/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Learning and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/lindif

Constructivism and personal epistemology development in undergraduate 7

chemistry students☆
⁎
Michael M. Bargera, , Tony Perezb, Dorian A. Canelasc, Lisa Linnenbrink-Garciad
a
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Psychology, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820, United States
b
Old Dominion, Department of Educational Foundations & Leadership, United States
c
Duke University, Department of Chemistry, United States
d
Michigan State University, Department of Counseling, Educational Psychology and Special Education, United States

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Students' beliefs about knowledge, or their personal epistemologies, are critical components of the learning
Personal epistemology process. Researchers and educators need to understand how portrayals of knowledge in the classroom shape
Development personal epistemology development. Using a quasi-experimental design, an organic chemistry instructor taught a
Constructivism traditional, lecture-based course and a constructivist-based interactive-learning course. Students (N = 270)
Epistemic climate
completed three surveys assessing personal epistemology and perceptions of constructivism in the classroom.
Interactive learning
Although the interactive-learning classroom did not seem to affect personal epistemology, evidence suggested
that perceptions of a complex learning environment predicted changes in personal epistemology. Students' initial
epistemic beliefs predicted how they perceived the classroom environment. Results also supported an epistemic
alignment hypothesis: students performed better on the final exam when their beliefs matched the course
structure. Findings support an interactive model between students' personal epistemologies and epistemic cli-
mate and highlight the challenges of changing beliefs through single-semester classroom interventions.

Knowledge construction is a central component of education.
Through the process of building knowledge, each learner develops be-
liefs about what knowledge is and how it is justified, a system of cog-
nitions known as personal epistemology (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002). Stu-
dents' specific beliefs about knowledge, also referred to as epistemic
beliefs, predict their self-regulation strategies (Bråten, Anmarkrud,
Brandmo, & Strømsø, 2014; Muis, 2007; Muis & Franco, 2009) and are
also closely interrelated with student motivation (Chen & Barger, 2016;
Bråten & Strømsø, 2004). Students' personal epistemologies also predict
achievement in various contexts (Bråten & Ferguson, 2014; Dai &
Cromley, 2014; Muis, 2004; Trautwein & Lüdtke, 2007). College
chemistry classrooms are one such context. For example, under-
graduates who have chemistry-specific epistemic beliefs (e.g., “In
chemistry truth is unchanging.”) that closely match their preferred
general epistemic beliefs (e.g., “I prefer to study subjects where truth is
unchanging.”) tend to receive higher grades in chemistry (Dai &
Cromley, 2014).
Given the importance of students' epistemic beliefs to the learning
process, it is essential to understand the situational factors that might
influence changes in personal epistemology (e.g., Feucht, 2010; Muis &
Duffy, 2013). Researchers and educators have debated the virtues of
two types of college pedagogical practices: traditional, lecture-based
classrooms and constructivist, active-learning-based classrooms
(Freeman et al., 2014; Friesen, 2011). Many researchers and educators
have taken a strong stance on which teaching approach is more ap-
propriate in STEM fields based on students' learning and achievement,
but few of these researchers have considered the role of students'
epistemic beliefs in this debate. Assessing epistemic beliefs can com-
plement existing research on the effectiveness of pedagogical techni-
ques as an explanatory mechanism or describe how the classroom for-
mats might affect underlying beliefs that students can carry beyond the
course. The current study examines the complex relations between
students' perceptions of constructivist pedagogical practices and per-
sonal epistemology development.
1. Theoretical background
1.1. Personal epistemology
Although there are many ways to conceptualize personal episte-
mology (Alexander, 2016; Chinn, Buckland, & Samarapungavan, 2011;
Hofer & Pintrich, 1997), one prominent conceptualization examines

☆
An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the Annual Conference of the American Educational Researchers Association in Chicago, April 2015.
⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mmbarger@illinois.edu (M.M. Barger).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2018.03.006
Received 27 April 2017; Received in revised form 15 March 2018; Accepted 29 March 2018
‹(OVHYLHU,QF$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG
M.M. Barger et al.
independent beliefs about the nature of knowledge (its structure) and
how knowledge is justified (its sources). Philosophers often define
knowledge as justified, true beliefs (Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta,
2008), but the focus in personal epistemology is on how individuals
think about knowledge themselves. Students generally hold these be-
liefs implicitly; they may not think about these beliefs until they are
explicitly asked to articulate them. Students' beliefs are both domain-
general (e.g., “all knowledge is unchanging,”) and domain-specific
(e.g., “chemistry knowledge is unchanging;” Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle,
2006). To some extent, these different levels of beliefs relate in a
hierarchical manner, such that someone who has a domain-general
belief is more likely to hold a similar domain-specific belief; however,
individuals can, and often do, hold different beliefs across domains,
such as chemistry and history (for a review, see Barger & Linnenbrink-
Garcia, 2017; Muis et al., 2006).
Three beliefs particularly relevant to the debate between lecture-
based and active-learning-based classrooms have also received con-
siderable attention by researchers studying epistemic beliefs more
broadly (see Greene et al., 2008; Hofer, 2000; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997):
1) simple/certain knowledge, 2) justification by authority, and 3) per-
sonal justification. Simple/certain knowledge involves the structure of
knowledge, and indicates the belief that knowledge is composed of
unchanging, unrelated facts, instead of complex, evolving information.
The belief that chemistry knowledge involves a collection of un-
changing facts that need to be memorized (e.g., equations and symbols
that are learned through memorization) exemplifies simple/certain
knowledge. On the other hand, the belief that scientists' understanding
of molecular structures and energetic processes constantly evolves
would not. Both justification by authority and personal justification
involve sources of knowledge. A belief in justification by authority im-
plies that knowledge is handed down by authority figures. A belief in
personal justification means that individuals construct knowledge for
themselves and therefore can hold different understandings of what is
true. Students with strong justification by authority beliefs would view
chemistry teachers and textbooks as the primary sources of knowledge,
whereas students with strong personal justification beliefs think that
people might come to different understandings by approaching pro-
blems from different perspectives.
Theoretically, different types of beliefs are considered adaptive or
maladaptive for learning and achievement (e.g., Muis, 2004). The belief
that knowledge is simple/certain, for example, has been described as
less availing, as it has been linked to lower achievement and learning
(Qian & Alvermann, 1995; Trautwein & Lüdtke, 2007). This connection
has been attributed to students using shallower cognitive processing
when they believe knowledge is simple/certain (Muis, 2004; Strømsø &
Kammerer, 2016). The evidence regarding the relation between beliefs
about sources and process of knowledge justification and achievement
is less consistent across contexts (e.g., Bråten & Ferguson, 2014; Bråten,
Ferguson, Strømsø, & Anmarkrud, 2013; Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, &
Harrison, 2004). In introductory science courses, it is especially im-
portant to understand that experts have agreed upon trustworthy,
foundational principles and that not every opinion in science is valid
(particularly if that opinion is not based on reliable scientific pro-
cesses). However, over-reliance on teachers might prevent students
from learning how to solve problems on their own or discover novel
solutions, especially in more advanced scientific study. Furthermore, it
is also important to understand that scientists' knowledge and under-
standing of scientific principles is constantly being developed, and
therefore scientists might have conflicting ideas that deserve further
inspection. Accordingly, the most sophisticated approach to the source
of knowledge may be a balance between justification by authority and
personal justification (Greene et al., 2008). To summarize, beliefs about
justification are not simply adaptive or maladaptive in science, but
depend on how they guide the student to useful or unuseful behaviors
in different contexts.
The extent to which students match their epistemic beliefs to the

