EVIDENCE – RULE 129 WHEREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the
EREAS, the fact that such acts were committed in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
G.R. No. L-1278 January 21, 1949
LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,
vs.
ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of
the Fourteenth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted by the petitioners against the respondents who
composed the 14th Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, to compel the latter to act and decide whether
or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of amnesty.
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As
the latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and after trial Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment. Before the period for
perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8,
dated September 7, 1946, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with
an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was
actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation, and said Jimenez decided to
submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the
other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by the respondents,
issued on January 9, 1947, an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of he said
Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have
admitted having committed the offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino
who shot and killed the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, issued by the President with the concurrence of
Congress of the Philippines, reads in part as follows:
WHEREAS, since the inception of the war until the liberation of the different areas comprising the
territory of the Philippines, volunteer armed forces of Filipinos and for of other nationalities
operated as guerrillas and other patriotic individuals and groups pursued activities in opposition
to the forces and agents of the Japanese Empire in the invasion and occupation of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, members of such forces, in their determined efforts to resist the enemy, and to bring
about his ultimate defeat, committed acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code;
WHEREAS, charges have been presented in the courts against many members of these resistance
forces, for such acts;
is not a valid defense under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the persons so accused should not be regarded as criminals but rather as patriots and
heroes who have rendered invaluable service to the nation; and
WHEREAS, it is desirable that without the least possible delay, these persons be freed form the
indignity and the jeopardy to which they are now being subjected;
NOW, THEREFORE, I Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions
of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an
amnesty inn favor of al persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code
in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the
enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each
particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation.
This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal
motives.
It is further proclaimed and declared that in order to determine who among those against whom
charges have been filed before the courts of the Philippines or against whom charges may be filed
in the future, come within the terms of this amnesty, Guerrilla Amnesty Commissions,
simultaneously to be established , shall examine the facts and circumstance surrounding each
case and, if necessary, conduct summary hearings of witnesses both for the complainant and the
accused. These Commissions shall decided each case and, upon finding that it falls within the
terms of this proclamation, the Commissions shall so declare and this amnesty shall immediately
be effective as to the accused, who shall forthwith be released or discharged.
The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work
the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code).
while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII,
Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402.,
403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo.,
497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a
condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which
he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is
in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does not confess the
imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to
the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which
he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in
the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in
accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public
act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms
of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province
or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the
evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
The right to the benefits of amnesty, once established by the evidence presented either by the
complainant or prosecution, or by the defense, can not be waived, because it is of public interest
that a person who is regarded by the Amnesty Proclamation which has the force of a law, not only
as innocent, for he stands in the eyes of the law as if he had never committed any punishable offense
because of the amnesty, but as a patriot or hero, can not be punishment as a criminal. Just as the
courts of justice can not convict a person who, according to the evidence, has committed an act not
punishable by law, although he confesses being guilty thereof, so also and a fortiori they can not
convict a person considered by law not a criminal, but as a patriot and hero, for having rendered
invaluable services to the nation inn committing such an act.
While it is true that the evidence must show that the offense charged was against chastity and was
committed in furtherance of the resistance against the enemy, for otherwise, it is to be naturally
presumed that is has been committed for purely personal motive, it is nonetheless true that though
the motive as a mental impulse is state of mind or subjective, it need not be testified to be the
defendant himself at his arraignment or hearing of the case. Generally the motive for the
commission of an offense is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of
the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words hat may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. The statement of
testimony of a defendant at the time of arraignment or the hearing of the case about said motive,
can not generally be considered and relied on, specially if there is evidence to the contrary, as the
true expression of the reason o motive he had at the time of committing the offense. Because such
statements or testimony may be an afterthought or colored by the interest he may have to suit his
defense or the purpose for which he intends to achieve with such declaration. Hence it does not
stand to reason and logic to say, as the dissenting opinion avers, that unless the defendant admits
at the investigation or hearing having committed the offense with which he is charged, and states
that he did it in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, and not for purely personal motive, it
is impossible for the court of Commission to verify the motive for the commission of the offense,
because only the accused could explain of the offense, because only the accused could explain his
belief and intention or the motive of committing the offense.
There is no necessity for an accused to admit his responsibility for the commission of a criminal act
before a court of Amnesty Commission may investigate and extend or not to him the benefits of
amnesty. The fact that he pleads not guilty or that he has not committed the act with which he is
charged, does not necessarily prove that he is not guilty thereof. Notwithstanding his denial, the
evidence for the prosecution or complainant may show the contrary, as it is generally the case in
criminal proceedings, and what should in such a case be determined is whether or not the offense
committed is of political character. The plea of not having committed the offense made by an
accused simply means that he can not be convicted of the offense charged because he is not guilty
thereof, and, even if the evidence would show that he is, because he has committed it in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy or against persons a ding in the war efforts of the enemy, and not
for purely political motives.
According to Administrative Order No. 11 of October 2, 1946, creating the Amnesty Commissions,
issued by the President of the Philippines, cases pending in the Courts of First Instance of the
province in which the accused claims the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, and cases already
decided by said courts but not yet elevated on appeal to the appellate courts, shall be passed upon
and decided by the respective Amnesty Commission, and cases pending appeal shall be passed upon
by the Seventh Amnesty Commission. Under the theory of the respondents and the writer oft he
dissenting opinion, the Commissions should refuse to comply with the directive of said
Administrative Order, because is almost all cases pending in the Court of First Instance, and all those
pending appeal form the sentence of said courts, the defendants must not have pleaded guilty or
admitted having committed the offense charged for otherwise, they would not or could not have
appealed from the judgment of the Courts of First Instance. To hold that a Amnesty Commission
should not proceed to the investigation and act and decide whether the offense with which an
accused was charged comes within the Amnesty Proclamation if he does not admit or confess having
committed it would be to defeat the purpose for which the Amnesty Proclamation was issued and
the Amnesty Commission were established. If the courts have to proceed to the trail or hearing of
a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has plead not guilty, there is no reason why the
Amnesty Commissions can not do so. Where a defendant to admit or confess having committed the
offense or being responsible therefor before he can invoke the benefit of amnesty, as there is no
law which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence against him in the courts
of justices in case the Amnesty Commission finds that the offense does not come within the terms
of the Amnesty Proclamation, nobody or few would take the risk of submitting their case to said
Commission.
Besides, in the present case, the allegation of Loreto Barrioquinto that the offended party or victim
was shot and killed by Agapito Hipolito , does not necessarily bar the respondents from finding,
after the summary hearing of the witnesses for the complaints and the accused, directed in the said
Amnesty Proclamation and Administrative Order No. 11, that the petitioners are responsible for the
killing of the victim, either as principals by cooperation, inducement or conspiration, or as
accessories before as well as after the fact, but that they are entitled to the benefits of amnesty,
because they were members of the same group of guerrilleros who killed the victim in furtherance
of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
Wherefore, the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately proceed to hear and decide the
application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless amnesty of petitioners
Barrioquinto and Jimenez, unless the courts have in the meantime already decided, expressly and
finally, the question whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation
No. 8 of September 7, 1946. So ordered.
EVIDENCE – RULE 129 died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon, the father, passed away on September 14,
1933 (Exhibit " E ").
G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner, by the Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The
vs. date of the lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910,
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS NARCISO, AMADO the Government, through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222
NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and ADELINA NARCISO, respondents. (Exhibit "B") over the said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00
each. The rental/s previously paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial
evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last installment, however, was paid on December 17,
1936, or three (3) years after his death.
MACARIA A. TORRES, petitioner,
vs.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, BALDOMERO
deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for
BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO
the sum of P300.00.3
PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and AMADO NARCISO, respondents.

