LUISA KHO MONTAER VS SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
Facts:
In August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman
Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners
Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and
Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children. On May
26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan
and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims,
filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before
the Sharia District Court.
The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer
and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of
Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K.
Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K.
Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05.
In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2)
the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are
the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the
widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the
daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and
a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.
Private respondents prayed for the following: partition of the
estate of the decedent; and the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decendent.
Petitioners filed an Asnwer with a Motion to dismiss mainly on
the following grounds:
Lack of jurisdiction
Private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket
fees;
Complaint is barred by prescription
Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents’
complaint. Thereafter they filed a MR to which the Petitioners
opposed alleging that the MR lacked a Notice of Hearing. The
court nevertheless denied the opposition and held that such
defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence
of the pleading.
The court thereafter reset the date for hearing for the MR. In
its first assailed order, the court allowed the private
respondents to adduce further evidence. In the second
assailed order the court ordered the continuation of trial on the
merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.
Contention:
Petitioners alleged that the Sharia District court of Marawi has
no jurisdiction over the complaint since the decedent is not a
muslim but a roman catholic
Issue: WON Sharia district court has jurisdiction
Held: yes.
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent
on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr.
is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there
has already been a determination resolving such a question
of fact.
It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did
not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed
orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving
this issue.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is
controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought
in the complaint or petition. The designation given by parties
to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to
treat it according to the said designation… courts are guided
by the substantive averments of the pleadings.
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed
before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial
partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of
the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, such
as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the
allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains
an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as
known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the
properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties
sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent.
Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its
subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth
in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to
dismiss. In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a
defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive
evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a
Muslim.
Special Proceedings
Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding
before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was
denominated as a special civil action.
Section 3(c) Rule 1 applies. This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact
of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer,
Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Docket Fees
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of
the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was
the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility
of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of
court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will not
automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of
courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records
do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether private respondents correctly paid
the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing
by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all
parties concerned. The Rules also provide that no written
motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof. However, the Rules allow a liberal
construction of its provisions in order to promote [the]
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party
can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this
reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the
merits rather than on technicalities.
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia
District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent
power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity
with the law and justice.
GR NO. 176466 JUNE 17, 2008
TIGIMENTA CHEMICALS PHILS./VIVIAN D. GARCIA VS
ROLAN BUENSALIDA
DOCTRINE:
A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of
the plaintiff. A complaint before the NLRC does not contain
specific allegations of these wrongful acts or omissions which
constitute the cause of action.
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of providing manpower
for the servicing and maintenance of air conditioning and air
handling units that it likewise provides to its
clients. On September 8, 1997, petitioner hired respondent
Buensalida as an aircon maintenance technician.
On February 26, 2003, respondent injured his left ring finger
while repairing the air handling units at the SM Department
Store in Davao City. As a result, respondent underwent a
surgical debridgement procedure and was confined in the
hospital for two days.
SM Prime Holdings initially shouldered respondents
hospitalization expenses which amounted to P30,331.61 but
it subsequently collected the amount from petitioner who, in
turn, informed respondent that the amount would be deducted
from his salary. Thus, on April 20, 2003, petitioner began
deducting P300.00 from respondents weekly earnings or a
monthly deduction of P1,200.00.
According to respondent, he wanted to avail of the SSS
benefits thus he accomplished an Employee Notification
Form. But petitioner did not send it backc because it was
