
sion of the system of duties in the Doctrine century.
of Virtue. Answering these questions will In Königsberg, the period from the end
allow us to assess the lasting influence of the of the seventeenth and the beginning of the
idea of moral sensibility on Kant’s theory of eighteenth century was characterized by a
moral agency. – IG number of reversals of philosophical orienta-
tion. The Albertina was a crucible of fierce
disputes among different schools.34 More in
particular, in the period from 1715 to 1740
Königsberg Aristotelianism, Eclecticism and Wolffianism
(→ Wolff) competed for the supremacy in
Königsberg, today known as Kaliningrad both theology and philosophy, during which
and part of Russia, was the capital of East → period each of these schools alternately
Prussia from the Late Middle Ages until 1945 prevailed.35
and was Kant’s birthplace. It was founded Indeed, the beginning of the eighteenth
by the Teutonic Knights around 1255 dur- century was characterized by a strong con-
ing the Northern Crusades. Due to its cru- servatism in both theology and philosophy.36
cial position on the Baltic Sea, Königsberg Aristotelianism and Protestant scholasti-
became one of the most vital cultural cen- cism were the dominant schools, which
tres of Prussia during the Renaissance. Its both rejected the modern philosophies and
main cultural institution was the University sciences such as those of → Bacon and →
Albertina, which was founded by Duke Descartes. At least until the winter semester
Albrecht I in 1554. of 1719/20, the university courses were the
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Philosophical and Historical Context
prerogative of Aristotelians such as Johann and Johann Franz Budde became a great suc-
Jakob Quandt and Johann Jakob Rohde.37 cess among academics. Aristotelianism and
From 1717, → Pietism and Wolffianism Wolffianism, headed by Jakob Quandt, coun-
became increasingly important in the aca- terattacked against Pietism, and to resolve
demic setting. In particular, Wolffianism gave the acrimonious situation the king appointed
a decisive blow to the Aristotelian move- Franz Albert Schultz, who was a Pietist and
ment since the early 1720s, becoming effec- also a student of Wolff in Halle, as mediator.43
tively part of the academic environment as However, Wolffians never regained the
is evidenced by the philosophical activity upper hand, also not when the Pietist inter-
of Johann Christian Friedrich Baumgarten, diction against Wolffian philosophy waned
Theodor Reinhard That and Johann Heinrich with the coronation of Frederick II: no pro-
Kreuschner. Some of the Königsberg pro- fessor could declare himself truly a Wolffian
fessors responded favourably to the new scholar and no Wolffian became full profes-
Wolffian publications and some instruc- sor.44 It was different with the condition of
tors were even prompted to immediately the Aristotelians, such as Kypke and Rohde,45
accept ‘the new creed as a group ideology’.38 who were marginalized by Pietism, but were
However, full professors of the philosophical not banished, and whose doctrines were
faculty like Georg Thegen and Johann David weakened towards Eclecticism.
Kypke, the latter a friend of Kant, ‘were The Enlightenment in Königsberg was
impervious to the new trend’.39 born against the background of these con-
Nevertheless, Wolffians had a brief flicts, which led to a general Eclecticism,
moment of glory between 1717 and 1723 which exercised some influence on the young
when they allied themselves with the Pietists Kant. At least until 1740, Pietists controlled
against the conservatism of the Aristotelians. Königsberg University, and even if afterwards
Evidence of this is the widespread and exten- their influence was still strong, there was an
sive use of Wolffian textbooks. The alliance increasing dissemination of Wolffian philos-
between Wolffians and Pietists lasted only ophy in the courses, through the mediation
for so long however; already in 1723 the of → Leibniz’s perspective, as the works of
affair ‘Wolff’ erupted in Halle, stirred up by Konrad G. Marquardt and Martin Knutzen
the Pietists, especially in Königsberg.40 Acting show. Both Marquardt and Knutzen were
against the Wolffians, in 1725 King William teachers of Kant during his university years.
I appointed to the theological faculty two Along with the dissemination of the
Pietist professors, Abraham Wolf and Georg Wolffian handbooks, the works of the British
Friedrich Rogall.41 In 1726, together with empiricists became more and more popular
Heinrich Lysius Rogall introduced a uni- in Königsberg, which thanks to its direct
versity reform in conformity with Pietism, contact with the British world was a hub of
against Wolffianism, which was effectively Lockeanism (→ Locke), involving important
banished until 1740, when Frederick II (→ projects of translation carried out by Knutzen
Frederick the Great) became king.42 himself and by Georg David Kypke.
The Pietist movement changed the univer- In the same period, the philosophy of
sity curricula, removed Wolffians from teach- Christian August → Crusius became very
ing posts, and favoured Eclectic philosophers. widespread in Königsberg with authors
Instead, the textbooks of Christian Thomasius such as Friedrich Johann Buck and Daniel
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Philosophical and Historical Context
Weymann, who were both opponents of Kant. works, is divided into four parts, which cor-
In the 1760s, Crusius’ philosophy prevailed respond to the four instruments of the human
as the philosophy of the Berlin Academy mind for finding truth: (1) Dianoiology, i.e.
of Sciences, which was led by Pierre-Louis the doctrine of reasoning; (2) Alethiology,
Moureau de Maupertuis, who was against i.e. the doctrine of truth; (3) Semiotics, i.e.
Wolffianism and promoted the ideas of the the doctrine of signs and meanings; (4)
French Enlightenment. – MS Phenomenology, i.e. the doctrine of appear-
ances. Dianoiology deals with the laws of
thought, which turn all common knowledge
into demonstrative knowledge. According
Lambert, Johann Heinrich to Lambert, all syllogisms can always be
reduced to geometric representations, which
Johann Lambert was born on 26 August make immediately evident whether an argu-
1728 in Mulhouse. He died of tuberculosis mentation is valid or not.
on 25 September 1777 in Berlin. In his youth, In the Alethiology, Lambert anatomizes the
he worked as secretary of Johann Rudolf human mind in order to find a priori the first
Iselin, who gave him access to his private primitive and simple concepts, which consti-
library, which contained books by philoso- tute the building blocks of knowledge and of
phers such as → Wolff, Malebranche and reality. Primitive concepts are such concepts
→ Locke, on which Lambert was taught. In as ‘will’, ‘consciousness’, ‘existence’, ‘unity’,
1756, he travelled around Europe, acting as ‘duration’, ‘succession’, ‘extension’, ‘move-
tutor for the son and the nephew of Count ment’ and ‘force’. According to Lambert, by
von Salis, and all the while meeting philoso- means of these concepts it would be possible,
phers and scientists such as Abraham Gotthelf following → Leibniz’s suggestion, to elaborate
Kästner, Pieter van Musschenbroeck, Jean Le a priori a mathesis universalis, which would
Rond d’Alembert and Charles Messier, who lie at the basis of every rigorous science such
influenced his mathematical approach to as ontology, geometry, physics, etc.
philosophy. In the Semiotics, by contrast, Lambert aims
In his first philosophical essay, the to reduce the doctrine of things to a doctrine
Criterium veritatis (1761), which was pub- of signs. This is possible because symbolic
lished posthumously in 1915, Lambert cognition is a necessary means for think-
sketched out his main philosophical idea ing in order to make clear the obscure con-
according to which the method of geometry cepts through signs. In the Phenomenology,
must be applied to philosophical investiga- Lambert explains how from the appearances
tion to ensure a solid foundation for all phil- of the world given by sensation it is possible
osophical disciplines. Lambert developed this to find the real laws of nature.
idea in Über die Methode, die Metaphysik, Thanks to the great success of the Neues
Theologie und Moral richtiger zu beweisen Organon and with the help of Leonhard →
(1762), in Methodus calculandi in logicis Euler and Johann Georg Sulzer, Lambert
(1763) and in the Neues Organon (1764), obtained a position in 1764 at the prestigious
which is his philosophical masterpiece. Berlin Academy of Sciences. In 1764, he wrote
The Neues Organon, which is directly another important work, the Anlage zur
reminiscent of → Aristotle and → Bacon’s Architectonic, which was however published
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Philosophical and Historical Context
only in 1771 in Riga with the help of Kant, refutes Lambert’s results for at least three
who valued Lambert’s logical project highly. reasons: (1) in metaphysics there cannot be
Even as late as 1800, in JL, Kant praises a complete analysis of simple concepts; (2)
Lambert as the greatest innovator in the field metaphysics proceeds by analysis, while
of logic after Aristotle (JL 21). mathematics proceeds by synthesis; (3) meta-
Lambert’s main project was to apply physical concepts are given in experience,
mathematical logic, i.e. combinatorics, while mathematical concepts are ‘arbitrary’
to metaphysics, developing further and and constructed by the human mind.
improving the failed attempts of logi- However, Kant does not dismiss Lambert’s
cians such as the brothers Bernoulli and project of an architectonic and for a meth-
Gottfried Ploucquet. It is from this particu- odology of metaphysics. In 1765, Kant
lar perspective that Kant’s relationship with announces to Lambert that he was work-
Lambert must be understood, especially in ing on a book entitled Proper Method for
connection with the pre-Critical writings Metaphysics (Corr-I 51), which however
and CPR. was never published. Nevertheless, there
In logic, Lambert’s main objective was are good reasons to believe that Kant had
to find an ars characteristica universalis, Lambert in mind when working on the parts
which could describe the ontological con- of CPR that deal with methodology and the
stitution of reality by means of the combi- ‘Architectonic’. – MS
nation of simple and fundamental concepts
(Grundbegriffe) according to their relations. Further Reading
The effectiveness of the description was
grounded in the analysis of simple concepts, A. Laywine, ‘Kant in reply to Lambert on
because every truth was based on funda- the ancestry of metaphysical concepts’,
mental concepts, whose possibility and cor- Kantian Review 5 (2001): 1–48.
rectness were immediately understood as E. Watkins (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure
true by the inner sense. Thus, Lambert con- Reason. Background Source Materials
flated Locke’s and Leibniz’s philosophical (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
approaches by integrating the fundamental 2009), ch. 6.
concepts as the structure of reality itself and
the first concepts of knowledge through
which everything can be known.
Lambert’s project was never completed. In Mendelssohn, Moses
fact, even in the Anlage zur Architectonic he
examines a number of fundamental concepts They belonged to the same generation: Kant
only in outline. He fails to demonstrate how was born in → Königsberg on 22 April 1724;
the combination of these primitive concepts Mendelssohn in Dessau on 6 September
could describe and constitute the ontological 1729. They had the same interests, as Kant
structure of reality comprehensively. confirmed to Mendelssohn in a letter dated
In the 1760s, Kant was engaged in a 7 February 1766. Dispensing with ‘fashion-
reform of metaphysics inspired by the reform able circumlocutions’, he welcomes corre-
of mathematics that Lambert had attempted. spondence between ‘two persons whose ways
However, in Inq, Kant implicitly denies and of thinking are, because of the similarity of
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Philosophical and Historical Context
their intellectual concerns and the mutuality works, he realized that their ‘basic principles
of their principles, in such agreement’ (Corr-I [did] not coincide’ (Corr-I 413).49
67–68).46 The central debates of rationalist meta-
Both Mendelssohn and Kant had physics, the immortality of the soul and
responded to the essay topic set by the Berlin the existence of God, resisted resolution.
Academy of Sciences for 1763 (→ Academy Mendelssohn’s convictions were not, there-
prize essay) on the reliability of evidence in fore, historically superseded by Kant’s critique
metaphysics: Kant’s Inq had come second of reason, even if Mendelssohn admitted that
to Mendelssohn’s prize-winning Treatise his philosophy was ‘no longer the philoso-
on Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences. Both phy of the times’.50 Rather their estrange-
exemplify the philosophical culture of the ment exposes their different relationship to
Enlightenment – Kant taking it to its logi- philosophy: Kant became a state-appointed
cal conclusion by revealing in its appar- Professor of Metaphysics; Mendelssohn kept
ently omnipotent rationalism its constitutive the accounts in Isaak Bernhard’s silk factory.
anthropomorphic limits and Mendelssohn Kant enjoyed personal security and official
representing in the life he lived ‘a kaleido- status; Mendelssohn suffered humiliation
scope of the European intellectual scene, and oppression. His secular knowledge was
Jewish and non-Jewish, in the second half of largely self-taught. While he had come to
the 18th century’.47 Berlin in 1743, he needed special royal per-
Yet, within two decades, Kant and mission, granted only in 1763, to reside per-
Mendelssohn faced each other with mutual manently in the capital. One vignette speaks
incomprehension. Kant was disappointed volumes: the students mocking and jeering at
that his correspondents in the Prussian capi- him while, in 1777 on a visit to Königsberg,
tal (→ Prussia), the centre of the German unrecognized he waited with them for Kant
Enlightenment, including Mendelssohn, to come and lecture.51
were apparently confounded by CPR, first Reluctant though he was to discuss it pub-
published in 1781, remarking to Schütz licly, Mendelssohn’s commitment to Judaism
in November 1785 that Mendelssohn’s sustained his secular activities.52 The first
Morning-Hours was ‘a masterpiece of the modern Jew, he intended to exemplify in
self-deception of our reason’, ‘this final legacy his person what the late eighteenth century
of a dogmatizing metaphysics’ (Corr-I 428– called the Jews’ capacity for ‘civic improve-
429), although its perspicacity would always ment’. Through his association with leading
test the principles of the critique of reason. German writers, especially Lessing, Abbt,
Mendelssohn, on the other hand, claimed in Nicolai and Moritz, his membership of the
a letter to Kant that his poor health prevented eminent philosophical discussion-forum the
him from engaging with CPR lest it consume Berlin Wednesday Society, his contributions
all his ‘nerve-juice’ (Corr-I 308). He was as a reviewer to prestigious literary and phil-
dismayed, as he noted in the preface to his osophical journals, and not least his writ-
Morning Hours or Lectures on the Existence ings on metaphysics, psychology, aesthetics
of God (1785),48 by Kant’s ‘total crushing’ of and political philosophy, Mendelssohn
metaphysics, and admitted in his last letter to demonstrated not just his own, pre-eminent
Kant on 16 October 1785 that, though he no intellectual stature. He was also respond-
longer had the strength to read his profound ing to a political dispensation that closely
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Philosophical and Historical Context
regulated Jews’ involvement in their secular Immortality of the Soul (1767), any appar-
environment. By showing that Jews were ently true precept indispensable for human
not inherently destined for an introverted, happiness and social well-being must for that
ghetto-bound existence, his secular achieve- reason be actually true.56 Under pressure to
ments exposed the life-chances they were justify his own metaphysical-theological posi-
losing. tion, let alone respond to Kant, he powerfully
Conversely, Mendelssohn’s works on advocated religious tolerance in Jerusalem
Judaism and Jewish philosophy like his prac- or Religious Power and Judaism (1783) and
tical support for Jewish communities sought, deduced the sufficient reason for God’s exist-
despite the disapproval of the orthodox, to ence in Morning-Hours (1785). In ‘Über die
encourage Judaism to modernize itself. He Frage: was heißt aufklären?’ (1784), mindful
focussed on a ‘purified’ Judaism based on surely of his own actual, vulnerable civic sta-
Mosaic Law and on the Pentateuch (which tus, Mendelssohn differentiates between the
he published in German translation from ‘culturally polished’ citizen and the ‘ration-
1780 to 1783). Crucially this represented ally enlightened’ human being.57
for him not only a core of religious belief Unlike Kant in E, UH and later in his cri-
Judaism ostensibly shared with Christianity tique of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem (TP 307–
(thereby disarming doctrinal prejudice) but 312), Mendelssohn58 refuses to sacrifice the
also a theological position that, like Christian living individual for the future benefit of the
faith, could be expressed in terms of rational- human species – an insight alone worthy of
ist metaphysics.53 a ‘thinker of the highest rank’.59 Conversely,
The process of secularization that the in OT Kant defended him against Jacobi’s
Enlightenment endorsed meant that human presumptuous allegations in the ‘pantheism
self-understanding would have to manage controversy’ that so distressed Mendelssohn
with ‘less truth’, with diminished meta- that they arguably hastened his death on
physical certainty.54 But, as its refutation 4 January 1786. Taking issue with Jacobi’s
of Mendelssohn’s psychological theory in zealotry, Kant cites Mendelssohn for insisting
CPR (in its second edition) shows (B413ff.), in Morning-Hours on the need for ‘healthy
Kant’s reductive method that left issues reason’ (OT 133–134) as an epistemological
such as the immortality of the soul and guide in the realm of metaphysics.60 Though
the actual existence of God undecidable Mendelssohn would have rejected deducing
did undermine Mendelssohn’s core meta- this orientating ‘rational belief’ analogically
physical principles. Mendelssohn already from geographical navigation and math-
realized this in 1781, but, unlike for exam- ematical modelling, Kant affirms the basic
ple the much younger Salomon Maimon ontological need for at least the concept of
(1753–1800) a decade later,55 he was indis- a supreme being. It was in his way a fitting
posed to critique Kant’s thinking within a tribute. – MD
Judaic context.
For Mendelssohn – as for later European- Further Reading
Jewish philosophers generally, such as
Marx, Rosenzweig, Bloch and Levinas – eth- R. Munk (ed.), Moses Mendelssohn’s
ics shapes epistemology. As Mendelssohn Metaphysics and Aesthetics (Dordrecht:
affirmed in his best-selling Phaedo or On the Springer, 2011).
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Philosophical and Historical Context
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Philosophical and Historical Context
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Philosophical and Historical Context
the centrality of the present, the concrete and concerned with the way one gives shape to,
the personal (‘one’s inner voice’), but also and improves, one’s life, in the here and now.
that he only recognized his fellow human This expressed the general wish to distance
being insofar as he would recognize himself oneself from all too theoretical or intellectu-
in the other. All experience and knowledge of alist approaches to being a Christian, which,
transcendent authority, all things heterono- as evidenced in previous ages, resulted all too
mous or external, he considered in terms of often in strife and destructive fervour among
an experience of something that is only rela- Christians. The Christian bourgeois of the
tively distinct from the human being, and so eighteenth century opposed orthodox theo-
must have a place within the purview of the logical theory as unfruitful, if not dangerous.
inner authority of the human being, to which Mere Christian doctrine does not amount to
God speaks directly. This meant the inclusion Christian faith, without it having relevance
of God in the context of sovereign human for one’s own life, without it satisfying one’s
self-consciousness and conscience, and the own personal needs. True faith means chang-
sublation of transcendence into what is expe- ing one’s life in accord with doctrine, not
rienced internally or purely inwardly. adhering to doctrine for the sake of it. It is
Individuality and inwardness thus become therefore not just critical of all the dialectical
central tenets of what it means to be a human subtleties of theological erudition, but it also
being in general. In this respect, Pietism is amounts to a positive demand for a practical
intimately connected to the emergence of employment of Christian creeds. This, how-
the Enlightenment in Germany. The devel- ever, often led to a moralistic, even utilitarian
opment of Pietism must also be seen against hollowing out of those creeds.
the background of the growing power of the The relation in the academic as well as
absolute state and the secular subjugation of public arena between the Pietists and the
the Church, or at least the more hierarchical- Wolffians (rationalists) (→ Königsberg) was
bureaucratic aspects of the Church, e.g. the often strained, and although they had very
appointment of clergymen (caesaropapism), different outlooks on life and society, this
while allowing the co-existence of various does not mean that they were always, in
religious denominations and leaving the con- all respects, working in opposite directions.
tent of one’s beliefs to each individual’s own Both were oriented to changing life practi-
conscience.61 Also the growing centrality of cally, focusing on improving one’s life by
the middle class and its sense of morality, virtue of good works that necessarily ensued
and not least the increasing status of science from faith, but the Pietists took care more of
and philosophy, played a significant role in the inward good works, whereas the ration-
the emergence of the individualism of which alist provided more for the outward ones.
Pietism is a clear religious manifestation. They were in unison, however, against any
The bourgeoisification and moralization of form of Christian quietism (though Pietists
the Christian religion meant that faith came were sometimes themselves accused of this).
to be regarded as something that must con- Furthermore, the Pietists felt only rela-
tribute to an inwardly experienceable, but no tively bound by the letter of the Bible and
less outwardly concretely observable change theological doctrine, namely only to the
in the way one conducts one’s own life, the extent that they were morally edifying. The
praxis pietatis. Christian faith was foremost moral principle of leading a good life was
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Philosophical and Historical Context
paramount in all one’s religious activities. defender of the theory of → physical influx,
Every aspect of one’s faith revolved around was a student of Schultz.
the idea of a natural, rational Christianity, Among Kant scholars, Kant is often por-
which was opposed not to revelation or even trayed as straightforwardly hostile to Pietism
mysticism and exaltation (they were consid- as he was to religious popular culture, reli-
ered perfectly compatible with a rationally gious ceremony, or ecclesiastical authority in
interpreted Christian faith), but to failing general. True, he denounced the often ‘slavish
to develop the human being, failing to sub- cast of mind’ (R 184–185n.) of the Pietists,
ject one’s creeds to the will and agency, and and their enthusiasm in their ‘fantastic’ belief
needs, of the individual, of oneself. For the of the possibility of experiencing the super-
eighteenth-century individual, nature was the sensible in terms of the supernatural as the
totality of objects that were at the disposal of cause of one’s empirical mystical experience
the will, feeling, and mind of the individual. (R 174; cf. CF 33, 57n.).64 Nevertheless, as
For the Pietist, rational Christianity likewise Allen Wood rightly observes, ‘much in Kant’s
means a Christianity that is in accord with conception of true morality and religion
the power of, and affirmed by, the human amounts to a rationally purified version of
being himself, who regards the Christian pietism’.65 It is thus not too fanciful to argue
creeds in terms of his own religious needs. that the central tenet of Pietism, the emphasis
The main centre of Pietism in → Prussia on moral autonomy and individuality, as well
was the University of Halle, where A. H. as the centrality in Pietism of morality and
Francke (1663–1727) propagated Pietistic moral life conduct, appears to have left an
ideas. It was from here that Pietism spread imprint on the young Kant so much so that,
throughout Prussia. The political importance in some more rational form, it influenced his
of Pietism increased when Frederick William mature theory of morality. – DS
I began relying on Pietists for his socio-polit-
ical reforms in opposition to the conservative Further Reading
forces in Prussia, which were allied to the
more orthodox elements within Lutheranism. R. Gawthrop, Pietism and the Making of
Francke was a fervent social activist. The Eighteenth-Century Prussia, new edition
Halleian, that is, Franckeian, variant of (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Pietism had a huge impact in Königsberg. The 2006).
Collegium Fridericianum, attended by the
young Kant, was first founded as a collegium
pietatis by Theodor Gehr in the spirit of the
Halle Anstalten.62 An important figure in the Prussia
intellectual and cultural life of Königsberg,
and from whom Kant received his ‘earliest In 1525, the Protestant Albrecht I of
religious instruction’,63 was F. A. Schultz, Brandenburg-Ansbach (1490–1568) united the
who was behind the attempt to reconcile remaining territories of the Deutschordensstaat
Pietism and Wolffianism, which was effec- into the Duchy (Herzogtum) of Prussia. This
tively banned in Königsberg between 1723 Duchy was not recognized by the Emperor of
and 1740. One of Kant’s teachers, Martin the Holy Roman Empire of which, as a conse-
Knutzen (1713–1751), himself a Pietist and quence, it would never form a part.
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Philosophical and Historical Context
Since 1657, Prussia had become entirely Kant too. The publication of R in 1793
independent from Poland and in 1701 resulted in Kant being summoned in October
the country had been turned into a king- 1794 by Wöllner, who made him promise to
dom under the former Elector Friedrich III refrain in future from publishing and lectur-
(1657–1713) of the house of Hohenzollern, ing on matters of religion.66
who in view of the lack of recognition had to Mid-eighteenth century Berlin, Prussia’s
name himself Friedrich I, King in, and not of, powerful political centre, had also devel-
Prussia. Drawing upon the combined power oped into the intellectual centre of Prussia.
of a standing army and a modern adminis- Already in 1700, Friedrich I had appointed
tration system his son Friedrich Wilhelm I the famous Gottfried Wilhelm → Leibniz
(1688–1740) expanded the territory and to establish the Berlin Academy, which sub-
wealth of the kingdom significantly. sequently was reformed by Frederick the
Prussia gained international political sig- Great in 1744 and renamed as the Académie
nificance eventually under the enlightened Royale des Sciences et Belles Lettres. From
absolute king Friedrich II (1712–1786), bet- then on, French was the institute’s language
ter known as → Frederick the Great, who of communication. Also, the king served as
considered himself to be the ‘first servant of its president in order to further the interests
the state’. Frederick the Great carried forward of the state. This is illustrated by the politi-
the reforms of his father mainly by modern- cally significant topic of 1777’s essay contest
izing the legal system of the Prussian state. (→ Academy prize essay), which the king
He abolished torture and also introduced a himself had proclaimed: ‘Does it serve any
relative freedom of the press. purpose to deceive the people?’67
An essential element of the new atmosphere The Prussian educational system reached
that Frederick the Great created in Prussia its peak with the foundation of the Berlin
was his tolerance towards other religions. University in 1809, soon to become the
Judaism, however, was more or less excluded standard for the reformation of German
from this tolerance. Consequently, under the universities into institutions offering both
reign of Frederick the Great Prussia attracted teaching and research programmes. Prussia’s
many emigrants from all over Europe and most important universities were those of
served as an asylum for French Huguenots Halle and → Königsberg. The main assign-
too. The flood of emigrants had an impor- ment of the first was to educate the future
tant positive influence on the enlightened civil servants of the state. The University
intellectual climate in Prussia as well as on of Halle enjoyed an excellent reputation
the state’s economic growth and prosperity. for its modern law school with among its
Many of Europe’s leading philosophers and staff Christian Thomasius and Christian →
scientists spent some time in Berlin. Wolff. Early in the eighteenth century August
Another positive factor was the freedom of Hermann Francke had established in Halle
the press introduced by Frederick the Great, a revolutionary new educational institution
even though it became temporarily restricted for educating both boys and girls, called the
in 1788 as a consequence of the religious Franckesche Stiftungen.
edict from the new Justice Minister Johann The University of Königsberg, on the
Christoph Wöllner, which lasted – albeit in other hand, was one of the first Protestant,
different forms – until 1797 and affected i.e. Lutheran universities in Europe, founded
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Philosophical and Historical Context
110
Philosophical and Historical Context
features of Being transcending the categories account of ens inquantum ens. Given Luther’s
in that they can be found in each category, own outspoken hostility towards Aristotle,
and the relationship between Being and mate- this came about as a rather surprising devel-
riality. Reflecting tensions between Thomist opment, bringing the Lutherans more or
and Scotist paradigms, the question of the less in line with the Scotist and Suárezian
analogy vs. the univocity of Being received tradition.
broad attention as well as the question as to A particularly interesting philosopher in
how the object of metaphysics is different this respect is Abraham Calov (1612–86)
from that of logic. Further important rep- who introduced Suárez’s metaphysics in
resentatives of seventeenth century Catholic Königsberg, and who in many ways held
school philosophy as a whole are Hirnhaim, views similar to those of Suárez on a number
Babenstuber, Sannig, and Magni. of important metaphysical issues. Moreover,
Calvinist school philosophy73 underwent Calov developed philosophical approaches,
significant Western European influences, in which, in the opinion of some commentators
particular of French and Dutch provenance, at least,75 are a precursor of sorts to Kant’s
with Petrus Ramus (1515–72) dominating in Critical method, for example gnostology and
the first half, and → Descartes in the second noology. These relate to Aristotle’s distinction
half of the seventeenth century. A further between the first and second operation of the
trait of Calvinist school philosophy was its intellect and try to account for foundational
encyclopedic tendency, which exemplified the concepts and principles respectively. Other
consolidating nature of German school phi- important Lutherans include Scheibler, J. and
losophy in an almost paradigmatic manner. C. Martini as well as Scherzer.
With the Ramist conceptions of methodology With regard to the eighteenth century,76
and completeness being crucial, metaphysics the distinctions according to confessions
– in the sense of examining Being as Being remained very much in place. That said,
– did not play the role of a foundational controversies between, on the one hand, a
discipline. When it came to metaphysics, it rationalist strand with thinkers such as →
was, overall, conceived of rather in terms Wolff and → Baumgarten (who as an author
of a Christian Neoplatonism (in marked of important textbooks for example in meta-
contrast to the Jesuit, as it were, ontologi- physics and ethics must perhaps be consid-
cal approach) and hence basically as natural ered the author of reference for Kant77) and
theology. Representatives of Calvinist School an anti-rationalist strand such as Thomasius,
Philosophy are e.g. Goclenius, Keckermann, Rüdiger, and → Crusius, on the other,78 were
Timpler, Alsted, and Clauberg. running through German school philoso-
Conflicts about the relation between phi- phy of the eighteenth century as a whole,
losophy and theology notwithstanding – as sometimes even occurring within these sub-
evidenced by attempts at establishing a so- divisions themselves, for example within the
called ‘Christosophia’, based ultimately on Lutheran tradition. Again, it is tempting to
revelation – it was the Lutheran German gloss over many, often subtle differences,
school philosophers74 of the seventeenth but it would certainly be a mistake to regard
century who returned to the ontological all rationalists, e.g. Baumgarten, simply as
conception of Aristotelian metaphysics as a Wolffians and construe too close an associa-
foundational discipline, with its focus on an tion between the non- or anti-rationalists and
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Philosophical and Historical Context
more downright religious movements, such to the entire realm of the practical. Further
as → Pietism. Moreover, older traditions, tensions were caused by the fact that lawyers,
such as Eclecticism and → Aristotelianism,79 theologians and philosophers in many cases
the latter particularly at Königsberg univer- claimed to be in charge of basically the same
sity, continued to play an important role. In issues, for example the doctrine of practical
any event, however, this conflict obviously natural law.80
foreshadowed Kantian themes insofar as the In the eighteenth century debates, a
anti-rationalists denied what the rationalists number of crucial controversies also deserve
maintained, namely the possibility of tran- close attention as a context for understanding
scendent metaphysical knowledge. Here, to the development and the structure of Kant’s
be sure, remnants of an earlier conflict came moral philosophy. One of those controver-
into play too, namely that between different sies concerned the status and nature of the
conceptions of metaphysics, i.e. metaphys- will and their implications for normative the-
ics as an all-encompassing and foundational ory. It is fair to say that here too, traditional
ontology, on the one hand, and as an essen- Thomist and Scotist strategies were in a sense
tially transcendent discipline covering a very re-run, for example in Wolff’s intellectualism
special realm of entities, on the other. and Crusius’s voluntarism, with the latter
While it would certainly be an exaggera- putting particular importance on the freedom
tion to regard the emergence of Kant’s Critical of the will as a foundational notion. While
philosophy entirely as an internal affair of this clearly resonates in Kant’s own thought,
German school philosophy, the influence other ideas, such as Baumgarten’s emphasis
from outside the school tradition altogether, on obligation as the core concept of morality,
such as from → Hume, may sometimes be are obviously also pertinent81 – depending, of
similarly overstated. course, on how we wish to understand Kant’s
As far as practical philosophy – in particu- approach in the first place. – WE
lar ethics – is concerned, seventeenth century
debates were characterized by the tensions
emerging from a predominantly secular out-
look adopted especially in the Aristotelian Smith, Adam
(and Stoic) sources, on the one hand, and
the radical nature of some of the Christian Kant’s interest in the Scottish moral sense
demands with regard to a proper conduct philosophers is well-known. Kant famously
of human life altogether, on the other. These says that David → Hume woke him from his
demands had been re-emphasized by the ‘dogmatic slumber’ and quotes him often. He
Reformers after basically the same issue had also pays tribute at various points to Francis
created similar frictions in academic circles → Hutcheson, identifying him at one point
of the High and late Middle Ages. Suggested in CPrR as the prime representative of the
solutions included a division of labour moral sentimentalist school (CPrR 40). So
between those approaches with regard to it is unsurprising to find that Kant also read
the civic, or external, dimension of conduct and respected the third central Scottish moral
and the inner, as it were ‘spiritual’ life respec- sense philosopher, Adam Smith, Hutcheson’s
tively, while others insisted that Christian student and successor, and one of Hume’s
principles must be applied comprehensively closest friends. Smith’s name rarely appears
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Philosophical and Historical Context
in the main body of Kant’s work, however, by reading the whole book himself. Whether
and perhaps for that reason there was until or not he read through the book, Kant does
recently far less discussion of Kant’s rela- seem to have been one of the first major fig-
tionship to Smith than of his relationship to ures in Germany to take an interest in WN.
Hume or Hutcheson. He also quotes from the book in his anthro-
Kant seems to have first read Smith’s pology lectures of 1785, a point at which it
Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) shortly was not widely known in Germany.83
after it was first translated into German by Aside from these explicit references to
Christian Rautenberg, in 1770. In a 1771 Smith, there are arguably a whole series of
letter to Kant, Marcus → Herz writes that allusions to him scattered throughout Kant’s
he has heard that ‘the Englishman Smith’ work. G discusses the advantages of the
is Kant’s ‘favorite’ (Corr-I 126) among the ‘division of labor’ in its preface, refers at
Scottish moral sense theorists, and Kant another point to a ‘rational impartial specta-
makes reference to ‘sympathy’ and the tor,’ and includes a brief but informed dis-
‘impartial spectator’ as alternative founda- cussion of prices (G 388; 393; 434–435). In
tions for moral judgment – thus, presumably, UH, written at more or less the same time as
contrasting Hume with Smith – in an unpub- G, Kant maintains that restrictions on trade
lished note that may have been written as will impede economic growth (UH 27), and
early as the fall of 1770. Later in the 1770s, suggests a sort of ‘invisible hand’ picture of
Kant’s unpublished reflections include one the workings of history, according to which
lamenting the fact that no German writers gains in freedom and well-being come about
have treated human moral consciousness by way of natural processes rather than the
with the insight that Smith shows, and one conscious efforts of human beings. A simi-
that asks of ‘Smith’s system’ why ‘the impar- lar view of history and endorsement of the
tial judge’ (a phrase Smith sometimes uses as importance of freedom to economic growth
a synonym for ‘impartial spectator’) would appear in CBH, from 1786, which in addi-
take an interest in the well-being of oth- tion contains a version of the stadial theory
ers. Yet another such reflection employs the of economic development associated with
notion of the impartial spectator to clarify Smith and his student John Millar.
the theory of taste. To observe an object from Later, in PP, Kant makes remarks on
the point of view of the impartial spectator, national debt that look like they may have
Kant suggests, is the same thing as observing come from WN, and endorses a position sim-
it from a communal point of view.82 So Kant ilar to Smith’s on the separation of church
clearly read Smith’s TMS. and state in MM. In CF the division of
That he read Smith’s Wealth of Nations labour re-appears, as an extended metaphor
(WN) is in one sense easier to show. He for how universities ought to be run.84
quotes from the book in two of his published Exactly what to make of these remarks
works, viz. at MM 289 and Anthr 209. But and allusions is hard to say. Some contem-
the passages Kant quotes are relatively dull porary philosophers have suggested that
ones (on the nature of money, and on sump- Smith’s impartial spectator procedure for
tuary laws), and he may have gotten one moral judgment is closer to Kant’s eth-
of them from a review of the book in the ical system than any other position among
Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen, rather than the moral sentimentalists.85 Some also see
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Philosophical and Historical Context
anticipations of Kant in Smith’s concep- opposition to it, shaped much of his later
tion of, and support for, political liberty.86 philosophy.
It is not easy to say whether Kant, if he Prior to 1785, Spinoza’s philosophy was
is responding to Smith in these respects, castigated as atheism, materialism and fatal-
means simply to endorse his views or in ism by most in the intellectual mainstream.
part to criticize them. Kant clearly does For over 100 years, Spinoza’s texts had been
favour a large role for the free market in banned and ostentatiously refuted in the
economics, but he also thinks governments universities, while simultaneously being cir-
should make provisions for the poor. This is culated and celebrated amongst anti-estab-
not dissimilar, however, to the view of pol- lishment thinkers. The reasons for this were
itical economy most scholars today attrib- Spinoza’s political and religious radicalism,
ute to Smith. Kant’s categorical imperative expressed most powerfully in the Tractatus
can be read as an a priori replacement for Theologico-Politicus (1670) and the seem-
Smith’s impartial spectator procedure, and ingly atheistic metaphysics underpinning it,
the absolute, a priori value he assigns to set out in his major work the Ethics.
humanity could be similarly read as a cri- Spinoza argues that all being is a single,
tique of Smith’s attempt to establish value infinite substance that is ‘God or nature’.
on an entirely empirical basis. Recognizing no ontological distinction
But again, versions of these thoughts can between God and the universe, Spinoza
plausibly be seen in Smith’s own work. It is denies transcendence, divine creation, teleol-
hard to say with any great precision how ogy, contingency, and free will, arguing that
Kant saw his own writings in relation to God is ‘the immanent cause of all things’
Smith: he does not explicitly discuss Smith which follow necessarily from his nature.
in any extended way. Instead, we have hints Human beings are finite modes, or proper-
and allusions – enough for a fascinating ties, of God, and are wholly determined by
series of speculations about the influence of him. Rejecting the God of theism, Spinoza
the great eighteenth-century Scottish theo- argues for the illusoriness of organized reli-
rist of freedom on the Prussian one, but per- gion, advocating a route to true knowledge
haps not for any definitive account of that of God through rational understanding of
relationship. – SF nature. He similarly seeks to reveal the imag-
inary foundations of contemporary politics
and to defend democracy and tolerance on
rational grounds.
Spinoza, Benedictus (Baruch) de; His critiques of established power struc-
SPINOZISM tures, founded on an apparently atheistic or
pantheistic metaphysics, led his work to being
Kant probably never read Spinoza directly, suppressed by the authorities and admired by
but the latter was nevertheless a significant freethinkers. So dangerous was his thought
influence on his thought due to the variants considered to be, that a published denuncia-
of Spinozism that rose to popularity follow- tion of Spinoza was virtually a requirement
ing the ‘pantheism controversy’ of the 1780s. of taking up an academic post in the early
From that time onwards, Spinoza’s became eighteenth century (that of Christian → Wolff
the rival position that, through Kant’s being particularly influential).
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Philosophical and Historical Context
The view that Spinoza’s philosophy is Naturphilosophie, suggesting that his natu-
atheistic, fatalistic, dogmatic metaphys- ralistic pantheism was compatible with the
ics finds expression in some of Kant’s lec- Christian world-view. Herder argued that
ture courses and pre-Critical essays. In Spinoza’s God was the organic force imma-
these remarks, Kant dismisses Spinozism as nent to all natural beings that organized them
absurd ‘enthusiasm’ rendered harmless by providentially and teleologically, thereby rec-
transcendental critique. What Kant did not onciling faith with natural science.
foresee, in 1781, was the surge of interest Herder’s was the variant of Spinozism to
in Spinoza that would follow the publica- which Kant was most vehemently opposed.
tion, in 1785, of Friedrich Jacobi’s Über die Kant and Herder had a philosophical prob-
Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn lem in common: how could nature be fully
Moses Mendelssohn. This book, which set determined through natural laws, while also
off the ‘pantheism controversy’ of the mid- displaying purposiveness in its organiza-
1780s, reinstated Spinoza as an intellectually tion? Herder’s response was to argue that
respectable philosopher, while strongly criti- God directs nature from within, according to
cizing his rationalism. For Jacobi, Spinoza’s a wise plan. ‘Spinozism’ came to name the
atheism proves that rationalist philosophy – view that nature was caused and directed by
including Kant’s – cannot be made consist- divine intelligence within it, a view that Kant
ent with faith. Without faith, Jacobi thinks, found dogmatic and incoherent.
philosophy falls into one of two traps: either Kant argued that the idea of God could be
Spinozism, affirming rational knowledge of conceived only as an intelligent creator sepa-
a single absolute and necessary substance, or rate from nature, and that nature’s purposive-
nihilism, denying our knowledge of the abso- ness was a function not of nature’s power, but
lute. Either way, as he saw it, God, freedom, of our power of judgment. These are the key
and morality were lost. arguments of the second half of CJ, impor-
Kant responded in OT, stressing that tant not only for solving the problem of pur-
transcendental idealism limits reason and posiveness, but moreover for harmonizing
upholds both freedom and faith, thereby Kant’s systems of nature and morality. Kant’s
distancing himself from both Spinoza and defence against Spinozism is therefore crucial
Jacobi. Yet the popularity of Jacobi’s book to the success of the Critique of Teleological
and the turn to Spinoza amongst younger Judgment and to that of CJ as a whole.
scholars led Kant increasingly to see Spinoza In §§72–73 of CJ, we find Kant’s most
as a rival and a threat. In Kant’s later texts, explicit refutation of Spinoza. Though
Spinoza takes on the role of the dogmatic ostensibly a diagnosis of Spinoza’s failure
enemy previously played by → Leibniz; yet it to account for purposiveness in nature,
is not the historical Spinoza with which Kant it is clear that Kant’s real objection is to
takes issue so much as his late-eighteenth Spinoza’s doctrine of immanent causality.
century adherents. Kant contends that this does not explain
Whereas Jacobi took Spinoza to be para- causality at all, but only the inherence of
digmatic of the exaltation of reason over accidents in substance. Spinoza’s substance
faith, others saw in his thought the poten- lacks intentional causality, intelligence, and
tial to heal the rift. Thinkers such as J. G. → contingency, meaning for Kant that it can-
Herder sought to rehabilitate Spinoza through not explain the idea of purposiveness. Yet
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Philosophical and Historical Context
the real issue for Kant is Spinoza’s denial Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University
of the idea of God as intentional, external, Press, 2000), pp. 54–77.
and transcendent to creation, for Kant relies B. Lord, Kant and Spinozism:
on this idea to reconcile natural determin- Transcendental Idealism and Immanence
ism with purposiveness. Kant’s aim here is from Jacobi to Deleuze (Basingstoke/New
to show that Spinoza’s anti-theism is unten- York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
able, because, he suggests, the idea of the
transcendent God is closely related to the
purposiveness that is the principle of reflec- Notes
tive judgment (§§76–77). Furthermore, only
the idea of a transcendent God can ground 1
Königliche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
our conception of nature as an arena suit- Berlin / Académie royale des sciences et belles-
lettres de Prusse.
able for moral action. The ‘special charac- 2
As quoted in ‘Introductions to the translations’
ter of the human understanding’ (CJ 405) in CE 1, p. lxii.
effectively rules out the notion of Spinoza’s 3
See S. Ebbesen, ‘The Aristotelian commenta-
God. tor’, in J. Marenbon (ed.), The Cambridge
Kant’s insistence, contra the Spinozists, Companion to Boethius (Cambridge, 2009),
pp. 34–55.
that the idea of God includes transcend- 4
See F. van Steenberghen, La philosophie au
ence and externality, is also a feature of his XIIIe siècle, second edition (Louvain/Paris,
final writings in OP. Kant refers frequently 1991), pp. 272, 359.
and puzzlingly to Spinoza in this text, some- 5
See S. Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250–1550.
times appearing to align Spinoza with his An Intellectual and Religious History of Late
Medieval and Reformation Europe (New
own transcendental idealism. Though there
Haven, 1980), pp. 231–239.
is no critical consensus on these passages, it 6
See his Disputationes Metaphysicae I.
seems likely that they reflect the influence of 7
See A. Speer, G. Frank, Der Aristotelismus
Spinoza on Schelling and the development in der frühen Neuzeit – Kontinuität oder
of idealism in the early 1800s. In this late Wiederaneignung (Wiesbaden, 2007), pp. 9–16.
8
Rabe is the author of important textbooks
period, Kant continued to see Spinozism as
such as Dialectica et analytica: scientiarum
a rival position to his own, and continued to biga utilissima; Commentarius in librum
object to it as a naturalist philosophy that categoriarum Aristotelis sive primitiae profes-
leaves no room for God or morality. – BL sionis logico-metaphysicae; Cursus philosophi-
cus; and Methodologia nova atque scientifica
sive tractatus de ordine genuino.
Further Reading 9
See M. Sgarbi, ‘Metaphysics in Königsberg
prior to Kant (1703–1770)’, /Trans/Form/
F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason. German Ação/ 33 (2010): 31–64.
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte 10
See M. Sgarbi, La Kritik der reinen Vernunft
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University nel contesto della tradizione logica aristotelica
(Hildesheim, 2010).
Press, 1987), chs 2 and 3. 11
Antoine Arnauld & Pierre Nicole, Logic or the
J. Edwards, ‘Spinozism, freedom, and Art of Thinking, ed. J. V. Buroker (Cambridge,
transcendental dynamics in Kant’s final 1996).
system of transcendental idealism’, in 12
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
S. Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant’s Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford,
1975), 2.1.2, p. 104; hereafter ECHU.
Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and
116
Philosophical and Historical Context
13
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human 32
D. Henrich, ‘Hutcheson und Kant’, Kant-
Understanding, ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford, Studien 49 (1957/1958): 49–69.
1999), 2.5; hereafter EHU. 33
It is worth emphasizing that Henrich’s paper
14
E.g. A854=B882 and LM 761ff. is based almost exclusively on an analysis of
15
E.g. A471=B499, A854=B882, and LM 763. posthumously published Reflexionen (Refl)
16
LM 232, LM-M/V 763, LM 542, and and remarks (Obs-R); Hutcheson is mentioned
LM-M/V 950. by name in these only once (Refl 6634).
17
See LM-M/V 763 and A854–855=B882–883. 34
See G. Tonelli, ‘Conditions in Königsberg and
18
F. D. Preuss (ed.), Oeuvres de Frédéric le Grand the making of Kant’s philosophy’, in A. J.
(Berlin, 1854), vol. X, p. 415. Bucher et al. (eds), Bewusst-sein (Bonn, 1975),
19
L. W. Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant pp. 126–127.
and his Predecessors (Bristol, 1996), p. 10. 35
See M. Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel
20
See W. Krauss, Studien zur deutschen und Kant precritico. L’ambiente intellettuale di
französischen Aufklärung (Berlin, 1963), p. 69. Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia
21
J. G. Hamann, ‘Metacritique on the Purism of kantiana (Frankfurt, 2010), pp. 84–91.
Reason’, trans. K. Haynes, in J. Schmidt (ed.), 36
See R. Pozzo, ‘Aristotelismus und Eklektik in
What is Enlightenment? (Berkeley/Los Angeles, Königsberg’, in H. Marti, M. Komorowski (eds),
1996), p. 166. Die Universität Königsberg in frühen Neuzeit
22
F. D. Preuss (ed.), Oeuvres de Frédéric le (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna, 2008), pp. 175–178.
Grand, vol. XXV, p. 226. 37
See G. Tonelli, The Critique of Pure Reason
23
See also TP 299–303, PP 381–383; cf. Refl 8043. within the Tradition of Modern Logic
24
See TP 299–300; cf. Refl 8051. (Hildesheim, 1994); cf. M. Sgarbi, La Kritik der
25
C. Garve, ‘review of Critique of Pure Reason’, reinen Vernunft nel contesto della tradizione
in B. Sassen (ed.), Kant’s Early Critics: logica aristotelica (Hildesheim, 2010).
The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical 38
G. Tonelli, ‘Conditions in Königsberg’, p. 132.
Philosophy (Cambridge, 2000), p. 75. 39
Ibid.
26
See K. Ameriks, Kant and the Fate of 40
See A. Ritschl, Geschichte des Pietismus (Bonn,
Autonomy (Cambridge, 2000), for a lengthy 1844), vol. II, p. 290.
discussion of the effect of this characterization. 41
See E. Riedesel, Pietismus und Orthodoxie in
27
See F. Beiser, German Idealism: the Struggle Ostpreußen. Auf Grund des Briefwechsels G. F.
against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 (Cambridge, Rogalls und F. A. Schultz’ mit den Halleschen
2002), ch. 5. Pietisten (Königsberg, 1937), p. 30.
28
See further the essay ‘First Responses to the 42
See G. von Selle, Geschichte der Albertus-
Critique of Pure Reason: the 1780s and Later’, this Universität zu Königsberg in Preußen
volume. (Würzburg, 1956), pp. 139–140.
29
I. Berlin, ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, in I. Berlin, 43
See J. J. Fehr, ‘Ein wunderlicher nexus rerum’.
Against the Current (Harmondsworth, 1979), Aufklärung und Pietismus in Königsberg unter
1–24. See also I. Berlin, ‘Herder and the Franz Albert Schultz (Hildesheim, 2005).
Enlightenment’, in I. Berlin, The Proper Study 44
See R. Pozzo, ‘Aristotelismus und Eklektik in
of Mankind, ed. H. Hardy, R. Hausheer (New Königsberg’, in H. Marti, M. Komorowski
York, 1998), pp. 359–434. (eds), Die Universität Königsberg in der frühen
30
R. Haym, Herder nach seinem Leben und Neuzeit (Cologne, 2008), p. 182.
seinen Werken, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1877/1885). 45
See W. Stark, ‘Wo lehrte Kant? Recherchen
31
Lessing’s translation of A System of Moral zu Kants Wohnungen’, in J. Kohnen (ed.),
Philosophy (1755) was published in 1756; Königsberg. Beiträge zu einem besonderen
Kant owned 1760 and 1762 translations of Kapitel der deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18.
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 1994), p. 88.
Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on 46
Kant’s word for ‘agree’, einstimmig, connotes
the Moral Sense (1728) and of An Inquiry into ‘speaking with one voice’.
the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; 47
A. Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn. A
In Two Treatises (1725). Biographical Study (London, 1973), p. xiii.
117
Philosophical and Historical Context
48
Moses Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden oder 62
M. Kuehn, Kant. A Biography (Cambridge,
Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes, in 2001), p. 36.
Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe, 63
M. Kuehn, Kant. A Biography, p. 37.
ed. F. Bamberger et al. (Stuttgart, 1971ff.), 64
See further especially Kant’s extremely
vol. III.2, pp. 1–175, here p. 3; hereafter JA, interesting account of the metaphysical
followed by volume and page numbers. antinomies that mystical theories of moral
49
See M. L. Davies, Marcus Herz and the End of regeneration lead to at CF 53–60. Kant
the Enlightenment (Detroit, 1995), pp. 36–38. acknowledged the rational nature of the
50
Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden, JA, III.2, p. 4. ‘problem’ that Pietists threw ‘in the path of
51
Mendelssohn, Morgenstunden oder the orthodox’, namely how ‘to make us other
Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes. Der human beings’ rather than ‘merely better
Briefwechsel Mendelssohn – Kant, ed. human beings’, but he criticized the ‘mysti-
D. Bourel (Stuttgart, 1979), pp. 252–253. cal’ nature of their solution for a ‘moral
52
Mendelssohn, Schreiben an den Herrn metamorphosis’.
Diakonus Lavater (1770), JA, VII, p. 8. 65
A. Wood, ‘Introduction’, I. Kant, Religion and
53
Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder über religiöse Rational Theology (Cambridge, 2001) (CE 6),
Macht und Judentum, JA, VIII, pp. 156ff., p. xii. Cf. J. Hare, The Moral Gap. Kantian
164–166, 191ff. Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance
54
H. Blumenberg, Säkularisierung und (Oxford, 1997), pp. 48–60. See Kuehn, Kant.
Selbstbehauptung (Frankfurt a/M, 1974), p. 239. A Biography, pp. 40ff. for a more pessimistic
55
See for more on Maimon the essay ‘First evaluation of the influence of Pietism on the
Responses to the Critique of Pure Reason: the mature Kant.
1780s and Later’, this volume. 66
See Kant’s letter to king Frederick William II
56
Mendelssohn, Phädon oder über die of 12 October 1794 (Corr-II 527–530). On the
Unsterblichkeit der Seele, JA, III.1, p. 88. edict see U. Wiggermann, Woellner und das
57
Mendelssohn, ‘Über die Frage: was heißt auf Religionsedikt: Kirchenpolitik und kirch-
klären?’, JA, VI.1, pp. 117–118. liche Wirklichkeit im Preußen des späten 18.
58
Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder über religiöse Jahrhunderts (Tübingen, 2010).
Macht und Judentum, JA, VIII, pp. 163–164. 67
An edition of the prize question has
59
N. Hinske, ‘Das stillschweigende Gespräch: recently been published in Nützt es dem
Mendelssohn und Kant’, in M. Albrecht, E. J. Volke, betrogen zu werden? Est-it utile au
Engel, N. Hinske (eds), Moses Mendelssohn peuple d’être trompé? Die Preisfrage der
und die Kreise seiner Wirksamkeit (Tübingen, Preußischen Akademie für 1780, ed. H. Adler
1994), p. 155. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2007).
60
See also Kant’s letter to Schütz from November 68
Cf. M. Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (Cambridge,
1785 (Corr-I 428–429). 2001), 154ff.
61
This forms the background of the notorious 69
With regard to seventeenth century German
religious edicts by J. C. Wöllner (1732–1800) school philosophy, this article is based on the
under Frederick William II, in which Kant most comprehensive account of it available,
also became embroiled in the 1790s, which namely H. Holzhey, W. Schmidt-Biggemann
were often regarded as a demonstration of (eds), in cooperation with V. Mudroch, Die
a conservative censure of Enlightenment but Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 4, Das
were arguably more intended to counteract Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation.
the proliferating anarchy of often quite radi- Nord- und Ostmitteleuropa (2 vols) (Basel,
cally heterodox religious opinions and beliefs 2001), vol. 1, pp. 291–606, esp. the con-
among both the Lutheran laity and clergy. cise outline in Walter Sparn, ‘Einleitung’, in
See the excellent account of the history of Holzhey, Schmidt-Biggemann (2001), pp.
Wöllner’s policies and Kant’s relation to it, 293–295. With regard to university history, see
B. Stangneth, ‘Introduction’ to I. Kant, Religion N. Hammerstein, ‘Die Universitäten. Geschichte
innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft und Struktur’, in Holzhey, Schmidt-Biggemann
(Hamburg, 2003), pp. xvii–lix. (2001), pp. 295–302.
118
Philosophical and Historical Context
70
See P. R. Blum et al., ‘Die Schulphilosophie Kant-Studien 82,3 (1991): 249–269, which
in den katholischen Territorien’, in Holzhey, is the first article-length treatment of the
Schmidt-Biggemann (2001), pp. 302–391. relationship between the two figures since A.
71
See Blum, pp. 313–330. Oncken, Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant
72
See the account in Blum, pp. 325–330. (Leipzig, 1877). The Reflexionen had not been
73
See Schmidt-Biggemann, ‘Die Schulphilosophie published when Oncken wrote, however, so
in den reformierten Territorien’, in Holzhey, the hard evidence for Smith’s influence on
Schmidt-Biggemann (2001), pp. 392–474, esp. Kant was limited to the Herz letter. This made
p. 395. it necessary for Oncken to treat the possibility
74
See W. Sparn, ‘Die Schulphilosophie in that Smith influenced Kant as a mere specula-
den lutherischen Territorien’, in Holzhey, tion. Subsequent scholars – e.g. W. Eckstein, in
Schmidt-Biggemann (2001), pp. 475–606, esp. his introduction to his 1926 German transla-
pp. 487–493. tion of TMS, and D. Raphael and A. Macfie,
75
See e.g. M. Sgarbi, Logica e metafisica nel in their introduction to their 1976 edition of
Kant precritico. L’ambiente intellettuale di TMS – followed Oncken, and were therefore
Königsberg e la formazione della filosofia kan- also hesitant to make any strong claims about
tiana (Frankfurt a/M, 2010), pp. 57–64. Smith’s importance to Kant. We can be con-
76
See, for the following as well, W. Röd, Die siderably more confident about such claims
Philosophie der Neuzeit 2. Von Newton bis today.
Rousseau (Munich, 1984), pp. 235–296. 83
Although WN was published in 1776, it did
77
See C. Schwaiger, Alexander Gottlieb not become well-known in Germany (as in
Baumgarten – ein intellektuelles Portrait: many other places) until the 1790s. See the dis-
Studien zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants cussion of reception of WN in Germany, as well
Leitautor (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2011). as the passages in Kant that refer to WN, in S.
78
With regard to this controversy, cf. also M. Fleischacker, ‘Values behind the market: Kant’s
Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im response to the Wealth of Nations,’ History of
Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Tübingen, 1945), and Political Thought 17,3 (1996): 379–407.
L. W. Beck, Early German Philosophy. Kant 84
For discussion of all these texts, see again
and His Predecessors (Cambridge, MA, 1969), S. Fleischacker, ‘Values behind the market’.
pp. 243–305. 85
See S. Fleischacker, ‘Philosophy in moral
79
See G. Tonelli, Kant’s Critique of Pure practice’, but see also S. Darwall, ‘Sympathetic
Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic liberalism: recent work on Adam Smith’,
(Hildesheim, 1994), passim. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28,2 (1999):
80
See, also with regard to practical philosophy in 139–164; S. Darwall, ‘Equal dignity in Adam
general, W. Sparn, ‘Die Schulphilosophie in den Smith’, in Adam Smith Review I (2004):
lutherischen Territorien’, pp. 495–497. 129–134; L. Montes, Adam Smith in Context
81
This has been emphasized recently by C. (Basingstoke/New York, 2004), ch. 4; M. A.
Schwaiger, Kategorische und andere Imperative. Carrasco, ‘Adam Smith’s reconstruction of
Zur Entwicklung von Kants praktischer practical reason’, Review of Metaphysics 58,1
Philosophie bis 1785 (Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt, (2004): 81–116; and C. Fricke, H.-P. Schütt
1999), against the traditional view of Crusius’s (eds), Adam Smith als Moralphilosoph (Berlin/
main role in leading Kant away from Wolff’s New York, 2005).
eudaimonism. 86
See A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge,
82
See Refl 6628, 1355, 6864, and 767 respec- 2009) and S. Fleischacker, A Third Concept of
tively. See further S. Fleischacker, ‘Philosophy Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and
in moral practice: Kant and Adam Smith’, Adam Smith (Princeton, 1999).
119
3
SOURCES AND INFLUENCES
121
Sources and Influences
122
Sources and Influences
e.g. ‘substance’ and ‘accidens’ being forms By contrast, Aristotle sees no reason to
in themselves. Aristotle sees the categories connect synthesis to the understanding, for
as from the outset connected with some- the sensed phenomenon is directly presented
thing as a concrete particular, a ‘this here’. in sensibility as sensible awareness of unity.
Accordingly, ‘location’ and ‘time’ play a con- The thing we perceive is present before us by
crete role in an assertion or judgment. virtue of its distinguishable types of impres-
Kant, on the other hand, keeps a critical sions (colour, sound and form), which are
distance from the immediate, concrete in received simultaneously in our capacity for
order to make explicit the necessary formal external perception. The impressions of a
structure of finite human knowledge. Kant sensed thing are directly present and col-
concentrates on both the formal aspects of lectively constitute the thing we hold to be
sensible intuition and the forms of thought, present before us. The fact of synthesis (unity)
to which he gives the Aristotelian label of is incontrovertible and not explainable by the
‘categories’ (CPR A79–80=B105), in contrast understanding alone, as it is for Kant. The
to – and in this sense Kant is more indebted perception of concrete things or particulars,
to Plato – the ideas of reason, which are far in their spatiality, goes hand in hand with the
removed from human experience. structural features of the natural life-world,
There is a likeness of sorts between Kant which is reflected by the human being as a
and Aristotle in the way that both mark time spontaneously moving, living being. The
in their painstaking analyses of the forms of involvement of the understanding is then but
knowledge, although the dynamics of analysis a reflection of the object’s own form that is
obviously differ. Importantly, however, Kant an integral part of its ‘essence’.
sees knowledge as resulting from the synthesis In Aristotle, synthesis and structure thus
of given representations, which as so deter- rest on an a priori that is of an entirely dif-
mined, as unified, first constitute, formally, an ferent nature from Kant’s conception of the
object. ‘Object’, then, corresponds with what synthetic a priori. Aristotle takes reality as
is thought as ‘determined’ (cf. the definition primordially alterable and moving, which
of object at B137 in CPR). In Kant’s account, comports with taking the natural life-world
the concept of ‘synthesis’, or ‘synthetic unity and the human perspective within that con-
of apperception’, plays a crucial role and is text as the starting point for an analysis of
closely linked to the function of the under- nature, society and the moral life. Therefore,
standing. The most important reason why a sense of immediacy forms the basis of
synthesis only first comes up with the account Aristotle’s inquiry.
of the understanding and in fact defines This can also be seen from Aristotle’s
‘thought’ for Kant lies in the fact that, from account in the Physics and its typical
the perspective of transcendental philosophy, explanations of kinds of movement, in the
one must start out from the object such as it is structure of the world as both earthly and
given in sensible intuition, viz. as a manifold heavenly spheres, and in the frequent ref-
of representations. Within the architectonic of erence to final causality or teleology in
Kant’s system of thought, the principle of the order to explain phenomena which in later
unity of synthesis is contrasted with the mani- philosophical traditions came to be seen as
fold data in sensible intuition, which forms entirely explainable mechanically. From the
the empirical basis of knowledge. perspective of these later accounts, ‘finality’
123
Sources and Influences
124
Sources and Influences
second half, only the first of seven that are an empirical foundation that is too narrow:
relevant to this part of the project is treated empirical philosophers duly ascertain and
in the remainder of the volume. Book I offers diligently examine empirical data, although
an unembellished examination of what he the data examined are of insufficient quan-
famously calls idols or false notions (idola), tity and quality. ‘The Superstitious system of
which ‘not only block [people’s] minds so that philosophy’ is constructed through a mixture
it is difficult for truth to gain access, but even of philosophy with theology and traditions.
when access has been granted and allowed The Great Instauration requires that these
[. . .] offer resistance and do mischief’.3 idols be recognized and eradicated. In addi-
The ‘Idols of the Tribe’ are intellectual tion, it requires a new method through which
weaknesses generally inherent in human it is possible to interpret, as opposed to antici-
nature. These weaknesses include the ten- pate, nature. In Book II of the New Organon,
dency to suppose more order in nature than Bacon presents the method of what he calls
there actually is; the disposition of the mind ‘true induction’.4
to be misled by the errors and dullness of the Figuring prominently in this method are
senses; the mind’s tendency to ignore excep- ‘illuminating experiments’ (experimenta
tions to generally accepted principles; to be lucifera). Illuminating experiments are dis-
influenced by the emotions; and to continue tinguished from ‘fruit-bearing experiments’.
in a direction of thought for which there is The purpose of the latter is practical: to use
no evidence for doing so. nature for human ends. By contrast, the pur-
The ‘Idols of the Cave or Den’ are personal pose of illuminating experiments is theoreti-
prejudices and biases. While some people are cal, namely to provide the critical instance or
obsessed with the details, others are obsessed facts necessary to decisively decide between
with the whole. While some look for differ- equally plausible hypotheses. Hence, they
ences, some look for similarities. should be conducted at theoretical crossroads
The ‘Idols of the Marketplace’ are ten- where the correct path is indeterminate.
dencies to err due to the bewitchment of the As a lifelong student of natural phi-
mind by language. These are the most power- losophy, and one who owned a copy of the
ful idols: not only does reason affect words, New Organon, Kant was no doubt familiar
but words also affect reason. with the aim and method of Bacon’s Great
The ‘Idols of the Theater’ are tendencies Instauration. To be sure, Kant’s aim in CPR
to accept fictional systems of knowledge is unmistakably Baconian; its motto (Bii),
based on traditional but mistaken styles of which draws explicit attention to a new
learning. Bacon identifies and criticizes three beginning in scientific inquiry, is taken from
systems of scientific knowledge in particu- the Preface to the New Organon.
lar. The ‘Sophistical system of philosophy’, What is more, Kant’s method in the same
prevalent among what he calls the ‘Rational way ‘imitates’ Bacon’s new scientific method.
School of philosophers’, is based upon a weak Kant undertakes an ‘illuminating experiment’,
empirical foundation: rational philosophers, presented in the Antinomy of Pure Reason in
such as → Aristotle, too hastily leave the CPR, in order to establish the facts neces-
realm of experience without duly ascertain- sary to decisively determine the correctness
ing and diligently examining its data. ‘The of the doctrine of transcendental idealism
Empirical system of philosophy’ is based on over against the doctrine of transcendental
125
Sources and Influences
realism. This is the experiment of pure rea- A first impact of Baumgarten’s terminol-
son that Kant first introduces in his preface ogy can be found in ND, from 1755, when
to the second edition of CPR. – BFS Kant deals with the problem of existence and
essence (ND 76). Kant criticizes Baumgarten’s
Further Reading notion of ‘existence’ because it is not distin-
guishable from the concept of the ‘possible’,
S.-H. Kim, Bacon und Kant (Berlin/New York: being the complement of essence according to
de Gruyter, 2008). all internal possibilities. Kant states that for
existence not only all internal possibilities are
necessary but also all the external ones, namely
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb relations. In Baumgarten, the determination
of all internal and external possibilities is the
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten was born omnimoda determinatio, which corresponds
in Berlin on 17 July 1714. He was educated to Kant’s notion of individual existence.5 Also
in Berlin by Martin Georg Christgau, who NM shows Baumgarten’s influence in the use
taught him Hebrew and Latin poetry. In of the concepts of ‘something’ as equivalent
1727 he moved to Halle an der Saale to study to ‘cogitabile’ and ‘nihil negativum’ as ‘irre-
at the Waisenhaus under the direction of the praesentabile’ (NM 171–172).
Pietist pedagogue August Hermann Francke. Kant recurs to this terminology in CPR
In 1730, Baumgarten was enrolled in the when he defines the concepts of ‘some-
University of Halle, where he studied theol- thing’ and ‘nothing’, which is based on §7 of
ogy and fine arts. During his university years, Baumgarten’s Metaphysica:
he became acquainted with Wolffian philoso-
phy (→ Wolff), of which he was an original The highest concept with which one is
interpreter, but not a follower, for all of his accustomed to begin a transcenden-
life. He died on 26 May 1762. tal philosophy is usually the division
between the possible and the impossible.
With his Meditationes philosophicae de
But since every division presupposes a
nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735),
concept that is to be divided, a still higher
Baumgarten founded a new philosophical one must be given, and this is the concept
discipline of aesthetics as the science of sen- of an object in general (taken problem-
sible knowledge. In 1739, he published his atically, leaving undecided whether it is
Metaphysica, which made him, at least accord- something or nothing). (A290=B346)
ing to Kant, the ‘deepest’ metaphysician of
his time. He also published the Aesthetica in What probably had the greatest influ-
1750, the Initia philosophiae practicae primae ence on Kant in the field of metaphysics is
in 1760, and the Acroasis logica in 1761. Baumgarten’s doctrine of transcendentals.