/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
demands of the course may explain the conflicting evidence (Dai &
Cromley, 2014). Epistemic cognition has been described as “flexible”
and dependent on contexts (e.g., Kienhues, Ferguson, & Stahl, 2016).
However, researchers have not yet examined whether this flexibility
can be adaptive if students come to hold beliefs that match the epis-
temic climate of the context. Following this line of thinking, we propose
that students will learn more when their beliefs match the way that
knowledge is portrayed in a particular class. Students beliefs about the
source of knowledge may direct them to seek or construct knowledge
using different strategies (e.g., memorizing what the instructor says or
practicing problems on one's own), which would be differentially ef-
fective depending on how the course is designed. It is therefore possible
that students with less constructivist beliefs (i.e., justification by au-
thority beliefs) will perform better in more traditional, lecture-based
college courses (i.e., courses that are more objectivist in nature because
the teacher's lecture serves as the singular truth in the class), whereas
students with more constructivist beliefs (i.e., personal justification
beliefs) will perform better in a constructivist-based, interactive-
learning context. Instead of describing certain beliefs as availing, we
propose the “epistemic alignment” hypothesis, which suggests that
beliefs are more adaptive in contexts that call for them. Successful
students are not simply those that hold universally “adaptive” beliefs,
but rather are the students whose beliefs align with the demands of the
learning context.
1.2. Mechanisms of personal epistemology development
Researchers have long observed that students' personal epistemol-
ogies can change over time (e.g., Kitchener & King, 1981; Perry, 1970;
Schommer, Calvert, Gariglietti, & Bajaj, 1997). Recent work suggests
two possible mechanisms for change, one explicit and one implicit
(Brownlee, Schraw, Walker, & Ryan, 2016; Lunn Brownlee, Ferguson, &
Ryan, 2017). Explicit mechanisms derive from the conceptual change
literature (e.g., Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). When stu-
dents' existing beliefs are directly confronted, this can trigger a dis-
satisfaction with current beliefs called “epistemic doubt” (Bendixen &
Rule, 2004). Examples of triggers include learners reading conflicting
texts (Ferguson, Bråten, & Strømsø, 2012) or instructors directly con-
fronting students' epistemic assumptions during class meetings
(Kienhues, Bromme, & Stahl, 2008). For example, a student may believe
that experts have all the answers; but, if the student then reads con-
flicting papers about how scientists disagree on what the healthiest
foods are, he or she learns to believe that experts are not omniscient.
Alternatively, epistemic change might occur implicitly through stu-
dents' experiences with the underlying epistemic assumptions of the
classroom. In these cases, the conceptions about nature of knowledge
are not directly presented; students' assumptions may subtly change in
ways that they are not aware of until they are explicitly asked with a
targeted interview or survey question. For example, a child who goes to
a school that allows students to direct their own learning may not be
explicitly told that knowledge can be personally constructed, or even
hear about “knowledge” or “truth” at all. Nevertheless, such an en-
vironment implicitly suggests that knowledge can be personally con-
structed and is not just handed down by authority figures. Such a child
could also develop the belief that experts are not omniscient.
A classroom's “epistemic climate” is the amalgam of students' per-
sonal epistemologies, the instructor's personal epistemology, the epis-
temic messages in classroom instruction, and the way course materials
present knowledge (Feucht, 2010). Within this interactionist model, a
classroom context that portrays knowledge as complex and originating
from multiple sources should lead students to develop similar epistemic
beliefs. Instructors' personal epistemology leads them to create tasks
within the classroom that correspond to those portrayals of knowledge.
Qualitative research has also found that even within the same subject,
the portrayals of knowledge can differ significantly between classrooms
(Hofer, 2004). The structure of a course in turn implicitly provides
M.M. Barger et al.
students with evidence about how knowledge is created (Barger &
Linnenbrink-Garcia, 2017), eliciting changes in students' epistemic be-
liefs (Muis, Trevors, & Chevrie, 2016). This is evident in one study that
demonstrated that a web-supported, problem-based learning course
structure decreased the belief that knowledge is simple/certain
(Tolhurst, 2007). Students in the same classroom can also interpret the
instructor's goals around knowledge differently (Hofer, 2004). How-
ever, the role of incoming beliefs in the epistemic climate remains
understudied. Hypothetically, students' beliefs reciprocally influence
their environment, such that when students' beliefs change, it changes
how they engage with peers, instructors, and course materials, further
eliciting epistemic change (Bendixen & Rule, 2004). However, little
existing empirical evidence supports this supposition.
1.2.1. Constructivism in classrooms and constructivist beliefs
One possible type of epistemic climate that instructors establish
incorporates the learning theory of constructivism. Constructivism
generally refers to a philosophical viewpoint that assumes no single
objective reality exists (Jonassen, 1991), and that truth must be con-
structed (Hodson & Hodson, 1998). Knowledge can be constructed
personally by an individual or constructed and shared socially (Driver,
Asoko, Leach, Scott, & Mortimer, 1994). In the present study, we refer
specifically to social constructivism, because the view that knowledge is
socially constructed is the theoretical basis for interactive-learning
classrooms in which students work in small-groups to solve problems
and create an understanding of the material. We specifically focus on
students' perceptions of a constructivist class in this study because
teaching from a constructivist paradigm lends itself to a particular
epistemic climate. Some epistemic beliefs align with constructivism,
such as the personal justification of knowledge belief, while other
epistemic beliefs are less aligned with constructivism, such as simple/
certain knowledge and justification by authority beliefs.
In practice, constructivism has meant many things in the classroom
context (Hmelo-Silver, Duncan, & Chinn, 2007; Kirschner, Sweller, &
Clark, 2006), including collaborative and problem-based learning.
Translating constructivist learning theory into pedagogical practices in
the classroom often includes several common components, such as
authentic tasks that are comparable to the activities of scientists (like
working through unsolved problems and conducting experiments),
supporting learner ownership of problems within a complex learning
environment, and building knowledge with peers (Savery & Duffy,
2001). For example, in the college setting, instead of an instructor
lecturing the majority of the time, class time instead could be devoted
to students engaged in solving challenging problems in small groups.
Such an approach creates an authentic task or problem that better re-
flects how scientists do their work (Osborne, 2010) and increases col-
laborative construction of knowledge between peers (Chi, 2009). This
experience may lead students to perceive knowledge in the domain as
more complex and coming from multiple sources.
Teaching using pedagogical techniques inspired by constructivism
in college STEM courses has become increasingly popular, in part be-
cause student populations tend to demonstrate more learning, on
average, in these classrooms compared to traditional, lecture-based
courses (Freeman et al., 2014). As an illustration, Process Oriented
Guided Inquiry Learning (POGIL) activities (Farrell, Moog, & Spencer,
1999; Moog & Spencer, 2008), which were developed with social
constructivism foundations, have gained momentum in science class-
rooms; hundreds of published POGIL activities are now available. Ad-
ditionally, flipped classrooms, in which students engage with tradi-
tional lecture content outside of the classroom and engage in problem
solving during class time, have received recent attention in college
chemistry (Goldwasser, Mosley, & Canelas, 2016; Canelas, Hill, &
Novicki, 2017; Chase, Pakhira, & Stains, 2013; Fautch, 2015; Hein,
2012; Teo, Tan, Yan, Teo, & Yeo, 2014). Researchers have proposed
many reasons for the advances in the average student's achievement
observed after implementation of these types of teaching practices. The

