Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AEA-HOIS(94)P2
AEA Technology
Petroleum Services
November 1994
AEA Technology
Petroleum Services
521 Harwell, Didcot
Oxfordshire OX11 0RA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
cladding may be required for inspection or maintenance and may not be adequately
replaced, with safety implications.
Many process systems have several units running in parallel, so maintenance
shutdown and valve renewal is relatively straightforward. Areas where inspection
could have impact are: i) valves which have significant influence on production
such as main oil line valves, main separators and choke valves, ii) emergency
isolation valves including ESDV's and SSIV's if inspection can be demonstrated as
a feasible option, iii) where there is a single valve on line, iv) where it negates the
need to remove fire protection of cladding, v) assessment of valve status
(open/closed/blocked, partially closed etc.) , vi) measurement of actual flow and
process conditions allowing less conservative assessment of maintenance intervals,
vi) assessment of actual condition of seals and valve internals, viii) improved
monitoring of leaks and vibration.
Potential inspection technology that could be applied or developed for valves has
been reviewed, categorised into methods for assessing valve status, integrity and
operability. The particular applications considered in detail include:
1. Definition of actual valve status (open/closed/partial/leaking/blocked)
2. Measurement of flow and process conditions
3. Vibrational analysis
4. Condition of seals and valve internals
5. Leak detection
6. Inspection of valve body
7. Valve-blockage by hydrates, wax or scale
8. Firewater deluge systems
9. Crevice corrosion of flanges
10. ESDV's, SSIV's and other riser valves.
There are special issues for subsea plant including reliability of actuators and
control systems, enhanced corrosion, and increased prevalence of hydrogen
embrittlement. There is no history of reliability in subsea operation. Development
of inspection methods for monitoring condition of subsea valve installations could
increase confidence and, for example, encourage SSIV use.
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. VALVE TYPES AND APPLICATION 2
3. HAZARDS AND SAFETY ISSUES 3
3.1. Regulatory Guidelines 3
3.2. Prioritisation of Hazards and Risks 3
3.3. Damage Mechanisms 4
3.4. Incidences of valve failures 6
3.5. Safety Issues 8
4. VALVE MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION 10
4.1. Pre-Service Inspection 10
4.2. Current practice for In-Service inspection (ISI) of Valves 10
4.3. Methods for In-Service Inspection (ISI) and Monitoring (ISM) 12
4.4. Prioritisation of Inspection Requirements 14
5. POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IN-SERVICE-INSPECTION(ISI)
FOR VALVES 15
5.1. Adequacy and Reliability of Current Methods 15
5.2. Potential Inspection Developments for topside Plant 16
5.3. Inspection Methods for ESDV's and SSIV's 19
5.4. Special Requirements of Subsea Plant 19
5.5. Physical factors affecting ISI 20
5.6. Organisational factors affecting inspection 21
6. CONCLUSIONS 22
7. REFERENCES 24
1. INTRODUCTION
This is the second of three safety-related reviews undertaken since 1993 by the
Harwell Offshore Inspection R&D Service. The first review [Reference 1] dealt
with the broader aspects of inspection for internal corrosion in topside pipework
and vessels.
This review is more specific and addresses the safety-related aspects of in-service
inspection of valves, including current practice and potential developments. By
inspection we mean the application of non-destructive testing methods (NDT) as
opposed to simple diagnostic testing of function. Valves are extensively inspected
during manufacture, but at present very little inspection is applied in-service. This is
in contrast to process pipework where monitoring and inspection are routine and
significant advances have been made particularly in development of non-intrusive
methods. The strategy adopted by most operators for valves is for maintenance
and replacement of valve-internals during planned workovers. For valve systems
integrity is not the only safety issue; valve status and operability are also of concern
and are areas where non-intrusive inspection methods could offer benefit.
This study is concerned primarily with safety and not with the wider issue of
efficient plant operation. There are cases where malfunction of valves could effect
operation but present no significant safety hazard. These are outside the scope of
this study. There are many more where there are both operational and safety
consequences with the balance between these varying considerably. In this study
the significance is related to the extent to which inspection practices impinge on risk
to safety of personnel from a failure or malfunction.
From a safety standpoint emergency shutdown valves (ESDV) and sub-sea
isolation valves (SSIV's) are of prime importance. This is highlighted in the report
on Piper Alpha [Reference 2] and the strict guidelines and regulations now applying.
Inspection of subsea isolation valves is extremely difficult. For this reason this
review is focused on valves in topside plant. The special requirements of subsea
isolation valves and subsea installations are addressed as a separate issue.