Baumgarten is probably the philosopher Baumgarten is the first prior to Kant to char-
who had the single biggest influence on Kant, acterize the concept of ‘transcendental’ as
who for more than 40 years used his hand- ‘logical’ and ‘essential’ in opposition to the
books for his lectures on metaphysics, ethics ‘metaphysical’ as ‘real’.6 In fact, in the Wolffian
and anthropology. Baumgarten’s influence is tradition, ‘transcendental’ was synonymous
particularly evident in Kant’s metaphysical with ‘metaphysical’, and also Kant first used
and aesthetic terminology. the term in this sense in the 1750s and in the
126
Sources and Influences
early 1760s. But from the mid-1760s, Kant representations, is arbitrium sensitivum, which
sharply distinguishes the ‘logical’ and ‘tran- is typical of higher animals. The human being’s
scendental’ from the ‘metaphysical’ and the power of choice, insofar as they are rational
‘real’, following Baumgarten’s distinction, as beings, is arbitrium liberum, namely moral
is evidenced by, for example, Refl 3765. In freedom or the faculty to act by means of mere
the same note, Kant also associates ‘the tran- reason, for freedom from sensibility does not
scendental unity’ with the thought that ‘eve- necessarily imply an immediate reaction.
rything is not many [ein iedes Ding ist nicht Also remarkable is the impact of
viel]’, which coincides with Baumgarten’s def- Baumgarten’s aesthetics on Kant. In CPR
inition of ‘unicum transcendentale’. Last but (A21=B35–36), Kant states that the Germans
not least, in his Acroasis logica, Baumgarten are the only people who use the word ‘aesthet-
used the concept of ‘transcendentalis’ to ics’ to designate what others call the critique
denote the higher concepts which contained of taste. Kant suggests to stop using this new
under them other concepts, similar to the way name ‘aesthetics’ in the sense of a critique of
in which Kant defines the categories as the taste, and to reserve the name ‘aesthetics’ for
higher pure concepts of the understanding in the doctrine of sensible cognition, following
CPR. Baumgarten was the first eighteenth- Baumgarten’s suggestion. In this sense, aes-
century philosopher before Kant to use the thetics would have been a part of transcen-
expression ‘transcendental concept’. dental philosophy as well as of psychology.
Kant is also very close to Baumgarten in Of course, Kant’s transcendental aesthet-
using the notion of spontaneity in the practical ics has nothing to do with Baumgarten, but
field in connection with the manifold mean- the aesthetics of CJ seems to share some of
ings of freedom. According to Baumgarten, his basic assumptions. First and foremost, for
spontaneity is the capacity of self-determi- both Baumgarten and Kant aesthetics has the
nation according to an inner principle of task to compensate for the limits of intellectual
the agent. Spontaneity differs from ‘choice’ a priori knowledge, expanding knowledge to
(arbitrium), even if the latter is based on the the cognition of the empirical and singular
former, for choice is the faculty to choose facts. Second, Kant takes from Baumgarten
whether to follow the inner desire or not. some key doctrines of his psychological aes-
There are two kinds of arbitrium: (1) arbi- thetics such as the distinction between an
trium sensitivum and (2) liberum arbitrium. aesthetic judgment and an intellectual judg-
The difference between the two conceptions ment, between the judgment of taste and the
of arbitrium consists in the different kinds of judgment of the agreeable and the disagree-
desire that determine actions. In cases where able, between the universal in concreto and
the inner desire is sensible, arbitrium is sen- the universal in abstracto. – MS
sitivum, while in cases where it is rational,
the arbitrium is liberum. Only in the latter Further Reading
sense, according to Baumgarten, is it possible
to talk of libertas or libertas moralis proper.7 K. Ameriks, ‘The critique of metaphysics:
Kant is concerned with this problem in Kant and traditional ontology’, P. Guyer
many places in CPR, CPrR and in several (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant
lecture notes. In CPR (A534=B562), Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
writes that a will, which is affected by sensible 1992), pp. 249–279.
127
Sources and Influences
A. Nuzzo, ‘Kant and Herder on Baumgarten’s known that the study of Cicero’s Letters, his
Aesthetica’, Journal of the History of Speeches and his dialogue On Duties formed
Philosophy 44,4 (2006): 577–597. part of Kant’s education, but an edition of
E. Watkins (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure Cicero has not been found in his library.
Reason. Background Source Materials Moreover, On Duties does not deal with
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, the themes of Stoic ethics which interested
2009), ch. 3. Kant in particular;9 and again, it is doubt-
ful whether the Stoic doctrines it presents are
particular to Cicero or rather derive from the
Stoic philosopher Panaetius.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius On the basis of his mature writings, it
becomes clear too that Kant was familiar with
In view of the fact that the young Kant found Cicero’s On the Ends of Good and Evil.10
himself strongly attracted to philology and Although this work is strongly influenced by
Latin literature,8 it is not surprising that his the older Academy and the Peripatetic School,
later moral philosophy is strongly influenced its fifth book, albeit inconclusive in its final
by Stoic ethics. In this respect, however, position, most likely presents Cicero’s own
Seneca seems to have been a more important doctrine of virtue and of the highest good, but
influence and source for Kant than Cicero, whether Kant was aware of this is doubtful.
whom he considered a Stoic philosopher with Thirdly, Kant rarely quotes or refers to
regard to his moral philosophy, but more of a ancient authors, and when he does, he usu-
Platonist (→ Plato) with regard to his specu- ally renders them imprecisely or erroneously.
lative philosophy (JL 31). It is certain though that Cicero exerted a
It is difficult to gauge Kant’s assessment of decisive influence on Kant in a crucial stage
Cicero exactly for a number of reasons. First, of his philosophical development. In 1779, a
the capacity to distinguish accurately between reform of the Prussian (→ Prussia) educational
Stoic doctrines original to Cicero, on the one system, in particular of the grammar schools,
hand, and doctrines which formed part of a was proclaimed by the Minister of Education
common Stoic world view and could have Karl Abraham von Zedlitz. Kant was of course
been found by Cicero in Stoic handbooks familiar with the agenda of this reform, which
and other sources, on the other, obviously intended to encourage the study of Plato and
presupposes highly developed philological Latin writers and philosophers, and in addi-
skills. And Kant did not possess these skills. tion to this to make the relevant writings avail-
His training in ancient philosophy and lit- able in German translation. One of the results
erature had rather focused on the literary of the latter objective was Christian Garve’s
technique of the classical, i.e. Latin authors, translation of and commentary on Cicero’s De
and on their imitation, which in spite of his officiis, published in 1783.11
own vigorous critique of this attitude, Kant Probably incited by Garve’s derogatory
himself never left behind. For this reason, he review of his own CPR (→ Garve-Feder
actually never undertook a thorough system- review), Kant wrote an extensive counter-
atic interpretation of any Stoic doctrine. review of Garve’s book. This review was
Secondly, it is not clear to what extent the basis for what eventually became Kant’s
Kant was familiar with Cicero’s writings. It is G (1785).12 Although G does not mention
128
Sources and Influences
Cicero by name, it aims to provide ‘a deci- 1760s onwards, although Kant never explic-
sive alternative’ to Garve’s ethics as well as to itly engaged with Crusius on these issues. He
the ethics of Cicero as defended by Garve.13 did so, however, with respect to his thoughts
Kant’s main objection to Cicero’s concept of on the first principles of cognition.
duty targets the position of Cicero and Garve Crusius presented a view of the supreme
that the duties of man follow from his nature, principles of human cognition that differed
as nature provides man with reason, and that substantially from the standard Wolffian con-
therefore man ought to follow nature in order ception. He denied that the principle of contra-
to act morally. For both Cicero and Garve, diction forms the single supreme principle, and
this nature is affected by and has an effect on claimed that there are in fact three: the princi-
our social environment and social character. ple of contradiction, the principle of the insep-
Kant rejects this view, for the duties of man, arable (‘what cannot be thought without each
as citizens of the world (Weltbürger), must other cannot be without each other’) and the
be universal and cannot be measured by the principle of the uncombinable (‘what cannot
standard of our social nature. – EOO be thought with and next to each other cannot
be with and next to each other’).15 The latter
Further Reading two principles, he argued, are characteristic
of human understanding, and we need them
U. Santoski, Die Bedeutung antiker to explain the truth of many cognitions. The
Theorien für die Genese und Systematik principle of contradiction on its own, there-
von Kants Philosophie (Berlin/New York: fore, does not suffice for human cognition.
de Gruyter, 2006). Regarding Wolff’s principle of sufficient
ground Crusius was equally critical. Crusius
rejected its derivation from the principle of
Crusius, Christian August contradiction, and argued that it is merely a
corollary of the principle of the inseparable.
In the middle of the eighteenth century Crusius’ thought was very important for
Christian August Crusius (1715–1775) was the development of Kant’s views, especially
the most important opponent of Christian in the pre-Critical period. In ND, Kant
→ Wolff. Rather than opposing elements in inclines to a Crusian position in his attacks
Wolff’s system, as many others did, Crusius on the Leibnizian-Wolffian interpretation of
established an entire system opposed to the especially the principle of sufficient ground.
Wolffian one. The main elements of this system Like Crusius, he does not consider the prin-
were already present in Crusius’ philosophical dis- ciple of contradiction to be the one supreme
sertations (published between 1739 and 1742).14 principle of cognition. Moreover, he repeats
In general, Crusius was critical of the Crusius’ criticism of the ambiguity of Wolff’s
Wolffian rationalist pretensions and instead term ‘sufficient ground’, preferring the term
recognized and investigated the limitations of ‘determining ground’ instead – according
human understanding. He opposed the use of to both a ground can be sufficient for many
the mathematical method in philosophy, and consequences, but it can be determinate for
rejected the ontological proof for the exist- only one, as determinacy excludes the oppo-
ence of God. In all these points, Kant was site of the consequence. Finally, like Crusius,
very much in the Crusian league from the he rejects both the derivation of the principle
129
Sources and Influences
of determinate ground from the principle of offering a general treatment of the synthetic
contradiction and the unlimited application a priori.
of the former – for Kant God’s existence has In a 1789 letter to Reinhold (Corr-II 41),
no determining ground, as he exists abso- Kant expresses what can be considered his
lutely necessarily. main criticism of Crusius, namely that he took
However, Kant is critical of Crusius as a merely subjective necessity, arising from the
well, as he rejects his arguments that free acts incapability to think things differently, for an
cannot have a determining ground; rather, he objective necessity. In the end, therefore, Kant
argues, they have their determining ground could not agree with Crusius, but this cannot
in the inclination of our conscious or uncon- obliterate the important role Crusius played
scious desires and volitions. This does not in his philosophical development. – JZ
deprive actions of their freedom, because the
determining grounds are not external to the Further Reading
inclinations of the subject.
Later, in the Prize Essay (Inq), written in H. Allison, ‘Kant on freedom of the will’,
1762, Kant still praises Crusius for noting in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
that human cognition not only needs for- Companion to Kant and Modern
mal principles, but also material ones. These Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
material principles are a number of proposi- University Press, 2006), pp. 381–415.
tions that Crusius derived from the nature of E. Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics
the understanding by means of the principles of Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge
of the inseparable and the uncombinable, University Press, 2005).
such as ‘every substance is somewhere’ and E. Watkins (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure
‘everything that comes to be, comes to be by Reason. Background Source Materials
a sufficient cause’.16 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Although Kant is critical of the specific 2009), ch. 4.
material principles that he brings forward,
Crusius’ idea that much of our cognition
cannot be derived from the principle of con-
tradiction alone but needs further principles Descartes, René
was very important for the development of
Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori principles: Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophical projects
shortly after writing the Prize Essay, Kant are both very similar and very different. René
discovered the distinction between analytic Descartes (1596–1650) is often called the
and synthetic judgments. For this reason, father of modern philosophy and undoubt-
some scholars, most notably L. W. Beck,17 edly one aspect of their connection is the idea
have suggested that Kant might have cred- that knowledge cannot be taken to simply
ited his awakening from his dogmatic slum- arise from mere beliefs, assertions or sense
ber to Crusius just as well as to → Hume. impressions. Beliefs must be rationally justi-
Kant himself acknowledges a link to Crusius fied for them to yield knowledge.
in Disc 245–246, but qualifies it by noting Descartes thought that only by pursuing
that Crusius only referred to the proof of a methodical inquiry into the foundations of
certain metaphysical propositions without truth could metaphysics be scientific in the
130
Sources and Influences
same way that mathematics is. The classi- it has to do solely with principles’ whose use
cal formulation of his manner of investigat- is also determined by those same principles
ing can be found in Descartes’ Discourse on (Bxxii–xxiv).
Method (1637), where he presents four rules The systematicity of metaphysics is thus
always to abide by in one’s investigations, the intimately related to the self-reflective capac-
first of which – ‘never to accept anything as ity of reason itself. The striking respect
true which I do not evidently know as being in which Descartes’ procedure is similar
true’ (AT VI, 18)18 – was later, at the start of to Kant’s is that a particular mode of self-
the Third Meditation of his Meditations on reflection or self-knowledge functions as the
First Philosophy (1641), advanced as the suc- model for knowledge. For both, the reflect-
cinct principle ‘everything is true which I per- ing cogito is central to the main argument
ceive very clearly and distinctly’ (AT VII, 35). concerning the possibility of foundational,
The work that Descartes undertook in the or, rational knowledge.19
Meditations to apply the rigorous method Of course, there are major differences
he introduced in the Discourse amounted to between Descartes and Kant. One major
providing a solid and universally valid foun- difference concerns the way in which their
dation – in the words of the Discourse, ‘the very methods are de facto employed, which
rock or loam’ (AT VI, 29) – for the possibil- informs the manner in which the cogito
ity of having certain knowledge of oneself as functions in their respective arguments for
well as the world of objects around one. the foundation of possible knowledge.20 It
The methodical character of Descartes’ is clear that Descartes’ procedure is based
investigations in the Meditations, which pro- on a radical form of scepticism, which how-
gressively leads to the certainty of the cogito, ever is more appropriately characterized as
the proof of God’s existence and thence a a method of unbending doubt.21 Descartes
justification of the propositions of our com- exercises this doubt, not like ‘the skeptics,
mon knowledge, corresponds to the way that who doubt purely for the sake of doubting’
Kant considered CPR to be a ‘treatise on the (AT VI, 29), but with a view to achieving
method’ (Bxxii) of metaphysics, and that its certainty. By contrast, while some of Kant’s
‘synthetic method’ (P 263) should provide arguments can plausibly be reconstructed
metaphysics with a firm scientific footing. as modes of argumentation by reductio,22
This concerns the crucial epistemological role Kant is rather unconcerned by sceptical chal-
of the subject in both their accounts. Kant lenges, insofar as he does not think that a
writes, right after the above-quoted remark knock-down argument against the sceptic
on method in the B-preface, that ‘pure specu- would be the only viable and interesting
lative reason [. . .] should measure its own philosophical demonstration of the possibil-
capacity according to the different ways for ity of knowledge. It is safe to say that the
choosing the objects of its thinking, [. . .] challenge of scepticism does not especially
because [. . .] in a priori cognition nothing inform the main arguments of CPR and it is
can be ascribed to the objects except what the evident that the Transcendental Deduction
thinking subject takes out of itself [. . .]’, as of the categories, arguably the centrepiece of
a result of which metaphysics, like logic, ‘has CPR, neither is anti-sceptical nor proceeds
the rare good fortune’ to be able to provide by means of methodical sceptical doubt as
a systematic and complete foundation ‘since with Descartes.
131
Sources and Influences
This difference is reflected precisely in attacks the view that the consciousness of
what their argumentations have in common, oneself would be more immediate than the
namely the central position of the cogito23 in perception of external objects.
the deduction of knowledge. The Kantian ‘I Herewith, Kant appears to attack the very
think’ is only a formal representation that method of Descartes’ radical doubt, or at least
conveys the idea that what is called ‘a higher Descartes’ procedure after having established
unity’ provides ‘the ground of the unity of the cogito and the clare & distincte princi-
different concepts in judgments’ (B131). In ple at the start of the Third Meditation. For
some sense, the Kantian ‘I think’ functions Descartes seems to presuppose the possibility
as the premise of the deductive argument, of having ideas of things that I judge to be
especially in its B-edition form, which by outside me, which might not in fact be ideas
means of a step-by-step procedure leads to that have objective reference and hence derive
the conclusion of the synthetic a priori, that in fact from things outside me. This does not
is, the applicability of the set of categories as necessarily mean that Descartes doubts the glo-
the necessary conditions of any experience. bal existence of external objects (he doesn’t),
The unity of apperception or ‘I think’ is the but he does seem to assume the epistemically
vehicle of reasoning, as it were, throughout privileged position of the mind as having self-
the argumentation of the Deduction. knowledge as opposed to knowledge of bod-
The order of reasoning in Kant’s ies (including one’s own body). He does so,
Deduction, then, appears different from that in fact, in the very position of the meditator
of Descartes’ in the Meditations, as the cog- who, at the start of his meditation, puts every-
ito there does not feature as the premise with thing to doubt and thus achieves self-certainty
which Descartes’ argument starts out, but as a first piece of knowledge. But is the taking
rather only emerges as a preliminary conclu- up itself of the position of the universal, radi-
sion at the end of a set of arguments. cal doubter, prior to arriving at any conclu-
Kant does not mention Descartes a lot in sions ensuing from the doubt procedure, not
his published work.24 The most important dependent on the assumption of at least one’s
instance where Kant discusses Descartes is, own existence as part of the world?
apart from the Refutation of Idealism in the This is related to Kant’s most detailed
B-edition, in the context of rational psychol- discussion of Descartes’ cogito in a footnote
ogy, that is, in the first-edition Paralogisms in in the B-Paralogism at B422–423n. There,
CPR (A366ff.) and then again in a well-known Kant appears to endorse the claim made by
note in the B-edition of the Paralogisms. Descartes that my existence is entailed by the
At A366ff., at the start of the Fourth proposition ‘I think’. In fact, Kant says, my
Paralogism concerning the relation of the existence is already contained in the ‘I think’
subject to outer objects, Kant criticizes and need not be inferred from it as a con-
Descartes’ dualist position regarding the clusion from an inference involving a major
relation between consciousness and exter- premise. That is, according to Kant the sup-
nal appearances, the knowledge of which posed inference would be: (1) Everything
the problematic idealist, i.e. Descartes, only which thinks exists; (2) I think; (3) therefore,
thinks possible through causal inference and I exist. Kant holds, to the contrary, that my
hence vulnerable to doubt (this is argued by existence is in fact identical with, and not
Descartes in the Third Meditation). Kant inferred from, my thinking.
132
Sources and Influences
But this charge against Descartes is histor- although Kant’s criticism in CPR is actually
ically not pertinent as Descartes himself does directed at arguments attempting to prove
not think that an inference is at issue, as is a highest being, rather than a most perfect
clear from his replies to certain of the objec- being (cf. by contrast OPD 156). At any rate,
tions from his famous readers. Rather, the according to Kant, one can perfectly conceive
indubitability of my existence is necessarily of God without thereby analytically implying
involved in my thinking as something that I his existence.
do; the proposition cogito ergo sum is in fact However, Descartes makes an important
not an inference, based on the application of distinction between various applications of
a prior universal rule, but a performance by the concepts of existence and essence (AT
a particular thinker or meditator.25 VII, 68) that Kant does not appear to have
However, Kant’s main point in this foot- noticed (but cf. A596=B624); in the case of
note (and in the main text to which the God, existence and essence are indeed mutu-
footnote is appended) is that Descartes, like ally implicative but in all other cases exist-
the other rational psychologists, seems to ence and essence do not coincide; therefore,
ignore the fact that, as the very proposition according to Descartes not all things of which
cogito ergo sum makes clear, a conception of I have an idea thereby necessarily exist. – DS
the self as an object without any empirical
‘material for thinking’ (B423n.) provided is Further Reading
in fact impossible. It is thus clear that Kant
takes aim at Descartes’ quintessential idea J.-M. Beyssade, ‘Descartes’ “I am a thing
that in the very thought that I have of myself that thinks” versus Kant’s “I think”’, in
as thinker I have determinate knowledge of D. Garber, B. Longuenesse (eds), Kant and
myself as a thing, a res cogitans, which is the Early Moderns (Princeton: Princeton
absolutely distinguishable from my body or University Press, 2008), pp. 32–40.
any res extensa. It is therefore not so much M. Fichant, J.-L. Marion (eds), Descartes en
the formal structure and epistemic role of Kant (Paris: PUF, 2006).
the Cartesian cogito that Kant objects to, but B. Longuenesse, ‘Kant’s “I think” versus
the metaphysical conclusions that apparently Descartes’ “I am a thing that thinks”’, in
Descartes draws from it. D. Garber, B. Longuenesse (eds), Kant and
The only other place where Descartes is the Early Moderns (Princeton: Princeton
explicitly mentioned in CPR is towards the University Press, 2008), pp. 9–31.
end of Kant’s account of the ontological
proof of the existence of God (A602=B630).
Kant’s criticism of Descartes in this respect is
chiefly related to Descartes’ belief that based Epicurus and Epicureanism
on a definition of God as the most perfect
being, existence cannot be denied of God on The picture which eighteenth-century
pain of contradiction, since necessarily exist- Germany formed of Epicureanism was not
ence is possessed by a most perfect being as based on a direct study of the ancient sources,
a being that possesses all properties, includ- including texts of Epicurus, but appears
ing existence. Kant famously refutes this as rather to be influenced by the presence
he denies that existence is a real predicate, of Epicureanism in contemporary French
133
Sources and Influences
philosophy and English → empiricism. On high moral sense and draws attention to the
this narrow basis, Kant valued Epicureanism fact that the principle of his moral theory is
above all because of its philosophy of nature, not intended to determine moral action, but
whose main tenets consist in the doctrine of rather to explain it (CPrR 116). Epicurus is a
atomism and the assumption of an empty ‘virtuous’ man with an ‘ever-cheerful heart’,
space or vacuum. According to Kant, the according to one qualification of Epicurus’
Epicureans ‘were the best natural philoso- moral attitude that Kant repeats more than
phers among all the thinkers of Greece’ once (here CPrR 116 and MM 485). Kant,
(JL 30). This judgment can be explained by however, has problems with the Epicurean
Kant’s approval of the exclusively mecha- connection of virtue with happiness, for the
nistic constitution of nature that Epicurus notion of virtue seems to be implied in the
defended. Kant praises Epicurus for his rig- Epicureans’ promotion of the individual’s
orous or ‘pure empiricism’ (A466=B494). In happiness. Epicurean happiness consists in
particular, Kant praises Epicurus for having the enjoyment of a highest pleasure regard-
proceeded ‘more consistently in accord with less of any moral consideration; the maxi-
his sensual system (for in his inferences he mum of happiness a fortiori consists in the
never exceeded the bounds of experience) satisfaction of a maximum of needs. The one
than Aristotle and Locke’ (A854=B882). who is happy has thus succeeded in achiev-
On the other hand, though, Kant feels com- ing the highest good. The principle of happi-
pelled to criticize the doctrine of Epicurean ness pivotal to Epicurean ethics is therefore
philosophy of nature that introduces the idea in Kant’s eyes completely mistaken (CPrR
of an ‘accidental generation’. Throughout his 126) as striving for happiness does not bring
works, he criticizes the induction of a theory about ‘a ground for a virtuous disposition
of well-structured and well-organized nature (Gesinnung)’ (CPrR 114).26
obeying mechanical or teleological laws of But even though the Epicurean moral
nature from the accidental nature of things principle is erroneous in view of grounding a
as ‘absurd [ungereimt]’ (CJ 391) or even, in moral theory, it is true in view of morality in
particular in his earlier works, as ‘impertinent general and in agreement with certain tenets
[unverschämt]’ (NH 227). In CJ, Kant argues of anthropology. Kant describes the principle
extensively against any form of generatio of Epicurean morality repeatedly as ‘self-love’
aequivoca, i.e. ‘the generation of an organ- (Selbstliebe), which he also finds in Helvétius
ized being through the mechanism of crude, and Mandeville.27 Self-love, however, is not
unorganized matter’ (CJ 419n.). According to be mistaken for ‘selfish love’ (Eigenliebe),
to Kant, this Epicurean model of explanation which excludes others, as Epicurean self-love
ignores ‘the difference between a technique is the ground for the love of others and thus
of nature and mere mechanism’ resulting increases our pleasure.28 According to the
in ‘blind chance [being] assumed to be the table of the ‘Practical Material Determining
explanation’ of the agreement of nature with Grounds in the principle of morality’ in
‘our concepts of ends’ (CJ 393). CPrR, the determining factor of the will in
As to his practical philosophy, Kant Epicurean ethics is what Kant calls a ‘physical
defends Epicurus against the charge of feeling’, i.e. it is ‘subjective’ and thus empiri-
upholding a mere hedonism. On several cal and not capable of providing a universal
occasions, Kant calls Epicurus a man with a moral principle (CPrR 40). – EOO
134
Sources and Influences
135
Sources and Influences
be seen as pointing in a Kantian direction. train for a mercantile career. In 1766, how-
Euler argues that one can only have ideas ever, he enrolled in the medical faculty of the
such as that of space through reflection. University of Königsberg, the only faculty
His disagreement with Wolff on this issue allowing Jewish students. Soon he realized
is echoed by Kant describing the Leibnizian that for him medicine was not meant to be
(→ Leibniz) conception of space as resulting more than a source of income, as his heart lay
from a ‘deception of transcendental reflec- with philosophy. In Königsberg, he attended
tion’ (A275=B331). Moreover, Euler also the lectures of Kant, with whom he soon devel-
understands the privileged role of space and oped a close friendship. This is borne out by
time as conditions of experience, but, unlike the fact that Kant appointed Herz to respond
Kant, he does not conclude to their transcen- to his inaugural dissertation (ID), thus oppos-
dental ideality.42 ing the will of the philosophy department.
Finally, an important influence of Euler Shortly afterwards, Herz had to abandon
upon Kant’s late views should be noted. This his studies in Königsberg due to financial rea-
is found in his theory of aether. In OP, Kant sons. Accompanied by a letter of recommen-
explains the role of heat in phase changes dation by Kant for Moses → Mendelssohn,
between the solid, liquid and gaseous states Herz returned to Berlin. Mendelssohn
of matter in terms of the penetration of mat- received him very warmly and soon after-
ter by a ‘universally distributed, continuous, wards they became close friends. The influ-
space-filling, perpetually vibrating’43 fluid ence of Mendelssohn on Herz’s philosophical
which he refers to as the caloric (Wärmestoff). development was probably as important as
This, Kant identifies with Euler’s light-aether that of Kant and prompted him to harmonize
(pulsus Aetheris) (OP-I 523). Insofar as both their philosophical systems.44 In 1774,
this caloric is viewed by Kant as providing Herz received the degree of doctor in medi-
‘a material principle of the unity of pos- cine from the University of Halle. In 1786 (or
sible experience’ (OP-I 585), it illustrates 1787), he was awarded the title ‘Professor’ by
how, even at this late stage, Euler’s influence the Prussian (→ Prussia) king, an exceptional
stretches to the heart of Kant’s philosophical distinction in view of the fact that Herz was
enterprise. – CO Jewish. Apart from widely acknowledged
treatises on medical issues,45 he authored sev-
Further Reading eral influential philosophical essays.
His early Betrachtungen aus der spekula-
E. Watkins (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure tiven Weltweisheit (Königsberg, 1771) dis-
Reason. Background Source Materials cussed Kant’s ID and had a huge impact on
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, the reception of ID and of Kant’s early phi-
2009), ch. 5. losophy in general.46 This book has the form
of a series of letters of a friend of the Kantian
philosophy, and is obviously extremely well
Herz, Marcus informed about the development of Kant’s
philosophy in the second half of the 1760s. It
Marcus Herz (1747–1803) was born in Berlin is of great historical value because here Herz
as the son of a Sofer or Jewish scribe. In 1762, elaborates on issues and debates which had
he was sent to → Königsberg in order to remained implicit in ID itself. Herz shows
136
Sources and Influences
137
Sources and Influences
whole course of our lives’ that could serve or our will (T 2.2.2 & 3.1.1). Moral distinc-
as the basis of the Cartesian idea of the self tions, however, do have an effect on our
(T 1.4.6.2). Each of us is literally ‘nothing passions and will – that is, ‘[m]orals excite
but a bundle or collection of different per- passions, and produce or prevent actions’
ceptions, which succeed each other with an (T 3.1.1.6), so they must be grounded in some-
inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual thing more than just reason. That something
flux and movement’ (T 1.4.6.4). In turn, more is feeling or sentiment. In An Enquiry
Hume argued, the identity we ascribe to this Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751),
bundle of perceptions is a fiction produced Hume wrote: ‘This sentiment can be no other
by the imagination (T 1.4.6.15). than a feeling for the happiness of mankind,
In tracing the idea of causation to its origin, and a resentment of their misery.’54
Hume began by arguing that it must be derived In Hume’s epistemology, sentiment or feel-
from some relation among objects (rather than ing continued to play a central role. According
from some quality of objects). The three rela- to Hume, belief does not involve a difference
tions involved are contiguity, priority, and nec- in the content of an idea, but ‘belief con-
essary connection. Necessary connection is the sists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment’
most important of these relations, and Hume (T App 2). ‘An idea assented to feels differ-
traced the idea of necessary connection not to ent from a fictitious idea’ (T 1.3.7.7). Ideas
the objects or events themselves, but to a feeling believed have ‘an additional force and vivac-
that arises in the mind only through repeated ity’ (T 1.3.7.5) that has been transferred from
experience. Hume argued that no impression impressions to ideas by means of custom. As
of necessary connection can be found when we a result, ‘belief is more properly an act of the
experience a single instance in which two objects sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our
are supposed to have a necessary connection natures’ (T 1.4.1.8). Hume extended this con-
(T 1.3.14, EHU 7.1). After repeatedly experi- clusion beyond belief to probable reasonings.
encing objects of the same sort being conjoined Hume claimed that ‘all probable reasoning
in the same way, however, ‘the mind is carried is nothing but a species of sensation. ‘Tis not
by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to solely in poetry and music, we must follow
expect its usual attendant, and to believe that our taste and sentiment, but likewise in phi-
it will exist’ (EHU 7.2.3). It is ‘this customary losophy’ (T 1.3.8.12). In the Treatise, but not
transition of the imagination from one object in the Enquiry, Hume even extended this to
to its usual attendant [that] is the sentiment or geometry, because, unlike arithmetic and alge-
impression, from which we form the idea of bra, geometry’s ‘first principles are still drawn
power or necessary connexion’ (EHU 7.2.3). from the general appearance of the objects’ (T
Hume further utilized his division of the 1.3.1.4 see also T 1.2.417ff.). Hume did, how-
perceptions of the mind into impressions and ever, distinguish knowledge from probability,
ideas to argue against the position that the but he also famously argued that ‘all knowl-
foundation of our moral distinctions (good, edge degenerates into probability’ (T 1.4.1.1).
evil, right, wrong, etc.) ‘is nothing but a con- Hume did not, however, repeat this argument
formity to reason’ (T 3.1.1.4). Hume argued in the Enquiry, where he drew the distinc-
that although through reason we discover tion between Relations of Ideas and Matters
truths about objects or ideas, reason by itself of Fact. There Hume wrote that relations of
does not have an effect on either our passions ideas, which include arithmetic, algebra and
138
Sources and Influences
139
Sources and Influences
solution because it would ultimately entail [a]nd that of sufficient reason’.75 These in
that there is no human freedom,64 and he turn, Leibniz used to ground the distinction
rejected Malebranche’s occasionalist solu- between necessary and contingent truths –
tion because rather than providing an expla- that is, truths of reason and truths of fact.76
nation, it simply amounts to an appeal to In his correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz
miracles.65 Instead, Leibniz developed his also used the principle of sufficient reason
view of pre-established harmony – holding to argue for his principle of the identity of
that ‘God originally created the soul (and indiscernibles,77 and in turn used the princi-
any other real unity) in such a way that ple of sufficient reason and the principle of
everything must arise for it from its own the identity of indiscernibles to argue against
depths [fonds], through a perfect spontane- the Newtonian theory of absolute space and
ity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect in favour of a relational theory of space.78
conformity relative to external things’.66 As Although Kant did famously write that ‘the
a result, God ‘brings it about that each sim- Critique of Pure Reason might well be the
ple substance has relations that express all true apology for Leibniz’ (Disc 250), in the
the others, and consequently, that each sim- Critical period Kant consistently criticized
ple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the main Leibnizian positions mentioned
the universe’.67 above. According to Kant, Leibniz’s mona-
Although each simple substance ‘repre- dology, pre-established harmony, principle
sents the universe from its own point of of sufficient reason, principle of the identity
view’68, finite substances do so only confus- of indiscernibles, and his relational theory of
edly.69 All substances have an infinity of per- space all revealed errors that could be attrib-
ceptions, but for finite substances, ‘at every uted to a single root cause, namely, Leibniz’s
moment there is in us an infinity of per- failure to recognize that understanding and
ceptions, unaccompanied by awareness or sensibility are entirely distinct sources of
reflection’.70 Nevertheless, just as the noise cognitive content, both of which are essential
of an individual wave contributes to the roar for cognition.79 As a result of this root error,
of the sea, each of these minute perceptions ‘Leibniz constructed an intellectual system
‘makes itself known only when combined of the world’ (A270=B326) in which he
confusedly with all the others’.71 ‘compared all things with each other solely
According to Leibniz, however, some through concepts’ (A270=B326), and intui-
substances perceive things more or less dis- tion was ‘intellectualized, i.e. transformed
tinctly than others. The perceptions of bare into mere confused concepts’ (PE 282). – SB
monads are not ‘sufficiently distinct to be
remembered’.72 Souls (e.g. animals) have sen- Further Reading
sations – that is, they are substances ‘where
perception is more distinct and accompanied A. Jauernig, ‘Kant, the Leibnizians, and
by memory’.73 Finally, minds have reason, Leibniz’, in B. Look (ed.), The Continuum
which enables them to have knowledge of Companion to Leibniz (London/New
necessary truths and to be capable of self- York: Continuum, 2011), pp. 289–309.
reflection.74 Leibniz goes on to say that the J. Mittelstraß, Leibniz und Kant.
reasonings of finite minds ‘are based on two Erkenntnistheoretische Studien (Berlin/
great principles, that of contradiction [. . .] New York: de Gruyter, 2011).
140
Sources and Influences
141
Sources and Influences
an experience of objects at all. As forms of a remark that both Locke and Leibniz failed to
priori intuition, they precede and make pos- separate the understanding from sensibility,
sible our knowledge of objects. which led Locke to seek knowledge of things
Another key area of interest for Kant, as in the sensibility alone, while Leibniz was led
far as Locke’s philosophy is concerned, is the to seek knowledge of things in the intellect
way in which we are led to an understand- alone. – NH
ing of substance. Locke viewed our idea of
substances of natural kinds of things as com-
plex ideas compounded out of various sim-
ple ideas. Particular substances, for Locke, Meier, Georg Friedrich
are products of the mind’s acts of combining
ideas into sorts of things; the ‘species idea’ is Georg Friedrich Meier was born in
nothing but the abstracted idea of a combi- Ammendorf near Halle on 29 March 1718.
nation of ideas which nominally agree with During his youth, he was educated in a
those qualities in things appearing in the Pietist (→ Pietism) milieu and in 1730 he
world over time. enrolled at the University of Halle, even
Kant’s method diverges drastically from though he only began his studies in 1735,
Locke’s abstractive method, which becomes finishing them in 1739. He started teaching
clear when we see that Kant instates the at Halle in the Fall semester of 1739/40 as
pure concept of ‘inherence and subsistence’ a Privatdozent, from 1746 to 1748 as an
or ‘substance’ as well as the accompanying Extraordinary Professor and from 1748 to
categorical form of judgment into the human 1777 as Full Professor.
understanding. Although the pure concept In 1754, he was ordered by Frederick
of substance is not an innate idea, accord- William II (→ Frederick the Great) to teach
ing to Kant, it nevertheless can be classed John → Locke’s Essay Concerning Human
as a kind of non-representational ground of Understanding, which Meier promptly
our experience of things which appear in the did as is evidenced by his Collegium über
world. So, whereas our idea of substance for Locks Versuch vom menschlichen Verstande.
Locke is and can only be a nominal kind, for However, Meier spent all of his life comment-
Kant it acts as a pure concept that conditions ing and writing companions on Christian →
our knowledge of appearances of the form Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb → Baumgarten.
of substance and accident, such that our Meier died on 21 June 1777.80
appearances will conform to the conceptual Kant was heavily influenced by Meier.
structure of our understanding. He read his logic lectures for about forty
Kant cites Locke in CPR a number of years based on Meier’s Vernunftlehre (1752)
times. Perhaps the most important section and his brief Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre
where Locke appears is the aforementioned (1752). Kant’s own Reflexionen (Refl) and
note to the section Amphiboly of Concepts lectures on logic (LL) as well as CPR show
of Reflection (A260–A292=B316–B349). a number of elements taken from Meier’s
Kant refers to Locke’s → empiricism as handbooks. This is evident already from the
‘noogony’, which, as a form of ‘sensualism’, is terminology used by Kant: Kantian terms
contrasted with Leibniz’s intellectually moti- such as ‘egoism’, ‘genius’, ‘horizon’, ‘system’,
vated epistemology. Kant makes the pointed
142
Sources and Influences
‘party’, ‘popular’, ‘pure’, ‘doctrine of reason’, Vernunftlehre, Meier writes that a doctrinal
and ‘prejudice’ all come from Meier.81 edifice (Lehrgebäude, systema) is a set of
In particular, Meier was important for dogmatic truths, which are related to each
Kant because he mediated Locke’s philoso- other and which taken together form scien-
phy, helping to introduce Lockean issues tific knowledge as a whole. Meier adds that
such as the ‘extent of human knowledge’ and the truth of a doctrinal edifice requires that
the ‘degrees of assent’ into Kant’s philosophi- all its parts are related in such a way that
cal framework. each of them is a ground or a consequence
Meier’s influence on Kant can also be of the others.82
found in the conception of ‘system’ and In relation to the above-mentioned section
‘architectonic’ in CPR. Kant states that the of Meier’s handbook, Kant is quoted as say-
‘architectonic’ is the art of constructing a ing (LL 100) that a system is a multitude or
system. Kant specifies that only a systematic manifold of various simple cognitions and
unity turns common knowledge into a sci- truths combined together, such that taken
ence, that is, transforms a simple aggregate together these constitute a whole, and that
into a system. This systematic unity ensures this system is either historical or rational.
that knowledge is not fragmentary, which is Kant comments on the same passage early
a crucial Kantian issue in conceiving of the in the 1770s in his lectures on logic (see LL
possibility of a complete a priori knowledge. 399–400). Unlike in the Logic Blomberg, in
System is defined as the unity of various cog- the Logic Philippi Kant raises the problem of
nitions under one idea. The idea is the concep- an a priori ordering idea or principle and the
tion of the form of the whole, since because necessity of a plan to set up the system,83 and
of it the extent of the manifold cognitions as he does so by elaborating on his ideas about
well as the position of the parts among them Meier’s doctrines.
can be determined (A832=B860). The idea Meier is also Kant’s source of the theory
is therefore fundamental in determining the of logical prejudices, which are those preju-
end and the form of the whole. The form of dices that find their origin in the general
the whole is ‘therefore articulated (articula- configuration of human thought and speech.
tio) and not heaped together (coacervatio)’ It was Meier who set the stage for Kant’s
(A833=B861). idea of ‘egoism’ in the variants of ‘logical’,
Kant goes on to state that if we abstract ‘aesthetic’, and ‘moral’ egoism. Kant was
from any content of knowledge, considered concerned about the consequences that
objectively, then all knowledge considered ‘private judgments’ have with regard to the
subjectively is either historical or rational transcendental conditions of human cogni-
(A836=B864). Historical knowledge is cog- tion. Like Meier, Kant stresses the need to
nitio ex datis, while rational knowledge is respect ‘logical pluralism’ and the necessity
cognitio ex principiis. It is historical when of a ‘universal human reason’ as a common
knowledge is not systematized according to ground of each individual human being.
principles. It is rational when it proceeds As a result of his examination of the dis-
from principles and investigates a priori tortions produced by prejudices, Meier took
every possible knowledge. Kant takes these great interest in the formative process of
notions from the lectures on Meier’s com- knowledge. In his Beyträge zu der Lehre von
panion of logic. In §104 of Auszug aus der den Vorurtheilen (1766), he problematized
143
Sources and Influences
144
Sources and Influences
period, especially in MFNS. There is consid- debate among scholars. Kant’s first law
erable and ongoing debate among scholars as expresses the conservation of quantity
to whether this text should be read as Kant’s of matter, and as such does not have an
philosophical justification of Newton’s equivalent in Newton’s laws. Kant’s sec-
ond law bears important similarities with
mechanics as spelled out in the Principia.87
Newton’s first law, although by ‘inertia’
There are in fact some important com-
Kant means ‘lifelessness’ of matter, and he
mon elements but also differences between mentions an ‘external cause’ for changes
Newton and Kant such as the following: of inertial state but no impressed forces.
(1) Kant’s mature theory of matter clearly Newton’s second law, with the notion
betrays its Newtonian origins by identi- of impressed force, is strikingly absent
fying attraction as an action at a distance from Kant’s mechanics. And Kant’s third
through empty space (MFNS 512). Yet law, i.e. action and reaction are always
the balancing argument through which equal in all communication of motion,
attraction and repulsion are introduced is once again not understood in terms of
can be regarded as pre-Newtonian:88 impressed forces, as in Newton.
from a Newtonian point of view, spin-
ning around its own axis would suffice to Some scholars (most notably, Michael
prevent matter from collapsing into one Friedman)89 have explained away these dif-
point due to attraction, without the need
ferences between Newton and Kant by argu-
of introducing a counterbalancing repul-
ing that Newton’s second law can indirectly
sive force.
(2) In the chapter on Phenomenology, by be derived from Kant’s third law, and that
rejecting absolute motion Kant differ- Kant’s third law is in turn just a version of
entiated himself from Newton’s notion Newton’s third law. Other scholars90 have
of absolute space, which could not be argued instead that the Leibnizian-Wolffian
an object of experience ‘for space with- tradition, rather than Newton, provides the
out matter is no object of perception, background against which we should read
and yet it is a necessary concept of rea- Kant’s laws: in defending the view that reac-
son, and thus nothing more than a mere tion was not a passive force of resistance,
idea’ (MFNS 559). Kant argued that we Kant signalled that his main interlocutors
can only have empirical representations
were Leibniz and Wolff, who indeed identi-
of space, whereby matter as the move-
fied reaction with a passive force of bod-
able in space changes its relation with
respect to space itself as a material move- ies called ‘inertia’. Thus, the exact nature
able. The latter, in turn, can be regarded of Newton’s influence on Kant’s philoso-
as contained into a bigger, yet still mate- phy of natural science remains a matter of
rial space, and so on to infinity, with debate. – MM
the result that ‘all motion or rest can be
relative only and never absolute’ (MFNS
559). Absolute space then becomes the
ideal limit of this open-ended sequence of Plato
nested material spaces.
(3) The chapter on Mechanics offers three
Kant’s philosophy is not particularly known
laws of motion, whose relation to
for its historical orientation. His critical
Newton’s three laws remains a matter of
project in philosophy entails an explicit
145
Sources and Influences
breach with the preceding tradition of meta- the Transcendental Dialectic (A568=B596).
physics. In his wish to make a new start in Kant introduces here the notion of an ‘ideal’.
philosophy by means of a critical investiga- An ideal is the single instantiation of an idea in
tion of the human capacity for knowledge, its complete perfection. Kant compares such
Kant turns away from the older philosophy. an ‘ideal’ with what in Plato is the transcend-
He still acknowledges the ‘great philoso- ent idea (Idee des göttlichen Verstandes), that
phers’ of the past, but their authority is no is, the true and perfect essence of each thing,
longer taken for granted. which as such can only be an object of an
In Kant’s Critical works, Plato is men- intellectual intuition. It is clear that, for Kant,
tioned a few times in a significant way. In such Platonic ideas existing in a supersensory
an interesting passage in the ‘Introduction’ divine realm are not acceptable. Kant wants
of CPR, Kant refers critically to Plato as an to bring back the divine ideas to the sphere of
example of the tendency of reason to free human reason, in which ideal notions func-
itself from the restriction of the senses in the tion as regulative principles in a practical
mistaken assumption that knowledge would sense. So instead of transcendent ideas which
come easier in a ‘free flight’ without the are the object of an intellectual intuition,
resistance from the part of the senses. Kant Kant speaks of ideas of pure reason which
writes: have but a regulative status.
In Kant’s oeuvre, there is one work in
The light dove, in free flight cutting which Plato is mentioned and discussed
through the air the resistance of which in a more than marginal sense. This is in
it feels, could get the idea that it could the late polemical essay PTS from 1796,
do even better in airless space. Likewise,
which Kant wrote on the occasion of the
Plato abandoned the world of the senses
Platonist inspired critique by Schlosser of
because it posed so many hindrances
for the understanding, and dared to go his philosophy. Schlosser published his cri-
beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in tique of Kant together with a translation of
the empty space of pure understanding. the letters of Plato.91 The famous Seventh
He did not notice that he made no head- Letter represents for Schlosser the para-
way by his efforts, for he had no resist- digm of true divinely inspired philosophy.
ance, no support, as it were, by which he In this letter, Plato distinguishes between
could stiffen himself, and to which he different degrees of knowledge. The high-
could apply his powers in order to get his est and most perfect degree of knowledge
understanding off the ground. (A5=B9) concerns the ‘thing itself in its truth’, which
is accessible by an immediate non-cognitive
Kant considers himself a critic of Platonism. insight:
For him, the fault of Platonism consists in
the attempt of reason to elevate itself above This knowledge is not something that
the world of the senses in order to contem- can be put into words like other sciences;
plate the Ideas in the supersensory realm of but after long companionship with it, as
between teacher and pupil in joint pur-
truth.
suit of the subject, suddenly, like light
An interesting passage where Kant refers
flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it
to the ‘idea’ of Plato is in the chapter on the is born in the soul and straightway nour-
Ideal of Pure Reason, in the second book of ishes itself.
146
Sources and Influences
This is the mystical side of Plato which is the necessity of conceptual labour in philos-
popular with all kinds of theosophical and ophy. Kant’s judgment of Plato is, thus, not
mystical conceptions of philosophy. This merely negative. As source of inspiration of
Plato is, according to Kant, ‘the father of all the Gefühlsphilosophen, especially on the
enthusiasm [Schwärmerei] by way of philos- basis of his Seventh Letter, he belongs to the
ophy’ (PTS 398), that is, of the belief in the camp of false and esoteric philosophy, of a
possibility of non-cognitive insight by way of philosophy of ‘fire in the soul’. But there is
inner feeling and intuition, a view which is another Plato, much more to be respected,
entirely rejected by Kant. one who has touched on, albeit hesitantly,
Kant’s objection to Plato concerns prima- the essential question of philosophy concern-
rily the point of intellectual intuition. In Kant’s ing the possibility of synthetic knowledge a
view, Plato’s philosophy is ‘mystical’, at least priori. – RtV
the Plato of the Letters: man closes his eyes
in order to contemplate by means of the soul Further Reading
the higher truth of the ideas. Kant sees a link
between Plato and the contemporary phi- R. Bubner, ‘Platon der Vater aller
losophers of sentiment (Gefühlsphilosophen) Schwärmerei’, in Antike Themen und ihre
who in their appeal to an immediate feeling moderne Verwandlung (Frankfurt a/M:
of the truth consider themselves to be exempt Suhrkamp, 1992), pp. 80–93.
from the long and laborious way of concep- R. Ferber, ‘Platon und Kant’, in A. Neschke-
tual thought. He disparages strongly the idea Hentschke (ed.), Argumenta in dialogos
of a philosopher who does not have to work, Platonis, Teil 1. Platoninterpretation und
but listens instead to his inner oracle. ihre Hermeneutik von der Antike bis
The verdict on mysticism and enthusiasm, zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Basel:
however, is not Kant’s final word with regard Schwabe, 2007), pp. 371–390.
to such a great and respected philosopher as H. Heimsoeth, ‘Plato in Kants Werdegang’,
Plato. Kant suggests that Plato is misused by in H. Heimsoeth, D. Henrich, G. Tonelli
the Gefühlsphilosophen such as Schlosser. (eds), Studien zu Kants philosopher
Plato himself – that is, the serious Plato of Entwicklung (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967),
the dialogues, not the ‘mystagogue’ of the pp. 124–143.
dubious Seventh Letter – should have used
the intellectual intuition only regressively in
order to explain the possibility of synthetic
knowledge a priori (see PTS 391n.). Here, Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
Kant refers to the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, by
means of which Plato accounts for the non- In 1756, → Mendelssohn translated Jean-
empirical element in our knowledge. In this Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality
sense, Plato had already known the central (1755) into German, and Johann Georg
question of all serious philosophy, viz. the Hamann mentioned Rousseau in a December
question concerning the possibility of syn- 1759 letter to Kant (Corr-I 30). The influence
thetic judgments a priori. In addition, Kant of Rousseau (1712–78) on Kant was pro-
points out that Plato founded the Academy, found, and it came most forcefully when Kant
which proves that he himself had recognized was about forty, as notes written in Kant’s
147
Sources and Influences
own copy of Obs around 1764–65 reveal. (DSS 368). Rousseau’s accounts of reason
In those notes, he claimed that Rousseau and alienation and the generally practical
stood to the moral world as → Newton did orientation of his philosophy also arguably
to the natural world (Obs-R 58–59). The influenced Kant’s assertion that pure practi-
Swiss thinker’s influence on Kant was above cal reason was primary vis-à-vis speculative
all (but not exclusively) in anthropology and reason (CPrR 119).
social philosophy, pedagogy, ethics and polit- Anthropology and social philosophy. In
ical philosophy. late 1763 Kant saw the discovery of a boy
In his writings in the 1750s, Kant mostly roaming outside → Königsberg as confirma-
examined natural philosophy (physics and tion of Rousseau’s anthropology, as EMH
geography) and theoretical metaphysics. (1764) showed. Kant’s notes reveal that he
After reading the British empiricists (→ was moved by Rousseau yet struggled not
Empiricism) and especially Rousseau’s Émile to be enchanted by his style and wit. Kant
and Of the Social Contract (both published famously claimed that Rousseau ‘set him
in 1762), Kant addressed the ends of human straight’ and inspired him to defend the rights
nature, intrigued by Rousseau’s notion of of humanity, whereas before he had thought
the difference between natural and civilized that one’s worth was linked to intellectual
human beings. Rousseau led Kant to recon- achievements (Obs-R 44). He held that
sider the aims of the arts and sciences and Rousseau was the first to discover ‘the deeply
especially philosophy, to think that philoso- hidden nature of humanity’ and ‘the secret
phy should have practical and moral conse- law whose observation justifies Providence’
quences, and to believe that knowledge for (Obs-R 58–59), and that whereas ‘belief in
its own sake was not sufficient to justify inequality also makes human beings une-
intellectual pursuits. qual’, only Rousseau’s teaching could make
On might think that the Swiss thinker did it so that even the most learned philosopher
not influence CPR, which Kant was still com- did not see himself as better than the com-
posing when Rousseau died in 1778, but the mon man (Obs-R 176). Yet he had to keep
very notion that reason was in need of a cri- reading Rousseau until the beauty of expres-
tique is in part traceable back to Rousseau’s sion did not unsettle him and he could read
diagnoses that social ills were caused by a use again with reason (Obs-R 30). His reading
of reason that overstepped its bounds, creating proceeded in stages, from a first impression
desires it could not satisfy. (‘Diminish desires, of finding an ‘uncommon mental acuity, a
and you will increase strength’, Rousseau noble flight of genius, and a sensitive soul’,
advised in Émile.) This arguably influenced followed by the impression of ‘alienation
Kant’s claim that pure theoretical reason had over strange and nonsensical opinions’ that
a natural and inevitable tendency to fall into conflicted so strongly with general opin-
an illusory dialectic that could be properly ions that one was inclined to suppose that
understood, if not avoided (A298=B354). In Rousseau only wanted to show off the magi-
the notes that reflect Rousseau’s influence, cal power of his eloquence (Obs-R 43–44).
Kant had defined metaphysics as ‘the science This view of philosophical writing perhaps
of the limits of human reason’ (Obs-R 181), helps us better understand Kant’s conscious
and in the contemporaneous DSS (1766) adoption of a relatively dry and abstract style
Kant published this definition of metaphysics in the Critiques, as the → Bacon epigraph at
148
Sources and Influences
the beginning of the B-edition of CPR dem- but also that in Émile and Of the Social
onstrates: de nobis ipsis silemus (‘of our own Contract and ‘other writings’, Rousseau
person we will say nothing’) (Bii). sought to solve the harder problem of how
Contrasting his method with Rousseau’s to reconcile moral and natural predisposi-
‘synthetic’ method, which began with the tions (CBH 116). Yet Kant held that since the
human being in the state of nature, Kant proper education of the youth and citizens
described his method as ‘analytic’ since it had not yet been carried out, every ill and
examined humans in the civilized condition vice arose from this culture-nature conflict.
(Obs-R 14). In the notes, Kant adopted a Pedagogy. Kant had worked as a pri-
Rousseauian distinction between a primitive vate tutor for well-off families between
innocence, ignorant of artificial goods, and a 1747 and 1754, before returning to the
wise innocence (Obs-R 77) that was familiar Albertina University. Kant concluded Obs
with, yet controlled, artificial impulses. Kant (1764), which even contained a footnote on
assessed the happiness of primitive humans Rousseau (Obs 246), with Rousseauian ref-
not in order to ‘return to the forests’, but to erences to ‘noble simplicity’ and the ‘as yet
see how far humanity had been artificially undiscovered secret of education’ (Obs 255).
constructed and what had thereby been Yet Kant’s call to activate and raise the moral
lost or gained (Obs-R 31; cf. Anthr 326). feeling in the breast of ‘every young citizen of
Likewise, in a published announcement of his the world’ revealed a cosmopolitanism that
lectures (1765), Kant distinguished between went beyond Rousseau.
wise (‘civilized’) and primitive innocence, The notes again showed a deeper, more
and urged us to understand human nature critical reception of Rousseau. While Kant
before attempting to state what should be agreed with him that education should be
done (AL 311–312; cf. Anthr 326–327). ‘free’ and also ‘make a free man’ (Obs-R
Kant agreed with Rousseau that the arts 167), Kant did not see how Rousseau’s pro-
and sciences required a degree of corrupting gramme for the pupil Émile could be made
luxury, but also believed they ‘cultivated’ us practical for instruction in schools (Obs-R
(UH 27). Although Kant agreed that social 29). Perhaps drawing from his experiences
decorum could have a negative influence, he as a tutor, Kant considered Rousseau’s ideas
thought Rousseau failed to offer a compel- impractical since they were based on a tutor-
ling plan for bringing about the final, most governor model, for in order for schools to be
important stage of humanity’s development: possible, one must ‘draw on’ or extend Émile
moralization (UH 26; cf. CBH 116; Anthr and show ‘how schools could arise from it’
324). In addition, what Rousseau called (Obs-R 29). Yet Kant esteemed Rousseau’s
amour propre emerged as Kant’s key notions views on education, calling them the ‘only
of self-conceit (CPrR 73), unsocial sociabil- means of bringing prosperity back to civil
ity (UH 20), and radical propensity to evil society’ in an age of luxury, since political
(R 28–32). laws apparently did not suffice (Obs-R 175).
Kant held that Rousseau’s writings seemed A Rousseauian, naturalist, and child-cen-
to conflict with each other and were often tred approach to teaching was ground for
misinterpreted. Kant thought Rousseau’s two Kant’s avid support of the Philanthropinum
Discourses correctly showed the unavoidable Institute established by Johann Bernard
conflict of culture with our physical nature, Basedow (1724–90) in Dessau in 1774,
149
Sources and Influences
as anthropology lecture notes reveal (LA not just to citizens of a particular political
722–723). In EPh, Kant held that the proper community (and it is not to be confused
educational method should be derived from with autocracy, or self-mastery and control
nature and that schools should develop new of inclinations). Kantian autonomy of the
methods that did not slavishly copy habit and will is an internalization of what remains in
tradition (EPh 449). In his pedagogy course, Rousseau a political notion.
given four times between 1776 and 1787, Like the author of Of the Social Contract,
Kant cited Rousseau often – for instance, to in MM Kant developed a social contract
support his views that discipline should come theory. Moreover, Kant’s thoughts on global
before informative instruction and that the peace explicitly referred to Rousseau, who
development of children’s bodies through himself publicly endorsed a European alli-
physical activity shapes them for society (LP ance for peace (1761). However, Kant pro-
469; cf. 442). posed a cosmopolitan (not just European)
Ethics and political philosophy. Kant’s federation of states (PP 360, cf. MM 352),
appeal to common moral knowledge in which he believed Rousseau ridiculed as fan-
the first section of G shares the spirit of tastic – since Rousseau may have considered
Rousseau’s conviction that fundamental the league to be imminent (UH 24). In the
moral truth is just as accessible to common notes, Kant had repudiated a general love of
human reason as to philosophical reason. humanity since it could lead to chimerical,
Moreover, there is a superficial resemblance idle wishes (Obs-R 25), but his later theories
between Kant’s view of autonomy as the of respect for humanity and human rights,
property of the will to be a law to itself (G so indebted to Rousseau, were arguably not
440) and to both Rousseau’s moral liberty subject to this criticism (MM 352). – RC
(‘obedience to a law which we prescribe to
ourselves’) and civil liberty limited by the Further Reading
general will (volonté générale).92 G’s Formula
of Autonomy (G 431), and its variant, the E. Cassirer, Kant, Rousseau, and Goethe
Formula of the Realm of Ends (G 439), also (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
sound somewhat like Rousseau’s claim that K. Reich, ‘Rousseau und Kant’, in K. Reich,
citizens should be subject to laws that they Gesammelte Schriften, ed. M. Baum
themselves author. However, these notions (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), pp. 147–165.
are at most analogous. Rousseau’s claim S. Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy
applies to legislators of a political law in a (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
community of citizens, that is, to deliberation Press, 2009).
and the public process of voting in an ideal S. Shell, R. Velkley (eds), Kant’s
state, and he presents a political theory con- Observations and Remarks: A Critical
cerned with coercive laws of a state within a Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University
limited jurisdiction. A citizen can be ‘forced Press, 2012).
to be free’,93 and a public authority exists R. Velkley, ‘Transcending nature, unifying
to ensure that the laws are obeyed. Kant’s reason: on Kant’s debt to Rousseau’, in
ethical theory is based on autonomy as (non- O. Sensen (ed.), Kant on Moral Autonomy
coercive) inner legislation of the will. Here (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
autonomy is ascribed to all rational beings, 2013), pp. 89–106.
150
Sources and Influences
151
Sources and Influences
worth, not to mention aspirations to immor- delimit its powers, tying reason to common
tality – in Kant’s materialistic metaphysics? experience before we philosophize. But since
Chapter 2, entitled ‘A Fragment of Occult the idea of a spiritual world answers to some
Philosophy, the Purpose of which is to Reveal of the deepest needs of the human soul – the
Our Community with the Spirit-World’ need to believe in our freedom, moral respon-
(DSS 329), offers a dualistic resolution to this sibility and survival after death – Kant argues
question, dividing the cosmos into material that practical reason can provide grounds for
and spiritual worlds, the former governed by belief that theoretical reason cannot.
laws of necessity and the latter governed by Part II, ‘which is historical’, deals explicitly
laws of freedom. Man has dual citizenship with Swedenborg, who is discussed in the most
and thus falls under both regimes. The moral scathing terms. Chapter 1, entitled ‘A Story,
problem is to live by the laws of freedom in the Truth of which is Recommended to the
the material world. Although Kant erects his Reader’s Own Free Examination’ (DSS 353),
account of the spirit world on metaphysi- retells the stories of Swedenborg’s three clair-
cal foundations, his blueprints clearly come voyant feats described in his letter to Charlotte
directly from Swedenborg’s Arcana Coelestia. von Knobloch. But in DSS, Kant treats them
Chapter 3, entitled ‘Anti-Cabbala – A as mere unconfirmed rumours and does not
Fragment of Ordinary Philosophy, the Purpose mention his extensive research and attempts to
of which is to Cancel Community with the corroborate them. Chapter 2, entitled ‘Ecstatic
Spirit-World’ (DSS 342), is a sceptical cri- Journey of an Enthusiast through the Spirit-
tique of the previous chapter from the point World’ (DSS 357), is a masterful condensation
of view of the empiricist Popularphilosophie of the essence of Swedenborg’s account of the
of the Berlin Enlightenment. This chapter spirit world in the Arcana Coelestia.
must not be seen as representing Kant’s own Chapter 3, entitled ‘Practical Conclusion
viewpoint. Indeed, the arguments he offers Drawn from the Treatise as a Whole’ (DSS
are rhetorically and logically self-refuting.98 368), returns to the idea that philosophy can
Kant does, however, accept one premise of guard itself from metaphysical absurdities
this critique, namely that any notion of a spir- like Swedenborg’s only by first delimiting
itual world cannot be based upon a claim to the powers of theoretical reason. Kant then
mystical intuition, which is accessible only to concludes by recommending a turn to the
the elect, but must instead rest on experiences practical. However, as we have seen from the
and arguments that all men can understand. conclusion of Part I of DSS, the turn toward
In chapter 4, entitled ‘Theoretical practice can provide a new foundation for
Conclusion Established on the Basis of All belief in a spiritual world.
the Observations Contained in the First Part’ DSS is the first work of Kant’s in which the
(DSS 348–349), Kant proposes to begin again. outlines of his mature Critical philosophy are
His account of the spirit world may resolve set forth. But what role did Swedenborg play
the problems of his early metaphysics, but in the emergence of the Critical philosophy?
he accepts that it needs new, non-dogmatic, Kant’s dismissive treatment of Swedenborg in
non-mystical foundations. Because theo- DSS naturally leads most scholars to conclude
retical reason has a tendency to overreach that he was merely chosen as a reductio ad
its grasp and launch itself into groundless absurdum of dogmatic metaphysics.99 Some
speculation, Kant states that we must first scholars, however, have noted a contradiction
152
Sources and Influences
between DSS and Kant’s respectful remarks in connection with enthusiasm. In LA 1059,
about Swedenborg in his letter to Charlotte Swedenborg is offered as an example of
von Knobloch and student notes on his lec- the connection of genius and madness
tures on metaphysics. They have hypoth- (Wahnsinn). Swedenborg is also mentioned in
esized that Kant may have dissembled his two Reflexionen from the 1770s: Refl 1486,
more positive views because Swedenborg where Swedenborg is cited as an example of
was regarded as a heretic by the ecclesias- enthusiasts and mystics who offer symbolic
tical establishment and as an enthusiast by interpretations of the Bible, and Refl 5026,
the Enlightenment. Known sympathies with where Swedenborg is offered as an example
Swedenborg might have harmed Kant’s aca- of appeal to intellectual intuition.
demic career.100 Mendelssohn clearly regarded In CF 46 and Anthr 191–192, Swedenborg
Kant as being deceptive in DSS, and Kant’s is mentioned in connection with the sym-
letter to Mendelssohn of 8 April 1766 (Corr-I bolic interpretation of scripture, nature,
69–73) is an attempt at damage control.101 and historical events.105 Kant believes that
It can be argued, furthermore, that sev- Swedenborg’s symbolic interpretation of
eral crucial ideas of Kant’s Critical system scripture is a form of enthusiasm because it
are influenced by Swedenborg. For instance, is based on a claim to special divine election
Swedenborg’s account of the spiritual world and is thus not intersubjectively verifiable.
contains a doctrine of the ideality of space Kant does, however, share Swedenborg’s
and time, space and time being ways in which desire to interpret phenomena symbolically,
spiritual relations appear to finite, embodied but he argues that such interpretations must
knowers.102 Also, Kant’s doctrine of the ‘king- be based on his moral philosophy, which is
dom of ends’ derives from Swedenborg’s spirit intersubjectively verifiable.
world. Indeed, Swedenborg even describes Kant’s interest in Swedenborg was intense,
the spirit world as a kingdom of ends (reg- long-standing and philosophically fruitful. In
num finium) in the Arcana Coelestia.103 particular, Swedenborg must be ranked along-
DSS contains Kant’s longest discussion side Rousseau as one of the prime influences
of Swedenborg, but it was by no means his on the emergence of Kant’s Critical philoso-
last. Numerous references to Swedenborg phy.106 The Kant–Swedenborg relationship
can be found in students’ lectures notes (LM is, however, relatively unexplored and is thus
113, 298–301, 447, 593, 689, 768, 897, and fertile ground for future research. – GJ
LM-M/V 919–920). These references appear
in Kant’s discussions of the state of the soul Further Reading
after death in the section on rational psychol-
ogy. At LM 298–301, Kant’s discussion of M. David-Ménard, La folie dans la raison
Swedenborg is detailed and highly respectful. pure: Kant lecteur de Swedenborg (Paris:
Swedenborg’s idea of the spirit world is here Vrin, 1990).
indeed described as ‘quite sublime’.104 M. Grier, ‘Swedenborg and Kant on
Furthermore, in DRTBaum 1325, Kant spiritual intuition’, in S. McNeilly (ed.),
reportedly mentions Swedenborg’s account On the True Philosopher and the True
of life on other planets and concludes: ‘He Philosophy – Essays on Swedenborg
appears, therefore, to have been a deliberate (London: The Swedenborg Society, 2002),
fraud’. In LA 284, Swedenborg is mentioned pp. 1–20.
153
Sources and Influences
G. Johnson, ‘The tree of melancholy: Kant Sulzer – began discussing and appreciating
on philosophy and enthusiasm’, in British, Scottish and French → empiricism
C. Firestone, S. Palmquist (eds), Kant while, on the other hand, retaining much
and the New Philosophy of Religion of the conceptual framework and the basic
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, assumptions of the Wolffian tradition. It is
2006), pp. 43–61. in this context that Tetens is often called the
S. Meld Shell, The Embodiment of ‘German Locke’ (→ Locke).107 Tetens and his
Reason. Kant on Spirit, Generation, and contemporaries, today largely unknown, are
Community (Chicago: University of thus forerunners of Kant’s endeavour to rec-
Chicago Press, 1996), ch. 5. oncile empiricism and rationalism. Tetens is
L. Thorpe, ‘The realm of ends as a also considered an important predecessor of
community of spirits: Kant and developmental psychology.
