CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 177807 / G.R. No. 177933 October 11, 2011
EMILIO GANCAYCO, Petitioner, v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondents. /
METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. JUSTICE
EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired), Respondent.
DECISION
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[1] promulgated on 18 July 2006 and the
Resolution[2] dated 10 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
84648.
The Facts
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land
located at 746 Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA),[3] Quezon City with an
area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. RT114558.
On 27 March 1956, the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904,
entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial
Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the
Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.[4]
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting
over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for
pedestrians against rain or sun.[5]
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an
arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA,
from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from
one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was
passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the
national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was
left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance,
the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the
property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to
the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first
floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an
arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times. On 8 August 1960, properties
located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance
No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further
amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial
buildings from Balete Street to Seattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated 1
March 1966 meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for
buildings along V. Luna Road, Central District, Quezon City.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently,
sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey
building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance
No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos
request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that
upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time,
demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest
so demands.[6]
Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of
EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution
No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7] The resolution authorized the MMDA and local
government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges,
parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions.[8]
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco
alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the
Philippines (Building Code)[9] in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA
gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that
was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the
fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was
referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. The records of the
present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition;
nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the
demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-
49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City
from demolishing his property. In his Petition,[12] he alleged that the ordinance
authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square
meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the
ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it
allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan
boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct
arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance
No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment
of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In
addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel,
laches and prescription.
Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the
nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the
ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the
questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of
pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the
legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]
The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September 2003 in favor of Justice
Gancayco.[14] It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional,
ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice
Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were being taken without
compensation for the publics benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and
oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners right to equal
protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares
Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,[15] Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional,
invalid and void ab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined
from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent
MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or
wing wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On 18 July
2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.[16] The CA upheld
the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to
promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers.
The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of
property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective
properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no
taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership
of the property, to wit:
Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his
commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said
property. Thus, there is no taking for public use which must be subject to just
compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for
providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same
still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront
of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature,
assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of
protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of
protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged. [17]
Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it
demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only
refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public
places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property.
Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to
declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the appeals are PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224, Quezon City, is
MODIFIED, as follows:
1) The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18] Series of
1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon City, is UPHELD; and
2) The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said
Ordinance is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective
Motions for Partial Reconsideration.[19]
On 10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not
present new issues nor offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of
the Court.[20]
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed
their respective Petitions for Review before this Court. The issues raised by the
parties are summarized as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED
FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
II. WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE
PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.
The Courts Ruling
Estoppel
The MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice
Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he
asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance. According to
them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government
to regulate the construction of buildings.
To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on
two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due
process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates
the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its
application.
On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the
constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance
constitutes a taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his
property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he
was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.
Moreover, in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21] we held:
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact
that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor
in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said
imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent
City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's
authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of
estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void
or ultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in British American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22] we likewise held:
We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the
undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it
considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or
misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to
comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only
later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its
unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what
it perceives to be unlawful discrimination. The mere fact that a law has been
relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from
assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only
when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that
the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the
ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the
exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually
granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the
demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while
the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the
proper person to do so.
Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid exercises of
police power .
In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23] we discussed the nature of police
powers exercised by local government units, to wit:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare.
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body.
To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first
determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can
determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits
of the delegation.
It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city
council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or
the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24] which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction
of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had
the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected
within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.[25]
With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue
zoning ordinances, we apply Social Justice Society v. Atienza.[26] In that case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance on 28
November 2001 reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to
commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in
those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that
they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city
government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect
public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the
end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from
industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and
apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and
future projection of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of
the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be
permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and
residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the
protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected
cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)
In Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27] we
also held:
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of
earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the
absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of
Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction
of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the
promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and
convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not
just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested
portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business
zone along EDSA.
Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28] which was passed after the
Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance
No. 2904. The Building Code states:
Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end,
make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control
their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and
maintenance.
Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing
or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local
government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their
respective jurisdictions.
Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his
property line, and the arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather
than within his property line. We do not need to address this argument
inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we
will not and need not delve into.
To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national
building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of
national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the
construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.
The wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se.
The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisance per
se.
We disagree.
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption
from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building
are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and
adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance
may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures
or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses;
(3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or,
(5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per
accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law
of necessity.[29]
Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building,
the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its
demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This
fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only
courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC
Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30] we held:
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or
abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a
particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can
it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be
determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis
supplied.)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco.
MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it
is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro
Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear
the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it
demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance
No. 2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building
may be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies
with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:
SECTION 205. Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein, the
Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code
in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant
thereto.
Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent
Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act
as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until
regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated
for causes provided by law or decree.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial
jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules
and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of
issuing building permits.
In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its
premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the
requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the
building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code,
the Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms
and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the
Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or
use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used
contrary to the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or
structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official
shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of
danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that
may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions,
Inc.[31] is applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its
charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media
installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3. This Court held:
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling
of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply
had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron
Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to
the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power.
Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:
...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is
an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its
functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz:
Sec.2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.- xxx.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and
in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery
of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy
of local government units concerning purely local matters.
The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009
and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks'
billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against
posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising
media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private property pursuant
to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the
areas as to which the prohibition applied. Moreover, MMC Memorandum
Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other
advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and
because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center
island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have
included MRT3 in its prohibition.
MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096
(Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive.
The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering
the law's following provision, thus:
also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there
was a violation of the ordinance.
As pointed out in Trackworks, the MMDA does not have the power to enact
ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City
Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.
Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be
considered to have approved the demolition of the structure, simply because
then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No.
02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA.
The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent
and abate a nuisance[32] and to further impose the penalty of removal or
demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the
expense of the owner.[33]
MMDAs argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of
powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government
of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,[34]
the city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA
only, without the participation and/or consent of Quezon City. Therefore, the
MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of
the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 is AFFIRMED.

Sec. 201. Responsibility for Administration and Enforcement. - SO ORDERED.

The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the
imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in
the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."

There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH
to implement the Building Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not
include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations.
Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days,
or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court, Provided,
that if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical
entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the
management thereof shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 199669
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED PERSONS, THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondents
DECISION
1
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
2
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated June 17, 2011, and
3
Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 102486, which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern
Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of1 Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons (NCWDP) (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the
Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of: Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as
the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442,
which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the
granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and
persons with disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax
deduction.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of: drugstore
operation in the Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies,
office and bureau tasked to monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442,
promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their effective
implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring1
establishments.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution
of Senior Citizens to Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and
For Other Purposes," was enacted. Under the said law, a senior citizen, who
must be at least 60 years old and has an annual income of not more than
4
P60,000.00, may avail of the privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of
which is 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. The said provision states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. - x x x:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment,
restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the
country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax
credit[.]
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior citizens, covered
establishments can claim an equal amount as tax credit which can be applied
against the income tax due from them.
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed R.A.
No. 9257, amending some provisions of R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained
the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines but removed the annual
income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the
law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted
to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income,
computed based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. The
pertinent provision, as amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled
to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and
(h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services
rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as
deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction
net of value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. (Emphasis
ours)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9257. Article 8 of Rule VI of the said IRR provides:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The establishment may claim the
discounts granted under Rule V, Section 4 - Discounts for Establishments;
Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10
and 11 -Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total
amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if applicable, shall
be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject
to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance
(DOF). (Emphasis ours)
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior citizens did not
sit well with some drug store owners and corporations, claiming it affected the
profitability of their business. Thus, on January 13, 2005, I Carlos Superdrug
Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other. corporation and
proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) I and/or
Preliminary Injunction before this Court, entitled Carlos
5
Superdrug I Corporation v. DSWD, docketed as G.R. No. 166494, assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily on the ground that it
amounts to taking of private property without payment of just compensation. In
a Decision dated June 29, 2007, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate exercise of police
power. The relevant portions of the decision read, thus:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable
of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances,
thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
xxxx
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the
Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws
and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to
property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion
of public good. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests
largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the other private
establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in
invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without
sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of RA. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
6
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Citations omitted)
On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing decision. Subsequently, the Court issued Resolution dated August
7
21, 2007, denying the said motion with finality.
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the "Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons" was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of
PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending
R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of
Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and
incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the
discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income, based on
the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442
reads:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
xxxx
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all
drugstores for the exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;
xxxx
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in subsections (a),
(b), (c), (e), (t) and (g) as taxdeductions based on the net cost of the
goods sold or services rendered: Provided, however, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable
year that the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in
their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was promulgated by the
DSWD, Department of Education, DOF, Department of Tourism and the
8
Department of Transportation and Communications. Sections 5 .1 and 6.1.d
thereof provide:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules and Regulations,
these terms are defined as follows:
5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under
Section 4 of RA 7277, "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-
Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended
and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other
Purposes." This is defined as a person suffering from restriction or
different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory
impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range
considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean: (1) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or
activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3)
being regarded as having such an impairment.
xxxx
6.1.d Purchase of Medicine - At least twenty percent (20%) discount
on the purchase of medicine for the exclusive use and enjoyment of
persons with disability. All drug stores, hospital, pharmacies, clinics
and other similar establishments selling medicines are required to
provide at least twenty percent (20%) discount subject to the
guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH.
On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the CA, seeking
to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257, and (b)
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar as these
provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross income based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered as compensation to private establishments
for the 20% discount that they are required to grant to senior citizens and
PWDs. Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be permanently
enjoined from implementing the assailed provisions.
Ruling of the CA
On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating the ruling of the
10
Court in Carlos Superdrug particularly that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was
a valid exercise of police power. Moreover, the CA held that considering that
the same question had been raised by parties similarly situated and was
resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood as a hindrance to
any further attempt to relitigate the same issue. It further noted that
jurisdictional considerations also compel the dismissal of the action. It
particularly emphasized that it has no original or appellate jurisdiction to pass
11
upon the constitutionality of the assailed laws, the same pertaining to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had concurrent jurisdiction
with the RTC, the principle of hierarchy of courts mandates that the case be
12
commenced and heard by the lower court. The CA further ruled that the
petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for prohibition will not lie
to restrain the actions of the respondents for the simple reason that they do not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the issuance or
implementation of the questioned provisions. Also, the petition was wanting of
the allegations of the specific acts committed by the respondents that
demonstrate the exercise of these powers which may be properly challenged in
13
a petition for prohibition.
14
The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated June
15
17, 2011 of the CA, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
November 25, 2011.
Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
I
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
I. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT A
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED WITH THE CA IS AN
IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE 20%, SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND
PWDs;
II. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN CARLOS
SUPERDRUG CONSTITUTES STARE DECISIS;
III. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 20%, SALES
DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN
INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO
THE PETITIONER AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
DRUGSTORES;
IV. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 20°/o SALES
DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW; and
V. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF
DISABILITIES AND PWDs ARE NOT VAGUE AND DO NOT
VIOLATE THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
16
LAW.
Ruling of the Court
Prohibition may be filed to question
the constitutionality of a law
In the assailed decision, the CA noted that the action, although denominated
as one for prohibition, seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No.9442. It held that in such a
case, the proper remedy is not a special civil 1 action but a petition for
declaratory relief, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
17
RTC, in the first instance, and of the Supreme Court, on appeal.
The Court clarifies.
Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no
appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not
18
been vested by law. This is, however, not the lone office of an action for
19
prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et al., prohibition was
also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive
20
officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number
of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the
constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.
21
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, therein petitioner
filed a petition for prohibition to assail the constitutionality of Section 5.4 of R.A.
No. 9006, or the "Fair Elections Act," which prohibited the publication of
surveys within 15 days before an election for national candidates, and seven
days for local candidates. Included in the petition is a prayer to prohibit the
Commission on Elections from enforcing the said provision. The Court granted
the Petition and struck down the assailed provision for being
22
unconstitutional.