Electronic control systems are not evaluated in this review, but should be noted as
an area where reliability of operation is a key and recognised concern with
implications to safety. For example, weaknesses in the valve control system were
identified as contributing to the EKOFISK North Sea blowout in 1980 [Reference
3
].
Section 2 of this report considers the main valve types and applications. Hazards
and safety issues are addressed in Section 3 including potential damage
mechanisms and factors affecting prioritisation of inspection requirements.
Inspection is introduced in Section 4 where current practice is reviewed. Potential
inspection developments are evaluated in Section 5. For valve systems it is difficult
to wholly separate economic and safety issues; benefits in both areas are needed if
operators are to move from current industry maintenance practice.
Within a typical topside plant there may be several thousand valves, ranging from
simple ball and gate valves to more complex choke-valve designs for multi-phase
environments. These may be manually or automatically actuated. The primary
applications of valves include control, isolation, shutdown, blowdown and safety
relief. As an example, the valve types used by BP in a recent topside production
plant are summarised in Table 1, classified by size and type. Globe and ball valves
are mainly used for shutdown and control, with extensive use of ball and gate
valves near the well-head. Choke valves are used for flow control and pressure
changes but may also be used for shut down within specified allowances on leak
rate. Butterfly valves are not yet extensively used offshore. Valve selection is
installation specific and will take account of pressure, flow conditions and internal
and external environments. Schematic diagrams of the main types of valve design
are shown in Figure 1. Valve designs are continually improving, particularly to meet
the more severe conditions of marginal and high pressure fields (e.g high CO2 , high
H2S, high pressure, high temperature or multi-phase environments). There have
been improvements in ball-valve design to remove features leading to erosion, for
example in the 'orbit' design where a cam separates and resets the ball and seat.
Choke-valve design has evolved significantly: external-cylinder/internal cage (VCI)
designs are now favoured by many operators because of improved resistance to
erosion and greater controllability. Newer butterfly valve designs offer weight
savings over ball valves combined with the ease of operation given by quarter-turn
designs. From a safety standpoint it is important to ensure that these advantages are
not at the expense of reduced sealing capacity. There are specialised designs of
valve under development such as vortex choke valves which do not rely on moving
parts.
Since Piper Alpha there has been considerable evolution in the design and
application of emergency isolation valves. The generic terms for these are
emergency shutdown valves (ESDV's) and sub-sea isolation valves (SSIV's). more
specific terms may be used to describe particular valve designs including: annular
safety valves (ASV's) , topside isolation valves (TSIV's) and surface-controlled
subsea safety valves (SCSSV's). The interest in this area is highlighted by over
350 published references in the Engineering Index since 1988, with a significant
number, then and earlier, focusing on reliability and risk assessment [References
45
, ]. For example, Shell have installed SSIV's extensively in the UK Sector for
lines with large hydrocarbon inventories and with the potential to jeopardise the
integrity of manned installations [Reference 6]. Duplicated oil and gas isolation
valves have been fitted in Piper Bravo in response to legislative changes
[Reference7] and subsea emergency shutdown valves were fitted on the Texaco
Tartan Platform oil and gas export pipelines in 1989 [Reference 8].
The usual classification for valves is in terms of valve type. Potentially more useful
classifications from an operational standpoint are in terms of production system,
application or process conditions (e.g. high pressure/low pressure,
oil/gas/multiphase, sour/sweet). Alternative classifications of valve types on this
basis are given in Table 2.
have been carried out by HSE and AEA Technology's Safety and Reliability
Directorate (SRD) in relation to Safety Case work. Several companies have in-
house risk assessment methods for assessing the case for installing SSIV's and
modelling their reliability.
An important reason for current inspection of valves, as opposed to maintenance, is
as part of the corrosion management strategy. Traditionally this selection for
inspection has been based on anticipated corrosion rate. Current and evolving
practice is to target inspection based on a broader perception of risk taking also into
account consequences and potential hazards.
Valves in topside process plant can encounter severe conditions during operation.
The local stresses and environment will fluctuate and alter during the lifetime of the
plant away from those anticipated in design. The exact process conditions are not
always known. Changes in conditions downhole or elsewhere in the process plant
can have knock-on effects on local plant conditions. Sand-erosion and souring are
increasing problems in production fluids from many older wells in the North Sea.
6. Cavitation erosion: Cavitation erosion occurs when liquid phase enters the
choke, suffers a severe pressure drop which leads to local boiling, followed by
pressure recovery as the outlet is approached which results in the collapse of
locally formed gas bubbles. Their collapse has a profound eroding action which
may also set up severe vibration. The flow appears to be single phase liquid at
both inlet and outlet making this situation relatively difficult to diagnose.
12. Build up of scale: This leads to poor repeat setting, stiff operation of the
actuator, blocking of pressure balancing ports and failure of the valve internals
to seat correctly when the valve is closed.
13. Clogging of Ports: Valves often have a number of ports through which fluid
flows from the inlet to the outlet under normal conditions. If the incoming fluid
contains a material capable of forming a blockage (e.g. wet sand, hydrates,
waxes) then a port may become blocked and the distribution between the
remaining ports will be changed. This leads to increased erosion of the
remaining ports.
14. Projectile damage: Materials which are extremely resistant to erosion are
generally more susceptible to brittle failure due to impact by objects (e.g.
pebbles, nut and bolts) or impact of the part itself against a hard surface (e.g.
seat). For example, ceramic (WC-Co cermet) components have been used in
choke valves to enhance erosion resistance. Whilst generally these materials
perform well, isolated cases of catastrophic failure of such components by
projectile damage have been reported by several operators.
16. External fire damage: many valves contain polymeric seals. External fires
can damage such seals causing leakage. This is of particular concern from a
safety standpoint in hydrocarbon lines.
Figure 2 illustrates potential sites for some of these types of damage in the case of
an internal cylinder/external cage choke valve design. Photographic examples to
illustrate erosion and corrosion damage mechanisms are shown in Figures 3 to 7.
The first two figures are taken from the UKOOA datasheets on corrosion which
includes 3 examples of damage to valves amongst the 45 samples examined
[Reference 11]. Not all the damage mechanisms are illustrated due to the paucity
of such information available. As with other plant failures such information is often
treated as confidential by operators and safety authorities or by the manufacturers
because of commercial requirements or potential liability. Many of the damage
mechanisms discussed in the first Safety Review [Reference 1] on topside
corrosion are also relevant here. A more detailed appraisal of mechanisms and
morphology of corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement and stress-corrosion cracking
(SCC) may be found there.
It is well recognised that pressure and temperature differentials and flow patterns
can cause problems such as erosion-corrosion or hydrate formation downstream of
valves particularly choke-valves and in multi-phase systems. Galvanic corrosion,
crevice corrosion and bolt failure are common problems for flanged joints. Welded
and threaded joints can also be preferential sites for degradation.
would be expected, erosion and vibration feature strongly. Many problems related
to the older needle and disc designs. Impact damage to or loss of valve internals
was reported by several operators reflecting the difficult balance in achieving good
erosion resistance without affecting toughness. The cermet materials used now in
valves to give high erosion resistance have low impact toughness and can be
susceptible to brittle fracture under impact loading, for example from foreign bodies
in the flow stream.
maintenance intervals. Loss of function is an issue for safety systems such as the
firewater mains. The latter can only infrequently be tested because of the risk of
corrosion to nearby plant. Where the valve status (closed/open/partially open)
differs to that anticipated there is the possibility of damage or leakage to adjoining
systems.
allowable leak rates and leakage above certain levels needs to be reported to HSE.
Some operators have agreed limits on acceptable leak rates with HSE above these
originally recommended rates. Such deviations from normal practice need to be
justified as part of the safety case for the installation.
Ultrasonics: Together with radiography, ultrasonic inspection is the major NDT
technology in use for detecting and measuring internal metal loss and cracking on
topside plant including valves. Routine manual measurements of wall thickness are
made using, typically, 5MHz piezo-electric contact compression-wave probes with
either an A-scan display UT set or a digital read-out instrument. Increasing use is
reported of scanning frames to produce thickness contour maps of areas of the
order of 1/10th of a square metre or more automatically. An advantage of scanning
frame mapping is that attempts to monitor the progress of corrosive metal loss by
comparison of measurements at successive inspections do not rely on precise
location of the probe at the same points each time. Alternatively UT probes can be
left in place for periodic interrogation. For example, 'FLEXIMAT' is being
developed as a means of leaving an array of relatively inexpensive transducers
permanently bonded to susceptible components and such monitoring methods may
be very well suited to valves. The pulse-echo shear-wave method is used to
inspect susceptible regions for cracking. Recently, the ultrasonic time-of-flight
diffraction (TOFD) method has been applied to surveys of weldments for cracking
and for weld root erosion/corrosion. Such methods have application for valve
bodies. All these methods require direct access to the valve external surface to
couple the probes to the metal. This presents a problem where the valve is clad in
thermal lagging or fire protection.
