Canadian Slavonic Papers

Yugoslav Workers' Self-Management: A Blueprint for Industrial Democracy?

Author(s): ALAN WHITEHORN
Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 20, No. 3,
YUGOSLAVIA (September 1978), pp. 421-428
Published by: Canadian Association of Slavists
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40867347 .
Accessed: 15/06/2014 06:50

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Canadian Association of Slavists and Canadian Slavonic Papers are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALAN WHITEHORN

Yugoslav Workers'Self-Management:
A BlueprintforIndustrialDemocracy?

Different Approaches to Analysing YugoslavSelf-Management

WiththedeclineoftheColdWarthere hasbeena greatdealofinterest
in East Europeanvariantsof socialism.Yugoslaviain particular has
attracted enormousinterest as a resultof itsuniqueformof industrial
relations.The Yugoslavsystemof workers'self-management has also
arouseda greatdealofcontroversy. Thisinvolves eventheapproaches to
For
Yugoslavself-management.1 example,many orthodox communists
have arguedthatsincetheYugoslavself-management systemis based
upon the market it is
mechanism,2 simply a form of restoration
capitalist
or socialistdegeneration.All theills of capitalism- businesscycles,3
regional stratification4
disparities, - havereemerged. A secondapproach
seestheYugoslavworkers' self-management system beingthemid-wife
as
inthemodernization process. Authors such as I. AdizesseetheYugoslav
system as a meansof socializingthe new working classintothemoresof
industrialsociety.5 see
They 'managedparticipation' as a wayto induce
greaterfinancialsavings,managerial effectivenessand economicgrowth.
This is in essencea technocratic perspective, althoughit can have
benevolent as inthecaseofAdizes.A thirdorientation
overtones analyses
theYugoslavworkers' self-management system as a prototype ofa new
formof industrialrelations- that is to say industrial democracy.
1. For a fullerdiscussionof some of the different approaches,see B. Denitch,'The
Relevance of Yugoslav Self-Management"in G. Bertsch and T. Ganschow (eds.),
ComparativeCommunism:The Soviet, Chinese,and Yugoslav Models (San Francisco,
1976),pp. 268-81.
2. In contrast,fora praisingevaluationofthelabour-managedmarketeconomy,see J.
Vanek, The ParticipatoryEconomy(Ithaca, 1971).
3. See B. Horvat, Business Cycles in Yugoslavia(White Plains, 1971) for a brilliant
expositionof thistopic.
as a Cause of Social Conflictsin Yugoslavia,"
4. See R. Lukió, "Social Stratification
InternationalJournalof Sociology, II, no.4 (Winter1972-73),333-63,and B. Horvat,An
Essay on YugoslavSociety(White Plains, 1969), particularly chapter5.
5. I. Adizes,IndustrialDemocracy:YugoslavStyle- TheEffectofDecentralization on
OrganizationalBehavior(New York, 1971).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
422 I Canadian Slavonic Papers

Increasingly,bothin theEast and theWest,leftists, disenchantedwiththe

lack of substantivechange fosteredby centralizednationalization,have
soughtto determinewhetherthe moredecentralizedvariantof socialism
could becomethebasis fora lessstratifiedsociety.6This shiftto a modelof
local workers'controlreflectsa moveto replacethesenseofpowerlessness
and anomiewitha self-guided democraticcommunity.7 Theseauthorssee
workers'self-management as a possible means of establishinga more
effectivesocial systembased on equality and cooperationratherthan
exploitation.It willbe thisthirdand moresociallysignificant orientation
thatwillbe analysedin thispaperto determine iftheYugoslavsystemcan
be a model,albeitat timesan imperfectand approximateone, on whichto
develop industrialdemocracyelsewhere.