Swedenborg on the kingdom of heaven Philosophische Versuche (like its shorter
and the cleansing of the doors of antecedent Ueber die allgemeine specu-
perception’, The Heythrop Journal 52,1 lativische Philosophie, from 1775) is mainly
(2011): 52–75. intended as a work in empirical psychology
(Erfahrungs-Seelenlehre). Structured rather
loosely, it includes a broad range of issues
such as the nature of representation (first
Tetens, Johann Nicolaus essay), feelings, impressions and sensations
(second essay), the origin of our cognition of
Johann Nicolaus (sometimes Nicolas) Tetens the objective existence of things (fifth essay),
(1736–1807) was among the most influ- the necessity of the universal truths of rea-
ential German philosophers in the 1770s, son (seventh essay), spontaneity and freedom
mainly due to his voluminous Philosophische (twelfth essay) or man’s perfectibility and
Versuche über die menschliche Natur und development (fourteenth essay).
ihre Entwickelung (1777). He was a philoso- Tetens insists that all knowledge of reality
phy professor in Bützow and Kiel until 1789, is based on both observation and reasoning
when he left academia to embark on a sec- (‘Raisonnement’).108 He aims at a synthesis of
ond career as a public servant in the Danish ‘British observational’ philosophy with ‘French
finance ministry where he became, among arguing’ philosophy and the ‘geometrical gen-
other positions, vice director of the Danish ius of Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy’.109 Tetens
national bank. argues: ‘As much as I have taken care to avoid
Tetens is a representative of a general blending hypotheses into experiential propo-
empiricist tendency in German philoso- sitions, I did not avoid drawing inferences and
phy between the late 1750s and 1780s. conclusions from the observations and thus
Dissatisfied with rigid Wolffianism (→ conjoining them’.110 According to Tetens, we
Wolff), quite a few of his contempo- have to ‘pursue the course to which Locke has
raries – including figures such as Ernst first guided us, with the torch of observation
Platner, Johann Georg Feder (→ Garve- in his hand, to find the sensations from which
Feder review), Christian Garve (→ Garve- the general notions are derived’.111 He leaves
Feder review) and, to a lesser extent, also no doubt that all concepts are derivative of
Moses → Mendelssohn and Johann Georg sensations.112
154
Sources and Influences
With regard to psychology, Tetens Christian Garve (Corr-I 341) Kant suspects
renounces physiological anthropology which that only Tetens, besides Herz, Mendelssohn
was flourishing at the time. Physiological and Garve, could be in a position to fully
anthropology is based on the attempt to grasp the importance of his Critical philoso-
explain mental features and events by modi- phy, requesting their assistance in explain-
fications of the brain and the nervous sys- ing and disseminating his doctrine. Johann
tem (without necessarily subscribing to a Georg Hamann notes in a letter to Johann
materialist ontology). Tetens instead prefers Gottfried → Herder that Kant was making
a Lockean ‘observational method’ that con- frequent use of Tetens’ works while he was
fines itself to what we observe in inner sense writing CPR;117 in an earlier letter to Herder,
and abstains from further speculations.113 he says that Kant is ‘very full of’ Tetens.118
Tetens’ peculiar attempt to synthesize However, Kant is also critical of Tetens.
rationalism and empiricism becomes obvious, In another letter to Herz (Corr-I 232), he
for instance, when he criticizes → Hume’s finds fault with the lack of structure and the
theory of causality. Tetens doubts that when redundancy especially of the second volume
we claim an event to be the cause of another of Philosophische Untersuchungen. In Refl
one, we are merely associating ideas: ‘Does 4900, Kant distinguishes his own approach
not this connection of ideas include more, from that of both Tetens and Johann Heinrich
something that is the real reason to make the → Lambert: ‘I concern myself not with the
understanding judge: Here, we find cause and evolution of concepts, like Tetens (all actions
effect? Is the association of ideas not con- by means of which concepts are produced),
nected to a certain necessity, wherever it may nor with their analysis, like Lambert, but
have originated?’114 Elsewhere, he argues in solely with their objective validity. I am not
some detail that the idea of causal connection in competition with [Mitbewerber] these
covers more than a connection, viz. an idea of men.’ – FW
dependence that is not included in Humean
association.115 Thus, the ideas of necessity Further Reading
and dependence are what reason irreduc-
ibly contributes to our concept of causality, H.-U. Baumgarten, Kant und Tetens.
according to Tetens. Untersuchungen zum Problem von
Tetens discusses Kant’s ID on various occa- Vorstellung und Gegenstand (Stuttgart:
sions, for instance with regard to the concept J. B. Metzler, 1992).
of space. Tetens argues that the concept of M. Kuehn, ‘Tetens, Johann Nicolas’, in H.
space as a whole is an individual idea, and Klemme, M. Kuehn (eds), The Dictionary
he considers himself in agreement with Kant of Eighteenth Century German
here: ‘What else did Herr Kant, the profound Philosophers (London: Continuum,
philosopher who studies the understanding 2010), vol. 3, pp. 1163–1169.
so acutely, intend to argue when he takes S. Stapleford, ‘A Refutation of Idealism
space to be an intuitive idea?’116 from 1777’, Idealistic Studies 40 (2010):
There is sufficient evidence that Kant has 139–147.
dealt with Tetens’ views to a considerable E. Watkins, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
degree. In letters to Marcus → Herz (Corr-I Background Source Materials (Cambridge:
270), Moses Mendelssohn (Corr-I 346) and Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch. 9.
155
Sources and Influences
156
Sources and Influences
157
Sources and Influences
158
Sources and Influences
25
See AT VII, 140–141. The locus classicus 35
M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences
for a discussion of this topic is J. Hintikka, (Cambridge, 1992), p. 15.
‘Cogito, ergo sum: inference of performance?’, 36
Euler, Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps, in
Philosophical Review LXXI (1962): 3–32. See Opera Omnia, ed. C. Carathéodory, Series
also the essential work on Descartes’ philoso- Tertia, vol. 2 (Zürich, 1952), pp. 376–377.
phy of mind by H. Sarkar, Descartes’ Cogito. 37
Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences,
Saved from the Great Shipwreck (Cambridge, p. 19. This view is discussed extensively in Inq
2003). 276–286.
26
K. Düsing, ‘Kant und Epikur. Untersuchungen 38
From 1758 (see MR 13–26), Kant’s views
zum Problem der Grundlegung einer Ethik’, did however differ from Leibniz’s in that his
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 1,2 relational notion of space was now grounded
(1976): 39–58, argues that Kant does not do on the analysis of motion, and the claim
justice to the Epicurean principle of ἡδονή, that there is a preferred reference frame (J.
for he does not make the crucial distinction V. Buroker, Space and Incongruence: The
between kinetic and katastematic lust. Origin of Kant’s Idealism [Dordrecht, 1981],
27
Cf. Refl 6894, LE 253 and LE-M 621. pp. 43–47). Moreover, his understanding
28
Cf. Refl 6894. of the law of inertia and its incompatibility
29
The French mathematician and cosmologist with Leibnizian monadology can be seen as
Laplace referred to Euler as ‘the master of influenced by Euler
us all’, urging mathematicians to read him (H. Timerding, ‘Kant und Euler’, Kant-
(W. Dunham, Euler: The Master of Us All Studien 23 [1919]: 18–64).
[Washington, 1999], p. xiii). 39
See again Euler, Réflexions sur l’espace et le
30
Euler’s pioneering work in setting up temps.
graph theory was triggered by the famous 40
Euler, Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps,
Königsberg bridge problem that exerted its p. 381.
citizens (and, one can speculate, Kant’s family 41
Buroker, Space and Incongruence, p. 51.
among them) in the first half of the eighteenth 42
Breidert, ‘Leonhard Euler and philosophy’,
century. This is the problem of finding a path p. 107.
crossing each bridge once and only once and 43
Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences,
returning to its starting point (B. Hopkins, p. 220.
R. Wilson, ‘The truth about Königsberg’, in 44
For an account of Herz as Enlightenment
R. E. Bradley, C. E. Sandifer [eds], Leonhard philosopher, see M. L. Davies, Identity or
Euler: Life, Work and Legacy [Amsterdam, History? Markus Herz and the End of the
2007], p. 410). Enlightenment (Detroit, 1995).
31
This did not prevent Voltaire from referring to 45
Cf. Briefe an Aerzte (Berlin, 1777), p. 84;
him as one who ‘never learnt philosophy’ (W. Grundriß aller medicinischen Wissenschaften
Dunham, Euler: The Master of Us All, (Berlin, 1782); Versuch über den Schwindel
p. xxvi). And the lack of esteem of his contem- (Berlin, 1786, 21791); and Grundlage zu den
poraries for his philosophical acumen was well Vorlesungen über die Experimental-Physik
matched by Euler’s disdain for philosophers (Berlin, 1787). On his remarkable career as
(W. Breidert, ‘Leonhard Euler and philosophy’, physiologist, see C. M. Leder, Die Grenzgänge
in R. E. Bradley, C. E. Sandifer [eds], Leonhard des Marcus Herz. Beruf, Haltung und Identität
Euler: Life, Work and Legacy, eines jüdischen Arztes gegen Ende des 18.
pp. 97–108). Jahrhunderts (Münster/New York, 2007).
32
W. Breidert, ‘Leonhard Euler and philosophy’, 46
A modern edition has been published by
p. 100. E. Conrad et al. (Hamburg, 1990). The impor-
33
See A. Speiser, Leonhard Euler und die tant Wörterbuch zum leichteren Gebrauch der
Deutsche Philosophie (Zürich, 1934), p. 8. Kantischen Schriften, compiled and written by
34
Speiser, Leonhard Euler und die Deutsche Karl Christian Erhard Schmid (Jena, 1786 ff.)
Philosophie, p. 9. does not quote Kant’s ID, but rather Herz’s
159
Sources and Influences
essay when dealing with the Dissertation. See 1981), p. 14; hereafter cited as NE followed by
further on Herz and the Dissertation the essay page number(s).
‘Until 1781: Responses to Kant’s ‘Inaugural 62
Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I, 51,
Dissertation’ (1770)’, this volume. Adam & Tannery, vol. VIII, p. 24, translation
47
Kant in a letter to Nicolai dated 25 October from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
1773 (Corr-I 142; translation mine). vol. I, trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch
Cf. Kant’s letter to Herz of 7 June 1771 (Corr-I (Cambridge, 1985), p. 210.
123). 63
NSN, G 4: 483, AG:143.
48
Versuch über den Geschmack und die 64
See NSN, G 4: 485, AG: 144.
Ursachen seiner Verschiedenheit (Mitau- 65
See NSN, G 4: 483, AG: 143.
Leipzig, 1776), p. 36; translation mine. 66
NSN, G 4: 484, AG: 143.
49
Cf. Kant’s letter to Herz of 15 October 1790 67
M §56, G 6: 616, AG: 220.
(Corr-II 229). 68
PNG §3, G 6: 599, AG: 207.
50
Cf. the chapter on Herz in E. Watkins (ed.), 69
M §60, G 6: 617, AG: 220.
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Background 70
NE 53.
Source Materials (Cambridge, 2009), ch. 7, 71
NE 54.
which contains translations of the letters as 72
PNG §4, G 6: 600, AG: 208.
well as parts of Betrachtungen (translated as 73
M §19, G 6: 610, AG: 215.
Observations from Speculative Philosophy). 74
PNG §§4–5, G 6: 600–601, AG: 208–209;
51
See further on Maimon the essay ‘First M §§28–30, G 6: 611–612, AG: 216–217.
responses to the Critique of Pure Reason: the 75
M §§31–32, G 6: 612, AG: 217.
1780s and later’, this volume. 76
M §§33–36, G 6: 612–613.
52
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human 77
See Leibniz’s fourth and fifth letters, G 7: 372,
Understanding, ed. T. L. Beauchamp (Oxford, 393–394, AG: 327–328, 333.
1999), 2.3 (hereafter referred to as EHU). 78
See Leibniz’s third and fourth letters, G 7:
53
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. 363–364, 372, AG: 324–325, 328.
D. Fate Norton, M. J. Norton (Oxford, 2000), 79
See especially the remark to the Amphiboly of
1.1.1.1 (hereafter referred to as T). the Concepts of Reflection (A268ff.=B324ff.)
54
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles and PE 281ff., 372ff..
of Morals, ed. T. Beauchamp (Oxford, 1998), 80
See R. Pozzo, Georg Friedrich Meiers
Appendix 1.3. Vernunftlehre: eine historisch-systematische
55
See e.g. Principles of Nature and Grace, Based Untersuchung (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2000).
on Reason (henceforth PNG), §§1–2, origi- 81
See N. Hinske, Zwischen Aufklärung und
nal text in Die philosophischen Schriften von Vernunftkritik: Studien zum Kantschen
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt Logikcorpus (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1998).
(Berlin, 1875–90), vol. 6, p. 598 (hereafter cited 82
Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle,
as G, followed by volume and page number[s]); 1752), 26.
translation from G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical 83
LL 530–531; cf. Refl 2702; JL 72, 139.
Essays, trans. R. Ariew, D. Garber (Indianapolis, 84
See R. Pozzo, ‘Prejudices and horizons:
1989), p. 207 (hereafter cited as AG followed by G. F. Meier’s Vernunftlehre and its relation to
page number[s]). Kant’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 43
56
A New System of Nature (henceforth NSN), G (2005): 185–202.
4: 478, AG: 139. 85
see M. Massimi, ‘Kant’s dynamical theory
57
NSN, G 4: 479, AG: 139. of matter in 1755, and its debt to specula-
58
PNG §1–2, G 6: 598, AG: 207; see also NSN, tive Newtonian experimentalism’, Studies
G 4: 479, AG: 139. in History and Philosophy of Science 42,4
59
Monadology (henceforth M) §9, G 6: 608, AG: 214. (2011): 525–543.
60
See e.g. M §1, §36, PNG §§1–3. 86
See M. Stan, ‘Kant’s early theory of motion:
61
New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. metaphysical dynamics and relativity’, The
& ed. P. Remnant, J. Bennett (Cambridge, Leibniz Review 19 (2009): 29–61.
160
Sources and Influences
87
For an influential defence, see M. Friedman, 103
G. Johnson, ‘From Swedenborg’s spirit world
Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, to Kant’s kingdom of ends’, Aries: Journal for
1992). the Study of Western Esotericism 9,1 (2009):
88
See D. Warren, ‘Kant on attractive and 83–99. See also G. Johnson, ‘Swedenborg’s
repulsive force: the balancing argument’, in positive influence on the development of
M. Domski, M. Dickson (eds), Discourse on Kant’s mature moral philosophy’, in S.
a New Method. Reinvigorating the Marriage McNeilly (ed.), On the True Philosopher and
between History and Philosophy of Science the True Philosophy: Essays on Swedenborg
(Chicago, La Salle, IL, 2010), pp. 193–241. (London, 2002), pp. 21–38.
89
M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences 104
See G. Johnson, ‘Kant on Swedenborg in
(Cambridge, 1992). the Lectures on Metaphysics: the 1760s
90
See E. Watkins, ‘Kant’s justification of the and 1770s’, Studia Swedenborgiana 10,1
laws of mechanics’, Studies in History and (1996): 1–38; and ‘Kant on Swedenborg in
Philosophy of Science 29 (1998): 539–560. the Lectures on Metaphysics: the 1780s and
91
See J. G. Schlosser, Platos Briefe (Königsberg, 1790s’, Studia Swedenborgiana 10,2 (1997):
1795); trans. G. R. Morrow, Plato’s Epistles 1–26.
(Indianapolis, IN, 1962). 105
G. Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, pp.
92
J. J. Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, Bk. I, ch. viii. 108–109.
93
J. J. Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, Bk. I, ch.vii. 106
G. Johnson, ‘Kant, Swedenborg, and
94
All of these references are translated by Rousseau: The synthesis of Enlightenment
G. Johnson and G. Magee in G. Johnson (ed.), and esotericism in Dreams of a Spirit-
Kant on Swedenborg: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Seer’, in R. Geffarth, M. Meumann,
and Other Writings (West Chester, PA, 2002); M. Neugebauer-Wölk (eds), Aufklärung und
hereafter referred to as Kant on Swedenborg. Esoterik: Wege in die Moderne, forthcoming.
95
See G. Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, 107
First noted in K. Rosenkranz, Geschichte
pp. 67–72. See also G. Johnson, ‘A der Kant’schen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1840),
Commentary on Kant’s Dreams of a Spirit- p. 65.
Seer’, PhD dissertation (Washington, DC, 108
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische
2001), ch. 2. Philosophie (Bützow/Wismar, 1775), in Die
96
G. Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, pp. 73–75. philosophischen Werke, ed. H.-J. Engfer, 4
97
G. Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, pp. 113. vols. (Hildesheim, 1979–2005), here vol. IV,
98
See G. Johnson, ‘Träume eines Geistersehers – p. 18; translations from this work are my
Polemik gegen die Metaphysik oder Parodie own.
der Popularphilosophie?’, in F. Stengel (ed.), 109
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische
Kant und Swedenborg. Zugänge zu einem Philosophie, p. 3.
umstrittenen Verhältnis (Tübingen, 2008), 110
Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die
pp. 99–122 ; hereafter referred to as Kant und menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung,
Swedenborg. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1777), in Werke I, p. xxix;
99
I summarize the differing interpretations of translations from this work are mine. Some
DSS in G. Johnson, ‘A Commentary on Kant’s further passages are translated in E. Watkins
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer’, ch. 1. For more (ed.), Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
recent interpretations, see F. Stengel (ed.), Background Source Materials (Cambridge,
Kant und Swedenborg. 2009), ch. 9.
100
I summarize such arguments in G. Johnson, 111
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische
‘Did Kant dissemble his interest in Philosophie, p. 72.
Swedenborg?’, The New Philosophy 102 112
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische
(1999): 529–560. Philosophie, p. 49.
101
G. Johnson, Kant on Swedenborg, pp. 83–86. 113
Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die
102
G. Johnson, ‘A Commentary on Kant’s menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung,
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer’, ch. 7. Werke I, p. iv ff., Werke II, pp. 223–299.
161
Sources and Influences
114
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische 117
17 May 1779; J. G. Hamann, Briefwechsel,
Philosophie, p. 74ff. ed. A. Henkel (Wiesbaden, 1959), vol. 4,
115
Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die p. 81.
menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung, 118
13 October 1777; J. G. Hamann,
Werke I, pp. 312–327. Briefwechsel, vol. 3, p. 377.
116
Tetens, Ueber die allgemeine speculativische 119
Trans. R. J. Blackwell (Indianapolis,
Philosophie, p. 54n. 1963).
162
PART III:
KEY THEMES AND TOPICS
4
KEY THEMES AND TOPICS
This section consists of an A–Z entries list literature is provided elsewhere in this
of key Kantian concepts, which are singled Companion.
out for their particular technical usage in The aim of this chapter is certainly not
Kant’s theoretical, practical and aesthetic to be exhaustive but to provide the serious
philosophy and in his anthropology, philos- beginning student of Kant and the generally
ophy of nature and philosophy of religion. interested philosopher with the basic vocab-
Particularly those concepts and terms are ulary that is required for an informed study
addressed that are closely associated with of Kant’s work. For more advanced scholarly
Kant and thus have special significance in research, one is advised to consult the three-
the context of his thought, or underwent volume Kant-Lexikon, edited by G. Mohr, J.
semantic changes in Kant’s philosophi- Stolzenberg and M. Willaschek (Berlin/New
cal language. Some of the key concepts are York: de Gruyter, 2016). – DS
grouped together under more general topics.
Also the familiar sections of core arguments
in the Critique of Pure Reason are addressed
under their known names, e.g. Analogies of Abstraction → logic
Experience, Antinomies, Paralogisms, Proofs
of the existence of God etc. Consistency Aesthetic judgment
overall has been sought while respecting
the pluralist interpretive voices across the Kant’s Critique of the Aesthetic Power of
entries. Judgment, the first part of CJ, has exerted
There are also provided here lists of fur- an enormous influence on modern aesthet-
ther reading that will enable the reader to ics. Yet some of its central claims remain a
undertake further research on all major top- matter of controversy and its relation to the
ics. Given the large number of secondary declared intentions of CJ as a whole, as they
texts available on Kant, these are necessar- are presented in its ‘Introduction’, still seems
ily selective; emphasis has been placed on to elude perspicuous understanding.
the most recent and accessible literature in It is useful to distinguish aesthetic judg-
English, German and occasionally French. A ments into three kinds, according to their
more extensive bibliography of the English objects. The beauty of works of art is
165
Key Themes and Topics
166
Key Themes and Topics
‘without a concept’ (CJ 219). Indeed, accord- idea’, the spatial shape that would result if
ing to the prevalent reading, they express a we were to superimpose a large number of
sense of harmony or fit between a particular members of a kind: ‘This normal idea is not
manifold given in the imagination and the derived from the proportions taken from
understanding as a faculty. In this relation, experience, as determinate rules; rather, it is
the understanding employs no concepts. A in accordance with it that rules for judging
central consequence of this interpretation is first become possible. It is the image for the
that judgments of beauty in nature and art whole species [. . .].’ (CJ 234)
are different in kind. The assumption of the aesthetic purpo-
In the ‘Introduction’ to CJ, Kant claims siveness of nature is then the assumption
that the assumption of the purposiveness of that the sensible manifolds that we find aes-
nature is a subjective condition of experi- thetically pleasing will prove amenable to
ence: ‘The power of judgment thus also has conceptual investigation. If this is right, then
in itself an a priori principle for the possi- aesthetic judgment is a necessary condition
bility of nature, though only in a subjective of → experience and → knowledge, because
respect, by means of which it prescribes a it is the ‘subjective condition of cognizing’
law, not to nature (as autonomy), but to itself (CJ 238) and the assumption of a common
(as heautonomy) for reflection on nature.’ sense is a ‘necessary condition of the univer-
(CJ 185–186) sal communicability of our cognition’ (CJ
Remarkably, a distinction is drawn 239). Without the assumption that nature
between two types of reflective judgment is aesthetically purposive the ‘understanding
that presuppose the teleological or concep- could not find itself in it’ (CJ 193).
tual purposiveness of nature and its aesthetic In the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of
purposiveness respectively (CJ 188–194) Judgment, Kant appears to draw metaphysi-
(→ teleology). This raises the question of cal conclusions from his analysis of judg-
whether the aesthetic pleasure of feeling that ments of natural beauty. The conflict between
certain sensible manifolds apprehended by their demand for universal assent and their
the imagination are somehow purposive for subjective and non-conceptual character is
the understanding is a subjective condition of resolved by pointing to the idea of the aes-
experience. Is this why a critique of aesthetic thetic purposiveness of nature, which Kant
judgment is an essential part of the Critical here refers to as the ‘supersensible substra-
project? tum of humanity’ (CJ 340). – IG
Perhaps it is Kant’s view that at the most
fundamental, pre-conceptual level it is aes- Further Reading
thetically pleasing spatial (or temporal) forms
that we make into objects. It is pure judgments H. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A
of taste that carve objects out of the manifold Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic
given in intuition. Furthermore, this aesthetic Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge
delineation of objects makes possible a first University Press, 2001).
sorting of them into similarly shaped objects H. Ginsborg, ‘Lawfulness without a law:
and so an account of our grasp of natural Kant on the free play of imagination and
kinds. This suggestion finds confirmation understanding’, Philosophical Studies 25
in the discussion of the notion of a ‘normal (1997): 37–81.
167
Key Themes and Topics
P. Guyer, ‘Kant’s ambitions in the third (corresponding to the four titles in the Table
Critique’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The of Judgment): → identity and difference;
Cambridge Companion to Kant and agreement and opposition; the inner and the
Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: outer; and matter and → form. The concepts
Cambridge University Press, 2006), of reflection differ from categories in that
pp. 538–587. categories determine objects (→ deduction),
whereas reflection merely serves the initial
task of finding the topos for a concept.
Kant examines the main points in Leibniz’
Amphiboly metaphysics from the vantage point of the
concepts of reflection. He attempts to show
In → Aristotle, an amphiboly is a logical fal- that Leibniz reached his results through a
lacy caused by the ambiguity of an expres- transcendental amphiboly. Leibniz, who ‘intel-
sion. In the section ‘On the Amphiboly of lectualized’ the appearances (A271=B327),
the Concepts of Reflection’ in CPR (A260– admits no role for sensibility, which he inter-
A292=B316–349), Kant offers an account prets as confused cognition.
of how the main points in → Leibniz’s meta- Since he does not distinguish between the
physical system arise from a transcendental sources of cognition, Leibniz’s reflection is
amphiboly. This is the fallacy of confusing merely logical. With respect to the first pair
appearances with objects of the pure under- of reflective concepts (identity/difference),
standing or noumena. The neglect to distin- this leads to a metaphysical application of
guish between them results from overlooking the principle of identity of indiscernibles.
the distinction between two sources of cogni- For concepts, the principle is valid, that is,
tion, sensibility and understanding. Leibniz if two concepts have the same internal deter-
thus treats all objects as noumena, which can mination, then they are identical. However,
be accounted for by purely conceptual means. due to the amphiboly, Leibniz neglects dif-
The cause of transcendental amphiboly is ferences that stem from sensibility. Space
the neglect of transcendental reflection. In (→ Transcendental Aesthetic) enables two
general → logic, reflection is the comparison conceptually identical objects to exist at
of concepts. For logic, the source of a → rep- different places, so Leibniz’s principle is
resentation, i.e. the question of which faculty invalid if taken as a law for appearances
it belongs to, is of no importance. By con- (A272=B328).
trast, the task of transcendental reflection is Reflecting on agreement and opposition,
to determine the cognitive source to which as applied to concepts, leads to the doctrine
representations (and judgments based on that reality is entirely positive and contains
them) belong, that is, whether they belong to no opposition. But in the experienced world
the understanding or to sensibility. To thus of appearances there exists real opposition,
determine the topos (place) of a putative such as opposed forces. Kant also traces the
cognition is a prerequisite for making philo- rationalist belief that evil is mere privation to
sophical claims. It is therefore a basic aspect this confusion of appearances and objects of
of → critique (A263=B319). the understanding (noumena) (A273=B329).
For this purpose concepts of reflec- As for the inner and the outer, objects of
tion are used. These consist of four pairs the understanding must have something
168
Key Themes and Topics
169
Key Themes and Topics
possible → experience. Here, Kant suggests form of judgment. Thus, the principles of
that characterization of the sphere beyond the understanding ‘are nothing other than
human experience can proceed through a rules of the objective use of the categories’
process of ‘symbolic anthropomorphism’ (A161=B200).
(P 357). Such an inference takes the relation As with all the principles however, the
between known objects and posits it as exist- application of the schematized categories is
ing between the sphere of possible experience discovered by way of argumentation to be a
and the sphere beyond possible experience. necessary and objective condition of the pos-
The form of analogical inference finds a sibility of coherent → experience, and not
role throughout the Critical system, whether merely a subjective employment of a concept.
in regard to the characterization of the divine As Kant notes in P (P 258–259), the applica-
(P 357) (→ proofs of the existence of God), tion of the concept of cause could be justified
the understanding of the free will of human on the grounds of pragmatic expedience or
beings (CPrR 55–57) (→ freedom) or the perhaps even indispensability, but the genu-
purposiveness of nature which can only be ine source of its objective validity is its role as
characterized through the process of anal- a transcendental condition of experience.
ogy, in comparison with the practice of the Kant states that the general principle of
human artist (FI 240) (→ teleology). – JC the Analogies is that ‘[e]xperience is possible
only through the representation of a necessary
connection of perceptions’ (A176=B218).
As such, each of the Analogies concerns the
Analogies of Experience manner in which the connection of represen-
tations within our experience is represented
In ID, Kant asks for an explanation of ‘how as manifesting a necessary connection. Since
it is possible that a plurality of substances the schematized categories are nothing but
should be in mutual interaction with each the representation of temporal relations
other, and in this way belong to the same within the manifold of representations, the
whole, which is called a world’ (ID 407). This Analogies can be understood as detailing the
explanation is provided within the Critical sense in which temporal representation man-
system in the sections of CPR detailed as the ifests different forms of necessary connection
Analogies of Experience. between our perceptions.
The Analogies of Experience are the set The result that Kant aims for is to dem-
of the principles of the understanding corre- onstrate how a traditional metaphysical pic-
sponding to the third class in the Table of the ture of the physical world as a community of
Categories, that of relation (A80=B106) (→ causally interacting substances undergoing
deduction). The categories under the heading change within a spatiotemporal continuum
of relation themselves correspond to the cat- can be articulated solely within the Critical
egorical, hypothetical and disjunctive forms vocabulary of necessary connection within
of → judgment. Thus the principle of causal- the temporal order of representation.
ity, for example, as discussed in the second A central claim that seems to play a role
analogy, is to be understood as the schema- in the argument for each of the Analogies
tized application of the category of cause, is that time itself cannot be perceived (e.g.
which is an analogue of the hypothetical B225, A192=B237, B257). Whereas time is,
170
Key Themes and Topics
171
Key Themes and Topics
172
Key Themes and Topics
concept (in that these marks become clear), synthetic unity of → apperception is ‘the high-
which leads to the concept becoming distinct est point’ of the understanding, presupposed
(cf. JL 34). If by analysis we were to discover by the analytic unity of consciousness (B134).
all marks thought in a concept (including the In line with this, Kant thinks it much more
marks of the marks), then we would have a important to analyze ‘the faculty of under-
complete definition of the concept. But ‘the standing itself, in order to research the pos-
exhaustiveness of the analysis of my con- sibility of a priori concepts’ (A65=B90) than
cept is always doubtful’ (A728=B756), hence to analyze concepts in order to make them
analyses will result in expositions rather than distinct. The former kind of analysis, called
in strict definitions. In an exposition, a prag- the Analytic of Concepts, is the task of →
matically sufficient number (though not all) transcendental philosophy; its aim is to find
of a concept’s marks are given. Definitions the pure concepts of the understanding (A65–
and expositions are expressed in analytic 66=B90–91) (→ deduction). The Analytic
judgments, since the marks in the predicate of Concepts is followed by the Analytic of
are found through analysis of the subject Principles, which gives the rules for applying
concept. Analytic judgments are thus called the categories to appearances (A132=B171)
‘judgments of clarification’ (A7=B11). (→ Analogies of Experience, Anticipations of
In the 1760s, Kant came close to equat- Perception, Axioms of Intuition).
ing philosophy with conceptual analysis. At Kant’s practical philosophy also contains
this point, he contrasts the synthetic method an analytic. As practical reason does not con-
of mathematics with the analytic method of cern the cognition of objects, but ‘its own abil-
metaphysics: whereas mathematics arbitrar- ity to make them real’, its analytic proceeds in
ily defines its concepts, metaphysics starts reversed order compared to that of theoreti-
from given concepts that have to be analyzed. cal reason (taken in a wide sense as including
This can be most difficult, as some concepts the Transcendental Aesthetic) (CPrR 89–90).
‘are scarcely capable of analysis at all’ (Inq Whereas the latter went from intuition via
280). In his Critical philosophy, Kant retains concepts to principles, the analytic of practi-
some of his earlier views on mathematics cal reason begins with the pure law.
and conceptual analysis, but a major revi- In CJ, there is an Analytic of the Beautiful,
sion takes place in his conception of philo- an Analytic of the Sublime and an Analytic
sophical method. Analyzing ‘the concepts of the Teleological Power of Judgment,
that inhabit our reason a priori, is not the end treating of these respective aspects of the
[. . .] but only a preparation for metaphysics reflecting power of judgment (→ aesthetic
proper, namely extending its a priori cogni- judgment). – MQ
tion synthetically, and it is useless for this end,
because it merely shows what is contained
in these concepts’ (B23). The primacy of →
synthesis is also shown in Kant’s claim that, Analytic judgment → judgment
even though they seem to be opposite actions,
analysis always presupposes synthesis, ‘for Anthropology
where the understanding has not previously
combined anything, neither can it dissolve Anthropology, understood as the empiri-
anything’ (B130). Kant thus holds that the cal study of human beings, forms part of
173
Key Themes and Topics
several of Kant’s works, e.g. his essays on issues concerning character, the moral role of
history (CBH, End, UH), MM, especially the human society, the formation of dispositions
Doctrine of Virtue, and R. It is however sys- to act in certain ways, the empirical expres-
tematically treated in Anthr, which is based sion of moral personality and more gener-
on Kant’s lectures on anthropology (LA), a ally the cultivation of psychological and
very popular topic Kant taught for over 20 social features that promote or facilitate the
years. Yet, when Anthr first appeared, it was achievement of our moral vocation.
criticized for being unsystematic, for creat- If the pragmatic perspective can be vindi-
ing a profound problem for the coherence of cated in terms of the overall architectonic of
Kant’s moral philosophy and for the trivial- Kant’s philosophy, a profound puzzle remains
ity of its observations. Assessing the sound- about the precise bearing of anthropological
ness of these criticisms offers a useful way observations upon morality. These observa-
into this deceptively readable book. tions are drawn from a variety of sources,
In terms of Kant’s overall philosophical from personal experience of one’s own past
project, the question ‘What is the human behaviour as well as that of others, travel
being?’ is a central one, so it is not surprising books, memoirs and novels, and also, as
that Kant dedicates a volume to the subject. regards national character and language. The
Alongside his lectures on anthropology, Kant behaviours, customs and habits Kant records
offered lectures on physical geography (PG), and comments upon show how natural needs
a portion of which was devoted to the study and traits are manifested and developed in
of human beings as natural creatures in their different cultural contexts, mainly of course
natural environment. the contexts with which Kant was more
But this is not the point of view of Anthr, immediately acquainted.
which is ‘pragmatic’. In G, the term ‘prag- The overarching aim is to show how human
matic’ is defined in contrast to ‘technical’, beings can overcome their natural egoism,
which refers to instrumental efficacy, and which can be aggravated in certain contexts,
to ‘moral’; ‘pragmatic’ refers to individual and cultivate human fellowship or ‘plural-
well-being and prudential planning for gen- ism’, a ‘way of thinking in which one is not
eral welfare (G 416–417). Also in G, Kant concerned with oneself as the whole world,
announces the need for a practical anthro- but rather regards and conducts oneself as a
pology, in the sense of casuistry, that is, of mere citizen of the world’ (Anthr 130).
showing how his moral philosophy applies to The puzzle is to reconcile this empirical
particular cases (cf. G 412). Yet in his intro- side with central tenets of Kant’s moral phi-
duction to Anthr, he appears to revise these losophy (→ morality), namely that human
distinctions, linking the term ‘pragmatic’ beings may assert their transcendental →
with moral ends and discussing the empirical freedom, that is, the freedom from all empiri-
conditions of moral development, namely the cal determination of their actions; that they
‘investigation of what [the human being] as ought to act autonomously, not as a result of
a free-acting being makes of himself, or can received opinions, maxims, and such exter-
and should make of himself’ (Anthr 119). nal influences, but only out of respect for the
The book, then, helps to flesh out the moral law (→ categorical imperative); and
moral commitments we have as rational finally, that they can transform their moral
and free creatures, addressing important personality by a ‘change of heart’, which
174
Key Themes and Topics
differs from a change in practice that takes on geography that Kant uses race in a biolog-
place ‘little by little’ (R 47). ical sense, while making disparaging remarks
Nevertheless, Kant also argues for the about non-white races (PG 316). At the same
importance of the moral development of the time, he holds that all human beings have
empirical self both at the individual level and common descent and form ‘one family’ (Refl
as regards society as a whole. So he clearly 1499) and that race diversity is down to envi-
believes that a coherent account can be given ronmental factors.
that binds together pragmatic aims, broadly In Anthr, Kant’s concern is the entire
understood, and moral aims. human race and its common vocation, which
How Anthr is interpreted, then, depends is to shape its own character and perfect
on how the relation between the empirical itself, so that ‘the human being, as an animal
and the noumenal self is treated in Kant’s endowed with the capacity of reason (ani-
other works as well. The empirical Kant mal rationabile), can make out of himself a
proved awkward for some of his contem- rational animal (animal rationale)’ (Anthr
poraries and was virtually ignored by sub- 321). – KD
sequent scholars. Some recent work on the
topic has opened up interesting interpretative Further Reading
and philosophical possibilities for integrating
anthropological concerns into Kantian moral P. Frierson, Freedom and Anthropology in
philosophy. Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge:
The charge of triviality resonates less Cambridge University Press, 2003).
with contemporary audiences, for whom B. Jacobs, P. Kain (eds), Essays on Kant’s
the material, with its wide range of refer- Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge
ences (from Virgil to Voltaire), offers an University Press, 2003).
interesting view of a historical period popu- R. Louden, ‘Applying Kant’s ethics: the
lated by characters some of whom are more role of anthropology’, in G. Bird (ed.),
enduring and recognizable than others. The A Companion to Kant (Malden, MA/
charge levelled against Kant nowadays is Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),
that he promotes negative stereotypes of pp. 350–363.
women and of non-white races. Some of the H. Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology.
descriptive material on women is dated like Its Origin, Meaning, and Critical
all observations of this kind. Moral develop- Significance (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
ment regards women equally as all human 2006).
beings without exception. What is different
are the circumstances, roles and gender char-
acteristics that facilitate, colour or impede
this overarching aim. Anticipations of Perception
When Kant turns to national character, his
aim is to emphasize negative traits because All of the categories are a priori concepts
he believes criticism helps us improve our- which serve as predicates in the synthetic a
selves. So, for example, we find that the priori judgments or principles that deter-
English are rude, and that the Spaniards mine the conditions for the possibility of
resist reform and so forth. It is in his lectures experience of objects. So also the categories
175
Key Themes and Topics
of quality, which are ‘reality’, ‘negation’ and quanta such as space and time, and is there-
‘limitation’, and whose application in con- fore not an extensive magnitude. But like the
creto are expounded in the Anticipations of extensive magnitudes space and time, percep-
Perception. tion is also a ‘continuous’ or ‘flowing’ mag-
In conformity with the role of the catego- nitude (B211=A170), for ‘between reality in
ries of quality, which is to establish the refer- appearance and negation there is a continu-
ence to a possible → object, the Anticipations ous nexus of many possible intermediate sen-
of Perception are concerned with the prin- sations’ (A168=B210; cf. A143=B182–183).
ciple of a priori cognition of the ‘matter of The degree of consciousness in a multiplic-
perception’, viz. ‘sensation’ (B208=A167), ity of perceptions can gradually increase or
and hence the application of the categories decrease until an approximation of zero (an
of quality to perceptions so as to establish actual zero degree of consciousness would
their objective reality. mean the absence or negation of sensation,
Of course, as Kant notes, it is impossible corresponding to the category of ‘negation’).
to anticipate a priori precisely that which can Sensation in perception is a merely sub-
only be encountered in a posteriori → experi- jective representation, but since sensation
ence, viz. the matter of experience, but Kant is connected to the real, any determination
argues that it is possible to determine that of the intensive magnitude of sensation is a
‘there is something which can be cognized determination of the empirical → reality of
a priori in every sensation, as sensation the object of perception, to which the sensa-
in general (without a particular one being tion corresponds. Notice, however, that what
given)’ (A167=B209). is determined as real is that which is repre-
According to Kant’s theory, ‘percep- sented by a concept of reality, in fact ‘a pure
tion is empirical consciousness, i.e., one in concept of the understanding’ (B182=A143),
which there is at the same time sensation’. and ‘does not signify anything except the
The objects of perception, appearances, do synthesis in an empirical consciousness in
not only have an a priori side to them (pure general’ (A175=B217).
spatiotemporal form) (→ Transcendental Importantly, Kant notes that if ‘all reality
Aesthetic), but must also have a material in perception has a degree, between which
component, namely ‘the real’ which affects and negation there is an infinite gradation
the subject who is conscious of the object. of ever lesser degrees’, then it is impossi-
This ‘real’ corresponds to the sensations ble to have an experience which proves ‘an
in the subject (B209=A168), which in fact entire absence of everything real in appear-
constitute the material aspect of a subject’s ance, i.e., a proof of empty space or of empty
empirical consciousness. time’ (A172=B214). The fact that ‘the entire
Therefore, the principle which anticipates absence of the real in sensible intuition can-
empirical perception asserts that ‘[i]n all not itself be perceived’ (ibid.) is important for
appearances the sensation, and the real, which showing that the standard assumption of nat-
corresponds to it in the object (realitas phe- ural philosophers ‘that the real in space [. . .]
nomenon), has an intensive magnitude, i.e., is everywhere one and the same, and can be
a degree’ (A166). Since sensation is instan- differentiated only according to its extensive
taneous, its apprehension does not rest on a magnitude’ (A173=B215), which leads them
successive synthesis, as with homogeneous to think that only assuming that volume ‘is
176
Key Themes and Topics
empty in all matter’ can explain differences ‘in of conditions that defines the completeness
the quantity of various kinds of matter in bod- of the world (A408=B434), which is the
ies that have the same volume’ (trans. Kemp topic of rational cosmology. This, however,
Smith), is ‘merely metaphysical’ and thus mis- issues in apparently mutually contradictory
taken in Kant’s view (ibid.). These differences statements: this is the Antinomy of Pure
can be accounted for because of the differ- Reason (A407=B433). In the Antinomy,
ences in intensive magnitude. reason’s search for the unconditioned is
More generally, given the fact that Kant defined in terms of ascending series moving
connects the anticipation of sensation in from conditioned to that which conditions it
general to empirical consciousness in inner (A410–411=B437–438).
sense (A175–176=B217–218) doubts can The Antinomy takes on different forms
be raised as to the possibility of being liter- depending upon the nature of this regress.
ally unconscious (in a first-order sense of Kant identifies four antinomies correspond-
consciousness), amounting to a negation=0 ing to the groups of categories: there are thus
of the intensive magnitude of the quality of two mathematical and two dynamical anti-
sensation, since no ‘being’ or ‘real’ would a nomies. For each antinomy, Kant presents a
fortiori correspond to zero degree of empiri- thesis and an antithesis, as well as proofs of
cal consciousness in perception (cf. B414). In these claims that should not rely upon the
P, Kant observes that ‘total unconsciousness’ results of the → Transcendental Aesthetic or
is in actual fact always ‘psychological dark- the Transcendental Analytic (→ deduction,
ness’, which should rather ‘be regarded as a Analogies of Experience).
consciousness that is merely outweighed by These claims are so structured that the
another, stronger one’ (P 307). This is impor- thesis locates the unconditioned ground in
tant for assessing Kant’s views regarding the the world: it is dogmatic and broadly in line
existence of first-order consciousness in rela- with the tradition of rationalist → metaphys-
tion to transcendental self-consciousness (→ ics. The antithesis understands this ground in
apperception). – DS terms of the infinite totality of all the condi-
tions: it is empiricist (A465–466=B493–494).
Further Reading (1) In the First Antinomy (A426–
433=B454–461), series of appearances are
B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to generated spatially by identifying larger
Judge (Princeton: Princeton University regions conditioning a given region of space
Press, 1998), ch. 10. by containing it, or in time by identifying a
previous time as conditioning the present one.
The antinomy leads (A426–427=B454–456)
to identifying a spatial boundary, or a first
Antinomies time (thesis), or on the contrary to the claim
that the world is unlimited in space or time
The faculty of → reason seeks the uncon- (antithesis).
ditioned for any conditioned knowledge (2) Instead of a regress in space or time,
(A409=B436). In the case of the appearances the parts of an object can be taken as condi-
of outer sense (→ inner/outer sense), this tions of the whole (Second Antinomy, A434–
leads it to posit the existence of the totality 443=B462–471). This mereological series
177
Key Themes and Topics
178
Key Themes and Topics
In the case of the dynamical antinomies, The latter point is key here, and is a direct
the regresses in the theses lead to an uncondi- consequence of the fact that the world of
tioned that is heterogeneous with the series, objects is already given as fully determined
while the antitheses deny the existence of for the transcendental realist. Insofar as the
this heterogeneous term (A529–530=B557– alternative to TR is the Critical perspective
558). As Kant indicates, ‘the case can be of → transcendental idealism (TI), for which
mediated to the satisfaction of both parties’ objects first arise through conceptual deter-
(A530=B558). Indeed, Kant can make use of minations of the representations in intuition
the distinction between two perspectives, an of the sensory manifold, the failure of TR to
empirical one (in the realm of appearances), resolve the mathematical antinomies amounts
and an intelligible one (in the realm of the to an indirect proof of the veracity of TI.
in-itself), to allow a regress from the one per- This important result may seem to depend
spective to lead to an unconditional condi- crucially upon the validity of the proofs of the
tion (thesis), while from the other perspective theses and antitheses. These are, however, gen-
the unconditional totality is the infinite series erally regarded as problematic. The antithesis
generated by the regress (antithesis). of the First Antinomy thus relies upon a →
The important Third Antinomy is thus principle of sufficient reason. From the obser-
resolved by a distinction between the intelli- vation that there is no sufficient reason for the
gible point of view from which there is a non- world to begin at any particular time or to be
natural causality defining first causes in the located in any determinate position in space,
natural world, and the empirical one which it follows that a bounded world has multiple
admits of no other causality than that of nature situatability in space/time. Such indetermi-
(A530–537=B558–565): this defines Kant’s nacy is, of course, not thinkable in a realist
solution to the free will/determinism problem framework. The endorsement of the principle
(A538–557=B566–585) (→ freedom). The of sufficient reason is problematic, although it
thesis and antithesis of the third and fourth is at least shared by Kant’s immediate target,
antinomies are therefore both true, once their Leibnizian philosophy (→ Leibniz).
scope has been specified appropriately. The verificationist principle underpinning
In the case of the mathematical antinomies, the thesis of the First Antinomy is arguably
Kant makes an additional claim that leads to more problematic. Here, the conclusion relies
a conclusion that is of central importance to upon the impossibility of thinking the world
his whole enterprise in CPR. He claims that as a totum syntheticum, i.e. a whole com-
transcendental realism (TR) is not able to posed of parts given separately. Some argue
provide a resolution of the first and second however that this way of thinking the world
antinomies. The problem for the transcen- is shared by the transcendental realist. Similar
dental realist is that he is faced with two pos- issues arise for the Second Antinomy, with
sible options in each case, and that one of defences of Kant by some commentators for
them must be true, because (1) they exhaust the thesis, and some others for the antithesis.
the list of possibilities for the determination If, however, the proofs are considered
in terms of the particular property at stake unsatisfactory, the antinomies can still func-
(boundedness or divisibility), (2) they are tion in support of TI. They could be seen as
mutually exclusive, and (3) indeterminacy is identifying states of affairs which conflict
not an available option. with aspects of our rationality. So, if either
179
Key Themes and Topics
180
Key Themes and Topics
given as such, but is always to some extent associated phenomena with the objects of
mind-dependent, i.e. ‘appearing to some sensible representations, ‘of things as they
subject s’. A determinate object is basically appear’, in contrast to intellectual represen-
the synthetic, conceptual unification of the tations, which represent ‘things as they are’.
appearance or manifold of appearances in He further specified that appearances pre-
intuition, so that the objects of our judgments cede the logical use of the understanding,
are nothing but the appearances that are the while strictly speaking only objects of expe-
undetermined objects of an empirical intui- rience are phenomena, where experience is
tion in abstraction from the determination of when ‘several appearances are compared by
them as objective by the pure concepts, i.e., the understanding’.
categories. The term ‘appearance’ thus strad- This introduces an idealist aspect. An
dles the intuition-concept distinction. object as phenomenon must be distin-
This also explains why Kant can say that guished from a → thing in itself (B69). We
‘objects can indeed appear to us without only know things insofar as they appear to
necessarily having to be related to func- us, that is, as appearances (cf. Bxxv–xxvii,
tions of the understanding’ (A89=B122). A34–35=B51, B59ff.=A42ff.; P 283, 286,
Appearances ‘nonetheless offer objects to 288–290). Appearances are not things in
our intuition’, even if they were not found to themselves (B66=A49; A101; A165=B206),
‘accord with the conditions that the under- therefore do not exist in themselves (B164;
standing requires for the synthetic unity’ that A505=B533), which seems to suggest their
establishes objective knowledge (A90=B122– merely virtual existence in us (A127; A129)
3). This is a controversial passage, which has or that they are merely the appearing parts
recently spawned a whole debate among or aspects of things in themselves (B59=A42)
conceptualist and nonconceptualist readers (this constitutes the ‘transcendental ideality
of the relation between appearance/intuition of appearances’; A506=B534). Kant says that
and conceptual activity. The central ques- appearances are given only in an empirical
tion is to what extent conceptual activity is synthesis (B527=A499), which means that
involved in sensible intuition and whether their existence depends on the synthesis by the
appearances are in fact possible without the understanding. However, the precise relation
understanding. Sometimes, Kant argues as if between appearances and things in themselves
appearances necessarily entail possible sub- is intensely disputed (see → thing in itself).
sumption under the categories (A119). But it Notoriously, Kant also asserts that
seems clear that, for Kant, appearances are appearances are ‘mere representations’
not eo ipso objects determined by the under- (A490–491=B518–519; B522=A493–494;
standing. Appearances can be merely subjec- B535=A507; A563=B591; A537=B565;
tive (B234–236=A189–191). A104; A370, A372; A391), which might seem
Kant sometimes also refers to determi- to imply that genuine objective → reality is
nate appearances as phenomena, to differ- denied of them. But objective reality is first
entiate them from appearances generally: conferred on the appearances by the under-
‘Appearances, to the extent that as objects standing, whereas things in themselves pre-
they are thought in accordance with the cisely lack objective reality, namely a reality
unity of the categories, are called phaenom- that is determinable for and by us. The fact that
ena’ (A248–249). In ID (392–394), Kant appearances are ‘mere representations’ thus
181
Key Themes and Topics
182
Key Themes and Topics
Quite appropriately, then, Kant uses the itself’ (B133). By the fact that ‘the analytic
Leibnizian term l’aperception (cf. Leibniz, unity of apperception is only possible under
Monadology §14; Principles of Nature and the presupposition of some synthetic one’
Grace, §4) (→ Leibniz) to indicate that self- (B133) Kant means that the act of apperceiv-
consciousness must be distinguished from the ing the manifold of representations by virtue
manifold states of first-order consciousness of synthesizing them, viz. the synthetic unity
in internal perception, of which I can have of apperception, is cotemporaneous with the
a higher-order awareness. Kant frequently analytic unity or awareness of identity among
uses simply the term ‘consciousness’ when he one’s representations. Synthesis is a logically
speaks of apperception, but from the context prior condition of the analytic unity of self-
it is clear that in such cases he means self-con- consciousness. That is, a priori synthesis is
sciousness, not mere consciousness (cf. A103). both a necessary and sufficient condition for
Transcendental or pure apperception is a ‘uni- the representation of the analytical identity of
versal self-consciousness’ (B133), which it is self-consciousness. No analytic unity of the
necessary to presuppose in order to have a self- self obtains without a prior synthesis, but also
conscious awareness of one’s identical self. no a priori synthesis fails to result in an ana-
Another aspect of pure apperception, lytic unity of apperception (cf. A108).
which relates to synthesis, is its → sponta- It is this implied, or ‘antecedently con-
neity (B132) as opposed to the merely pas- ceived’ (B133n.), synthesis or synthetic unity
sive sense in which empirical apperception which provides the insight into the intertwine-
occurs, which Kant identifies with inner ment between pure apperception and objec-
sense (A107) (→ inner/outer sense). tive unity, as it is the a priori synthesis which
Pure apperception plays an important role constitutes the objective unity that makes both
in the → deduction of the categories. It is the self and the object of experience possible.
the function of unity that is required for the It is thus the act of synthesis that yields an
possibility of → experience as well as of the objective unity of representations (cf. B137; →
objects of experience. Pure apperception thus object, objectivity). Objective unity is therefore
provides the basis for the objective unity that analytically implied in pure apperception.
lies in the categories: ‘The numerical unity In the decade prior to the publication of
of this apperception therefore grounds all CPR in 1781, specifically in the so-called
concepts a priori [. . .].’ (A107) Kant shows Duisburg Nachlass, which are Kant’s notes
the interconnectedness between self-con- from 1775–76 (esp. Refl 4674–4679), Kant
sciousness and possible experience of objects first experimented with the notion of apper-
by demonstrating that an analytic unity of ception as the principle for a deduction of the
consciousness, that is, the thoroughgoing categories but it is arguably only in the second
identity of apperception, rests on an implicit version of the Deduction, published in 1787,
awareness of an a priori act of → synthesis that Kant actually manages to derive the cat-
among one’s appearances (B133; A108). egories from the principle of apperception
This synthesis is not given, but is the result by starting the argument with the so-called
of an act by means of which a manifold of rep- ‘I think’-proposition, by means of which, as
resentations is combined into a unity, whose we saw above, Kant formally defines self-
conception is the representation of ‘the identity consciousness. It should be noted however
of the consciousness in these representations that the ostensible analogy between self-
183
Key Themes and Topics
consciousness and the way we must conceive knowledge is ‘independent of all experience’
of objects continues to be a highly controver- (B2–3): it is → pure. A posteriori knowledge
sial issue among Kant commentators. – DS has its source in experience: it is empirical.
To identify the domain of a priori knowl-
Further Reading edge, Kant identifies its two characteristic fea-
tures. In modal terms, it is necessary; in terms
K. Ameriks, Kant’s Theory of Mind. An of its scope, it is strictly universal (B3–4). The
Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure latter is a covertly modal feature: it amounts
Reason, new edition (Oxford: Clarendon to the claim that ‘no exception at all is allowed
Press, 2000). to be possible’ (B4). This modality is always
K. Ameriks, ‘Kantian apperception and the understood in relation to experience, i.e.
non-Cartesian subject’, in Kant and the defined in terms of our type of cognition. The
Historical Turn. Philosophy as Critical → necessity of a priori knowledge is therefore
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, weaker than that of logical necessity; but its
2006), pp. 51–66. certainty is stronger than mere (empirical) psy-
W. Carl, Der schweigende Kant. Die chological necessity (B5). It can be described
Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der as transcendental psychological necessity.
Kategorien vor 1781 (Göttingen: After briefly showing that there is a pri-
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), ori knowledge, e.g. → mathematics (B5),
esp. pt. III. Kant outlines the central task of CPR as the
P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge examination of the possibility of a priori
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, knowledge so as to circumscribe this cogni-
1987), esp. chs 3 and 5. tive domain (A2–6=B6–10). – CO
P. Kitcher, Kant’s Thinker (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011). Further Reading
H. Klemme, Kants Philosophie des Subjekts
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1996). Ph. Kitcher, ‘A priori’, in P. Guyer (ed.),
D. Schulting, Kant’s Deduction and The Cambridge Companion to Kant
Apperception. Explaining the Categories and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge:
(Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Cambridge University Press, 2006),
Macmillan, 2012). pp. 28–60.
184
Key Themes and Topics
objects that stand under the concept of a par- its content is infinite. The mysterious mental
ticular end’ (CJ 229). The first are the primary ability to represent sensibly an idea of reason
subject matter of the Analytic and their para- creates such abundance in the representation
digmatic object is natural beauty (→ aesthetic and its details that it is by definition never
judgment). Adherent judgments are the subject fully determinate, that is, the meaning of an
matter of the sections on beautiful art (esp. artwork can never be fully articulated.
§§43–50 [CJ 303–320]) and their paradig- Genius is the distinct mental capacity that
matic object is artistic beauty. Surprisingly, art- finds an original representation that is the
works cannot be the objects of pure judgments sensible correlate of an idea of reason. The
of taste. The notion of genius and the analysis artist aspires to give concrete expression to
of the creative process elucidates why this is so. this mental representation in an artwork.
The creation of beautiful art harnesses Thus, art is a product of intentional causality.
two necessary and jointly sufficient abilities. The conception of its creator is the origin of
One is the acquired skill to produce a work its existence. An artwork is thus an end, the
according to certain academic rules of repre- product of purposive activity (→ teleology).
sentation. The other is genius, a rare innate The end of a work of art is the concept of
talent to create the original content of the what it is meant to depict. The judgment of
work, which is ‘not yet known at all before an artwork as beautiful always presupposes
the artist who made it’ (Anthr 224). Thus, this end and concept. It is for this reason that
genius endows yet unborn artworks with the judgment is adherent or ‘no longer purely
original mental content or ‘material’, whereas aesthetic’ (CJ 311). – AR
the embodiment of this material in an object
requires ‘academically trained’ skill (CJ 310). Further Reading
A detailed characterization of this original
content or, in Kant’s terminology, new rule, H. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A
is given in §49 (CJ 313–319). There are two Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic
elements to this rule: an aesthetic idea and an Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge
idea of reason. An aesthetic idea is a mental University Press, 2001), ch. 12.
representation, the origin of which is the free P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste,
creative power of the → imagination. The second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
manner in which an aesthetic idea is created University Press, 1997).
is, therefore, original (Anthr 224–225). Kant
gives two alternative formulations as to why
he names these representations ideas: the fact
that they are sensible complements of ideas Autonomy → freedom
of reason and, consequently, their endlessly
fertile indeterminacy. Axioms of Intuition
Although the imagination initially draws
the material for creating these representations The discussion of the principle of the Axioms
from nature, they represent ideas of reason of Intuition is the first part of Kant’s Analytic
(→ idea, ideas). An idea of reason always des- of Principles in CPR and thus marks the
ignates a concept which far exceeds what can opening of the detailed schematization of the
be given in intuition (A320=B377); as such, categories that was promised in the chapter
185
Key Themes and Topics
on → schematism. The question of the appli- the line is further suggested to apply to how
cability of the principles of → mathematics we are able to describe a determinate sense of
to experience has not been settled by Kant’s temporal objects since these also require that
argument for taking these principles to be an aggregative synthesis take place.
synthetic a priori in the → Transcendental This argument seems to refer back to the
Aesthetic (B40–41). Kant turns to provid- point in the A-Deduction concerning the
ing a justification for the applicability of the unity of all temporal representation (A99).
principles of mathematics to experience in the The point of insisting upon it is to suggest
first two parts of the Analytic of Principles, that empirical consciousness requires, in
which concern this section and the following order to cognize anything at all, the same
one on the → Anticipations of Perception. form of combination that is at work in gen-
These two sets of principles are thus erating mathematical objects and this is the
termed ‘mathematical’ not because they are reason for thinking that mathematical objects
principles within mathematics but rather are cognizable within experience.
because they are principles that make ‘pure The principle of the Axioms of Intuition
mathematics [. . .] applicable to objects of is explicitly presented as the basis of geo-
experience’ (A165=B206). In the second edi- metrical construction and Kant gives a
tion of CPR, just prior to the Axioms, Kant series of statements that arise naturally as
adds a note indicating that the type of → syn- cardinal for Euclidean → geometry in this
thesis involved in these ‘mathematical’ prin- context (A162–163=B203). It is these latter
ciples is a ‘composition’ in which the parts that are the Axioms and the transcendental
have no necessary connection to each other principle referring to ‘extensive magnitudes’
as when two triangles emerge from a division is the principle that makes possible their
of a square (B201n). This synthesis is gener- cognition.
ally one of homogeneous elements but, in the Kant also distinguishes here between the
case of the principle of the Axioms, it also principles of geometry and those of arith-
concerns ‘aggregates’. metic pointing out that the latter, while syn-
As is the case with many of the other thetic like those of geometry, are not general
principles the statement of this one alters as they do not describe objects that can be
between the two editions of CPR with the given in many different manners but only
A-version referring to ‘appearances’ in their their particular possibility in one way. Kant’s
intuition while the B-version merely discusses point here is that numerals are not capable
→ intuition. Both versions, however, describe of being represented in various ways, as for
intuitions as being ‘extensive magnitudes’ by example triangles are. For something to be
which is meant that they possess a represen- a part of an arithmetical addition it has to
tation whose whole only arises by means of belong to a set that enables its classification
combination of the parts (B203). with others of the same type.
This conception of ‘extensive magnitudes’ Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is
is illustrated with the example of drawing a intended to be given a ground by means of
line in thought which is meant to show that the defence of the principle of the Axioms
to get the conception of what a line involves but, while the philosophy of mathematics
we have to bring it into being, something that Kant presents has itself proved controversial,
cannot be done all at once. This point about the transcendental principles underlying it
186
Key Themes and Topics
have been more rarely treated to extended In the second section of G, Kant translates
treatment. – GB this common understanding of morality in
terms of rules or principles that will consti-
Further Reading tute the synthetic a priori judgments of prac-
tical rationality (G 412, 420). Considering
G. Banham, Kant’s Transcendental how rules operate as imperatives in practical
Imagination (Basingstoke/New York: rationality (G 413), Kant notes that we have
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), ch. 6. no difficulty making sense of hypothetical
H. Klemme, ‘Die Axiome der imperatives. Either in the form of rules of skill
Anschauung und die Antizipationen spelling out how to contribute to advancing a
der Wahrnehmung’, in G. Mohr, M. specific purpose (‘Use a serrated knife to cut
Willaschek (eds), Immanuel Kant. bread’), or counsels of prudence where the
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in the series end of happiness is assumed (‘Avoid excess’),
Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie they are essentially unproblematic because
Verlag, 1998), pp. 247–266. analytic (G 416–419).
B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to But unconditional goodness is not good-
Judge (Princeton: Princeton University ness with respect to the pursuit of a certain
Press, 1998), ch. 9. end (G 416). The command which enjoins us
to do what is morally good cannot therefore
be hypothetical, but must be categorical. For
a categorical imperative, however, the ques-
Capacity to judge → judgment tion of its possibility arises (G 419).
Kant proceeds to settle it by exhibiting the
Categorical imperative content of such an imperative. In line with
(moral law) section I, Kant claims that morality requires
our maxim of action to conform to a prac-
In the first section of G, Kant proceeds by tical law (G 420). Since all that character-
elimination to identify what is uncondition- izes this law is that it is universally valid,
ally good. Drawing on our moral intuitions, he claims that a maxim which conforms to
his investigation homes in on the good → will it must be universalizable. And since action
as the only thing that is good in itself, and on the law must be motivated by respect
independently of anything else (G 393). The for the law, it is the universalizability of
latter condition implies that the good will’s the maxim that must provide the motive
action cannot be motivated by any inclina- for morally worthy action. Kant expresses
tion, but only by reason (G 396). The concept this motivational constraint in terms of the
of duty (→ duty, duties) is then introduced requirement that it be possible simultane-
to explain the moral worth of the good will: ously to will that this maxim be universal
the good will’s action must be in accordance law (G 420–421).
with and from duty (G 397). Finally, Kant In the examples (G 421–423), Kant
unpacks the notion of duty by noting that to chooses to illustrate the application of the
do one’s duty involves acting in conformity Formula of Universal Law (FUL), by refer-
to a law (the moral law), and out of respect ring to a modified version. Here, the require-
for it (G 400). ment is the more usable one that one act as
187
Key Themes and Topics
though one’s maxim were to become a uni- is directed to an end, that of dutiful action has
versal law of nature (G 421). to be objective and hold for all rational beings
Kant shows how the FUL can be used to (G 428). Only persons have absolute worth,
identify what is forbidden by the moral law. so humanity is the only possible objective end.
There are essentially two ways in which a Kant characterizes humanity as the ability to
maxim can fail to pass the test of the FUL formulate ends for one’s actions.
(G 424). These are generally known as the con- This gives rise to the Formula of Humanity
tradiction in conception (CC) and the contra- (FH), which enjoins us never to treat others as
diction in the will (CW). Both tests essentially means only, but always also as ends (G 429).
rely upon there being basic rules of practical This formula is useful in dealing with certain
rationality. According to this ‘logic of the will’, cases of immoral actions that the FUL is not
there is a contradiction in willing an end and able to exhibit as forbidden. Its ability to
not having the means to achieve it. deal with such maxims stems from the fact
In the CC case, willing the universali- that it is the end of humanity which bestows
zation of the maxim amounts to willing a value upon the agent’s ends.
situation in which some means required by As a result, natural actions such as suicide
the end of one’s action are no longer avail- can be dealt with using the FH. Kant shows
able. In the CW case, the agent thereby wills that a maxim of committing suicide when life
that certain means which foster the pursuit becomes unbearable does not pass the FH
of her ends not be available. Thus, willing test (G 429). Indeed, an agent’s end of mak-
that all agents break their promises when ing one’s life bearable to the end acquires its
convenient amounts to willing a situation in value from that of the humanity of the agent.
which promises will no longer be accepted. To destroy his agency is to destroy the source
This contradicts (CC) the purpose of profit- of this value, which exhibits a contradiction
ing from breaking one’s promise (G 422). in terms of practical rationality.
In the second case (CW), the contradiction Kant provides two more formulations of
is located, not in the universalization itself, but the categorical imperative, each designed
rather between this universalization and the to add a different dimension to its content.
agent’s pursuits of her ends. Thus, willing that The Formula of Autonomy adds a reflexive
no-one provide help to those in need amounts dimension, i.e. defining how a moral agent
to willing that one never be helped, even when should view herself, namely as an autono-
this would serve one’s ends (G 423). mous legislator (G 432) (→ spontaneity).
As a result, the duties defined by these contra- The formula of the → kingdom of ends adds
dictions are of different strength and scope. The an inter-subjective dimension through the
first define perfect and strict duties, such as that conception of the legislator as a member of
of self-preservation. There is no room for inter- a realm of autonomous legislators (G 433–
pretation here, and the obligation can be dis- 436). Both formulas, which Kant presents
charged. The second define imperfect and broad without derivation, bring the categorical
duties, as the duty to cultivate one’s talents. There imperative closer to our intuitions.
is scope for inclinations to guide our choices and There have been a number of objections to
the obligation cannot be discharged. Kant’s conception of the categorical impera-
Kant’s FUL is only the first form of the cate- tive. Most prominently, Hegel claimed that
gorical imperative. Noting that all human action some prior knowledge of the good is required,
188
Key Themes and Topics
else the good will could be wrong about what J. Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the
is good. Hegel also seems to think an appeal Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary
to the value of certain institutions (e.g. prom- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
ising) is required if the categorical imperative 2007).
is to successfully reject maxims such as that A. Wood, ‘The supreme principle of
of breaking one’s promises. But this gets morality’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The
the order wrong: the categorical imperative Cambridge Companion to Kant and
defines what is right, and doing what is right, Modern Philosophy (Cambridge:
because one sincerely holds it to be right, is Cambridge University Press, 2006),
morally worthy. pp. 342–380.