23
In Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al., therein
petitioner assailed the constitutionality of paragraphs (c ), (d), (f) and (g) of
Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," on the ground that they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power for granting unbridled discretion to schools and
private employers in determining the manner of drug 'testing of their
employees, and that the law constitutes a violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It also sought to enjoin the Dangerous
Drugs Board and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency from enforcing the
24
challenged provision. The Court partially granted the petition by declaring
Section 36(f) and (g) of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional, and permanently
25
enjoined the concerned agencies from implementing them.
26
In another instance, consolidated petitions for prohibitions questioning the
constitutionality of the Priority Development Assistance Fund were deliberated
upon by this Court which ultimately granted the same.
Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to challenge the
constitutionality of various laws, rules, and regulations.
There is also no question regarding the jurisdiction of the CA to hear and
decide a petition for prohibition. By express provision of the law, particularly
27
Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the CA was granted "original
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or I processes, whether or not in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This authority· the CA enjoys concurrently with
RTCs and this Court.
In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the ·. hierarchy
of courts does not pose any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at
hand. It is well to remember that "the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-
clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For
this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at the first instance
to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of
facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
28
factual but legal questions."
Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and
important reasons, such as when dictated by public welfare and ' the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
29
justice. Thus, when based on the good judgment of the court, the urgency and
significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should not
hesitate to exercise its duty to resolve.
The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically raises
a legal question on the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the
breadth of its rightful beneficiaries. More importantly, the resolution of the
issues will redound to the benefit of the public as it will put to rest the questions
on the propriety of the granting of discounts to senior citizens and PWDs amid
the fervent insistence of affected establishments that the measure
transgresses their property rights. The Court, therefore, finds it to the best
interest of justice that the instant petition be resolved.
The instant case is not barred by stare decisis.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that the ruling in Carlos
Superdrug constitutes as stare decisis or law of the case which bars the
relitigation of the issues that had been resolved therein and had been raised
anew in the instant petition. It argues that there are substantial differences
between Carlos Superdrug and the circumstances in the instant case which
take it out from the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis. It cites that
in Carlos Superdrug, the Court denied the petition because the petitioner
therein failed to prove the confiscatory effect of the tax deduction scheme as
no proof of actual loss was submitted. It believes that its submission of financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to prove the confiscatory effect of the
law is a material fact that distinguishes the instant case from that of Carlos
30
Superdrug.
The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare
decisis to the instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission of
financial statements which were wanting in the first case, but because it had
the good sense of including questions that had not been raised or deliberated
in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount
granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442
and violation of the equal protection clause.
Nonetheless, the Court finds nothing in the instant case that merits a reversal
of the earlier ruling of the Court in Carlos Superdrug. Contrary to the
petitioner's claim, there is a very slim difference between the issues in Carlos
Superdrug and the instant case with respect to the nature of the senior citizen
discount. A perfunctory reading of the circumstances of the two cases easily
discloses marked similarities in the issues and the arguments raised by the
petitioners in both cases that semantics nor careful play of words can hardly
obscure.
In both cases, it is apparent that what the petitioners are ultimately questioning
is not the grant of the senior citizen discount per se, but the manner by which
they were allowed to recoup the said discount. In particular, they are protesting
the change in the tax treatment of the senior citizen discount from tax credit to
being merely a deduction from gross income which they claimed to have
significantly reduced their profits.
This question had been settled in Carlos Superdrug, where the Court ruled that
the change in the tax treatment of the discount was a valid exercise of police
power, thus:
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net
income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would
have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
xxxx
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount.
As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the
health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of
senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them
for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral
part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set
forth in the law itself. Thus, the Act provides:
SEC. 2. [R.A.] No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.- Pursuant to Article XV, Section
4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly
members while the State may design programs of social security for them. In
addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national
development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt
an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available
to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with
these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act:
xxxx
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the
improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their
partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to
senior citizens for medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory
fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals,
and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic
land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable
of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances,
thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does
to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
proper rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
31
welfare. (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach
the point in their lives when the vigor of their youth has diminished and
resources have become scarce. Not much because of choice, they become
needing of support from the society for whom they presumably spent their
productive days and for whose betterment they' exhausted their energy, know-
how and experience to make our days better to live.
In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important
State responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration
32
into the mainstream of society. This entails the creation of opportunities for
them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing field which
had been unduly tilted against them because of their limitations.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State,
but also on the community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty
emanates from its role as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to
provide protection and look after the welfare of its people especially those who
cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country,
and refers to the State in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a
33
provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves. In fulfilling this
duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power,
eminent domain and power of taxation.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
34
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, the Court passed upon one of the
inherent powers of the state, the police power, where it emphasized, thus:
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least
limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the
State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an
inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs,
police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State,
as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held
that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of
35
the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. (Citations omitted)
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos.
9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of
medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of
this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the
discount is illegal as it constitutes taking without just compensation. It even
submitted financial statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to support its claim
of declining profits when the change in the policy was implemented.
The Court is not swayed.
To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant
case as it had already been made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power
being exercised by the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its
police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just
compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely
because there is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
36
In Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of the DSWD, et al., the
Court ruled that by examining the nature and the effects of R.A. No. 9257, it
becomes apparent that the challenged governmental act was an exercise of
police power. It was held, thus:
[W]e now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it
constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at
their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and
other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount serves to
honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives
on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct
cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the
ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to
a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross
sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other
words, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of
a private establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden
specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that
matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and
the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments
may derive from, senior citizens.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of 'return on investment control laws
37
which are traditionally regarded as police power measures. x x x. (Citations
omitted)
In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
38
health, and prosperity of the State." Even then, the State's claim of police
power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of
the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and
safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State
exercises, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or property
rights in order to advance common good. To warrant such interference, two
requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the!
State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the:
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power
39
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.
The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are
individuals whose well-being is a recognized public duty. As a public duty, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
responsibility for their care devolves upon the concerted efforts of the State,
the family and the community. In Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, the
State is mandated to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power1 for the common good. The more apparent
manifestation of these social inequities is the unequal distribution or access to
healthcare services. To: abet in alleviating this concern, the State is committed
to adopt an integrated! and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost, with priority for the needs of the
40
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
In the same manner, the family and the community have equally significant
duties to perform in reducing social inequality. The family as the basic social
41
institution has the foremost duty to care for its elderly members. On the other
hand, the community, which include the private sector, is recognized as an
active partner of the State in pursuing greater causes. The private sector, being
recipients of the privilege to engage business in our land, utilize our goods as
well as the services of our people for proprietary purposes, it is only fitting to
expect their support in measures that contribute to common good. Moreover,
their right to own, establish and operate economic enterprises is always subject
to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
42
common good so demands.
The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the
legislature to implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to
impose discounts on the medical services and purchases of senior citizens and
PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction rather than tax credit.
The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to
prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there
must be taking of property without just compensation.
Illuminating on this point is the discussion of the Court on the concept
43
of taking in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., viz.:
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory"
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves
no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
xxxx
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far
and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized
that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by
general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme
Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter
of considering the facts in each case.
x x x.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government
regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless
principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the
land make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered
a taking.
xxxx
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an
unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the
44
owner. (Citations omitted)
The petitioner herein attempts to prove its claim that the pertinent provisions of
R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 amount to taking by presenting financial statements
purportedly showing financial losses incurred by them due to the adoption of
the tax deduction scheme.
For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the financial statement is
not of compelling significance in justifying its claim for just compensation. What
is imperative is for it to establish that there was taking in the constitutional
sense or that, in the imposition of the mandatory discount, the power exercised
by the state was eminent domain.
45
According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi, five
circumstances must be present in order to qualify "taking" as an exercise of
eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private
property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
46
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property which clearly does
not obtain in this case. There is no private property that is; invaded or
appropriated by the State. As it is, the petitioner precipitately deemed future
profits as private property and then proceeded to argue that the State took it
away without full compensation. This seemed preposterous considering that
the subject of what the petitioner supposed as taking was not even earned
profits but merely an expectation of profits, which may not even occur. For
obvious reasons, there cannot be taking of a contingency or of a mere
possibility because it lacks physical existence that is necessary before there
could be any taking. Further, it is impossible to quantify the compensation for
the loss of supposed profits before it is earned.
47
The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of permanence and
consistency.1âwphi1 The presence of these characteristics is significant
because they can establish that the effect of the questioned provisions is the
same on all establishments and those losses are indeed its unavoidable
consequence. But apparently these indications are wanting in this case. The
reason is that the impact on the establishments varies depending on their
response to the changes brought about by the subject provisions. To be clear,
establishments, are not prevented from adjusting their prices to accommodate
the effects of the granting of the discount and retain their profitability while
being fully compliant to the laws. It follows that losses are not inevitable
because establishments are free to take business measures to accommodate
the contingency. Lacking in permanence and consistency, there can be no
taking in the constitutional sense. There cannot be taking in one establishment
and none in another, such that the former can claim compensation but the
other may not. Simply told, there is no taking to justify compensation; there is
only poor business decision to blame.
There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of ownership.
Establishments are neither divested of ownership of any of their properties nor
is anything forcibly taken from them. They remain the owner of their goods and
their profit or loss still depends on the performance of their sales.
Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are also provided with a
mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts they grant the senior citizens
and PWDs. It is provided in Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 9442 that establishments may claim the discounts as "tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered." Basically,
whatever amount was given as discount, covered establishments may claim an
equal amount as an expense or tax deduction. The trouble is that the
petitioner, in protesting the change in the tax treatment of the discounts,
apparently seeks tax incentive and not merely a return of the amount given as
discounts. It premised its interpretation of financial losses in terms of the effect
of the change in the tax treatment of the discount on its tax liability; hence, the
claim that the measure was confiscatory. However, as mentioned earlier in the
discussion, loss of profits is not the inevitable result of the change in tax
treatment of the discounts; it is more appropriately a consequence of poor
business decision.
It bears emphasizing that the law does not place a cap on the amount of mark
up that covered establishments may impose on their items. This rests on the
discretion of the establishment which, of course, is expected to put in the price
of the overhead costs, expectation of profits and other considerations into the
selling price of an item. In a simple illustration, here is Drug A, with acquisition
cost of ₱8.00, and selling price of ₱10.00. Then comes a law that imposes 20%
on senior citizens and PWDs, which affected Establishments 1, 2 and 3. Let us
suppose that the approximate number of patrons who purchases Drug A is
100, half of which are senior citizens and PWDs. Before the passage of the
law, all of the establishments are earning the same amount from profit from the
sale of Drug A, viz.:
Before the passage of the law:
Drug A
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ₱10.00
Number of patrons 100
Sales:
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Profit: ₱200
After the passage of the law, the three establishments reacted differently.
Establishment 1 was passive and maintained the price of Drug A at ₱8.00
which understandably resulted in diminution of profits.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Establishment 1 Establishment 3
Drug A Drug A

Acquisition cost ₱8.00 Acquisition cost ₱8.00

Selling price ;₱10.00 Selling price ₱11.20

Number of patrons 100 Number of patrons 100

Senior Citizens/PWD 50 Senior Citizens/PWD 50

Sales Sales

100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00 100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00

Deduction: ₱100.00 Deduction: ₱110.00

Profit: ₱100.00 Profit: ₱190.00

The foregoing demonstrates that it is not the law per se which occasioned the
On the other hand, Establishment 2, mindful that the new law will affect the losses in the covered establishments but bad business I judgment. One of the
profitability of the business, made a calculated decision by increasing the mark main considerations in making business decisions is the law because its effect
up of Drug A to ₱3.20, instead of only ₱2.00. This brought a positive result to is widespread and inevitable. Literally, anything can be a subject of legislation.
the earnings of the company. It is therefore incumbent upon business managers to cover this contingency
and consider it in making business strategies. As shown in the illustration, the
Establishment 2 better responses were exemplified by Establishments 2 and 3 which promptly
put in the additional costs brought about by the law into the price of Drug A. In
Drug A
doing so, they were able to maintain the profitability of the business, even
Acquisition cost ;₱8.00 earning some more, while at the same time being fully compliant with the law.
Selling price ₱11.20 This is not to mention that the illustration is even too simplistic and not' the
most ideal since it dealt only with a single drug being purchased by both
Number of patron 100 regular patrons and senior citizens and PWDs. It did not consider the
Senior Citizens/PWDs 50 accumulated profits from the other medical and non-medical products being
sold by the establishments which are expected to further curb the effect of the
Sales granting of the discounts in the business.
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00 It is therefore unthinkable how the petitioner could have suffered losses due to
Deduction: ₱112.00 the mandated discounts in R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, when a fractional
increase in the prices of items could bring the business standing at a balance
Profit: ₱208.00 even with the introduction of the subject laws. A level adjustment in the pricing
of items is a reasonable business measure to take in order to adapt to the
contingency. This could even make establishments earn more, as shown in the
For its part, Establishment 3 raised the mark up on Drug A to only ₱3.00 just to illustration, since every fractional increase in the price of covered items
even out the effect of the law. This measure left a negligible effect on its profit, translates to a wider cushion to taper off the effect of the granting of discounts
but Establishment 3 took it as a social duty: to share in the cause being and ultimately results to additional profits gained from the purchases of the
promoted by the government while still maintaining profitability. same items by regular patrons who are not entitled to the discount. Clearly, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
effect of the subject laws in the financial standing of covered companies
depends largely on how they respond and forge a balance between profitability
and their sense of social responsibility. The adaptation is entirely up to them
and they are not powerless to make adjustments to accommodate the subject
legislations.
Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the sense that the
State takes away a portion of its supposed profits which could have gone into
its coffers and utilizes it for public purpose. The petitioner claims that the action
of the State amounts to taking for which it should be compensated.
To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and
not earned profits. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a
vested right or an entitlement that has accrued on the person or entity such
that its invasion or deprivation warrants compensation. Vested rights are "fixed,
unalterable, or irrevocable."48 More extensively, they are depicted as follows:
Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a
person that they are not subject to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any
other private person, and which it is right and equitable that the government
should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled
according to the then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not
be deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be
deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure and for the
public welfare. x x x A right is not 'vested' unless it is more than a mere
expectation based on the anticipated continuance of present laws; it must be
an established interest in property, not open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its
accurate legal sense, a right must be complete and consummated, and one of
which the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested without his consent.
49
x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask for just
compensation, it being only an inchoate right or one that has not fully
50
developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own. An inchoate right
is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence. It is
contingent as it only comes "into existence on an event or condition which may
not happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their
51
vesting." Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim confiscation or taking of
something that has yet to exist. It cannot claim deprivation of profit before the
consummation of a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD.
Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute nor indefeasible. It
does not come into being until the occurrence or realization of a condition
precedent. It is a mere "contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It
stands for a mere possibility of profit but nothing might ever be payable under
52
it."
The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the possibility of
compensation because it lacks the quality or characteristic which is necessary
before any act of taking or expropriation can be effected. Moreover, there is no
yardstick fitting to quantify a contingency or to determine compensation for a
mere possibility. Certainly, "taking" presupposes the existence of a subject that
has a quantifiable or determinable value, characteristics which a mere
contingency does not possess.
Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it
is to say that it is within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its
legislative power. It has the authority to choose the subject of legislation,
outline the effective measures to achieve its declared policies and even impose
penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole discretion to decide which
policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not
interfere in this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional
limitations. "In performing this duty, the legislature has no guide but its
53
judgment and discretion and the wisdom of experience." In Carter v. Carter
54
Coal Co., legislative discretion has been described as follows:
Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of means, and
ends with the adoption of methods and details to carry the delegated powers
into effect. x x x [W]hile the powers are rigidly limited to the enumerations of
the Constitution, the means which may be employed to carry the powers into
effect are not restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to
the end, and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the
55
Constitution. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or tax credit is a
matter addressed to the wisdom of the legislature. After all, it is within its
prerogative to enact laws which it deems sufficient to address a specific public
concern. And, in the process of legislation, a bill goes through rigorous tests of
validity, necessity and sufficiency in both houses of Congress before
enrolment. It undergoes close scrutiny of the members of Congress and
necessarily had to surpass the arguments hurled against its passage. Thus,
the presumption of validity that goes with every law as a form of deference to
the process it had gone through and also to the legislature's exercise of
56
discretion. Thus, in lchong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez) etc., and Sarmiento, the
Court emphasized, thus:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the
constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of
determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the
judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law
promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures
adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest.x x
57
x. (Emphasis ours)
The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional burdens: It may
also regulate industries, in the exercise of police power, for the protection of
the public. R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are akin to regulatory laws, the issuance
of which is within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law, zoning
ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and
hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like fall under this
58
category.
Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police power measures from
which affected persons or entities cannot claim exclusion or compensation. For
instance, private establishments cannot protest that the imposition of the
minimum wage is confiscatory since it eats up a considerable chunk of its
profits or that the mandated remuneration is not commensurate for the work
done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum wages underlies the
59
effort of the State; as R.A. No. 6727 expresses it, to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living
for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the
countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business and industry
reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth, and as the
60
Constitution expresses it, to affirm labor as a primary social economic force.
61
Similarly, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 7581 is
likewise a valid exercise of police power and affected establishments cannot
argue that the law was depriving them of supposed gains. The law seeks to
ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime commodities at
reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return
on investment. It likewise aims to provide effective and sufficient protection to
consumers against hoarding, profiteering and cartels with respect to the
supply, distribution, marketing and pricing of said goods, especially during
periods of calamity, emergency, widespread illegal price manipulation and
62
other similar situations.
63
More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc., it was ruled that it is within the
bounds of the police power of the state to impose burden on private entities,
even if it may affect their profits, such as in the imposition of price control
measures. There is no compensable taking but only a recognition of the fact
that they are subject to the regulation of the State and that all personal or
private interests must bow down to the more paramount interest of the State.
This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does not authorize the
destruction of the business. While a business may be regulated, such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance
must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
64
interfered with even by the exercise of police power. After all, regulation only
signifies control or restraint, it does not mean suppression or absolute
prohibition. Thus, in Philippine Communications Satellite
65
Corporation v. Alcuaz, the Court emphasized:
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless
enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control
with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the
66
laws. (Citation omitted)
Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, under the
guise of regulation, allow undue interference in an otherwise legitimate
business.1avvphi1 On the contrary, it was shown that the questioned laws do
not meddle in the business or take anything from it but only regulate its
realization of profits.