¡s the Yugoslav Workers* Self-Managed FactoryMore Democraticthan

its Canadian CapitalistCounterpart?
The Yugoslav systemof workers'self-management has undergone
enormousstructuralchangesover recentdecades. These reforms, forthe
mostpart,wereideologicallyinspired.As empiricalsocial scienceresearch
in Yugoslavia increasedin the 'sixties,8some Yugoslav social theorists
speculated that "some suppositions,on which self-management was
based, were illusions, and all of them were insufficiently
empirically
tested."9Increasingly,a disparitybetween the normativetheory of
workers'self-management and theactual practiceofself-managementwas
noted.10One disparitywas thatof industrialdemocracy.
The questionof whethertheYugoslavworkers'self-managed factory
is in fact more democraticthan the capitalist factoryis crucial in
evaluatingthis generalquestion.11Data were taken froma larger field
12Poweris
studyby thisauthor in Yugoslavia and Canada during 1972-73.

6. See M. Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston, 1949) fora fascinatingportrayalof the

tensionsbetweentwo formsof socialism- decentralizedand centralized.
7. A. Etzioni, The ActiveSociety(New York, 1968) and W. Breed, The Self-Guiding
Society (New York, 1971). See also A. Whitehorn,"Alienation and Workers' Self-
Management,"Canadian Slavonic Papers, XVI, no. 2 (Summer 1974), 160-86.
8. R. Supek, "Problemsand Perspectivesof Workers'Self-management in Yugoslavia"
in M. J. Broekmeyer (ed.), YugoslavWorkers'Self-Management(Dordrecht,1970),d. 230.
9. J. JerovSek,"Self-management Systemin YugoslavEnterprises," FirstInternational
Conferenceon Participationand Self-ManagementReports, vol. I, Reports(Zagreb, 1972),
p. 114.
10. This was one of the major themesof the now defunctjournal Praxis whichwas
publishedin Zagrebfrom1964until1974.ReprintsofmanyPraxisarticlescan be foundin B.
Horvat,M. Markovié,R. Supek (eds.), Self-GoverningSocialism (White Plains, 1975).
11. There can be littledoubt that presentnationalizedfactories,whetherin Great
Britainor the Soviet Union,are not markedby highlyparticipatory democraticfeatures.
12. A. Whitehorn,"Alienation and Socialism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
CarletonUniversity, 1975). Please note thatthisstudyof Yugoslav factorieswas limitedto

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Workers'Self-Management| 423

ubiquitous in politics but is neverthelessa controversialconcept to

measure. As I have reportedpreviouslyin this journal,13analysis of
perceivedamountsof influenceof thevariousgroupswithintheYugoslav
self-managedfactory,indicates influencebeing the greatestfor the
director,thenthe democratically-elected workers'council,management
board, League of Communists,technicalstaff,supervisorsand least for
the union, skilled workersand unskilledworkers.14 While the factory
directoris still quite influential,his power neverthelesshas declined
relativeto thatof his collectivesubordinatesto whom he is responsible.
This can be determinedin part by comparingstructurestraditionally
associated with labour' (e.g., workers' council, union, skilled and
unskilledworkers)and thoseassociatedwith'management'(e.g., director,
managementboard,supervisors and technicalstaff).The resultingratioof
perceivedmanagerial influencevis-à-vislabour influence is 1.278/1.000
(i.e., managementbodies are seen as only 28 per centmoreinfluential).
This is quite favourable when contrasted with capitalist Canadian
factorieswith an influenceratio of 1.345/1.000(i.e., a 35 per cent
difference in favourofmanagement).Comparedto Canadian factoriesthe
Yugoslav factory has less disparityin power between labour and
management,the two major collectivitiesin the workprocess.
This evidence is reinforcedby the findingthat Yugoslav labourers
indicated a greater sense of self-influencethan their Canadian
counterparts. Wherethefindingsbecomemostintriguing, however,is the
discovery that Yugoslav managers also indicated greaterinfluencethan
the Canadian managerssuggested.15 One can speculatefromthisthatas
structuresfor mass participationand cooperationare strengthened, the
totalamountofinfluencebyall personswithinthefactoryincreasesowing
to an increasein effectivenessof thecommunicationsystem.This finding
fortheYugoslav factoryis corroboratedbyempiricalstudiesbyR. Likert
within North America.16Likert found that among those American
factorieswhich were more democratic,total influenceby all factory
groupswas greaterthanamongthelessdemocraticAmericanones. Here,
the suggestionthat power need not lead to zero-sumbased conflictis