allegedly filed beyond the allowable period. Petitioner also
ignored respondent’s PhilHealth 1 which the latter sent
together with the SSS form.
Thereafter, respondent demanded for the restoration of the
deducted amounts but was denied by petitioner; hence,
on May 16, 2003, he filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal with money claims against petitioner before the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI of the NLRC-Davao City.
Meanwhile, respondent was recalled to the Head Office at
QC. He averred that his transfer was purposely done by
petitioner to harass him.
He then filed another complaint for constructive dismissal
against petitioner befor the NLRC in QC (NCR case).
Subsequently he amended his complaint in the include
underemployment or non-payment of salaries service
incentive leave, 13th month pay and boarding house rental. He
claimed that petitioner failed to pay his boarding expenses
arising from his assignment to Davao City, contrary to the
promise of petitioner. His ECOLA, 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay were also not paid in the manner provided
by law.
Petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss the NCR case on the
ground of forum-shopping. Alleged that the Davao case was
a pending case similar to the NCR case.
Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss contending that
the two cases had different causes of action. While
the Davao case was for illegal deduction, the NCR case was
for constructive illegal dismissal as shown by the distinct
issues raised by respondent in his position papers filed in the
two cases.
The LA in the NCR case dismissed the complaint of the
respondent on the ground that the cause of action was
embraced in the Davao case. NLRC affirmed.
On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the NLC resolution. No
forum-shopping considering that the 2 cases had distinct
causes of action.
Issue: WON the 2 cases raised 2 distinct causes of action
Held: here, SC upheld the CA. it correctly relied not only on
the face of the complaints, but also on the position papers
submitted by respondent in determining the causes of action
raised in the 2 cases.
A complaint in a case filed before the NLRC consists only of
a blank form which provides a checklist of possible causes of
action that the employee may have against the employer. The
check list was designed to facilitate the filing of complaints by
employees and laborers even without the intervention of
counsel. It allows the complainant to expediently set forth his
grievance in a general manner, but is not solely determinative
of the ultimate cause of action that he may have against the
employer.
Section 3, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02 (Series of 2002),
provides:
… These verified position papers to be submitted shall cover
only those claims and causes of action raised in the
complaint excluding those that may have been amicably
settled, and shall be accompanied by all supporting
documents including the affidavits of their respective
witnesses which shall take the place of the latters direct
testimony. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to
allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred
to and any cause or causes of action not included in the
complaint or position papers, affidavits and other documents.
Thus, the complaint is not the only document from which the
complainants cause of action is determined in a labor
case. Any cause of action that may not have been included in
the complaint or position paper, can no longer be alleged after
the position paper is submitted by the parties. In other words,
the filing of the position paper is the operative act which
forecloses the raising of other matters constitutive of the
cause of action. This necessarily implies that the cause of
action is finally ascertained only after both the complaint and
position paper are properly evaluated.
A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of
the plaintiff. A complaint before the NLRC does not contain
specific allegations of these wrongful acts or omissions which
constitute the cause of action. All that it contains is the term
by which such acts or omissions complained of are generally
known. It cannot therefore be considered as the final
determinant of the cause of action.
Davao Case the following as causes of action: constructive
illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, non-payment of premium
pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay.
While the NCR case had for its cause of action constructive
illegal dismissal only. Later, the complaint in the NCR case
was amended to include underpayment of salaries and
wages, service incentive leave and 13th month pay as well as
non-payment of boarding house rental fees. At face value, it
would seem that the causes of action set forth in the two
complaints are indeed similar, if not, identical.
However, the position papers filed in the 2 cases raise distinct
causes of action, issues and prayed for reliefs.
Davao case, the following issues were clearly spelled out:
(1) whether the injury sustained by respondent was work-
related;
(2) whether the salary deductions made by petitioner was
proper; and
(3) whether petitioner was justified in refusing to complete
respondents SSS and Philhealth forms. While the complaint
in the Davao case also indicated constructive illegal
dismissal, non-payment of premium pay, holiday pay and
service incentive leave pay as causes of action, these were
not mentioned or discussed in respondents position paper.
In contrast, the amended complaint in the NCR case is one
for constructive illegal dismissal and underpayment of
monetary benefits. The issues raised therein are:
(1) whether complainant was illegally dismissed;
(2) whether complainant is entitled to all his monetary claims;
(3) whether complainant is entitled to full backwages and
separation pay; and
(4) whether complainant is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
Thus, the causes of action pleaded in the two cases are
not the same. The Davao case was clearly one for illegal
deductions and the NCR case was for constructive illegal
dismissal and money claims.
the factual allegations that support the causes of action in the
two cases are likewise dissimilar. The Davao case involved
factual circumstances related to petitioners refusal to shoulder
respondents hospitalization costs as well as the validity of the
salary deductions made by the former. On the other hand, the
NCR case pertained to alleged facts dealing with the
aftermath of the filing of the Davao case, particularly the
tactics petitioner allegedly employed to harass respondent
and ease him out of his regular employment, as well as
averments involving underpayment of monetary benefits.
Thus, respondent was not guilty of forum shopping when he
filed the NCR case despite the pendency of the Davao case.
the two cases here cannot be consolidated because they were
filed and are pending before different regional arbitration
branches of the NLRC the first, in Davao City and the second,
in the National Capital Region.
[G.R. NO. 152572 : October 5, 2007] (3) Upon a judgment.

SPOUSES ABELARDO BORBE and ROSITA LAJARCA-
BORBE, Petitioners, v. VIOLETA CALALO,Respondent.
Doctrine:
Facts:
On September 28, 1981, Rosita Lajarca-Borbe, petitioner, and
Violeta Calalo, the surviving spouse of Jose Palo, respondent,
executed an agreement or "Kasunduan." The agreement
provides that petitioner has purchased the 400-square meter
lot inherited by respondent from her late husband; that
petitioner shall pay respondent P3,000.00 as down payment;
and that she shall pay the balance of P3,000.00 the moment
a new TCT shall have been issued in the name of respondent.
The Kasunduan was also signed by respondent's children.
After 13 years or in April 1995, petitioner spouses presented
a prepared deed of sale in Filipino indicating that respondent
is selling to petitioners the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-
51153 in her name. However, respondent and her children
refused to sign the document, asking a higher price for the lot.
(Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. The Makati
Tuscany Condominium Corporation) the term "right of
action" is the right to commence and maintain an action.
The right of action springs from the cause of action, but
does not accrue until all the facts which constitute the
cause of action have occurred.
Under the terms of the "Kasunduan," petitioners would pay the
balance of P3,000.00 once the land sold will be titled in the
name of respondent. TCT No. T-51153 covering the subject
lot was issued in respondent's name on September 22, 1982.
From this day, petitioners could have asked respondent to
accept the remaining balance of P500.00 and execute a new
deed of sale in their favor.
Unfortunately, it was only in 1995 when petitioners attempted
to pay the remaining balance of P500.00. And it was only on
August 15, 1995, or 13 years after the lot was registered in
respondent's name, that petitioners filed the complaint for
specific performance. Clearly by then, petitioners' cause of
action had prescribed.