On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
asking for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon,
the Bureau of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action. 1 prays that the judgment Torres. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of
rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled Cavite on November 7, 1957, also in the name of said heirs.
"Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs. Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and CA-
G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria A. Bautista, et
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with
al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition
the Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot
for New Trial, be set aside; and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7,
No. 551 without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For her
1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it for new trial.
part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of
Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over Lot then Court of First Instance of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of
approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6804 issued in the
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court
name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
of First Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was
conjugal property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish child. Private respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita
regime, was married to Claro Santillan. Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro Torres; that they are her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.
died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely: Alfredo, Salud
(married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958
to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan,
with a finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to
are the private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of the cases while Vicente died on
private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third
June 4, 1957, 2 during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without progeny .
(1/3) portion. 4 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending
its resolution, the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete destruction of
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without the records of the two cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.
benefit of marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco
Bautista) was born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism
On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting
issued by the Parish Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named
reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof
as father and mother of petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another
reads as follows:
Baptismal Certificate, however, listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left
blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were
married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
 (1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children
and heirs of the deceased Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already
dead. The parties may make the partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness,
however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot
where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case
the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her
parents, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each
other. There was no legal impediment for them to marry It has also been
established that Macaria A. Torres had been taken care of, brought up and
reared by her parents until they died. The certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also
shows that Macaria Torres was given the family name of Arvisu, which is also
the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her father is Leon Arvisu
and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A. Torres
possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents
were married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated daughter of on
Arbole and Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals 7 rendered the judgment
sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:
(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to
Macaria Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas,
Amado, Salud, Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children
and heirs of Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The
parties may make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, subject to confirmation by the Court. In fairness, however, to the
parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the lot where his or her
house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three commissioners
to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and
Margarita Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or
after the marriage of her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in
their brief, the fact that she was taken cared of, brought up and reared by her
parents until they died, and that the certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows
that she was given the family name of Arvisu did not bestow upon her the status
of an acknowledged natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter,
children shall be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when
they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof, and Article 131 of the same code provides that the acknowledgement
of a natural child must be in the record of birth, in a will or in some public
document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the acknowledgment
of a natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism of Macaria A.
Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This
article of the old Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made
in a will or other public document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in
other words, in the civil register (Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In
support thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of
spouses Leon Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres,10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of
majority age, and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite,
P.I., after being duly sworn to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of
wedlock on the 26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was
legitimized by our subsequent marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have
married without dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that
of her mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the
Church.
The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same
was only found by petitioner's daughter, Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings of
private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who may have
attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and
contended that it is not newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced during the
trial by the exercise of due diligence.