the more industrializednorth-western Yugoslav republicof Slovenia. It was feltthatthis

industrializedand urban republicwould providethebesttestinggroundforthehypothesis
thattheYugoslav systemof workers1 self-management could be a modelforotherindustrial
societies.
13. Whitehorn,Canadian Slavonic Papers, XVI, no. 2 (Summer 1974), 175.
14 J. Kolaja, in hispioneeringstudyWorkers'Councils:The YugoslavCase (New York,
1966),p. 34, foundthefollowingconfiguration of influence:workers'councilwiththemost,
thenthe director,the union and lastlv,the League.
15. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,1* p. 174.
16. R. Likert,New Patternsof Management(New York, 1961),p. 98.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
424 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes

inescapable,forit seemsthatpower,ifchannelledproperlythroughsuch
meansas workers'self-management, can increasecooperationand mutual
responsivenessvia enhanced effectivecommunication.In short,it can
become a plus-sumgame and introducea new plateau of industrial
relations.
The foregoingdata should not be interpreted as suggestingthatthe
Yugoslav factory is without continued hierarchical patterns and
Indeed, inequalityof influenceis stillverymuch present.
stratification.
For example,when Yugoslav and Canadian respondentswereasked to
evaluatetheirown individualself-influence,itwas foundthatlabourersin
both systemsreportedsignificantly lower amounts of influencethan
management.17
Perhapsan explanationfortheinequalityof perceivedself-influence
is the moreseriousproblemof the persistenceof information inequality
withinthefactory.Analysingthefactoryas a communication system18one
notesthelow levelofknowledgeabout thefactory's democraticstructure,
details regardingmeetingsand importantmatterssuch as enterprise
profitsand sales.19Hereagain,anothervariablecan be seento explainthis
phenomenon.One of the mostdisturbing findingsof thesurveywas that
evenin Slovenia,themostindustrialized, affluentand educatedrepublicin
Yugoslavia, 50.6 per cent of the respondentsrepliedthat they never
attendedworkers'councilmeetings.20 Withwidespreadabsenteeismfrom
the workers'assembly,it is no wonderthatbasic information about the
systemseemslacking.
A major considerationin any analysis of power is the economic
dimension of power. Wage distribution,in contrastto self-influence
perceptions,reflectssubstantiallyless economic inequalitywithinthe
Yugoslavfactorythanin thecapitalistenterprise. Whereasthewage ratio
of the most skilledto the least skilledin capitalistfactoriesfrequently

17. This finding supports the substantial referencesto stratificationfound in

convergencetheory.See forexample A. Meyer,'Theories of Convergence,"in C. Johnson
(ed.), Changein CommunistSystems(Stanford,1970),pp. 313-41.In thisregardrulingclass
theoristssuch as Pareto and Mosca may be mostgermane.See R. Dahrendorfs Class and
Class Conflictin IndustrialSociety(Stanford,1959)foran insightful reviewand synthesisof
the literature.
18. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism, pp. 178-79.See also H. Wachtel,Workers
Managementand Workers'Wagesin Yugoslavia(Ithaca, 1973).
19. The percentageof Canadian GNP held by labourershas not increasedin the last
thirtyyears.This may suggestthatmajor incomeinequalityis a permanentfeatureof the
capitalisteconomyirrespective of thesocial welfarelegislationintroduced.The base income
See S. Peitchinis,The Canadian Labour Market
level, it seems, makes littledifference.
(Toronto, 1975),p. 332.
20. See, forexample,K. Deutsch,The Nervesof Government (New York,1966),and O.
Young, Systemsof Political Science (Englewood Cliffs,1968), particularlyno. 4. For a
Russianworksee V. S. Afanasyev,The ScientificManagementof Society(Moscow, 1971).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Workers'Self-Management| 425