/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
reasons include inducing deeper learner understanding of the material
(Ruiz-Primo, Briggs, Iverson, Talbot, & Shepard, 2011), replacing
competition with collaboration (Springer, Stanne, & Donovan, 1999),
and providing students with opportunities to resolve cognitive dis-
sonance (Jensen & Lawson, 2011). Phrases such as student-centered
learning, active-learning, interactive-learning, and cooperative learning
have different, nuanced meanings for different people, but these terms
are often used interchangeably in the literature. We will employ the
phrase “interactive-learning” throughout the remainder of the text for
consistency—it constitutes the most accurate description of the learning
environment in this study, which involves actively engaging students in
inquiry-guided problem solving activities in small groups to allow them
to construct a shared understanding of organic chemistry.
One experimental study provided evidence that constructivist ped-
agogical practices can change epistemic beliefs among undergraduate
statistics students (Muis & Duffy, 2013). This study demonstrated that,
when compared to a typical classroom, a constructivist classroom led
students to believe that statistics knowledge is complex and can be
personally constructed. This supports the assertion constructivist
learning environments shape epistemic beliefs and may serve as one
way of fostering epistemic change. This prior study and others (e.g.,
Brownlee, Purdie, & Boulton-Lewis, 2001) involved interventions that
explicitly targeted students' personal epistemologies; however, it is not
clear whether epistemic development would occur “in a more natur-
alistic constructivist classroom that did not explicitly… foster epistemic
change” (Muis & Duffy, 2013, pp. 223–224). For example, a course
structure that required students to learn on their own or figure out
answers in teams would implicitly suggest that knowledge is complex
and socially constructed, without explicitly addressing these issues with
students. Furthermore, it is unclear from these studies what specific
aspects of the constructivist classroom led to epistemic changes. Did the
opportunity to interact with peers, participating in authentic tasks, the
complexity of the problems presented in class, or some other factors
lead to changes in beliefs?
The studies also did not explicitly test the interactive nature of
students' preexisting personal epistemologies with the portrayal of
knowledge in the classroom. A student's initial personal epistemology
may color his or her interpretation of the epistemic climate. For ex-
ample, the effectiveness of one personal epistemology intervention
depended on whether students already held constructivist views of
knowledge (Kienhues et al., 2008). Furthermore, students in traditional
science classrooms who believed that science is socially negotiated
were more likely to perceive their classroom as lacking opportunities to
construct knowledge (Tsai, 2000). However, it seems just as likely that
under the context of a constructivist classroom, more constructivist
beliefs would allow students to perceive (and thus take advantage of)
opportunities to construct complex knowledge for oneself. If students
are in a interactive-learning context, possessing constructivist epistemic
beliefs should direct students to construct their own knowledge.
1.3. Current study
The current study sought to improve our understanding of the role
of a constructivist-based, interactive-learning environment in epistemic
change. We investigated college students' personal epistemology de-
velopment in traditional lecture-based and interactive-learning organic
chemistry classrooms. Examining students' epistemic beliefs and per-
ceptions of a constructivist climate enabled us to: (1) investigate whe-
ther or not perceptions of the epistemic climate implicitly cause epis-
temic change and (2) clarify what role learners' initial epistemic beliefs
play in the process. Finally, we wanted to examine an epistemic
alignment hypothesis, postulating that epistemic beliefs differentially
predict academic achievement in lecture-based and interactive-learning
contexts. If the hypothesis is correct, then an individual learner's aca-
demic achievement to some extent depends upon the degree of
matching between the learner's epistemic beliefs and the classroom
M.M. Barger et al. /HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Participants (N = 270) were undergraduates in two sections of an

organic chemistry course at a selective university in the southeastern
United States. The first was a lecture-based format (n = 116, total en-
rollment of 132), and the other section used a problem-based, inter-
active-learning course format (n = 154, total enrollment of 158). At this
university, students typically take an advanced general chemistry
course in the fall of their first year, followed by two semesters of or-
ganic chemistry in the spring of their first year (the context of the
current study) and the fall of their second year as previously described
(Hall, Curtin-Soydan, & Canelas, 2014; Canelas, 2015; Canelas et al.,
2017). The overall sample included 85.1% first-year students and re-
Fig. 1. The conceptual model of the development of personal epistemology via
flected the gender (47.2% male) and ethnic (41.6% Caucasian, 29.4%
perceptions of a constructivist learning environment. These perceptions are
Asian/Pacific islander, 9.3% African American, 5.2% Hispanic, 9.3%
divided into three dimensions in the tested model (see Fig. 2).
other/multiracial, 5.2% did not report) make-up of the university.1 The
demographic characteristics of the lecture-based and interactive-
environment established by the instructor. learning classes are presented in Table 1. The study was approved by
We tested three research questions based on our conceptual model the institutional review board in accordance with guidelines to protect
of epistemic change. (RQ1) Do students' epistemic beliefs, final exam human subjects.
grades, and perceptions of different components of constructivism vary
between interactive-learning and lecture-based classrooms? We hy-
pothesized that the interactive-learning classroom would increase per- 2.2. Procedure
ceptions of constructivism such as having more opportunities to interact
with peers, seeing problems as complex, and authentic scientific tasks. The third author was the instructor for both of the classes, covering
We also hypothesized that students in the interactive-learning class- the structures and reactions of carbon compounds and the impact of
room would subsequently report more constructivist epistemic beliefs selected organic compounds on society. The use of different instruc-
(i.e., higher personal justification, lower justification by authority and tional strategies was not advertised to students. Thus, students were not
simple/certain knowledge) relative to those observed in the traditional, aware of the approaches to teaching when they enrolled for the course.
lecture-based classroom at the end of the course (as in Muis & Duffy, In the lecture-based class, students attended three 50-minute lec-
2013). (RQ2) Is there a reciprocal relation between perceptions of a tures per week and the instructor primarily delivered course content via
constructivist classroom and changes in personal epistemology over the lecture. The instructor used visual aids (e.g., PowerPoint slides, docu-
course of the semester (see Fig. 1)? We hypothesized that the percep- ment camera, and writing on board) while explaining the course con-
tions that the classroom had more constructivist teaching practices tent. Students were also sometimes given time to think about a problem
would predict changes in epistemic beliefs, and that this relation might and then randomly selected to answer a question, but the instructor
be stronger in the interactive-learning classroom. We also expected that delivered a traditional lecture for the majority of class time while the
students' initial beliefs would predict their perceptions of the classroom students took notes. Students were advised to keep up with the course
environment in both classrooms, providing evidence for one possible by reading and doing practice problems for 1–2 h each day outside of
mechanism for how learners' personal epistemology impacts the epis- class.
temic climate (Feucht, 2010). (RQ3) How do epistemic beliefs relate to Students in the interactive-learning class also attended three 50-
achievement in organic chemistry in these different contexts? We ex- minute classes per week. In this case, student-centered, cooperative-
pected support for an epistemic alignment hypothesis: less con- learning activities replaced the lecture; the goal was to spend the ma-
structivist epistemic beliefs predict higher achievement in the lecture- jority of class time with all students actively engaged in inquiry-guided
based classroom, but more constructivist epistemic beliefs predict problem solving in small groups rather than listening passively to a
higher achievement in the interactive-learning classroom (Dai & lecture. The primary mode of instruction for the interactive-learning
Cromley, 2014). class involved working in small groups on POGIL (POGIL; Farrell et al.,
1999; Moog & Spencer, 2008) or Problem Manipulation activities (Niaz
& Robinson, 1992; Siburt, Bissell, & MacPhail, 2011). POGIL uses
Table 1 scaffolded classroom activities and rotating team member group roles
Demographic information: compositions of the lecture-based and interactive- that are carefully designed and faculty peer-reviewed to contain a cycle
learning classes; N-values and percentages by gender and self-reported race. of constructive learning: exploration, concept invention, and applica-
Lecture-based % Interactive-learning % tion (https://pogil.org/about). These interactive-learning activities
class class align with many components of constructivism (Savery & Duffy, 2001).
First, it provides students the opportunity to work with their peers and
Gender Male 40 36 87 61
socially construct understanding of the material. Second, working on
Female 72 64 56 39
Race Black 11 10 14 10 problem solving tasks as opposed to listening to lectures more closely
Asian 41 37 38 27 aligns with what scientists do compared, making classroom activities
White 46 41 66 46 more authentic. Third, the flexibility of the problem-solving tasks
Hispanic 7 6 7 5 should allow students to take multiple pathways to solving problems,
Other/ 7 6 18 13
multiracial
1
The distribution of gender across the two sections of the course was unequal. Gender
was controlled in initial analyses but was unrelated to epistemic beliefs (as other re-
searchers have found; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) and was therefore not included in final
analyses.