Radiography: Radiography has a well-established position for examination of
metal components for both metal-loss and cracking and is routinely used for
manufacturing inspection of valve bodies. Radiography has the considerable
advantage that it can operate through thermal lagging and other types of coating
without requiring their removal. However, there are operational drawbacks in that
other IRM activities may be disrupted by the need to restrict operations because of
the radiological hazard. Low energies can be used to profile the outer surface for
detection of under-insulation corrosion. The thickness of metal to be penetrated
for examination of the inner surface or internals requires much higher energy
sources. Application of radiography in the field for examination of valve internals is
not straightforward. The use of radiography on topside plant is increasing as
improvements in equipment, particular in sensitivity of detectors, reduces doses and
the needs for radiological protection.
Tangential radiography is capable of giving good radiographs of the profile of the
inner surface to check for evidence of pitting, erosion and "localised" uniform
corrosion. The performance of radiography with respect to crack detection and
sizing is variable. It depends on accessible orientations of the source and film
(detector) lining up with the direction of planar defects such as cracks.
Eddy Current: Traditional eddy current testing faces two problems in relation to
ISI for internal corrosion or erosion damage to valves. The first is that cracks
induced by internal damage will open on the remote surface and the second is that
most valve bodies are of ferritic steel so that depths of penetration of eddy currents
in the 100 kHz range are measured in microns rather than millimetres required for
wall-thickness measurements. For wall thickness monitoring and detection of
larger area internal corrosion and erosion, low frequency (DPEC) and long transient
eddy-current techniques (TEMP) are being developed. These can have the great
advantage of allowing significant stand-off from the component-wall so that they
can operate though lagging. The transient method appears to be more sensitive to
internal damage, but does not discriminate between internal and external metal loss.
Both these methods face problems dealing with anything other than cylindrical
geometries and would be difficult to apply to valves.
Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL): Magnetic flux leakage methods such as MPI
have limited potential for valves because most of the potential damage is internal.
Larger scale MFL methods are the basis of a number of pipeline inspection pigs,
but with the possible exception of SSIV's, valve internals preclude the possibility of
using internal inspection vehicles.
Thin-layer activation (TLA): Thin layer activation is a quantitatively accurate
means of measuring loss of metal during corrosion and/or erosion processes.
However, it requires the activation of the surface in question by means of
irradiation which cannot, in general, be carried out in-situ. Its main use is therefore
for specialised studies rather than as a general monitoring tool with typically a
square cm of surface being irradiated. In TLA the corrosion rate is measured
quantitatively by measuring changes in radiation levels with time. Application of
TLA to monitor valve erosion has been proposed for high pressure marginal fields.
iii. Where there is a single valve on line and failure could have safety
implications and impact on production costs. It is conventional now to use
double block and bleed arrangements on flow lines.
iv. Where maintenance currently involves removal of fire protection or
protective cladding.
v. Assessment of actual valve status (open/closed/blocked, partially closed
etc.). Valve status is difficult to determine, particularly in subsea valves
because of the unreliability of the position indicator system, and could have
implications to safety.
vi. Assessment of actual flow and process conditions allowing better control
and less conservative assessment of maintenance intervals. This has both
safety and economic benefits.
vii. Assessment of condition of seals and valve internals. This would minimise
the chance of unexpected failure and may allow extended intervals
between workovers.
viii. Improved monitoring of leaks and vibration.
Inspection methods with the potential to meet these needs or improve current
maintenance strategy for valves are discussed in Sections 5.2 to 5.4
Vibrational analysis
This is currently a major area of condition assessment. Vibrational monitors are
extensively used in topside plant and the technology is continually being developed
in DTI and other joint industry programmes. Acoustic monitoring and neural-
network techniques for pattern-recognition have application here.
Condition of seals
Neutron radiography has been used to inspect seals in valves, but is expensive. The
steel body is relatively transparent to neutrons. The elastomeric materials used in
seals are generally opaque to neutrons and easily discriminated. Conventional
gamma and X-ray radiography would have insufficient discrimination but inspection
would be possible using a high-energy Betatron or portable neutron source. Further
development is required of portable neutron sources before they could be
considered a practical proposition for on-line use on offshore process plant. A less
expensive solution would be to monitor pressure changes on valve-closure using a
series of pressure monitors around the seal and listening to the acoustic signature of
the flow. Neural-network techniques could be used to characterise and recognise
flow-signatures associated with particular seal conditions. Other potentia l solutions
include use of fluorescent dye inside the seal to reveal leaks or detection using a
hydrocarbon detector.