rangesfroma low of 10:1 to a highof20:1, theYugoslavfactoriessampled

were characterizedby moderateratios rangingbetween4.8:1 to 3.4:1.21
One should note,however,thatthebase salarylevelsin thetwo societies
varysomewhat,withtheCanadian beingthehigher.This maybe a factor,
albeita doubtfulone, causinggreaterincomerangein Canada.22
From the preceding,one can see thattherhetoricof themass public
extensively activein a factorysystemof participatory democracyis stilla
potential,ratherthana fullyaccomplished,fact.While one can notethe
verypositiveachievementthathundredsof thousandsof Yugoslavshave
participatedin thesystemof factoryparliaments, a greatmanylabourers
are stillnon-participants in both attitudeand behaviour.Hence, a more
traditionalmodel of representative democracyseems appropriatewhen
analysing the actual Yugoslav practice to date.23This representative
workers'councilsystemis in themoreimmediatesphereoftheworkplace
and deals withless abstractmattersthan the traditionallyremotestate
legislaturewhichofnecessitymustcoverwidergeographicand population
jurisdictions.Alienationbetweenelectedrepresentatives and electorateis
stillpossible,24
however,and thereare continuedattemptsto decentralize
the factoryparliamentsstill furtherto the shop floor level.25This
decentralizationand continuationof experimentsto nurturea more
democraticand proletariancultureseem reminiscent of Chineseefforts,
despitethe different institutionalmeans selectedin the two countries.26

21. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,"p. 180. It is forthisreasonthatMarkovié

argues in favourof self-management structurescreatingtheirown democraticsystemof
information thatwouldbe independent of managementsinformation system.M. Markovió,
"Basic Issues of Self-Management," Praxis,X, nos. 1-2(1974), 93-100.
22. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,"p. 185.
23. For attemptsat such modelling see D. Goropió and I. Paj, Workers'Self-
Managementin YugoslavUndertakings (Zagreb, 1970)and D. Goropié, The Enterpriseand
theDevelopmentof YugoslavEconomicSystem(Zagreb, 1974).Whitehorn, "Alienationand
Socialism,"pp. 180-85.Goropic's use of Dahl's term"polyarchy"is particularly
interesting.
For a recenttheoreticaldiscussion of the termsee R. Dahl, Afterthe Revolution?-
Authorityin a Good Society(New Haven, 1970).
24. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,"p. 227.
25. The introduction oftheBOAL (Basic Organizationof AssociatedLabour) in recent
yearscan be seen as an attemptto increasedirectparticipation.For a briefoutlineof this
subject,see S. Andov, "CommodityProductionin the Basic Organizationof Associated
Labour," Socialist Thoughtand Practice,1977,no. 2, pp. 69-92,and M. Velimirovié,'The
Organizationof AssociatedLabour," Socialist Thoughtand Practice,1977,no. 1,pp. 68-90.
See also recentissues of YugoslavSurveyand Yugoslav Trade Unions.
26. For a fascinatingcomparisonof the two régimesfroman organizationaltheory
perspectivesee W. Dunn, "Revolutionand Modernizationin EconomicOrganizations,"in
C. Mesa-Lago and C. Beck (eds.), ComparativeSocialist Systems:Essays on Politicsand
Economics(Pittsburg,1975),pp. 147-91.It shouldalso be notedthatDunn and J.Obradovié
havejust publisheda new book, Workers'Self Managementand OrganizationalPowerin
Yugoslavia(Pittsburg,1978) whichdeals at greaterlengthwiththissubject.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
426 I Canadian Slavonic Papers

The resultis thattheYugoslavsystemofworkers'self-management is nota

staticbureaucraticstructure. It is an evolutionaryinterim system,mid-
way between an authoritarian corporatism and a self-guidedfactory
collective.This complicatesresearchand analysis;nevertheless,a number
of tentativeconclusionsabout industrialdemocracyin generaland the
Yugoslav model of workers'self-management in particularare possible.