M.M. Barger et al.
making the scientific process seem more complex than a collection of
memorizable facts. Most activities were drawn from reviewed and
published literature (Ruder, 2015; Straumanis, 2009), although the
instructor designed some activities (see Supplementary Materials for an
example of instructor-designed activities). The instructor and several
teaching assistants circulated through the classroom engaging in con-
versations with groups of four to six students about the activities in
order to prompt or scaffold their thinking about the activities. Prior to
coming to class, students had access to video lectures and were en-
couraged to work on introductory activities related to the problems
they would complete in small groups.
Following a previously reported procedure (Canelas et al., 2017), an
independent coder observed five randomly selected classes in both the
lecture-based and interactive-learning sections. During these observa-
tions, the coder assessed the amount of time that all students were
engaged in active-learning activities other than listening or taking
notes. Students in the interactive-learning class spent approximately
63% of class time working actively in small groups compared to about
17% of class time devoted to active-learning in the lecture-based class.
The remainder of the times included students listening and taking
notes, having tasks explained, and going over solutions.
The laboratory sections (once per week), recitation sessions (once
per week), homework assignments, textbook (Organic Chemistry, 5th
ed.; Loudon, 2009), course website, and other course materials were
identical in both classes. This included identical online resources such
as unit plans with learning objectives, online homework problems,
worksheets for guiding recitations led by teaching assistants, a folder of
student-centered activities, optional lecture videos, PowerPoint slides,
and information about places to get extra help (peer tutoring, chemistry
resource room, instructor office hours). Students in the lecture-based
class had access to all of the activities that the students in the inter-
active-learning class were completing in real time, and they were en-
couraged to do them on their own for practice as an optional activity.
Conversely, students in the interactive-learning class were encouraged
to take advantage of the optional lecture videos when needing clar-
ification about concepts.
Students completed surveys in their chemistry class at the beginning
(T1), middle (T2), and end (T3) of the semester assessing their epis-
temic beliefs about chemistry (T1 and T3) and their perceptions of the
classroom environment (T2). Students completed a final, cumulative
exam in the week following the T3 survey. These time points were se-
lected to assess students' initial and final beliefs while getting a cross-
section of their perceptions of how the class was proceeding in the
middle of the semester. The instructor introduced the researchers at the
beginning of the study but was not present while students were re-
cruited to participate in the study or while they completed the surveys.
Students were not compensated for participating.
2.3. Measures
All items were measured on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly
Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree). Items within each subscale were averaged
to create a single score at each time point. We calculated Cronbach's
alpha to determine the internal consistency reliability of each of the
measures. Generally, an alpha ≥0.70 indicates sufficient reliability
(Cortina, 1993); however, reliability scores lower than 0.70 may also be
acceptable (Schmitt, 1996). We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
to validate the factor structure of the measures. We report the specific
results of the CFA analyses in the results section.
2.3.1. Personal epistemology
The epistemic beliefs about chemistry survey was adapted from a
scale that was previously used in the domain of engineering (“en-
gineers” and “engineering” were replaced by “chemists” and “chem-
istry”), developed by Barger, Wormington, Huettel, and Linnenbrink-
Garcia (2016) via combining items from scales that were designed to

/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
function across multiple domains, including psychology, science, math,
and history (Greene, Torney-Purta, & Azevedo, 2010; Hofer, 2000). The
original engineering items had been inspected previously by an expert
in the field of epistemic cognition and were reviewed by the third au-
thor, a chemistry professor, who found the adapted scales relevant to
the organic chemistry context. We selected these scales because they
were domain-specific and showed reasonable reliability with a similar
demographic of students. There were 17 domain-specific items, which
assessed three subscales including simple/certain knowledge (e.g.,
“Truth is unchanging in chemistry.”), justification by authority (e.g., “If
a chemist says something is fact, I believe it.”), and personal justifica-
tion (e.g., “In chemistry, what's a fact depends on a person's point of
view.”) at both T1 and T3. Based on the CFA results, we dropped one
item from the justification by authority scale (“If you read something in
a chemistry textbook, you can be sure it's true.”) and two items from the
simple/certain knowledge scale (“In chemistry, most work has only one
right answer” and “All chemistry professors would probably come up
with the same answers to questions in chemistry.”). Thus, the final scale
included 14 items total (personal justification = 3 items, αT1 = 0.66,
αT3 = 0.71; justification by authority = 5 items, αT1 = 0.73,
αT3 = 0.81; and simple certain knowledge = 6 items, αT1 = 0.67,
αT3 = 0.81). Thus, the personal epistemology scales met the generally
accepted standard for reliability of α ≥ 0.70 at all-time points except
for the simple certain knowledge and personal justification scales at
time 1, which were only slightly under the 0.70 rule of thumb. See
results for further details about the validity of the scales.
2.3.2. Perceptions of constructivist learning environment
We chose to measure perceptions of constructivism in order to as-
sess whether students were able to perceive differences in classroom
practices and because we expected students' subjective perceptions to
be more predictive of individual belief change than a more objective
measure. A combination of items used in prior research (Kahle, Meece,
& Scantlebury, 2000) and new items representing additional con-
structivist practices (Savery & Duffy, 2001) were used to measure stu-
dents' perceptions of a constructivist environment in their organic
chemistry classroom (i.e., perceptions of constructivism). The final
measure included 10 items. Students were asked to think about their
current organic chemistry classroom when reading these items. Two
items represented the role of peers in the learning process (Con-
structivism-Peers, e.g. “I learn from my classmates.” α = 0.88). Four
items measured the extent to which students felt the instructor believed
in the complexity of knowledge (Constructivism-Complex, e.g. “My or-
ganic chemistry professor thinks problems can be solved in more than
one way.” α = 0.72). The final four items measured whether students
found the learning environment to authentically replicate the work of
scientists (Constructivism-Authentic, e.g. “My organic chemistry pro-
fessor encourages me to think like a scientist when solving problems.”
α = 0.77). Overall, the perceptions of constructivism sub scales met the
generally accepted standard for reliability of α ≥ 0.70. A CFA sup-
ported the three-factor structure of the perceptions of constructivist
learning environment scale (see results section for further details).
2.3.3. Final exam scores
Students in both courses completed an identical cumulative final
exam that was worth a maximum of 300 points (M = 199.8,
SD = 44.7). The exam included twenty multiple choice questions (33%
of grade) as well as free-response questions such as essays for ex-
plaining concepts, writing mechanisms, and interpreting spectral data
(67%). Given the wide variety of question types and forms of assess-
ment, this test conformed to norms in the discipline of chemistry and
was considered an appropriate assessment of students' organic chem-
istry content and learning gains in both classrooms. The use of the same
exam, which measured key concepts of general chemistry including
basic knowledge and higher level conceptual understanding, enabled us
to directly compare learning in the two classroom contexts. Students
M.M. Barger et al.
completed the timed paper-and-pencil exam in class over 3 h, with no
notes or books. The final exam score was not curved and was roughly
normally distributed (skewness = −0.44, kurtosis = −0.36).
2.4. Data analysis
2.4.1. Confirmatory factor analyses
It is important to establish construct validity and reliability of
measures used in any study. We used CFA to test the construct validity
of the hypothesized latent factor structure of the perceptions of con-
structivism and epistemic beliefs scales. The goal was to assure that
observed covariance between items fit a theoretical pattern in which
covariance between items on a single scale are more related to each
another than to items on a different scale, establishing construct va-
lidity (Hoyle, 2000). We examined fit indices to assess the fit of the CFA
models (see below for model fit standards). We also examined mod-
ification indices for evidence of cross loading of items on other factors
(Byrne, 2012). A modification index of > 3.84 (suggesting specifying
the parameter would result in a significant reduction in chi-square) and
a large expected parameter change (EPC) suggests possible cross-
loading with a factor that an item was not intended to measure. We
evaluated the adequacy of items based on these factors and, im-
portantly, based on the theoretical structure of the measure (Byrne,
2012). We also examined correlations between different measures to
assess discriminant validity between epistemic beliefs and perceptions
of constructivism.
2.4.2. Primary analyses
Each class of students was considered a separate group in the ana-
lysis (one group experienced the lecture-based class, while the other
group experienced the interactive-learning class.) To analyze our first
research question (RQ1: Do students' epistemic beliefs, perceptions of
different components of constructivism, and exam performances vary
between interactive-learning and lecture-based classrooms), we used
mixed repeated-measures MANOVA to examine any differences be-
tween the groups in their changes in epistemic beliefs over the time-
frame of the semester. In the repeated-measures analysis, a significant
time × group interaction would indicate differences between the two
groups in changes in epistemic beliefs from T1 to T3. MANOVA was
used to examine mean differences between the groups in their per-
ceptions of constructivism variables. An independent samples t-test was
used to examine differences between the groups on final exam scores.
To account for multiple tests, we used p ≤ .016 (0.05 divided by three
tests) as an indicator of a significant omnibus test using the Bonferroni
correction (Howell, 2012).
For research question two (RQ2: Is there a reciprocal relation be-
tween perceptions of a constructivist classroom and changes in personal
epistemology over the course of the semester?) we used path analysis
(see Fig. 2). A path modeling approach was most appropriate since this
allowed us to examine the reciprocal effects of epistemic beliefs on
perceptions of constructivism and vice versa over the course of the
semester in a single analysis (Keith, 2015). Such an analysis would have
otherwise required piecemeal multiple regression analyses, which is
less ideal than using a single model.
Finally, to examine research question 3 (RQ3: How do epistemic
beliefs relate to achievement in organic chemistry in these different
classroom contexts), we specified a multi-group path model (Byrne,
2012). We analyzed the same model specified for research question 2
(see Fig. 2), but analyzed this model for the lecture-based class and the
interactive-learning class separately in a single path analysis. This ap-
proach allowed us to test whether the effects of epistemic beliefs on
achievement were the same in both classes (Byrne, 2012). We first al-
lowed all coefficients between the two groups (lecture-based and in-
teractive-learning classes) to vary (the configural model) and examined
the model for adequate fit. Given an acceptable model fit, we then fixed
the regression coefficients across the two groups to be equal and

/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
compared the new model's fit to the configural model using the change
in chi-square test (Byrne, 2012). Using this approach, a statistically
significant change in chi-square test indicates a significantly worse fit-
ting model compared to the configural model. Under such circum-
stances, we examined the modification indices to determine which
specific coefficients should be freely estimated across the two groups.
We freed regression coefficients based on the modification indices until
the change in model fit was non-significant compared to the configural
model. In other words, the aim of this analysis was to find the most
parsimonious model (the model with the most degrees of freedom) that
is not significantly worse fitting compared to the configural model.
Given rules of thumb related to sample size in SEM analysis (Mueller
& Hancock, 2008), our sample size was relatively small for the path
analyses described above (see Limitations for a discussion of this point).
However, the path analysis approach is best when examining reciprocal
effects (Keith, 2015), and reduced the number of statistical tests re-
quired to answer our research questions. To mitigate our potential to be
underpowered, we did not include a measurement model in the ana-
lyses so there would be less complexity to the model.
To determine the quality of model fit, we followed guidelines uti-
lized in prior research (Pekrun, Hall, Goetz, & Perry, 2014; Trautwein
et al., 2012). Accordingly, we considered models to demonstrate ac-
ceptable model fit when at least two indicators met the conventions of
good model fit (≥0.95 for CFI, < 0.08 for RMSEA, and < 0.10 for
SRMR) outlined by Hu and Bentler (1999).
In the path analyses, missing data was handled using Full
Information Maximum Likelihood estimation to fit the models, which
uses all available data instead of excluding participants with some
missing data entirely (Raykov, 2005). We used listwise deletion in the
mean comparison analyses (MANOVAs and t-test).
3. Results
3.1. Confirmatory factor analyses
3.1.1. Epistemic beliefs
We examined the adequacy of a three-factor model at both T1 and
T3. However, modification indices suggested cross-loading of 3 items
across the three-factors at T1 and T3 epistemic beliefs. Any model ad-
justments based on modification indices should be made with the
theory and prior research in mind. Since these three items were cross-
loading on factors that were not appropriate given the construct they
were intended to measure based on prior research, we removed these
items from the analyses. The final CFA models for T1 (χ2
[74] = 142.68, p < .001, CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.068, 90% CI:
[0.051, 0.085], SRMR = 0.066) and for T3 (χ2 [74] = 124.95,
p < .001, CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.052, 90% CI: [0.035, 0.067],
SRMR = 0.054) demonstrated acceptable model fit. We present the
factor loadings for the epistemic beliefs scales in Table 2. Both the
model fit and factor loadings (all factor loadings were statistically sig-
nificant and > 0.35), combined with the acceptable Cronbach's alpha,
provide evidence that our observed covariance matrix aligns with our
theoretical model of these three epistemic beliefs constructs, which
helps to establish construct validity (Hoyle, 2000).
3.1.2. Perceptions of constructivism
The CFA on the perceptions of constructivism scale supported a
three-factor structure (χ2 [32] = 71.45.68, p < .001, CFI = 0.92,
RMSEA = 0.074, 90% CI: [0.051, 0.097], SRMR = 0.056). While there
was some evidence of potential cross-loading on two items, we decided
to retain these items since there was not a strong theoretical rationale
for removing them, and since removing these items would significantly
reduce model fit. We present the factor loadings on the perceptions of
constructivism scale in Table 3. Again, these CFAs provide evidence
that our proposed theoretical model reasonably fit the observed cov-
ariance matrix, providing evidence for construct validity.
M.M. Barger et al. /HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²

Fig. 2. The initial model with all pathways shown. The initial two-group model constrained means and path coefficients to be equal across classes. Correlations
between variables are not shown to reduce visual complexity.