Leak detection
Leak detection methods are already widely used to detect any external leakage of
hydrocarbons and other production fluids. This has been referred to above with
respect to condition of seals.
Valve-blockage by hydrates
Radiography, ultrasonics, flow measurement or temperature measurement by
thermography all have application here. As the problem is unlikely to be restricted
just to the valve, potential problems may be identifiable by inspection of adjacent
pipework.
assess and maintain the condition of the plant. Any repair or inspection requires
ROV hire or use of divers and may be costly and slow to implement.
Access to subsea components such as bolts and flanges for inspection and repair is
not straightforward or cheap and needs careful consideration at the design stage.
In the context of valves, reliability of actuators and control systems is an important
issue. There is a limited history of reliability in subsea operations. Development
of methods for monitoring condition of subsea valve installations could increase
confidence. Currently most inspection of subsea plant is carried out by visual
inspection using divers or ROV. Leak detection is straightforward subsea, but any
leakage is undesirable on safety and environmental grounds.
Coatings
Most components on the platform will have been given some form of coating for
protection against external corrosion. Where these are thin and in good condition
they are unlikely to hinder ultrasonic methods, for example, but where they have
degraded they will prevent satisfactory coupling of the probes to the component and
may require removal before the inspection can be carried out. A danger then is
that in-situ re-application of the coating leaves a sub-standard job with the risk of
accelerating the deterioration of the outer surface.
High temperatures
During operation high temperatures are likely to be encountered. These not only
present a problem to the inspection personnel, but may affect the inspection
equipment as in the case of conventional ultrasonic probes with polymeric
components. In the case of electromagnetic techniques such as eddy currents, the
temperature of the steel alters the electrical conductivity and to some extent the
magnetic permeability.
6. CONCLUSIONS
7. REFERENCES
15. Martin D: Risk and the human factor. BP Grangemouth explosion, Process
Engineering Vol 72 No. 6, p53-54 , June (1991).
16. Shioji Y: Fire casual caused by explosion of hydrocracking system in Britain,
Anzen Kogazu Journal of Japan Society for Safety Engineering), Vol . 30
No. 1, p57-63, January (1991)
17 Chauvin R J: Non-destructive testing of valves: Materials Evaluation, 39
1088 (1981).
18 Sisak W A and Gordon J R: Laboratory and field evaluations of clad Xmas
tree equipment, SPE Production Engineering, Vol 6 No. 1, p45-48, February
(1991).
19 Pate-Cornell M E : Fire Risks in oil refineries; economic analysis of camera
monitoring, Risk Analysis Vol. 5, p277-278, December (1985).
20 Hansen P A and Freeland A: Ninian field wellhead/tree commodity action
team and manufacturing alliance relationship, Proceedings of the 1992 SPE
drilling conference p511-521, Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) USA,
Technical paper IADC/SPE 23899 (1992).
1
Saunderson D H and Wall M; Safety-related aspects of topside inspection for internal
corrosion, AEA Technology report HOIS(93) P4 (Revised), March 1994.
2
Cullen, The Hon. Lord: The public enquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, HMSO 1990.
3
Golan M, Waloen A O: Some operational and equipment failures in the EKOFISK North
Sea blowout, University of Trondheim (Norway): ASME Paper n-80-Pet-89 for meeting Feb
3-7 (1980).
4
Engen G, Rausand M (STATOIL- NORWAY), Reliability studies test SCSSV's in the North
Sea: Pet. Eng Int.56(2) p30, February (1984).
5
Comer P J, Clements F and Van Der Graf: Assessing the risk of riser and pipeline failures
on offshore installations; Proceedings of the first International Conference on Health Safety
and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production; SoSociety of Petroleum
Engineers, Ed. Richardson T X, p657-665, Technical Paper SPE 23279, The Haque
(Netherlands) 11-14 Nov (1991).
6
Newman W.J, Kontua T Y and Aldeen A:: Pipeline isolation using remotely activated
spheres, Proceedings of 25th Offshore Technology Conference (OTC), Volume 4, p971-480,
3-6 May (1993)
7
New Piper B reflects Piper A safety lessons, Oil and Gas journal (United States), v. 91(8),
p35-36,. 22 February (1993).