The YugoslavSystemas a Model for IndustrialDemocracy

Increasingly,publicationshave emergedon the subjectof industrial
democracy.27 manyit is simplyan idea whose timehas come. For
For
othersitrepresents a stepbackwardwithitsallegedrejectionoftheconflict-
based traditional collective bargaining. Whether workers' self-
managementcan generatea new era of cooperationand social justice in
industrialrelationscannotbe resolvedin thispaper. However,a number
of importantquestionsand themescan be discussedthatmayassistin the
28
ongoingdebate on the subject.
First, note the positive featuresof the Yugoslav model. In the
economic realm, one observes that Yugoslavia has one of the most
dynamiceconomiesofthecommunistEast Europeanstates.Thisconfirms
thetheoreticalworkby P. Blumberg29 and J. Vanek30in whichtheyassert
thatindustrialdemocracyneed not hinder economicgrowth.Indeed,there
are sound theoreticalsuggestions that as job dissatisfaction,work
alienation,and communication break-downs31 are reducedthenefficiency
and profitability to
logicallyought improve. One can also arguethatthe
moredemocratically decentralizedcollectivistprocessofdecision-making
may augment the range of advice solicitedand resultin more accurate
plans and productionquotas thanin either monopolycapitalismor Soviet
type command
centralized planning.
In thepsychologicaldomain,one has alreadyobservedtheimportant
attitudinalimprovementsfound in the workers'self-managedfactory.
Lower levels of job dissatisfaction, work alienationand powerlessness
seems likelyto nurturemore democraticpersonalitytraitsamongstthe

27. See, for example, the journal Autogestionet Socialisme (Paris) and in Canada,
Canadiansfor a Democratic WorkplaceNewsletter (Ottawa).
28. See, for example, A. Whitehornand D. Waiden, "Some Considerationsin the
Developmentof a PluralistModel of Self-ManagingSocialism*'(Paper presentedto the
Caucus fora New PoliticalScience,APS A annualmeeting, San Francisco,September1975).
29. P. Blumberg,IndustrialDemocracy: The Sociology of Participation(London.
1968).
30. Vanek,p. 49.
31. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,**passim.For a recentstudyon thissubject
see V. Arzensek,"Alienationand Self-Management** (Paper presentedat the Second
InternationalConferenceon Participation,Workers* Controland Self-Management,Paris,
September1977).

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Workers'Self-Management! 427