Focusing on the FUL, Hegel claimed that A. Wood, ‘Kant’s formulations of
it is empty as it cannot, for instance, rule out the moral law’, in G. Bird (ed.), A
universal egoism. This however overlooks Companion to Kant (Malden, MA/
the fact that it is not rational to pursue an Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),
end and simultaneously not to want to be pp. 291–307.
helped to achieve it – or the end has been
wrongly formulated in the first place.
Many objections, such as Mill’s claim
that a notion of universal utility must be Categories → deduction
presupposed when carrying out the FUL
test, fail largely because of problematic Causality → Analogies of
interpretations of the notion of contradic- Experience, laws (of nature)/
tion in conception. These problems have lawfulness
been tackled in different ways in the lit-
erature, although issues remain however, Choice → will
in particular that of how specific a maxim
of action should be for the FUL testing Clear/obscure →
procedure. – CO representation
189
Key Themes and Topics
190
Key Themes and Topics
of States – which at times he seems to con- such as → logic and → mathematics devel-
sider a more prudent surrogate, cosmopoli- oped with a better understanding of what
tan right establishes standards of respect that we can discover in an object in conformity
are not only just but also conducive to the with its conception. Accordingly, Kant thinks
cosmopolitan condition. Cosmopolitan right, that a ‘Copernican revolution’ is necessary in
in this sense, anticipates the 1948 Universal metaphysics, which means that reason enacts
Declaration of Human Rights and the norma- an experiment with itself by virtue of system-
tive principles on which contemporary global atically criticizing unfounded philosophical
institutions such as the UN are based. – LC presumptions (→ method). This means that
reason must subject itself to a critique of its
Further Reading own capacity (A738=B766; cf. Bxxxv-xxxvi;
A65–66=B90–91).
D. Archibugi, ‘Immanuel Kant, cosmopolitan The elementary presumption of metaphysics
law and peace’, European Journal of seems to be that knowledge ‘must conform to
International Relations 1,4 (1995): 429–456. the → object’ (Bxvi). Kant posits the opposite
J. Bohman, M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds) hypothesis: the object of knowledge must → a
Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s priori conform to our cognition. The experi-
Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge: ment that reason enacts with itself consists in
Cambridge University Press, 1997). critically analyzing the character and scope of
O. Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law its own concepts and seeking its own ‘objective
and Peace, trans. A. Newton (Cambridge: reality’ in relation to the object of cognition.
Cambridge University Press, 2006). This results in what one may call a relativism
P. Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism ‘with a positive accent’. Our concepts must not
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, be taken as determinations of things in them-
2011). selves for we can only know for certain that
they are the forms in which we as finite beings
must de facto intuit and think them.
In a letter to Marcus Herz of 21 February
Critique 1772 (Corr-I 130), Kant formulated the fun-
damental Critical problem for the first time
Kant begins CPR with a diagnosis of the state as the problem of how our representations,
of → metaphysics in his days. Metaphysics is that is, pure concepts of the understanding
the science of → reason as such, which is a as well as forms of → intuition, may be said
kind of → knowledge that must, according to to relate to the objects of our experience, the
Kant, be scientific in a strict sense. The very solution to which is expounded in detail in
first pages of the ‘Preface’ in the second edi- CPR. His analysis starts in the ‘Introduction’
tion CPR make clear that Kant thinks that to CPR with the observation that there is
the prevailing schools of philosophy, ration- no doubt ‘that all our cognition begins with
alism and → empiricism, give conflicting experience’ (B1), but that importantly not all
accounts of the nature of metaphysics. cognition arises from → experience.
This situation reflects the fact that meta- In this respect, Kant makes a crucial dis-
physics is clearly not yet founded on a secure tinction between the → form and the mat-
scientific footing. Other domains of science ter of experience. When considering the
191
Key Themes and Topics
192
Key Themes and Topics
classes of each three ‘moments’, are those of the categories rest on the same function of the
relation, i.e. substance, causality and com- understanding on which the logical functions
munity, which play a crucial role in the → for judgment rest (→ synthesis), and in fact
Analogies of Experience. completely coincide with the latter (B159; cf.
In TD, Kant wants to show not only that P 305). The Table of the Categories is mod-
the categories are justifiably used – this con- elled on the Table of Judgment in the sense
cerns the so-called quid juris question of TD that the categories are ‘grounded on logical
(see CPR §13 [A84–92=B116–124]) – but functions in judgments’ (B131) and express
also that they are the necessary a priori con- these same functions for judgment insofar as
ditions for the possibility of objective experi- they refer to an object outside thought. More
ence. These two goals are interconnected. precisely, categories ‘are concepts of an object
TD appears in two versions in CPR, com- in general, by means of which its intuition is
monly referred to as the A- and B-Deductions regarded as determined with regard to one of
corresponding to the first (1781) and second the logical functions for judgments’ (B128).
(1787) editions of CPR. Although Kant him- There are some controversial issues con-
self stated (Bxxxviii) that the changes he made cerning the precise function of MD in relation
in the B-version were only presentational, it to the main goal of TD. This concerns, among
is clear that there are more dissimilarities other things, the fact that only 12 functions
than Kant would have us believe, so much of judgment are listed and that these pre-
so that some commentators focus entirely on sumably exhaust the series of possible func-
the A-version (such as Heidegger) and some tions for judgments. Kant thinks that if we
on the B-version of CPR. Nevertheless, the proceed in accordance with a principle then
objective of both versions of TD appears to we can derive fully a priori all the necessary
be the same: to show that experience is only elementary functions of judgment, and based
possible on condition of the applicability of on them, the necessary concepts of experi-
the categories. ence. This has been roundly criticized as it
Before Kant proceeds to show that the cat- would appear that at any rate the use of the
egories do indeed apply to any possible expe- forms of judgment, and hence the categories,
rience in the actual TD (which starts at A95 is always already assumed in any putative
and B129 respectively), Kant addresses sev- a priori demonstration of their derivability.
eral preliminary issues in the preceding sec- However, this objection rests on the assump-
tions (§§9–14). §§9–12 are usually referred tion that a deduction in the proper sense
to as the Metaphysical Deduction (MD). must be something like a derivation from an
Although there is no heading thus named, indisputable basic logical principle so as to
Kant retrospectively refers to these sections constitute a genuine proof and that the dem-
with that designation at B159. onstration conflates with experience itself.
In MD, Kant provides definitions for the Without delving further into the intrica-
terms he will use in TD and first lists, in a cies of MD and aforementioned issues, it is
Table of Categories, the various categories important to note that Kant wants to show
that will be shown, in TD, to apply necessar- that there is a link between the way that we
ily to experience. This table is derived from a think and form judgments on the basis of
table of → judgment in accord with a guiding concepts, which are functions of thought (cf.
thread (A79=B104–105), which shows that A68=B93), and the way in which we refer to
193
Key Themes and Topics
objects outside our thoughts. Put succinctly, the senses or be derived from the objects
Kant aims to show the intimate connection (B134), but requires an act of spontane-
between the subjective conditions of thought ous → synthesis (§15).
and the objective conditions of knowledge 2. The synthetic unity achieved by this act
of synthesis involves a ‘higher’ unity.
or experience (A89–90=B122). The genuine
3. The higher unity is ‘the I think [which]
challenge that Kant’s TD presents, which
must be able to accompany all my repre-
makes it an argument belonging to a → sentations’ (§16), which shows an analytic
transcendental → logic, is the counterintui- truth with regard to the → identity of my
tive claim that by analyzing the structure of self-consciousness (S) (→ apperception).
discursive thought and, also fully a priori, 4. S requires an a priori synthesis, i.e. a ‘tran-
the way that human beings are answerable scendental unity of self-consciousness’
to sensory input we can come to know all (TUS), since S by itself is a purely formal
that which makes experience of an object unity and contains no manifold.
possible, independently of that experience or 5. TUS is the consciousness of an a priori
reference to the object itself. synthesis (B135; cf. A108).
6. TUS is an objective unity of conscious-
TD is furthermore a transcendental deduc-
ness (OUC) (§17; cf. §18).
tion (a quaestio juris), and not an empirical
7. OUC constitutes the concept of an →
one (a quaestio facti), as the demonstration object as ‘that in the concept of which the
concerns not the material origin of the cat- manifold of a given intuition is united’
egories or the fact that they are used but the (B137).
rightfulness of their use, that is to say, their 8. OUC determines the objective validity of
justified applicability to objective experience. representations and defines a judgment
If Kant can show that indeed the categories (B141).
are applicable to experience, by showing that 9. All unitary intuitions are determined
they make experience possible, then he will in regard to the logical functions of
have shown their legitimate use. judgment.
10. The categories are these logical functions
If we look at the actual argument of the
insofar as the manifold is determined in
more streamlined B-Deduction, it is appar-
regard to them.
ent that Kant divides the proof into what 11. Therefore, the categories apply to a united
has been called ‘two steps’. It is controversial manifold in an intuition (§20).
how exactly these two ‘steps’ are connected,
but it is at any rate clear what the respective In the second step, which runs from §21 to
arguments are in each of these two steps. The §26, Kant argues for the necessary applica-
first step runs through §15–20 and presents tion of the categories to objects of human
the argument concerning the necessary con- sensible, i.e. spatiotemporal, experience.
ditions for the representation of an object in The second step thus provides an argument
general. The argument proceeds roughly as for the possibility of, not the mere concep-
follows: tion, but rather the perception of an actual
empirical object (cf. §22). In the important
1. C
ombination, which is the representa-
tion of a synthetic unity of the mani- §24, Kant differentiates between figurative
fold of representations in an intuition and intellectual synthesis so as to indicate
and is required for possible reference to the difference between the synthesis of rep-
an object, can never occur by means of resentations in general, which yields the pure
194
Key Themes and Topics
concept of an object, and the synthesis of make knowledge possible by being limited to
empirical representations in human sensibil- the domain of objects of experience.
ity that enables the experience of a sensible It is not only in CPR that one encounters a
object. Kant then argues in §26 that it is the deduction; also in the other Critiques are pro-
act of synthesis itself in sensibility – that is, a vided deductions. In CPrR (42ff.) the deduc-
synthesis of space and time as a priori forms tion concerns the principles of pure practical
of intuition (→ Transcendental Aesthetic) – reason (→ morality) and in CJ (279ff.) the
which establishes the synthetic unity of a spa- deduction involves the question concerning
tiotemporal object of sensible intuition. Any the legitimacy of pure aesthetic judgments of
empirical apprehension of a sensible object taste (→ aesthetic judgment). – DS
is therefore subject to the a priori synthesis
of the understanding, and a fortiori stands Further Reading
under the categories. By virtue of the same
act of synthesis that determines any manifold W. Carl, ‘Kant’s first drafts of the
in general, the understanding determines sen- Deduction’, in E. Förster (ed.), Kant’s
sible intuition and hence the unity of space Transcendental Deductions (Stanford:
and time itself, being the necessary forms Stanford University Press, 1989),
of sensible intuition, as themselves objects pp. 3–20.
of perception. This concludes the argument P. Guyer, ‘The Deduction of the Categories.
towards the legitimation of the use of the cat- The metaphysical and transcendental
egories in regard to objective experience. deductions’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The
Towards the end of §26, Kant elaborates on Cambridge Companion to Kant’s
the results of the deduction of the categories by ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (Cambridge:
arguing that ‘all appearances of nature’ stand Cambridge University Press, 2010),
under the categories. Nature itself depends pp. 118–150.
on the categories, which form the ‘original B. Longuenesse, ‘Kant on a priori concepts.
ground of its necessary lawfulness’ (→ laws The metaphysical deduction of the
(of nature)/lawfulness). But only ‘nature in categories’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
general, as lawfulness of appearances in space Companion to Kant and Modern
and time’ is concerned here, as ‘natura formal- Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
iter spectata’ (B165), not nature in terms of University Press, 2006), pp. 129–168.
its ‘particular laws’ (B165), which is ‘natura D. Schulting, Kant’s Deduction and
materialiter spectata’ (B163). Apperception. Explaining the Categories
In conclusion, in TD Kant’s general argu- (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave
ment is that (1) objects can only be thought Macmillan, 2012).
by means of the categories; (2) objects can
only be known in combination with intuition;
(3) intuition is for us always sensible, so that Desire → interest
(4) knowledge is always empirical and that
(5) therefore, knowledge is only possible of Dialectic
objects of experience. This in turn concludes
the argument for the justified use of the cat- The Transcendental Dialectic is the second
egories, as it is hereby shown that categories and largest part of the Logic in CPR. Yet its
195
Key Themes and Topics
196
Key Themes and Topics
197
Key Themes and Topics
are perfect, he claims, because one cannot The generality of duties is a matter of
coherently conceive of everyone doing the their applicability – he derives our most
opposite, whereas our duties to cultivate our general duties by considering whether the
own talents and to help others are imperfect most general reasons, those applicable to
because one can conceive of everyone doing human beings generally, might be consist-
the opposite, but nonetheless not want them ent with the formulas in the most general
to (G 421–424, 421n.). human circumstances, and he claims that
He uses the same examples to make a cor- more specific duties are to be derived by
responding claim about the formula of the considering more specific reasons in more
end in itself – namely, that a duty is perfect specific circumstances (MM 216–217,
when its opposite considers affected agents 224, 390–391, 403–404, 468–469; LE
merely as ‘things’ or ‘means’ to satisfy incli- 536–538). – TB
nations, while a duty is imperfect when its
opposite considers affected agents as ‘ends in Further Reading
themselves’ (→ kingdom of ends), but without
actively promoting these ends (G 429–430). M. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without
In MM, on the other hand, Kant distinguishes Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
political from ethical duties, or duties of justice Press, 1995), pt. 2.
from duties of → virtue, on the grounds that O. O’Neill, ‘Instituting principles: between
the former are duties merely to do or refrain duty and action’, in M. Timmons
from certain actions, since one can be coerced (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals:
to fulfil them, whereas the latter are duties to Interpretative Essays (Oxford: Oxford
recognize certain reasons for action, which University Press, 2002), pp. 331–343.
cannot be coerced. Ethical duties are therefore J. Timmermann, ‘Acting from duty:
‘imperfect’ or ‘wide’, he claims, not because inclination, reason and moral worth’, in
they allow for exceptions for the sake of non- J. Timmermann (ed.), Kant’s Groundwork
moral reasons, but only because they leave of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical
some ‘playroom’ in terms of precisely which Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University
actions fulfil or neglect them and thus allow for Press, 2009), pp. 45–62.
exceptions for the sake of fulfilling other duties
(MM 214, 218–221, 231, 239, 375, 382, 390–
391, 410–411).
Kant also presents our manner of judging Empirical realism → reality
what our duties are in two different ways.
In his treatments of the four examples in G, End(s) → categorical imperative,
he simply tests specific reasons in specific duty, freedom, interest,
circumstances against the formulas. But his teleology
account in MM is more systematic. There he
claims that in reasoning over specific cases, Enlightenment
we must balance the requirements of different
duties against each other, particularly by pri- Kant’s essay E is widely regarded as giving
oritizing political duties over ethical ones and expression to the highest ideal of the age
more general duties over more specific ones. of Enlightenment, namely the progressive
198
Key Themes and Topics
liberation of reason from superstition however, does not have connotations of ripe-
and censorship. The essay appeared in the ness. It is connected to the word for mouth,
December 1784 issue of the Berlinische Mund, and is specifically used to designate
Monatsschrift, the journal of the Berlin the coming of age, that is, having reached an
Wednesday Society, one of the many learned age at which a person is legally recognized as
societies active in Berlin at the time. The soci- independent, as having rights and responsi-
ety met regularly to discuss scientific and bilities, in short, as having a ‘voice’.
political events but also topics of broad intel- Kant’s conception of immaturity or
lectual interest, such as the benefits and dan- minority has a precise sense; it is the ‘inabil-
gers of freethinking or the role of religion in ity to make use of one’s own understand-
contemporary society. ing without direction from another’ (E 35).
Kant’s essay, as its title indicates, was The inability Kant identifies has nothing to
prompted by a question posed by Johann do with lack of capacity. Rather it has to
Friedrich Zöllner, in a piece published a year do with a settled disposition to defer to the
earlier in the then newly established journal. opinions of those who ‘set themselves up as
Zöllner, one of the leading lights of the Berlin [. . .] guardians’ and who have ‘kindly taken
Enlightenment, argued that the question it upon themselves to supervise’ the rest of us
‘what is enlightenment?’ is ‘almost as impor- (ibid.). The notion of ‘guardian’ has an obvi-
tant as the question what is truth’ and ‘yet I ous Platonic reference. → Plato entrusts the
have nowhere found it answered!’ ‘guardians’ with the protection and govern-
Kant rises to this challenge with a concise ment of the ideal city, because they know the
and resonant reply: ‘Enlightenment is human Good and are able to discriminate between
being’s emergence from his self-incurred right and wrong (Republic 375a–376c).
minority’ (E 35). He also provides a motto What Kant is saying here is that our own
for enlightenment: ‘Sapere aude! Have cour- claim to think for ourselves can be rightfully
age to make use of your own understand- asserted. He uses the legal term ‘naturaliter
ing!’ (E 35) Because of its powerful message maiorennes’, which means those who have
and accessible tone, Kant’s essay on enlight- come of age by virtue of nature and indicates
enment is one of few among his works, that, having reached a certain age, a person
together perhaps with G, to have found a is recognized by law as an adult and as no
wide non-specialist audience. However, to longer in need of supervision by a guardian.
properly understand Kant’s answer to the The treatment proposed in the essay is
question of enlightenment an appreciation nothing short of revolutionary. To take the
of his broader philosophical commitments first steps to maturity all that is needed is
is necessary. enlightenment, which consists in the ‘freedom
Kant’s essay makes a diagnosis and then to make public use of one’s reason’ (E 36)
proposes a treatment. The diagnosis is ‘self- (→ reason). This use of reason is one anyone
incurred minority [selbst verschuldeten can make, Kant insists. So we are all invited
Unmündigkeit]’. The sometime translation to suspend our habitual reliance on external
of the German terms mündig and unmündig authority and assert the rights of our own
as ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ respectively, gives reason. This is not mere self-assertion, how-
the misleading impression that Kant refers ever. Rather, we are asked to submit our rea-
to an organic process. The adjective mündig, soning to a putatively universal public.
199
Key Themes and Topics
200
Key Themes and Topics
to Kant’s lectures testify (LE 175–177). In a with affect. ‘This state of mind’, Kant says,
footnote in Obs Kant writes: ‘seems to be sublime, so much so that it is
commonly maintained that without it noth-
Fanaticism [Schwärmerei] must always ing great can be accomplished’. In particular,
be distinguished from enthusiasm enthusiasm is ‘aesthetically sublime, because
[Enthusiasmus]. The former believes it is a stretching of the powers through ideas,
itself to feel an immediate and extraor-
which give the mind a momentum that acts
dinary communion with a higher nature,
far more powerfully and persistently than
the latter signifies the state of the mind
which is inflamed beyond the appropri- the impetus given by sensory representa-
ate degree by some principle, whether it tions’ (CJ 272).
be by the maxim of patriotic virtue, or of Fanaticism, instead, is ‘a delusion of being
friendship, or of religion, without involv- able to see something beyond all bounds
ing the illusion of a supernatural com- of sensibility, i.e., to dream in accordance
munity. (Obs 251n.; cf. DSS 348, 365) with principles (to rave with reason) [. . .]’
(CJ 275). In CF, Kant explains the anthro-
What distinguishes fanaticism from enthu- pological importance of the concept of
siasm is the belief in the implication of a ‘enthusiasm’:
supernatural and divine cause in the deter-
mination of the activity of the mind. In par- [T]he passionate participation in the
ticular, Kant has in mind the British moral good with affect, i.e., enthusiasm
philosophers such as Shaftesbury and also (although not to be wholly esteemed,
since all affect as such deserves censure),
→ Pietism.
provide[s] through this history the occa-
In the contemporary essay EMH, Kant
sion for the following remark which is
gives concrete examples from morality by important for anthropology: genuine
distinguishing enthusiasm from fanaticism enthusiasm always moves only toward
and considering the latter as a negative aspect what is ideal and, indeed, to what is
of the life of the mind, which is deceived by purely moral, such as the concept of
false appearances (or chimeras): right, and it cannot be grafted onto self-
interest. (CF 86; trans. amended)
This two-sided appearance of fantasy in
moral sensations that are in themselves In this last moral sense enthusiasm is referred
good is enthusiasm [Enthusiasmus], to also in CPrR (cf. CPrR 157) and it is
and nothing great has ever been accom-
extremely important for Kant’s ethics and
plished in the world without it. Things
philosophy of history. – MS
stand quite differently with the fanatic
(visionary, enthusiast [Schwärmer]).
The latter is properly a deranged person Further Reading
with presumed immediate inspiration
and a great familiarity with the powers R. Clewis, The Kantian Sublime and the
of the heavens. Human nature knows no Revelation of Freedom (Cambridge:
more dangerous illusion. (EMH 267) Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.
169–214.
In CJ, Kant asserts that enthusiasm arises P. Fenves (ed.), Raising the Tone of
when the idea of the good is connected Philosophy. Late Essays by Immanuel
201
Key Themes and Topics
202
Key Themes and Topics
their source in the understanding itself. He The sense of experience meant here is the
also believes that a proper understanding above-mentioned first sense and concerns
of experience will enable him to explain the the sensations of outer and inner sense (→
possibility of synthetic a priori cognition – it inner/outer sense) that are the matter of
is rooted in the formal conditions of experi- experience.
ence and so our synthetic a priori theoretical It is also important to note, however, that
cognition is grounded in what is required for according to Kant, sensibility does not just
the possibility of experience. contribute to the material conditions of expe-
Kant opposes the empiricist view (→ rience. For it is essential to realize that, along
empiricism) that the senses not only provide with the pure concepts of understanding, the
us with impressions, but also with the way pure forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time
they are connected. One of Kant’s most fun- (→ Transcendental Aesthetic), are a compo-
damental assertions is that ‘the combination nent of the formal conditions of experience. In
(conjunctio) of a manifold in general can order for sensations to be either outer or inner,
never come to us through the senses’ (B129). this already presupposes the representations
Instead, ‘all combination [. . .] is an action of of respectively space and time (although being
the understanding’ (B130). sensations outer sensations are also always
As a result, according to Kant, ‘experi- in time). According to Kant, then, outer and
ence itself is a kind of cognition requiring the inner experience is only possible through the
understanding, whose rule I have to presup- representations of space and time.
pose in myself before any object is given to The formal and material conditions
me, hence a priori’ (Bxvii). Experience is not of experience play a crucial role in the →
something simply given as a fact to which we Analogies of Experience and in the →
must then apply our understanding. Instead, Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General
experience is only first made possible through (A218=B265ff.). According to the first pos-
the synthetic activity (→ synthesis) of the tulate, if something fits within the frame-
imagination and understanding. work of the formal conditions of experience,
Once the necessary contribution of the then it is possible. According to the second
understanding in the production of experi- postulate, if something can be connected
ence is recognized, however, it would none- with the material conditions of experi-
theless be a mistake to conclude on that basis ence (i.e. with perception), then it is actual.
that experience can arise through the intel- Finally, according to the third postulate, if
lect alone – this is a mistake Kant believes → something ‘is determined through the con-
Leibniz was led into as a result of his intel- nection of perceptions in accordance with
lectualizing space and time. For sensibility is concepts, then the object is called necessary’
also an essential component of experience. (A234=B286–287). – SB
In order to have experience at all, there
must be something to experience. As Kant Further reading
puts it, right at the beginning of the intro-
duction to CPR (B1), ‘[t]here is no doubt S. M. Bayne, Kant on Causation. On the
whatever that all our cognition begins with Fivefold Routes to the Principle of
experience’, by means of which ‘the cogni- Causation (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
tive faculty [is] awakened into exercise’. 2004), ch. 1.
203
Key Themes and Topics
204
Key Themes and Topics
a judgment of taste (CJ 223) (→ aesthetic make them happy or cultivates one’s own
judgment). – MQ skills because this improves one’s own ability
to act for reasons (G 428–430).
Further Reading The formula of autonomy emphasizes
that one’s will is thus autonomous, or self-
R. Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form (New legislating, in the sense that the reasons for
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). which one acts fundamentally concern only
the will, something which one appreciates
simply as and because one is a will, rather
than for other, contingent reasons (G 431–
Forms of intuition (pure 433; CPrR 33–41).
intuition) → INTUITION Kant considers the will’s autonomy also to
presuppose the will’s freedom in the sense of
Freedom its being undetermined by antecedent causes.
He appeals to his → transcendental idealism
Kant conceives of freedom primarily in terms to claim that we need not consider ourselves
of the autonomy, or self-legislation, of the merely as objects of possible experience, sub-
will. By → will he means one’s ability to act ject to determination by antecedent causes,
for reasons and he considers autonomy to and that we may consider, if not experience,
consist in taking this ability itself – whether ourselves otherwise. He also argues that in
one’s own or others’ – as a reason for action. acting according to moral reasons, and so
He also thinks that this autonomy coincides achieving autonomy, the will causes actions
with moral goodness, such that an autono- in a way that differs from that of antecedent
mous will is also a ‘good will’. causes of changes in the objects of possible
He emphasizes these claims in presenting experience and is thus underdetermined by
his basic understanding of → morality in G such causes (CPrR 28–29; G 450).
and particularly with his formulas of the end In some passages, he also argues that
in itself and autonomy. The formula of the this freedom is manifested in a variety of
end in itself describes a morally good action other ways – in acting for reasons, whether
as one done considering each affected agent as moral or not (A532–534=B560–562, A800–
an ‘end in itself’ (→ kingdom of ends) – that is, 803=B828–831; P 344–347; G 455–457),
as something of such value that he or she may in producing ‘ideas’ (→ idea, ideas) that go
not be used merely as a ‘thing’ or a ‘means’ for beyond the objects of possible experience (G
satisfying one’s own or others’ inclinations. 447–463), or in being responsible for actions
The examples that he gives in presenting in the sense of their being within one’s ‘con-
this formula show that, for Kant, to con- trol’ (CPrR 94–100) – and in G he argues
sider each affected agent as an end in itself that this freedom implies the will’s autonomy,
is to consider each affected agent’s will as since the only alternative to determination by
itself providing reasons to do or refrain from antecedent causes is such moral self-determi-
action – as when one refrains from mak- nation (G 446–447) (→ spontaneity). But
ing false promises because others could not in CPrR he insists that this freedom must
consent to this, helps others to get what they be considered simply as a presupposition
want because they consider these things to of autonomy and cannot be demonstrated
205
Key Themes and Topics
206
Key Themes and Topics
developed, which deny Euclid’s fifth postu- geometry is a particularly suitable conven-
late. Whereas in Euclidean geometry there tional choice, e.g. according to a criterion of
is one and only one line parallel to a given simplicity.
straight line and passing through a point Second, this would leave us with the pos-
external to it, in hyperbolic geometry there sibility of other ways of intuiting non-Eucli-
are infinitely many such parallel lines, and in dean figures, e.g. by making use of models of
elliptic geometry there are none. elliptic and hyperbolic geometry in Euclidean
Some commentators view Kant’s pro- space. This would amount to different ways
nouncement on the logical possibility of of schematizing geometrical concepts than
denying fundamental mathematical proposi- suggested at A141=B180. The resulting for-
tions (B14) as creating the conceptual space mal intuitions would represent non-Eucli-
for non-Euclidean geometry. Others see his dean geometrical concepts; the generated
geometry as necessarily Euclidean insofar as images are both Euclidean and ostensive con-
geometric results are obtained by construc- structions (under the selected model). Such
tion in space, and such constructions are constructions share properties with both
Euclidean. While the former view generally Kant’s ostensive and symbolic constructions
mistakenly sees Kant as a forerunner of axi- (A717=B745) (→ mathematics).
omatic geometry, the latter overlooks the dis- Our formal intuition of perceptual space
tinction between space as form of intuition is three-dimensional, and this feature is
and as geometrical space. important for Kant’s interest in incongruent
Two observations are useful with regard to counterparts. Kant first discusses them in the
the issue of Kant and non-Euclidean geom- pre-Critical essay DS (1768), which argues
etry. First, Kantian examples of Euclidean against → Leibniz’s relational view of space.
plane geometry (A717ff.=B745ff.) easily let According to Kant, counterparts such as the
us overlook the distinction between geo- right and the left hand are spatial objects for
metrical image and a priori spatial intuition. which all internal relations are identical, but
The latter is a transcendental condition of which are not superposable. That is to say, it
spatial images which instantiate it. But the is not possible to turn the one into the other
actual generation of images involves empiri- using a rigid continuous transformation.
cal conditions connected with the specificity Kant’s argument successfully shows that
of our perceptual apparatus, and this may this property of incongruence depends upon
explain the Euclidean framework’s privi- the nature of space as a whole. Kant con-
leged status. cludes that this invalidates the Leibnizian
The suggestion is therefore that the fact relational theory of space. In ID (1770), Kant
that our images are Euclidean is ultimately examines the epistemological implications of
a feature of our perception that is related to this conclusion. Knowledge of space cannot
our embodiment in space, and to the conven- be intellectual: sensibility does not therefore
tion of how to formalize it. It is therefore provide a confused type of knowledge, but is
not a priori, thus distinguishing a posteriori rather a distinct source of cognition.
applied geometry from a priori pure geome- The Critical Kant concludes (A283=B339)
try. This does not involve the mistaken claim that, since the relational properties of things in
that our perceptual geometry is Euclidean, themselves must only be dependent upon their
but rather the observation that Euclidean intrinsic properties, spatial objects are not
207
Key Themes and Topics
208
Key Themes and Topics
209
Key Themes and Topics
210
Key Themes and Topics
211
Key Themes and Topics
212
Key Themes and Topics
of inner or outer ‘objects’, belong to the but merely a function of unity among one’s
mind and thus to inner sense. Time, Kant representations in an intuition that is given to
says, is the ‘immediate condition of the it. Apperception, ‘under the designation of a
inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby transcendental synthesis of the imagination’,
also the mediate condition of outer appear- ‘exercises that action on the passive subject’
ances’ (B50=A34). However, the represen- (B153). The inner sense, which is mere form
tations of outer sense ‘make up the proper of intuition, containing no synthetic unity, is
material with which we occupy our mind’ in this way affected by the act of appercep-
(B67). They are the actual matter of all our tion, which combines and hence determines
representations. the manifold in inner sense.
The → form of → intuition is, Kant tells Inner sense is also central to the argument
us, nothing other than ‘the way in which the of the → Refutation of Idealism, where Kant
mind is affected by its own activity’, that is, attempts to undermine the ostensible threat
‘affected through itself’ (B67–68) and this of idealism, and which continues to occupy
makes it an inner sense (B68). The subject Kant’s mind afterwards, judging by the
as → appearance is the object of this inner numerous Reflexionen that Kant wrote in
sense (B68), not the subject as its own self- the years after the publication of the second
activity. But the question is ‘how a subject edition of CPR, which reflect on the problem
can internally intuit itself’ (ibid.). Kant notes of idealism (see esp. Refl 5655 and LenFr in
that → apperception or self-consciousness is relation to inner sense). – DS
only a simple representation through which
nothing manifold is given; if a manifold were Further Reading
given in it, then the inner intuition would be
intellectual and would be identical to apper- H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.
ception. But as apperception is merely sim- An Interpretation and Defense, revised
ple, ‘an inner perception of the manifold that & enlarged edition (New Haven: Yale
is antecedently given in the subject’ (B68), University Press, 2004), ch. 10, pt. I.
independently of the spontaneity of the G. Mohr, Das sinnliche Ich. Innerer Sinn
mind, is required. This justifies the distinc- und Bewußtsein bei Kant (Würzburg:
tion between self-consciousness as spontane- Königshausen & Neumann, 1991).
ous self-activity (→ spontaneity) and the way
the mind is affected by it in inner sense, and
is thus passive.
At B153ff. Kant reiterates the argument Intellect → judgment
from B68 and notices that it might strike one (understanding)
as paradoxical that we only intuit ourselves
‘as we are internally affected’ by ourselves. Intellectual synthesis →
How can the same ‘I’ be both passive and synthesis
active?
To explain this, Kant again sharply discrim- Interest
inates between inner sense and apperception.
The function of apperception, the activity of For Kant, the notion of ‘interest’ is of impor-
the understanding, is not a faculty of intuition tance in a variety of contexts. Most generally,
213
Key Themes and Topics
interest drives a finite rational agent towards an far from easy to comprehend the interest that
end: it is the ‘dependence of a contingently deter- explains the legislation of an autonomous
minable will on principles of reason’ (G 413n; will and the role that the feeling of respect
see also G 460n, MM 212, CJ 204, 207). plays in moral agency (CPrR 71–89, esp.
By way of a deep-seated analogy, Kant 79–81; see also MM 399–403) (→ categori-
speaks of the interests of our faculties: ‘Reason, cal imperative). Were a sceptic to ask us why
as the faculty of principles, determines the inter- morality has ‘a worth so great that there can
est of all the powers of the mind but itself deter- be no higher interest anywhere [. . .] we could
mines its own’ (CPrR 119–120). → Reason is give him no satisfactory answer’ (G 449ff.;
by nature architectonic; its most fundamental cf. G 459–463). Kant’s ultimate answer seems
end is to discover an absolute foundation for → simply to be that the law interests us because
knowledge (A474ff.=B502ff.) (→ system). This it arises ‘from our proper self’ (G 461).
speculative interest leads it uncritically to claim Kant lays great emphasis on the claim
knowledge of what lies beyond the bounds of → that judgments of taste are disinterested (CJ
experience, in particular, to the → Paralogisms, 203–205) (→ aesthetic judgment). Although
→ Antinomies and → proofs of the existence they are expressions of pleasure, it is neither
of God (A340ff.=B398ff.). However, the psy- merely sensual nor moral (CJ 205–211).
chological, cosmological and theological ideas Finding a thing beautiful (or → sublime) is
do have a necessary regulative role in leading ‘merely contemplative, i.e., a judgment [. . .]
reason towards systematic unity (A671=B699) indifferent with regard to the existence of an
(→ regulative principles, system). object [. . .]’ (CJ 209). Nevertheless, it is ‘also
The discussion of the conditions and limits not directed to concepts; for the judgment of
of knowledge answers the first of the three taste is not a cognitive judgment [. . .]’ (CJ
questions that unite all interests of reason: ‘1. 209). Aesthetic judgment expresses pleasure
What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. in the interaction of our mental faculties.
What may I hope?’ (A805=B833). The sec- From the disinterestedness of aesthetic judg-
ond question is answered by moral theory ments follows their claim to universality (CJ
(→ morality); it does not lead reason beyond 211–212) and the difficulty of judging objects
its bounds. The third reveals that its practical purely aesthetically. Though aesthetic judg-
interest reaches farther than the theoretical. ments are essentially disinterested, the beauty
The moral imperative cannot be separated of → art promotes our natural interest in socia-
from the hope for happiness and thus from bility and finding nature beautiful is a mark of
the belief that a wise creator rewards moral- interest in the good (CJ 296–303). – IG
ity and that the striving for it is endless (CPrR
122–132). Theoretical reason cannot prove
moral → freedom, God’s existence or the
soul’s immortality. Reason’s interest is ‘com- Intuition
plete in practical use alone’ (CPrR 121).
Central to Kant’s practical philosophy is The term ‘intuition’ (Anschauung), whose
the distinction between pathological interests Latin cognates are already introduced by
in natural ends that satisfy desires and a pure Kant in ID (387, 396, 402–403) to differen-
moral interest that is simply the feeling of tiate a sensible form of → knowledge that
‘respect for the law’ (G 401n). However, it is is irreducible to intellectual (conceptual)
214
Key Themes and Topics
knowledge, denotes a direct reference to a extent that knowledge should arise from it;
particular or → object, which cannot be cap- Kant famously says that intuitions without
tured by a concept. In Kant’s theory of con- concepts are blind, and that concepts with-
cepts (→ logic), a concept is always a general out intuitions are empty (A51=B75). This
or universal → representation, never a repre- dictum in fact conveys the idea that only
sentation of a singular thing. An intuition is intuitions are the means by which empirical
‘immediately related to the object and is sin- content is provided – that is, that an immedi-
gular’, whereas a concept is always ‘mediate, ate relation to the perceived object by way of
by means of a mark, which can be common sensations is established – whereas concepts
to several things’ (A320=B377; cf. A19=B33; are the forms necessary to objectively deter-
ID 396). ‘That representation [ . . . ] which can mine this content.
only be given through a single object, is an Nevertheless, intuitions are not just
intuition’ (B47=A32). Hence, unlike concepts empirical content, but also have a necessary
an intuition is not a discursive representa- → form. Hence, Kant distinguishes between
tion, which can be represented of a plurality → pure and empirical intuition, where the
of objects. Only by means of sensibility can former is the necessary form of the lat-
intuitions, through which alone objects can ter. An intuition is empirical if it contains a
be presented to us, be given. manifold of sensations, which is the matter
Three criteria for intuitions can be iden- of an intuition. Furthermore, the object of
tified: (1) the immediacy criterion; (2) the an empirical intuition is an → appearance.
singularity criterion; and (3) the dependency On the other hand, ‘pure intuition contains
criterion. merely the form under which something is
The first criterion concerns the above- intuited’ (A50=B74), and is → a priori. Pure
noted aspect of the direct relation of an intui- intuition is the ‘pure form of sensibility’
tion to its object, unlike a concept, which is (A20–21=B34–35), and contains nothing but
only indirectly related to an object by means relations (B66–67).
of other concepts or by means of an intuition The two pure intuitions at the centre of
(A68=B93). The second aspect, as noted, indi- Kant’s argument in the → Transcendental
cates that an intuition picks out a particular. Aesthetic are space and time (B38–40,
The third concerns an often ignored element, 46–47). Already in ID, published eleven
namely the fact that intuitions only exist on years prior to CPR, it is argued that space
the basis of a given object. An intuition ‘takes (as well as time) is a pure intuition and is
place only insofar as the object is given to the ‘very form of all sensory intuition’ (ID
us’ (A19=B33). That is, the existence of an 402–403). Space and time are the ‘formal
intuition is dependent on the existence of an principle[s] of our intuition’, i.e. ‘the condi-
object (i.e. an as yet undetermined object or tion under which something can the object of
appearance) (B72; P 281). By contrast, a con- our senses’, hence the ‘condition of sensitive
cept need not depend on an actually existing cognition’ (ID 396). Space and time as mere
object (the concept of a unicorn, say). forms of intuition become formal intuitions
While Kant sharply distinguishes between – and so objects in their own right, which in
intuitions and concepts, whose roles must not the case of space can be studied in → geom-
be mixed up (A52=B76), he also importantly etry – under the influence of the → synthesis
argues for their necessary connection to the of the → imagination (B160–1n.).
215
Key Themes and Topics
216
Key Themes and Topics
the understanding, or act of thought, comes understanding (the categories) predicates are
down to an act of judgment, defined as the related such that they refer to a determinate
capacity to subsume under rules. ‘Therefore, object of intuition that is subsumed under the
thinking is the same as judging’ (P 304). subject predicate. As Kant is reported to have
This analysis forms the basis of Kant’s said in LL 928: ‘A judgment is the representa-
claim in the guiding thread (A79=B104– tion of the way that concepts belong to one
105) that ‘[t]he same function [i.e. ‘the same consciousness universally[,] objectively.’
understanding’, D.S.] that gives unity to the In FI and CJ, Kant makes a distinction
different representations in a judgment also between a ‘determinative’ judgment and a
gives unity to the mere synthesis of differ- ‘merely reflecting’ judgment, corresponding to
ent representations in an intuition’, which the determining and reflecting powers of judg-
yields the pure concepts of the understand- ment respectively (FI 211; cf. CJ 179). For Kant,
ing, the categories (→ deduction, synthesis). this distinction is important for arguing for the
That is to say, the elementary functions for possibility of finding among the multiplicity
judgment, which are listed in the Table of of the empirical objects of nature a common
Judgment, correspond in a strong sense to ground for their unity and arriving at empirical
the pure concepts by means of which the concepts and their thorough interconnection
connection between the understanding and a into empirical laws. Other than with determi-
determinate → object is made possible. native judgment in the context of establishing
The elementary functions for judgments the possibility of determinate knowledge, where
are what, apart from the modal forms, ‘its transcendental schematism serves it [. . .] as
makes up the content of a paradigmatic a rule under which given empirical intuitions
subject–predicate judgment. The quantita- are subsumed’ (FI 212) so as to provide an
tive moments concern the predicate of a object for the judgment, the reflecting power of
judgment being attributed to either all, some judgment ‘proceeds with given appearances, in
or a particular thing(s) that are/is subsumed order to bring them under empirical concepts
under the subject. The qualitative moments of determinate natural things [. . .] in accord-
relate to whether the copula in a judgment is ance with the general but at the same time
affirmative, negative or infinite. Furthermore, indeterminate principle of a purposive arrange-
a judgment is characterized by three possible ment in a system’ (FI 213–214).
relations among its predicates: either it is cat- The power of judgment in its ‘merely
egorical, hypothetical or disjunctive. reflective’ mode proceeds empirically and
These elementary unitary forms corre- ascends from the particular to the general
spond to the categories being those very and unlike judgment in its determining mode,
same forms in respect of their relation to which subsumes the particular under a uni-
the intuition of an object. This is why Kant versal, it does not yield a determinate concept
identifies, at a crucial stage in the argument of an object. Therefore, a reflective judgment
in the Transcendental Deduction (§19) (→ is not objectively but merely subjectively nec-
deduction, object), a judgment as ‘nothing essary. Examples of such judgments are →
other than the way to bring given cogni- aesthetic judgment and teleological judgment
tions to the objective unity of apperception’ (→ teleology).
(B141; cf. MFNS 476n. and Refl 5933), i.e. In potential conflict with the account
the way that by means of the concepts of the of judgment in CPR is the distinction Kant
217
Key Themes and Topics
makes in P, published three years before Kant This something is → experience, from which
first defined judgment as an objective unity analytic judgments are, by contrast, entirely
of representations in MFNS (476n.), between independent for their comprehension.
judgments of experience and judgments of All judgments of experience are synthetic.
perception. The former are ‘empirical judg- However, not all synthetic judgments are
ments, insofar as they have objective validity’, empirical judgments of experience, i.e. a pos-
whereas the latter ‘are only subjectively valid’ teriori. Crucially, Kant also talks about syn-
and ‘do not require a pure concept of the thetic a priori judgments (→ synthesis). These
understanding, but only the logical connec- judgments are amplificatory but nonetheless
tion of perceptions in a thinking subject’ (P → a priori, and do therefore not depend on
298). Judgments of perception do not appear experience. Typical synthetic a priori judg-
to be consistent with the definition of judg- ments are ‘Everything that happens has its
ment provided in §19 of CPR. cause’ (A9=B13) or such mathematical judg-
Most importantly, although the grounding ments as ‘7+5=12’ (B15) or ‘The straight line
of both reduces to the same original synthetic between two points is the shortest’ (B16) (→
unity of apperception (cf. B133–134n.), Kant mathematics, geometry). The principle that
differentiates sharply between analytic and makes these judgments possible is what is
synthetic judgment (A6ff.=B10ff.). Analytic expressed by the synthetic a priori.
judgments are merely clarificatory in that In natural science, synthetic a priori judg-
they are propositions whereby the predicate ments are precisely the principles which
is already implicitly contained in the subject enable objective empirical experiences and
term of the judgment and can be made explicit form the subject content of the chapter in
by means of conceptual → analysis alone. The CPR that deals with the ‘synthetic principles
sole principle on which analytic judgments of pure understanding’ (B197ff.=A158ff.)
rest is the → principle of (non-)contradiction. (→ Axioms of Intuitions, Anticipations of
The reference to any underlying intuition of an Perception, Analogies of Experience). – DS
object is otiose as it does not contribute to the
understanding of the relation between subject Further Reading
and predicate, which is merely conceptual.
A synthetic judgment, by contrast, is a B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to
judgment where the predicate is not already Judge (Princeton: Princeton University
contained in the subject; synthetic judgments Press, 1998).
do not rest on strict conceptual identity
among their predicates. The predicate really
amplifies knowledge that is not already con-
tained in the subject term of a judgment (cf. Judgment of taste → aesthetic
JL 111; P 266–268). That which increases judgment
the knowledge beyond the information con-
tained in the predicates must be something Kingdom of ends
‘in addition to the concept of the subject [.
. .] on which the understanding depends in By ‘kingdom’, or better ‘realm [Reich]’,
cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that Kant understands ‘a systematic union of
concept as nevertheless belonging to it’ (A8). various rational beings through common
218
Key Themes and Topics
laws’ (G 433). Rational beings, for Kant, ‘Morality’, Kant says, ‘consists [. . .] in the refer-
are characterized by two features: (1) they ence of all action to the lawgiving by which
determine freely their own ends and (2) they alone a kingdom of ends is possible’ (G 434).
can follow the moral law. This last capacity Acting morally, in other words, means acting
grounds their intrinsic dignity. As Kant puts as if we were members (legislators and at the
it: ‘Morality, and humanity insofar as it is same time subjects) of a kingdom of ends. A
capable of morality, is that which alone has rational, autonomous being cannot but see
dignity.’ (G 435) himself as member of a kingdom of ends.
If we think of this ‘systematic union’ by To deny such membership would be tan-
abstracting from the particular ends rational tamount to denying one’s transcendental
beings may have in virtue of their inclina- → freedom, that is, one’s ability to legislate
tions, rational beings are thought of merely from the universal point of view required by
as subject to the moral law (the sole ‘com- the moral law, which in turn would be tanta-
mon law’ that remains if such abstraction is mount to denying one’s own personality.
made). We thus arrive at the notion of king- The close relationship between the idea
dom of ends: of the kingdom of ends and that of moral-
ity is also made evident by the fact that one
[A]ll rational beings stand under the law of the formulas of the → categorical impera-
that each of them is to treat himself and all tive turns on this notion, namely that ‘every
others never merely as means but always rational being must act as if he were by his
at the same time as ends in themselves.
maxims at all times a lawgiving member
But from this there arises a systematic
of the universal kingdom of ends’ (G 438).
union of rational beings through common
objective laws, that is, a kingdom, which Stated as an imperative this becomes: ‘[A]ct
can be called a kingdom of ends (admit- in accordance with the maxims of a member
tedly only an ideal) [. . .]. (G 433) giving universal laws for a merely possible
kingdom of ends.’ (G 439)
In this kingdom, not only do rational beings This formula brings to light one of the crucial
treat each other as ends in themselves, but dimensions of moral agency, namely the neces-
they are also the authors of the laws to which sity in our moral reasoning to rise to the level of
they are subject. If a member is ‘not subject an ideal legislator of an equally ideal kingdom
to the will of any other’ (G 433) and if ‘he is a to enact laws which could earn acceptance by
completely independent being, without needs a community of fully rational agents.
and with unlimited resources adequate to Interestingly, in CPrR, Kant clarifies that
his will’ (G 434), then this member belongs we should not think of ourselves as sover-
to the kingdom as a sovereign (Oberhaupt). eigns in the kingdom of ends, at least if this
Therefore, rational yet finite beings such as implies failing to recognize our inferior posi-
ourselves belong to the kingdom as members tion as creatures in this kingdom, that is,
and as legislators. An infinite rational being as beings that necessarily stand under the
such as God belongs to it as sovereign. authority of the law. As Kant puts it:
Although ‘only an ideal’ (G 433), the
notion of kingdom of ends plays a crucial role We are indeed lawgiving members of a
in Kant’s ethical system. In fact, it is intrinsi- kingdom of morals possible through free-
cally connected to the very idea of → morality. dom [. . .] but we are at the same time
219
Key Themes and Topics
subjects in it, not its sovereign, and to sensibility and the understanding respec-
fail to recognize our inferior position as tively, or what Kant intriguingly refers to as
creatures and to deny from self-conceit the ‘two stems of human cognition, which
the authority of the holy law is already to may perhaps arise from a common but to us
defect from it in spirit, even though the let-
unknown root’ (B29).
ter of the law is fulfilled. (CprR 82–83)
However, Kant states that knowledge
in the strict sense can only arise from the
We are authorized to think of ourselves as combination of → intuition and concept, as
legislators of the kingdom, because the moral ‘[t]houghts without content are empty,
law springs from our own reason, but not [and] intuitions without concepts [. . .]
as sovereigns. The law in fact presents itself blind’ (A51=B75). More in particular,
with absolute authority and exacts subor- knowledge or cognition, according to
dination. It is an absolute command (albeit Kant in a late essay, ‘is a judgment from
self-imposed), quite different from the dis- which proceeds a concept that has objec-
cretionary power usually associated with the tive reality, i.e., to which a corresponding
idea of sovereignty. – LC object can be given in experience’ (PE 266).
Furthermore, knowledge is → transcenden-
Further Reading tal when it concerns not objects but the
faculty of knowledge itself in respect of its
K. Flikschuh, ‘Kant’s kingdom of ends: a priori application to things (A11–12, cf.
metaphysical, not political’, in J. P 293).
Timmermann (ed.), Kant’s Groundwork The various forms of knowledge that
of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Kant recognizes depend on the various
Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University forms of → judgment. One can distinguish
Press, 2009), pp. 119–139. four basic types of knowledge. Knowledge,
C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of like judgment, can be analytic, synthetic, a
Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University posteriori or → a priori. Analytic knowledge
Press, 1996), pt. I. is purely formal (cf. JL 111), ‘from mere
J. Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the concepts’ (A47=B64; cf. A7–8). ‘With ana-
Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary lytic cognition I make a given concept dis-
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, tinct’ (LL 845). It rests essentially on the →
2007). principle of (non-)contradiction. Knowledge
is synthetic when the predicate of the judg-
ment is not a part of the subject. A posteriori
knowledge consists in empirical judgments
Knowledge (cognition) drawn from → experience, whereas a pri-
ori knowledge is independent of all percep-
In the so-called Stufenleiter, an ‘objective tion and all experience. These four types of
perception’, that is, a perception that refers knowledge were already identified by Kant
to an → object, is defined as knowledge in a reflection dating from around 1770: ‘All
(Erkenntnis) or cognition, which ‘is either knowledge is based in either empirical or
an intuition or a concept (intuitus vel con- rational principles; the latter are either logi-
ceptus)’ (B376=A320), corresponding to cal or real.’ (Refl 4162)
220
Key Themes and Topics
Kant’s question concerning the possibility the section of the CPR called the Discipline
of knowledge in general reduces to the cen- of Pure Reason. Specifically, the two forms
tral question of his theoretical philosophy: of rational knowledge are philosophical
‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possi- knowledge ‘from concepts’, which consid-
ble?’ (B19) The question can be rephrased as ers the particular only in the universal, and
follows: Can one speak of a priori synthetic mathematical knowledge ‘from the construc-
(non-analytic) judgments which are both tion of concepts’, which, by contrast, con-
necessary and universally valid? How is it siders ‘the universal in the particular, indeed
possible for there to be any sort of necessity even in the individual, yet nonetheless a pri-
of or within experience? ori and by means of reason’ (A714=B742).
‘To know is to judge something and hold Philosophical knowledge is divided into pure
it to be true with certainty’ (LL 148). All and empirical cognition (A840=B868). It is
knowledge consists in the recognition of a sub-divided further into propaedeutic and
→ necessity. Such necessity is at once formal → metaphysics, the latter comprising the
and material. Apodictic judgments express a metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics
lawfulness that does not in any way abstract of morals (cf. A841=B869).
from the given material of the actual (→ In contrast to the rationalists, who derive
laws (of nature)/lawfulness). Necessity in all knowledge from a single principle (the
this sense consists in the framing of the real principle of non-contradiction), and the
in accordance with a rule; it is the relation empiricists (→ empiricism), who gladly
of an object to thinking insofar as thinking renounce the programme of systematizing
determines the being of the object itself. An knowledge, Kant wrestled with the question
apodictic judgment is one that, like the con- of architectonic and the systematic unity of
clusion of a syllogism, can never be contin- knowledge intensively for his entire life (→
gent, but rather contains necessity in itself: system). Questions concerning the taxonomy
‘[T]he conclusion is always accompanied of knowledge are prominent in Kant’s think-
with the consciousness of necessity and con- ing from DSS onwards. – GM/SS
sequently has the dignity of an apodeictic
proposition.’ (JL 122)
The formal unity of consciousness, or the
transcendental unity of apperception (→ Laws (of nature), lawfulness
apperception), is the highest presupposition
of all necessary synthetic connections of In Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the faculty of
the sensibly given manifold and, as a result, understanding is identified as the ‘source of the
the necessary ground of the objectivity of laws of nature’ (A127). Through the under-
knowledge (cf. B137) (→ object, objectiv- standing and its categories the manifold of
ity). Things in themselves, on the other hand, appearances, coming from the pure forms of
which abstract from all connection with sensible → intuition, is conceptually determined.
experience, cannot be known (→ transcen- Appearances (→ appearance) become objects of
dental idealism; thing in itself). → experience, ultimately, by virtue of the unity
The two most basic forms of rational of apperception as the transcendental ground for
knowledge are expounded at the beginning the lawfulness of nature (→ deduction, appercep-
of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method in tion). Hence, all empirical laws can be regarded
221
Key Themes and Topics
222
Key Themes and Topics
223
Key Themes and Topics
cognition, constitutes dialectic, the logic of in a definition; but for given concepts we
illusion (A61=B85) (→ Dialectic). cannot be certain of having achieved that
Kant’s theory of concepts starts from the (A728=B756). An incomplete analysis of a
critical division of the cognitive faculties. A concept is called an exposition (A729=B757).
concept is a general → representation medi- Kant also countenances obscure, as opposed
ately linked to objects, whereas an → intui- to clear, concepts (i.e. unconscious ones)
tion is a singular representation immediately (LL 702).
connected to its object (A19=B33; JL 91). Relative to their intension (Kant uses the
This goes against the rationalist doctrine term ‘content’), concepts can be hierarchi-
of singular concepts; for Kant, a concept is cally ordered. The higher concepts are poorer
essentially general. It contains marks that are and the lower ones richer in intension. So for
common to several objects (LL 752). instance, ‘metal’ is above ‘gold’. Since the lat-
Concepts are generated by certain acts of ter concept is a specification of the former,
the understanding: comparison, reflection and ‘gold’ contains all the marks of ‘metal’
and abstraction. In comparing for instance a plus additional ones, its intension is richer.
spruce, a willow and a linden, their differ- The extension of ‘gold’ – the concepts below
ences are attended to. Reflection involves it in the hierarchy, or as Kant often says,
noticing what they have in common, and ‘contained under’ it – is on the other hand
abstraction, finally, is the isolating of these less than the extension of the higher concept
common marks (e.g. the possession of a ‘metal’. Intension and extension are thus
trunk, branches and leaves), leaving out inversely proportional (JL 95; LL 925).
the differences, so that the concept ‘tree’ is Kant is sometimes unclear as to whether
acquired (JL 94–95). This account, which the extension is the concepts located under a
is close to that of the Wolffians (→ Wolff), concept in the hierarchy, or rather the objects
may appear artificial: noticing differences falling under it (the modern sense of ‘exten-
(comparison) seems to involve noticing what sion’). The hierarchical ordering of concepts
the objects have in common (reflection). But can also be expressed in the terminology of
rather than meaning three successive stages, genus and species (JL 96–97). A higher con-
Kant perhaps points to conditions for acquir- cept is a genus for that which is under it (its
ing and having a concept: this requires the species), but is itself a species under a higher
ability to notice both similarities and differ- concept, its genus (LL 911).
ences, and to abstract from the differences. Similar views are frequently met in Kant’s
Kant’s theory of concepts develops the contemporaries (→ Meier); they go back to
Cartesian and Leibnizian-Wolffian distinc- Aristotle’s doctrine of genus and species
tions concerning clarity and distinctness. A and the conceptual trees of Porphyry. Kant
concept is clear if a person is conscious of deviates from one strand of this tradition
it (JL 33; LL 702). Clear concepts can be by stressing that there can be no individual
distinct or indistinct. A concept is distinct if concepts at the bottom of the hierarchy.
the person is clear about its content, i.e. the Concepts can always be further specified
marks of which it is composed (cf. JL 34). (LL 927). The hierarchical model of con-
To make a concept distinct is to analyze it cepts is the background to the distinction
into its constituents. Distinctness comes in of analytic and synthetic judgments. In
degrees. A complete → analysis would result an analytic → judgment, the predicate’s
224
Key Themes and Topics
marks are contained in the subject, and the rule’ (A304=B360). This means that its
conceptual containment is modelled in such subject term, ‘Locke’, is subsumed under
hierarchies. the predicate ‘philosopher’, which is the
Concepts are combined into judgments (in ‘condition’ (i.e. subject term) of the major
accordance with the elementary forms sys- premise (the rule). Reason is thus able to
tematized in the Table of Judgment). To make determine ‘Locke’ through the predicate of
logical inferences from judgments is the task the rule, and infer that Locke is learned (cf.
of reason. In its logical use, it is the capacity to A304=B360–361).
infer (or draw a conclusion) from a premise, The major premise of a syllogism is itself
insofar as the inference is mediate, that is, conditioned, and presupposes further con-
requires another premise. Inferences of reason ditions from which it follows. Obviously,
(syllogisms) consist of a major and a minor this would be the case also for such further
premise from which the conclusion is drawn conditions. Only if the totality of conditions
(A304=B361; A330=B386). In contrast, a could be given would reason’s demand for
direct or immediate inference (for instance of the unconditioned be satisfied (A307=B364).
‘Some B are A’ from ‘All A are B’) is an infer- This ascending series from condition to fur-
ence of the understanding (Verstandesschluss) ther conditions consists of prosyllogisms, in
(A303=B360). Here, conclusion and ground which the major premise of a given syllogism
share the same matter but differ in form is inferred as conclusion from higher premises
(LL 769), whereas in a syllogism the conclu- (A331=B387–388). The descending series
sion differs from the ground as to matter, i.e. from the conditioned to further inferences,
the pair of concepts in the conclusion is not through episyllogisms, where the conclusion
found together in any of the premises. of a syllogism is used as premise for a new
There are three forms of syllogism: the syllogism, can also be continued indefinitely,
categorical, the hypothetical and the dis- but it is not important for reason. For rea-
junctive (A304=B361). Each of these has as son seeks grounds; and a given judgment is
major premise a judgment of one of the three grounded on its premises and not on its poten-
relational forms in Kant’s Table of Judgment. tial consequences (A331ff.=B388ff.). – MQ
Examples of the types of syllogism are ‘All
A are B, All C are A, therefore all C are B’ Further Reading
(categorical); ‘If A then B, A, therefore B’
(hypothetical); and ‘A is either B or C, A is B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to
not B, therefore A is C’ (disjunctive). The Judge (Princeton: Princeton University
hypothetical and the disjunctive inferences Press, 1998), pt. II.
do not belong to Aristotelian syllogistic, but R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Kants Logik (Berlin/
conform to Kant’s wider characterization of New York: de Gruyter, 1976).
the syllogism as a mediate inference from a
premise serving as a rule (A304=B360–361).
Kant calls the major premise in a cat-
egorical syllogism (e.g. ‘All philosophers are Majority, maturity →
learned’) the rule, whereas the minor premise Enlightenment
(e.g. ‘Locke is a philosopher’) puts the cog-
nition it expresses ‘under the condition of Manifold → synthesis
225
Key Themes and Topics
226
Key Themes and Topics
227
Key Themes and Topics
228
Key Themes and Topics
229
Key Themes and Topics
[. . .]; second, the doctrine of the reality of the properly methodical nature of CPR, which
concept of freedom, as that of a knowable he calls a ‘treatise on the method’ (Bxxii) of
super-sensible, in which metaphysics is still → metaphysics as science. He repeats here
only practico-dogmatic.’ (PE 311) – GM/SS again the nature of the Critical method as
having to do with a reversal in the way a
Further Reading priori cognition, the business of metaphys-
ics, can be made possible as opposed to
K. Ameriks, ‘The critique of metaphysics: the many attempts in traditional, dogmatic
Kant and traditional ontology’, in P. metaphysics to extend knowledge syntheti-
Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion cally. Kant does this by enacting a thought
to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge experiment, which he presents as analo-
University Press, 1992), pp. 249–279. gous to the way Copernicus made advances
N. Fischer (ed.), Kants Grundlegung einer in astronomy possible (Bxvi; cf. Bxviii n.).
kritischen Metaphysik (Hamburg: Meiner, The thought experiment relates to the way,
2010). similar to the account in P, in which it is
J. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New suggested that only an antecedent analysis
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), chs of the subjective conditions of thought will
10–13. provide apodictic insight into the a priori
relation between subject and → object.
The acceptance of this hypothesis results in
what Kant calls ‘the altered method of our
Method way of thinking’ (Bxviii).
Despite the ostensibly hypothetical nature
In P, Kant makes a distinction between the of the thought experiment in the B-Preface,
‘critical method’ and ‘the dogmatic method’ Kant however insists that ‘[c]riticism is not
(P 308), where the Critical method provides opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason
a means to investigate the a priori principles in its pure cognition as science’. For Kant,
of experience ‘completely and according to a science, and thus metaphysics, ‘must always
principle’ ‘from the nature of the understand- be dogmatic, i.e., it must prove its conclu-
ing itself’, rather than dogmatically ‘from the sions strictly a priori from secure principles’
things themselves’ (P 308). At the same time, (Bxxxv). The sense in which it is opposed
the Critical method assures that ‘only as to dogmatic metaphysics is that rather than
objects of experience are all things necessarily presuming to be able to obtain (synthetic)
subject a priori’ to the principles of experience, knowledge purely on the basis of concep-
not as things in themselves, which is the central tual → analysis, reason must first critically
purport of Kant’s → transcendental idealism. inquire ‘in what way and by what right it has
This intimate connection between the possibil- obtained’ the principles by means of which it
ity of → a priori cognition and the limitation acquires pure cognition (Bxxxv).
of → knowledge to the objects of possible → This procedure also explains the crucial
experience is the differentiating characteristic distinction that Kant makes in P (P 263,
of Kant’s Critical method (→ Critique). 274ff., 278ff.) between the analytic and syn-
In the preface to the second edition, thetic methods, or regressive and progressive
Kant expounds on the significance of the methods respectively. Analysis ‘proceeds from
230
Key Themes and Topics
that which is sought as if it were given, and the faculty of reason ‘badly needs a disci-
ascends to the conditions under which alone pline to constrain its propensity to expan-
it is possible’ (P 276n.), i.e. from consequent sion beyond the narrow boundaries of
to ground, whereas conversely → synthesis possible experience’ (A711=B739). Unlike
proceeds from ground to consequent. Kant the Transcendental Dialectic which focused
makes clear that while P is sketched out after upon the content of the claims made by
the analytical method, CPR itself must be reason in its use beyond these boundaries,
synthetic, that is, start from a principle rather the discipline looks at the method that rea-
than from a given in experience, which in the son employs.
case of P is the fact of → natural science and In a first section on the dogmatic use
→ mathematics, the grounds of whose pos- of reason, Kant compares the warranted
sibility is inquired into by regressive analy- employment of reason in mathematics with
sis. Only the synthetic, progressive method, ‘that by means of which one seeks the same
however, constitutes a genuine philosophical certainty in philosophy’ (A713=B741). He
→ proof, which accepts no data ‘except rea- rejects the notion that the difference between
son itself’ and thus ‘develop[s] cognition out philosophy and mathematics could lie in the
of its original seeds without relying on any first dealing with quality while the latter has
fact whatever’ (P 274). quantity as its object (A714=B742). While it
This is somewhat similar to the remark is true that mathematics constructs magni-
Kant makes in the B-Preface, namely that tudes (or even magnitude in algebra), it does
what in the Preface had been proposed ‘as not deal with quality simply because the lat-
a hypothesis’ (i.e. the Copernican thought ter requires empirical intuition (A715=B743),
experiment), must ‘in the treatise itself [. . .] which is also lacking for pure concepts of
be proved not hypothetically but rather apo- reason.
dictically from the constitution of our rep- Rather, mathematics exhibits its concepts
resentations of space and time and from the in pure intuition, by construction, i.e. through
elementary concepts of the understanding’ a homogeneous synthesis which considers its
(Bxxii n.). Proofs in philosophy must always objects merely as quanta (A723=B751) (→
be ‘ostensive’ (A789=B817), albeit not in Transcendental Aesthetic). The success of
the mathematical sense, as Kant makes suf- the mathematical method leads to the expec-
ficiently clear in the Transcendental Doctrine tations that it could be successful in pure
of Method, the second main part of CPR, philosophy (A724ff.=B752ff.). Philosophy
which however only takes up one-sixth of cannot exhibit its concepts in pure intuition
the whole of CPR. (A722=B750), and appeal to empirical intui-
In the first chapter of this part, on the tion cannot yield a priori knowledge. But
Discipline of Pure Reason, Kant explicates this leaves a task for philosophy, namely to
the distinctive method of the transcen- explore the principles ‘of the synthesis of pos-
dental philosophy. He defines discipline sible empirical intuitions’ (A722=B750): this
as having the task of limiting and eventu- defines ‘rational cognition from concepts,
ally eradicating the ‘compulsion through which is called philosophical’ (A724=B752).
which the constant propensity to stray Such conceptual cognition pertaining to the
from certain rules is limited’ (A709=B737). possibility of being given objects in empirical
Although it makes a negative contribution, intuition amounts to philosophy ‘knowing
231
Key Themes and Topics
232
Key Themes and Topics
because they are good in a further, universal The other two formulas, those of auton-
and unconditional way. omy (→ freedom) and the → kingdom of
In Kant’s terms, to have a good will one ends, emphasize a corollary of this – namely,
must act not only ‘in conformity with duty’ that, since the reason for which one does a
(→ duty, duties) but also ‘from duty’ rather morally good action fundamentally con-
than ‘from inclination’ (G 397–399), and cerns only affected agency, it is a reason
one’s duties are ‘categorical imperatives’ (→ that one appreciates simply as and because
categorical imperative), rather than ‘hypothet- one is an agent, rather than a reason con-
ical’ ones based on contingent needs, wants, cerning something else that one may or may
pleasures, or authorities (G 414–420). not appreciate. In this sense, Kant thinks
In G, Kant describes the reasons that make that in doing what is morally good for mor-
an action morally good in terms of four for- ally good reasons one is ‘autonomous’ or
mulas. The first, the formula of universal law, ‘self-legislating’ and constructs a systematic
describes the reason for which one does a ‘kingdom’ of agents, reasons and actions
morally good action as a reason for which one with other agents (G 431–436, 440–445;
could want all others to do the same action CPrR 33).
in similar circumstances – in other words, it In MM Kant proceeds to derive two kinds
is a reason for which one could want it to be of general moral requirements, political and
a ‘universal law’ (→ categorical imperative) ethical. Since political requirements are those
to do this action in these circumstances. that one can be coerced to fulfil by others,
For example, Kant argues that it is mor- he treats them as requirements merely to
ally wrong to make a false promise or ignore do, refrain from, or allow certain actions,
the needy for self-interest because if every- rather than to do so for certain reasons (MM
one were to do the same no one would trust 214, 218–221, 231, 239). He identifies these
one’s promise or help oneself in turn, and actions as those which ensure that any one
this would conflict with one’s self-interest. agent’s freedom of action does not impinge
One could not, then, want it to be a ‘uni- on others’ equal freedom – in his terms,
versal law’ to do these things for self-inter- ‘[a]ny action is right if it can coexist with
ested reasons (G 402–403, 421–424; CPrR everyone’s freedom in accordance with a uni-
27–28). versal law’ (MM 230–233, 237–238).
The second formula, the formula of the He argues in particular that property
end in itself, describes a morally good action rights (→ right) to things are limited by the
as one done considering each affected agent finite nature of the earth, such that one per-
an ‘end in itself’ (→ kingdom of ends) – son’s coming to own an un-owned thing,
that is, as something of such value that he while necessary for his or her freedom of
or she may not be used merely as a ‘thing’ action, also diminishes others’ similar free-
or a ‘means’ to satisfy one’s own or others’ dom – it follows, he claims, that we must
inclinations. Kant argues that this formula consider things as if they were originally
too explains why making a false promise owned ‘in common’ by all affected agents.
or not helping the needy is morally wrong, To secure these property rights, he fur-
since a promisee could not consent to being ther argues, we must obey a state that also
deceived nor a needy person accept that his ensures our equality and consent (MM
or her needs be ignored (G 427–431). 245–270, 311–318).
233
Key Themes and Topics
234
Key Themes and Topics
235
Key Themes and Topics
a matter of debate (→ laws (of nature)/ of opposite directions; or (3) form an angle,
lawfulness). when motions along different rectilinear lines
In the preface to MFNS, Kant distinguishes are combined.
between proper and improper natural sci- Dynamics considers motion ‘as belonging
ence. The former ‘treats its object wholly to the quality of matter, under the name of an
according to a priori principles, the second original moving force’ (MFNS 477). Matter
according to laws of experience’ (MFNS is here defined as ‘the moveable insofar as
468). Kant took chemistry to be an exam- it fills a space’ through a particular moving
ple of the latter category, which lacked apo- force (MFNS 496). By reasoning a priori
dictic certainty. Kant’s concern was instead about properties of matter, Kant introduced
with proper natural science, whose apodic- two moving forces, attraction and repulsion.
tic certainty presupposes a metaphysics of Attraction causes matter to approach other
nature, i.e. pure a priori principles underly- matter. Repulsion causes matter to repel
ing the empirical part. Metaphysics of nature other matter.
focuses on the empirical concept of matter The repulsive force is characterized as an
and brings all the determinations of the con- original expansive force ‘also called elas-
cept of matter under the a priori concepts of ticity’ (MFNS 500) through which mat-
the understanding (→ deduction). ter’s impenetrability is explained. In other
The basic determination of the empirical words, matter resists penetration dynami-
concept of matter is motion as the object cally, i.e. via a force of repulsion, not via
of outer sense (→ inner/outer sense). Hence its solidity. Kant argued that if there were
natural science is ultimately a doctrine of only repulsive force as an original expansive
motion and its metaphysical foundations are force, matter would disperse itself to infinity.
brought under four chapters (Phoronomy, Hence, there must be a counteracting attrac-
Dynamics, Mechanics and Phenomenology), tive force, through which matter impels
corresponding respectively to the four titles another to approach it. On the other hand,
of categories: quantity, quality, relation and no attraction is possible without repulsion
modality. because, if only attraction existed, all mat-
Phoronomy takes motion as a ‘pure quan- ter would coalesce into a point and space
tum in accordance with its composition’ would be empty. While repulsion manifests
(MFNS 477). Motion is here considered itself as a contact force or a surface force
only kinematically, i.e. with respect to speed (via impenetrability), attraction acts at a
(defined as a scalar quantity), direction and distance through empty space as a penetrat-
composition of motions. Matter is consid- ing force.
ered as a material point and all motions are Mechanics takes matter ‘in relation to
rectilinear motions, whose composition with another through its own inherent motion’
regard to their respective speeds and direc- (MFNS 477). Matter is here defined as ‘the
tions falls under three possible cases (MFNS moveable insofar as it, as such a thing, has
490). Two motions (with equal or unequal moving force’ (MFNS 536). The moving
speeds) either (1) constitute a new motion forces in this chapter are those that set matter
along the same line and the same direction in motion and communicate motion between
in one body; or (2) constitute a new motion bodies, although mechanics presupposes
along the same line, when combining motions dynamics – e.g. the original attractive force is
236
Key Themes and Topics
said to be ‘the cause of universal gravitation’ the cohesion of matter could be due to the
as a mechanical force (MFNS 541). ether distributed everywhere in the universe
Kant calls mass the quantity of matter (MFNS 564).
(intended as the moveable present in a certain Kant’s speculations on the ether find
space), and calls quantity of motion what is their ultimate expression in OP. In continu-
now called momentum (i.e. the product of ity with F, the ether is identified as both the
mass and speed). Three laws of mechanics fol- matter of heat (also called caloric) and the
low (for their statements → laws (of nature)/ matter of light (OP-II 214). The existence of
lawfulness). The first law is about quantity the ether is transcendentally deduced so as
of matter being conserved. The second law to allow the transition from the metaphysi-
is a version of Newton’s law of inertia, with cal foundations of natural science to physics
the important difference that Kant defined (OP-I 218). In OP, Kant’s aim was indeed to
matter’s inertia as ‘nothing else than its life- go beyond attraction and repulsion as estab-
lessness, as matter in itself’ (MFNS 544), and lished a priori in MFNS towards physics as
does not consider inertia as the cause of a ‘the systematic investigation of nature as
body’s resistance (MFNS 551). The third law to [durch] empirically given forces of mat-
is a variant of the law of action and reaction ter’ (OP-II 298). The search for a system of
(→ Newton). empirically given forces of matter remains a
Phenomenology ‘determines matter’s regulative idea of reason (→ regulative prin-
motion or rest merely in relation to the mode ciples) in line with Kant’s later view of nature
of representation or modality’ (MFNS 477). as a lawful system. – MM
Matter is defined as ‘the moveable insofar as
it, as such a thing, can be an object of experi- Further Reading
ence’ (MFNS 554). For matter to be an object
of experience the faculty of understanding E. Förster, Kant’s Final Synthesis
has to determine it with respect to the predi- (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
cate of motion. Kant identified three pos- Press, 2000).
sible predicates, corresponding to the three M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences
categories of modality (possibility, actuality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
and necessity). The ‘rectilinear motion of a Press, 1992).
matter with respect to an empirical space’ M. Friedman, Kant’s Construction of Nature.
(MFNS 555) is said to be a possible predi- A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations
cate. Thus, absolute motion, as motion of of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
matter not with respect to an empirical space University Press, 2013).
or other matter external to it, is said to be M. Massimi (ed.), Kant and Philosophy of
impossible. Science Today (Cambridge: Cambridge
Circular motion (as a continuous change University Press, 2008).
of rectilinear motion) is an actual predi- E. Watkins (ed.), Kant and the Sciences (New
cate. Finally, an opposite and equal motion York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
for every motion of a body is said to be a E. Watkins, Kant and the Metaphysics
necessary predicate (given the third law of of Causality (Cambridge: Cambridge
mechanics). To prove the physical impossi- University Press, 2005).
bility of empty space, Kant speculated that
237
Key Themes and Topics
238
Key Themes and Topics
consciousness of the moral law in general is pos- has organized CPR. At a crucial stage in the
sible (→ morality, categorical imperative). His argument of the → deduction Kant defines
answer – decisive for the whole of practical phi- an object as ‘that in the concept of which
losophy – is as follows: ‘We can become aware the manifold of a given intuition is united’
of pure practical laws just as we are aware of (B137). In the A-Deduction, Kant speaks of
pure theoretical principles, by attending to the the ‘transcendental object’, as ‘that which
necessity with which reason prescribes them to in all our empirical concepts in general can
us and to the setting aside of all empirical con- provide relation to an object, i.e., objective
ditions to which reason directs us.’ (CPrR 30) reality’ (A109). But this definition is not the
Of beauty, as Kant says in §18 of CJ, one premise of Kant’s argument. The objectiv-
thinks that it has a necessary connection to ity of knowledge, and so what is an object
satisfaction (→ aesthetic judgment). ‘[T]his at all, is the key point that must rather be
necessity is of a special kind: not a theoreti- explained.
cal objective necessity [. . .] nor a practical Although Kant formulated the Critical
necessity [. . .]. Rather, as a necessity that is problem formally in terms of the general
thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only question how synthetic judgments a priori
be called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the could be possible (B19) – which represent
assent of all to a judgment that is regarded the kind of knowledge that especially meta-
as an example of a universal rule that one physics presupposes – his explanation of
cannot produce.’ (CJ 236–237) In this case human knowledge is in fact both broader
it has to do with a subjective necessity, con- and deeper than an analysis of synthetic a
ditioned by the idea of a common sense. priori judgment.
According to the title of §22: ‘The neces- It is in the Transcendental Deduction of
sity of the universal assent that is thought the categories (TD) that Kant demonstrates
in a judgment of taste is a subjective neces- that the whole project turns on the expla-
sity, which is represented as objective under nation of the aspect of the → synthesis of
the presupposition of a common sense.’ (CJ representations as an essential element in
239) – GM/SS human knowledge. Without synthesis our
representations would be a chaotic stream
Further Reading of impressions. → Knowledge of an object
in the strong sense is reflected in the type of
J. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: ‘synthesis’ of representations that is found in
Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 2. a → judgment as such. The essential step lies
in determining the implications of the objec-
tive unity of a synthesis of representations as
distinguished from a merely subjective con-
Noumenon, noumena → THING IN nection of representations (cf. B136–142)
ITSELF, transcendental idealism (→ apperception), which is based solely on
the laws of association of the human mind
Object, objectivity as they had been explained by David →
Hume.
The concept of ‘object’ (Gegenstand, Hume distinguished two kinds of proposi-
Objekt) is the centre around which Kant tion that relate to two areas of knowledge:
239
Key Themes and Topics
relations between matters of fact and rela- thinking something as an ‘object’. The con-
tions of ideas. He concluded that the nature cept of object has its own import as Kant
of the certainty of the knowledge of mat- stresses constantly against Hume: it implies
ters of fact is of a completely different kind ‘thinking’ something, thinking something
from that of pure relations of ideas as such. formally as ‘determined’, that is, as some-
Hume showed at any rate that there is no thing that is such and such for me. For Kant,
strictly logical or a priori explanation pos- judgment and object thus are intimately
sible of relations of matters of fact but only connected.
a psychological reference to a tendency of In this context, Kant focuses on the role
the mind to assume a → necessity of sorts in of the self, more in particular, the way I
the sequence of factual events. The character myself am ‘implicated’ in the formal anal-
of the ‘necessary connection’ of some cause ysis of the objectivity of knowledge (→
and some effect is, however, logically always apperception). He is not interested in what
contingent. I accomplish actively in the construction
By contrast, Kant thinks he must bring the of propositions but rather in the way that
problem to another level and interpret the something is thought as an ‘objective unity’
problem in terms of a → transcendental foun- or as an object ‘for me’ (B138). This ‘me’
dation of the objectivity of human knowledge or this form of self-consciousness does not
that is to be distinguished from an explana- refer to a kind of self-perception whereby
tion in terms of the laws of association of the I am involved in or literally know my own
mind. For Kant, the central question is: What different acts. The ‘me’ that is crucial in this
is the formal character, the meaning, and case is the ‘me’ that is just ‘implicated’, so to
implication of an objective unity of represen- speak, in the ‘objective character’ of some-
tations in a synthetic judgment? thing that is thought as something (for me).
In §19 of the B-version of TD (B140–142), Put differently, it is a ‘me’ that is derivative
Kant focuses on the fact that through the cop- of the determination of the object. This ‘me’
ula ‘is’ a judgment shows its intrinsic inten- is always essentially ‘implicit’ in the concep-
tional character that is entirely missed when tion of an object.
one explains the objectivity expressed in a Thus, Kant’s argument in §§17 and 19 of
judgment in terms of a contingent association TD stresses the ‘immanent’ strong connection
of ideas, as Hume does. A judgment, which between the concept of ‘object’ and a kind
is in essence ‘synthetic’ – all judgments ulti- of self-consciousness that does not imply an
mately rest on a synthesis of concepts – and empirical soul-substance but functions only
is ‘nothing other than the way to bring given as a ‘relational’ concept of sorts in the formal
cognitions to the objective unity of appercep- analysis of objectivity.
tion’ (B141), means something different from Importantly, Kant associates objects with
a merely subjectively linked succession of appearances (→ appearance) as the only things
representations. that can be known, in contrast to things in
The concepts in a judgment function as themselves (→ thing in itself; transcendental
subject and predicate in relation to each idealism). This is of course connected with his
other and as such in relation to an object view of objects as functions of judgment, and
that is ‘thought’ or determined as to its hence as dependent on the subjective condi-
own character. Judgment, in itself, means tions of thought. – KJB
240
Key Themes and Topics
241
Key Themes and Topics
242
Key Themes and Topics
243
Key Themes and Topics
The first postulate concerns the application thinking. This alone, however, does nothing
of the category of possibility in an empiri- to help us understand whether something is
cal judgment: that is possible ‘which agrees objectively or really possible. Whether some-
with the formal conditions of experience’ thing is objectively or really possible involves
(A218=B265). Kant is concerned to show ‘the conditions of space and of its determina-
how for something to be a possible object of tion’ (A221=B268), which is as much as to
knowledge at all, it must at least fall under say that to grasp the real possibility of some-
the general formal conditions of knowledge, thing requires seeing it as standing under the
that is, the forms of → intuition, space and formal conditions of intuition, as well as the
time (→ Transcendental Aesthetic), and the concepts of the understanding that concern
categories (→ deduction). quantity, quality and relation and determine
The postulate of the actuality of things is what is given in intuition.
bound up with ‘the material conditions of The important point with the postulate of
experience (of sensation)’ (A218=B266); an the actuality of things is that any cognition of
object must be given a posteriori in a sensible a thing must be mediated by our perceptions,
intuition and must thus be sensibly perceived, also when it is something objective that can-
for any concept of an object, in accordance not immediately be perceived by means of
with the categories, to be about a really the senses, such as a magnetic field, whose
existing object (B268–269=A221–222). existence must be inferred from its connec-
‘Perception [ . . . ] is the sole characteristic tion with actual perceptions within possible
of actuality’ (A225=B273). The postulate experience (cf. B521=A493), i.e. that ‘mag-
of actuality thus concerns the requirement netic matter’ really exists can be inferred
of ‘the connection of the object with some from the existence of perceivable ‘attracted
actual experience, in accordance with the iron filings’ (B273=A226), for which only a
analogies of experience’ (B272=A225). magnetic field could be responsible.
The third postulate concerns the way the It is at this point in his discussion of the
category of necessity is to be schematized in postulates that Kant refers to previous sys-
connection ‘with the actual as determined tems of idealist thought (in particular →
in accordance with universal conditions of Descartes), which have cast serious doubts
experience’ (A218=B266). That is to say, the over the existence of external objects and
third postulate unites the two postulates of over the fact that we immediately perceive
possibility and actuality, and thus indicates objects in experience, as Kant has pointed
that, necessarily, we can only have knowl- out in his discussion of the postulate of actu-
edge of actual objects that conform to the ality. Such external world scepticism would
conditions of possible experience. threaten to undermine the Critical principles
The schematization of the concept of of experience, which is the main reason why
possibility relates to the formal subjective Kant inserts a section on the → Refutation of
conditions of experience that enable objec- Idealism in the B-version of CPR, in which he
tive experience. Hence, it is different from attempts to allay the sceptical worry, before
a merely logical understanding of possibil- turning to the postulate of → necessity.
ity, which would only involve the absence By the postulate of necessity, Kant means
of contradiction, i.e. that the thought of an that ‘it pertains to material necessity in exist-
object does not contradict the formal rules of ence’, and ‘not [to] the merely formal and
244
Key Themes and Topics
logical necessity in the connection of con- cognition with its object’ (B82=A58). This is
cepts’ (B279=A226). That is, any really exist- what in scholastic philosophy is known as the
ing object can only be known through the dictum veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.
perception of it in conformity with ‘general This nominal definition of truth is granted by
laws of experience’ (B279=A227), more par- Kant, although it does not provide ‘the general
ticularly ‘in accordance with laws of causality’ and certain criterion of the truth of any cogni-
(B279=A227). This means that the existence tion’ (ibid.; emphasis added). Kant asks what
of the object cannot be known ‘fully a priori’ it is that makes the intellect correspond to the
(B279=A226). Kant maintains that the neces- → object of → knowledge.
sity of which we have knowledge only con- The difficulty with determining a criterion
cerns the relation between actual appearances, of truth is that it must at the same time be
so that we only know the necessity of ‘effects general to be valid for all objects and be par-
in nature’ (A227=B280). Therefore, the pos- ticular so as to hold for any particular object,
tulate of necessity is only about the hypotheti- the content with which truth is precisely con-
cal necessity of the relation between objects cerned. To ask ‘a sufficient and yet at the
of possible experience, not about the absolute same time general sign of truth’ (A58=B83)
necessity of the existence of things. – NH/DS seems a tall order.
Kant therefore distinguishes between the
Further Reading content or matter and → form of cognition,
and accordingly makes a distinction between
P. Guyer, ‘The Postulates of Empirical ‘material (objective) truth’ (A60=B85) and
Thinking in Genreal and the Refutation ‘the form of truth’ (A59=B84), with which
of Idealism’, in G. Mohr, M. Willaschek not two kinds of truth are meant but two
(eds), Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen formally separable aspects of truth. This is
Vernunft, in the series Klassiker Auslegen to avoid ‘a material use of the merely formal
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), pp. principles of pure understanding through
297–324. empty sophistries’ (A63=B88).
G. Motta, Die Postulate des empirischen The ‘merely logical criterion of truth,
Denkens überhaupt (Berlin/New York: de namely the agreement of a cognition with
Gruyter, 2012). the general and formal laws of understand-
ing and reason’ (A59=B84) is the principle
of non-contradiction, or the principle of
Principle of identity of contradiction as Kant labels it. The princi-
indiscernibles → identity ple amounts to the thought that ‘no predi-
cate pertains to a thing that contradicts
Principle of (non-) it’ (B190=A151). In modern parlance: of
contradiction some a of which is asserted F cannot also
be asserted ¬F. It is the ‘conditio sine qua
In the ‘Introduction’ to CPR, in the section ‘On non’ or ‘negative condition of all truth’
the division of general logic into analytic and (A59–60=B84; cf. B190=A151). But ‘for all
dialectic’, Kant clarifies his understanding of that a judgment may be free of any internal
→ truth and agrees with the traditional notion contradiction, it can still be either false or
of truth as correspondence or ‘agreement of groundless’ (A151=B190).
245
Key Themes and Topics
The first use of the principle is thus a nega- rationalism (→ Wolff) insofar as he breaks
tive one, i.e. in order ‘to ban falsehood and the principle of sufficient reason (principium
error’, which makes it a necessary condi- rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis)
tion of all thought. But it also serves a posi- down into (1) the principle of antecedently
tive role, as it is the sufficient condition for determining grounds – the ‘reason why’
analytic → judgment (A151=B190–191; cf. (ratio cur), or the ‘ground of being or com-
P 267), ‘[f]or the contrary of that which as ing to be’ (ratio fiendi vel existendi) – and (2)
a concept already lies and is thought in the the principle of consequentially determining
cognition of the object is always correctly grounds – the ‘ground that’ (ratio quod), or
denied, while the concept itself must nec- ‘ground of knowing’ (ratio cognoscendi).
essarily be affirmed of it, since its opposite Kant asserts the necessary validity of the
would contradict the object’ (ibid.). principle of the determination of a thing
But the principle cannot be used mate- through its cause: ‘Nothing which exists
rially; it is not sufficient for objective contingently can be without a ground which
cognition. Some other principle must be pre- determines its existence antecedently.’ (ND
supposed which will provide the sufficient 396; heading) At the end of the work, Kant
ground of knowledge (→ principle of suffi- derives two further principles from the prin-
cient reason). ciple of sufficient reason: the principle of suc-
In one of his earliest works, ND, Kant cession (Proposition XII) and the principle of
elaborated on the supreme principle of co-existence (Proposition XIII).
metaphysics and made the case for two In the Critical period, the principle of
reciprocal principles, the principle of sufficient reason loses its ontological char-
affirmative truths (‘whatever is, is’) and acter and is construed as the fundamental
one for negative truths (‘whatever is not, a priori principle of the determination of
is not’), which basically come down to one the possibility of → experience itself. This
supreme principle, namely the principle of idea is clearly anticipated in several reflec-
→ identity (ND 389), on which the prin- tions from the so-called Duisburg Nachlass
ciple of contradiction, viz. the principle (1774–1775): ‘Everything that happens [. .
of negative truths, is based. Incidentally, .] cannot be specifically determined in the
in ND Kant still formulates the principle time in which it occurs except by means of
of contradiction in quasi-temporal terms a rule. [. . .] Thus the principle of sufficient
that he refutes in CPR: ‘[I]t is impos- reason is a principium of the rule of experi-
sible that the same thing should simul- ence, namely for ordering it.’ (Refl 4680; cf.
taneously be and not be.’ (ND 391; cf. Refl 4682)
B191–193=A152–153) – DS Ontology as the science of things in them-
selves is impossible, according to Kant, and
‘must give way to the modest [. . .] analytic of
the pure understanding’ (B303=A247). The
Principle of sufficient reason Transcendental Analytic is meant to show
that true, discursive knowledge of things is
There is a reason for everything that is. nevertheless possible. The principle of suf-
In Proposition IV of ND (ND 392), Kant ficient reason cannot, strictly speaking, be
takes aim at the main support of Wolffian proven (see A783=B811). But Kant singles out
246
Key Themes and Topics
the proof of the principle of causality in the the country, wherever the tendency of hid-
Second Analogy of Experience (→ Analogies den association may happen to lead them.’
of Experience) as a surrogate for a proof of (A783=B811)
the principle of sufficient reason: ‘All altera- Such → transcendental proofs are subject
tions occur in accordance with the law of the to completely different constraints than are
connection of cause and effect.’ (B232) Kant the synthetic a priori principles of → math-
regards this as the most important condition ematics, which can be drawn immediately
for the possibility of the objects of experi- from → pure → intuition (cf. A782=B810).
ence: ‘Thus the principle of sufficient reason Transcendental proofs amount to nothing
is the ground of possible experience, namely more than a demonstration that without cer-
the objective cognition of appearances with tain connecting concepts of the understand-
regard to their relation in the successive series ing → experience itself, and consequently the
of time.’ (A200–201=B246) – GM/SS objects of experience, would not be possible.
But this does not imply that transcendental
Further Reading proofs are directed towards objects. Rather,
they are meant to establish ‘the objective
B. Longuenesse, ‘Kant’s deconstruction of validity of the concepts and the possibility
the principle of sufficient reason’, in Kant of their synthesis a priori’ (A782=B810) (→
on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: deduction).
Cambridge University Press, 2005), As a precaution against the dogmatic use
pp. 117–142. of → reason, Kant lays down three rules to
be observed in the carrying out of philosoph-
ical proofs:
(1) N o transcendental proofs may be
Productive imagination → attempted ‘without having first consid-
imagination, synthesis ered whence one can justifiably derive the
principles on which one intends to build’
Proof (A786=B814).
(2) There can be only one proof for
Within the ‘Systematic Representation of all any transcendental proposition (see
Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding’ A787=B815ff.).
(A158=B197) Kant presents the proof of (3) S uch proofs must not be ‘apagogic’
the → Axioms of Intuition, the proof of the (disproving the opposite), but rather
‘ostensive’ (making evident the truth
→ Anticipations of Perception and the three
of the transcendental proposition
proofs of the → Analogies of Experience.
directly). This yields not only certainty,
The possibility of attaining, synthetically but also insight into the sources (the
and a priori, to certain → knowledge of objective ground) of the certainty (see
things must be established here. Only A789=B817ff.).
by this means can thorough and orderly
knowledge of things arise. Kant explains The three main divisions of the → Dialectic,
later in the Discipline of Pure Reason: viz. the → Paralogisms, the → Antinomies
‘Without attention to this the proofs, like and the Ideal of Pure Reason (→ transcenden-
water breaking its banks, run wildly across tal ideal, proofs of the existence of God) are
247
Key Themes and Topics
devoted to exposing the counterfeit proofs of argument from possibility. Kant argues that
pure reason which violate these three rules although absolutely necessary existence or
each in their own way. – GM/SS being cannot be explained purely by means
of the → principle of (non-)contradiction,
which concerns what he calls the ‘internal
possibility’ of concepts (OPD 77), absolutely
Proofs of the existence of God necessary existence can be inferred from the
necessary ‘material element’ of the possibil-
Kant’s justly famous critique of the physico- ity of conceivability. The former rests on the
theological, cosmological and especially logical → necessity in the predicates entailing
ontological proofs of God’s existence is that what is self-contradictory is absolutely
best known in its Critical version published impossible, and the latter concerns the suf-
in CPR (A583–A642=B611–670). But it is ficient condition of the conceivability of con-
preceded by an at least as equally important cepts, or their ‘absolute real necessity’ (OPD
version of his critique of the proofs in OPD, 82). By this latter, Kant means that there
published some 18 years earlier, which in turn must be something given for what is conceiv-
is preceded, by some eight years, by a short able for if material possibility is annulled,
argument similar in nature in Proposition then all possibility is annulled. That is to say,
VII in ND 395–396. Other than in CPR, in if nothing exists, then nothing is possible. Of
ND and OPD Kant still thinks it possible to course, one can deny the existence of a single
provide what he considers the only possible contingent thing, but one cannot consistently
ground for a positive proof of God’s exist- deny all existence. Although, as Kant says,
ence, which as such does not reappear in ‘there is no internal [logical, D.S.] contradic-
CPR. tion in the negation of all existence’ (OPD
OPD is important for various reasons. 78; emphasis added), ‘[o]n the other hand, to
Historically, Kant’s famous belief that say that there is a possibility and yet nothing
existence is not a predicate finds its first real at all is self-contradictory’. Therefore,
expression here (OPD 72). Secondly, for necessarily something exists for there to be
a systematic understanding of Kant’s piv- something to be possibly thought for if ‘all
otal claims regarding material possibility in existence is denied, then all possibility is can-
the section on the → transcendental ideal celled as well’ (OPD 79).
(A571–583=B579–611), which precedes the Kant then proceeds to argue, not entirely
discussion of the actual proofs, one must convincingly, for the existence of an abso-
have recourse to the core argument of OPD, lutely necessary being; in one of its versions,
to which it is heavily indebted. The argument the argument runs as follows:
from possibility, which Kant presents in OPD,
[1] All possibility presupposes something
is refashioned in such a way that an inference actual in and through which all that can
from the necessity that something absolutely be thought [alles Denkliche] is given.
necessary exists to God as the unique exem- [2] Therefore, there is a certain actuality, the
plification of this is no longer deemed valid cancellation of which would itself cancel
in its Critical version. all internal possibility whatever.
In OPD, the ground for a proof of God’s
existence is thus offered on the basis of an
248
Key Themes and Topics
[3] But that, the cancellation of which eradi- conceptually or logically contradictory (OPD
cates all possibility, is absolutely neces- 81). Kant makes an important distinction
sary [schlechterdings nothwendig]. between the relation between the predicates
[4] Therefore, something exists absolutely of a thing and the relation of the existing
necessarily [absolut nothwendiger Weise].
thing to the subject that judges about the
(OPD 83; trans. amended)
thing. This latter relation is what Kant calls
From thereon, Kant argues that only one the absolute positing of the thing with all its
being can fit the bill of absolutely neces- predicates (OPD 82).
sary existence and that it has all the nec- If I assert the proposition ‘God is omni
essary characteristics that in fact define potent’, then it is only the logical relation
the idea of God, among which there is between concepts that is thought, since it
supreme reality, which is the ‘real ground’ is an explanation of the concept ‘God’. No
upon which ‘all possible reality’ is depend- existence of God is thereby posited (OPD
ent (OPD 85). 74). It is a true judgment, even if one were
The pre-Critical Kant thus thinks it still not to acknowledge God’s existence. By con-
justified to infer from the necessity of an trast, the judgment ‘God exists’, or ‘God is an
absolutely necessary being, which is an ens existent thing’ (OPD 74), is not the expres-
realissimum, to the absolutely necessary sion of a relation between a predicate and the
existence of God as its personification. But subject term of a judgment. More properly –
the Critical Kant of CPR no longer deems and herein Kant’s analysis of existence shows
the inference valid or indeed that there must to be a clear precursor of the modern notion
be some being (cf. A586–587=B614–615; of existential quantification – one should
cf. A675=B703) that absolutely necessarily analyze this judgment as stating ‘Something
exists, rather than is ‘a mere creature of [rea- existent is God’, or more precisely, ‘[T]o
son’s] own thinking’ (A584=B612), an ‘ens an existing thing belong those predicates,
rationis’ (A681=B709). Nonetheless, Kant which taken together we designate by means
continues to believe that reason quite natu- of the expression “God”’ (OPD 74; trans.
rally seeks an ‘immovable rock of the abso- amended). This analysis is repeated in CPR.
lutely necessary’, which serves as that which Importantly, against what he takes to be
‘alone can complete series of conditions the traditional ontological argument Kant
carried out to their grounds’ (A584=B612), points out that, once something is posited as
and to which ‘the concept of a being hav- existent, existence is not a predicate added
ing the highest reality would be best suited’ to the totality of predicates that a possible
(A586=B614) (→ Dialectic). thing possesses; ‘nothing more is posited in
In OPD, before going on to offer his posi- an existent thing than is posited in a merely
tive argument, detailed above, Kant first possible one’ (OPD 75), although of course
introduces his central, and most famous, ‘more is posited through an existent thing’,
argument that existence is not a predicate – that is, an actual thing is more than a pos-
an argument also central to the account con- sible thing, because this ‘involves the abso-
cerning the impossibility of the ontological lute positing of the thing itself as well’ (OPD
proof in CPR – and that any proof of God’s 75; cf. Kant’s Critical account of the hundred
existence cannot be based on the premise actual thalers compared to hundred possible
that a denial of God’s existence would be thalers at A599=B627).
249
Key Themes and Topics
A very similar, albeit much condensed in succinct form as follows: ‘[1] If something
and less clear, argument is offered in CPR exists, then an absolutely necessary being
when Kant addresses the transcendental or also has to exist. [2] Now I myself, at least,
ontological proof (A594ff.=B622ff.; see also exist; [3] therefore, an absolutely necessary
LPöl, which are from the period after the being exists.’ (ibid.) Kant says that ‘the minor
publication of the first edition of CPR). In premise contains an experience’, whereas the
Kant’s view, the classical a priori proof that inference is from experience to ‘the existence
existence cannot be denied of the highest of something necessary’. In the footnote to
reality, namely God, on pain of contradic- this passage, Kant indicates that in its classical
tion can be dismissed on the grounds that a formulation the proof is indeed concerned to
distinction must be heeded between absolute show that ‘everything contingent must have
positing and the relative (logical) positing of a cause, which, if it in turn is contingent,
concepts, the latter of which entails that pos- must likewise have its cause, until the series
iting the subject while at the same time can- of causes [. . .] has to end with an absolutely
celling the predicate that belongs essentially necessary cause, without which it would have
to it is contradictory but the former of which no completeness’ (A605=B633n.).
can perfectly well be negated without a con- According to Kant, the force of the cosmo-
tradiction ensuing. So existence as belonging logical proof rests on the ontological proof,
to a highest reality, which is an absolutely which makes the reference to experience in
necessary being, cannot be proved purely on its premise in fact superfluous. And since the
the basis of the principle of non-contradic- ontological proof has been dismissed, Kant
tion. Also, the ontological argument, if it is does not think that the cosmological proof
presumed to be analytic, crucially rests on a succeeds either.
conflation of the categories of ‘reality’ and The ostensible difference with the onto-
‘existence’ (A597=B625). At any rate, the logical argument is that the cosmological
attempt ‘to think existence through the pure argument is not an a priori proof but neither
category alone’, without having recourse to is it empirical in the same way that the phys-
a posteriori experience, makes it impossible ico-theological is, which ‘uses observations
to ‘assign any mark distinguishing it from about the particular constitution of this sen-
mere possibility’ (A601=B629). sible world of ours for its ground of proof’
Next to the one transcendental, i.e. a pri- (A605=B633).
ori, argument Kant considers the two classical The physico-theological proof
a posteriori arguments, i.e. the cosmological (A620ff.=B648ff.) draws Kant’s praise but
and physico-theological proofs (which Kant as with the foregoing proofs he argues that
had also addressed in OPD). it must be rejected as a philosophical proof.
The cosmological proof is a proof that The proof, today often referred to as the
argues from contingency to an absolutely argument from design, is premised on the
necessary being, referred to by Kant as observation that the world shows clear signs
→ Leibniz’s ‘proof a contingentia mundi’ of ‘immeasurable [. . .] manifoldness, order,
(A604=B632). In his presentation of the purposiveness, and beauty’ that can only
argument, Kant however does not mention be explained by an order that pertains con-
contingency, although he does refer to it in a tingently to the world and which therefore
footnote to the proof, which he circumscribes points to a ‘sublime and wise’ (A625=B653)
250
Key Themes and Topics
unitary self-subsisting cause external to the who [. . .] cannot by his own powers make
world as well as proportionate to it. it harmonize thoroughly with his practical
But despite its popular reputation, which principles’ (CPrR 124–125; cf. CJ 442ff.) (→
Kant is loath to ridicule, there is a fatal morality, religion).
flaw in the physico-theological proof since Lastly, in OP Kant makes the prima facie
it moves from anthropomorphic reasoning new claim that the God of moral theol-
based on empirical experience to the postu- ogy only exists as a moral postulate (OP-II
lation of a highest being, God, whose deter- 116) and that the notion of God designates
minate concept it cannot establish and for no ‘substance different from man’ (OP-I
which it must have recourse to the a priori, 21). – DS
ontological proof. Also, the physico-theo-
logical proof could only establish that there Further Reading
must be an architect, not that he is also the
creator of the world. P. Byrne, Kant on God (Aldershot: Ashgate,
Kant thus dismisses all of the above proofs, 2007), chs 2, 3 and 5.
which he thinks exhaust the possible kinds of A. Chignell, ‘Kant, modality, and the most
theoretical proof of God’s existence. The con- real being’, Archiv für Geschichte der
cept of a highest being can only function as a Philosophie 91,2 (2009): 157–192.
‘regulative principle of reason’ (A619=B647) W. Forgie, ‘Kant and existence. Critique of
(→ regulative principles). He does however Pure Reason A600/B628’, Kant–Studien
proffer a positive argument for the necessary 99 (2008): 1–12.
postulation of God in CPrR and CJ based L. Kreimendahl, ‘Einleitung’ to I. Kant,
on moral and, in the latter case, also natural Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu
teleology. einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes,
In CJ (441–442), Kant argues that the ed. L. Kreimendahl & M. Oberhausen
concept of a supreme intelligence, by anal- (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), pp.
ogy with human intelligence, is required to XIII–CXXIX.
be able to conceive of the ‘purposive arrange- J. Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New
ments’ of nature, given the way our discur- York: Oxford University Press, 1999),
sive faculties are constituted, although this ch. 12.
concept cannot be theoretically determined A. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca,
to pertain to an actual intelligent designer NY: Cornell University Press, 2009
(→ teleology). [1978]).
In CPrR, in chapter 5 of section 2 of the
Dialectic (CPrR 124–132), Kant aims to
undergird the moral teleology that assures
that the moral world and the realm of nature Psychology
can be seen to coincide by postulating God’s
existence. Only the actuality of ‘a highest For Kant, the object of its investigation
original good, namely of the existence of defines the discipline of psychology, which
God’ (CPrR 125) is the guarantee ‘for a nec- is the thinking subject (A334=B391). While
essary connection between the morality and Kant negotiates the diverse views of → Wolff,
the proportionate happiness of a being [. . .] → Baumgarten, → Meier, → Locke, → Hume
251
Key Themes and Topics
252
Key Themes and Topics
tendency to alter the object of one’s examina- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
tion, such that one cannot grasp unalterable 1992), pp. 200–227.
truths regarding one’s own self through tem- T. Sturm, ‘How not to investigate the human
poral acts of introspective observation (MFNS mind: Kant on the impossibility of
471). Transcendental psychology, on the other empirical psychology’, in E. Watkins (ed.),
hand, proceeds via argumentation to uncover Kant and the Sciences (New York: Oxford
the features of the transcendental self that must University Press, 2001), pp. 163–184.
be operative in order for self-consciousness (→
apperception) per se to be possible.
Finally, Kant claims that the type of cogni-
tion with which he is concerned, namely → a Pure
priori cognition, cannot be examined through
the methodology of empirical psychology. A A cognition (or representation) is pure if
priori cognition involves apodictic certainty, it is ‘not mixed with anything foreign to
i.e. → necessity (B4), whereas empirical psy- it’ (A11); more specifically, if no sensa-
chology can only concern itself with facts tion is intermixed with it (A11; A20=B34).
regarding what is or has been the case, and ‘Pure’ is thus very close to → a priori in
not what must be the case (A86–87=B119). meaning, and these two terms are often
To uncover the sources of a priori cognition, used interchangeably. Purity is also closely
a different kind of inquiry into our cognitive related to → form (in contrast to matter).
powers must be pursued. Kant holds this to But occasionally Kant takes care to demar-
be true of all a priori judgments, including cate purity as a further specification under
aesthetic ones (CJ 266). the concept ‘a priori’. This makes it possi-
Despite Kant’s own achievements with ble for there to be non-pure a priori judg-
regard to the transcendental conditions of the ments. Such a judgment contains a concept
thinking subject, he ultimately rejects the pos- linked to → experience. For instance, the
sibility that empirical psychology could ever a priori judgment ‘Every alteration has its
achieve the status of a science, properly so cause’ is not pure in this more restrictive
called (MFNS 471). Apart from the fact that sense, since the concept of alteration ‘can
its methodology precludes it from achieving be drawn only from experience’ (B3; cf.
a priori cognition, Kant also holds that since UTP 183–184).
empirical psychology is ultimately concerned An important task of Kant’s Critical
with the self as inner appearance, it is not ame- project is to isolate pure uses of faculties,
nable to mathematical quantification of its as well as pure types of → judgment and
solely temporal dimension, which is for Kant → representation in the different areas of
a necessary feature of genuine science. – JC philosophy. As regards sensibility, its pure
forms are found by abstraction of all mat-
Further Reading ter (i.e. sensation) from → intuition. In this
way, pure intuition is uncovered, and with it
G. Hatfield, ‘Empirical, rational and the pure forms of sensibility (space and time)
transcendental psychology: psychology (cf. A20–21=B34–35) (→ Transcendental
as science and as philosophy’, in P. Guyer Aesthetic). A corresponding investigation of
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant the understanding as to its form leads to the
253
Key Themes and Topics
254
Key Themes and Topics
a propensity to genuine evil, i.e., moral But, if a human being is corrupt in the very
evil, which, since it is only possible as the ground of his maxims, how is a restoration
determination of a free power of choice (Wiederherstellung) of the original predispo-
and this power for its part can be judged sition to the good at all possible? The only
good or evil only on the basis of its max-
way to reconcile propensity and predisposi-
ims, must reside in the subjective ground
tion is ‘by saying that a revolution is neces-
for the possibility of the deviation of the
maxims from the moral law. And, if it is sary in the mode of thinking [Denkungsart]
legitimate to assume that this propensity but a gradual reform in the mode of sense
belongs to the human being universally [Sinnesart] [. . .] and [that both] must there-
[. . .], the propensity will be called a fore be possible [. . .] to the human being’
natural propensity of the human being to (R 47–48).
evil. (R 29) Insofar as we are able to reverse the supreme
ground of our maxims by which we were evil
The radicality of the Kantian conception lies human beings, we are in principle receptive to
in the fact that it not only concerns a gen- the good, but are not yet good human beings:
eral weakness or a shortcoming of human I can only hope, through hard labour, to find
nature, nor merely an impurity of the human myself upon the path of constant progress from
heart, refusing to adopt the moral law (→ bad to better – without acquiring any insight
categorical imperative) alone as its sufficient into ‘the depths of [my] own heart (the subjec-
incentive, but ‘the perversity (perversitas) of tive first ground of [my] maxims)’ since it is
the human heart, for it reverses the ethical ‘inscrutable [unerforschlich]’ to me (R 51).
order as regards the incentives of a free power According to Kant, the thesis of an innate,
of choice’ – a perversity or reversal by which radical evil means essentially this: ‘We can-
‘the mode of thinking [Denkungsart] is [. . .] not start out in the ethical training of our
corrupted at its root (so far as the moral connatural moral disposition to the good
disposition [Gesinnung] is concerned) [. . .]’ with an innocence which is natural to us but
(R 30; translation amended). must rather begin from the presupposition of
It is this morally evil propensity that a depravity of our power of choice in adopt-
deserves the predicate radical insofar as ‘it ing maxims contrary to the original ethical
corrupts the ground of all maxims; as natu- predisposition; and, since the propensity to
ral propensity, it is also not to be extirpated this [depravity] is inextirpable, with unremit-
through human forces, for this could only ting counteraction against it.’ (R 51)
happen through good maxims [. . .]’ (R 37). In all this, it is important to keep in mind
Simultaneously, Kant maintains that ‘it must that, for Kant, the battle against evil is not so
equally be possible to overcome [überwie- much a problem of (or within) the individual,
gen] this evil, for it is found in the human but from the outset an issue with social and
being as acting freely’ (R 37). This is why political dimensions and implications. – JV
he forcefully argues that the ground of evil
should not be situated in the sensible nature Further Reading
(Sinnlichkeit) of the human being, but nei-
ther in a corruption (Verderbnis) of morally S. Anderson-Gold, P. Muchnik (eds), Kant’s
legislative reason itself. Anatomy of Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
255
Key Themes and Topics
M. Forschner, ‘Über die verschiedenen other hand, however, reality must be seen as
Bedeutungen des “Hangs zum Bösen”’, more than determinate objects of experience,
in O. Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant. Die that is, the appearances in experience.
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der That is to say, Kant makes a distinction
bloßen Vernunft, in the series Klassiker between the reality of phenomena, i.e. the
Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, objects of experience, and the realitates nou-
2011), pp. 71–90. mena, which are putative ‘example[s] of [. . .]
P. Rossi, The Social Authority of Reason. pure and non-sensible reality’ (B338n.). Kant
Kant’s Critique, Radical Evil, and the refers to reality as realitas phenomenon and
Destiny of Humankind (Albany, NY: as realitas noumenon in the → Amphiboly
SUNY Press, 2005), ch. 4. section, where the former relates to ‘realities
in → appearance’ and the latter to reality as
‘represented only through the pure under-
standing’ (B320). In a Reflexion, Kant links
Rational faith → religion this to another distinction, namely between
‘absolute’ and ‘comparative’ reality (Refl
Reality (objective reality) 5826), whereby absolute reality concerns
what ‘in respect of a thing in general belongs
Reality is the equivalent of the German to Being’. In Refl 4182, Kant makes clear
Realität, whereas Kant’s term Wirklichkeit that reality is either comparative or absolute
is usually translated as ‘actuality’. Actuality and that realitas phenomenon is not abso-
means ‘[t]hat which is connected with the lute. The latter does not immediately refer to
material conditions of experience’ (B266). the thing in itself but is only that to which the
Everything is actual which ‘stands in one category of reality is attributed, which is in
context with a perception in accordance fact ‘the synthesis in an empirical conscious-
with the laws of the empirical progres- ness in general’ (A175=B217). The reality
sion’ (A493=B521). Actuality does not refer meant here corresponds to sensation (B207).
to things in themselves but to the objects However, in the Schematism chapter Kant
of perception, which exist ‘only in experi- asserts that that which corresponds to sen-
ence, and [. . .] do not exist at all outside it’ sation is ‘the transcendental matter of all
(A492–493=B521). objects, as things in themselves (thinghood,
Actuality is to be identified with the modal reality)’ (B182=A143). The term ‘thinghood’
category of ‘existence’ (Dasein) (A80=B106), is the English translation of the German
whereas ‘reality’ is one of the categories of Sachheit, which Kant equates with ‘reality’
quality (→ Anticipations of Perception). So (B602) in the transcendental sense, i.e. real-
when Kant speaks of the reality of things he ity regarded as ‘transcendental matter’ or
does not, or not in the first instance, mean the noumenal thing in itself rather than as
the reality, or more precisely, the actuality of the sensible matter of perception. Only the
the objects of → experience. Reality, as cate- former is reality in the absolute sense.
gory, is attributed to the things judged about By ‘objective reality’, Kant understands
in terms of the objective determination of the the relation of cognition to an → object
manifold of sensations that are involved in (A155–156=B194–195), which amounts to
any particular empirical → judgment. On the an object being ‘given in some way’, which ‘is
256
Key Themes and Topics
nothing other than to relate its representation a modest dwelling ‘just roomy enough for
to experience (whether this be actual or still our business on the plane of experience’
possible)’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘[t]he pos- (A707=B735).
sibility of experience is therefore that which The task of surveying reason’s cognitive
gives all of our cognitions a priori objective claims takes shape both in his major philo-
reality’ (ibid.). It is in fact the synthetic unity sophical works and in his contributions to
of concepts in synthetic a priori propositions contemporary debates through his ‘popu-
that establishes objective reality by provid- lar’ essays. A common thread throughout
ing them a ‘third thing, namely a pure object’ is the notion of → critique, that is, the self-
(B196=A157). Similarly, at A109 Kant argues examination of reason in order to ascertain
that ‘[t]he pure concept of this transcendental which of its claims are ‘rightful’, viz. valid
object [. . .] is that which in all of our empiri- and rightfully presented for our assent, and
cal concepts in general can provide relation which are ‘groundless pretensions’ (Axi) and
to an object, i.e., objective reality’. must be rejected.
These distinctions are related to Kant’s dis- In CPR, Kant calls upon reason to under-
crimination between empirical realism and take ‘the most difficult of all its tasks, namely
transcendental realism, the former of which that of self-knowledge’ (Axi). That reason is
he associates with his own → transcenden- capable of self-knowledge is central to Kant’s
tal idealism. Empirically real is that which is conception of both philosophical and popu-
conditioned by the → pure forms of human lar uses of reason. In the domain of → meta-
cognition, which leads Kant to claim that physics, or of ‘pure reason’, Kant’s stance is
space and time are not transcendentally real shaped by his analysis of the failure of clas-
(B52–53), but only objectively or empirically sical rationalism to establish that a priori
real, which comports with their transcenden- reflection yields substantive truths and that
tal ideality. – DS it is a reliable procedure of philosophical
justification.
Self-knowledge results in the repudiation
of certain claims to metaphysical knowledge,
Reason a topic analyzed in the Transcendental →
Dialectic of CPR. The negative conclusion of
In → Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, which Kant the Transcendental Dialectic is that reason
used as a course textbook, ‘ratio’, which is affords us no insights of its own. At the same
translated as ‘ground’ (Pars I, ontologia §14), time, Kant is keen to establish that reason is
is the principle of connectedness of all things. not ‘inactive’, as → Hume claimed, but capa-
Knowledge of these grounds is ontology ble of self-reflection, self-criticism and, cru-
or, as Baumgarten indicates, ‘architectonic’ cially, of offering us guidance in the practical
(ibid., §4), which consists of principles of sphere.
cognition as well as of objects of knowledge. Accordingly, the positive conclusion that
Kant adopts from his predecessors the idea can be drawn from the Transcendental
of an architectonic order of rational knowl- Dialectic is that reason is capable of setting
edge but radically revises it, giving up on the its own boundaries. The limits of rational
ambition to build ‘a tower that would reach reflection are not something we discover, as
the heavens’, and offering his readers instead a brute fact of our human constitution, but
257
Key Themes and Topics
258
Key Themes and Topics
may, as a species, shape our character, bring Refutation to oppose all forms of transcenden-
to fruition our rational abilities and become tal realism, which is the view that the mind can
a ‘rational animal’ (Anthr 321). – KD know objects as they are in themselves – that
is, either by directly intuiting their essence in
Further Reading some sense, or by claiming knowledge of real
objects existing independently of the mind (see
S. Engstrom, The Form of Practical A369) (→ thing in itself).
Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Not only is Kant concerned, in the
Imperative (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Refutation, with defeating a brand of exter-
University Press, 2009). nal world scepticism associated with the
S. Gardner, ‘The primacy of practical rationalism of Descartes, but it is clear that
reason’, in G. Bird (ed.), A Companion he is also challenging a brand of empirical
to Kant (Malden, MA/Oxford: Wiley- scepticism that one finds in the philosophy
Blackwell, 2010), pp. 259–274. of → Hume (see Hume, Treatise of Human
O. O’Neill, ‘Vindicating reason’, in P. Guyer Nature, Bk 1, pt. IV, §II, ‘Of scepticism with
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant regard to the senses’). In the B-preface, in a
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, note (Bxxxix n.) that is intended to supple-
1992), pp. 280–308. ment the argument of the Refutation, Kant
S. Neiman, The Unity of Reason: Rereading claims that it is a ‘scandal of philosophy’ that
Kant (New York: Oxford University a proof for the existence of external objects
Press, 1994). has as yet not been forthcoming. So in essence,
the Refutation is important for Kant as a
positive argument in itself, but, importantly,
it is also designed to distance the theory of
Receptivity → spontaneity knowledge put forward in CPR from those
systems of thought mentioned above.
Reflection → logic It is important to mention that Kant
inserts the Refutation in the → Postulates of
Reflection, concepts of → Empirical Thought section of the B-edition
Amphiboly of CPR. This placement is significant due
to the fact that the Postulates are inextrica-
Reflective judgment → bly bound up with the modal categories of
aesthetic judgment, judgment experience in general. The modal categories
of possibility, actuality and → necessity are
Refutation of Idealism employed in order to ‘express only the rela-
tion [of the concept] to the faculty of cogni-
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism, which is found tion’ (A219=B266). Given that the Refutation
in the B-version of CPR (B274–279), is explic- appears at the end of the Second Postulate,
itly concerned with distancing the → transcen- which deals with ‘cognizing the actuality of
dental idealism of CPR from what he calls the things’ (B272=A225), we can clearly see that
‘problematic idealism’ (B274) of → Descartes, one of its main concerns is to emphasize the
and the ‘dogmatic idealism’ of Berkeley (B274). centrality of the a priori conditions required
It is clearly the case that Kant also intends the for our knowledge of things.
259
Key Themes and Topics
The main content of the Refutation argu- something is made possible through a ‘thing’
ment can be found in one condensed paragraph outside me (B275) and then by ‘actual things’
at B275–276, along with an important accom- (ibid.) perceived outside me. The perception
panying passage contained in the B-Preface of these ‘actual things’ leads to a key point
(Bxli). The Theorem basically tells the reader in the argument, in the penultimate sentence
exactly what the argument hopes to achieve of the paragraph, when Kant claims that my
overall, which is that if I am conscious of my ‘consciousness [of my existence] in time’
own existence, as empirically determined, then (B276) is inextricably bound up with ‘the
this proves that I am also aware of objects existence of the things outside me’ (ibid.),
existing outside of my mind in space. which condition such time-consciousness.
The Proof starts with the basic claim that These ‘things’ stand in as perceptual surro-
what I am most immediately aware of is my gates for the unchanging permanent struc-
own conscious existence: ‘I am conscious of ture, which are perceived in space – the realm
my existence as determined in time.’ (B275) of outer sense. Kant can now say that my own
What Kant is aiming to do at this point is consciousness in time is ‘at the same time an
to seemingly offer a tacit agreement with immediate consciousness of the existence of
the sceptic’s claim that it is almost beyond other things outside me’ (ibid.).
reproach that I am conscious of my ideas, An intriguing aspect of the Refutation is
which appear in successive moments in time. how Kant separates the role of the → imagi-
It follows from this that the sceptic main- nation from our intuition of space. Claiming
tains that I can never actually be certain of that the faculty of → intuition would be
the existence of objects external to the mind. ‘annihilate[d]’ (B277n.) should there be no
Kant then argues, in the second premise of outer sense, Kant argues that without an a
the Proof, that if I accept the first premise priori grasp of something given through pure
(which appeases the sceptic), then one can receptivity there would be no imagination.
only accept it if a condition can be found for It is clear, however, that in order even
the changing states of mind which I undergo. only to imagine something as outer, that is,
It is at this point that a remarkable turna- to present it to sensibility in intuition, we
round in the argument ensues, because Kant must already have an outer sense, and must
at once demands that the immediacy of our thereby immediately distinguish the mere
inner consciousness is only possible if ‘some- receptivity of an outer intuition from the →
thing persistent in perception’ (B275) can be spontaneity which characterizes every act of
found. In many ways, this is the point in the imagination (B277). – NH
argument where Kant’s claim that ‘the game
that idealism plays has [. . .] been turned Further Reading
against it’ (B276) is most significant. In other
words, in order for the empirical idealist to D. Emundts, ‘The Refutation of Idealism
claim that what is immediately known are and the distinction between phenomena
our own inner representations, something and noumena’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The
must be perceived outside of us, i.e. in an Cambridge Companion to Kant’s
‘outer sense’ (→ inner/outer sense). ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (Cambridge:
Building on the above, Kant continues his Cambridge University Press, 2010),
argument by insisting that the permanent pp. 168–189, pt. I.
260
Key Themes and Topics
P. Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge as heuristic ones, that are transcendentally
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, presupposed (see B544).
1987), pt. IV. For one thing, Kant argues that philo-
S. Stapleford, Kant’s Transcendental sophical concepts like → necessity and con-
Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason tingency are not objectively valid since they
(London/New York: Continuum, 2008), do not pertain to or concern things (i.e.
ch. 3. appearances) themselves. They can however
be justified as subjective principles of reason,
because these concepts or principles encour-
age and impel us to keep on searching for
Regulative principles further (necessary) grounds of what is con-
tingently given, and thus remind us never to
The importance of Kant’s distinction between assume anything empirical as an uncondi-
constitutive and regulative principles, which tioned endpoint of our analysis (cf. B644).
respectively relate to the constitution of expe- Interestingly, Kant also appeals to his
riential cognition (→ knowledge) and to the notorious ‘as if’-argument to explicate the
mere regulation thereof, can hardly be under- regulative character of the summum ens by
estimated since it touches upon the basic stating that ‘[t]he ideal of the highest being
structure of his Critical philosophy. In fact, is [. . .] nothing other than a regulative
no extensive comment seems to be needed principle of reason’, and that one should
to show that whereas constitutive principles ‘regard all combination in the world as
apply legitimately only to the understand- if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary
ing, regulative principles apply to pure → cause, so as to ground on that cause the
reason itself and, therefore, are exemplarily rule of a unity that is systematic and neces-
discussed in the → Dialectic, the second part sary according to universal laws’ (B647).
of the Logic in CPR. Clearly, for Kant such a statement implies
According to Kant’s definition, a regulative no assertion of anything existing that is
principle of reason is a rule (Latin: regula) objectively necessary, but precisely denotes
prescribing a regress in the series of condi- a mere formal regulative principle, although
tions of possibility for (spatiotemporally) he warns that it is unavoidable, by means
given appearances. That is to say, it concerns of what is called a ‘transcendental subrep-
not the possibility of (experiential) cognition tion’, ‘to represent this formal principle to
of objects, as with the constitutive principles oneself as constitutive, and to think of this
of the understanding, but at the same time it [systematic] unity hypostatically’ (B647).
does not go fully beyond all possible experi- Thus, it is absolutely crucial to keep in
ence either, as would be the case with a (the- mind that regulative principles involve the
oretically unjustifiable) constitutive principle constant danger of transcendental illusion
of reason. It is then merely a principle that (→ Dialectic), that is, of mistaking them
regulates or postulates ‘the greatest possible for constitutive ones by forgetting their
continuation and extension of possible expe- objective indeterminacy.
rience’, as Kant writes (B537), in terms of a Another example mentioned by Kant
legitimate and consistent account of the sub- could be illuminating from a historical
jectively necessary elements of thinking, such viewpoint, namely that of what he calls
261
Key Themes and Topics
262
Key Themes and Topics
kingdom of God, beyond civil society or legal and cults in the wider sphere should be criti-
institutions, which would ultimately satisfy cally evaluated by the moral and universal
the unity and universality claims of religion. standards of the inner one. Moreover, they
On the other hand, there is the essen- should ultimately be used for instrumental
tially historical and statutory concept of or provisional reasons only, as a means (or
‘ecclesiastical faith’ (Kirchenglaube), also ‘vehicle’) to an end, namely in order to grad-
called ‘historical faith’ or ‘statutory reli- ually approximate these a priori standards.
gion’, ‘statutory faith’ or ‘revealed faith’ It is important to note that Kant starts
(Offenbarungsglauben), or indeed ‘revealed his discussion of religion against the back-
religion’ (geoffenbarte Religion). This con- ground of his Critical practical philosophy
cept corresponds to the different organized (→ morality), in particular his doctrine of
churches or various religious denominations, the moral law (→ categorical imperative).
including all their particular beliefs and rites, Recall, for instance, two famous statements
that exist or have existed (or, for that mat- in the preface to the first edition (1793) of
ter, might exist) positively and visibly in the R regarding, on the one hand, the founda-
course of human history. tional role of morality and, on the other, the
Famously, in the preface to the second edi- supplementary or functional role of religion,
tion (1794) of R, Kant uses the image of con- namely for the sake of (the possibility of)
centric circles to indicate the relation between morality’s efficacy in the world.
his two concepts of religion or faith: First, Kant states that ‘morality really has
no need of an end for right conduct’ since the
Since [. . .] revelation can at least com- moral law ‘that contains the formal condition
prise also the pure religion of reason, of the use of freedom in general suffices to it’.
whereas, conversely, the latter cannot do Nevertheless, ‘it cannot possibly be a matter
the same for what is historical in revela-
of indifference to reason how to answer the
tion, I shall be able to consider the first as
question, What is then the result of this right
a wider sphere of faith that includes the
other, a narrower one, within itself (not conduct of ours?’ (R 4–5).
as two circles external to one another but Secondly, Kant adds that reason’s own
as concentric circles); the philosopher, as interest in the efficacy of the moral law in
purely a teacher of reason (from mere the world entails ‘the idea of an object that
principles a priori), must keep within the unites within itself the formal condition of all
inner circle and, thereby, also abstract such ends as we ought to have (→ duty) with
from all experience. (R 12) everything which is conditional upon ends
we have and which conforms to duty (happi-
This picture of two concentric circles, the ness proportioned to its observance)’. What
inner circle of pure rational religion and the Kant means here is the notion ‘of a highest
wider circle of historical revelation, already good in the world’, the possibility of which
reveals the philosophical primacy and prior- presupposes ‘a higher, moral, most holy, and
ity of pure rational religion. Since, in Kant’s omnipotent being’ (R 5), who alone is able to
view, pure rational religion represents the unite duty and happiness.
true inner kernel or final destination of any What appears to be crucial to Kant’s
(possible) historical religion, all historical approach, however, is to acknowledge
elements, particular beliefs or religious rites the appropriate order between duty and
263
Key Themes and Topics
happiness, between moral foundation and than principles of morality, make up the
moral end, namely that the idea of a highest groundwork and the essence of the church’
good ‘rises out of morality and is not its foun- (R 179).
dation; that it is an end which to make one’s And similar arguments are presented
own already presupposes ethical principles’ against religious worship and religious
(R 5). One could of course argue whether, cult, as being forms of obtaining favour
or to what extent, Kant remains completely (Gunstbewerbung) that obstruct and pervert
faithful to these programmatic statements on the moral principle that ‘[a]part from a good
the relation between morality and religion, life-conduct, anything which the human
between duty and happiness, and on the being supposes that he can do to become
idea of a highest good in the world and the well-pleasing to God is mere religious delu-
need of assuming ‘a higher, moral, most holy sion and counterfeit service of God’ (R
omnipotent being’. 170–171). – JV
However, there are no profound reasons to
doubt the global consistency and coherence Further Reading
of Kant’s philosophy of religion, as well as
the validity of its major concerns. In essence, J. DiCenso, Kant, Religion, and Politics
it is a theory of morally and rationally war- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
ranted hope. Kant writes: 2011).
J. DiCenso, Religion within the Boundaries of
Reason says that whoever does, in a dis- Mere Reason. A Commentary (Cambridge:
position of true devotion to duty, as much Cambridge University Press, 2012).
lies within his power to satisfy his obli- J. E. Hare, The Moral Gap. Kantian Ethics,
gation (at least in a steady approxima- Human Limits and God’s Assistance
tion toward complete conformity to the (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pt. I.
law), can legitimately hope that what lies O. Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant. Die Religion
outside his power will be supplemented innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen
by the supreme wisdom in some way or Vernunft, in the series Klassiker Auslegen
other (which can render permanent the
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2011).
disposition to this steady approxima-
M. Kuehn, ‘Moral faith and the highest
tion). (R 171)
good’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Kant and Modern
The implications of Kant’s theory become Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
particularly evident when looking at his University Press, 2006), pp. 588–629.
views on specific religious issues. Priestcraft L. Pasternack, Kant on Religion within the
(Pfaffentum), for instance, is unmasked by Boundaries of Mere Reason (London,
Kant as ‘a regime in the counterfeit service New York: Routledge, 2013).
[Afterdienst] of the good principle’ (R 175) A. Wood, ‘Religion, ethical community, and
since it is supposed to involve ‘the constitu- the struggle against evil’, in C. Payne,
tion of a church to the extent that a fetish- L. Thorpe (eds), Kant and the Concept of
service [Fetischdienst] is the rule; and this Community (Rochester, NY: University of
always obtains wherever statutory com- Rochester Press, 2011), pp. 121–137.
mands, rules of faith and observances, rather
264
Key Themes and Topics
265
Key Themes and Topics
266
Key Themes and Topics
that they can legitimately claim to be entitled a division of powers (legislative, executive,
(to have a right) to certain treatment by other judiciary) and by the fact that all its citizens
individuals or groups. could consent to the enacted laws.
Kant’s account of private right begins The second subdivision of public right –
with an analysis of the conditions on which the right of nations – defines the rules that
things could be ‘mine or yours’. Kant thinks should govern international relations. Since
that anyone can acquire and own property (a nations stand to one another very much like
piece of land or any other object of choice) – individuals in the state of nature, Kant argues
a tenet in direct contrast with feudalism and that they should enter a ‘universal associa-
slavery. This possibility follows directly from tion of states’, where ‘rights come to hold
the pre-political, innate right to external conclusively and a true condition of peace
freedom. In the section ‘Postulate of practical [will] come about’ (MM 350).
reason with regard to rights’, he argues that The third and final subdivision of public
if one were denied in principle the possibility right – cosmopolitan right – concerns the rules
of acquiring and owning an object, then one all nations should adopt in the treatment of
would be deprived of the means with which foreign individuals, especially those who visit
to exercize one’s external freedom. As he puts for the sake of commerce or cultural exchange.
it: ‘[F]reedom would be depriving itself of the Individuals hold, Kant thinks, a right ‘to visit
use of its choice with regard to an object of all regions of the earth’ (though not to stay),
choice, by putting usable objects beyond any while they try ‘to establish a community with
possibility of being used.’ (MM 250) all’ (MM 353). Cosmopolitan right is one of
In a state of nature something external Kant’s most important innovations in legal
can thus be mine or yours, but, says Kant, theory and is recognized as laying the foun-
‘only provisionally’ (MM 256). A provision- dations for contemporary declarations and
ally rightful possession becomes ‘conclusive’ treatises of human rights. – LC
only if the state of nature is overcome and a
civil condition is created. The moral status Further Reading
of the state as well as the → duty for anyone
who lives side by side with others to enter the B. S. Byrd, J. Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine
civil condition rest on the fact that the state of Right. A Commentary (Cambridge:
protects rights already present in the state of Cambridge University Press, 2010).
nature. They do not depend on some empiri- O. Höffe (ed.), Immanuel Kant:
cal fact about human nature, such as its pro- Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
pensity to violence. Rechtslehre, in the series Klassiker
Public right has three main subdivisions: Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999).
state right, the right of nations (or interna- W. Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit.
tional right) and cosmopolitan right (→ Immanuel Kants Rechts- und
cosmopolitan, cosmopolitanism). State right Staatsphilosophie, third edition
spells out how a state should look in order to (Paderborn: mentis, 2007).
guarantee humans’ pre-political entitlements. R. Pippin, ‘Mine and thine? The Kantian
The state must (1) recognize the freedom, state’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
equality and independence of all members, Companion to Kant and Modern
(2) be a republic, i.e. a state characterized by
267
Key Themes and Topics
268
Key Themes and Topics
According to Kant, ‘[t]he schema of a pure fact tells us that ‘their mere form is a hidden
concept of the understanding, on the con- art in the depths of the human soul, whose
trary, is something that can never be brought true operations we can divine from nature
to an image at all, but is rather only the and lay unveiled before our eyes only with
pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity difficulty’ (A141=B180–181).
according to concepts in general, which the This lack of detail becomes particularly
category expresses, and is a transcendental acute with the schemata for the categories.
product of the imagination, which concerns With the schemata for pure concepts, Kant
the determination of the inner sense in gen- forgoes the ‘dry and boring analysis of what
eral, in accordance with conditions of its is required for transcendental schemata of
form (time) in regard to all representations pure concepts of the understanding in gen-
[. . .]’ (A142=B181). eral’ (A142=B181), and he simply lists their
That is, in the case of a pure concept, the schemata without any argument for their
schema produces, or is, a transcendental time correctness. – SB
determination (A138–139=B177–178). For
example, the schema for the pure concept Further Reading
of substance is ‘the persistence of the real in
time’, ‘[t]he schema of actuality is existence H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.
at a determinate time’, and ‘[t]he schema of An Interpretation and Defense, revised
necessity is the existence of an object at all and enlarged edition (New Haven: Yale
times’ (A144–145=B183–184). University Press, 2004), ch. 8.
The schematism chapter is important S. Bayne, Kant on Causation. On the Fivefold
because in the Transcendental Deduction (→ Route to the Principle of Causation
deduction) Kant has proven that experience (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004), ch. 1.
is only possible through the categories, but M. Pendlebury, ‘Making sense of
in the Analytic of Principles (→ Analogies Kant’s schematism’, Philosophy and
of Experience, Axioms of Intuition, Phenomenological Research 55,4 (1995):
Anticipations of Perception) the goal is to 777–797.
prove that those categories have objective
use (A161=B200), that is, application to spa-
tiotemporal objects. To do this, the condi-
tions for subsumption under a concept must Science → natural science,
be specified and this is what schemata do. metaphysics, critique
‘Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure
understanding are the true and sole condi- Self-activity → spontaneity
tions for providing them with a relation to
objects, thus with significance [Bedeutung] Self-legislation → freedom
[. . .]’ (A145–146=B185).
For all of its importance for Kant’s theory Sensation → Anticipations of
of concepts and the Analytic of the Principles, Perception
the biggest concern with Kant’s exposition of
the schematism is his lack of explanation of Sensibility → experience
the precise details of the procedure. Kant in
269
Key Themes and Topics
270
Key Themes and Topics
affected by things (and are thus passive), yet Cambridge University Press, 1997),
[. . .] can produce from its activity no other pp. 29–55.
concepts than those which serve merely to
bring sensible representations under rules’
(G 452). Here, self-activity rests on the func-
tion of combination that the understanding Sublime
must operate in order for a given manifold of
representations to have a synthetic structure, In the early work Obs, Kant presents an
which is ‘not given through objects’ (B130). anthropological examination that distin-
Self-activity in this sense is thus merely rela- guishes the feeling of the beautiful from the
tive to the need for combination of the sensi- sublime. The first section of this work exam-
ble manifold in receptivity that the manifold ines the different manners in which various
itself does not contain. → Reason, on the objects arouse these pleasurable feelings. The
other hand, shows to be ‘a spontaneity so second and third sections extend these obser-
pure that it thereby goes far beyond anything vations and draw from them distinct features
that sensibility ever can afford it’ (G 452; of human beings in general and of the two
emphasis added). sexes (Obs 211–227, 228–243).
Kant thus appears to discriminate between Roughly, sublimity has to do with moral and
the spontaneity involved in the act of under- noble qualities and is diametrically opposed
standing, which is linked to receptivity, and to the ridiculous, while beauty is closely asso-
the absolute spontaneity of reason, which ciated with refinement and tenderness and is
is far removed from it. Herein, Kant’s con- opposed to disgust. The last section offers a
cept of spontaneity must be distinguished differentiation between national characteris-
from that of his successors such as Fichte tics, based on the particular proportions of
and Hegel, who clearly conflated the two beauty and sublimity in them.
capacities. – DS In the Critical period, the Analytic of the
Sublime in CJ draws a comparison between
Further Reading the beautiful and the sublime as the two
types of pure → aesthetic judgment. They are
H. Allison, ‘Kant on freedom: A reply to my both characterized as unique feelings that are
critics’, in Idealism and Freedom. Essays the affective aspect of a particular relation
on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical between two cognitive faculties. Therefore,
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge although they are triggered by natural objects
University Press, 1996), pp. 109–128, esp. or events, their ‘satisfaction does not depend
pt. IV. on a sensation [. . .] nor on a determinate con-
H. Allison, ‘Autonomy and spontaneity cept’ (CJ 244). Both judgments are charac-
in Kant’s conception of the self’, in terized as singular, disinterested, universally
H. Allison, Idealism and Freedom, valid, subjectively purposive and necessary.
pp. 129–142. The sublime is awakened by an amorphous
R. Pippin, ‘Kant on the spontaneity of object, which appears to be extensively unlim-
mind’, in Idealism as Modernism. ited, and is therefore related to the quantity
Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: of the representation. It is a feeling ‘that
arises only indirectly’ (CJ 245). Specifically,
271
Key Themes and Topics
272
Key Themes and Topics
273
Key Themes and Topics
imagination, ‘whose synthesis is subject solely P. Kitcher, Kant’s Thinker (New York:
to empirical laws, namely those of association’, Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 8.
which belongs not to transcendental philosophy B. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to
but to → psychology (B152; cf. B139–140). Judge (Princeton: Princeton University
The synthetic a priori plays a pivotal role Press, 1998), chs 1, 2, 8 and 9.
in all of Kant’s arguments in CPR after the D. Schulting, Kant’s Deduction and
Deduction, in particular of course in the Apperception. Explaining the Categories
chapter that deals with the synthetic a priori (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave
principles that govern possible experience, Macmillan, 2012).
viz. the → Axioms of Intuitions →, the →
Anticipations of Perception, the → Analogies
of Experience and the → Postulates of
Empirical Thinking in General. Synthetic a priori (judgment) →
But the concept of synthesis also plays a synthesis, judgment, Analogies
significant role in the Dialectic, in particular of Experience
in the First and Second → Antinomies and
in the → transcendental ideal, where Kant Synthetic judgment → judgment
argues for an even more fundamental synthe-
sis than the synthesis of the understanding, System
namely a ‘synthesis of all predicates which
are to make up the complete concept of a The notion of ‘system’ is, for Kant, intrin-
thing’; this synthesis constitutes the ‘transcen- sically linked with scientific knowledge:
dental presupposition [. . .] of the material of a systematic unity makes a system out of
all possibility, which is supposed to contain an aggregate of → knowledge, which then
a priori the data for the particular possibility serves as the basis for scientific knowledge
of every thing’ (A572–573=B600–601). (B860ff.). ‘System’ here means the unity of
Here, synthesis is not meant as the formal various cognitions (as parts) under an →
necessary condition of conceiving of a unified idea (B860; cf. B673). This idea, which is
manifold of representations so as to determine a concept of → reason, determines a priori
an → object as → appearance, but as the meta- the limits of its parts as well as their place
physical condition, viz. the principle of thor- within the whole. The intrinsic relation-
oughgoing determination, that first enables the ship between whole and parts, as well as
individual thing in its very being, as a → thing between the parts themselves, ensures that
in itself. This synthesis involves a concept, or → the system will only expand through inter-
idea, which can never be exhibited in concreto, nal differentiation, like an organism, and
in contrast to the synthesis of the pure con- not through an external addition of parts
cept of the understanding that by means of an (B860ff.).
empirical intuition can thus be exhibited. – DS Furthermore, the → form of a system is
not an external feature of reason, but reason
Further Reading itself, for reason is by nature architectonic
(e.g. B502, 673, 676, 835) and systematic
H. Hoppe, Synthesis bei Kant (Berlin/New (B765ff.). In this subjective respect, reason
York: de Gruyter, 1983). aims at totality: with reason we form a
274
Key Themes and Topics
unity out of our cognitions. Hence reason, As far as the internal structure of the sys-
in the broad sense, deals with itself (cf. e.g. tem of transcendental philosophy is concerned,
B708). according to Kant it consists of, roughly speak-
Systematicity is a general characteristic of ing, a level of → critique and a level of → meta-
both philosophy and scientific knowledge. physics, also called ‘doctrine’. In conformity
Undoubtedly, Kant thought of Euclidean with this general structure, Kant’s final system
→ geometry, Aristotelian → logic, or the of philosophy has three critical parts and two
mechanics of → Newton and Kepler, as para- doctrinal parts: the critical parts provide a
digmatic systems. However, for methodolog- radical foundation for the determination of the
ical reasons such systems cannot adequately objects to be determined in the doctrinal parts.
deal with the question of their foundation. In particular, it was Kant’s view that the
Especially the mathematical → method with unity of reason merely has a regulative, subjec-
its axiomatic-deductive proofs (→ proof) tive character which inspired the development
shows crucial shortcomings in the way it of post-Kantian idealism towards a conception
can scientifically justify its own axioms, or, of a system of philosophy that should over-
presuppositions. come Kant’s dualistic model of constitutive
Kant, therefore, introduces a new method and regulative principles. The post-Kantians
for philosophy, namely → transcendental phi- strived for a higher form of unity of reason:
losophy. Contrary to many of his predecessors, one that incorporates a constitutive function.
for Kant the ground of the validity of a system Reason then turns out not to be a system in a
cannot be a system external to reason itself. The merely subjective way aiming at systematiza-
system of knowledge and the system of what is tion, but reason is also a system in an objec-
known, respectively the subject and object of tive sense: it is the constitutive foundation for
knowledge, must be intrinsically related. possible objectivity, and hence not only regu-
However, for Kant the systematic unity of rea- lative for the knowing subject. – CK
son itself does not have a constitutive function.
On the contrary, the unity of reason has merely Further Reading
a regulative function that unites the knowledge
of the understanding. Consequently, Kant denies P. Abela, ‘The demands of systematicity:
that the unity of reason has objective reality. The rational judgment and the structure of
system as architectonic unity thus is merely a nature’, in G. Bird (ed.), A Companion
regulative → idea of reason (→ regulative princi- to Kant (Malden, MA/Oxford: Wiley-
ples). The unity of reason remains a postulate; it Blackwell, 2010), pp. 408–422.
is not the concept of an object of possible experi- H. Fulda, J. Stolzenberg (eds), System
ence, but the idea of the thoroughgoing unity of der Vernunft. Kant und der deutsche
knowledge gained by understanding (B670ff.). Idealismus. Bd. 1, Architektonik
In CJ Kant broadens his concept of a sys- und System in der Philosophie Kants
tem, as nature too is now taken, by virtue (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).
of the power of reflective judgment, to be a P. Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and
system (→ teleology). But he holds on to the Freedom: Selected Essays (Cambridge:
regulative status of this unity. In OP, Kant Cambridge University Press, 2005).
then tries to transform the subjective unity
into an objective one.
275
Key Themes and Topics
N. Rescher, Kant and the Reach of Reason contradiction in the teleological doctrine of
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, nature.’ (UH 18)
2000), ch. 4. It is, however, only in the Analytic of the
Teleological Power of Judgment of CJ that
Kant systematically elaborates the claim that
organisms (including human beings), their
Table of categories → organs, systems and capacities are viewed as
deduction if they were designed to serve ends.
Second, in the ‘Appendix’ to the
Table of judgment → deduction, Transcendental Dialectic of CPR and in the
judgment ‘Introduction’ to CJ, Kant appears to claim
that the assumption of the purposiveness of
Taste → aesthetic judgment nature is a necessary transcendental condition
of experience and knowledge generally. We
Teleological judgment → necessarily regard nature as though it were
teleology, judgment made to be known by our distinctive cognitive
faculties. Although his language can some-
Teleology (purposiveness, end) times be misleading, Kant consistently regards
teleology as an assumption only, however, and
Teleology or purposiveness is essential to never asserts that there are teleological forces
descriptions of rational agency and seems to or purposive beings in nature; nowhere does
be unproblematic. This is not at all the case he contradict the modern scientific commit-
in descriptions of natural laws and proc- ment to blind mechanistic causality.
esses (→ laws (of nature)/lawfulness), which It is of great importance to see that the point
according to the canons of modern science of departure of the Analytic in CJ is the fact that
are blind rather than purposive. we commonly speak of organisms as if they
Teleological notions and ideas are preva- were self-organizing beings. For this fundamen-
lent in Kant’s works. They appear already in tal fact implies in itself that we view them as
the pre-Critical period (most notably perhaps goal-directed. Kant writes: ‘An organized prod-
in OPD 87–89; see also ND 412–416). uct of nature is that in which everything is an
In the Critical period, teleology is impor- end and reciprocally a means as well. Nothing
tant in two related contexts. First, the in it is in vain, purposeless, or to be ascribed to
assumption that organisms are to be viewed a blind mechanism of nature.’ (CJ 376)
teleologically or purposively is fundamental Again, despite such misleading language,
in the biological papers on race (DR, HR, Kant is not asserting that certain natural
UTP) and it underwrites Kant’s conception objects are purposive. Teleology is simply the
of universal history and the development of conceptual framework through which we
humankind: ‘All natural predispositions of a judge these objects. Kant writes:
creature are determined sometime to develop
themselves completely and purposively [. . .] [I]n teleology we certainly talk about
An organ that is not to be used, an arrange- nature as if the purposiveness in it were
ment that does not attain to its end, is a intentional, but at the same time ascribe
this intention to nature, i.e., to matter, by
which we would indicate (since there can
276
Key Themes and Topics
277
Key Themes and Topics
P. McLaughlin, Kant’s Critique of Teleology which belong to a world that is distinct from
in Biological Explanation (Lewiston, NY: our spatiotemporal world of appearances; (d)
Edwin Mellen, 1990). as a metaphysical claim about the nature of
M. Quarfood, ‘The antinomy of things which do not thereby define a world
teleological judgment’, in M. Quarfood, that is distinct from that of our spatiotem-
Transcendental Idealism and the poral objects. These are the methodological
Organism (Stockholm: Almqvist & and metaphysical two-aspect theories, the
Wiksell, 2004), pp. 160–208. two-world, and the two-perspective theories
respectively, which have become standard in
the Anglophone Kant literature (→ transcen-
dental idealism).
Thing in itself While no knowledge of reality in itself
is possible, Kant does allow for us to have
In the Preface to the B-edition of CPR, Kant thoughts about things as they are in them-
first contrasts appearances (→ appearance) selves (Bxxvi); he adds that in so doing, we
with ‘things as they are in themselves’ (Bxx), would be thinking of them as that which
and then explains that his Critical approach appears as the objects of our spatiotemporal
(→ critique) to the problem of pure specu- → experience (ibid.). In thinking of things in
lative reason has the consequence that ‘we themselves, a useful tool is the concept of the
can have cognition of no object as a thing ‘transcendental object’ (B63; A109), by which
in itself’ (Bxxvi). Kant’s justification for Kant refers to the general conceptual struc-
the latter claim follows from his proofs, in ture of an → object. Kant sometimes uses this
the → Transcendental Aesthetic, that space to refer to things in themselves (A380; B506;
(A26=B42) and time (A32=B49) do not rep- B522; A613–614=B641–642), but, impor-
resent properties of things in themselves; tantly, no knowledge claim is made through
as a result, we do not gain cognitive access this use, not even that the thing in itself is an
to things in themselves when we acquire → object of any particular sort.
knowledge of spatiotemporal objects. The To think of things in themselves is to think
notion of ‘thing in itself’ is thus introduced of an intelligible world, and in the → Dialectic
to refer to things as they are independently of of CPR, Kant will both dismantle the claims
our cognition. made by traditional → metaphysics of cogni-
This can be interpreted in a number of tive access to truths about the soul, the world,
ways: (a) as a purely methodological claim, and God, while showing in what way reason
namely that the objects of our spatiotemporal necessarily forms ideas about the intelligible
knowledge can be considered independently world which regulate the progress of our
of this spatiotemporal mode of access, i.e. as knowledge (→ Paralogisms; → Antinomies;
they are in themselves; (b) as a metaphysi- → proofs of the existence of God; → regu-
cal claim about the different modes of access lative principles). Barring cognitive access to
to what we know as spatiotemporal objects, the intelligible world has a further systematic
which defines a perspective upon them that function in Kant’s Critical system: as Kant
transcends cognition, and from which they puts it, ‘I had to deny knowledge in order
are viewed as they are in themselves; (c) as a to make room for faith’ (Bxxx): Kant shows
metaphysical claim about the nature of things that belief in God and the immortality of
278
Key Themes and Topics
the soul are required by → morality (A809– phenomenal, i.e. not objects of our sensible
811=B837–839; CPrR 121–133). intuition. These he calls noumena, and while
Our epistemic situation with respect to noumena are characterized only negatively
things in themselves is, however, not only (B306), one can also consider a positive
characterized by the prohibition of knowl- characterization of noumena as objects of a
edge (A42=B59). Indeed, first, while it is non-human non-sensible type of cognition,
not possible to know anything about things i.e. of an intellectual intuition or intuitive
in themselves, there is evidence that Kant understanding (B307). Kant clearly says that
endorsed the minimal claim that things in we cannot claim that positive noumena exist
themselves exist (P 315), although this is a (A286–287=B343). Such a denial of the pos-
contentious issue among commentators. It sibility of existence claims about noumena in
is however initially not clear how it is pos- the positive sense does not, however, trans-
sible to make such a claim, as it seems to go late into a denial that things in themselves
beyond the bounds of knowledge established exist unless these things are thereby claimed
in the Analytic of CPR. to be objects of some sort (noumena). Rather,
Second, if we are to think of things in Jacobi’s claim that it is not possible to claim
themselves as appearing as spatiotemporal that things in themselves exist can be refuted
objects, for such appearances to come about by pointing to the difference between deter-
it is necessary that our sensibility be first minate knowledge of things in themselves
affected (A19=B33): this is a transcenden- (which is denied by Kant) and indetermi-
tal condition of appearing. This relation of nate knowledge of something that affects us,
affection is typically interpreted as involving something, of which we cannot even say that
things in themselves having a causal impact it is an object but is nonetheless presupposed
upon us, although there are interpreters who as a ground for knowledge.
rather understand spatiotemporal objects Jacobi’s complaint set the scene for the
as the prime candidates for what affects us, post-Kantian dismissive attitude to things in
and others who view the need for a combi- themselves. The German Idealists Schelling
nation of both, i.e. hold a theory of double and Hegel dispensed with the notion of thing
affection. in itself altogether by seeking a ground to
These two controversial issues of the their systems of thought that does not appeal
existence of, and affection by, things in them- to anything beyond thought. Schopenhauer,
selves, come together in a way that Kant’s on the contrary, did away with the denial
contemporary Friedrich Jacobi (1743–1819) that knowledge of things in themselves is a
famously deemed to amount to an inconsist- possibility, by claiming that in fact reality in
ency in Kant’s Critical system. Jacobi com- itself is ‘the Will’, as opposed to the represen-
plained that, while it is not possible to enter tations to which we have access in our nor-
this system without presupposing the exist- mal cognition. – CO
ence of the thing in itself, neither is it possi-
ble to affirm its existence within the system. Further reading
There are, additionally, arguably grounds
for viewing such existence claims as denied Adickes, E., Kant und das Ding an sich
by Kant himself. Kant considers the possi- (Berlin: Pan, 1924).
bility of objects of knowledge that are not
279
Key Themes and Topics
Allison, H., Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: experience – when we give it ‘a use that
An Interpretation and Defense, revised reaches out beyond the boundaries of experi-
and enlarged edition (New Haven: Yale ence’ (A296=B352–353).
University Press, 2004), ch. 3. Both senses of transcendental are to be
Prauss, G., Kant und das Problem der Dinge contrasted with the term transcendent. A
an sich (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974). transcendent principle is one that inherently
Schulting, D., J. Verburgt (eds), Kant’s denies that our theoretical cognition is lim-
Idealism. New Interpretations of a ited to the boundaries of experience. On the
Controversial Doctrine (Dordrecht: contrary, it is ‘a principle that takes away
Springer, 2011). these limits, which indeed bids us to overstep
them, [and therefore] is called transcendent’
(A296=B353). – SB
Thoroughgoing determination
→ transcendental ideal
280
Key Themes and Topics
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant’s task could not grasp a concept defined by an infi-
is to examine intuitive representations, with nite number of marks. A concept’s extension
the aim of identifying any eventual a priori could be infinite, but this would amount to
contribution made by intuitions to the cog- an infinity of instances under the concept.
nition of objects. Unlike the Transcendental By contrast, an infinity of parts is thought
Analytic, which first has to identify con- within space (B39–40): only an intuition
cepts that have a transcendental function could thus be infinite.
(this occurs in the so-called Metaphysical As we shall see, Kant’s claim that the rep-
Deduction; → deduction), the intuitions resentations of space and time are a priori is
of space and time are already known to be at the core of his → transcendental idealism.
the subject matter of the Transcendental His arguments are aimed at philosophers
Aesthetic. holding sensationist or constructivist theo-
On the other hand, unlike the categories, ries of spatiotemporal cognition, chiefly →
the nature of space and time as intuitive Leibniz and → Locke. The latter view spatial
representations is problematic. Aside from relations as deriving from non-spatial rela-
dealing with this issue (A24–25=B39–40; tions respectively of monads and sensible
A31–32=B47–48), the ‘Metaphysical data (and the same goes for time).
Exposition’ establishes the → a priori nature Focusing on space (the case of time is
of the representations of space and time. This analogous) in his first argument, Kant draws
identifies them as having a → transcendental attention to the impossibility of construct-
function in cognition, and as accounting for ing spatial relations out of non-spatial ones:
the possibility of certain synthetic a priori space is not derived from empirical data.
judgments (e.g. those of → geometry in the What space allows is the representation of
case of space, B40–41). the data in intuition as relating to things that
Kant presents two arguments for the intu- are taken ‘not merely as different but as in
itive nature of the representations of space different places’ (A23=B38). In particular,
(and similar arguments in the case of time). space has the transcendental function of ena-
The part-whole relations of space are charac- bling the representation of purely numerical
terized by containment of parts in a unique differences in outer sense (→ identity).
all-encompassing space which is logically The priority of space with respect to
prior to them. In the case of a concept, the empirical data and its necessity in experi-
relation is different: the concept’s intension is ence are confirmed in the second argument.
defined by a set of marks (A320=B377) that Kant’s claim that ‘one can never represent
are its parts; but these marks are prior to the that there is no space’ (A24=B38) establishes
concept. Correlatively, the whole of space its → necessity, while the claim that ‘one
prior to all these parts is unique; this is not can very well think that there are no objects
the case for a concept since the concept as a to be encountered in it’ (ibid.) confirms its
whole always refers to a potential multiplic- priority.
ity of instances, its extension (→ logic). The ‘Transcendental Exposition’ shows
Aside from the part–whole relation, space why the representation of space must be an a
differs from a conceptual representation in priori intuition if the science of geometry is to
that it is infinite (in the sense of limitless: be possible. Insofar as geometric judgments
its quantum is infinite). Our understanding are amplificatory, and not merely clarificatory
281
Key Themes and Topics
(A7=B10–11; B14–17), they must be synthetic manifold through which the representations
(→ judgment). This is only possible if spatial of a determinate space or time are generated’
representations enable us to go ‘beyond the (B202), i.e. the synthesis of composition of
concept’ (B41): they must be intuitions. And homogeneous parts of the single space. Such a
insofar as geometric knowledge is apodictic, → synthesis is thought in the concept of mag-
these intuitions must be a priori. nitude, so that the appearances we perceive are
Important metaphysical conclusions are all ‘extensive magnitudes’ (B203).
derived from these epistemological consider- It is this synthesis that Kant refers to in
ations (A26=B42; A32–33=B49–50). Insofar a famous footnote in the Transcendental
as the intuition of space is a priori, space Deduction (B160–161n.), where he explains
‘represents no property at all of any things in that it is presupposed by the unity of space.
themselves nor any relation of them to each This defines space as a ‘formal intuition’,
other’ (A26=B42). If space is to have the aside from its general role as ‘form of
transcendental functions described above, its intuition’ for the manifold of sensations.
representation cannot be derived from things Although this synthesis makes concepts of
in themselves (→ thing in itself). space (as in geometry) possible, its unity ‘pre-
Therefore, no Leibnizian (relational) or cedes all concepts’ (B161n.). The meaning of
Newtonian (absolutist) (→ Newton) theory of this claim is much discussed in the literature.
space could account for the role of the repre- What it suggests is the possibility of consid-
sentation of space described above. This, how- ering syntheses under a given category (here,
ever, seems to leave a big gap in the argument categories of quantity) which do not issue in
to the conclusion that things in themselves are a conceptual determination; this has impor-
not spatial. If it has been shown that space is tant implications for the question of non-
one of the ‘subjective condition[s] of sensibil- conceptual content in Kant. – CO
ity’ (A26=B42), there remains the neglected
alternative (raised by Reinhold and, most Further Reading
famously, Trendelenburg) that space should
also be a property of things in themselves. H. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism:
If space (and time), and the ‘extended An Interpretation and Defense, revised
beings’ in it, are transcendentally ideal, Kant and enlarged edition (New Haven: Yale
claims that space also possesses ‘empirical University Press, 2004), ch. 5.
reality’ (A26–28=B42–44) (→ reality). That J. V. Buroker, Kant’s Critique of Pure
is, judgments about objects located in space Reason. An Introduction (Cambridge:
are valid as long as they are understood to Cambridge University Press, 2006), ch. 3.
refer to the human standpoint, i.e. as long as L. Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism (Toronto:
it is understood that these things ‘be taken as Toronto University Press, 1995).
objects of our sensible intuition’ (ibid.). C. Onof, D. Schulting, ‘Space as form of
As indicated above, the Transcendental intuition and as formal intuition. On the
Aesthetic must consider intuitions in abstraction note to B160 in Kant’s Critique of Pure
from concepts. In the → Axioms of Intuition, Reason’, The Philosophical Review 124,1
Kant shows how the manifold in intuition is (2015).
first synthesized under the categories of quan- L. Shabel, ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’,
tity. This occurs ‘through the synthesis of the in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
282
Key Themes and Topics
283
Key Themes and Topics
sensation. Secondly, however, there seems to omnitudo realitatis not just concerns a tran-
be more at stake in Kant’s analysis of the ideal scendental ideal, but also ‘the one single genu-
when he writes that ‘the material for the pos- ine ideal of which human reason is capable’,
sibility [Materie zur Möglichkeit] of all objects as it is ‘only in this one single case an – in itself
of sense has to be presupposed as given in universal – concept of one thing thoroughly
one sum total [Inbegriffe]’ and that ‘all pos- determined through itself, and cognized as the
sibility of empirical objects, their difference representation of an individual’ (ibid.).
from one another and their thoroughgoing On the other hand, due to what Kant
determination, can rest only on the limitation calls a transcendental illusion, irremediably
[Einschränkung] of this sum total’ (B610). attached to human reason (→ Dialectic),
Thus, Kant claims that the principle of we have a natural propensity to hypostatize
thoroughgoing determination presupposes, and personify the idea of the sum total of
as its grounding condition, a transcendental all reality. Kant writes that such a hyposta-
substrate, a non-empirical notion of materi- tization and personification come about
ality, which in turn is identified with the idea because, time and again, we dialectically,
of an omnitudo realitatis. He writes: that is, illegitimately though unavoidably,
transform ‘the distributive unity of the use
[I]f the thoroughgoing determination in of the understanding in experience, into the
our reason is grounded on a transcenden- collective unity of a whole of experience’ and
tal substratum, which contains as it were subsequently ‘from this whole of appearance
the entire storehouse of material from
[. . .] think up an individual thing contain-
which all possible predicates of things can
ing in itself all empirical reality’, which we
be taken, then this substratum is nothing
other than the idea of an All of reality [All then confuse ‘with the concept of a thing that
der Realität] (omnitudo realitatis). (B603) stands at the summit of the possibility of all
things, providing the real conditions for their
thoroughgoing determination’ (B610–611).
In a sense, Kant’s doctrine of the transcen- That is also the reason why Kant stresses
dental ideal centres on the insight that it is that the objective of the Dialectic is not just ‘to
only in the case of omnitudo realitatis that describe the procedure of our reason and its
reason produces the thoroughgoing deter- dialectic’, but also ‘to discover its sources, so
mination of what is thought in the idea and as to be able to explain this illusion itself [. . .];
hence is capable of a genuine ideal. Kant for the ideal we are talking about is grounded
even describes this in terms of the notorious on a natural and not a merely arbitrary idea’
notion of the → thing in itself, by asserting (B609). Thus the doctrine of the transcenden-
that ‘[t]hrough this possession of all reality tal ideal affirms the need, at the level of the
[Allbesitz der Realität]’ is a representation Dialectic, to give a fundamental explanation
possible of ‘the concept of a thing in itself for reason’s dialectical proceedings. – JV
which is thoroughly determined’ (B604).
At the same time, from the concept of an Further Reading
ens realissimum which is the concept of ‘an
individual being’ that is determined by means J. Ferrari, ‘Das Ideal der reinen Vernunft’, in
of each of all possible predicates that abso- G. Mohr, M. Willaschek (eds), Immanuel
lutely belong to it, it follows that the idea of Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in
284
Key Themes and Topics
285
Key Themes and Topics
and that what we call outer objects are In the Antinomies, Kant argues that the way
nothing other than mere representations we think about the world in the pursuit of empir-
of our sensibility, whose form is space, ical knowledge drives us unavoidably to contra-
but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing dictory conclusions, when we try to think about
in itself, is not and cannot be cognized
the extent of the world in space and time, the
through them, but is also never asked
divisibility of matter, freedom of the will, and the
after in experience. (A30=B45)
first cause of the world. He argues that contradic-
[E]verything intuited in space or in time,
tions arise because we only ever have knowledge
hence all objects of an experience possi-
of things which are conditioned (dependent), but
ble for us, are nothing but appearances,
i.e., mere representations, which, as they seek total explanations which require something
are represented, as extended beings or unconditioned (something which would not
series of alterations, have outside our need further explanation), and we assume that if
thoughts no existence grounded in itself. we are given something conditioned, the uncon-
(A490–491=B518–519) ditioned will also be given (→ Dialectic).
Our empirical thinking seems both to
Thus, central to understanding the position involve and not to involve the idea of the
is making sense of what it means to say that unconditioned, leading us to contradictory
objects in space are mere representations, giv- claims about the empirical world thought as
ing an account of Kant’s reasons for thinking a totality. Kant argues that positing his pro-
that we cannot know things in themselves, as posed distinction between things in them-
well as an account of what his commitment selves and appearances enables us to resolve
to things in themselves amounts to – that is, this contradiction: we have knowledge of
whether it is a commitment to an actually appearances only, which contain nothing
existing aspect of → reality. which is unconditioned. The idea that where
In the → Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant there are conditioned things there must be
argues that our representation of space (and something unconditioned appears to us only
then, in parallel arguments, time) is → a pri- as a principle of reason (→ regulative princi-
ori (not derived from experience) and is an ples), but it is not in fact true of the spatio-
→ intuition. The role of intuition, according temporal world of which we have experience.
to Kant, is to give us the objects about which While we need to give the principle a role in
we think, something, Kant believes, concepts our thinking, we need not think that it is true
could never do. Kant argues that space and of the world we experience.
time are the a priori forms of our intuition, In addition to talking about things as they
and concludes from this that space ‘represents appear to us and things as they are in them-
no property at all of any things in themselves’ selves, Kant talks about phenomena and
(A26=B42) and that ‘[s]pace is nothing other noumena. Phenomena are objects which are
than merely the form of all appearances of given to our senses and which have been
outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of thought through the categories (→ deduction).
sensibility, under which alone outer intuition Noumena are objects which are known by a
is possible for us’ (ibid.). A priori intuition is pure intellect, without sense experience. Kant
supposed to explain the possibility of synthetic explains his notion of things in themselves by
a priori knowledge (→ synthesis, Analogies of distinguishing between a positive and a nega-
Experience), and to lead to idealism. tive sense of the term ‘noumenon’. The positive
286
Key Themes and Topics
notion of noumenon is the notion of a distinct L. Allais, ‘Kant’s idealism and the secondary
kind of object: one which is not spatio-tempo- quality analogy’, Journal of the History of
ral, and which does not affect our senses, but Philosophy 45,3 (2007): 459–484.
rather would be known by the intellect alone. H. Allison, ‘Transcendental realism, empirical
Putative examples of such an object would be realism and transcendental idealism’,
God, Cartesian souls, Leibnizian monads, and, Kantian Review 11 (2006): 1–27.
perhaps, platonistically understood numbers. D. Schulting, J. Verburgt (eds), Kant’s Idealism.
Kant argues that we cannot have knowl- New Interpretations of a Controversial
edge of such objects, including knowledge Doctrine (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).
that there are any, and do not even really
understand what such objects would be. In
the negative sense, however, the notion of Transcendental logic →
noumena refers to the things of which we deduction, judgment
have knowledge (through sense experience),
thought of in abstraction from what we Transcendental reflection →
know about them through the senses. Kant Amphiboly
says that the notion of things as they are in
themselves should be understood in terms of Transcendental unity of self-
the notion of noumena in the negative sense. consciousness → apperception
Kant explicitly distances his position
from Berkeleian idealism, which he sees as Truth
an example of the position he calls empiri-
cal idealism, which doubts the existence of According to the nominal definition of truth,
objects in space, or denies that we cognize truth is ‘the agreement of cognition with its
them immediately (A369; A491=B519). Kant object’ (A58=B82). The → object is the com-
says that space and objects in space are ideal mon ground of intersubjective agreement,
in a transcendental sense, saying that space ‘through which the truth of the judgment is
‘is nothing as soon as we leave aside the con- proved’ (A821=B849).
dition of the possibility of all experience, and Despite the wealth of passages where Kant
take it as something that grounds the things equals truth to agreement with the object (e.g.
in themselves’ (A28=B44). At the same time, A237=B296; LL 219, 718, 823), there is some
he insists that objects in space are real, and controversy as to whether Kant really adheres
that we have immediate experience of them, to a correspondence theory of truth, or if he
as opposed to inferring their existence as the only refers to it in a preliminary fashion. It
causes of certain merely mental states. – LA might seem more plausible to construe Kant’s
view as a coherence theory of truth, since ide-
Further Reading alism can be taken to hold that the objects
of cognition are subordinated to the subject
L. Allais, ‘Kant’s argument for transcendental and therefore cannot serve as independent
idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic’, truthmakers (→ transcendental idealism). But
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society this interpretation is based on too subjective
110,1 (2010): 47–75. a construal of Kant’s idealism. Its empiri-
cal realism countenances objects with which
287
Key Themes and Topics
judgments can agree. The a priori determina- what truth consists in (according to the received
tions of objects prescribed by the categories definition). It is in this sense, as a demand for a
and forms of → intuition are taken by Kant general and sufficient criterion, that the question
to be conditions for the possibility of true ‘What is truth?’ is absurd and leads to absurd
and false judgments about objects. In that answers, a situation Kant compares to the sight
sense, the Transcendental Analytic is a ‘logic of ‘one person milking a billy-goat while the
of truth’ (A131=B170), making cognition of other holds a sieve underneath’ (A58=B82–83).
objects possible. Coherence is a feature of the From an ethical point of view, truthfulness
systematicity of cognition (→ system) required is ‘the greatest virtue in the world’ (LL 62).
by → reason, rather than of truth as such. Though one can be mistaken as to the truth of
A couple of qualifications are needed here, what one says, ‘one can and must stand by the
however. First, agreement with the object does truthfulness of one’s declaration or confession,
not explain the truth of analytic judgments because one has immediate consciousness of
(→ judgment). Such a judgment lacks a cor- this’; for as regards what we hold as true, we do
responding object, since its predicate merely not need to compare it with an object, but only
repeats marks contained in its subject con- ‘with the subject (before conscience)’ (MT 267).
cept, and therefore amounts to a conceptual Kant holds that truthfulness is a → duty, how-
analysis of the subject concept. Its truth can ever great the disadvantage it may lead to (SRL
be cognized through the law of contradiction 426); notoriously, this is a duty towards every-
alone (A151=B190) (→ principle of (non-) one, even to a murderer at our door. – MQ
contradiction). The explanation of the truth
of an analytic judgment lies in its formality Further Reading
(→ form). In addition to a synthetic judg-
ment’s material agreement with its object, G. Prauss, ‘Zum Wahrheitsproblem bei
truth has a ‘formal aspect’ that ‘consists in Kant’, in G. Prauss (ed.), Kant. Zur
agreement with the laws of the understand- Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen
ing’ (A294=B350). Although this can refer to und Handeln (Cologne: Kiepenheuer &
the principles of transcendental logic which Witsch, 1973), pp. 73–89 [also in Kant-
determine the form of an empirical object, it Studien 60,2 (1969): 166–182].
also applies to general → logic, so that a state- A. Vanzo, ‘Kant on the nominal definition
ment true merely in virtue of logic can be said of truth’, Kant-Studien 101,2 (2010):
to agree with the formal conditions of thought 147–166.
rather than to an object (cf. A59=B84).
Second, there are passages where Kant may
seem to cast doubt on the adequacy of the Unconditioned, the →
received definition of truth (A57–60=B82–84; Antinomies, idea/ideas,
JL 50–51). However, what is here in critical regulative principles
focus is not correspondence, but the notion of a
general criterion of truth. Such a criterion would Understanding → judgment,
be ‘valid of all cognitions without any distinc- knowledge
tion among their objects’ (A58=B83). But that
would amount to abstracting from all content Unity of consciousness →
or relation to an object, and yet such content is apperception
288
Key Themes and Topics
289
Key Themes and Topics
290
PART IV:
RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE
5
RECEPTION AND INFLUENCE
This chapter presents a series of short essays of scholarship on the reception and influence
on the reception of Kant’s work, in particu- of Kant’s thought. – DS
lar his Inaugural Dissertation from 1770
and the first publication of the Critique
of Pure Reason in 1781, in the period
1770–1802. The main figures treated here Until 1781: Responses to Kant’s
that were important for the development Inaugural Dissertation (1770)
and early reception of Kant’s philosophy
and that can be loosely grouped under the In his treatise On the Form and Principles of
often used historical label of post-Kantian- the Sensible and Intelligible World, known
ism – although most of them were certainly as the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 (ID),
not card-carrying Kantians – are Lambert, Kant claims that time and space are subjec-
Schultz, Mendelssohn, Herz, Garve and tive forms, rooted in the nature of the human
Feder, Hamann, Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, mind rather than pertaining to things in
Schulze, the early Schelling, Diez, Flatt, themselves, and that as a result our cogni-
Rapp, Fichte and the early Hegel. The tion of the sensible world is distinct in kind
emphasis here is on these thinkers’ reception from the cognition of the intelligible world.
of Kant’s work, not their own philosophies. Kant argues for the subjectivity of time and
A second set of essays addresses the influ- space by showing that conceiving either as
ence Kant’s thought exerted on later devel- an object or as a determination of an object,
opments in philosophy in the second half of whether an accident or relation, cannot
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, account for the character of the representa-
in particular Schopenhauer, neo-Kantianism tion that we have of each.
and Heidegger’s influential phenomenological With respect to time, for instance, Kant
reading. A final set of articles gives an overview argues that the idea we have of it could not
of mainstream contemporary Kantianism, have been acquired through use of the senses
both in theoretical philosophy and ethics. but is in fact presupposed in any such use.
With each essay a list of further reading So, against those, like Leibniz, who have
is provided that will enable the reader to claimed that our ideas of succession arise
undertake further research in a specific area from our (confused) representation of the
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Reception and Influence
series of actual things existing one after the theologian, and literary critic. In addition, a
other, Kant claims that ‘I only understand the review of ID was published late in 1771 in
meaning of the little word after by means the Königsbergische gelehrte und politische
of the antecedent concept of time [. . .] [for] Zeitungen by Johann Schultz (1739–1805), a
those things come after one another which court chaplain and professor of mathematics
exist at different times’ (ID 399). in Königsberg.
In addition, Kant points out that our rep- As was to be expected, Kant’s arguments
resentation of time is singular rather than for the status of time and space as pure
general, and that it cannot be analyzed into intuitions, and his conclusion that they are
characteristic marks, both of which imply not objective and real but merely subjective
that the idea of time could not be a discursive forms, proved the most controversial. Kant’s
representation. Altogether, these features, respondents raised a number of problems
which also pertain to the representation of with these claims, ranging from minor quib-
space, imply that the ideas of time and space bles to serious challenges. Sulzer, for instance,
could only be pure intuitions and from this objected that time and space are ‘constructed
it is inferred that neither is something ‘objec- concepts’ in that they include the notion of
tive and real’ but only ‘the subjective condi- order and that it was duration and extension
tion which is necessary, in virtue of the nature that should be considered ‘absolutely simple
of the human mind, for the co-ordinating of concepts’ (Corr-I 112), a point echoed by
all sensible things in accordance with a fixed Lambert (at least with regard to duration; cf.
law’ (ID 400). Corr-I 108).
Given this, things in time and space are More substantively, Schultz objected to
to be regarded as phenomena, and their cog- Kant’s claim that space and time are only
nition, even when it involves the use of the forms of the sensible world, arguing that
understanding, is to be distinguished from the from the fact that these are intuitions it does
cognition of noumena, or things considered not follow that they do not extend to intel-
apart from these sensible forms. According lectual things. Indeed, Schultz contends that
to Kant, it has been the failure to recognize there is good reason to think that space and
and enforce this distinction that has led to time are also forms of the intelligible world.
persistent errors in metaphysics. With respect to space, Schultz claims that
Kant rightly considered his account of the the intellectual concept of ‘subject’ as a mere
status of time and space, his take on the dis- relation (to its accidents) or general notion
tinction between phenomena and noumena, falls short of the complete concept of sub-
and his diagnosis of the errors in metaphys- stance, which also includes the thought of
ics to be original and important philosophi- an absolutely singular existing thing, and for
cal contributions. For this reason, he sent which Schultz argues the intuition of the sub-
his Dissertation to a number of prominent ject in space is required.1
intellectuals, including Johann Heinrich As it relates to time, Schultz contends that
Lambert (1728–1777), a scientist, math- the subject’s persistence (a temporal predicate)
ematician, and philosopher; Johann Georg is required to conceive of the unchangeable
Sulzer (1720–1779), known primarily for his as well as the changeable: ‘every alteration
work in aesthetics; and Moses Mendelssohn requires the persistence of the subject and a
(1729–1786), the famous philosopher, succession of opposed states, and even for the
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Reception and Influence
existence of the unalterable the persistence of representations, both those of God and
the subject is required, although without the those of their fellow minds. Consequently
succession of opposed states.’2 succession is to be regarded as something
Significantly, Schultz was not the only objective. (Corr-I 115; trans. amended)
critic to challenge Kant’s claim that time, as a
subjective form, does not apply to intelligible As Mendelssohn counters, we might con-
objects as both Lambert and Mendelssohn vince ourselves that time is subjective if we
raise a similar objection in their comments limited our consideration to the perspective
on ID. Both reject Kant’s case for the subjec- of the representing subject since, from that
tivity of time, arguing that while we might perspective, there is no basis for determin-
deny the reality and objectivity of space, we ing whether the temporal order of our rep-
cannot possibly deny the reality and objec- resentations is grounded in their objects or in
tivity of time since, at the very least, we can- ourselves.
not deny that changes occur in the thinking Nonetheless, the claim that time is subjec-
subject’s own representations. Lambert, who tive cannot be sustained when we consider
was the first to respond with this criticism in the representing subject as itself an object of
his letter of 13 October 1770, puts the objec- representation on the part of other minds.
tion in the following way: This is because, considered from the per-
spective of such minds, including God’s, the
The trouble seems to lie only in the representing subject does not merely rep-
fact that one must simply think time resent objects successively but is also itself
and duration and not define them. the subject of successive representations.
All changes are bound to time and are
Accordingly, the representing subject must
inconceivable without time. If changes
be recognized as itself really changing with
are real, then time is real, whatever it
may be. If time is unreal, then no change respect to these representations and, there-
can be real. I think, though, that even an fore, time (as applying in this way to the sub-
idealist must grant at least that changes ject) must be objective and real.
really exist and occur in his representa- Given their illustrious sources, these
tions, for example, their beginning and objections could not but be taken seriously
ending. Thus time cannot be regarded as by Kant, and his first replies to his critics are
something unreal. (Corr-I 107) found in the well-known letter to Markus
Herz of 21 February 1772. Against Schultz’s
Mendelssohn, in his response to Kant in a contention that space might equally be a con-
letter of 25 December 1770, offers much the dition of the intelligible world, and as such
same criticism but draws the key contrast be objective, Kant explains that the complete
more sharply: analysis of space yields no substances, nor
connections among those substances, that
For several reasons I cannot convince might serve as a real ground for this repre-
myself that time is something merely sub- sentation, and, therefore, that space could
jective. Succession is to be sure at least not possibly be objective (Corr-I 133–134).
a necessary condition of the representa-
Concerning the objection raised by
tions of finite minds. But finite minds are
Lambert, Mendelssohn and Schultz, Kant
not only subjects; they are also objects of
confesses that it ‘has made me reflect
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Reception and Influence
considerably’ (Corr-I 134) but argues that a commentary on Kant’s work, though one
its implausibility becomes evident once we that extends Kant’s analysis in significant
consider how it might be applied to objects ways.
in space: In particular, Herz contends that while
Kant denies space and time objective reality,
Why does one not accept the follow- they are nonetheless not thereby reduced to
ing parallel argument? Bodies are real wholly ideal entities but must be accorded at
(according to the testimony of outer least a reality in the subject. Herz argues that
sense). Now, bodies are possible only
the objective reality of a relation, as involv-
under the condition of space; therefore
ing a comparison of two things, has to have
space is something objective and real
that inheres in the things themselves. The its ground either in one of the things that are
reason lies in the fact that it is obvious, being compared or in both taken together.
in regard to outer things, that one can- But Herz rules each of these options out,
not infer the reality of the object from concluding instead that ‘with all relations
the reality of the representation, but in some subject must be presupposed which
the case of inner sense the thinking or compares these objects with one another
the existence of the thought and the and, from the differences it perceives in the
existence of my own self are one and the effects of both, brings forth a simple result
same. (Corr-I 134) [i.e. the relation]’.3
Interestingly, Herz proceeds to use this as a
Just as no one would accept that bodies are basis for demonstrating the simplicity of the
real based solely on the testimony of outer thinking subject that is thereby presupposed.
sense (and so that space, as the condition of As he argues, the thinking subject could not
bodies, is also real), so we should not accept consist in a number of parts, because if it did
that changes in the thinking subject are real then the representations that are compared in
based solely on the testimony of inner sense the relation would be distributed among the
(and so that time, as the condition of such parts and we would have to posit a further
changes, is also real). Accordingly, there is subject in order to institute the comparison
no reason to think that because the think- that results in the relation. While the posit of
ing subject is represented as in time through this subject might be postponed for as long
inner sense that it really is in time. as one wishes, in the end one will require ‘a
Whatever the merits of this particular line simple being [. . .] which is in the position
of response, Kant evidently continued to of representing to itself various objects at
reflect on the objection as he would return the same time and bringing forth from their
to it in CPR in the ‘Elucidation’ that follows comparison a single result’.4
the discussion of time in the Transcendental Kant praised Herz’s text as a ‘discerning
Aesthetic (A37=B53–54). and deeply thoughtful little book’ (Corr-I
It bears noting that not all of the reac- 132), and it is certainly possible that its
tion to Kant’s Dissertation was of a criti- claims about the nature and centrality of
cal tenor. Herz himself, a former student of the thinking subject exercised an important
Kant and the original respondent to ID, pub- influence on the direction of Kant’s thought
lished his Betrachtungen aus der speculativen in the 1770s, the so-called silent decade at
Weltweisheit in 1771, a text that amounts to the end of which Kant published CPR. – CD
296
Reception and Influence
297
Reception and Influence
that ‘transforms the world and ourselves into thinkers, exerted a ‘considerable subterra-
representations’.10 nean influence’.13
We can therefore understand why Garve Hamann’s focus upon later sections of
was embarrassed by the ‘incoherence’ of the CPR, in particular ‘The Discipline of Pure
Göttingen review. For it ended up as, not only Reason’, means that, even in 1781, he rec-
a misguided, but also an inconsistent polemic, ognizes that Kant attempts some kind of
sometimes misreading Kant as a Humean for ‘answer’ to Hume by forging a ‘middle path’
whom objects outside our impressions are between dogmatism and scepticism.14 As a
rationally indemonstrable, while also accus- self-confessed Humean, however, Hamann
ing Kant of the Berkeleyan claim that objects remains unimpressed, and claims that Kant
outside our impressions are impossible. unduly sides with dogmatism by insisting
Kant explicitly responds to Feder’s charges upon the autonomy of reason. Hamann thus
of Berkeleyanism in P,11 but does not similarly refers to Kant’s suggestion that ‘sensibility
respond to Garve’s Humean misreadings. and understanding [. . .] spring from a com-
Yet, perhaps Kant’s many claims throughout mon, but to us unknown, root’ (A15=B29)
P concerning how ‘criticism’ is intended as a to make the Humean claim that an investi-
‘solution’ to Humean scepticism (which are gation into this ‘common root’ would reveal
almost entirely absent from the first edition that impressions constitute the ‘transcen-
of CPR12) constitute such a response. dental root’ from which all concepts are
These claims set the agenda for CPR’s abstracted.15
reception within the decade to come. In those Likewise, in the Metakritik, he appeals
years, Kant’s defenders as much as his oppo- to Hume’s Berkeleyan argument that, con-
nents questioned the extent to which he suc- tra Locke, ‘all general ideas are nothing but
ceeded in silencing the sceptic, often arguing particular ones, annexed to a certain term,
that radical reconfigurations of Kantian doc- which gives them a more extensive signi-
trine are required for the critical philosophy fication’16 to dismiss Kant’s claim to a fac-
to achieve this – reconfigurations which led ulty of a priori concepts. Kant’s claim is the
to the emergence of German Idealism in the product of a ‘purification’ which erroneously
1790s. interprets reason as independent of (1) ‘all
tradition and custom and belief in them’,
Investigations into the ‘Common Root’: (2) ‘experience and its everyday induction’
Hamann, Reinhold and Maimon and (3) ‘language’.17
In regard to the latter, Hamann suggests
While the Göttingen review was the first that, had Kant attended to how ‘the entire
published review of CPR, it was not the first faculty of thought [is] founded on lan-
review ever composed. The first review was guage’18 and thus how all thought depends
completed on 1 July 1781 (just six weeks upon the ‘visible and audible’,19 he would
after publication of CPR) by Johann Georg have realized that our intellectual faculties
Hamann (1730–1788). Hamann developed are rooted in the sensible. Hamann thus dis-
his criticisms of Kant in order to com- misses Kant’s enquiry into ‘the possibility of
plete, in 1784, a text entitled Metakritik the human cognition of objects of experience
über den Purismum der reinen Venunft, without and before any experience and [. . .]
which, in being circulated among leading the possibility of a sensible intuition before
298
Reception and Influence
299
Reception and Influence
Are There any a Priori Synthetic Truths? between intuition and concept from the prin-
Maimon’s Humean Doubts ciple of consciousness. As Reinhold believes
that Humeans and Leibnizians must accept
In P, Kant reproached the Göttingen review the principle of consciousness, he hopes that,
for not appreciating the question concern- by its means, he can convince them of the
ing synthetic cognition a priori; one had to synthetic apriority of mathematical truths.
appreciate that question, Kant implied, to Reinhold’s foundationalism failed to con-
understand why he embraced transcenden- vince Maimon, however, who allied him-
tal idealism. Nonetheless, it was soon recog- self with Hume and Leibniz in maintaining
nized that, in this regard, Kant simply begged that all a priori cognition is derived from
the question against the Humean sceptic. For the principle of non-contradiction. Maimon
Kant simply presupposed that we possess admits that for a ‘finite understanding’ such
synthetic cognition a priori, and thus had lit- judgments may appear synthetic, but insists
tle to say to a Humean, who, in holding all a that for the ‘infinite understanding’ they are
priori truths to be analytic and all synthetic analytic.
truths to be a posteriori, was under no obli- He claims that we only believe math-
gation to accept any of the results of Kant’s ematical judgments to be synthetic insofar as
investigation into the possibility of synthetic their subject is either ‘badly defined’ or ‘not
cognition a priori. defined at all’ and says that demonstrating
A case in point is mathematical cognition: that they are analytic would be a not impos-
Kant presupposed that this is a priori syn- sible, albeit laborious, task.33 He also denies
thetic and failed to justify the validity of this that natural science contains any synthetic
presupposition to the bulk of his initial read- cognition a priori to follow Hume in claim-
ership who, under the influence of Hume ing that all its truths are a posteriori.
or Leibniz, were convinced it was analytic. Indeed, in his Versuch einer neuen Logik
Likewise, he had little to say to those who oder Theorie des Denkens he castigates Kant
denied the apriority of mathematical truths, for lumping together two very dissimilar
such as the ‘many mathematicians’ who, at questions, i.e. the questions concerning the
the time, considered them as ‘hypothetical’.31 possibility of (1) pure mathematics and (2)
This worried Reinhold, who maintains that a (supposed) physica pura, under the rubric
CPR lacks resources to convince the Humean of the question concerning a priori synthetic
or Leibnizian that mathematical judgments judgments, as if they possessed an essential
are not analytic, since Kant derived the dis- similarity.34
tinction between intuition and concept, req- For Maimon these questions are very dif-
uisite for any such argument, from the very ferent since (1) in referring to determinate
assumption that mathematical judgments are objects mathematical judgments can be
a priori synthetic.32 illustrated ‘through construction’ (e.g. every
Just such a problem, for Reinhold, jus- straight line is the shortest because, in being
tifies his Elementarphilosophie. For the constructed, every straight line must acquire
Elementarphilosophie endeavours to prove the predicate of being the shortest), whereas
that mathematical judgments are a priori (2) the judgments of a (supposed) physica
synthetic from the distinction between intui- pura never refer to determinate objects and
tion and concept, and proves the distinction cannot be illustrated through construction.35
300
Reception and Influence
Maimon thus argues that even if the causal that our ability to distinguish an objective
law is an a priori principle applicable to succession of appearances from a subjective
objects of experience in general, it does not succession of apprehended perceptions is the
legitimate cognition of necessary connections product of a cognition of necessary connec-
between determinate objects, and the most tion enabled by the category of causality, but
coherent explanation of ‘synthetic judgments Maimon questions this account for the fol-
that refer to determinate objects of actual lowing reasons:
experience’36 is that provided by Hume. (1) He denies that we possess any sure
However, that Hume’s position can also criterion for distinguishing an objective suc-
explain judgments concerning objects of cession of appearances from a subjective suc-
experience in general leads Maimon to con- cession of perceptions. For if we compare a
clude his Versuch einer neuen Logik with the supposedly objective succession of b follow-
claim that ‘in my opinion [. . .] the catego- ing a with a subjective succession of c fol-
ries are designed not for empirical employ- lowing a we find that in themselves these
ment, but only for the employment in the successions are indistinguishable. We might
determination a priori of the objects of believe that the succession of a to b is objec-
mathematics’.37 tive because of its irreversibility, but this does
not provide an adequate criterion for distin-
Maimon on the Quid Facti and guishing it from a to c, since, when I appre-
the Quid Juris hend c following a, it is just as impossible
that I could at the same time apprehend a
Maimon expressed doubts about whether we following c as it is that I could apprehend a
employ a priori concepts to cognize objects following b.38
of experience when he writes to Kant con- (2) He maintains that our commonsensi-
cerning ‘the question quid facti?’ that ‘[y]ou cal pretension to distinguish necessarily con-
seem to have touched on this, but it is, I think, nected events from contingent sequences of
important to answer it fully, on account of perceptions can be based, as Hume main-
the Humean skepticism’ (Corr-II 17). Kant tained, only on experience. E.g. ‘the stove in
described the question quid facti – with refer- the room has been lit and then we notice that
ence to Locke’s Essay – as demanding physi- outside snow has fallen’39. Common sense
ological explanation of our ‘possession of maintains that the warming of the air and the
pure knowledge’ (A87=B119) to distinguish snowfall are objectively real events, so why
it from the Transcendental Deduction’s quid do we believe that the former illustrates nec-
juris question, which demands explana- essary connection while the latter does not?
tion of how a priori concepts are applicable For Maimon this can only be based upon
within experience. past experience, as Hume claimed.
Maimon grants the former question more (3) If we have no criterion to distinguish
significance, since he recognizes that, in focus- an objective succession of appearances from
ing upon how pure knowledge of experience a subjective succession of perceptions other
is possible, Kant does not answer Hume’s than fallible inductive inferences from past
doubts concerning such pure knowledge. experience, the possibility that we possess
Kant may have attempted to answer Hume nothing but subjective successions of percep-
in the Second Analogy with his argument tions cannot be ruled out.40 Garve’s objection
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Reception and Influence
that CPR does not provide a sure criterion For Maimon, the forms of intuition and
for distinguishing truth from illusion (see categories are not fundamentally heterogene-
above), cannot therefore, albeit for different ous, since the former are originally concepts.
reasons, be ruled out decisively. He thus claims that in thinking forms of intu-
The Versuch über die ition we do not apply the categories directly
Transzendentalphilosophie, despite doubting to them, but rather think the relations of
the fact of experience (in the Kantian sense), still things in general which would be thought by
maintains that Kant’s categories possess objec- an infinite understanding. What, however, are
tive validity as ‘conditions of perception’.41 those ‘things’, the concepts of their relations
There, for example, Maimon argues that of which constitute the objective ground of
the category of causality has objective valid- intuitions of space and time? Maimon here
ity as a condition of possibility of alteration, refers to ‘ideas of the understanding’ which,
and is therefore a condition of possibility of in a letter to Kant (Corr-II 16), he claimed to
even subjective sequences of perceptions.42 have introduced to answer the quid juris.
Transcendental philosophy must explain this He insists that the diversity of empirical
objective validity by demonstrating how cat- intuition compels us to assume a correspond-
egories are valid of empirical intuition, i.e. by ing diversity among its objective grounds and
answering the quid juris question. declares that the objective grounds of both
Nevertheless, Maimon’s transcendental the matter and form of intuitions are immi-
philosophy rules out transcendental argu- nently contained within them as elements
ments concerning the possibility of experience from which they are composed. These ele-
(since he doubts that we possess ‘experiential ments are ‘ideas of understanding’ since we
propositions’), to focus upon transcendental can never be conscious of them insofar as
arguments concerning the possibility of ‘math- consciousness presupposes their synthesis.45
ematical propositions’.43 Maimon thus refers As elements of synthesis they complement
to himself within a letter to Kant as enlarging the ‘idea of reason’, i.e. the idea of a ‘complete
the scope of the quid juris question. For Kant, synthesis’, which, for Maimon, is the idea of
the quid juris concerned the application of a an infinite understanding. They are ‘useful for
priori categories to a posteriori intuitions; and resolving the question quid juris?’46 because
the connection between the categories and a they enable Maimon to explain the applica-
priori intuitions established within mathemati- tion of the categories to empirical intuitions
cal propositions was seen by Kant as a resource by appeal to our participation within the
for the solution to the former problem rather infinite understanding’s conceptual grasp of
than as generating another problem. the things which it produces.47 Only in this
Maimon however objects that ‘even if they way, Maimon believes, does the quid juris
are a priori, intuitions are still heterogeneous attain a satisfactory answer.48
with concepts of understanding’44 to con-
clude that the quid juris must be extended to The Problematic Status of Things
the categories’ application to a priori intui- in Themselves: Jacobi’s and Schulze’s
tion. The solution to this problem provides Critique of Kant’s Idealism
resources for the further problem concern-
ing the categories’ application to a posteriori Maimon’s description of the ‘ideas of under-
intuitions. standing’ as noumena and the perceptible
302
Reception and Influence
303
Reception and Influence
As such, one of his final criticisms of the towards directions pursued by himself and
doctrine of things in themselves concerns other German Idealists.
how any correspondence between them Schelling borrows Schulze’s term ‘for-
and their appearances is even conceivable. malism’60 to disparage the position of those
Schulze writes: who – according to Schelling – misread Kant
as claiming that ‘the form of our cognitions
to be [. . .] convinced of the fact that, originate within ourselves whereas their mat-
according to the principles of the critical ter is given to us from the outside’.61 Such
philosophy, cognition of empirical sensa- misreadings, Schelling observes, are respon-
tion [. . .] may not possess an actual rela-
sible for the assumption that Kant accounts
tion to things outside us [. . .] one need
for the material content of empirical intui-
only, after having dissolved the represen-
tation of a sensible object into the marks tion as the product of the affection of things
from which it is constituted, abstract in themselves, which, as Jacobi and Schulze
those which, according to the critical pointed out, contradicts his critical restric-
philosophy, belong merely to the form of tion of the categories of actuality and causal-
cognition [. . .]. How much remains after ity to appearances.
abstraction of all these forms [. . .] as Like Maimon, Schelling attempts to free
matter for cognition? It might be noth- Kant from this contradiction by denying
ing. Therefore according to the most that he ever appealed to things in them-
recent dogmatic system [i.e. the critical selves to explain the origins of experience.62
philosophy] [. . .] the representation of
According to Schelling, Kant could have in
an empirical object is [. . .] compounded
no way intended that things in themselves
from forms of cognition; it could thus
appropriately be called formalism [. . .] possess such a role, first, because CPR main-
to indicate its differences from other tains that ‘everything that is for us an object
dogmatic systems.58 or thing has become object etc. only within
an original synthesis of intuition’63; and sec-
ondly because that would reduce Kant to
Towards German Idealism: Schelling’s being an inconsistent Humean. In regard
Reaction in the 1790s to the latter, Schelling remarks how for the
‘Formalists’
The influence of the Humean sceptics’
reception of Kant is well illustrated by the the world bears no affinity to our spirit
Allgemeine Uebersicht der neuesten philoso- [Geiste] other than that of a contingent
phischen Litteratur that Friedrich Wilhelm affect. Nevertheless such a world [. . .]
they claim to govern with laws that [. . .]
Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) wrote for the
have been implanted in the understand-
Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft
ing. As the supreme legislators of nature
Teutscher Gelehrten. There, Schelling (1) [and] with the full consciousness that the
highlights misinterpretations of Kant that world is comprised of things in them-
should be avoided and (2) draws upon some selves, they impose these concepts and
of Kant’s early critics to offer an interpreta- laws of the understanding onto these
tion of ‘what [Kant] had to have intended things in themselves [. . .] and this world
if his philosophy was to prove internally of eternal and determinate nature obeys
cohesive’.59 In so doing, Schelling points their speculative decree. [. . .] Hume, the
304
Reception and Influence
sceptic, first had claimed what is now the essence of an individual nature (of selfhood
being attributed to Kant. [Ichheit])’.70 – RF
Yet Hume readily admitted that all our
natural sciences amount to deception, Further Reading
[and] that all laws of nature constitute
but a routine of our imagination. This F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German
was consistent philosophy. And Kant is Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge,
supposed to have done no more than
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
repeat Hume so as to now render him,
E. Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of
who had been consistent, inconsistent.64
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012).
Schelling’s ‘non-formalist’ interpretation of M. Frank, ‘Unendliche Annäherung’: Die
Kant draws upon many of Maimon’s sug- Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik
gestions for how transcendental philosophy (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1997).
should be reconfigured. Just as Maimon P. Franks, All or Nothing. Systematicity,
accused Kant of promulgating an ‘indolent Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism
philosophy’ with respect to time and space, in German Idealism (Cambridge, MA:
insofar as he simply presupposed that they Harvard University Press, 2005).
are ‘original forms’ without investigating R.-P. Horstmann, Die Grenzen der Vernunft.
whether they might originate within some Eine Untersuchung zu Zielen und
prior ground,65 so Schelling denies that we Motiven des Deutschen Idealismus, third
‘simply bring along [the forms of space and edition (Frankfurt a/M: Klostermann,
time] as something finished and ready-made 2004), esp. pt. II: ‘Vom Buchstaben zum
for the purpose of intuition’.66 Geist. Die Rezeption der Kantischen
For Schelling, investigation into the prior Philosophie durch F. H. Jacobi und die
ground of these forms of intuition provides – just Deutsche Idealisten’.
as it did for Maimon – ‘a hint [regarding] the most M. Kuehn, ‘Kant’s Critical philosophy and
complete account of the essence of intuition (of its reception – the first five years (1781–
its material)’,67 which can explain the material 1786)’, in P. Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge
content of empirical intuition without recourse Companion to Kant and Modern
to ‘that fantasy of the brain [Hirngespinnst] that Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
has tormented our philosophers for so long – University Press, 2006), pp. 630–663.
viz. the things in themselves’.68
Furthermore, to obviate the objection that
critical idealism is an inconsistent Humeanism, Kantianism in the 1790s: From
Schelling follows Maimon’s rationalist dogma- Reinhold to Hegel
tism in denying the absolute heterogeneity of
the form and matter of empirical intuitions to Reinhold’s major impetus
argue that both arise inseparably united as a
result of the ‘self-intuition of a spirit [Geistes]’ It would appear beyond doubt that the Critical
or ‘absolute subject’,69 which – akin to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant is, in general, of
relationship between Maimon’s infinite under- great importance to the philosophical devel-
standing and our own understanding –‘contains opment of German Idealism. Historically,
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Reception and Influence
however, its importance to post-Kantian phi- philosophical programme, which was the ini-
losophy is often overstated. One must keep tial motivation behind his own foundational
in mind, for example, that until 1790 only a philosophy of the Grundlage der gesamten
handful of books on the Critical philosophy Wissenschaftslehre (1794). Fichte’s adapta-
had appeared, most of them also critical of it. tion of Kantian philosophy is virtually the
In institutional terms, though, among inverse of its adaptation by the students in
the first attempts to establish Kantian phi- the Tübinger Stift (most famously, Hölderlin,
losophy academically, in the mid-1780s the Hegel, and Schelling). Initially, they in fact
University of Jena made the Critical phi- do not deal with Kant’s critical philosophy
losophy compulsory for students in the fac- directly, but as mediated by the aforemen-
ulty of philosophy.71 Due to this curricular tioned interpretive work of Schulz and the
reform and the subsequent appointments of writings of Reinhold.