3.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations Table 3

Standardized factor loadings for perceptions of constructivism.
Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations for 1 2 3
each of the classes, are presented in Table 4. Correlations among the
variables are presented in Table 5. The correlations between epistemic I talk with my classmates about how to solve problems. 0.72
I learn from my classmates. 0.92
belief and perceptions of constructivism were small (rs ≤ 0.3), which
My organic chemistry professor asks questions that have 0.50
suggests discriminant validity between the two sets of measures. more than one answer.
My organic chemistry professor thinks problems can be 0.59
solved in more than one way.
3.3. RQ1 My organic chemistry professor encourages us to develop our 0.57
own problems to solve.
My organic chemistry professor encourages us to find and 0.68
We examined differences in changes in personal epistemology from
understand patterns on our own.
baseline to the end of the semester using repeated-measures MANOVA. The assignments serve a larger purpose than just busy work. 0.51
The multivariate test indicated a non-significant time × class interac- My organic chemistry professor encourages me to think like a 0.56
tion indicating there were no significant differences between the two scientist when solving problems.
groups in their change in personal epistemology over time (Pillai's I understand how new concepts in organic chemistry relate to 0.52
my previous knowledge.
Trace = 0.01, F [3, 190] = 0.93, p = .430, η2 = 0.014). The process behind solving organic chemistry problems is 0.56
We used MANOVA to examine mean differences between the groups very important.
in their perceptions of constructivism. The multivariate test indicated
significant differences in perceptions of constructivism by the two Note. 1 = Constructivism-peers. 2 = Constructivism-complex. 3 = Constructivism-
groups (Pillai's Trace = 0.33, F [3, 219] = 35.362, p < .001, authentic. All factor loadings are statistically significant at p < .001.
η2 = 0.33). The univariate tests indicated there were significant

Table 2
Standardized factor loadings for epistemic beliefs CFA models at time 1 and time 3.
Time 1 Time 3

1 2 3 1 2 3

All experts in chemistry understand the field in the same way. 0.39 0.58
Truth is unchanging in chemistry. 0.62 0.72
Principles in chemistry are unchanging. 0.50 0.69
Most of what is true in chemistry is already known. 0.41 0.59
In chemistry, what is a fact today will be a fact tomorrow. 0.55 0.67
Chemists' knowledge of the facts about chemistry does not change. 0.53 0.65
If my personal experience conflicts with ideas in a chemistry textbook, the book is probably right. 0.36 0.42
If a chemist says something is a fact, I believe it. 0.67 0.78
Things written in chemistry textbooks are true. 0.59 0.62
I believe everything I learn in chemistry classes. 0.78 0.76
If a chemistry professor says something is a fact, I believe it. 0.60 0.82
In chemistry, the truth means different things to different people. 0.71 0.83
In chemistry, everyone's knowledge can be different because there is no one absolutely right answer. 0.53 0.52
In chemistry, what's a fact depends upon a person's point of view. 0.66 0.68

Note. 1 = simple/certain knowledge. 2 = justification by authority. 3 = personal justification. All factor loadings are statistically significant at p < .001.


M.M. Barger et al. /HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²

Table 4 when compared to the students in the lecture-based class. There were
Descriptive Statistics for Groups in the lecture-based and the interactive- no mean differences between the groups in either changes in epistemic
learning classes. beliefs over time or final exam score. Overall, this pattern of findings
Lecture-based class Interactive-learning class was contrary to our first hypothesis. We elaborate on this further in the
discussion section below.
n M SD n M SD
3.4. RQ2
Time 1
Simple certain 114 2.29 0.47 145 2.44 0.51
knowledge We hypothesized that constructivist perceptions would predict
Justification by 114 3.46 0.50 145 3.56 0.55 changes in personal epistemology (see path analysis results in Fig. 3).
authority
Indeed, perceiving a complex environment predicted decreases in
Personal justification 114 2.86 0.66 143 2.91 0.73
Time 2
simple/certain knowledge (b = −0.18, p = .018, β = −0.18) after
Constructivism peers 93 3.73 0.82 133 4.44 0.55 controlling for initial epistemic beliefs. In other words, perceptions that
Constructivism 93 3.84 0.55 131 3.48 0.62 the learning environment was complex predicted a decrease in the
complex belief that knowledge is a collection of unchanging facts. However,
Constructivism 93 3.99 0.42 131 4.00 0.53
learning from peers and perceiving class problems as authentic did not
authentic
Time 3 relate to changes in epistemic beliefs.
Simple certain 81 2.33 0.54 120 2.50 0.65 We also hypothesized that students' initial personal epistemology
knowledge would predict their perceptions of the classroom environment. As ex-
Justification by 81 3.50 0.57 120 3.59 0.56
pected, beliefs in simple/certain knowledge predicted lower percep-
authority
Personal justification 81 2.92 0.70 120 2.92 0.72
tions of an authentic learning environment (b = −0.21, p = .002,
End of semester β = −0.23). Therefore, if students started the semester believing that
Final exam grade 110 200.49 40.20 143 199.56 48.07 knowledge was a collection of unchanging facts, they perceived the
classroom as less relevant to real world problems. Also in line with our
Note. Means that significantly differed between classes are bolded. hypotheses, personal justification predicted higher perceptions of
complexity (b = 0.12, p = .038, β = 0.14). In other words, believing
that people construct knowledge for themselves was associated with

Table 5
Correlations between all measures in study for students in the lecture-based and interactive-learning classrooms.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

⁎⁎
1. T1 SCK 0.04 −0.13 0.07 −0.15 −0.12 0.34 −0.03 −0.10 −0.10
2. T1 JA 0.33⁎⁎ −0.12 −0.11 0.29⁎ 0.07 0.02 0.52⁎⁎ −0.04 0.18
3. T1 PJ −0.17† −0.28⁎⁎ 0.12 −0.08 0.01 −0.03 −0.16 0.34⁎⁎ 0.10
4. T2 peers −0.16 0.11 −0.15 0.21† 0.29⁎ −0.18 −0.12 0.18 −0.10
5. T2 authentic −0.20⁎ 0.07 0.15 0.49⁎⁎ 0.49⁎⁎ −0.26⁎ 0.37⁎⁎ 0.16 0.15
6. T2 complex −0.22⁎ −0.04 0.30⁎⁎ 0.36⁎⁎ 0.51⁎⁎ −0.35⁎⁎ 0.00 0.25⁎ −0.12
7. T3 SCK 0.63⁎⁎ 0.38⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎ −0.12 −0.19† −0.26⁎⁎ 0.23⁎ −0.21† 0.08
8. T3 JA 0.40⁎⁎ 0.72⁎⁎ −0.35⁎⁎ 0.16 0.08 −0.08 0.50⁎⁎ 0.12 0.31⁎⁎
9. T3 PJ −0.07 0.00 0.54⁎⁎ −0.11 0.09 0.18† −0.05 −0.19† −0.04
10. Final exam 0.00 −0.02 0.28⁎⁎ −0.06 0.14 0.04 −0.09 −0.10 0.21⁎

Note. Correlations between variables for students in the lecture-based class are located above the diagonal and those for the interactive-learning class are located
below the diagonal. SCK = simple/certain knowledge; JA = justification by authority; PJ = personal justification. T2 variables are components of perceptions of
constructivism.
†
p < .10.
⁎
p < .05.
⁎⁎
p < .01.

differences between the groups on constructivism-peers (F [1,
221] = 58.71, p < .001, η2 = 0.21) and constructivism-complex (F [1,
221] = 19.65, p < .001, η2 = 0.08). The group in the interactive-
learning classroom was, on average, significantly higher on con-
structivism-peers when compared to the lecture-based class group (see
Table 4 for mean values). However, the lecture-based class group had
significantly higher mean constructivism-complex scores compared to
the interactive-learning group.
Finally, we used an independent samples t-test to examine any
differences in the average final exam scores. Results indicated that the
two groups did not perform differently on the final exam (t
[251] = 0.16, p = .870, d = 0.02; see Table 4 for means).
In sum, mean group differences were observed in perceptions of
constructivism-peers and constructivism-complex by the students in the
lecture-based and interactive-learning classes. On average, the group of
students in the interactive-learning class reported more learning with
peers and perceived the teacher as creating a less complex environment
perceiving the classroom as more complex. Contrary to our expecta-
tions, justification by authority beliefs positively predicted perceptions
of an authentic learning environment (b = 0.13, p = .040, β = 0.16).
The belief that knowledge comes from authorities was related to per-
ceiving the classroom as more relevant to real world problems.
Finally, when combining both classes, T1 personal justification
predicted final grade (b = 15.33, p = .001, β = 0.24). However, when
analyzed across the two classes, this relation did not hold for both
groups. We review this finding in the next section.
3.5. RQ3
After following the multi-group modeling procedure described
previously, a multi-group model with freely estimated regression paths
from T1 personal justification to final exam score and from T3 justifi-
cation by authority to final exam score while leaving the remaining
regression paths constrained to be equal across groups was most


M.M. Barger et al. /HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²

Fig. 3. The final model of personal epistemology devel-

opment across both courses. Only the paths between T1
personal justification and final exam grade and T3 justi-
fication by authority and grade differed between students
in the lecture-based and interactive-learning classrooms.
All other paths were thus constrained to be equal across
groups. Unstandardized path coefficients are shown.
Final exam grades were graded on a scale of 300. Non-
significant paths and correlations between variables at
each time are not shown to reduce the complexity of the
figure.