populace. Indeed, empiricalvalidationof thishypothesisemergesin the

observationthatdemocraticaspirationsare actuallygreaterin Yugoslavia
than in Canada.32This occursdespitethe brieferdurationof democratic
in Yugoslavia.
social structures
Turningto thepoliticalrealm,one mustnotethevarioussuccessesof
Yugoslav workers'self-management. Greaterinformation, participation
and communicationamongstthe citizenryare presentand are all key
aspectsin ensuringthesurvivalof democraticinstitutions. Byopeningup
intra-factory decision-makingand by democratizinggiant corporate
structures,the Yugoslavs have taken an importantstep in tamingthe
corporate leviathans. Democratic factories can act as significant
counterweights to excessivestatepower.33In short,theycan be democratic
buildingblocks fora fullersociety-wide democracy.
Despite theabove mentionedachievements, theYugoslavexperience
also indicatessome importantpossibleweaknessesand areas in need of
refinement in theconceptof industrialdemocracy.Withdecentralization
of economicdecision-making to the factorylevel,a mixtureof modified
marketmechanismand tutelarydemocraticsocialistplan has necessarily
evolved.The consequence,as Horvathas shown,is thepresenceofdistinct
businesscycleswithinevitableperiods of recession.Giventhe extensive
Yugoslav economic interactionwith the western economies,34the
unemployment and inflationthatis foundin the West is also presentin
Yugoslavia. WhileYugoslavia is a transitionalmodernizing economy,the
ratesforunemployment and inflationseem somewhathighfora labour-
managed economy. Should a continuationof these high rates occur,
régimestabilitymightwell be endangered.No societycan endurelarge
sectorsof underprivileged and unemployedforlong,particularly whena
potentiallyinflammatory nationalityproblemis present.
In the psychologicalsphere there seems to be an increase in
materialistand technocraticorientations. Raised expectations and
demands,while particularlyunderstandablein a developingsociety,are
likelyto unleash increasesin social conflict.35
In his classic studieson
32. Whitehorn,"Alienationand Socialism,"p. 173.
33. This idea of counter-balancewas a key theme in E. Durkheim'swritingson
socialism.See his Socialism (New York, 1958). In thisregard,see varioustheoristsof the
threatby mass societyto democraticorder.W. Kornhauser,The Politicsof Mass Society
(New York, 1959), pp. 227-38. It is perhapsno accidentthat personallibertiesare much
greaterin workers* self-managedYugoslavia than in the centralizedstatistSoviet Union.
34. For a discussionof Yugoslavia's tradingpatterns,see R. Amacher, Yugoslavia's
ForeignTrade: A Studyof State Trade Discrimination (New York, 1972),and R. Biéanic,
Economic Policyin Socialist Yugoslavia(Cambridge,1973).
35. See Z. Mlinar,"Social Values,Development,and Conflicts,"International journal
of Sociology,II, no. 4 (Winter1972-73),384-418(specialissueon Yugoslavia).Mlinarargues
in favourof greaterawarenessand realismregarding theexistenceofconflictwithintheself-
managementsystem.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
428 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes

Suicide and The Divisionof Labour in Society,™ E. Durkheimwarnedof

thesocial consequencesofunrestrained egoismand materialism. Theseare
problemswithwhichYugoslav social theoristswill increasingly have to
deal.
In the politicalrealmof factoryself-management R. Supek suggests
that there has been substantialtransferof power away frompolitical
bodies to technocraticstructures.37 Certainly,an initialpower-balance
shift was necessaryif the Stalinist command economy was to be
dismantled.How fardecision-making should be transferredto technical
groups is open to question. The values favoured by the technical
maywellbe antithetical
intelligentsia to thelongtermpoliticalgoals ofthe
régime. If this is so, there is a serious danger of possible goal
displacement.38
On thisPlatonic-likequestionof whetherit is betterto be ruledby a
technocraticélite or to be a self-guiding democraticcollectivity,one
observes that this problem has perplexed political philosophersfor
centuries.The Yugoslavshave selectedone possibleanswerto thisthorny
question. How viable a long-termsolution this is remainsto be seen.
Certainly,in the short-run,theexperimenthas been a unique success.39

36. E. Durkheim,Suicide (New York, 1965) and The Division of Labour in Society
(New York, 1964).
37. R. Supek, 'Two Types of Self-ManagingOrganizations and Technological
Progress"in FirstInternationalConferenceon Participationand Self-Management,vol. I,
Reports(Zagreb, 1972),p. 169.
38. W. Dunn, "Revolutionand Modernizationin EconomicOrganizations,p. 147.A.
R. Johnson, The Transformation of CommunistIdeology: The YugoslavCase, 1945-1953
(Cambridge,1972) also documentsan earlierdoctrinalshift.
39. M. Jezernik,"StructuralDeterminantsof Political Participationin Yugoslavia**
(Paper presentedto Second InternationalConferenceon Participation,Workers'Control,
and Self-Management,Paris, 1977),p. 1.

This content downloaded from 62.122.79.31 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:50:37 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions