Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe
Like many African nations at the end of the eighties, Somalia faced economic, social and
political problems. Many of these countries are still struggling to survive through the upheaval, but
Somalia could not solve its problems as a healthy nation. Instead the problems which led to its
disintegration and dismemberment with a bloody civil war, have claimed more than three hundred
thousand dead and wounded, with roughly four fifth of its population displaced. Nearly one fifth of
the population fled to Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya as refugees, these displaced people have lost their
past and their future and that of their children. Subsequently, the country has been divided into
fiefdoms ruled by separate armed clans. Each clan group (or clan-family as is better known) are
grouped in a clan-security area. The international community as well as the Somalis is still pondering
and exhausting on how the Somali state will be revived. The memories of the dreadful fratricidal war
still linger in the minds of the Somalis thus creating major obstacles to peace. Any peace agreement,
unless it is seen in concomitance with the reality of today's Somalia and the background of the
tragedy, cannot be a sustainable one.
The preamble of the Constitution of the Somali Republic promulgated in June 1961 stressed
that Somalia is being a unitary republic with a representative democratic form of government. The
legislature was unicameral and it was composed of deputies elected by universal direct and secret
suffrage for a term of five years and representing the whole people. Though the system was based on
liberal democracy, it did not define well the separation of power (e.g. the system did not separate the
executive from the legislative). In fact, soon the system degenerated into anarchy and paved the way
for the military takeover which soon transformed the Somali state into a police state.1
After over a century of colonial defamation of Somali culture followed by a decade of feeble
governing and two decades of repressive centralised state control involving the manipulation of clan
mentality, the exploitation of traditional rivalry and suppression and collective punishment of any
form of rebellion a destructive instinct was created in society against the fabric of the Somali
nationhood. Consequently, the outcome triggered an unprecedented turning point for the Somali state,
that people should return to their clan "areas". Given the weakening of the foundations of national
unity, it was inevitable that the relative strength of lineage and clan loyalties, and their institutions to
become the dominant social structure.
Not only has the Somali state failed to replace the clan with a feeling of security for the
individual Somali, but it has also become a threat to his being. It was a natural regression, therefore
for the Somali to go to his/her roots, i.e. the clan, which was eroded by the tides of social change and
political exploitation. These phenomena created resentment amongst the Somalis, which turned into
an instinct of destruction towards the state and its institutions. The destructiveness was assumed to be
derived from "the unbearable feeling of powerlessness, since it aims at the removal of all objects with
which the individual has to compare himself."2 Life has an inner dynamism of its own and if it is
curbed it decomposes and transforms into energies directed towards destructiveness. 3 The systematic
repression of the last two decades by the dictatorial military regime, thereby accelerates the process
of destructiveness in Somali society. Destructive political culture has been introduced into the
political thinking of the Somalis, changing the positive cultural values of the nationhood. 4
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undermine the "traditional source of leadership"6 which was to cripple the future leadership of the
modern Somali state and as a result pave the way for the breakdown of the Somali state institutions at
the end of the 1990s.
From this frightening prospect is there a way out? Can Somalis build a new hope for the
rubble of the collapsed unitary Somali state? Unless an alternative to this situation is found there is
no way out from the current plight. To answer these questions I have attempted to put forward an
alternative solution as a way out of this nightmare.7
For convenience, I will give examples on how the main political institutions should be
created.
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group (or clan) who are outside the government and in effect, this can create a negative impression at
this crucial time in Somali history.
In a stabilised political democracy, it can be taken for granted that social and economic
politics will work out by and through parties, even when "one party replaces another after an election
it would overturn everything that its predecessor has done" 19 as this relies on a broad consensus
between the parties about the nature of the economic and social system.20 However, in this critical
time, the stillborn political democracy of Somalia cannot be trusted on parties.
For two depressing decades Somali society did not experience any form of democratic
exercise. Worse, the new generation had never had any chance at all to do so. The party polity of the
first decade of independence (1960s) fell short of what the Somali people expected to get from the
democratic exercise. Instead the circumstances generated tense hostility among clans and lineages in
the whole country. The unity which the country needed most was going to erode.
Both elections, which were held in the civilian governments, March 1963 and in March 1969
respectively, were marred by violence. In the social context the elections opened old wounds among
lineages and sub-lineages as the traditional rivalries found new means of expression. Some sub-
lineages or lineages put forward one of their own members as a candidate. The parties became an
instrument for forwarding clan interests; at the close of the 1960s, the country had 64 parties because
of the attempts to satisfy the various clans or lineage interests.
The democratic parliamentary process which was 'expected' to go well with the traditional
political institutions turned sour.21 Emphasis had been placed on party politics rather than on
mobilisation for national needs22 and the system definitely facilitated anarchy.23
AN ALTERNATIVE TO PARTIES
The system described below emphasises interest groups' to promoting their interest in a
national framework. In this sense an interest group is "an association of people who come together, or
are brought together, to represent, promote and defend particular interests or sets of interests" 24
There should be two groups: (1) a cause group whose interests, aims to promote and defend a
much wider section of society, and (2) a pressure group who is a group representing an interest group
which seeks to achieve its aim by putting pressure on the government, either on the canton (for
convenience I will use the word canton or in the Somali word Waax) or national level.
Sovereignty should reside in the cantons (Waax). The national government should exercise
only those powers vested on it by the constitution. As democracy is for the people, by the people,
this system focuses the need to decentralise the power to enable the Somalis to take their political
lives in their hands and at the same time stimulates the participation of the people in the cantonal and
national affairs.
The cantons have to contribute part of their revenue to the running of the national
government. The national government has to divide, in equal terms, any kind of aid obtains.
Each canton has to preserve its own separation of powers based on: (1) the Legislative, (2)
the Executive, (3) the Judiciary
Here the concept of the separation of powers is designed to ensure that the Executive and
Legislature are not integrated, but interrelated, keeping each other in check.
Autonomous Cantons
Regions
Villages
VOTING QUALIFICATION
Anyone who reaches the age of 18 shall be eligible to vote. However, the criteria for those
standing for office will vary according to the office in question (not defined here).
As this system emphasises that the democratic process of the country should come from the
grassroots, the nucleus of the power lies in the regions, districts (and its hamlets) and village levels.
Therefore, each of these political units has to elect its own councils.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The laws of the national and cantonal administration have to comply with the Principles of
Islam, and that of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on 10th December 1948.
Respect shall be given to the fundamental rights of the citizens, social equality, political and
judicial guarantees.
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Cantonal Level
CANTONAL LEVEL
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c) The Chamber of Representatives shall be elected every four years by the canton's district
electoral bodies. It is divided into various sub-committees, e.g. Financial and Economic, Foreign
Affairs, Security and Defence Affairs, Social and Cultural Affairs. The number of sub-
committees will depend on the needs of the Cantonal Assembly. These sub-committees shall
monitor the day-to-day activities of the Cantonal Council and their administration.
NATIONAL LEVEL
SEPARATION OF POWERS
This structure shall divide the three powers of the state: the power to make law, i.e. its
legislative function; the power to enforce the law, i.e. its executive functions; and the power to
interpret the law and adjudicate in disputes between the citizen and the canton, i.e. its judicial
function.
The accumulation of all powers, namely legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same
hands may lead to dictatorship and tyranny, hence, to avoid such circumstance, this system creates a
check and balance structure as follows: (1) the National Assembly, (2) the National Council, and (3)
the National Judiciary Council.
Full faith and credit shall be given in each Canton (Waax) to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other Canton. The Chamber of the Cantonal Council (see below) may
by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof.
National Level
The citizens of each Canton shall be entitled to the same privileges and immunities as each
other. Because of the nature of the federal system the national government shall retain the
responsibility of the national defence, currency, foreign affairs, etc.
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There is no time limit for Chamber of Elders membership, except in cases where a member
reaches the age of compulsory retirement (not specified here) or in the case of a member being
mentally unsound, in which circumstance the member automatically loses his/her membership.
This system is presented as a possible solution to the current nightmare of the Somali
dilemma, where the country is fragmented into fiefdoms ruled by separate armed clans. This system
has many advantages as well as disadvantages, and they are as follows:
ADVANTAGES
1. As the name defines, this system recommends adopting a semi-federal system of government
as a possible solution to the Somali plight. The country is currently divided into 4 or 5 parts
which in turn can to be interpreted into cantons or states and its unrealistic to reconstruct Somalia
on the old system (a unitary system of government) which was a factor in the creation of the
current crisis. On the contrary, the current reality presents an opportunity to create a semi-federal
state.
2. The system emphasises the decentralising of power within the individual cantons and within
the federation. It emphasises the separation of the three powers of the state, namely legislative,
executive and judiciary of both levels (canton and national). The purpose is to avoid these powers
falling into one hand, which could lead to dictatorship.
3. The nucleus of the power lies in the hamlets or villages. This gives strength to the claim that
is a "pure democracy".
4. It can give the people the right to choose their representatives in the government. It can also
give an opportunity to supervise and control their representatives. This practice can stimulate a
positive political culture which can change the destructive instinct which has affected the people
in the last two decades and which caused the erosion of the foundations of the Somali nationhood.
5. This system entrusts four levels to be represented by the people: district, region, canton and
elders (or traditional leaders). The district and region lies in the canton level, and the latter two
represents the autonomous cantons and the traditional leaders.
6. The national executive (National Council) is a collegiate whose presidency rotates each year.
This collegiate is composed of a member from each of the canton who becomes president of the
federation.
7. Each autonomous canton shall have its own bi-cameral assembly (Cantonal Assembly): (a)
the Chamber of Councillors and (b) the Chamber of Representatives. Both chambers will give
both the regions and the district electorate the chance to be represented.
8. At the national level, there is the National Assembly, which is composed of two chambers:
(a) the Chamber of Elders and (b) The Chamber of the Canton Council. The main purpose of the
two cameras, pattern is to ensure that the cantons and the lineages or clans are properly
represented in the law making "factory" of the nation. On the other hand it can be helpful in
solving regional differences of interest. Regional interests which might object to a central
government are to some extend pacified by the knowledge that they are formally represented at the
centre.
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9. A no-party system could be a healing device for the Somali crisis. Currently, the Somalis are
divided across clans and lineages. Taking a party system, as experience has shown previously,
can lead to a division across clans or lineage which could further exasperate the Somali crisis. A
political party can be the ultimate source of power and permeates all aspects of the political
system and the state institutions. The majority of one-party states have the party's monopoly
enshrined within the constitutions. In the same ostensibly multiparty states legal control will
sometimes favour the dominant government party, making life for opposition group difficult, and
it can lead to other social tension. In the Somali context, politics are sometimes personalised and
the dominant party may be interpreted as the dominant clan or lineage.
10. As an alternative to parties, this system emphasises interest groups as a device with which to
promote a group's interest within the national framework. In this sense an interest group is "an
association of people who come together, or are brought together, to represent, promote and
defend a particular interest or set of interests." In case of the removal from office, or death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties vested on a councillor (of every level,
e.g. national, canton, regional, district, village, etc.) this system has a mechanism which makes it
easy to replace the member by the "reserve". As the reserve shall take part in the debates, this can
also assure continuity of the business led by the replaced council
DISADVANTAGE
1. The system gives limited power to the national level. A strong central government might be
needed at this crucial time to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction which the country
desperately needs.
2. Only the National Council and the Cantonal Council will be elected indirectly rather than by
universal suffrage. This means that they are elected by councillors which are being delegated by
their respective areas.
3. The alternative to parties will be interest or pressure groups. It might be difficult for the
pressure group to spearhead a national issue. They can handle only a limited interest which will
have limited spotlight.
4. It is commonly believed that it is difficult to exercise without party in a truly democratic
procedure . It is also difficult to see the opposition as there is no party to express their opinion.
5. Anybody who stands for an office, whether cantonal or national level, has to stand as a
private or group candidate. For the electorate this will be confusing as it will not be easy for them
to see the candidates policy.
6. This is a new system which has never been applied before, and it is hard to forecast the
complication which might arise during its implementation.
NOTES
1
. Much of the introduction I have taken from Abdisalam M Issa-Salwe, The Collapse of the Somali State, 1994).
2
. Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom, 1980, pp.155-56.
3
. Ibid., p.158.
4
. Maxamed D. Afrax, The Mirror of Culture, in Catastrophe to Renewal? ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, 1994, pp.233-251.
5
. Ibid, p. 239.
6
. Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, 1988, p.49.
7
. I have worked out this alternative in January 1990. Because of the change of the situation in Somalia and the
subsequent collapse of the Somali unitary state system, I had to alter few detail to meet the new development.
8
. Eli Sagan, At The Dawn of Tyranny, 1986, p.225.
9
. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, 1961, p.1.
10
. Mohammed I. Farah, From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity, (Doctoral Dissertation at Uppsala University,
Uppsala 1993), pp.43-44.
11
. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit. pp.36-89.
12
. Ali Moussa Iye, Le Verdic de L'Arbre (Go'aankii Geedka), by Lidwien Kapteijn in Hal-Abuur, Vol.I, No.1,
Summer 1993, pp.33-35.
13
. Ibid., p.198.
14
. Though it can hardly be called democratic as women and other marginalized group are excluded from the meeting.
15
. I M Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, op. cit., pp.196-200
16
. Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia, op. cit. p.49.
17
The Somali version: Qaranka Daryeelka ee Ummadda Soomaaliyeed (QDUS).
18
. J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, World Political System, 1991, pp.150-60.
19
Charlotte Waterlow, What is Federalism? 1994, p.7.
20
Ibid., pp.7-8.
21
. I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia, 1980, p.205.
22
. Ali Mazrui, and Michael Tidy; Nationalism and New States of Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984). p.226.
23
. Ibid, p.76
24
. J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, World Political Systems, op. cit. p.175
REFERENCES
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The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? ed. Ahmed I. Samatar, (Boulder,
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Derbyshire J. Denis; and Derbyshire, Ian; World Political Systems: An Introduction to Comparative
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Farah, Mohammed I.; From Ethnic Response to Clan Identity: A Study of State Penetration among
the Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern Kenya, (Doctoral Dissertation at
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Fromm, Erich; The Fear of Freedom, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paule, 1980).
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(London: Haan Associates, 1996).
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Pastorale", by Ali Moussa Iye, in Hal-Abuur, Vol.I, No.1, Summer 1993.
Lewis, I M ; A Pastoral Democracy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
------- Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (London: Longman,
1980).
Mazrui, Ali; and Michael Tidy; Nationalism and New States of Africa, (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1984).
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State, (London: Faber and Faber, 1986).
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