Table 6 an interactive-learning course on perceptions of constructivism, per-

Model fit statistics for nested multi-group path models. sonal epistemology development, and final exam grades. We identified
Free χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR
three components of constructivism as perceived by students in the
parameters classroom: opportunities to learn from peers, an instructor who portrays
complexity, and an authentic learning environment. The interactive-
M1: configural model 112 22.11 18 0.99 0.04 0.04 learning classroom increased perceptions of peer interaction.
M2: fix all regression 85 66.99 45 0.94 0.06 0.09
Surprisingly, students in the interactive-learning classroom reported
paths
M3: free T1PJ → grade 86 61.03 44 0.96 0.05 0.08 that the instructor provided fewer opportunities to solve complex pro-
M4: free T3JA → grade 87 57.85 43 0.96 0.05 0.08 blems relative to the lecture-based classroom. Perceiving classroom
tasks as authentic was not affected by the class type. In this case, the
Note. Final model is in bold. Δχ2 (25) = 35.74, p > .05. interactive-learning classroom did not directly change personal episte-
mology or grades. Despite these unexpected findings, the second and
parsimonious (Δχ2 [25] = 35.74, p > .05).2 The final model, shown in third research questions provided an opportunity to examine the crucial
Fig. 3, met the criteria for acceptable fit (χ2 [43] = 57.85, p = .06, relations between constructivist practices in the classroom, personal
CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.051, 90% CI: [0.000, 0.082]; SRMR = 0.079; epistemology, and achievement.
Hu & Bentler, 1999). Table 6 presents model fit information for each Perceptions of constructivist practices in the form of complexity in
model in each step of our analysis. In the lecture-based classroom, T3 the classroom predicted changes in the belief in simple/certain
beliefs in justification by authority (a less constructivist belief) posi- knowledge, and all of students' initial epistemic beliefs predicted their
tively predicted final exam score (b = 22.82, p = .005, β = 0.33). A perceptions of a constructivist classroom environment. The perception
one-unit increase on the T3 justification by authority scale corre- that the classroom afforded opportunities to take ownership of complex
sponded with approximately a 23-point increase (7.6%) in final exam problems seemed to be a key ingredient for epistemic change. Those
score. The relation between T3 justification by authority and final exam who perceived class materials as complex reported lower non-con-
score was not statistically significant in the interactive-learning class- structivist belief of simple/certain knowledge by the end of the seme-
room (b = 3.81, p = .684). However, in the interactive-learning class- ster.
room, higher scores on beliefs in personal justification (a more con- The results also provided novel evidence that students' beliefs play a
structivist belief) at the beginning of the semester positively predicted role in the epistemic climate. In line with the interactive epistemic
final exam score (b = 22.96, p < .001, β = 0.35). Specifically, a one- climate model (Feucht, 2010), we found evidence that initial personal
unit increase in T1 personal justification corresponded with approxi- epistemologies predicted students' perceptions of the classroom en-
mately a 23-point increase (7.6%) in final exam grade in the inter- vironment. Whereas previous research found that students in a tradi-
active-learning class. There was no such relation in the lecture-based tional classroom with more constructivist beliefs found their classroom
class between these two variables (b = 6.78, p = .26). These findings environments to afford fewer opportunities to construct knowledge
support the epistemic alignment hypothesis, which we elaborate on (Tsai, 2000), the current study mostly found that students with initial
further in the discussion section. constructivist epistemic beliefs reported more practices aligned with
constructivist learning.
4. Discussion First, students who initially believed that knowledge is complex and
evolving rather than simple and certain were more likely to find their
This study adds to the broader research literature on the interplay classroom tasks as authentic. Second, students who started their class
between students' beliefs, the epistemic climate of the classroom, and believing that knowledge is self-constructed (high personal justifica-
achievement under different contexts. First, we examined the effects of tion) were more likely to perceive class activities as complex. Perhaps
believing that knowledge is self-constructed makes knowledge por-
2
The value of the modification indices for freeing the path from T1 personal justifi- trayals in the classroom seem more complex since this belief orients the
cation to final grade and the path from T3 justification by authority to final grade were student to thinking about how multiple individuals play a role in
very close in value, suggesting each would equally improve model fit equally if freed. creating that knowledge. In both cases, having more constructivist
Therefore, we freed both paths to reach our final model.


M.M. Barger et al.
beliefs predicted students seeing more constructivist practices in the
classroom, as hypothesized. However, justification by authority (a less
constructivist belief) predicted higher perceptions of authentic pro-
blems, contrary to expectations. Given the surprising nature of this
result, the small effect size, and the non-significant zero-order corre-
lation in the interactive-learning class between these two variables,
future research will need to replicate and explicate this finding.
To answer our third research question, we tested whether the re-
lation between beliefs and achievement depends on the structure of the
classroom. We found some support for the epistemic alignment hy-
pothesis. Students who began the semester with more constructivist
epistemic beliefs (i.e., higher personal justification beliefs) fared better
on the final exam in the interactive-learning class, but not in the lecture-
based class. Conversely, students who ended the semester with less
constructivist beliefs (i.e., higher justification by authority beliefs) in
the lecture-based classroom achieved higher scores on the same final
exam. These results suggest that “adaptive” epistemic beliefs only
benefit performance in cases where the epistemic climate of the class-
room aligns with an individual student's own epistemic beliefs. These
findings are in line with recent findings that personal epistemology
alone does not predict achievement, but rather that a match between
students' epistemic beliefs and the epistemic context of the classroom is
key (e.g., Dai & Cromley, 2014; Fruge & Ropers-Huilman, 2008). An
open question is whether levels of students' achievement reinforce be-
liefs that match the epistemic climate. In other words, students who
develop a belief that is adaptive in one classroom (e.g., justification by
authority in a lecture-based classroom) may then carry that belief into
future classes. This is a particularly important question, given the
findings that incoming students' beliefs frame their perceptions of the
epistemic climate, which in turn might lead to epistemic change and
play a role in learning.
There were some unexpected findings regarding the effects of the
intervention on students' perceptions and beliefs. The finding that stu-
dents perceived the interactive-learning classroom to be less complex
was inconsistent with expectations. One interpretation is that requiring
knowledge construction of less knowledgeable students necessitates a
simplification of the material (Kirschner et al., 2006), suggesting a gap
between constructivist theory and constructivist practice. Alternatively,
it is possible that students' perceptions differed from reality. The in-
teractive-learning classroom may have been objectively more complex,
but it was perceived by learners to be less complex. POGIL activities are
extensively reviewed by multiple instructors to effectively scaffold
students from their existing knowledge to more complex ideas (Farrell
et al., 1999; Moog & Spencer, 2008). It seems plausible that class ac-
tivities seemed less complex because the interactive-learning format
and well-designed activities made organic chemistry seem less difficult,
as evidenced by students' self-reported gains in understanding concepts
(Canelas et al., 2017). Even if this was the case, perceptions of com-
plexity predicted changes in personal epistemology. Therefore, re-
searchers need to keep an open-mind to the possibility that interven-
tions may have unintended consequences (see also, Kienhues et al.,
2008).
Furthermore, prior work has demonstrated that epistemic beliefs
can be changed through intervention, but the current intervention did
not change students' beliefs. It may be that specifically targeting epis-
temic beliefs is critical to initiating change (Brownlee et al., 2001; Muis
& Duffy, 2013). In the present intervention, messages about the nature
of knowledge were only implicit to the course structure. Future studies
should compare classrooms with explicit epistemic messages and
classrooms that do not explicitly send messages about knowledge. For
example, instructors might explicitly address beliefs by directly con-
fronting students' beliefs, such as using a refutational text (Gill, Ashton,
& Algina, 2004) or by using specific linguistic cues (e.g., “This is un-
decided in the field;” “I'm not the only source of answers.”) that expose
the nature of knowledge in the discipline (Barger & Linnenbrink-Garcia,
2017). The importance of students' initial epistemic beliefs found here

/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
might also explain why our intervention was not effective in changing
beliefs. A one-size-fits-all approach to classroom interventions might be
particularly ineffective since students bring different beliefs to the first
day of class.
4.1. Limitations
The lack of strong findings for the intervention may also be due to
weaknesses in the methodological design. It may be that the single
instructor was actually sending constructivist messages to both classes;
this could wash out the potential effects from the structure of the in-
teractive-learning class itself. Though using the same instructor was
useful to control for likely instructor effects on the classroom environ-
ment (Roth & Weinstock, 2013), it may have reduced the strength of the
potential effects of being in an interactive-learning classroom. Re-
searchers might also consider blinding instructors to the objectives of
future interventions, given that the opposite problem could occur if
instructors attempt to directly change students' beliefs.
Likewise, the use of identical assessments in the course may have
dampened the effects of the course structures. Students in both classes
may have focused on the knowledge that would be required on the
exams, and so they may have not been as affected by the day-to-day
epistemic climate. However, it is difficult to compare achievement in
two separate classes if the same assessment is not given. It may be
important to assess other learning and achievement outcomes (e.g.,
achievement in future courses to assess long-term learning) if the exams
cannot be equated across two contexts.
The current study is only able to shed light on development of
personal epistemology in the context of introductory undergraduate
organic chemistry. Personal epistemology has domain-specific compo-
nents (Muis et al., 2006) and changes as students learn more about a
topic (Greene et al., 2008). Prior domain knowledge was also not as-
sessed in this study and having more domain knowledge may play a role
in more sophisticated epistemic cognition (Ferguson & Bråten, 2013).
Students with greater domain knowledge may also be more able to
perceive the complexity in problems. Furthermore, students might be
more likely to change their beliefs in a more elementary course (e.g.,
general chemistry) or in a subject in which they have no prior experi-
ence. Initial beliefs may play a stronger role in students' perceptions of
the classrooms in advanced coursework because students become more
committed to their beliefs over time. Future research will need to in-
vestigate these possibilities in a broader range of topics with varying
levels of expertise.
Future research should carefully consider issues of measurement.
Epistemic belief measures often do not meet the criteria of being reli-
able and valid (DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold,
2008). Even though the measures of epistemic beliefs used in this study
demonstrated similar reliability and fit to other established measures
(e.g., Greene et al., 2010), concerns about measurement cannot be ig-
nored in future research. Using a Likert-type scale assumes that one end
of a continuum is more adaptive, when in fact it may be that moderate
levels of endorsement are ideal (e.g., a balance of beliefs that knowl-
edge is justified by authority figures whom may also differ in their
opinions; Barger et al., 2016; Greene et al., 2010). Supplementing
surveys with in-depth interviews or more fully revising measures to
better reflect beliefs relevant to different domains of study might help
to address these issues (Greene & Seung, 2014). Researchers might also
consider a broader range of beliefs about knowledge (e.g., Chinn et al.,
2011). For example, this study did not assess beliefs about whether
collaboration can create knowledge, which may be particularly im-
portant in an interactive-learning course. Future research might also
improve on the assessment of perceptions of constructivism, as there
are few established measures for students' perceptions of their class-
rooms' epistemic climate.
Finally, a larger sample size would have been more ideal for our path
analyses. Some of our lack of significant findings may have been due to
M.M. Barger et al.
decreased power due to our relatively small sample. Future research
should include a larger sample to test similar models, which would also
enable the testing of a full SEM model rather than the path model and thus
would enable us to also account for measurement error. Even so, we de-
tected significant effects despite a relatively small sample.
4.2. Implications
These results provide several preliminary insights for research and
practice. First, learners' personal epistemologies do play a role in the
classroom environment. As the field moves towards a contextualized
view of epistemic cognition (Chinn et al., 2011; Sandoval, 2014), this
serves as a reminder that individual differences in students' incoming
views of knowledge predict both how they view events in the classroom
and how likely they are to succeed in the course. Therefore, individual
learner differences play a role in epistemic thinking in context. For
educators who hope to change students' beliefs with innovative
teaching techniques, some attempts may not be effective for some
students. It is therefore important to understand students' preexisting
beliefs when designing interventions. Teachers might consider in-
formally evaluating what students think about discipline-specific
knowledge and explicitly addressing beliefs that are not aligned with
the epistemic nature of the course (Muis et al., 2016). Teachers could
also go one step further by making epistemic change an explicit com-
ponent of their course objectives (Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008). Using
this study's findings, it is also possible that establishing a complex
classroom environment (e.g., asking questions that have more than one
answer, encouraging students to understand material in their own way)
might be helpful if instructors draw students' attention to why they are
setting up the course in this way.
These findings should also be of importance to college educators as
they consider how their teaching practices impact students. The debate
over lecturing versus student-centered active learning has escalated
recently (Freeman et al., 2014; Friesen, 2011) and spilled into popular
media (e.g., Abrams, 2012; Furedi, 2013; Worthen, 2015). Many re-
searchers and college educators emphatically support one approach.
Our findings suggest that singularly championing one instructional
approach ignores the role that students own beliefs play in how they
interact with the course material. Individual differences in students'
epistemic beliefs are a moderating factor for the impact of the class
format on student achievement. We advise against completely rejecting
a teaching approach without further consideration of moderating fac-
tors, such as students' epistemic beliefs.
Finally, this study has implications for the socialization of beliefs
from teachers to students. Teachers' beliefs do not necessarily align with
their practices (Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008), and the current study
suggests that teachers' practices may not even align with students ex-
periences. There are many bridges between teachers' beliefs and their
students' beliefs about knowledge. Researchers will need to consider
ways for educators to bridge these gaps, for example by having teachers
consistently reflect on their own epistemic cognition and incorporate
this into their classroom practices (e.g., Lunn Brownlee et al., 2017).
Epistemic climate and personal epistemology development are in-
teractive phenomena. Both the classroom structure and students' beliefs
about knowledge work together, in tandem, to form an epistemic cli-
mate which can bring about epistemic change. This makes interventions
targeting epistemic change more challenging, but ultimately opens
exciting new doors for how educators might change the way students
think about knowledge.
Acknowledgements
The research was supported by a grant from the Duke University,
Arts & Sciences Faculty Assessment Committee to Canelas, D.,
MacPhail, R., & Linnenbrink-Garcia, L. We would like to thank Prof.
Keith Whitfield for his support and the financial contributions from the
/HDUQLQJDQG,QGLYLGXDO'LIIHUHQFHV²
Provost's Office that funded researchers' salaries while the analyses
were being conducted. Andrea Novicki and Randy Riddle are thanked
for their efforts in leading the 2013–14 Flipped Faculty Scholars group.
We also thank Andrea Novicki for careful monitoring of the use of class
time as either student-centered or lecturer-centered.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2018.03.006.
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