Despite demand, respondent and her children still refused to

execute a new deed of absolute sale.

As efforts to settle the dispute before the barangay authorities

failed, petitioners, on August 15, 1995, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Lipa City, a complaint for specific
performance against respondent.

Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal by

respondent, CA reversed TC in view of the belated filing of
complaint citing Arts 1144- action upon a written contrast must
be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues. In cases where there is no special provision for such
computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period
must be counted from the day on which the corresponding
action could have been instituted, or the legal possibility of
bringing the action. As the complaint was filed only on August
15, 1995, or almost thirteen (13) years later, it is clear that
appellees' action had already prescribed.

Contentions:

Petitioners contend that their cause of action accrued only in

1995, when they tendered the remaining balance of P500.00
to respondent which the latter refused to accept. Thus, the
Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed their complaint by
reason of prescription.

Respondent, for her part, maintains that the petition should be

denied for lack of merit.

Issue: WON the right of action has prescribed

Held: yes

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within

ten years from the time the right of action accrues:cra:nad

(1) Upon a written contract;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) Upon an obligation created by

law;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC,
vs. SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE
AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
Doctrine:
before an action can properly be commenced all the essential
elements of the cause of action must be in existence, that is,
the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions
precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether
prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the parties or
implied by law must be performed or complied with before
commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse
party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or
excuse non-performance of the condition;
where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable
requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to the goods,
the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action
for loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability.
Facts:
A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein
Petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc.
(Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private
respondents Sweet Lines, Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans
Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I.
Line (The Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E.
Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo, seeking
recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs allegedly due
to defendants' negligence.
In or about March 1977, the vessel SS VISHVA YASH took on
board at Baton Rouge, LA 2 consignments of cargoes for the
shipment to Manila and later for transshipment to Davao city,
consisting of 600 bags Low density Polyethylene 647and
another 6,400 bags bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both
consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company
of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum,
Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were covered, respectively,
by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common
carrier. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum
Plastics Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc.
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and
discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila for transhipment
to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited
and made use of the services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet
Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.
Subject cargoes were loaded in Holds Nos. 2 and 3 of the
interisland carrier. These were commingled with similar
cargoes belonging to Evergreen Plantation and also Standfilc.
On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the
interisland carrier into the custody of the consignee. a survey
was then conducted: of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags,
originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags
were delivered to the consignee in good order condition,
leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss from this particular
shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to.
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into
between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and defendants S.C.I. Line
and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in
settlement of the claim against them. thereafter, TC granted
petitioners’ motion to dismiss grounded on said amicable
settlement.
TC thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners
and ordered Sweet lines to pay the former the sum of
P34,902.00, with legal interest thereon from date of
extrajudicial demand on April 28, 1978.
On appeal, CA reversed the TC’s decision. Hence, this case.
Contentions:
1. Petitioners alleged that it was an error to reverse
the appealed decision on the suppose ground of
prescription when SLI failed to adduce any
evidence in support thereof;
2. that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened
periods for filing a claim and for instituting a court
action against the carrier were never offered in
evidence. Considering that the existence and tenor
of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have
allegedly not been established, petitioners maintain
that it is inconceivable how they can possibly
comply therewith.
3. Respondent SLI averred that it is standard practice
in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments
entrusted to it for carriage and that it in fact issued
bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor
with proof of their existence manifest in the records
of the case.
Issue: WON action of petitioner has prescribed (WON
prescription can be maintained as such defense)
Held: action has already prescribed.
CA correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that
defense was so considered and controverted by the parties.
This issue may be taken cognizance of by the court even
if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its
existence is plainly apparent on the face of relevant
pleadings. In the case at bat, prescription as affirmative
defense was seasonably raised by SLI in its answer except
that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally
offered in evidence.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation
under the contract of carriage as contained in the bills of
lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as
actionable documents which under the Rules must be
properly pleaded either as causes of action or
defenses and the genuineness and due execution of
which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party. The rules on actionable
documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or
defense based on said documents.
In the instant case, petitioners failed to controvert the
existence of the bills of lading, hence they impliedly admitted
the same when they merely assailed the validity of subject
stipulations.
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much
less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments in
question amounts to an admission.
(On Accrual of Right of Action)
Next, Petitioners attacked the validity of para 5 of the bills of
ladings which unequivocally prescribes a time frame of 30
days for filing a claim within the carrier in the case of loss or
damage to the cargo and 60 days from accrual of right of for
instituting an action in court, which periosds must concur,
petitioners posit that the alleged shorter prescriptive period
which is in the nature of a limitation on petitioners' right of
recovery is unreasonable and that SLI has the burden of
proving otherwise. They postulate this on the theory that the
bills of lading containing the same constitute contracts of
adhesion and are, therefore, void for being contrary to public
policy
SC ruled that: it is more accurate to state that the filing of a
claim with the carrier within the time limitation therefor under
Article 366 (Code of Commerce) actually constitutes a
condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against
a carrier for damages caused to the merchandise. The
shipper or the consignee must allege and prove the
fulfillment of the condition and if he omits such
allegations and proof, no right of action against the
carrier can accrue in his favor. As the requirements in
Article 366, restated with a slight modification in the assailed
paragraph 5 of the bills of lading, are reasonable conditions
precedent, they are not limitations of action.
fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to
relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to inform it
that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged
with liability therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine
the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by
affording it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim
while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to
safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.
On the other hand, the validity of a contractual limitation of
time for filing the suit itself against a carrier shorter than the
statutory period therefor has generally been upheld as such
stipulation merely affects the shipper's remedy and does not
affect the liability of the carrier.
In the case at bar, there is neither any showing of compliance
by petitioners with the requirement for the filing of a notice of
claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that
effect. It may then be said that while petitioners may
possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with
the above condition precedent they lost whatever right of
action they may have in their favor or, token in another
sense, that remedial right or right to relief had prescribed.