Karl Leonhard Reinhold and Johann Gottlob Reinhold was one of the very first who, in
Fichte, the Salana soon became one of the the second half of the 1780s, adopted the phi-
leading German universities. losophy of Kant. His interest was aroused by
The main figure behind this reform was the aforementioned review in the Allgemeine
Christian Gottfried Schütz, who was the Literatur-Zeitung. One year after this review
founder of the most successful journal of this had been published, Reinhold’s first two of
period, the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, in all eight ‘Letters on the Kantian philoso-
which was also committed to the general phy’ appeared between August 1786 and
propagation of Kantian philosophy. However, September 1787 in the Teutsche Merkur.
after the publication of CPR, it took more Journalistically, these ‘Letters’ proved a huge
than four years until in July/August 1785 success. It is no exaggeration to say that it is
a first positive assessment of Kantian phi- thanks to them that the Kantian philosophy
losophy appeared. The lengthy review in was put on the philosophical agenda.
the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung was based Reinhold’s ‘Letters’, however, are anything
largely on the at that time only obtainable but a concise exploration of the more techni-
exposition of CPR, the Erläuterungen über cal tenets of the Critical philosophy. Rather,
des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der reinen they deal very broadly with the more general
Vernunft (1784), written by the court chap- question of its usefulness (Nutzen). It is by
lain of Königsberg, Johann Schul[t]z. virtue of this question that Reinhold made
For the earliest reception of the Critical the extremely difficult insights of the Critical
philosophy this book proved far more impor- philosophy accessible for the learned audi-
tant than CPR itself. Virtually all classical ence of his time. Due to its specific orienta-
German writers and philosophers from the tion, but also due to the fact that CPR itself
beginning got acquainted with the key issues plays a relatively minor role in the ‘Letters’,
of CPR through reading this book, with the from the very beginning the debate around
noticeable exception of Fichte. the Critical philosophy followed a pattern
Fichte was one of the very few who, in that was more in line with the interests of
1790, studied the Critiques firsthand and Reinhold himself rather than those of the
also understood their content and intention Critical philosophy strictly speaking.
more or less in its literal sense. In 1792, he In an engaging way, Reinhold summarized
got acquainted with Reinhold’s foundational the results of the Critical philosophy and fitted
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Reception and Influence
them in with the programme that he himself he became familiar with CPR.74 From Diez’
had pursued since his time in Vienna.72 It has correspondence we may conclude that he
often been claimed that Reinhold only popu- also discussed Reinhold’s ‘Letters’ with his
larized Kant’s thought, which consequently fellow students.
led to the general disregard of his own Another important source for the recep-
philosophy. Such views, however, fail to do tion of Kantian philosophy in the Stift are
justice to Reinhold’s historical importance. the lectures of the philosophy professor
According to Reinhold, the chief merit of Johann Friedrich Flatt (1759–1821). In a
the Critical philosophy is that it frees us from lecture most probably attended by Hegel
blind faith and false religious beliefs, and that and Hölderlin he offers a concise guideline
it thus paves the way towards an enlightened for studying Kant. Flatt repeatedly recom-
society. The Kantian philosophy purifies the mends Schulz’ Erläuterungen and Reinhold’s
Christian religion that had been corrupted ‘Letters’, while Reinhold’s Versuch he only
by self-opinionated dogmatism and the self- recommends with reservations.
serving clergy. Reinhold’s main point in this Flatt’s main criticism is directed against
regard is that philosophy, by means of a Reinhold’s attempt in the Versuch to provide
critical approach to reason, is able to achieve a foundation for the results of CPR. Virtually
what Christianity originally had brought into all students, however, rejected Reinhold’s
the world by means of the heart. foundationalism (Grundsatzphilosophie) as
This was, of course, not the intention well as Fichte’s more substantial attempt at
behind Kant’s own philosophical pro- providing such a foundation. In this respect
gramme. Nevertheless, just a cursory look it is significant that Hegel approached the
at Hegel’s early philosophy shows that early discussions on this subject matter with
Reinhold propounded philosophical ideas indifference.75
that could not but wake the young students It is noticeable that, towards the end of
of the Stift ‘from their dogmatic slumber’. In 1790, two factions of Kantians came to the
Reinhold’s view, Critical philosophy was to fore in the Stift. The one faction leans heavily
be seen as paving the way for a new religion, on Reinhold’s Versuch for its understanding
which was propagated some years later in of Kant, while the other is inspired prima-
the so-called Älteste Systemprogramm des rily by Reinhold’s ‘Letters’. The first group
deutschen Idealismus. includes the radical Kantians, especially the
aforementioned Diez.
Pivotal Minor Figures: Diez, Flatt, Rapp On the basis of his reading of Kant, Diez
reaches the conclusion that divine revelation
The importance of Reinhold’s philoso- is impossible and consequently he refuses to
phy for understanding the development of acknowledge the authority of the Lutheran
Kantian philosophy cannot be underesti- confessions of faith. In 1792, he moves to
mated. One of the early leading Kantians in Jena to study medicine. For his friends and
the Stift, Immanuel Carl Diez (1766–1796), fellow students in the Stift, but also for the
writes in regard to Reinhold’s second main younger generation of students, Diez’s action
work, his Versuch einer neuen Theorie proved too extreme.
des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens In response, the other faction adhered to
(1789),73 that it was through this book that Reinhold’s aim in the ‘Letters’ to try and
307
Reception and Influence
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Reception and Influence
love in our hearts enabling us to follow their need of a principle that mediates between
laws by virtue of a loving heart. The laws sensibility and morality in order to bring
of our fathers, however, do not necessar- about a virtuous sentiment.
ily correspond to the moral law. Therefore, The origin of the post-Kantian idealist tra-
Christianity provides the example of a loving dition is thus not the result of a direct discus-
father and the fulfilment (πλήρωμα) of the sion and confrontation with Kant, but rather
moral law in the real life of God’s beloved is the effect of debates initiated by Reinhold’s
Son. Since this example has originally been reception of the Kantian philosophy and its
provided for mankind, it is no longer neces- problems highlighted against the backdrop
sary for each of us to perform the hard task of Storrian theology.
of a compulsory love for the divine lawgiver;
it is enough to be ‘infatuated’ with the testi- The Limited Role of Fichte
mony of the real life of Jesus Christ revealing
in man’s hearts that to follow the law is no The commonly assumed influence of Fichtean
longer a cold demand of moral reason, but philosophy must be put into perspective. It
an easy demand of the heart. is certainly true that Fichte’s Versuch einer
It is Rapp’s intent to replace the ‘frigidity’ Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792) immediately
of the moral law and likewise the cold feeling became the object of intense study in the
of respect (Achtung) of Kantian moral phi- Stift. Its central argument, however, that rev-
losophy by the mediating reality of a loving elation is not only possible but also necessary
heart that is informed by the moral law. Only for the sustainability of the moral order, was
such a heart can affect us genuinely and can not shared by the students of the Stift.
oppose our manifold sensuous inclinations. The Storrian Friedrich Gottlieb Süßkind
Kantian morality, by contrast, stays within (1767–1829) argues in a lengthy essay
the realm of the intellect and does not affect that Fichte’s proof of the possibility of rev-
the sensible realm where genuine actions are elation is a recipe for reinstalling orthodox
performed. Thus, Kantian transcendental theology,84 which was an imminent peril that
philosophy cannot go beyond its own intel- had to be averted. Hegel expresses a very
lectual bounds and is thus unable to have any similar criticism in relation to his plan of
impact on the real world that is in great need expanding the moral argument with physico-
of being transformed, at least according to theology, as Fichte ‘restores the old-fashioned
many of the students of the Stift. way of proving in [Christian] dogmatics’.85
The programmatic claims of Rapp con- The general charge of dogmatism against
verge in Hegel’s fragment Der Geist des Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is also brought
Christentums. Hegel writes: ‘To complete by Hölderlin, for Fichte in his theory aims
subjection [Knechtschaft] under the law of to go beyond the fact of consciousness. In his
an alien Lord, Jesus opposed not a partial fragment ‘Seyn, Urtheil und Modalität’ this
subjection under a law of one’s own, the critique is specified insofar as, in Hölderlin’s
self-coercion of Kantian virtue [Tugend], view, being cannot be subordinated to self-
but virtues without lordship and without consciousness.
submission, i.e., virtues as modifications of Post-Kantian idealism is not a linear
love [. . .] as modifications of one living spirit development from Kant to Hegel. Things are
[Geist].’83 According to Hegel too, we are in far more complicated than this influential
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310
Reception and Influence
execution. In spirit or principle, Hegel are formed.’89 By shifting in this way the
believes that Kant’s philosophy contains a focus of the inquiry from the content of an
core of potentially ‘authentic’ or ‘true ide- experience to its form (the ‘relations’ under
alism’.86 In its specific execution however, which any object of experience must nec-
Hegel deems it fundamentally insufficient. essarily be thought), Kant manages, in his
Kant’s idealism remains a ‘subjectivism’ intentions at least, to break through the
insofar as it affirms the opposition between opposition between the subjective and the
concept (Begriff) and being (Sein). In this objective, since, in Hegel’s words, for Kant
way, Hegel alternates between praise for the ‘[t]he objectivity here means the element of
potential of the principle of Kantian thought, universality and necessity, i.e. of the determi-
and criticism of its actual execution. nations of thought themselves – the so-called
The meritorious principle which Hegel a priori’.90 From this point of view, Kant’s
takes to guide Kant’s thought is that philoso- philosophy is true idealism because objectiv-
phy should consist in a self-justification of ity is taken in terms of the determinations of
reason. For Hegel, this means that self-con- thought, rather than as simply opposed, or
sciousness must show itself to be the implicit external, to them.
unity of all explicit conceptual oppositions. Secondly, for this same reason, Hegel finds
However, Kant succeeded in developing such in Kant’s philosophy a core of true idealism
an ‘authentic idealism’ only from a ‘limited ‘insofar as it shows, that neither the concept
standpoint [eingeschränkten Standpunkt]’.87 in isolation nor intuition in isolation is any-
Hegel identifies several aspects of Kantian thing at all; that intuition by itself is blind
thought which contain this ‘authentic Idea and the concept by itself is empty’.91 Since
of Reason’.88 First, it is expressed in the for Hegel any self-justification of reason
question guiding CPR: ‘How are synthetic must entail that subjectivity recognize itself
judgments a priori possible?’ The turn with as absolute (i.e. the implicit unity of what is
which Kant set out to put metaphysics on explicitly opposed), Hegel takes Kant’s stipu-
the ‘secure course of a science’ (Bxviii), con- lation that neither intuitions nor concepts
sisted in the hypothesis that objects conform can by themselves yield knowledge to be
to our knowledge, rather than the other way fully justified.
around. That is to say, critical philosophy Lastly, it is above all in the Transcendental
must involve an investigation into the ways Deduction that Hegel recognizes in Kant’s
in which the object of experience must be philosophy an authentic idealism: ‘It is one
thought in accordance with the rules of the of the profoundest and truest insights to be
understanding. found in the Critique of Reason that the unity
The ways in which the object must be which constitutes the essence of the concept
thought are expressed by the categories, is recognized as the original synthetic unity
on which rests any synthetic judgment a of apperception, the unity of the “I think”, or
priori. Hegel writes: ‘The determinations of self-consciousness.’92
of thought or concepts of the understand-
ing make up the objectivity of experience The Implicit Principle of Speculation
[Erfahrungserkenntnisse]. They contain
relations only [überhaupt], and therefore The greatest merit of Kant’s turn in metaphys-
through them synthetic judgments a priori ics is that it asserts that the ‘highest point’
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312
Reception and Influence
313
Reception and Influence
released from what he saw as his depress- revised 1847), Schopenhauer argues for several
ing destiny in the family merchant business. modifications and simplifications of Kant’s
Turning to the study of medicine and physi- picture of the cognitive faculties. The under-
ology, Schopenhauer soon became enthralled standing should not be construed as the fac-
by philosophy, especially Kant and Plato. ulty for thinking intuitions through pure and
Under G. E. Schulze’s tutelage in Göttingen, empirical concepts. Rather, it non-conceptu-
Schopenhauer read Kant first-hand and ally transforms sensory intuitions into a world
became acquainted with the criticisms that had of experience ordered in space, time and cau-
been levelled for two decades at the Critical sality. On Schopenhauer’s view, basic human
philosophy. In 1811, Schopenhauer moved to sensory experience is not-yet-conceptualized
Berlin to study with Fichte, but he soon became and is similar – with variations for different
disappointed in Fichte’s lectures finding them sensory organs – to that of non-human ani-
obscure to the point of obscurantism.97 Worse mals. The fact that non-human animals do not
still, Schopenhauer thought Fichte (as well as use language and thus seem to lack concepts
Schelling and Hegel) had steered philosophy but nonetheless perceive and act intelligently
back to the kind of rationalist project thor- constitutes evidence, in Schopenhauer’s view,
oughly discredited by the First Critique. For for construing the understanding as operating
these and other reasons, Schopenhauer har- non-conceptually. Distinctive to human cogni-
boured a career-long hostility to Schelling, tion is the faculty of reason, but in contrast
Fichte and Hegel (in order of increasing dis- to Kant, according to Schopenhauer reason is
dain) of which he made no secret. nothing but the faculty that abstracts concepts
Schopenhauer was the first ‘back to Kant’ from experience and imposes four modes of
philosopher. His aim was to ‘take up directly explanation, that is, the four roots of the prin-
from Kant’ in order to modify and offer a ciple of sufficient reason, onto experience as
self-consistent transcendental idealist sys- well as onto our judgments.99
tem.98 This has not generally been recognized This changed picture of the cognitive facul-
by commentators since Schopenhauer makes ties means that while Schopenhauer agrees with
greater knowledge claims concerning the Kant in the view that ‘concepts without intui-
thing in itself than Kant ever thought possi- tions are empty’ he disagrees with the view that
ble, namely, in addition to the world as repre- ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’ (CPR
sentation, there is another side of the coin, as A50–51=B74–75). On the contrary, intuitions
it were, the world as will. In order to see how without concepts form a class of knowledge he
Schopenhauer thought he could stay true to calls ‘feeling’ (Gefühl) or ‘intuitive knowledge’
Kant’s transcendental idealism while identify- (intuitive Erkenntniß) as opposed to concep-
ing the Kantian thing in itself with will – con- tual knowledge (Wissen).100
ceived as a non-teleological and thus ‘blind’
striving – one must turn to Schopenhauer’s Identification of the Thing in Itself as ‘Will’
reception of Kant’s epistemology.
The best summary of Schopenhauer’s recep-
Modifications to Kant’s Epistemology tion of Kant’s metaphysics is to be found in the
Appendix to the first volume of his magnum
In his doctoral dissertation, The Fourfold Root opus The World as Will and Representation
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813–14; (1818, revised with a second volume in 1844;
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Reception and Influence
third edition 1859) titled ‘Critique of the least two things, for Schopenhauer, we can
Kantian Philosophy’. Here we gain a sense of know about the thing in itself: It is not spa-
the Kantian views from which Schopenhauer tiotemporal and it may not be understood
never wavered: He asserts that ‘Kant’s great- as causally related to phenomena. It is the
est merit is to distinguish between appearance strict adherence to the exclusive subjectiv-
and thing in itself – by proving that the intellect ity of space and time as well as to the claim
always stands between us and things, which that space and time constitute the principle
is why we cannot have cognition of things as of individuation that leads Schopenhauer
they may be in themselves’.101 Another doc- to argue that Kant should have talked only
trine from which he never departs is Kant’s about unindividuated ‘thing in itself’ in the
distinction between the empirical and intel- singular, although strictly speaking the thing
ligible character, which Schopenhauer consid- in itself is not ‘one’ in the way an object is
ers ‘one of the most excellent things anyone one, nor in the way a concept is one, rather,
has ever said’.102 We also get a sense of how the will is ‘one in the sense that it lies outside
Schopenhauer interpreted Kant’s version of of [ . . . ] the possibility of multiplicity’.104
transcendental idealism from the fact that he Notwithstanding his agreement with Kant
praises the exposition of it in P and asserts that we can never have direct cognition of
the superiority of the first edition of the First the thing in itself, there is a very special
Critique over the second, claiming that the instance of knowledge – one’s first-personal
latter spoiled its insights. insight into acts of volition – that is immedi-
To put things in contemporary scholarly ate in the sense that it is not mediated by the
terms, Schopenhauer thought that the best way forms of space or causality, but which is still
to understand Kant’s transcendental idealism known in ‘the form of time, as well as that of
is as a ‘two-worlds’ or ‘causality’ view rather being known and of knowing in general’.105
than as a ‘two-aspects’ or ‘identity’ view.103 Schopenhauer believes the distinctive imme-
Interestingly, Schopenhauer’s own version of diacy of an individual’s epistemic access to
transcendental idealism is well characterized her own body in acts of willing licenses an
as a metaphysical version of a two-aspects or identification of the thing in itself with will.
identity view: The world has two sides, the In a revealing passage Schopenhauer writes:
world as we represent it, and the way it is in
itself, as will. But these two sides are not related It is nonetheless fair to say that we are
causally, rather, the world of representation is only using a denomination from the
the ‘objectification’ of the world as will. superior term [a denominatio a potiori]
that gives the concept of will a broader
To arrive at this view, Schopenhauer recon-
scope than it has had before. [ . . . ] no
figured transcendental idealism in a way that
word [could] designate the concept of this
would avoid the criticism levelled famously genus. Accordingly, I will name the genus
by Jacobi and Schulze that Kant had unjus- after its most important species; the more
tifiably applied the category of causality to intimate and immediate cognition we
things in themselves. Further, Schopenhauer have of this species leads to the mediated
adhered very strictly to the notion that space, cognition we have of all the others.106
time and causality are exclusively forms that
the subject imposes to structure the world The rhetorical device that Schopenhauer
of representation. Accordingly, there are at explicitly employs to call the thing in itself
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Reception and Influence
‘will’ is the denominatio a potiori, literally, certain way, prompt us to judge an object as
‘receiving its name from what is better, supe- beautiful or sublime, as opposed to the largely
rior or greater’. What Schopenhauer offers us objective investigations of Aristotle, Burke,
is metonymical insight into the thing in itself. Winckelmann, Lessing and Herder.108 Kant’s
He is trying to get us to widen the extension theory of the sublime comes in for high praise,
of the concept of ‘will’ which we know from however, and in his Studienhefte entry on
our nearly immediate experience of willing the Third Critique (1808–11), one sees that
beyond the bounds of possible sensation to Schopenhauer was clearly moved by it: ‘How
the thing in itself, and invites his readers to true and fine is what he says about the sub-
do this on the strength of their special insight lime!’ He qualifies this appraisal only as fol-
into their own wills. lows: ‘[O]nly a few things in his language and
This is the same kind of sensible confirma- the fatal faculty of reason [die fatale Vernunft]
tion by way of a felt connection that Kant are to be overlooked.’109
affirms in §59 of the Critique of Aesthetic Affinities between their views include the
Judgment (CJ 351ff.), namely the notion that conception of aesthetic experience as disin-
beauty is a symbol of morality, except that terested and a focus on both nature and art.
the Schopenhauerian connection is not to be This follows in the tradition of eighteenth
brought about by the felt recognition of struc- century aesthetics, although Schopenhauer
tural analogies, but rather, by felt contiguity; understands aesthetic experience more par-
that is, we gain insight into the nature of the ticularly as ‘will-less’ (willenlos). In addition,
thing in itself by being part of the in-itself, Schopenhauer’s theory of the sublime is really
and by experiencing ourselves in the least a transformation of Kant’s theory that retains
mediated way available.107 Another place to the distinction between the mathematical
look in Kant for the origin of Schopenhauer’s and dynamical sublime, the mixed painful/
metonymical mode of making the thing pleasurable nature of the experience that is
in itself sensible is CJ 338–346 (§§56–57), theorized as a kind of oscillation between, on
where Kant resolves the antinomy of taste the one hand, fear (dynamical) or frustration
by invoking the ‘supersensible substratum of (mathematical) and, on the other, exaltation
appearance’. Here as well, Kant sees a role in the felt recognition of a supersensible qual-
for feeling (aesthetic feeling) in making the ity in ourselves. The main difference between
rational idea of the thing in itself sensible their respective accounts derives from
without being able to provide a direct intui- Schopenhauer’s excision of the role of reason
tion thereof. – ‘die fatale Vernunft’ – in the experience.110
Yet, Schopenhauer departs from Kant’s aes-
Aesthetics thetic theory in several ways. Schopenhauer
sees a greater cognitive import of the experi-
Schopenhauer faults Kant’s aesthetic theory ence of the beautiful and sublime than did
for its focus on judgments rather than on aes- Kant. In place of Kant’s cognitive free-play in
thetic experience, but applauds it for giving the an experience of beauty, Schopenhauer sees
correct ‘general method of investigation’ for a ‘perception of Ideas’, the ideas being the
aesthetics. The correct method is the largely essential features of the phenomenal world.
subjective method of investigating the elements Since the perception of Ideas is a somewhat
in human nature which, when stimulated in a rare form of intuitive knowledge, this renders
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Reception and Influence
art highly significant from a cognitive per- predicating causality beyond the bounds of
spective. The most significant art form on sense. Finally, Schopenhauer is outraged by
his view is music. Absolute music, that is, the fact that Kant’s ethics does not include
non-programmatic music without a text, for non-rational animals directly as objects of
Schopenhauer bypasses the Ideas and affords proper respect, and believes it seriously ethi-
a ‘copy of the will’ by expressing universal cally defective accordingly.
human emotions and strivings shorn of any The basis of morality for Schopenhauer
particular context in the phenomenal world. is instead the feeling of compassion.
Like first-personal volitional insight – the Compassion involves feeling the suffering
basis on which Schopenhauer identifies the (or prospective suffering) of another as if
world in itself with ‘will’ – absolute music is it were one’s own, and thus motivates one
experienced only in time, without the media- to try to relieve (or to prevent) that suffer-
tion of other forms of cognitive conditioning ing. Unlike sentimentalist views, however,
such as space and causality. It thus affords, Schopenhauer believes there is a metaphysi-
for Schopenhauer, the closest – though still cal basis that grounds the normativity of this
not entirely immediate – access we can have feeling. Whereas persons of predominantly
to the nature of the in-itself of the world. egoistic and malicious character see a ‘thick
partition’ between themselves and others, the
Ethical thought compassionate person recognizes the funda-
mental connection among all living beings.
Schopenhauer’s most pronounced departure This connection may be interpreted in a
from Kant concerns his ethical thought. In robustly metaphysical fashion as a felt recogni-
his essay ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840, tion of the unindividuated nature of the in-itself
published with his essay ‘On the Freedom of of the world as will, or it may be interpreted
the Will’ in 1841) Schopenhauer spends the axiologically as the felt recognition of inherent
entire first half of the essay offering a highly value in all living beings. If one favours the latter
critical assessment of Kant’s ethics before giv- interpretation (as this author does) one might
ing his positive account of the basis of moral- see a greater affinity after all between Kant and
ity. Schopenhauer argues that Kant begs the Schopenhauer’s ethical views: Schopenhauer’s
question by assuming that morality has an view that all living beings have inherent value
imperatival form, and anticipating G. E. M. may be seen as a transformation of Kant’s view
Anscombe’s criticism, continues that a ‘moral of rational nature as having inherent value. On
law’ makes little sense without the notion both interpretations, the compassionate per-
of a divine or worldly lawgiver. Further, son, for Schopenhauer, ‘sees the world aright’
Schopenhauer does not think reason can (to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase), that is, inso-
play the moral lawgiver role due to its being far as she responds compassionately to the
merely a faculty for abstracting concepts from suffering of others, she tracks the way things
and imposing on experience the four forms really are. – SSh
of explanatory reasoning (the four roots of
the PSR). Relatedly, Schopenhauer does not Further Reading
think reason can legitimately be seen as the
ground for any ‘causality through freedom’ P. Guyer, ‘Schopenhauer, Kant, and the
insofar as this idea involves illegitimately methods of philosophy’, in C. Janaway
317
Reception and Influence
318
Reception and Influence
This line starts with Hegel’s death as a his- as the ultimate foundational discipline of
torical date that has symbolic meaning for the both philosophy and the other sciences. To
history of philosophy: German Idealism had be sure, this does not imply a reduction of
lost its leading spiritual position in Germany. philosophy to epistemology: neo-Kantian
Henceforth, natural science, a more histori- philosophy is about culture in the broad
cal orientation, realism, and the general ‘loss sense, not just about knowledge and sci-
of illusions’ gradually came to dominate ence in the narrow sense. With respect to
intellectual culture and this provoked a kind the rehabilitation of philosophy, the neo-
of post-idealistic identity crisis. With Hegel’s Kantians, as the epithet suggests, return to
death his philosophy and the Hegelian con- Kant.
ception of the unity of facticity and meaning, Of course, many regard neo-Kantianism
of reason and reality, gradually lost purchase. as primarily an epistemological Kantian
As a result, not only the influential theme of movement. There are many reasons for
‘worldview’ (Weltanschauung) suggesting a doing so. Widespread topical and meth-
situated perspective on totality could spring odological uncertainty in the universities
up and grow popular, but also all kinds of led philosophers such as Eduard Zeller and
naturalism and scientific reductionism, evok- scientists like Hermann von Helmholtz to
ing loss of meaning, of the richness and depth attempt to provide philosophy with its own
of life, sprouted. The ghost of nihilism, of a topic and its own method, while at the same
metaphysical void, dawned. time discussing the methods and principles
This spiritual background points already of the non-philosophical sciences, which
to neo-Kantianism as it tried to overcome were developing ever so rapidly in their
the above-sketched post-idealistic gap time. Such attempts led to what at the end
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. The situation of the 1870s became known as the Marburg
becomes even more complex as the empiri- and Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism.
cal sciences appeared to be emancipated Fairly soon these schools came to dominate
from philosophy and became wholly inde- the epistemological debates of the nineteenth
pendent. The question arose: why then still century. It is therefore not entirely untrue to
philosophy? see neo-Kantianism as primarily an episte-
mological movement.
Neo-Kantianism as Epistemology However, more recent research on neo-
Kantianism suggests that this view is
By the mid-nineteenth century, marking out responsible for much confusion about neo-
and making sense of the field of properly Kantianism. Especially the cultural-phil-
philosophical investigations had become osophical nature of neo-Kantianism as a
problematic. This problem leads us directly reaction to a crisis has, as a result, been insuf-
to the beginning of neo-Kantianism. In reac- ficiently acknowledged. Recent research has
tion to the identity crisis of philosophy, neo- emphasized that questions regarding world
Kantianism, both in its early and its mature view were in fact the driving force behind the
forms, makes a case for the rehabilitation of ‘logical’ preoccupations of the neo-Kantians.
philosophy. Despite the major differences in approach, it
This rehabilitation starts with a clear com- is a modern philosophy of culture that unites
mitment to epistemology (Erkenntnistheorie) the Marburg and Southwest neo-Kantians.
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320
Reception and Influence
321
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validity (a priori structures, values, etc.), is develop another kind of relationship that not
understood as the foundation of all that can only turns out to be more fundamental, but
be valid and hence as the ground for the pos- also proves to be of great importance to the
sibility of objectivity. By means of this strat- development of a philosophy of culture.
egy, which discriminates sharply between, on Starting the philosophical analysis with
the one hand, a ‘pure’ subject as foundation given cultural phenomena or spheres of cul-
of objectivity and an ‘empirical’ subject which ture, which implicitly contain objective valid-
is grounded in that normative foundation, on ity claims, does not imply that the premise
the other, the neo-Kantians try to overcome of the analysis is a Faktum that is stipulated
what they consider to be certain exaggerated dogmatically as valid. Rather, the analysis
positions or naïve, objectivist worldviews takes such ‘facta’ as problematic, as a validity
be they called naturalism, materialism, psy- claim that is in need of philosophical evalua-
chologism, empiricism, positivism, logicism, tion. According to the neo-Kantians’ under-
fideism, historicism, Lebensphilosophie, or standing of the method of transcendental
nihilism. philosophy, the original determinacy of the
different spheres of culture is to be known
Philosophy of Culture via an oblique, validity-reflexive disclosure of
the constituents of meaning of those spheres
As in theoretical philosophy, the relation of culture, i.e. of the principles of validity of
between the unconditional norm of the pure those claims.
subject and its conditional fulfilment by the
empirical subject equally plays a central role The Primacy of ‘Ought’
in the philosophy of culture. This propor-
tional relation of validity makes clear that the Like Kant, the neo-Kantians understand
duality of facticity and meaning, of reason culture as a system of meaning in order to
and reality, of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, is grounded on provide a conceptual account of ‘the world
premises that turn out to be false. of man’. With this they aim to show reason
We may illustrate this through Heinrich itself to be the governing principle of our
Rickert’s concept of ‘meaning’. Meaning world, of culture.
is conceptualized as the recognition by the Take the case of the Southwest School
finite rational being called ‘man’ of uncon- of neo-Kantianism. Unlike the Marburg
ditionally valid theoretic and non-theoretic School, the Southwest School did not fall
values. The reciprocal relation of implica- victim to the ‘narrow intellectualist’ focus of
tion, and the one-sided relation of founda- Cohen, who restricted philosophical analy-
tion between the norm and that for which sis mainly to the cultural fact of scientific
the norm is, absolute demand and finite ful- knowledge, although the later development
filment, principle and the concrete, implies of of the Marburg School broadened the scope
course that the human production of mean- of analysis as can be seen in the work of
ing is characterized by finitude. Natorp and Cassirer. From the start, how-
Therefore, the neo-Kantians deny that ever, the Southwest School takes culture in its
the duality of subject and object as between widest sense.
an empirical subject and an inner or outer The Southwest School conceives of culture
world is fundamental to epistemology. They as determined by values. From a philosophical
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Reception and Influence
point of view, what is called theoretical far beyond its methodological function in
culture (‘knowledge’) has a logical and a the constitution of the subject matters of
systemic primacy. Already in theoretical phi- the arts and humanities. It points to the
losophy it turns out that theoretical culture aforementioned metaphysical dimension
rests on a range of theoretical values (a priori that contains the grounds of our thoughts
structures, principles), which determines the and actions.
validity of theoretical endeavours. The val- The debate is thus not so much about the
ues that comprise the value ‘truth’ ought to validity and status of some traditional val-
be normative for the thoughts of empirical ues. Rather, against the background of the
subjects in order to assure that their thought post-Idealist conception of reality as value-
yields knowledge of objects, i.e. that thought free and without meaning, the debate focuses
is objective. This logical relation within the primarily on the foundations of our under-
realm of theoretical culture is then trans- standing of the world and ourselves. Values
ported to other spheres of culture: these too traditionally treated by metaphysics, such as
consist of subjects who acknowledge values. truth and morality, unity and plurality, value
In this sense, the Southwest School neo- and reality, function as a framework to ena-
Kantians propagate the primacy of ‘ought’ ble our understanding of, and dealings with,
(Sollen), a primacy of practical reason in the world. Hence, the philosophy of values
its most radical, and not just in its practical operates against the background of nihil-
sense, namely in the sense that it encompasses ism and aims at elucidating the principles of
all dimensions of reason. They propagate human existence and the world that humans
a philosophy of values as a philosophy of live in.
culture. In conclusion, the main schools of neo-
Numerous historical and systematic studies Kantianism take the basic problem of phi-
of the first decades of the twentieth century losophy to be that of the validity of our
make clear that the Southwest School is to be theoretical and non-theoretical endeav-
seen as a comprehensive philosophy of values. ours. This problem is to be solved through
But they also make clear that the concept of a determination of the principles of valid-
value is a fundamental concept: philosophy ity. These principles are what make up the
itself is essentially about values. The idea of sphere of the ‘transcendental’. The transcen-
living through a metaphysical crisis fits in well dental domain, therefore, is not to be con-
with this systematic perception. After all, the fused with the psychology of an empirical
exploration of values should contribute to the subject or with the metaphysics of an abso-
overcoming of the post-German-Idealist divide lute reality.
between values and reality that threatened Far from declaring the world we live in
to make human orientation both practically to be meaningless, the neo-Kantians aim to
impossible and theoretically incomprehensi- bring to light the philosophical foundations
ble. The philosophy of values acts against the of the world. Hence, they try to understand
culture of nihilism by showing that there are the rationality of our world and its mean-
values that are objectively valid. ing. The concept of culture functions as a
Hence, the concept of ‘value’ – and universal and fundamental framework, a
closely related concepts like ‘meaning’, framework that was once occupied by meta-
‘ought’, ‘validity’ – has a meaning that goes physics. This framework is now freed from
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Reception and Influence
ontological premises yet is still able to coun- had not yet engaged with this text in writ-
teract nihilism. – CK ing. Davos offered him a pre-eminent
opportunity to challenge the neo-Kantian
Further Reading approaches to Kant which had dominated
German academic philosophy from the
A. Chignell (ed.), ‘On going back to Kant’, 1870s onwards. It should be recalled, how-
special issue on neo-Kantianism in ever, that neo-Kantianism was already wan-
The Philosophical Forum 39,2 (2008): ing, not in the least because Kant’s account
109–298. of pure intuition and a priori principles was
M. Heinz, C. Krijnen (eds), Kant im considered to have been refuted by Einstein’s
Neukantianismus: Fortschritt oder relativity theory.
Rückschritt? (Würzburg: Königshausen Trying to reconcile Kant and Einstein,
& Neumann, 2007). Cassirer had contributed to this debate by
S. Luft, R. Makkreel (eds), Neo-Kantianism in means of various publications. However, at
Contemporary Philosophy (Bloomington, Davos the stakes of the debate were quite
IN: Indiana University Press, 2010). different. In order to defend Hermann
D. Pätzold, C. Krijnen (eds), Der Cohen’s legacy against Heidegger’s onto-
Neukantianismus und das Erbe des logical reading of CPR, Cassirer focused
deutschen Idealismus (Würzburg: on its humanistic and idealistic elements
Königshausen & Neumann, 2002). rather than on Kant’s alleged foundation
K. Pollok, ‘The “Transcendental Method”. of physics. Yet, as most of the participants
On the reception of the Critique of Pure would have realized, his revision of neo-
Reason in neo-Kantianism’, in P. Guyer Kantianism was no match for Heidegger’s
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion radical new philosophical voice. From now
to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason on, Heidegger was to lead the way – not just
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, away from neo-Kantianism, but also from
2010), pp. 346–379. the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl,
who until recently had regarded Heidegger
as one of his most promising pupils.
Heidegger’s ontological reading of CPR
Heidegger’s ONTOLOGICAL also helped him to clarify his own approach
Reading of Kant to philosophy, not least by marking the dif-
ference between it and both Cohen’s chiefly
In the spring of 1929, Martin Heidegger epistemological interpretation of Kant and
and Ernst Cassirer famously discussed their Husserl’s focus on transcendental conscious-
views of Kant’s CPR before an audience of ness. Drawing from his earlier lecture series
philosophers and students who had come and the lectures he gave in Davos, he pub-
to Davos from all over Europe. Heidegger, lished Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
aged 39, had acquired great fame through his in 1929. His other, less famous, texts on
Marburg lecture courses and the publication Kant consist of various published lecture
of Being and Time two years earlier. courses partly or primarily devoted to Kant,
Although he had lectured on Kant’s CPR including Basic Problems of Phenomenology
during the winter of 1927/1928, Heidegger (1927), Phenomenological Interpretations of
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Reception and Influence
proper foundation. CPR, Heidegger notes, warrant this view. Evidently, it was crucial
is ‘the foundation of metaphysics in that it for Kant to present intuition and thought as
reveals the essence of ontology’.121 the two complementary ‘sources’ or ‘stems’
of our capacity to acquire knowledge of
Intuition something,128 for the rationalist metaphys-
ics he opposed purported to possess a priori
Given his opposition to neo-Kantianism, knowledge of things based on thought alone.
Heidegger understandably puts great empha- Yet in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant
sis on the role of intuition in CPR. Cohen also conceived of pure imagination as a basic
and his followers had downplayed the role of faculty of the soul that underlies all a priori
the Transcendental Aesthetic by reinterpret- knowledge (A124).129 Moreover, he repeat-
ing space and time as categories in the logical edly notes that pure intuition, pure imagina-
sense of the term.122 tion and pure apperception together produce
Heidegger, by contrast, takes Kant to mean the synthetic a priori cognition of objects
that human beings relate to the world pri- that precedes empirical knowledge.130
marily and necessarily by means of intuition, For Heidegger, however, imagination is
which means that their relation to objects is not just one of these three elements. Insofar
essentially receptive.123 On this view, discur- as human thought produces synthetic a pri-
sive thought only has the task of clarifying and ori principles, it does not relate to things
ordering the contents perceived by the senses. ‘out there’, but presents to itself the possible
Heidegger even goes so far as to state that ways in which representations can be unified
thought stands essentially in the service of or turned into objects of knowledge. Kant,
intuition.124 It is intuition, as it were, that Heidegger argues, attributes this synthetic
uses the understanding to achieve its own activity primarily to pure imagination.131
goal, namely, to reveal beings as objects. Accordingly, it is primarily by dint of pure
Its dependence on the understanding – qua imagination that we can conceive of beings
means – to achieve this goal is indicative of as possible objects of experience. Heidegger
the finitude of human thought as such.125 takes this to imply that both pure intuition
This does not entail, however, that human and pure understanding (or transcendental
thought is not creative at all. What it creates, apperception) are merely derivative forms of
qua pure understanding, are the synthetic a imaginative synthetic activity.132 Their myste-
priori principles that reveal the ontological rious ‘common root’, in other words, turns out
structure of beings qua possible objects of to be none other than pure imagination.133
experience.126 It creates, in other words, the As Heidegger points out, Fichte and
‘horizon of objectivity’ that allows something Schelling had interpreted Kant’s concep-
to appear as an object in the first place.127 tion of pure imagination in a similar vein.134
Yet whereas the German Idealists went on
The imagination to identify this imagination with reason,135
Heidegger moves into the opposite direc-
But is it really the understanding, or the tion. For, on his view, Kant’s remarks on pure
understanding alone, to which Kant assigns imagination precisely contest the hegemony
the creation of this very horizon? According of thought celebrated by neo-Kantians and
to Heidegger, Kant’s texts by no means German idealists alike.
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Reception and Influence
He holds, moreover, that Kant opposed of knowledge. Indeed, as was noted above,
this hegemony in an even deeper sense than Kant reflected on the horizon of objectivity
he himself was ready to admit. Confronted produced by the transcendental schemas pri-
with the ‘abyss’ opened up by his insight marily to oppose former special metaphysics.
into the nature of pure imagination, Kant in Heidegger suggests, however, that this
the second edition of CPR conceived of its very horizon constrains philosophical ques-
activity as a mere function of the understand- tioning in a more radical way than Kant
ing, thus removing the incongruity between could admit. Human life, for example, can-
the content of CPR and its architectonic not be turned into an object of knowledge by
division into Transcendental Aesthetic and means of schematized categories. If the onto-
Transcendental Logic.136 logical horizon revealed by Kant entails that
beings can only appear as objects of experi-
The schematism ence, then philosophy – concerned with the
being of beings – should not only affirm the
Heidegger puts pure imagination central stage necessity of this horizon insofar as scientific
in order to highlight the role of the transcen- knowledge is concerned, but also oppose
dental schemas it produces. In his view, CPR its predominance within the realm of phi-
as a whole hinges on Kant’s account of the losophy. That is why Heidegger in Being and
schematization of the categories.137 According Time as well as in the last part of Kant and
to Kant, each category articulates a particular the Problem of Metaphysics proposes that
way of connecting representations. Categories philosophy first of all reflect on the horizon
only have meaning, however, insofar as their of any understanding of being.141
content can be translated into rules that tell
us how to unify representations that affect Temporality
our inner sense one after the other, that is,
occur in time. In Being and Time, Heidegger aimed to
Thus, the schema of the category ‘sub- expose the limits of this horizon by arguing
stance’ tells us that we must a priori that it tends to constrain our understanding
determine something in our successive repre- of being to that which is constantly present.
sentations as persisting, or unchangeable, in Constant presence, in its turn, refers to a par-
order to constitute something as an object at ticular mode of what Heidegger calls tempo-
all.138 This means for Kant that the schemas rality. Since Kant’s account of the schematism
constitute particular determinations of time highlights the constitutive function of time
qua pure intuition.139 qua form of all representations, Heidegger
Accordingly, Heidegger regards the tran- starts from this account to argue that the
scendental schemas as rules that bring about horizon within which being can merely
the horizon within which something can present itself as constant presence relies on a
present itself as an object in the first place.140 certain form of temporality.
In this sense, the schemas can be said to con- He realized, however, that this step involved
stitute the true ground of any metaphysics. As a ‘more primordial repetition’142 of Kant’s
such, they also explain why categories cannot own foundation of metaphysics, since, in
be used to turn putative ‘things’ such as the his eyes, Kant’s conception of time remained
soul, the world as such, and God into objects dependent on the traditional definition of
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328
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Temporality (Basingstoke: Palgrave no longer accept the main goals and claims of
Macmillan, 2002). the original programme, and the term ‘ana-
lytic philosophy’ now has a broader, partly
institutional sense, in which it refers more to
an approach to philosophy than to a particu-
Analytical Kantianism lar set of doctrines, or to a particular use of
the method of analysis. In analytic philoso-
Analytic Kantianism here refers to the influ- phy in the broader sense, the strict focus on
ence of Kantian ideas on philosophy in the logical analysis becomes an emphasis on con-
analytic tradition, as opposed to interpre- ceptual clarity, the programme of logicism
tations of Kant by analytically oriented gives way to an emphasis on the importance
philosophers. To the extent that analytic of logic as a central part of philosophy, and
philosophy, in its early stages, was a specific the positivism of the early project shifts to a
programme oriented around logical analy- broad naturalism and respect for the natural
sis, it was not engaged with the history of sciences.
philosophy, and was officially opposed to Kantianism is an important strand in ana-
almost all central doctrines and concerns of lytic philosophy in the broader sense. Kant is
Kantianism. also a central figure in analytic ethics; ana-
However, in the broader sense in which it lytic Kantian ethics is a topic in its own right,
refers to a style of philosophy which dominated and will be mentioned only briefly here.
English-speaking philosophy departments in the
twentieth century, analytic philosophy became Key tenets of Kant’s philosophy
increasingly interested in the history of philoso-
phy in general and Kant in particular, and parts Logicism, Carnapian empiricism and
of Kant’s philosophy had a large influence on Quinean naturalism centrally rejected key
central figures such as Peter Strawson, Wilfred tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant
Sellars and Hilary Putnam. presents CPR as addressed to the question:
As a specific programme, analytic philoso- how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?
phy was centrally and originally associated He thinks that if metaphysics is to be possi-
with the logicism of Bertrand Russell and ble, there must be synthetic a priori knowl-
Gottlob Frege, the empiricism and positivism edge, since metaphysical claims must be
of A. J. Ayer, Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna substantive, and not merely logical, but are
Circle, and subsequently with the naturalism not claims within empirical science.
of W. V. Quine. Logicism was the project of His solution to this question has three
attempting to reduce mathematics to logic; parts, which Kant sees as inseparably inter-
positivism the rejection as meaningless of connected: the idea of a priori intuition,
claims that lack empirical content, and transcendental idealism and so-called ‘tran-
Quinean naturalism questioned of all a pri- scendental arguments’. Kant thinks all sub-
ori knowledge. This programme was there- stantive (synthetic) knowledge claims concern
fore explicitly and firmly opposed to central objects which it is possible for us to have
Kantian claims, discussed below. presented to us in immediate, singular repre-
Most philosophers who consider them- sentations, which he calls intuitions. Without
selves to be working in an analytic tradition intuitions, we may have coherent conceptual
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Reception and Influence
thought, but these thoughts will not succeed While Kant does not use the term, the argu-
in being about any actual object. mentative strategy of defending synthetic a
Like all synthetic claims, synthetic a pri- priori claims by showing them to be condi-
ori claims require objects which can be given tions of the possibility of experience has come
to us in intuition, but since the claims are a to be referred to as a transcendental argument.
priori, these objects cannot be presented to A transcendental argument defends a contro-
us merely empirically, through objects affect- versial claim by showing it to be a condition
ing our senses. Kant’s solution is to propose of the possibility of a less controversial claim.
that we have a priori intuition: representa- In sum, Kant’s project is characterized by the
tions which are singular and immediately inclusion of a kind of idealism, a belief in a sharp
present to us, yet which do not depend on and exhaustive analytic-synthetic distinction,
sense experience. Kant argues that space and and a belief in more than one kind of neces-
time are the a priori intuitions, or the a pri- sity, since both analytic a priori and synthetic
ori forms of our intuition. A priori intuition a priori claims have some kind of necessity, so
makes synthetic a priori knowledge possible: logical necessity is not the only necessity.
such knowledge is either a priori knowledge While Kant’s project is in a certain sense
of the structure of space and time – in which a critique and rejection of metaphysics (sub-
case its ‘objects’ are the pure forms given to stantive a priori knowledge of non-spatio-
us in a priori intuition; or knowledge of a temporal objects such as God and Cartesian
priori conditions of cognizing spatiotem- souls), it can also be seen as doing metaphys-
poral objects – in which case its objects are ics in another sense, in that it aims to come
empirical, spatiotemporal objects. up with necessary truths, known a priori,
Kant thinks that the idea that space and about the spatiotemporal world.
time are the a priori forms of our intui-
tion leads to the complicated position he From the early analytic programme’s
calls transcendental idealism, according to rejection of Kant to Strawson’s defence
which the only objects of which we can have
knowledge are spatiotemporal objects which The early analytic programme rejected all
affect our senses, and these objects are in of these aspects of Kant’s position. The aim
some sense dependent on the standpoint of of logicism was to reduce mathematics to
human cognition, or essentially connected to logic, thereby doing away with Kant’s need
the possibility of our being presented with to invoke intuition, and rejecting the idea of
them (representing them). synthetic a priori knowledge (although Frege
Kant then thinks we can establish certain continued to accept Kant’s view of geometry).
synthetic a priori metaphysical claims by dem- In addition to its positivism, the empiricism
onstrating them to be necessary conditions of the Vienna circle was also centred around
of the possibility of experience. What can be the idea that the only a priori knowledge is
known a priori to be a necessary condition of knowledge of analytic truths, and the only
the possibility of experience is true of all objects kind of necessity is logical necessity. Both
of experience; since spatiotemporal objects movements explicitly rejected metaphysics.
are essentially connected to our experience of Quine’s naturalism attacked the last cen-
them, this enables us to establish certain neces- tral Kantian claims about synthetic a priori
sary truths about spatiotemporal objects. knowledge, in rejecting the idea of a sharp
330
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331
Reception and Influence
332
Reception and Influence
333
Reception and Influence
for why agents should view these contradic- important parts of Kant’s ethics.164 However,
tions as serious. This question in turn leads this does also resurrect questions about the
to viewing the two types of contradiction as kind of teleological appeal that might be
examples of lack of consistency in relation to involved in Kant’s ethics, albeit without the
something fundamental but disagreement has reference to ‘nature’ that Paton appeared to
persisted concerning what this fundamental import being required.165
reference is concerned with. One of the earli- Further, some have objected that such a
est ways of understanding it, and one which reference to ‘purposes’ in Kant requires him
has proved resilient, is in relation to purposes to affirm a conception of value that is inher-
by means of a teleological law of consistency ently at odds with the Kantian approach.166
of purposes. A version of this was first pro- The problem of asserting the contradiction in
moted by Herbert Paton158 and appeal to the will test over the contradiction in concep-
such a notion also featured in Bruce Aune’s tion test thus concerns the way it appears to
work159 but, in relation at least to the con- affect the understanding of the general struc-
tradiction in conception test, has been chal- ture of Kant’s moral theory and this shows
lenged, not least by Richard Galvin.160 that the discussion over the understanding of
The contradiction in conception test has the universalization tests cannot be viewed in
been more generally understood as involv- isolation from the assessment of the mean-
ing notions of either practical contradiction ing and import of the distinct formulas of the
or logical contradiction. The practical con- categorical imperative.
tradiction view, like the teleological con-
tradiction view, does involve reference to The formulas of the categorical imperative
purposes but, unlike the teleological contra-
diction view, abstracts these from nature and Since Paton there has been a sustained dis-
relates them solely to the agent’s intentions. pute concerning how many formulations
However, as Christine Korsgaard admits, a of the categorical imperative Kant presents
lot then depends on how the statement of in G, with Paton suggesting that there were
maxims is given and this makes the practi- five separate formulas although Kant him-
cal contradiction view controversial.161 This self appears to indicate there are only three.
problem of the determination of the maxim If much of the controversy concerning uni-
afflicts even the logical contradiction test versalization has been based on the appeal
and the latter has the further problem of not to examples that Kant makes in the second
obviously offering substantive material for part of G, the same work presents, allegedly,
moral judgments.162 some other formulas that Kant does not con-
If the contradiction in conception test is nect to examples or therefore use in practical
controversial, the contradiction in the will assessment of actions. Some commentators
test has appeared more appealing due to its have, in fact, rejected the general conten-
more substantive appearance.163 One of the tion that it is the point of the categorical
reasons for this is clearly because the contra- imperative to be used in practical assessment
diction in the will test is connected to Kant’s of actions167 but this kind of view tends to
formula of humanity with the reference to be based mainly on an intuitionist view of
persons as ends in themselves, a reference ethics (such as was classically given by W.D.
often taken to be one of the most generally Ross168).
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Reception and Influence
While this type of reading of Kant’s ethics which it is often confused concerns instead
has been revived in recent years169 it remains the justification of principles and the account
a minority response to Kant, not least because of their application is meant to describe how
it is a clear revisionary reaction to his work the principles justified will be connected to
that undermines any justificatory appeal given matters.174
of the categorical imperative in ethics.170 If The point of this distinction is to suggest
such a view is not to be adopted, however, that deontologists are committed to a plural-
there remains the need to account for Kant’s ist conception of the good while the assertion
appeal to notions such as the ‘kingdom of of the priority of the right is meant to show a
ends’ and ‘autonomy’ in his discussion of procedure for constraining the way in which
the categorical imperative. In accounting for heterogeneous goods can be related to thus
this, it is possible to take the former notion providing us with an understanding of which
as part of the overall work of ethics171 while goods are permissible.175 Viewed in this way
the latter idea, as central to Kant’s general the key point for normative ethics is not so
view of freedom, can, by contrast, be argued much deontology itself (which emerges as a
to unite a number of disparate themes in meta-ethical thesis on this view) as the prior-
Kant’s philosophy.172 The general problem ity of the right over the good.
of how to think the relationship between the Recent writers have subjected the attribu-
formulas overall has, however, certainly not tion to Kant of deontology to some critical
been solved.173 scrutiny with Barbara Herman176 using Kant’s
claims about the good will in the first part
Deontology and the priority of the right of G to argue for a view of rational agency
as containing an ultimate internal condition
The general view of Kant’s ethics which until that we have to value. On Herman’s view,
recently was the received interpretation is there is a need for a ‘grounding’ conception
that it is a form of deontology that asserts the of value in order to account for the right-
priority of the right over the good. In order making characteristics of action and to give
to explain both this interpretation and the motivational force to moral conduct.
challenges that have recently been presented Paul Guyer, in contrast to Herman, tends
to it, however, it is necessary to indicate the to conflate deontology with the priority of
distinction that exists between deontology as the right over the good as Guyer takes deon-
a general claim and the assertion of the prior- tological theories to require a constraint of
ity of the right over the good as a specifica- the good by the right.177 This runs into the
tion of it. problem that, when discussing the ‘fact of
Samuel Freeman has articulated this dis- reason’ in CPrR, Kant clearly asserts the need
tinction in terms of the parts of moral theory for the good to be determined after the moral
stating that there is a distinction between the law and through it (CPrR 63). In response,
content of its principles, the means of justi- Guyer stresses the notion that freedom is the
fying them and the ways in which the prin- locus of value for Kant and that the notion of
ciples are applied. According to Freeman, autonomy incorporates both the notions of
deontology is a thesis concerning the content value and duty. However, Guyer’s interpreta-
of moral principles, while the conception of tion is clearly revisionist in requiring rejec-
the priority of the right over the good with tion of Kant’s argument in CPrR in favour
335
Reception and Influence
of the appeal to the good will in G though Herman’s construal since it allows for a
the value of this good will is still found in notion of value independently of the sim-
freedom. ple appeal to willing. Similarly, Andrews
The most radical challenge to the concep- Reath, in his defence of the priority of the
tion of Kantian deontology comes, however, right over the good, does allow for value
not from Herman or Guyer but rather from commitments to be brought into pure prac-
David Cummiskey, who articulates a case for tical reason which appears to contravene
‘Kantian consequentialism’.178 Cummiskey’s deontology positively understood.182 Reath,
view, like Guyer’s, is explicitly revisionist however, rejects the appeal to the good will
since it is not here the claim that Kant him- as a source of value183 on the grounds that
self was a consequentialist but rather that a what makes the good will good is only its
consistently worked-out normative theory of conformity to law.
the Kantian type will be consequentialist even
though Kant’s ‘foundational’ theory is not Moral agency
consequentialist. The point of Cummiskey’s
interpretation is to present the ‘foundational’ The dispute concerning deontology and the
theory of Kant as involving formalism and priority of the right shows further strains
the derivation of the categorical imperative over how to combine Kant’s formalism with a
(or the content of his principles on Freeman’s moral content that has substantive force and
view), the normative theory, by contrast, as the formalist readings of Kant have tended to
the place where the justification is provided appeal consistently to the sense that the only
and this justification is taken by Cummiskey ‘good’ available on Kantian premises con-
to be amenable to consequentialist interpre- cerns conformity to law. In some sense, this
tation. Although Cummiskey’s interpretation conformity to law is clearly central to Kant’s
is certainly controversial,179 it is far from general normative theory though the basis of
alone in articulating a view of Kant that it as a picture of rational agency requires a
makes his ethics amenable to consequential- response to questions about the structure of
ist readings.180 reasons for action.184
These successive challenges to the Such responses have been forthcoming,
received interpretation of Kant’s ethics notably in Korsgaard185 but these defences
have not gone without challenge and there have tended to be open to objection both
is a series of gradations that have led to the by those committed to a stronger form of
consequentialist reading since Guyer earlier externalist view186 and by those who want
suggested a kind of maximization involved to articulate a more clearly psychologis-
in Kant’s ethics, at least with regard to free- tic view of Kant generally.187 There are
dom. The denial of a place in ethical theory also defences of Kant’s view that are more
for this thesis of maximization is part of strongly metaphysical than Korsgaard sug-
the understanding of deontology, at least gests.188 The relationship of Kant’s moral
on John Rawls’ influential (and arguably psychology to these general problems is
Kantian) view.181 surely at present under-developed, not least
However, Rawls’ commitment to the because, as Gary Banham189 pointed out in
notion of ‘primary goods’ does seem to some detail, the general topic of Kantian
contravene deontology as understood on moral psychology has been, until recently,
336
Reception and Influence
337
Reception and Influence
traditions (which continue into the twentieth If this places Kant’s ethics in a tradition of
century). In analyzing the question of why reflective endorsement ethics, it also shows
there are moral obligations,198 she first dis- him to be a voluntarist, with the source of
tinguishes the ‘voluntarist’ tradition (Hobbes, obligation lying in the agent’s own will; and
Pufendorf) for which obligations result from it identifies moral commands as intrinsically
a legislator’s will and the contract binding normative as the realist has it.
agents to it. The realist tradition (Clarke, Aside from this original work on Kant’s
Price, Moore, Prichard, Nagel) she presents place among different traditions in eth-
as responding originally to the regress arising ics, Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s
from the further question of what makes such foundational claims arguably enables us
a contract with the legislator binding. More to understand how Kant’s ethics informed
generally, it would seem that whatever answer the development of new ethical theories in
is given to the normative question, it leads to the twentieth century.200 In her attempt to
such a regress insofar as whatever grounds reconstruct the Kantian grounding of eth-
are provided, their normative force can be ics, Korsgaard finds that Kant’s appeal
questioned. To avoid scepticism about moral to the fact of reason proof (CPrR 47) can
obligation, the realist draws such questioning only work if the ‘highest good’ is given as
to a close by appealing to moral properties as a goal of rationality, together with the con-
real features of the world whose normativity ception of moral law, as a fact of reason.201
is intrinsic. This notion of the highest good is too thick
Additionally, according to Korsgaard, a teleological notion to meet with universal
there is a third tradition which can be assent. Apparently no other notion is avail-
traced back to Hume, and includes Bernard able to Kant to play an analogous ground-
Williams (and to an extent Bentham and ing role, since he draws exclusively upon
Mill) for which the proper way to address the content of rationality. This suggests that
scepticism is to show how moral values are with some transformation of the content of
endorsed under different points of view Kant’s ethical principles, minimal grounding
(e.g. self-interest, human flourishing). If assumptions (‘thicker’ than mere rational-
such ‘reflective endorsement’199 can be used ity) that meet with universal assent could be
to give an account of why there is moral sought.
obligation in general, it is not sufficient to This provides one way of interpret-
explain why one is morally obligated in ing important developments in twentieth-
any particular case of decision-making. century practical philosophy in the Kantian
This is where Kant’s notion of autonomy is tradition. Rawls, on the one hand, and Apel
required. Korsgaard interprets Kant’s con- and Habermas, on the other, have sought to
cept of normativity as defined in terms of construct frameworks for universal norma-
endorsement by the reflecting self-conscious tive practical principles which are directly
agent. This identifies normative reasons as inspired by Kant. These authors appeal to
laws of the agent’s freedom. And, going some constructive process to generate the
somewhat beyond Kant, she argues that the principles that all agents will take as binding.
kind of laws that are normative for an agent In so doing, they replace the grounding role
as those which define the agent’s practical of Kantian teleological assumptions either
conception of herself. with universal desires (Rawls) or non-moral
338
Reception and Influence
normative constraints (Apel and Habermas) For Rawls, the question about what is fair
that underpin the constructive process. must be agreed upon in this ideal state.207
And this notion of fairness will then define
John Rawls normative constraints. This approach defines
an important strand in twentieth-century
Rawls distances himself from Kant insofar as practical philosophy, contractualism.208
he views the test of the Formula of Universal The Rawlsian notion of ‘ideal state’ is
Law (the CI test) as rejecting the maxim of however not unproblematic. Much as Rawls
charity in the same way as it rejects the maxim seeks to thicken the rational agent to take
of universal egoism, i.e. because of a contra- into account wants and priorities, the way
diction in the will.202 That is, insofar as Rawls these essential needs are identified could be
takes ‘willing’ to mean ‘wanting’, he argues questioned. That is, insofar as Rawls aban-
that one could not will to be committed to a dons Kant’s notion of rational agent, what
maxim of charity that would conflict with the is taken as legitimately defining agents’ true
pursuit of our other ends. This leads to a con- human needs will have an impact upon deci-
cern with moral scepticism, i.e. a threat to the sion-making in the ideal state.
normative force of moral laws.203 A corresponding problem arguably arises
To generate morally binding principles, for the very notion of person which replaces
Rawls injects the notion of willing with ‘true Kant’s rational agent. For instance, Nozick
human needs’, which are taken to define argues that if we are to distribute benefits and
wants that are universally valid for human burdens among agents, this assumes bounda-
beings.204 This follows from Rawls’s claim ries between persons and assets are clearly
that mere rational willing will not suffice defined.209 These are however not given, and
to generate principles: the agents’ desires potentially difficult to draw insofar as real
and priorities must be taken into account. individuals are always already found with
This thickening of the agent to include true assets. As soon as persons as properly situ-
human needs has the advantage of transform- ated, i.e. with certain assets, are considered,
ing the test procedures using the Formula of there is no reason why this existing distri-
Universal Law into the making of rational bution of assets should meet with general
choices committed to securing these basic assent. The apparently neutral idea of a fair
needs.205 This involves a move away from decision in an ideal situation as definitive of
Kant’s formal tests, which reflects Rawls’s a normative conception of justice can there-
uneasiness with the formal and a priori fore be questioned because it does not prop-
aspects of Kant’s ethics.206 erly represent the situatedness of the agents
Rawls’s solution for an impartial form of and how this might affect what they take to
rational choice is to consider an a-historical be their true human needs. It is therefore not
ideal situation, the original situation, from clear how Rawls’s proposal can in fact lead
which we can decide which kind of social to a consensus.
contract would produce a fair and just soci-
ety. This situation is characterized by an igno- Apel and Habermas
rance of the particular features of the agents
involved in the decision-making, as well as of The notion of an ideal process generating
their place in the future social arrangements. principles that would be binding for those
339
Reception and Influence
340
Reception and Influence
for an unwarranted exportation of normativ- it is not clear how much can be achieved by
ity of human discourse into the realm of the such a line of reasoning. Her first move is
practical, it may be worth exploring whether a transcendental argument which establishes
this normativity cannot be understood in a that the value of humanity must feature in
deeper sense as a feature of rational agency, my decision-making. Her argument is that, if
and thus inherent both to discourse and to I value X, and X can be described as a par-
practical decision-making. tial ‘consequence’ of Y, then I am obligated
to value Y also.
Korsgaard (II) Although this argument has been chal-
lenged,219 another worry is that it is not clear
Korsgaard makes a move along these lines, how Korsgaard can account for the nor-
by drawing upon the notion of reflective mative force of ethical commands. Cohen
endorsement which places rational dis- points to what he calls, after Hobbes, the
course at the heart of practical decision problem of the sovereign.220 Although the
making. As we saw above, her account sovereign is bound by the laws he makes,
of the historical position of Kantian eth- he can alter these laws. It would there-
ics leads to viewing it as the culmination fore seem that if the source of normativity
of a tradition of reflective endorsement. for Korsgaard is human, then she has no
Normativity for Korsgaard lies in the answer to this problem. And indeed, when
endorsement by the self-reflecting agent. she identifies the sense of one’s practical
To get from here to obligation, Korsgaard identity as defining normative constraints
makes three moves. for an agent, what is apparently lacking is
The first is closely connected to Kant’s something like Kant’s appeal to a faculty
argument for the Formula of Humanity. of reason at the transcendental level as the
Korsgaard argues that, insofar as one val- only way of binding the agent. For Kant,
ues anything at all, one must thereby value in the moral realm, we are subjects rather
the source of such values, namely oneself as than sovereigns (CPrR 82). To these criti-
a human being. Recognizing that this gives cisms, Korsgaard responds that a legislat-
us no obligations towards others, she does ing agent cannot alter the law at will, since
not attempt to move from self-interested rea- universality constraints apply.221
sons to concern for others. Rather, she draws This claim relies upon accepting that she
upon Wittgenstein’s private language argu- can derive universality constraints from her
ment to argue for the publicity of reasons: minimal premises. Her interesting detailed
there are, for Korsgaard, no private reasons account of this claim draws upon an under-
that could not be translated into a communi- standing of the agent as wanting to see him-
cable form. And the third step consists in fol- self as having a causally effective will.222 This
lowing Nagel’s lead in arguing that another’s is at the heart of the agent’s sense of identity.
reasons will therefore feature in my practical This view however amounts to endorsing a
thinking and define obligations insofar as the teleological premise in which a proto-exis-
other is thereby recognized as a person like tentialist pursuit of an agent’s identity is sub-
me.218 stituted for the role played by the pursuit of
Even if we accept the Wittgensteinian the highest good in her earlier reconstruction
move at the heart of Korsgaard’s argument, of Kant’s fact of reason proof.
341
Reception and Influence
and Apel’s approaches is a rejection of Pure Reason [incl. Schultz’s review of ID],
trans. and ed. J. C. Morrison (Ottawa, 1995),
Kant’s alleged formalism and the meta-
p. 169 [hereafter referred to as Exposition].
physical commitments of his notion of the 2
J. Schultz, Exposition, pp. 168–169.
a priori. This tradition of Kantian ethics is 3
M. Herz, Betrachtungen aus der speculativen
thus largely divorced from the investigation Weltweisheit (Königsberg, 1771), p. 66 [hereaf-
of transcendental idealism as an alterna- ter referred to as Betrachtungen]; all transla-
tions from this text are my own.
tive to naturalism. This may make it more 4
M. Herz, Betrachtungen, p. 74.
attractive to many, but one might wonder 5
See Hamann’s letter of 8 December 1783 to
with Cohen whether, ‘if morality is merely Herder, in J. G. Hamann, Briefwechsel, ed. W.
human, then it is optional as far as rational- Ziesemer, A. Henkel (Wiesbaden, 1955–1957),
ity is concerned’.223 – CO pp. v, 107.
6
B. Sassen (ed.), Kant’s Early Critics: The
Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical
Further reading Philosophy (Cambridge, 2000), p. 61.
7
B. Sassen, Kant’s Early Critics, p. 59.
K.-O. Apel, ‘Discourse ethics, democracy, 8
B. Sassen, Kant’s Early Critics, p. 60.
and international law: Toward a
9
Kant thus refers to Garve’s claim that ‘neither
the concepts of space and time, nor the catego-
globalization of practical reason’,
ries combined with them, are particular to the
American Journal of Economics and conditions of alertness and sensation in which
Sociology 66,1 (2007): 49–70. alone we assume existing objects; we can find
K. Baynes, The Normative Grounds of them also in novels, fantasies, and dreams,
Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls and even in the fantasies of the insane. Whenever
we dream, we see what is represented [. . .] in
Habermas (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
accord with the laws of our spirit, and yet we
1992). do not in the end recognise it as actual’ (B.
P. Gilabert, ‘Considerations on the notion Sassen, Kant’s Early Critics, p. 76).
of moral validity in the moral theories of 10
B. Sassen, Kant’s Early Critics, pp. 53–54.
Kant and Habermas’, Kant-Studien 97,2
11
Kant interprets Berkeley as a ‘Platonist’ or
‘enthusiast’ who claims that ‘all cognition
(2006): 210–227.
through the senses and experience is nothing
O. O’Neill, ‘Constructivism in Rawls and but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in
Kant’, in S. Freeman, The Cambridge the ideas of pure understanding and reason’,
Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: and shows that such a claim is diametrically
Cambridge University Press, 2002), opposed to CPR’s conclusion that ‘[a]ll
cognition of things out of mere pure under-
pp. 347–367.
standing or pure reason is nothing but sheer
A. Wellmer, ‘Ethics and dialogue: Elements illusion, and there is truth only in experi-
of moral judgment in Kant and discourse ence’ (P 374).
ethics’, in A. Wellmer, The Persistence 12
In the 1781 edition, Hume is not mentioned at
of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley all until ‘The Discipline of Pure Reason’.
342
Reception and Influence
13
F. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 40
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 372.
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, 41
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 215. This claim sits
1987), p. 38. uncomfortably alongside Maimon’s conclu-
14
See J. G. Hamann, Sämtliche Werke: sion to his later Versuch einer neuen Logik (see
Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. J. Nadler Maimon, GW, vol. V, pp. 495–496).
(Vienna, 1949–1957), vol. III, p. 279 [hereafter 42
See Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 215–217
referred to as HKA]. All translations are my and 372.
own. 43
See Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 363–364.
15
See Hamann, HKA, p. 278. 44
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 64.
16
Hamann, HKA, p. 283. 45
Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 415–416.