8
Dawes A. : Installation, commissioning and operation of subsea emergency valves in the
Tartan field, Proceedings of the European Petroleum Conference EUROPEC 90, Part 1, 21-24
Jan (1990)..
9
HSE Offshore Installations Guidelines, 4th Edition (1990).
10
Pressure Systems in Transport Gas container Regulations (PSR)
11
UKOOA datasheets on corrosion of topside plant..
12
King J A, Badelek P S C:Performance of valve materials in Wet H2S and CO2
contaminated hydrocarbons, Proc. Conf. Corrosion 982- International Corrosion Forum,
NACE, Houston USAp 134 (1982)
13
El-Arabi M and Azur A: Flow-line failure resulting from Erosion-Corrosion in a high
production oil well, Materials performance 24 No. 9 p19-22 september (1985)
14
US Survey of leakage in refineries 1976.
Table 1
Summary of valves used in recent topside production plant, classified by type
and size (Source BP)
1/2" 3/4" 1" 11/2" 2" 3" 4" 6" 8" 10" 12" 14" 16" 18" 20" 24" 28" 32"
TOTAL 175 893 1344 506 735 157 218 128 108 74 30 66 23 9 17 3 1 1 4488
Table 2
Alternative classifications of valves in offshore production plant by valve type,
system, application and environment.
Table 3
Summary of areas of safety concern and damage mechanisms affecting offshore valves
Table 4
Summary of anecdotal information on choke-valve failures.
Table 4
Typical hydrotest durations and permissable leakage rates for procurement
testing of offshore valves (reproduced from British Standard).
Table 5
Current Practice for Offshore Valve Inspection.
ESDV's / riser valves: Tested visually and for function 3-4 Months
Pressure tested yearly
Blow-down valves: Tested 6 monthly
Control Valves: Tested as part of planned maintenance - Visual inspection at
6 month interval, Calibration tested once a year
Choke Valves/high risk Ultrasonic wall thickness measurement used as part of
systems: corrosion management strategy. Thicknesss compared with
warehouse values on spare chokes.
Subsea valves Visual inspection by ROV or diver
Other process system Most maintenance by replacement in planned workovers.
valves
Table 6
Potential safety and economic benefits of in-service inspection
Safety
1. Identifies unexpected problems
2. Flexibility to respond to current plant conditions
3. Knowledge of current valve status and conditions
4. Feedback on effects of changes in production and process conditions.
5. Less disruptive to plant operation and protection
(cladding, fire protection etc.)
6. In-situ assessment of valve condition (Without removal)
Economic
1. In-situ assessment of actual valve condition (Without removal)
2. Extended time between workover.
3. Valve specific and targeted maintenance.
3. Reduced downtime
4. Targeting of maintenance and inspection
Table 7
Potential applications of NDT inspection to offshore valves,
classified in terms of valve status, integrity and operability.
ANNEX 1
ANNEX 2
Figure 1
Schematic diagrams illustrating main types of valve in topside process plant of
offshore installations ( standard gate valve not shown).
Figure 1 (Continued)
Figure 2
Schematic diagram of internal cage/external cylinder choke valve illustrating potential
regions for damage to valve in service
Figure 3
Wall thickness loss due to combination of CO2 corrosion and erosion in choke-valve body.
High CO2, high pressure production fluids. (Source UKOOA corrosion datasheets - Sample 2)
Figure 4
Example of corrosion and erosion failures in topside valves: (a) Preferential weld corrosion on
inlet flange of oilwell choke valve, (b) material loss by erosion in turbulent flow downstream of a choke
valve (Source UKOOA corrosion datasheets Samples 1,33).
AEA Technology hois(94)p2.doc 3
Commercial-in-Confidence
Safety Related Aspects of In-Service Ref: HOISP(94)2
Inspection of Valves Date: 21 Nov 1994
Version: 2.0 Final Report
Figure 5
Severe erosion failure in valve -spool downstream of choke-valve in sand producing well, North Sea,UK
Sector. Loss of wall thickness was first evident by external perforation (marked). The erosion pattern is
indicative of swirling in the flow.
AEA Technology hois(94)p2.doc 3
Commercial-in-Confidence
Safety Related Aspects of In-Service Ref: HOISP(94)2
Inspection of Valves Date: 21 Nov 1994
Version: 2.0 Final Report
Figure 6
Example of cavitation-erosion on disc exposed to flow.
Figure 7
Erosion of painted elbow eroded at Vg 30 m/s, Vl 8 m/s annular flow.