Being conditions precedent, their performance must precede

a suit for enforcement and the vesting of the right to file spit
does not take place until the happening of these conditions.

Now, before an action can properly be commenced all the

essential elements of the cause of action must be in
existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All
valid conditions precedent to the institution of the particular
action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of
the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied
with before commencing the action, unless the conduct of the
adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive
performance or excuse non-performance of the condition.

A right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of

action, while a cause of action consists of the operative facts
which give rise to such right of action. The right of action does
not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to
the action and may be taken away by the running of the statute
of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstances
which do not affect the cause of action. Performance or
fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon which a right of
action depends must be sufficiently alleged, considering that
the burden of proof to show that a party has a right of action
is upon the person initiating the suit.

where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable

requirement of giving notice of loss of or injury to the goods,
the giving of such notice is a condition precedent to the action
for loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability.
Such requirement is not an empty formalism. The
G.R. No. L-13159 February 28, 1962 Held: No.

REMEDIOS QUIOGUE, ET AL., Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v. JACINTO BAUTISTA, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Doctrine:
Section 3, Rule 2: A contract embraces only one single
cause of action because it may be violated only once
even if it contains several stipulations. Thus, non-
payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a
single cause of action. The creditor cannot split up this
single cause of action into two separate complaints, one
for payment of the debt and another for the foreclosure
of the mortgage.
Facts:
This is an action to foreclose two deeds of mortgage
executed to secure the payment of two loans, one for
P2,000.00 and another for P6,000.00 covering two
parcels of land situated in the City of Manila. The first
deed was executed on May 9, 1944 and the second on
October 11, 1944 and it was stipulated therein as a
common provision that the two loans cannot be repaid
within one year from the date of the termination of the
last world war.
considering that the first case refers to a transaction
different from those covered in the present case.
Section 3, Rule 2, of our Rules of Court, invoked by
Bautista et al, which provides that a single cause of
action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to
be made the subject of different complaints, does not
apply, for here there is not a single cause of action that
was split up, but several causes that refer to different
transactions. And it was held that a contract embraces
only one cause of action because it may be violated only
once even if it contains several stipulations.1 Thus, non-
payment of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a
single cause of action. The creditor cannot split up this
single cause of action into two separate complaints, one
for payment of the debt and another for the foreclosure
of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first
complaint will bar the second complaint. In other words,
the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall
be considered as a waiver of the right to foreclose the
mortgage executed thereon.2 The lower court, therefore,
did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on this
ground.

Bautista et al set up the defense that the present action

is already barred by Civil Case No. 11969 filed in the
same court between the same parties, and that if there
is any amount recoverable from them the same shall be
computed in accordance with the Ballantyne schedule.

TC rendered a decision in favor of Quiogue et al.

It appears that prior to the filing of the present complaint

Quiogue et al had instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action to foreclose a first mortgage
on the same properties and that on the date said action
was filed the two loans covered by the second and third
mortgages which are herein foreclosed had already
matured. It also appears that a judgment was duly
entered in the first case and when a writ of execution was
issued to enforce it, it was duly satisfied by Bautista et al.

Contentions:

It is now contented, among others, that the instant case

is barred by the decision rendered in the first case (Civil
Case No. 11969.

Counsel for Bautista et al argues that the TC erred in not

dismissing this case as premature since it was agreed
that the loans cannot be paid within 1 year from the
termination of the last world war and according to the
treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers the same
should come into force for each State only after its
ratification and from sate of the deposit of its instrument
of ratification, it cannot be said that the war has
terminated when this action was brought on June 23,
1956, it appearing that the instrument of ratification was
deposited only on July 23, 1956.

Issue: WON action has already prescribed.