17
Hamann, HKA, p. 284. 46
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 355.
18
Hamann, HKA, p. 286. 47
See Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 355–356.
19
Hamann, HKA, p. 288. 48
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 82.
20
Hamann, HKA, p. 285. 49
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 32.
21
See Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Beyträge 50
See F. H. Jacobi, Werke (Darmstadt, 1968–
zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes 1980), vol. II, pp. 301–302. All translations are
der Philosophie beym Anfange des 19. my own.
Jahrhunderts (Hamburg, 1801), vol. I, 51
Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, pp. 303–304.
pp. 206–212. 52
Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, pp. 307–310.
22
Reinhold, Über das Fundament des philoso- 53
Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 304.
phischen Wissens, ed. W. Schrader (Hamburg, 54
Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 307.
1978), p. 71 [hereafter referred to as Über das 55
See G. E. Schulze, Aenesidemus oder über
Fundament]. All translations are my own. der von Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena
23
Reinhold, Über das Fundament, p. 72. gelieferten Elementarphilosophie: Nebst
24
Reinhold, Über das Fundament, pp. 74–75. einer Verteidigung des Skeptizismus gegen die
25
Reinhold, Beiträge zur Berichtigung Anmaßungen der Vernunftkritik, ed. M. Frank
bisheriger Mißverständnisse der Philosophen. (Hamburg, 1996), p. 183 [hereafter referred to
Erster Band, das Fundament der as Aenesidemus]. All translations are my own.
Elementarphilosophie betreffend, ed. 56
See Schulze, Aenesidemus, p. 184.
F. Fabbianelli (Hamburg, 2003), pp. 98–99, 57
Schulze thus writes that ‘as long as the exist-
and 113 respectively. See also Reinhold, Über ence of [things in themselves] is uncertain, we
das Fundament, pp. 77–78. are unable to decide anything about whether
26
Reinhold, Über das Fundament, pp. 82–83. that which we experience in our present life
27
See Reinhold, Beiträge zur Berichtigung, constitutes more than a mere illusion’ (Schulze,
p. 233. Aenesidemus, p. 259).
28
See further the essay ‘Kantianism in the 1790s: 58
Schulze, Aenesidemus, p. 263–264.
from Reinhold to Hegel’, this volume. 59
F. W. J. Schelling, Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe
29
Maimon, Gesammelte Werke (Hildesheim, (Stuttgart, 1976–), vol. IV, p. 102 [hereafter
1965–1976), vol. II, p. 432 [hereafter referred referred to as HKA]. All translations are my
to as GW followed by volume and page num- own.
bers]. All translations are my own. 60
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 90–92.
30
See Maimon, GW, pp. 64–65. 61
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 82. From his accom-
31
See Reinhold, Beiträge zur Berichtigung, p. 199. panying remarks – see e.g. Schelling, HKA,
32
Ibid. vol. IV, p. 91 – it is clear that Schelling has
33
Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 178–179. Reinhold’s version of the critical philosophy
34
Maimon, GW, vol. V, pp. 473–475. very much within his sights.
35
Maimon, GW, vol. V, pp. 470 and 490–491. 62
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 73. For Maimon’s
36
Maimon, GW, vol. V, p. 490. related claims see Maimon, GW, vol. V,
37
Maimon, GW, vol. V, 495–496. p. 435.
38
See Maimon, GW, vol. II, pp. 187–188. 63
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 73.
39
Maimon, GW, vol. II, p. 371. 64
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, pp. 78–79.
343
Reception and Influence
65
Maimon, GW, vol. V, p. 479. 80
G. C. Rapp, ‘Ueber die moralischen
66
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 73. Triebfedern, besonders die der christlichen
67
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 74. Religion’, in Allgemeines Repertorium für
68
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 75. empirische Psychologie und verwandte
69
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 85. Wissenschaften, ed. I. D. Mauchart, vol. 1,
70
Schelling, HKA, vol. IV, p. 87. continued in vol. 2 (1792), pp. 130–156 and
71
Cf. H. Schröpfer, Kants Weg in die 133–220 [hereafter referred to as ‘Ueber die
Öffentlichkeit. Christian Gottfried Schütz moralischen Triebfedern’]. Hegel’s occupa-
als Wegbereiter der kritischen Philosophie tion with this essay is attested to by his letter
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2003). on Christmas Eve, 1794 to Schelling; see
72
Cf. my ‘Einleitung’, chs 3 and 4 in K. L. Schelling, HKA, vol. III/1, p. 14.
Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des 81
K. L. Reinhold, Letters on the Kantian
menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, vol. 1 Philosophy, ed. K. Ameriks (Cambridge, 2005),
(Hamburg, 2010). p. 33.
73
An English translation has recently appeared 82
Rapp, ‘Ueber die moralischen Triebfedern’,
under the title New Theory of the Human p. 151.
Capacity for Representation, trans. and ed. T. 83
G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. 1: Frühe Schriften
Mehigan, B. Empson (Berlin/New York, 2010). (Frankfurt a/M, 1971, 1986), pp. 359–360;
74
D. Henrich (ed.), Immanuel Carl Diez, trans. in T. M. Knox (ed.), Early Theological
Briefwechsel und Kantische Schriften. Writings (Philadelphia 1971, 1996), p. 244.
Wissensbegründung in der Glaubenskrise 84
Cf. my ‘Hegel zwischen Fichte und der
Tübingen – Jena (1790–1792) (Stuttgart, Tübinger Fichte-Kritik’, in C. Krijnen, D. H.
1997), p. 176. Heidemann (eds), Hegel und die Geschichte
75
Cf. the report by Leutwein in D. Henrich, der Philosophie (Darmstadt, 2007), pp.
‘Leutwein über Hegel. Ein Dokument zu 171–190. Storrian theology is not a branch of
Hegels Biographie’, in Hegel-Studien 3 (1965): such orthodoxy, as has been made clear in M.
39–77. Franz, ‘’Tübinger Orthodoxie’. Ein Feindbild
76
Cf. M. Brecht, ‘Die Anfänge der idealistischen der jungen Schelling und Hegel’, in S. Dietzsch,
Philosophie und die Rezeption Kants in G. F. Frigo (eds), Vernunft und Glauben. Ein
Tübingen (1788–1795)’, in H. Decker-Hauff philosophischer Dialog der Moderne mit dem
(ed.), 500 Jahre Eberhard-Karls-Universität Christentum (Berlin, 2006), pp. 141–160.
Tübingen. Beiträge zur Geschichte der 85
Schelling, HKA, vol. III/1, p. 19.
Universität Tübingen 1477–1977 (Tübingen, 86
See Hegel, Differenz des Fichteschen und
1977), pp. 381–428. Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie, in
77
J. F. Flatt, Briefe über den moralischen Hauptwerke, vol. 1 (Hamburg, 1999), p. 5
Erkenntnisgrund der Religion überhaupt, und [hereafter referred to as Differenzschrift];
besonders in Beziehung auf die Kantische trans. W. Cerf, H. Harris, The Difference
Philosophie (Tübingen, 1789), pp. 16 and 72 between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of
respectively. Philosophy (Albany, 1977), p. 79 [hereafter
78
Schelling, HKA, vol. III/1, p. 16. That referred to as Difference].
this does not refer to the teachers in 87
Hegel, Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur
the Stift is shown by M. Franz, ‘Johann Philosophie, in Hauptwerke, vol. 1, p. 223
Friedrich Flatts philosophisch-theologische [hereafter referred to as Skeptizismus]; all
Auseinandersetzung mit Kant’, in ». . . an translations of this essay are my own.
der Galeere der Theologie«? Hölderlins, 88
Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, in Hauptwerke,
Hegels und Schellings Philosophiestudium vol. 1, p. 326; trans. W. Cerf, H. S. Harris,
an der Universität Tübingen, ed. M. Franz, Faith and Knowledge (Albany, 1977), p. 69.
in the series Schriften der Hölderlin- 89
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences
Gesellschaft, Bd. 23/3 (Tübingen, 2007), in Basic Outline, §40 [hereafter referred to as
pp. 189–222. Encyclopaedia]; all translations of this work
79
Schelling, HKA, vol. II, pp. 19, 21. are my own.
344
Reception and Influence
90
Hegel, Encyclopaedia, §41. ‘absoluteness’ and ‘certainty’ (p. 13) he was
91
Hegel, Glauben und Wissen, p. 326; Faith and convinced, Liebmann wrote at the end of each
Knowledge, p. 68; translation amended. chapter: ‘Hence, we must return to Kant [Also
92
Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. G. di Giovanni muß auf Kant zurückgegangen werden].’
(Cambridge, 2010), p. 515. 113
The influence of Kantian thought can be
93
Hegel, Differenzschrift, p. 6; Difference, p. 80. found in post-Kantian German Idealism, in
94
Hegel, Skeptizismus, p. 223. the work of J. F. Fries, J. F. Herbart, R. H.
95
Hegel, Skeptizismus, p. 224. Lotze, E. Laas, R. Avenarius and E. Mach,
96
Hegel, Differenzschrift, p. 5; Difference, p. 80. in W. Dilthey, K. Jaspers and M. Heidegger,
97
For a detailed account of Schopenhauer’s the Frankfurt School, the transcendental
disillusionment with Fichte’s philosophy, see pragmatics of K.-O. Apel, and even in post-
R. Safranski, Schopenhauer and the Wild modern philosophers like J.-F. Lyotard and M.
Years of Philosophy, trans. E. Osers (London, Foucault.
1989), ch. 8. 114
See K. de Boer, Thinking in the Light of Time.
98
A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel (Albany,
Representation, volume I, trans. and ed. J. NY, 2000) for an interpretation of Being and
Norman et al. (Cambridge, 2010), p. 443, Time and related texts that focuses on the
henceforth WWR I. issue of temporality.
99
See The Fourfold Root of the Principle 115
Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of
of Sufficient Reason, Chapter 5; WWR I: Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft (Bloomington,
Section 3. 1990, 1997), p. 201/140 [hereafter referred
100
WWR I: Sections 10–11. to as KPM]; the page references are to the
101
WWR I: 444. English translation and the original German
102
WWR I: 535. edition respectively, separated by a slash.
103
For a clear account of these two interpreta- 116
cf. KPM 21/15, 32/22.
tions of transcendental idealism see A. Wood, 117
KPM 20/14.
Kant (Malden, MA, 2005), ch. 4. 118
KPM 16–17/11.
104
WWR I: 138. 119
KPM 16/10.
105
The World as Will and Representation, vol- 120
KPM 11/7.
ume II, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York, 1966), 121
KPM 15/10; cf. 125/88.
p. 197. 122
KPM 145/102; cf. 51/36.
106
WWR I: 135–6. 123
KPM 25/18.
107
For a full argument for this interpretation see 124
KPM 22/15.
my ‘Poetic intuition and the bounds of sense: 125
KPM 24/17.
metaphor and metonymy in Schopenhauer’s 126
KPM 30/21, 38–39/26–27.
philosophy’, European Journal of Philosophy 127
KPM 84/59; cf. 119/84.
16,2 (2008): 211–229. 128
KPM 135/95.
108
WWR I: 560–1. 129
Cf. KPM 134/95.
109
WWR I: 562, and Manuscript Remains in 130
KPM 135/95.
Four Volumes, ed. A. Hübscher, trans. E. F. J. 131
KPM 84/59.
Payne (Oxford, 1988), vol. II: 320. 132
KPM 142/99–100, 151/106.
110
For the full argument see my ‘Schopenhauer’s 133
KPM 137–138/96; cf. A15=B29.
transformation of the Kantian sublime’, 134
KPM 137/96–97.
Kantian Review 17,3 (2012): 479–511. 135
cf. KPM 197/138.
111
E.g. H. Bergson, G. Sorel, E. Durkheim, 136
KPM 164–169/115–118.
W. Dilthey, M. Weber, G. Simmel, R. Michels, 137
KPM 89/63.
G. Mosca and V. Pareto. 138
See A144=B183; cf. KPM 107–108/76.
112
In his book Kant und die Epigonen (Stuttgart, 139
Cf. KPM 197/138.
1865), in which he compared the German 140
KPM 103/73, 108/76.
idealists, Herbart, Fries and Schopenhauer 141
Cf. KPM 224–226/157–158.
with the Critical philosophy of whose 142
KPM 220/154.
345
Reception and Influence
143
KPM 200/140. 162
See however S. Engstrom, The Form
144
KPM 200/140; cf. B156. of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the
145
KPM 189–191/132–134. Categorical Imperative (Cambridge, MA,
146
KPM 196/137. 2009) for one of the most recent attempts to
147
KPM 202/141. suggest otherwise.
148
P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense. An Essay 163
See A. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought
on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London, (Cambridge, 1999) and A. Wood, Kantian
1966). Ethics (Cambridge, 2007).
149
P. F. Strawson, Individuals. An Essay in 164
R. Dean, The Value of Humanity in Kant’s
Descriptive Metaphysics (London, 1959). Moral Theory (Oxford, 2006).
150
See J. Campbell, Reference and 165
H. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (Chicago,
Consciousness (Oxford, 2002), Q. Cassam, 1948); P. Guyer, ‘Ends of reason and ends of
Self and World (Oxford, 1997), Q. Cassam, nature: the place of teleology in Kant’s ethics’,
The Possibility of Knowledge (Oxford, 2007), Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2002): 161–186.
and G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference 166
A. Reath, ‘Value and law in Kant’s moral
(Oxford, 1982). theory’, Ethics 114 (2003): 127–155.
151
W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: 167
T. C. Williams, The Concept of the
Variations on Kantian Themes (Atascadero, Categorical Imperative: A Study of the Place
1992 [1968]). of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s
152
J. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1968); P. Stratton-
MA, 1994, 21996); see also McDowell, Lake, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth (London/
Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, New York, 2000).
Hegel, and Sellars (Cambridge, MA, 2009) 168
W. D. Ross, Kant’s Ethical Theory (Oxford,
153
R. Hanna, ‘Kant and non-conceptual content’, 1954).
European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005): 169
R. Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory
247–290; R. Hanna, ‘Kantian non-concep- of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton,
tualism’, Philosophical Studies 137 (2008): 2004).
41–64; L. Allais, ‘Kant, non-conceptual con- 170
See C. Onof, ‘Moral worth and inclinations in
tent and the representation of space,’ Journal Kantian ethics’, Kant Studies Online, posted 7
of the History of Philosophy 47,3 (2009): April 2011.
383–413. 171
C. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends
154
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, (Cambridge, 1996).
MA, 1971). 172
S. Holtmann, ‘Autonomy and the kingdom of
155
See further the essays ‘Analytic Approaches ends’, in T. Hill (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to
to Kant’s Ethics’ and ‘Kantian Normativity in Kant’s Ethics (Oxford/New York, 2009),
Rawls, Korsgaard and continental practical pp. 102–118, which should be compared with
philosophy’, this volume. P. Guyer, ‘Kant on the theory and practice
156
M. Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New of autonomy’, in P. Guyer, Kant’s System
York, 1961). of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays
157
See e.g. O. O’Neill, Acting on Principle (New (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 115–145.
York, 1975). 173
See the essays in P. Guyer (ed.), Kant’s
158
H. Paton, The Categorical Imperative Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals:
(Chicago, 1948). Critical Essays (Lanham, 1998) for various
159
B. Aune, Kant’s Theory of Morals (Princeton, accounts of the formulas.
1979). 174
See S. Freeman, ‘Utilitarianism, deontology,
160
R. Galvin, ‘Ethical formalism: the contradic- and the priority of the right’, Philosophy and
tion in conception test’, History of Philosophy Public Affairs 23,4 (1994): 313–349, which
Quarterly 8,4 (1991): 387–408. however says little about application.
161
C. Korsgaard, ‘Kant’s formula of universal 175
This also connects to Silber’s conception of the
law’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 summum bonum as composed for Kant of heter-
(1985): 24–47. ogeneous goods. See J. Silber, ‘Kant’s conception
346
Reception and Influence
347
Reception and Influence
348
PART V:
BIBLIOGRAPHY
6
KANT BIBLIOGRAPHY
The literature on Kant is very large and con- edition (see further the List of Abbreviations
stantly growing so it is necessarily the case in this volume).
that this bibliography is selective but the
selection is aimed at providing for the reader
reference to the major recent works on each
aspect of Kant’s philosophy, at least with 2. English Translations
regard to English-language contributions.
Only very selective attention has been paid The Cambridge Edition of Kant’s work, which
to work in other languages with the result has been appearing since 1992, edited by Paul
that the overwhelming focus is on works in Guyer and Allen Wood, has gained authority
English. However, this bibliography is rare in as the source for many of Kant’s works and
presenting works on each of the major ele- includes translations of lectures and notes
ments of the Critical division of Kant’s works that were, until very recently, not available
in addition to incorporating wide material at all in English. The edition of the Critique
on the background, context and influence of of Pure Reason, published in 1998, has not,
the Critical philosophy. – GB/DS however, decisively replaced the long-classic
translation by Norman Kemp Smith (1929)
(published by Palgrave Macmillan). The
2007 edition of Kemp Smith also includes an
1. Kant’s Works in German extensive bibliography of English-language
work on the Critique but does not entirely
The standard critical edition of Kant’s works, overlap with this one as it is more focused
which provides the pagination for all vol- than this. Alongside these two translations
umes cited in this Companion other than the of the Critique an important third one, by
Critique of Pure Reason is Kant’s gesammelte Werner Pluhar, has also appeared (1996).
Schriften, edited by the Königlich Preußische Hackett, the publishers of Pluhar’s edition
Akademie der Wissenschaften, subsequently of the Critique of Pure Reason, have further
Deutsche and then Berlin-Brandenburg published translations by him of the Critique
Akademie der Wissenschaften and which is of Judgment and the Critique of Practical
generally simply referred to as the Akademie Reason. Hackett and Cambridge University
351
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Press thus offer competing translations of the Ewing, A. C., A Short Commentary
central Critical works. For a list of transla- on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
tions of Kant’s works into English, see P. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Guyer (ed.)(2010), pp. 668–673. 1938).
Gardner, S., Kant and the Critique of Pure
Reason (London/New York: Routledge,
1999).
3. Biographies of Kant Guyer, P., Kant (London/New York:
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Cassirer, E., Kant’s Life and Thought (New Hall, B., The Arguments of Kant’s ‘Critique
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981 of Pure Reason’ (Lanham, MD:
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Gulyga, A., Immanuel Kant: His Life and Hartnack, J., Kant’s Theory of Knowledge
Thought (Boston: Birkhauser, 1987). (London/Toronto: Macmillan, 1968).
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An Introduction and Interpretation
Altman, M., A Companion to Kant’s (Durham: Acumen, 2012).
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418
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419
Index
italics in entries indicate that these pages are devoted to analysis of the term or person in
question.
a priori/a posteriori 2, 12–13, 15–16, 18– amphiboly 94, 142, 160, 168–9, 197, 204,
26, 33, 37–40, 45, 48, 50–1, 56, 64, 70, 210, 256, 259, 287
72–3, 88–91, 95, 101, 114, 123, 127, analogies of experience see experience,
130–2, 137, 143, 147, 167, 173, 175–6, analogies of
183, 184, 187, 192–5, 203–4, 206–7, analogy 26, 58, 60, 63–4, 74, 111, 169–70,
211, 218, 220, 223, 226, 228–32, 183, 214
236–41, 246–7, 250, 253, 257, 259–60, analysis 13, 20, 35, 41, 66, 102, 135, 155,
263, 272–4, 280–6, 297–302, 311, 318, 159, 167, 172–3, 185, 191–2, 206, 210,
321–7, 329–31, 342 see also synthetic 217–18, 224, 226, 230–1, 238, 240,
absolute 12–13, 38, 41, 43–5, 55, 91–2, 107, 249, 261, 262, 265, 269, 272, 284, 288,
109, 114–15, 135, 140, 144–5, 188, 295–6, 321–2, 329, 331, 337
192, 204, 209, 214, 220, 237–8, 241, analytic 17, 19, 23, 25, 28, 30–1, 33, 35–7,
245, 248–50, 254, 256, 261–2, 270–3, 40, 46, 48–9, 51, 53, 55–7, 59–60,
294, 305, 310–13, 317, 322–3, 345 72, 89, 91, 94, 130, 133, 149, 157,
abstraction 165, 219, 224, 253, 287, 304, 166, 172–3, 177, 183, 185–7, 194,
312–13 196, 206, 210, 218, 220–1, 226, 230,
actuality 12, 75, 211, 237–8, 243–4, 235, 245–6, 250, 269, 271–2, 276,
248, 251, 256, 259, 269, 303–4 280, 283, 288, 300, 325, 329–33, 337
see also modality; necessity; possibility; see also synthetic
reality anthropology 7, 35–6, 70, 96, 113, 121,
aesthetic (transcendental) 2–4, 7, 15, 17, 126, 134, 137, 148, 150, 155, 173–5,
20–4, 46, 49, 51–8, 94–6, 126–7, 137, 201, 229, 271, 321
156, 165–8, 171, 173, 176–7, 184–6, anticipations of perception see perception
192, 195, 197, 201, 203, 204–6, 208, antinomy/antinomies 13, 18, 29–30, 34, 50,
212, 214, 216–17, 226, 231, 239, 58–9, 64–5, 72, 79, 95, 118, 125, 135,
243, 253–4, 259, 270, 271–2, 276, 177–80, 196, 209, 214, 228–9, 238,
280–2, 285, 294, 296, 316, 320, 326–7 247, 270, 274, 278, 285–6, 288, 316
see also transcendental Apel, Karl-Otto 337–40
algebra 90, 135, 138, 227, 231 appearance 14, 19, 22, 26–8, 30, 39, 43,
see also mathematics 45, 48, 58, 101, 105, 132, 142, 157,
421
Index
168–9, 171–3, 176–9, 180–2, 186, 183, 185, 189, 192–5, 206, 209, 217,
192, 195, 201, 204, 212–13, 215, 221, 223, 236–8, 243–4, 250, 256,
217, 221–2, 227, 238, 240, 242–3, 259, 269, 273, 281–3, 286, 288, 301–4,
245, 247, 253, 256, 261, 274, 278–9, 311–13, 321, 325–7 see also deduction
282–6, 297, 301, 303–4, 312, 315–16 cause/causality 2, 15, 20, 25–7, 30–1, 33,
see also phenomena 37, 39, 44–6, 48–50, 54, 58–9, 72–3,
apperception 24, 26, 123, 132, 173, 177, 75, 94, 105, 108, 114–15, 122–3,
180, 182–4, 189, 194, 208, 210–13, 130, 132, 137–40, 140, 155–6, 168,
217–18, 221, 239–42, 253–4, 273, 283, 170–1, 178–9, 185, 189, 193, 201,
287, 311, 326, 328 see also spontaneity 205, 218, 222, 229, 234–8, 240,
apprehension 27, 55, 171, 176, 184, 195, 245–7, 250–1, 253–4, 261, 270,
226, 273 see also synthesis 276–7, 279, 286, 301–4, 314–17, 341
architectonic 17, 32, 52–3, 71, 78, 101–2, see also experience, analogies of, laws
123, 143, 174, 214, 221, 257, 274–5, 327 certainty 40, 85, 104, 131–2, 184, 197, 221,
Aristotle/Aristotelianism 23, 26, 32, 86–7, 231, 234, 236, 240, 247, 253, 345
90–1, 99–102, 110–12, 121–4, 125, Christianity/Christian 61, 63, 65–6, 86,
134, 141, 168, 204, 223–5, 275, 316 104, 106–8, 111–12, 115, 122, 307,
arithmetic 15, 90, 138, 186, 226–7, 229, 309 see also religion
238 see also mathematics Cicero, Marcus Tullius 128–9
art 3, 53, 56–7, 137, 165–7, 184–5, 214, 316–17 coercion 71, 150, 198, 206, 233, 266, 309
autonomy 39, 47, 49, 108, 124, 150, 167, cognition 14–16, 20, 22–4, 26, 28, 32–3, 40,
185, 188, 205–6, 233, 266, 290, 298, 48, 50–2, 54, 56–7, 60, 90–1, 94, 101, 127,
335, 338 see also freedom; spontaneity 129–31, 140–1, 143–4, 154, 166–8, 172–3,
176, 178, 184, 186, 191, 196, 202–4, 207,
Bacon, Francis 19, 87, 99, 101, 124–6, 148 209, 211, 215–17, 220–1, 223–5, 227–8,
Bauch, Bruno 320 229–31, 240–7, 253–4, 256–7, 259, 261,
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb 12, 98, 265, 268, 270, 272–5, 278–81, 285, 287–8,
100, 111–12, 126–7, 142, 157, 228–9, 293–4, 297–301, 303–4, 314–15, 326, 330,
251, 257, 265 342 see also knowledge
beauty/beautiful 4, 51, 53–8, 148, 165–7, Cohen, Hermann 320, 322, 324, 326
173, 184–5, 204, 214, 239, 250, 254, common sense 33, 36, 55–6, 166–7, 235,
271, 316 see also aesthetic; sublime; taste 239, 301
being see ontology community 27, 62, 64–6, 73, 105–6, 150,
belief 32, 91, 104, 107–8, 130, 138, 147, 152, 170, 190, 193, 201, 219, 222, 262,
152, 168, 201, 214, 238, 258, 263, 278, 267, 340 see also religion
298, 307 concepts 12, 16, 20–5, 28, 33–4, 40–1,
beneficence/benevolence 38, 79–80, 289, 333 45–6, 48–9, 51–5, 57–9, 88–90, 101–2,
Berkeley, George 17, 29, 32–3, 94–5, 259, 297–8 121–2, 126–7, 132–4, 137, 140–2,
144–5, 147, 154–6, 166–8, 170–3,
Campbell, John 331 175–6, 179–81, 183, 185, 191, 192–4,
categorical imperative 3, 36–9, 47, 69–70, 196, 200–4, 206–10, 212, 214–18,
77, 114, 174, 187–9, 197–8, 212, 219, 220–9, 231–2, 236, 238–41, 243–54,
227, 232–3, 235, 238–9, 254–5, 263, 257, 261, 262–3, 265, 268–71, 272–5,
266, 290, 333–7 see also morality 276–7, 280–3, 286, 288, 294, 298–304,
categories 2, 23–6, 28, 30, 34, 36–7, 40–1, 311–12, 314–15, 322, 325, 329, 331–2
49, 53, 55, 64, 72, 86, 111, 121–3, 127, see also categories; deduction; ideas;
131–2, 168, 170, 173, 175–7, 180–1, schematism; understanding
422
Index
conscience 79–80, 99, 107, 232, 288 216–17, 221, 223, 227, 236, 239, 244,
consciousness 26, 29, 80, 95–6, 98, 101, 254, 269, 272–4, 276, 281–3, 287, 301,
107, 113, 132, 156, 171–3, 176–7, 311–13, 321, 326 see also transcendental
182–4, 186, 189, 194, 210, 212–13, deontology 333–6 see also right
217, 221, 239, 240–2, 253, 256, Descartes, René 2, 11–12, 20, 29, 41–2, 87,
260, 265, 272, 287–8, 299–300, 302, 95, 99, 105, 111, 121, 130–3, 137–9,
304, 309, 311–13, 321, 324, 331 224, 235, 241, 244, 259, 285, 287, 330–2
see also apperception; representation desire 47, 51–2, 54, 62, 127, 130, 137,
constitutive 31, 51, 58–60, 73, 103, 148, 195, 214, 272, 290, 338–9
171, 178, 222–3, 261, 275, 327 see also inclination; interest
see also regulative dialectic 15–18, 23, 28, 31, 34, 36, 45–6,
construction 12, 18, 169, 186, 206–7, 49, 51, 57–9, 61, 92, 94–5, 107, 146,
221, 226–7, 231, 240, 300, 333 148, 157, 167, 178, 195–7, 204, 208–9,
see also geometry; intuition; mathematics 224, 228, 231, 242, 245, 247, 251, 254,
contract 73–6, 93, 148–50, 338–9 257, 261–2, 265, 274, 276, 278, 283–4
contradiction 19, 33, 38, 42, 91, 129–30, 133, see also analytic
137, 140, 156–7, 178, 188–9, 218, 220–1, Diez, Carl 307, 310
245–6, 248, 250, 272, 276, 286, 288, difference 125, 139, 144, 168, 177, 197,
300, 303–4, 333–4, 339–40 see also logic 210, 224, 265, 281, 296, 299, 312–13
Copernican 18–19, 191, 231, 285 see also amphiboly; identity
cosmopolitan 68–9, 76, 78, 149–50, 190–1, discursive 194, 215–16, 246, 252, 268,
243, 267 272–3, 277, 294, 326
Critique of Judgment 3–4, 22, 50–60, dogmatism 16, 23, 29, 32–4, 89, 103, 112,
115–16, 124, 127, 134, 137, 158, 165–7, 115, 121, 130, 139, 143, 151–2, 156–7,
173, 184–5, 195, 200–1, 204–6, 212, 192, 227, 229–32, 247, 258–9, 298–9,
214, 216–17, 234, 239, 251, 253–4, 304–5, 307, 309 see also empiricism;
271–2, 275–7, 316, et passim rationalism
Critique of Practical Reason 45–50, 51, duty/duties 35, 37–8, 46–7, 49, 63, 70–1,
60–1, 64, 72, 98, 112, 127, 134, 170, 74, 77–81, 99, 129, 187–8, 197–8, 204,
173, 201, 204–6, 214, 219, 233–5, 212, 233–4, 263–4, 267, 288, 335, 337
238–9, 251, 254, 258, 270, 290, 335, dynamical/ dynamics 25, 30, 42–5, 55–6,
338, 341, et passim 144, 171, 177–9, 236, 238, 272, 313,
Critique of Pure Reason 2, 11, 15, 16–32, 316 see also force; matter; motion
33–4, 36–7, 39–42, 44–56, 64, 88–9,
94–5, 102–4, 110, 123, 125–8, 131–3, Eberhard, Johann August 88–9, 157
137, 141–3, 146, 155–7, 168, 179, empirical 20, 26–8, 31, 35, 47, 49, 52–3, 57,
183–4, 185–6, 191–3, 208, 210–13, 65, 70–3, 75, 89, 98, 108, 114, 122–3,
215–18, 221, 226, 227–31, 235, 238–9, 125, 127, 133, 145, 147, 171–2, 174–7,
242, 244–6, 248–50, 254, 257–9, 265, 180–4, 186, 194–7, 202, 206–7, 211,
268, 272–4, 296–300, 302–4, 306–7, 215, 217–18, 220–3, 229, 237, 239,
311–12, 324–9, 331, 351, et passim 240–4, 250–4, 256–7, 259, 260–1, 265,
Crusius, Christian August 100–1, 105, 268, 273–4, 277, 285–8, 299, 301–5,
111–12, 119, 129–30, 157, 228, 235 312, 314–15, 321–3, 330, 340, et passim
concepts 20, 40, 75, 217, 236, 239, 257,
deduction 17–18, 23–6, 28, 41, 47–9, 56, 268, 277, 314
73, 95, 131–2, 166, 168, 170, 173, 177, consciousness 26, 176–7, 182–3, 186,
182–3, 186, 189, 192–5, 202, 208–9, 242, 256
423
Index
idealism 29, 33, 260, 287 256–7, 259, 263, 268–70, 274–8,
intuition 181, 215, 217, 231, 270, 273, 280–1, 284–7, 297–8, 301–4, 311–14,
302–5, 312 316–18, 321, 325–8, 330–2
judgment 218, 220, 244, 252, 256 analogies of 25–7, 30, 44–5, 95, 105,
laws 14, 52–3, 59, 211, 217, 221–3, 274, 277 170–2, 173, 177–8, 189, 193, 203, 218,
object 29, 194, 217, 252, 270, 283–4, 222, 243–4, 247, 269, 272, 283, 286, 301
288, 303–4, 330
psychology 154, 157, 229, 252–3 faith 60, 63–6, 80, 104, 106–8, 115, 204,
realism 198, 257, 287 256, 258, 262–4, 278, 307–8, 320
reality 22, 192, 256–7, 282, 284 see also religion
self/subject 175, 252, 321–3 Feder, Georg Friedrich Heinrich 17, 32,
empiricism 90–1, 95, 100, 121, 134, 94–5, 128, 154, 297–8
141–2, 148, 152, 154–5, 177, 191, feeling 49–57, 64, 79–80, 98–9, 108, 134,
202–3, 221, 228–9, 322, 329–32 138, 147, 149, 154, 166–7, 212, 214,
see also dogmatism; rationalism 254, 271–2, 289–90, 309, 314, 316–17
enlightenment 1, 91–2, 96–7, 100–1, see also aesthetic
103–4, 107, 118, 152–3, 156, 198–200, Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 271, 306–10, 314,
212, 225, 232 320, 326
Epicurus 32, 90, 133–4 Flatt, Johann Friedrich 307–8
epistemology/epistemic 88, 104, 131–3, force 20, 42–5, 58, 60, 98, 101, 105,
138–9, 141–2, 184, 207, 280, 282, 314, 115, 144–5, 168, 235–7, 276
319, 321–2 see also knowledge see also dynamics; matter; motion
essence 12, 40, 89, 122–3, 126, 133, 146, form/formal 13–15, 20, 22–3, 25, 33, 39–40,
259, 264, 305, 311, 326 54, 56, 79, 95, 123, 142–4, 157, 168–9,
ethics 2–3, 35, 49, 70–1, 78–9, 81, 86–7, 98, 191–2, 195, 202–3, 204–5, 213, 222–5,
104, 110–12, 124, 126, 128–9, 134, 148, 240, 254, 257, 261, 263, 265, 268–9,
150, 156, 201, 229, 254, 317, 329, 332–42 272, 275, 282, 286, 288, 294, 302,
see also categorical imperative; morality 304–5, 313, 330 see also matter/material
Euler, Leonhard 101, 135–6, 202 formalism 303–5, 336, 342
Evans, Gareth 331 Frederick the Great 91–3, 100, 109, 118,
evil 48–9, 61–3, 65, 77, 138, 149, 168, 202, 142, 156
234, 254–6, 262, 290 freedom 19, 30, 32, 39, 44, 46, 48–50,
existence 11–13, 15–16, 19, 22, 25, 29–32, 52–3, 67, 70–2, 91–2, 113–15, 127,
38, 42–3, 46, 50, 59–60, 75, 90–1, 95, 130, 140, 151–2, 154, 170, 174, 179,
101, 103–5, 126, 129–33, 137, 139, 185, 192, 198–200, 205–6, 214, 219,
141, 154, 170–2, 177–9, 181, 185, 229–30, 233–5, 238, 258, 263, 266–7,
189, 192, 208, 214–16, 222, 228, 235, 269–71, 285–6, 290, 317, 335–6
237–8, 241–5, 248–51, 256, 259–60, see also autonomy; spontaneity
269, 277, 279, 285–7, 295–6, 303, 308, French revolution 93–4
312, 323, 331 see also ontology
experience 14, 18–20, 22–8, 31–4, 36, Garve, Christian 17, 32, 94–5, 128–9,
40–1, 45, 49, 52, 55, 61, 70, 72, 90–1, 154–5, 297–8, 301, 303
102, 106–8, 123, 125, 132, 134–8, genius see art
141–2, 144–5, 152, 157, 167, 169, geometry 14–15, 21, 33, 58, 90, 101, 135,
170–2, 174–6, 178, 180–1, 183–4, 186, 138–9, 169, 186, 206–8, 215, 218,
190–5, 202–4, 205, 211, 214, 216, 218, 226–7, 229, 238, 270, 275, 281–2, 330
220–3, 228–32, 234–8, 243–7, 250–3, see also construction; mathematics
424
Index
God 2, 11–12, 19, 22, 31–2, 46–7, 49–50, idealism 1–2, 17, 29, 33, 94–5, 115–16, 125,
59–60, 63–6, 80–1, 90–1, 103–7, 158, 275, 285–7, 297–8, 302, 304–7,
114–16, 129–31, 133, 140–1, 151, 308–11, 318–19, 321, 330–2, et passim
157, 170, 189, 192, 208–9, 214, 219, refutation of 19, 22, 29, 95, 132, 158,
228, 232, 241, 243, 248–51, 263–4, 213, 244–5, 259–60
285, 295, 308–9, 312, 325, 327–8, 330 transcendental 29, 33, 95, 115–16,
see also faith; proof; religion 179–80, 204–5, 230, 242, 257, 281,
good/goodness 35–6, 39, 46, 48–50, 58, 285–7, 297, 300, 314–15, 329–32
61–6, 107, 124, 128, 134, 138, 187, 189, ideas 13–14, 16, 28, 31, 34, 39, 45, 56–7,
197, 199, 201, 205, 208, 214, 232–5, 90–1, 94, 121–3, 132, 137–8, 141–2,
241, 251, 254–5, 258, 262–4, 277, 146–7, 155, 185, 196, 204–5, 208–10,
289–90, 333–6, 338 see also categorical 214, 234, 240, 254, 265, 283, 285, 293,
imperative; morality; religion; will 298, 302, 307, 316–18
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of identity 29, 138, 140, 168, 182–3, 194,
Morals 3, 34–9, 46–7, 53, 61, et passim 210, 218, 242, 245–6, 252, 281,
312–13, 315, 341–2 see also amphiboly;
Habermas, Jürgen 337–42 difference
Hamann, Johann Georg 92, 96, 147, 151, illusion 15, 22, 28, 178, 182, 196–7, 201,
155, 298–9 204, 224, 241–2, 254, 261, 284, 297,
happiness 32, 37, 47, 49–50, 78–80, 302–3, 319, 342–3 see also antinomies;
104, 124, 134, 138, 149, 187, 204, dialectic; paralogisms
208, 214, 234, 251, 263–4, 289–90 image 95, 137, 167, 202, 206–7, 211,
see also feeling; morality; virtue 268–9 see also schematism symbol
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 68, 157, 188–9, imagination 23–4, 27, 44, 53–5, 57, 138,
271, 279, 305, 307–14, 319–21, 342 166–7, 185, 202–3, 211–12, 213,
Heidegger, Martin 17, 29, 193, 211, 324–8 215–16, 252, 260, 268–9, 272–4, 299,
Herder, Johann Georg 85, 96–7, 115, 151, 305, 326–8 see also apperception;
155, 200, 316 deduction; synthesis
Herz, Marcus 13, 16, 18–19, 25, 27, 113, immortality 32, 46, 50, 103–4, 141, 152,
136–7, 155, 191, 227, 265, 295–6 214, 234, 242, 252, 278, 285, 308
humanity 38, 55, 60, 62–5, 71, 73, 79–80, 92–4, see also paralogisms psychology
114, 148–50, 167, 188, 219, 254, 334, 341 Inaugural Dissertation 13–16, 20, 22, 136,
see also categorical imperative; morality 293–7 et passim
Hume, David 2, 16, 20, 25, 27, 32–4, 48, inclination 35–6, 38, 50, 62–3, 130, 150,
60, 90–1, 98, 112–13, 130, 137–9, 155, 187–8, 197–8, 205, 212, 219, 233–4,
202, 239–40, 251, 257–9, 268, 272, 254, 289–90, 308–9 see also duty;
297–301, 303–5, 338 feeling; morality; virtue; will
Husserl, Edmund 17, 324 inner/outer sense 22, 27, 102, 141, 155,
Hutcheson, Francis 98–9, 112–13 177, 183, 203, 212–13, 236, 242, 260,
hypothetical 19, 31, 36–8, 170, 187, 209, 269, 273, 281, 286, 296, 327–8
217, 225, 230–1, 233, 245, 290, 300 intelligible 14–16, 32, 39, 48–9, 62,
see also categorical imperative 71–3, 157, 179, 278, 293–5, 315
see also Inaugural Dissertation; sensible
ideal 15, 30, 34, 54–5, 63, 65, 75, 81, interest 53–4, 57, 166, 199, 201, 213–14,
145–6, 150, 196, 199, 201, 209, 233, 289, 338, 341 see also desire
219–20, 248, 261, 274, 283–5, 339–40 intuition 13, 15, 19–23, 25, 28, 33, 40–2,
see also transcendental 48–50, 55, 59, 72, 88–9, 91, 95, 123,
425
Index
135, 141–2, 146–7, 152–3, 166–7, Königsberg 13, 61, 87, 96, 99–101, 102–3,
169, 173, 176, 179–82, 185–6, 191–5, 107–12, 136, 148, 151, 159, 228, 294,
204–8, 210–13, 214–16, 220–2, 226–8, 306
231–2, 239, 241–2, 244, 247, 253, 260, Korsgaard, Christine 334, 336, 337–41
265, 268–70, 273–4, 280–2, 286, 288,
294, 298–300, 302–5, 311–14, 324–7, Lambert, Johann Heinrich 13, 42, 101–2,
329–30, 332 155, 294–5
axioms of 25, 41, 171, 173, 185–7, 218, Lask, Emil 320
222, 232, 243, 247, 269, 274–5, 282 law/laws/lawfulness 3, 12–14, 19, 33–40,
see also empirical; sensibility 44–53, 45–6, 59–65, 67–71, 73–4,
76–80, 93, 98–9, 101, 104, 109,
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich 97, 104, 115, 112–13, 115, 134–5, 144–5, 148–50,
279, 302–5, 315 152, 167–8, 171–2, 174, 180, 189, 195,
Judaism 65, 103–4, 109 212, 219, 221, 222–3, 235–8, 239, 245,
judgment 4, 15, 19–24, 31, 33–5, 41–2, 256, 258, 266, 276, 288, 304, 341
51–60, 72, 76, 88–9, 91, 115–16, 123, empirical 14, 52–3, 211, 238, 274, 277
132, 142–3, 147, 165–7, 170, 172–3, of freedom 70, 152, 229, 338
175, 180–1, 184–5, 187, 193–4, 202, moral/ethical 39, 47–8, 64, 70, 78–9, 98,
204, 209–12, 214, 216–18, 220–5, 187–9, 219, 238, 263, 338
227, 238–41, 249, 252, 256, 273, 277, of motion 12, 19, 59, 135, 144–5, 222,
281–2, 287–8, 300–1, 332–3, et passim 237
aesthetic 3, 51–4, 56–8, 127, 137, 165–7, of nature 12, 33, 59, 101, 134, 188,
173, 185, 195, 197, 204, 212, 214, 217, 221–3, 229, 305
239, 243, 254, 259, 271, 276, 316 system of 266
of experience 33–4, 218 universal 12, 33–4, 37–9, 47, 71, 79, 187,
moral 113, 124, 333–4 197, 204, 219, 233, 238, 258, 261, 266,
of perception 33–4, 218 339–40
reflective 3–4, 53, 57–60, 116, 167, 217, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 15, 20, 22,
222–3, 259, 275 28, 60, 87–8, 100–2, 105, 109, 115,
synthetic 19–23, 33, 35, 56, 72, 88–9, 121, 129, 136, 139–40, 141–2, 144–5,
91, 130, 147, 175, 187, 210, 218, 154, 156, 168–9, 179, 183, 203,
221, 224, 227, 238–40, 274, 281, 288, 207, 210, 224, 226, 228–9, 235, 250,
300–1, 311 262, 268, 281–2, 287, 293, 299–300
of taste 53–8, 127, 166–7, 184–5, 195, see also amphiboly; metaphysics; Wolff,
205, 214, 218, 239, 254 Christian
teleological 51–2, 58–60, 115, 217, 277 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 85, 88, 103, 316
Liebman, Otto 320, 345
knowledge 19–20, 23, 89–92, 101–3, Locke, John 28, 42, 90–1, 100–2, 134,
107, 112, 114–15, 121–7, 130–3, 141–2, 143, 154, 202, 225, 251–2,
135–44, 146–8, 150, 154, 157, 167, 281, 298, 301 see also amphiboly;
169, 177, 181, 184, 188, 191–2, empiricism
194–6, 202, 206–7, 214–18, 220–1, logic 14, 23, 28, 41, 52–4, 87, 89, 102, 131,
223, 226, 228–31, 238–40, 243–7, 142–3, 156, 168–9, 191, 193–4, 196,
257–9, 270, 272–80, 285–7, 297, 204, 218, 223–5, 229, 244–5, 248–9, 265,
299, 301, 303, 310–16, 318–19, 268, 270, 275, 280–1, 288, 318, 321–3,
321–3, 325–31 329–31 see also abstraction; concepts
Knutzen, Martin 87, 100, 105, 108, 235 lying 47, 49, 80, 289
426
Index
magnitude 15, 20–1, 55, 171, 176–7, 186, method/methodology 4, 15, 17–19, 31–3,
226–7, 231, 282 see also perception, 35–7, 41, 46, 48, 50–1, 58, 60, 66–7,
anticipations of 70, 78, 86, 101–2, 104, 111, 122,
Maimon, Salomon 16, 104, 137, 298–302, 124–5, 129–32, 142, 149–50, 155–7,
304–5 172–3, 191–2, 209, 228, 230–2, 253,
manifold 12, 23–4, 27, 34, 54, 123, 166–7, 262, 275, 278, 316, 319, 321–3, 329
170–2, 179, 182–3, 194–5, 203, 206, mind 13–14, 29, 39–40, 50, 52, 55–7,
210, 213, 215–16, 221–2, 226, 239, 79, 90, 101–2, 105, 108, 121, 125,
256, 265, 270–4, 280, 282, 303, 309, 132, 137–8, 140–2, 144, 166, 182,
312 see also synthesis 201, 211–14, 240, 252, 259–60,
mathematics 15, 18–19, 25, 33–4, 40, 265, 270, 272, 277, 293–5, 303
71, 86, 102, 131, 135, 173, 184, see also apperception; knowledge;
186, 191, 207, 218, 226–7, 228–9, paralogisms; psychology; receptivity;
231–2, 238, 247, 294, 300–1, 329–30 spontaneity; inner/outer sense
see also arithmetic; geometry modality/modal 25, 28, 30, 36–7, 45,
matter/material 12–14, 38–45, 47, 49, 55, 64, 184, 217, 222, 236–8, 243,
59–60, 72, 79, 105, 130, 134–6, 138–9, 256, 259 see also actuality; necessity;
144–5, 168–9, 176–7, 185, 191, 202–4, possibility
213, 221–2, 225, 235–8, 240, 242, monads/monadology 43, 135, 139–40, 169,
244–5, 253, 256, 268, 276–7, 286, 297, 183, 228, 235, 281, 287
302, 304–5 see also amphiboly; form/ moral/morality 32, 35–9, 46–50, 53, 55,
formal 57–8, 60–6, 68–70, 74, 78–81, 85, 91,
maxims 35, 37–9, 46–7, 50, 59, 61–3, 68– 93–4, 98–9, 107–8, 112–13, 115–16,
70, 78–9, 91, 174, 187–9, 196, 200–1, 121, 123–4, 127–9, 134, 138–9, 143,
204, 219, 227, 255, 258, 266, 333–4, 148–53, 166, 174–5, 187–9, 192, 195,
339 see also categorical imperative 197–8, 201, 204–5, 208, 214, 219–20,
McDowell, John 332 228–9, 232–5, 238–9, 251, 254–5,
mechanics, mechanical 44–5, 59–60, 123, 258, 262–4, 266–7, 271–2, 277, 285,
134–5, 144–5, 222, 236–7, 252, 270, 289–90, 308–9, 316–17, 323, 332–42
275–7 see also teleology/teleological see also ethics
Meier, Georg Friedrich 142–4, 224, 251, motion 12, 19, 21, 41–2, 44–5, 59, 135,
265 144–5, 222, 236–7 see also dynamics;
Mendelssohn, Moses 11, 13, 44, 85–6, 92, force; matter
102–4, 136–7, 147, 151, 153–5, 241, mysticism/mystic 106, 108, 147, 151–3
294–5
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Natorp, Paul 320, 322
Science 40–5, 51, 172, 235–7, et passim natural science 235–7 see also science
metaphysics 2–3, 14–16, 18–20, 32–6, nature 12–13, 16, 30, 32–3, 37, 39–41,
38–41, 43, 70, 87–9, 102–5, 110–12, 43–4, 49, 51–3, 56–60, 62, 94, 101, 108,
114–15, 121, 126, 130–1, 135, 137, 114–15, 123–5, 129, 134, 138, 144–5,
148, 151–3, 156–7, 168, 172–3, 191–2, 150, 165, 167, 170–2, 179, 185, 188,
196–7, 221, 227–30, 236, 238–9, 241, 195, 210, 214, 217, 221–3, 229, 235–8,
246, 252, 254, 257, 275, 278, 285, 245, 251, 254, 270, 272, 275–7, 304–5
294, 297, 311, 314, 318, 321, 323–32 human 62, 70, 94, 148–9, 201, 234,
see also epistemology; ontology; 254–5, 262, 316
philosophy state of 64, 67–8, 76, 78, 149, 266–7
Metaphysics of Morals 3, 70–81, et passim see also empirical
427
Index
necessity 36–7, 56, 59, 130, 143, 152, 155, 273, 275, 283–4, 294–6, 299, 301–3,
166, 169, 184, 192, 196, 221, 227, 308, 311–13, 318, 322–3, 326–7, 331
237, 238–9, 240, 243–5, 248–9, 253, see also reality
259, 261, 266, 269, 281, 308, 311, 330 obligation 71, 74, 79–80, 98–9, 112, 188,
see also actuality; modality; possibility 264, 337–8, 340–1
neo-Kantianism 17, 318–26 Only Possible Argument in Support of the
Newton, Isaac 19, 22, 43, 45, 135, 140, Existence of God 11–13, 14–15, 31,
144–5, 148, 172, 222, 228–9, 235, 237, 248–50, et passim
275, 282 ontology 89, 101, 112, 155, 157, 228–9,
noumenal/noumenon/a 14, 28, 60, 75, 241, 246, 257, 318, 321, 325–6
77, 79, 144, 168–9, 175, 192, 210, see also metaphysics
239, 256, 279, 285–7, 294, 302 organic/organism 60, 115, 124, 199, 274,
see also idealism, transcendental 276–7 see also teleology/teleological
number 135, 226–7, 287
see also arithmetic; mathematics paralogisms 17, 28–30, 34, 95, 105,
132, 182, 192, 209, 214, 228,
object(s) 14–16, 18–20, 22, 25–7, 29, 40, 241–3, 247, 252, 258, 270, 272, 285
45–9, 52–6, 58–60, 71–2, 75, 108, 113, see also psychology
123, 126, 131–3, 135, 138, 141–2, peace 66–70, 78, 94, 150, 190, 243, 267
145–6, 165–71, 175–86, 191–5, 202–7, see also cosmopolitan
209–18, 220–4, 226–31, 234, 236–8, perception(s) 25, 27, 33–4, 90, 95, 123,
239–41, 242–7, 252, 254, 256–7, 132, 137–40, 145, 156–7, 170–2,
259–61, 263, 265, 267–72, 274–5, 176–7, 180, 183, 194–5, 202–3, 207,
277–88, 293, 295–301, 303–4, 311–12, 213, 216, 218, 220, 240, 243–5, 256,
321–2, 325–8, 330–2 260, 265, 301–2, 316, 323, 331
of aesthetic judgment 55, 166 anticipations of 25, 175–7, 178, 186,
as appearance 180–1, 192, 274 218, 222, 247, 256, 269, 274
of cognition 60, 191, 285, 287 perfection 63, 78–80, 124, 146, 157
empirical 29, 194, 217, 252, 270, 283–4, phenomenology 45, 101, 145, 236–7, 324
288, 303–4 phenomenon/a 12, 14, 28, 79, 123–4,
of experience 40, 45, 72, 145, 175, 135, 153, 176, 181, 192, 256, 277,
180–1, 183, 192, 195, 202, 208, 230, 285–6, 294, 303, 315, 321, 328
234, 237, 247, 256, 285, 301, 311, see also appearances
325–8, 330 philosophy, passim
external 29, 71–2, 132, 244, 259, 265 critical 4, 16, 19, 26, 56, 88–9, 95, 105,
of intuition 216–17 112, 121, 135, 151–3, 155–7, 173, 180,
of knowledge 169, 191, 244, 275, 318, 204, 254, 261, 272, 297–9, 303–8,
326–8 310–12, 314, 320–1, 329, 332, 345
of perception 145, 171, 176, 180, 195 of culture 319–23
of practical reason 48 of nature 134, 238
of representation 27, 295 political 103, 148, 150, 337
of thought 41, 209, 299 practical 2–3, 32, 34, 36, 52–3, 70, 112,
objective/objectivity 15, 17, 24, 27, 38, 46, 134, 173, 180, 204, 208, 214, 239, 254,
48, 56, 58, 98, 122, 124, 128, 130, 263, 277, 337–9
132, 143, 154–5, 166, 170–2, 176, of religion 88, 264
181–3, 191–6, 202, 209, 215–22, 238, school 110–12
239–40, 244–7, 256–7, 261–2, 269–70, theoretical 2–3, 97, 221, 322–3
428
Index
transcendental 20, 122–3, 126–7, 173, quantity 15, 25, 29–30, 41–4, 54–5, 64, 77,
227, 231, 262, 265, 274–5, 299, 302, 144–5, 177, 206, 222, 227, 231, 236–7,
305, 309, 313, 318, 321–2, 328 244, 271, 282 see also matter
of values 323 Quine, W. V. O 329–31
phoronomy 41–2, 45, 236
physics 20, 50, 71, 80, 87, 101, 135, 144, radical evil 254–5 see also evil
228–9, 235, 237, 324, 332 Rapp, Gottlob Christian 307–9
Pietism/pietist 100, 106–8, 112, 126, 142, rationalists/rationalism 16, 96, 103, 107,
156, 201–2, 235 111–12, 115, 122, 135, 141, 154–6,
Plato 32, 94–5, 121–3, 128, 145–7, 199, 177, 191, 196–7, 221, 246, 252, 254,
287, 314, 318, 342 257–9, 299, 326
pleasure 47–8, 51–7, 74, 81, 134, 166–7, Rawls, John 3, 77, 332, 336–9, 342
197, 214, 233–4, 243 see also aesthetic; reality 22, 46, 56, 94, 101–2, 122–4, 135,
happiness 139, 157, 168, 176, 178, 191–2, 198,
possibility 12–13, 18, 20, 28, 30–1, 33–4, 220, 230, 249–50, 256–7, 279, 282–4,
39, 43, 46, 48, 50, 58, 71, 73, 89, 91, 286, 295–6, 303, 309, 319, 322, 323
102, 108, 112, 131, 143, 147, 169, 171, see also empirical; objective
173, 175, 178, 183, 186, 193–4, 202–3, reason(s) 257–9, et passim
207, 210–11, 216–17, 221, 223, 229–31, fact of 47, 91, 235, 335, 338, 341
237–8, 243–4, 246–50, 254, 259, 261, for action 198, 205, 234, 336
263, 270, 272–4, 279, 281, 283–4, practical 19, 36, 39, 45–50, 61, 69, 72–3,
286–8, 297–302, 309, 315, 321, 325, 330 79, 95, 98, 152, 173, 195, 228, 254,
see also actuality; modality; necessity 258, 267, 312, 323, 336
postulates of empirical thought 25, 27, 29, pure 16, 18, 28, 30–4, 39, 45, 48, 50, 61,
95, 203, 222, 228, 243–5, 259, 274 89, 94, 125–6, 146, 156–7, 196, 208–9,
see also experience; modality 221, 229, 231–2, 241, 247–8, 254,
principle of contradiction see contradiction 257–8, 298, 308
Prize Essay 85–6 sufficient 104, 140, 156, 179, 246–7,
Prolegomena to Any Future 303, 314
Metaphysics 32–4, et passim theoretical 48, 50, 148, 152, 173, 214, 254
proof(s) 32, 85, 135, 176–7, 179–80, 194, receptivity 14, 21, 211, 216, 260, 270–1
208, 231–2, 247–8, 259–60, 275, 309, see also spontaneity
338, 341 regulative (principles) 16, 31, 34, 37, 45,
of the existence of God 12–13, 30–1, 60, 58–9, 146, 171, 178, 196, 204, 208,
129, 131, 133, 170, 189, 192, 214, 228, 214, 222–3, 237, 243, 251, 261–2, 275,
241, 243, 248–51, 278, 308, 312 283, 286, 288, 312 see also constitutive
psychology see empirical; transcendental Reinhold, Karl Leonhard 16, 88, 92, 95, 97,
publicity/public 68–9, 71, 75–8, 92, 190, 130, 282, 298–300, 303, 305–10
199–200, 258, 266–7, 337, 341 religion 3, 34, 61–6, 68, 76, 88, 91, 107–9,
purposive/ness 31, 53–4, 56, 58–9, 115–16, 114, 199, 201–2, 204, 208, 234, 251,
124, 166–7, 170, 185, 217, 223, 250–1, 256, 262–4, 307–8
254, 271–2, 276–7 see also teleology Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Putnam, Hilary 329, 332 Reason Alone 3, 60–6, et passim
representation(s) 14, 16, 20–5, 27, 48, 63,
quality 25, 29–30, 41–2, 53, 64, 77, 125, 66, 94–5, 101, 106, 123, 127, 132, 145,
138, 176–7, 222, 231, 236, 244, 256 154, 166, 168–72, 176, 179, 181–3,
see also anticipations of perception 185–6, 189, 191, 194–5, 194–5, 201–3,
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210–13, 215–18, 224, 226–7, 231, 237, sensibility 14, 20–3, 25, 33, 39, 99, 123,
239–42, 247, 252–3, 257, 260, 265, 127, 140, 142, 144, 166, 168, 192, 195,
268–74, 280–2, 284–6, 293–9, 303–4, 201–3, 207–8, 211–12, 215, 220, 253,
312, 314–15, 326–30, 332 see also mind 260, 269, 271–3, 279–80, 282, 286,
republic/republican 67–8, 190, 267 298–9, 303, 308–9 see also experience;
respect 36, 49, 55, 62, 72, 79–80, 98–9, inner/outer sense
150, 174, 187, 191, 214, 266, 272, Smith, Adam 75, 112–14
309, 316, 329 see also categorical sovereign/sovereignty 39, 76–7, 93, 107,
imperative; morality 219–20, 341
Rickert, Heinrich 320, 322 space 12, 15, 19–22, 25, 27, 29–30, 33,
right(s) 46, 67–79, 91, 93, 138, 148, 150, 41–6, 49, 134–6, 140–1, 144–6, 153,
189–91, 199, 201, 206, 230, 233, 258, 155, 168–9, 172, 176–9, 182, 192, 195,
263, 266–7 203–4, 206–7, 210, 212, 215, 226, 229,
cosmopolitan 68–9, 76, 78, 190–1, 267 231, 236–7, 242, 244, 253, 257, 260,
domestic 73–5 268, 270, 278, 280–2, 285–7, 293–7,
international 78, 190, 206, 267 299, 302, 305, 314–17, 326, 328,
private 71, 73, 75–6, 266–7 330–1 see also transcendental aesthetic
property 73, 233 absolute 41, 45, 135, 140, 144–5
public 69, 71, 76, 78, 190, 266–7, 337 empty 43–4, 134, 145–6, 176, 236–7
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 147–50, 151, 153, 229 Spinoza, Benedict de 59, 97, 114–16, 121, 139
spontaneity 24, 39, 127, 140, 154, 183,
scepticism/sceptical 2, 29, 32, 34, 90, 121, 188, 205, 211, 213, 252, 260, 270–1,
131, 152, 192, 214, 229, 244, 258–60, 273, 280 see also apperception
285, 298–300, 303–5, 332, 338–9 state(s) 67–9, 71, 76–8, 93, 107, 109,
see also dogmatism 156, 190, 206, 233, 266–7, 339
Schelling, F. W. J. 116, 279, 304–6, 308, see also nature and right
310, 314, 326 Stoics/Stoicism 50, 63, 112, 122, 128
schema/schematism 25–8, 32, 37–41, 49, Storr, G. C. 308–10
63, 95, 170, 186, 206–7, 212, 217, Strawson, Peter 26–7, 329, 331–2
226–7, 256, 268–9, 280, 327 subject/subjective 15, 24, 27, 38, 46, 54,
Schiller, Friedrich 97, 137 56, 60, 62, 67, 76, 79–80, 106, 124,
Schultz, Franz Albert 100, 108 130–2, 134, 144, 166–7, 170–3, 176,
Schultz, Johann 294–5, 306–7 181–2, 194, 196, 209–10, 213, 217–18,
Schulze, Gottlob Ernst 302–4, 314–15 220, 225, 230, 239–44, 249–53, 261,
science(s) 14–15, 18–20, 32–4, 40–1, 57–8, 270–2, 275, 282, 285–7, 288, 293–6,
70, 99, 101, 107, 115, 124, 126, 135, 299, 301–2, 305, 308, 310–13, 315–16,
145–6, 148–9, 157, 172, 191, 209, 218, 321–3, 340–1, et passim
222–3, 226–31, 235–7, 246, 253, 269, sublime 3, 51, 53, 55–6, 153, 166, 173,
276, 281, 299–300, 305, 311, 318–19, 197, 201, 214, 250, 271–2, 316
321, 329, 331–2 see also knowledge; substance(s) 13, 15, 26–9, 27, 43–4, 72, 87,
mathematics; philosophy 105–6, 114–15, 121–3, 130, 137, 139–40,
Sellars, Wilfrid 1, 4, 329, 332 142, 144, 169–72, 193, 210, 212, 222,
sensation 14, 20, 42, 52, 54, 57, 94, 101, 227, 235, 240–2, 251, 269, 272, 294–5,
138, 140, 144, 154, 176–7, 182, 201, 327 see also metaphysics; ontology;
203, 212, 215–16, 244, 253, 256, 265, apperception, analogies of experience
269, 271, 280–2, 284, 297, 299, 303–4, succession 27, 101, 138, 141, 172, 222,
316 see also intuition; perception 240, 246, 293–5, 301
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Süßkind, Friedrich Gottlieb 309 totality 13, 40, 49, 59, 63, 76, 108, 177–9,
Sulzer, Johann Georg 13, 101, 154, 294 182, 209, 225, 249, 272, 274, 286, 319
Swedenborg, Emanuel 96, 151–4, 229 Toward Perpetual Peace 66–70, et passim
syllogism 28, 30, 77, 101, 209, 221, 223, transcendental 280, et passim
225, 242, 252 see also logic aesthetic 15, 17, 20–4, 94–5, 127, 156,
symbol/symbolic 14, 58, 63, 101, 153, 156, 168, 171, 173, 176–7, 182, 186, 192,
170, 207, 227, 316, 319 195, 203, 206, 208, 212, 215, 226, 231,
synthesis/synthetic (a priori) 2, 13, 19–25, 244, 253, 278, 280–2, 285–6, 296, 326–7
27, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 48, 56, 72, 88–9, analytic 17, 23, 28, 30–1, 33, 94, 157,
91, 95, 102, 123, 130–2, 147, 149, 173, 177, 235, 246, 280–1, 288, 325
175–6, 178–81, 183–4, 186–7, 189, arguments 232, 302, 329–31, 341
193–5, 202–4, 206, 209–11, 213, 215–18, deduction 17–18, 24–6, 28, 41, 73, 131,
220–1, 223–7, 230–2, 239–43, 247, 254, 192–5, 216–17, 239, 269, 282, 301,
256–7, 268–71, 272–4, 281–2, 286, 288, 311, 321, 326
297, 300–4, 311, 313, 325–6, 328–31 dialectic 15, 17–18, 23, 28, 34, 45, 146,
system(s)/systematicity 19, 31–2, 35, 38, 157, 195–6, 231, 257, 265, 276, 283
51–2, 58–61, 76, 86, 99, 105, 113, 115, see also dialectic
123, 125, 128–9, 131, 134–6, 140, ideal 30, 34, 196, 209, 247–8, 262, 274,
142–3, 153, 156–7, 168–70, 196, 198, 283–5 see also ideal
204, 208–9, 214, 217–19, 221–3, 229, idealism 2, 21, 29, 33, 95, 105, 115–16, 125,
233–4, 237–8, 247–8, 261–2, 266, 135, 179–80, 192, 204–5, 208, 221, 228,
274–6, 277–9, 288, 303–4, 307, 310, 230, 239–40, 242, 257, 259, 278, 281,
313, 321–3, 337, 340 see also philosophy 285–7, 297, 300, 314–15, 329–32, 342
ideas 34, 39, 196, 208–9
taste 52–8, 113, 127, 138, 166–7, 184–5, logic 17, 23, 28, 196, 223, 280, 288, 318,
195, 204–5, 214, 218, 239, 254, 276, 321, 327
316 see also beauty philosophy 20, 122–3, 126–7, 173, 227,
teleology/teleological 3–4, 51–3, 58–60, 231, 262, 265, 274–5, 299, 302, 305,
114–15, 123–4, 134, 167, 170, 309, 313, 318, 321–2, 328
173, 185, 198, 217, 223, 251, 254, psychology 24, 252–3
275, 276–8, 314, 334, 338, 341 realist/realism 29, 105, 141, 179, 257, 259
see also purposiveness reflection 136, 168–9, 204, 210, 340
Tetens, Johann Nicolaus 139, 141, 154–5, 252 truth(s) 31, 50, 76, 85, 91, 94, 101–2, 104,
theology/theological 12, 30–1, 36, 60–1, 124–5, 129–30, 138, 140, 143, 146–7,
85–6, 88, 99–100, 104, 106–7, 110–12, 150, 154, 194, 199, 223, 226, 238,
125–6, 151, 157, 209, 214, 228, 245–7, 253, 257, 278, 287–8, 297,
248–51, 283, 294, 308–9 see also God; 299–300, 302–3, 323, 330, 340
proof; religion
time 15, 17, 19–22, 24–7, 30, 33, 42, understanding 13–15, 18, 20, 23, 28, 48–9,
46, 49, 75, 78, 123, 135–6, 141–2, 51–5, 57–60, 90, 94–5, 116, 123, 127,
153, 170–2, 176–9, 182, 192, 195, 129–30, 140–2, 146, 155–6, 166–71,
203–4, 212–13, 215, 222, 226, 229, 173, 176, 178, 180–1, 191–3, 195–6,
231, 242, 244, 246–7, 252–3, 257, 199, 202–4, 208–13, 216–18, 220–5,
260, 269, 280–2, 285–6, 293–7, 299, 229–31, 236–8, 243–7, 253–4, 256, 261,
302, 305, 314–15, 317, 326–8, 330–1 268–71, 273–5, 279–81, 283–4, 288, 294,
see also transcendental aesthetic; 298–300, 302, 304–5, 311–14, 326–8,
schematism 334 see also judgment; reason; sensibility
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