That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her
father's family name.
Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper
remedy be made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as
desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th
day of March 1930.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus
Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and
New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not new trial should
be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then
formed, composed of Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N.
Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or having disqualified himself). In a minute
resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both
reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments of error.
The first was expressed as follows:

Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is

(Thumbmarked) (Thumbmarked) not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria
Signed in the prsence of: A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters
with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the
Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect conclusion in adjudicating the entire
share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan
x----------------------------------------------------x and the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis supplied)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ) of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930, she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her
MUNICIPALITY OF TANZA ) ss parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the mother, etc.
PROVINCE OF CAVITE ) will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary,
which action may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant exceptions. 12
Leon Arvisu exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of
going over 60 years of age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the
certificate being exempt on account of her sex. Ejectment Case reading:

Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid. the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and
nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20,
CONSTANCIO T. VELASCO 1931. (Emphasis supplied).
Notary Public, Cavite Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930. The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the
determination of her participation in the disputed property.
Not. Reg. No. 56
P. No. 2 We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11 Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was deleted so that the statement simply read:
 That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who
died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as
abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no
longer forms part of the record. 13
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial,
and depending on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective participation of the
parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence.
Having been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would
have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which,
as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be
no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in
evidence. 14

It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied
the legitimacy of petitioner.

The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:

Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for new trial, knowing as it does that the judgment is clearly erroneous
in view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part
of the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered
as it was found from the personal belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse
party, after his death.

It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice.
Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is
established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such vital
considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document
prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of
acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by Article 121
of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document
was the equivalent of the consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article
133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon petitioner the status of a legitimated
child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.

Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she should be
chargeable with knowledge of its existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly
discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as newly discovered
evidence, which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due
diligence; specially if it really had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who,
it was alleged, suppressed the document.

In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court,
now empowered to do so under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
EVIDENCE – RULE 129
[G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.]
JOSE TABUENA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., Respondents.
Ramon Dimen for Petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE OUT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN ANY
EVIDENTIARY VALUE. — The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, "At the trial on
the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its
cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot
be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."
2. ID; ID; RATIONALE OF THE RULE. — The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest
his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial.
3. ID; ID; WHEN CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE ADVERSE PARTY. — We did say in People
v. Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the
adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself
been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not fine that these requirements have been
satisfied in the case before us.
4. ID; ORIGINAL RECORD OF A CASE ARCHIVED; WHEN CONSIDERED READ INTO THE RECORD OF A
CASE PENDING BEFORE A COURT; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS. — It is clear, though,
that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of
the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly
referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn form the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not
been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony
in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As
the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon
him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
5. ID; TAX RECEIPTS AND DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP; ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL POSSESSION
SUPPORT CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations
of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become
strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property. It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession
of the land covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a
claim of ownership.
6. ID; ACTS ACCOMPANYING CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — All the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose
Tabuena indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more that fifty years and indeed, she herself stayed
there until she died. She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. Jose Tabuena built a house
of strong materials on the lot. He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the
Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged him as the owner. These acts denote
ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent’s claim that the petitioner was only
an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
7. ID; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INFERIOR COURTS HELD NOT CONFORMABLE TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD. — It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is now showing that they have
been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on
record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of
basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not submitted
by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters and
situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the
herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was
required to vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla
while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa
Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan’s instruction, conveyed the subject land to Tabernilla. At the
same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her
life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she promised to
do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following which the petitioner, her son
and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof The complaint was filed when demand
was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited
from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since then
and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between Peralta
and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides
by the Makato River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by
the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve
the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921 addressed
in Makato, Capis, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of
P600.00 — the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-
2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by
Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C."
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript
of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also upheld the use by
the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "Y" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament
of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of exhibits does not
include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C." In fact, the trial court categorically declared that "Exhibits ‘A,’ ‘A-
1,’ ‘A-2,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and ‘C-1,’ were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered for
admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the finding of the appellate
court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the
evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying them at
that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Inter pacific
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the
exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In
the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value."
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. 4
We did say in People v. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that these
requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said exhibits could
be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the plaintiff’s
witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-examined by
the defendant’s counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:
ATTY. LEGASPI:
What is this Exh. "A" about?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court:
The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena’s testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 7
Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a
case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated;
or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the
archives by the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as
a part of the record of the case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with
the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the
case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn
from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions
have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his
testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending
before it. As the petitioner puts t, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly
sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice of
the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiffs cause because
"the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the plaintiff." What
"other evidences" ? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate,
to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate
its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr., who
was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that before
1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not have validly
conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate authorization from
the owner. No such authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases. However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception.
In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact,
the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner’s
ownership. As this Court has held:
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. 9
built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his
claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our
adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner’s contrary
contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with
costs against the private Respondent. It is so ordered.

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the
tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject parcels of land by
the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title
to the said subject parcels of land. 11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and magnanimously
allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in
his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not much concerned with
the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had bought from America. That
is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that unconcerned, it is curious
that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have
demanded another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living on the land. On
the other hand, if he were really interested in the property, we do not see why he did not have it
declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did
not object when the payments were made in her own name.

In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the
owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12 She paid
the realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the
lot. 14 He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private
persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent’s claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably
to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil
Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner,
in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged are as an edifice
EVIDENCE – RULE 129 1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss
when such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971 in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that there was
no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous
dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, who as
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest.
vs.
There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the finality of the decsion
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor children,
in the previous case which would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It
DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there
any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was
FERNANDO, J.: predictible?

The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction
Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that
been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a
judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was
of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A
answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for. citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."3
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss
filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior 2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a
judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being clearly remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to
plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal heirs and which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time
successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever
Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be
Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law.
involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as defendants are the Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system
widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. in mind.5
That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has already
been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs against
December 6, 1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on
plaintiff.
the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be
apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the complaint
from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order
complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants
under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a
prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's
complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants
predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their rights, in an order dated December 6,
1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same
parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is
hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by
the same plaintiff. [So ordered]"2 Hence, this appeal.

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.
EVIDENCE – RULE 129 1989 Tax Credit P112,491.00
TOTAL AMOUNT P297,492.00
G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000 REFUNDABLE

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable
vs. amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable
respondents. amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it
apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is undisputed that a
taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities to keep money not
belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another.
The Case
On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00
with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989
refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return
or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.
Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund,
petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of
the amount of P112,491.00.

The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground that petitioner
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals 1
failed to present as evidence its corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993 Decision2 of the Court of Tax
fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount
Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:
P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court
merit.3
in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994.6

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads as follows:
As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition.7

WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioner's claim for refund is hereby DENIED
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit.4

In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution5 denying reconsideration.

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its 1990 Annual
The Facts
income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00), so as to refute its
previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax
The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise: credit in the succeeding year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis
to grant the claim for refund. . . .
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioner's
tax withheld for the year 1989. Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in derogation of
sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the
In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following items are reflected: exemption. In other words, the burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient
and competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund.8
Income P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions P1,026,218,791.00 Issue
Net Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss) (P8,286,960.00) In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:
Less:
1988 Tax Credit P185,001.00
 The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the refund of Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an opposition to
P112,491.90, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for the taxable year 1989.9 petitioner's Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In denying the Motion
for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the same vein, the CA did not
The Court's Ruling pass upon that significant document.

The Petition is meritorious. True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the
trial.1âwphi1 The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that
proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence." 13 The
Main Issue:
paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for orderly
Petitioner Entitled to Refund
presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from considering undisputed facts
to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was thus entitled
to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 10 of the 1986 Tax Code which states
In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed that
that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such refund or (2) to credit said
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA, petitioner
amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it
could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said Return, as well as
would apply the said amount as a tax credit for the succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently,
the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the appellate court committed a
petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax
reversible error.
refund, instead of applying it as a tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming,
petitioner filed its claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination
of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. 14 But there can be
The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared in its 1989
no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict technicality, the Return
Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax credit for the following
submitted before the CTA and even before this Court. 15 To repeat, the undisputed fact is that
year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done so. The CTA and the CA ruled
petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990; accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit
that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because it did not present its 1990 Return,
could be applied. Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax
which would have shown that the amount in dispute was not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA
refund which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.
concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund.

Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was
We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are
not the final adjustment Return, but petitioner's first two quarterly returns for 1990. 16 This
binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is premised
allegation is wrong. An examination of the records shows that the 1990 Final Adjustment Return
on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant facts
was attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the two quarterly returns for
which if considered would justify a different conclusion. 11 This case is one such exception.
1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed before the
CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents' specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its
In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the amount Surrejoinder, to which was attached the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the
as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the manager of petitioner's Final Adjustment Return for 1990. 17
accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented its claim for refund and a
certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioner's vice-president, stating that the amount of
CTA Case No. 4897
P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically credited/offset against any succeeding
quarters' income tax liabilities for the rest of the calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also
presented were the quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990. Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered
by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case,
the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 . . . ." 18 Respondent,
The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioner's claim. In fact, it
however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers, the CIR could
have easily disproved petitioner's claim. To repeat, it did not do so.
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding
More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to petitioner's Motion
the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." 20
for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. 12 A final adjustment return shows whether a corporation
incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In this case, that Return clearly showed
that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in 1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought
amount in dispute as a tax credit. to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy
of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court.
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.

To our mind, respondents' reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really
believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not
suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact
appearing therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused
to controvert the same fact established by petitioner's other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioner's case. It is merely
one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay
its taxes for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold that petitioner
has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with the rules of procedure;
it may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however, should not compel the Court to
disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, and that it could not
have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and legalisms,
however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not belonging to it and
thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to
observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against itself
in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of
honor, dignity and uprightness.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to
petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
EVIDENCE – RULE 129
[G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005]
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. (formerly JS STEEL CORPORATION), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following that in which the tax
credit arises. Hence, excess income taxes paid in 1995 that have not been applied to or used in 1996
may still be the subject of a tax refund in 1997, provided that the claim for such refund is filed with
the internal revenue commissioner within two years after payment of said taxes. As a caveat, the
Court stresses that the recognition of the entitlement to a tax refund does not necessarily mean the
automatic payment of the sum claimed in the final adjustment return of the taxpayer. The amount
of the claim must still be proven in the normal course.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January
10, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 58838. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against Petitioner.[3]
The Facts
Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks
for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and
household appliances.
Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996
declaring a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax
due in the amount of P3,311,559.00.
Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of
1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.
It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995, several of its clients
withheld taxes from their income payments to [p]etitioner and remitted the same to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in the sum of P3,159,687.00. Petitioner further
alleged that due to its income/loss positions for the three quarters of 1996, it was
unable to use the excess tax paid for and in its behalf by the withholding agents.
Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the [p]etitioner on April 10, 1997 for
the refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or unused creditable withholding taxes
for the year 1995. The instant petition was subsequently filed on April 18, 1997.
Respondent, in his Answer, averred, among others, that:
1) Petitioner has no cause of action;
2) Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements set
out in Section 5 of Revenue Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94;
3) It is incumbent upon [p]etitioner to prove by competent and
sufficient evidence that the tax refund or tax credit being sought is allowed
under the National Internal Revenue Code and its implementing rules and
regulations; and
4) Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed strictly against the
taxpayer as they partake the nature of tax exemption.
To buttress its claim, [p]etitioner presented documentary and testimonial
evidence. Respondent, on the other hand, presented the [r]evenue [o]fficer who
conducted the examination of [p]etitioners claim and found petitioner liable for
deficiency value added tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence.
The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is whether or not [p]etitioner is
entitled to the refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or overpaid income tax for
the taxable year 1995.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In denying petitioners refund, the CA reasoned out that no evidence other than that
presented before the CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax payments had been made in 1995.
From the inception of the case to the formal offer of its evidence, petitioner did not present its 1996
income tax return to disclose its total income tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine
whether such excess tax payments were utilized in 1996.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issue
Petitioner raises this sole issue for our consideration:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when, while purportedly requiring
petitioner to submit its 1996 annual income tax return to support its claim for refund,
nonetheless ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record the
authenticity of which has not been denied or its admissibility opposed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[6]
 The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Sole Issue:
Entitlement to Tax Refund
Section 69 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)[7] provides:
Sec. 69. Final adjustment return. -- Every corporation liable to tax under Section
24 shall file a final adjustment return covering the total taxable income for the preceding
calendar or fiscal year. If the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during the said
taxable year is not equal to the total tax due on the entire taxable net income of that
year the corporation shall either:
(a) Pay the excess tax still due; or
(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case may be.
In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated quarterly
income taxes paid, the refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return may be
credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters
of the succeeding taxable year.
Tax Refund
Allowed by NIRC
A perusal of this provision shows that a taxable corporation is entitled to a tax refund when
the sum of the quarterly income taxes it paid during a taxable year exceeds its total income tax due
also for that year. Consequently, the refundable amount that is shown on its final adjustment return
may be credited, at its option, against its quarterly income tax liabilities for the next taxable year.
Petitioner is a corporation liable to pay income taxes under Section 24 of the NIRC. Hence, it
is a taxable corporation. In 1995, it reported that it had excess income taxes that had been paid for
and on its behalf by its withholding agents; and that, applying the above-quoted Section 69, this
excess should be credited against its income tax liabilities for 1996. However, it claimed in 1997 that
it should get a refund, because it was still unable to use the excess income taxes paid in 1995 against
its tax liabilities in 1996. Is this possible? Stating the argument otherwise, may excess income taxes
paid in 1995 that could not be applied to taxes due in 1996 be refunded in 1997?
The answer is in the affirmative. Here are the reasons:
Claim of Tax Refund Beyond the
Succeeding Taxable Year
First, a tax refund may be claimed even beyond the taxable year following that in which the
tax credit arises.
No provision in our tax law limits the entitlement to such a refund, other than the requirement
that the filing of the administrative claim for it be made by the taxpayer within a two-year
prescriptive period. Section 204(3) of the NIRC states that no refund of taxes shall be allowed unless
the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner [the] claim for x x x refund within two years after
the payment of the tax.
Applying the aforequoted legal provisions, if the excess income taxes paid in a given taxable
year have not been entirely used by a taxable corporation against its quarterly income tax liabilities
for the next taxable year, the unused amount of the excess may still be refunded, provided that the
claim for such a refund is made within two years after payment of the tax. Petitioner filed its claim
in 1997 -- well within the two-year prescriptive period. Thus, its unused tax credits in 1995 may still
be refunded.
Even the phrase succeeding taxable year in the second paragraph of the said Section 69 is a
limitation that applies only to a tax credit, not a tax refund. Petitioner herein does not claim a tax
credit, but a tax refund. Therefore, the statutory limitation does not apply.
Income Payments Merely
Declared Part of Gross Income
Second, to be able to claim a tax refund, a taxpayer only needs to declare the income
payments it received as part of its gross income and to establish the fact of withholding.
Section 5 of RR 12-94[8] states:
xxxxxxxxx
(a) Claims for Tax Credit or Refund of income tax deducted and withheld on
income payments shall be given due course only when it is shown on the return that the
income payment received has been declared as part of the gross income and the fact of
withholding is established by a copy of the Withholding Tax Statement duly issued by
the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withheld
therefrom.
(b) Excess Credits. -- A taxpayer's excess expanded withholding tax credits for the
taxable quarter/taxable year shall automatically be allowed as a credit for purposes of
filing his income tax return for the taxable quarter/taxable year immediately succeeding
the taxable quarter/taxable year in which the aforesaid excess credit arose, provided,
however, he submits with his income tax return a copy of his income tax return for the
aforesaid previous taxable period showing the amount of his aforementioned excess
withholding tax credits.
If the taxpayer, in lieu of the aforesaid automatic application of his excess credit,
wants a cash refund or a tax credit certificate for use in payment of his other national
internal tax liabilities, he shall make a written request therefor. Upon filing of his
request, the taxpayer's income tax return showing the excess expanded withholding tax
credits shall be examined. The excess expanded withholding tax, if any, shall be
determined and refunded/credited to the taxpayer-applicant. The refund/credit shall
 be made within a period of sixty (60) days from date of the taxpayer's request provided,
however, that the taxpayer-applicant submitted for audit all his pertinent accounting
records and that the aforesaid records established the veracity of his claim for a
refund/credit of his excess expanded withholding tax credits.
That petitioner filed its amended 1995 income tax return in 1996 is uncontested. In addition,
the resulting investigation by the BIR on August 15, 1997, reveals that the income accounts were
correctly declared based on the existing supporting documents.[9] Therefore, there is no need for
petitioner to show again the income payments it received in 1995 as part of its gross income in
1996.
That petitioner filed its 1996 final adjustment return in 1997 is the crux of the controversy.
However, as will be demonstrated shortly, the lack of such a return will not defeat its entitlement
to a refund.
Tax Refund Provisions:
Question of Law
Third, it is a cardinal rule that only legal issues may be raised[10] in petitions for review under
Rule 45.[11]
The proper interpretation of the provisions on tax refund is a question of law that does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.[12]
Having been unable to use the excess income taxes paid in 1995 against its other tax liabilities in
1996, petitioner clearly deserves a refund. It cannot by any sweeping denial be deprived of what
rightfully belongs to it.
The truth or falsity of the contents of or entries in the 1996 final adjustment return, which has
not been formally offered in evidence and examined by respondent, involves, however, a question
of fact. This Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it a collection agency for the government. Although
we rule that petitioner is entitled to a tax refund, the amount of that refund is a matter for the CTA
to determine judiciously based on the records that include its own copy of petitioners 1996 final
adjustment return.
Liberal Construction
of Rules
Fourth, ordinary rules of procedure frown upon the submission of final adjustment returns
after trial has been conducted. However, both the CTA law and jurisprudence mandate that the
proceedings before the tax court shall not be governed strictly by technical rules of evidence. [13] As
a rule, its findings of fact[14] (as well as that of the CA) are final, binding and conclusive[15] on the
parties and upon this Court; however, as an exception, such findings may be reviewed or disturbed
on appeal[16] when they are not supported by evidence.[17]
Our Rules of Court apply by analogy or in a suppletory[18] character and whenever practicable
and convenient[19] and shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [20] After all, [t]he
paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth.[21]
In the present case, the 1996 final adjustment return was attached as Annex A to the Reply to
Comment filed by petitioner with the CA.[22] The return shows a negative amount for its taxable
income that year. Therefore, it could not have applied or used the excess tax credits of 1995 against
its tax liabilities in 1996.
Judicial Notice
of Attached Return
Fifth, the CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final adjustment return
which had been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of
equal force.[23]
As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records
in other cases tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually
pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to such
records is sufficiently made without objection from the opposing parties:
. . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in
some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of
the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of
the record of the case then pending.[24]
Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well-aware of the
existence of another case pending before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and causes
of action.[25] Because of the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy, the CTA
could have easily taken judicial notice[26] of the contested document attached in that other case.
Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment
return in petitioners Reply to Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that return, a
reference made with the knowledge of respondent, the latter still failed to controvert petitioners
claim. The appellate court should have cast aside strict technicalities[27] and decided the case on the
basis of such uncontested return. Verily, it had the authority to take judicial notice of its records and
of the facts [that] the record establishes.[28]
Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters x x x ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions.[29] If the lower courts really believed that
petitioner was not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to ascertain
its veracity and accuracy[30] and to prove that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in 1996.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, BPI-Family Savings Bank v. CA[31] (on which it rests
its entire arguments) is not on all fours with the facts of this case.
While the petitioner in that case also filed a written claim for a tax refund, and likewise failed
to present its 1990 corporate annual income tax return, it nonetheless offered in evidence its top-
ranking officials testimony and certification pertaining to only two taxable years (1989 and 1990).
The said return was attached only to its Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA.
 Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that extended beyond
two taxable years, because the excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used up
during the second (1996) taxable year, and because the claim for the refund of those credits had
been filed during the third (1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead attached to
its Reply to Comment filed before the CA.
Moreover, in BPI-Family Savings Bank, petitioner was able to show the undisputed fact: that
petitioner had suffered a net loss in 1990 x x x.[32] In the instant case, there is no such undisputed
fact as yet. The mere admission into the records of petitioners 1996 final adjustment return is not a
sufficient proof of the truth of the contents of or entries in that return.
In addition, the BIR in BPI-Family Savings Bank did not controvert the veracity of the return or
file an opposition to the Motion and the return. Despite the fact that the return was ignored by both
the CA and the CTA, the latter even declared in another case (CTA Case No. 4897) that petitioner
had suffered a net loss for taxable year 1990. When attached to the Petition for Review filed before
this Court, that Decision was not at all claimed by the BIR to be fraudulent or nonexistent. The
Bureau merely contended that this Court should not take judicial notice of the said Decision.
In this case, however, the BIR has not been given the chance to challenge the veracity of
petitioners final adjustment return. Neither has the CTA decided any other case categorically
declaring a net loss for petitioner in taxable year 1996. After this return was attached to petitioners
Reply to Comment before the CA, the appellate court should have required the filing of other
responsive pleadings from respondent, as was necessary and proper for it to rule upon the return.
claim for tax refund. After all, [t]ax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions]41[ and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.
Finally, even in the absence of a final adjustment return or any claim for a tax refund,
respondent is authorized by law to examine any book, paper, record or other data that may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.[42] Failure to make an assessment of petitioners proper tax
liability or to contest the return could be errors or omissions of administrative officers that should
never be allowed to jeopardize the governments financial position.
Verily, the officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue should receive the support of the courts
when these officers attempt to perform in a conscientious and lawful manner the duties imposed
upon them by law.[43] Only after it is shown that if something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was duly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.]44[
In brief, we hold that petitioner is entitled to a refund; however, the amount must still be
proved in proper proceedings before the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals for the proper and immediate determination of
the amount to be refunded to petitioner on the basis of the latters 1996 final adjustment return.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Admissibility Versus Weight

Indeed, [a]dmissibility x x x is one thing, weight is another.[33] To admit evidence and not to
believe it are not incompatible with each other x x x.[34] Mere allegations by petitioner of the figures
in its 1996 final adjustment return are not a sufficient proof of the amount of its refund entitlement.
They do not even constitute evidence[35] adverse to respondent, against whom they are being
presented.[36]

While it seems that the [non-production] of a document which courts almost invariably expect
will be produced unavoidably throws a suspicion over the cause,[37] this is not really the conclusion
to be arrived at here. When petitioner purportedly filed its administrative claim for a tax refund on
April 10, 1997, the deadline for filing the 1996 final adjustment return was not yet over. Hence, it
could not have attached this return to its claim.

For reasons unknown even to this Court, petitioner failed to offer such return as evidence
during the trial phase of this case. For its negligence, petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge in
a liberal application of the [r]ules[38] by giving it a blanket approval of the total refund it claims.
While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to
forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.[39]

It would not be proper to allow petitioner to simply prevail and compel a refund in the amount
it claims, without affording the government a reasonable opportunity to contest the formers
allegations.[40] Negligence consisting of the unexplained failure to offer the exhibit should not be
rewarded with undeserved leniency. Petitioner still bears the burden of proving the amount of its