The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
The petitioner argues that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are violative of the equal
protection clause in that it failed to distinguish between those who have the
capacity to pay and those who do not, in granting the 20% discount. R.A. No.
9257, in particular, removed the income qualification in R.A. No. 7432
of'₱60,000.00 per annum before a senior citizen may be entitled to the 20o/o
discount.
The contention lacks merit.
The petitioner's argument is dismissive of the reasonable qualification on which
67
the subject laws were based. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., the Court
emphasized:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means
that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
68
circumstances. (Citations omitted)
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
69
and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it
must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
70
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is
a valid classification. The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of
their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs. When the
Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the
71
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children, it did not make
any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal
circumstances. It was a blanket privilege afforded the group of citizens in the
enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class.
R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to
enact measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. 72 Specifically, it
caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is based on age
and therefore qualifies all who have attained the age of 60. Senior citizens are
a class of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government
support, and the fact that they may still be earning for their own sustenance
should not disqualify them from the privilege.
It is well to consider that our senior citizens have already reached the age
when work opportunities have dwindled concurrently as their physical
health.1âwphi1 They are no longer expected to work, but there are still those
who continue to work and contribute what they can to the country. Thus, to
single them out and take them out of the privileges of the law for continuing to
strive and earn income to fend for themselves is inimical to a welfare state that
the Constitution envisions. It is tantamount to penalizing them for their
persistence. It is commending indolence rather than rewarding diligence. It
encourages them to become wards of the State rather than productive
partners.
Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract
workers of the past. While some may be well to do or may have the capacity to
support their sustenance, the discretion to avail of the privileges of the law is
up to them. But to instantly tag them. as undeserving of the privilege would be
the height of ingratitude; it is an outright discrimination.
The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs as a class in
R.A. No. 9442 and in granting them discounts.1âwphi1 It needs no further
explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for most,' last their entire
lifetime. They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving of government
support as our elderlies. While some of them maybe willing to work and earn
income for themselves, their disability deters them from living their full
potential. Thus, the need for assistance from the government to augment the
reduced income or productivity brought about by their physical or intellectual
limitations.
There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to
the purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development and make essential goods
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with
special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among others. The
privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and allow them to live more
comfortably.
The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the government for the
welfare of the senior citizens and PWDs. It is not some random predicament
but an actual, continuing and pressing concern that requires preferential
attention. Also, the laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs, respectively,
without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements for a
valid classification were met.
The definitions of "disabilities" and "PWDs" are clear and unequivocal
Undeterred, the petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9442 is ambiguous particularly
in defining the terms "disability" and "PWDs," such that it lack comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning. It
likewise bewails the futility of the given safeguards to prevent abuse since
government officials who are neither experts nor practitioners of medicine are
given the authority to issue identification cards that authorizes the granting of
the privileges under the law.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The Court disagrees.
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines
"disabled persons" as follows:
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities,
as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in
the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being[.]
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
5.1. PersonswithDisability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of
[R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development
and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and their integration
into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is defined as a
person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the
range considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical
1or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more psychological,
physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such
individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having
such an impairment.
The foregoing definitions have a striking conformity with the definition of
"PWDs" in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities which reads:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with
others. (Emphasis and italics ours)
The seemingly broad definition of the terms was not without good reasons. It
73
recognizes that "disability is an evolving concept" and appreciates the
74
"diversity of PWDs." The terms were given comprehensive definitions so as
to accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not confine it to a
particular case as this would effectively exclude other forms of physical,
intellectual or psychological impairments.
75
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, it was declared, thus:
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
76
act x x x. (Citation omitted)
At any rate, the Court gathers no ambiguity in the provisions of R.A. No. 9442.
As regards the petitioner's claim that the law lacked reasonable standards in
determining the persons entitled to the discount, Section 32 thereof is on point
as it identifies who may avail of the privilege and the manner of its availment. It
states:
Sec. 32. x x x
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons with disability
who are Filipino citizens upon submission of any of the following as proof of
his/her entitlement thereto:
(I) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the
barangay captain of the place where the persons with disability
resides;
(II) The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or
(III) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
It is, however, the petitioner's contention that the foregoing authorizes
government officials who had no medical background to exercise discretion in
issuing identification cards to those claiming to be PWDs. It argues that the
provision lends to the indiscriminate availment of the privileges even by those
who are not qualified.
The petitioner's apprehension demonstrates a superficial understanding of the
law and its implementing rules. To be clear, the issuance of identification cards
to PWDs does not depend on the authority of the city or municipal mayor, the
DSWD or officials of the NCDA (formerly NCWDP). It is well to remember that
what entitles a person to the privileges of the law is his disability, the fact of
which he must prove to qualify. Thus, in NCDA Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
77
001, series of 2008, it is required that the person claiming disability must
submit the following requirements before he shall be issued a PWD
Identification Card:
1. Two "1 x l" recent ID pictures with the names, and signatures or
thumb marks at the back of the picture.
2. One (1) Valid ID
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

78
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability condition d) Sex
e) Address
To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical certificate or f) Date of Birth
assessment, as the case maybe, issued by a licensed private or government g) Picture
physician, licensed teacher or head of a business establishment attesting to his h) Signature of PWD
impairment. The issuing entity depends on whether the disability is apparent or i) Information of medicine purchased:
79
non-apparent. NCDAA.O. No. 001 further provides: i.1 Name of medicine
i.2 Quantity
DISABILITY DOCUMENT ISSUING ENTITY i.3 Attending Physician
i.4 License Number
Apparent Medical Licensed Private or Government Physician i.5 Servicing drug store name
Disability Certificate i.6 Name of dispensing pharmacist
j) Authorization letter of the PWD x x x in case the
medicine is bought by the representative or caregiver
School Licensed Teacher duly signed by the of the PWD.
Assessment School Principal
Certificate of  Head of the Business The PWD identification card also has a validity period of only three years which
Disability Establishment facilitate in the monitoring of those who may need continued support and who
 Head of Non-Government have been relieved of their disability, and therefore may be taken out of the
Organization coverage of the law.

Non-Apparent Medical Licensed Private or Government Physician
Disability Certificate
To provide further safeguard, the Department of Health issued A.O. No. 2009-
0011, providing guidelines for the availment of the 20% discount on the
purchase of medicines by PWDs. In making a purchase, the individual must
present the documents enumerated in Section VI(4)(b ), to wit:
i. PWD identification card x x x
ii. Doctor's prescription stating the name of the PWD, age, sex,
address, date, generic name of the medicine, dosage form, dosage
strength, quantity, signature over printed name of physician,
physician's address, contact number of physician or dentist,
professional license number, professional tax receipt number and
narcotic license number, if applicable. To safeguard the health of
PWDs and to prevent abuse of [R.A. No.] 9257, a doctor's prescription
is required in the purchase of over-the-counter medicines. x x x.
iii. Purchase booklet issued by the local social/health office to PWDs
for free containing the following basic information:
a) PWD ID number
b) Booklet control number
c) Name of PWD
At any rate, the law has penal provisions which give concerned establishments
the option to file a case against those abusing the privilege Section 46(b) of
R.A. No. 9442 provides that "[a]ny person who abuses the privileges granted
herein shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than six months or a
fine of not less than Five Thousand pesos (₱5,000.00), but not more than Fifty
Thousand pesos (₱50,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court." Thus,
concerned establishments, together with the proper government agencies,
must actively participate in monitoring compliance with the law so that only the
intended beneficiaries of the law can avail of the privileges.
Indubitably, the law is clear and unequivocal, and the petitioner claim of
vagueness to cast uncertainty in the validity of the law does not stand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic
Act No. 9257 and Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby
declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 159110 / G.R. No. 159692 December 10, 2013
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, vs. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO)
SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN, Respondents.
BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., and BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE
BRADBURY JABAN, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF
CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF
CITY OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD and CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN
GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO,
and LITO GILBUENA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government units
(LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To
attain the goal, the National Legislature has devolved the three great inherent
powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political subdivision is there by vested
with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly empowered the
LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular traffic and to prohibit
illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now challenged before the Court are
the constitutionality and validity of one such ordinance on the ground that the
ordinance constituted a contravention of the guaranty of due process under the
Constitution by authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles through the
clamping of tires. The challenge originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
the instance of the petitioners – vehicle owners who had borne the brunt of the
implementation of the ordinance –with the RTC declaring the ordinance
unconstitutional, but it has now reached the Court as a consolidated appeal
taken in due course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
the judgment of the RTC.
Antecedents
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu
enacted Ordinance No. 1664toauthorizethetraffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions
1
defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). The pertinent
provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 read:
Section 1. POLICY–It is the policy of the government of the City of Cebu to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating any provision of any City Ordinance on
Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more particularly Ordinance No. 801,
otherwise known as the Traffic Code of Cebu City, as amended, in order to
have a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all
times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES–Any vehicle found violating any
provision of any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu which prohibits,
regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping
any tire of the said violating vehicle with the use of a denver boot vehicle
immobilizer or any other special gadget designed to immobilize motor vehicles.
For this particular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP
Personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby
authorized to immobilize any violating vehicleas hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES–Any motor vehicle, owner or driver violating any
ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations and/or restrictions, as may be
providedunder Ordinance No. 801, as amended, or any other existing
ordinance, shall be penalized in accordance with the penalties imposed in the
ordinance so violated, provided that the vehicle immobilizer may not be
removed or released without its owner or driver paying first to the City
Treasurer of Cebu City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the
accumulated penalties for all prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or
unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) for
the immobilization of the said vehicle, and receipts of such payments
presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau responsible for the release
of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise ordered released by any of the
following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belciña
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an immobilized
or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
liable for its loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for
such loss or destruction under pain or penalty under the
Revised Penal Code and any other existing ordinance of the
City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to his/her civil
liabilities under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided that
any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably
extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard
thereof shall be towed to the city government impounding area
for safekeeping and may be released only after the provision
of Section 3 hereof shall have been fully complied with.
3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance
shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not
less than one (1)month nor more than six (6) months or of a
fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos(₱2,000.00)nor more
than Five Thousand Pesos(₱5,000.00), or both such
2 house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that after
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia,
its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives or officers
of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of
Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process
3 Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the traffic
and for being contrary to law, and damages. Their complaint alleged that on
June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area
on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents fromhis
office;4that upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car
being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the
5
effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; that he had been
infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been thereby
rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was
impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he
had first to pay₱4,200.00as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the
release of his car;6that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and
without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been
immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on
the early morning of November 20, 1997 while his car was parked properly in a
parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without
violating any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was
compelled to pay ₱1,500.00(itemized as ₱500.00 for the clamping
and₱1,000.00for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;
that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM
operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total sum of
₱1,400.00for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment
7
rendered by a court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the
City of Cebu,T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand the
delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu
8
City, and damages. He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had
left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate
of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had
asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the
residence inasmuch as his daughter’s car had been parked in the carport, with
9
the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; that while waiting for
the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the
a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons had clamped
10
the front wheel of his car; that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation
stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM representatives with a
warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover
11
to criminal charges; and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo
12
Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
13
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, the City
enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the
14
plaintiffs; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of
15
constitutionality and validity.
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after trial,
rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void upon the following ratiocination:
In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was expressed by
Daniel Webster as a "law which hears before it condemns". In another case[s],
"procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It
contemplate(s)notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered
affecting ones (sic) person or property." In both procedural and substantive due
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
process, a hearing is always a pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of
one’s life, liberty or property must be done upon and with observance of the
"due process" clause of the Constitution and the non-observance or violation
thereof is, perforce, unconstitutional.
Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a prohibited, restrycted
(sic) or regulated area in the street or along the street, the vehicle is
immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized the motor
vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus, depriving its owner of the
use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP
personnel or Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle
immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the owner or driver paying
first to the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the
accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law violations, plus the
administrative penalty of ₱500.00 and, further, the immobilized vehicle shall be
released only upon presentation of the receipt of said payments and upon
release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police,
Fire and Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed
that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these
ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in
question mandates, is the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector.
Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his
right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by a person
who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority. The
Ordinance in question is penal in nature, and it has been held;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Ordinance No.1664unconstitutional and directing the defendant City
of Cebu to pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the sum of ₱110,000.00
representing the value of his car, and to all the plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi,
Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum
of ₱100,000.00 each or ₱300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another
₱100,000.00 each or₱300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With
costs against defendant City of Cebu.
16
SO ORDERED. (citations omitted)
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning the
following errors to the RTC, namely: (a) the RTC erred in declaring that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding
that any violation prior to its declaration as being unconstitutional was
irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was
unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in awarding damages to the plaintiffs;
(d) granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, the
damages awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and (e) the decision of
the RTC was void, because the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had not
been notified of the proceedings.
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,17overturning the
RTCand declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid, to wit:
The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of Ordinance 1664.
Defendants-appellants contend that the passage of Ordinance 1664is in
accordance with the police powers exercised by the City of Cebu through the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. A thematic analysis of the law on municipal
corporations confirms this view. As in previous legislation, the Local
Government Code delegates police powers to the local governments in two
ways. Firstly, it enumerates the subjects on which the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public
streets, Section 458 of the Code states:
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative branch of the
city, x x x shall x x x
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, park
and other public places and approve the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately owned vehicles which serve the
public; regulate garages and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate
stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting
up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide
for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or
obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places.It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of the
legislative authority of the local government is set out in Section 16, to wit:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Section 16. General Welfare. –Every local government unit shall exercise the unreasonable or discriminatory. The measure in question undoubtedly comes
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as within these parameters.
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on August 4,
welfare. 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for
review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general welfare
clause. As expounded in United States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil 102, the general Issues
welfare clause has two branches. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk
of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may
Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are decisive of
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
the challenge, to wit:
conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause
is much more independent of the specific functions of the council, and
authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for 1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664was enacted within the ambit of the
health, safety, prosperity and convenience of the municipality and its legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
inhabitants.
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664complied with the requirements for
In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause complements the more validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the
specific powers granted a local government. It serves as a catch-all provision Constitution and the relevant statutes.
that ensures that the local government will be equipped to meet any local
contingency that bears upon the welfare of its constituents but has not been Ruling
actually anticipated. So varied and protean are the activities that affect the
legitimate interests of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to say The petitions for review have nomerit.
beforehand what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure
that a local government can react positively to the people’s needs and A.
expectations, the general welfare clause has been devised and interpreted to Tests for a valid ordinance
allow the local legislative council to enact such measures as the occasion
requires. 18
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court restatesthe tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:
Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may be deemed a
legitimate exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
City of Cebu. This local law authorizes traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
for safekeeping vehicles on the streets that are illegally parked and to release
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
them upon payment of the announced penalties. As explained in the preamble,
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
it has become necessary to resort to these measures because of the traffic
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing penalties to
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
curb it. The ordinance is designed to improve traffic conditions in the City of
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial relation to the welfare, comfort and 19
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
convenience of the people of Cebu. The only restrictions to an ordinance
passed under the general welfare clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the
regulation must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
purposes of the corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
and the substantive (i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
B.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the formal requirements
Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the
LGU of the City of Cebu?
The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby raised
against the formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we
presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress enacted the
LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the
State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain,
and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of
these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning
subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.
In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public
20
needs.’" It is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
21
of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same." According to Cooley:
"[The police power] embraces the whole system of internal regulation by which
the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offences
against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens,
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to
prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment
of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent with the right enjoyment of
22
rights by others."
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police
power. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village
23
Association,Inc., the Court cogently observed:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them
by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with
the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done
through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.24Section 458of the LGC
relevantly states: Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. –
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of
the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code,
and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
xxxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and
other public places and approve the construction, improvement repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops and terminals or
regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve the
public; regulate garages and operation of conveyances for hire;designate
stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting
up of signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the streets; and provide
for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;(vi)
Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles
thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the
removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places;(emphasis
supplied)The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to
the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic congestions
associated with development and progress because they were directly familiar
with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed, the LGUs would be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity with
the conditions peculiar to their communities. With the broad latitude in this
regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities ,their traffic regulations must be held
valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional limitations and
statutory safeguards.
C.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the substantive requirements
The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty is embedded in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.4
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any
arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether committed by the
Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential to every
inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has
25
vividly written:
x x x.
If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property,
he is denied the protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is
conditioned on an unreasonable requirement, due process is likewise violated.
Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely
a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process.
Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair
play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of due process; and this
is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure prescribed
by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.
26
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court expounded on the aspects of the
guaranty of due process of law as a limitation on the acts of government, viz:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on
government, usually called "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process."
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that
the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with that kind
of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes
a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is
sufficient justification for the government’s action. Case law in the United
States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very
much on the level of scrutiny used. For example, if a law is in an area where
only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as
the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights,
then the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove that
the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
27
of the person to his life, liberty and property.
The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the confiscation and
immobilization of the motor vehicles to the traffic enforcers or the regular
personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to officials
exercising judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional guaranty of due
process; that such confiscation and immobilization should only be after a
hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the immobilization and the
clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the police or traffic enforcers could
be subject to abuse.
On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664 violated the
constitutional guaranty of due process for being arbitrary and oppressive; and
that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the absolute discretion
to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all at the same time
28
were vague and ambiguous. He reminds that the grant of police powers for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
the general welfare under the LGC was not unlimited but subject to
29
constitutional limitations; and that these consolidated cases should not be
resolved differently from the resolution of a third case assailing the validity of
Ordinance No.1664 (Astillero case), in which the decision of the same RTC
declaring Ordinance No.1664 as unconstitutional had attained finality following
the denial of due course to the appeal of the City of Cebu and its co-
defendants.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process
of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained.1âwphi1 Even
under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC,
supra, were broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else
obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were precisely the subject
of Ordinance No. 1664 in a vowedly aiming to ensure "a smooth flow of
vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times" (Section 1).
This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz:
WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance No. 801) as
amended, provided for Parking Restrictions and Parking Prohibitions in the
streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of parking on certain
streets of Cebu City, violations continued unabated due, among others, to the
very low penalties imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to address the traffic
congestions caused by illegal parkings in the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.1642 in order to fully
address and solve the problem of illegal parking and other violations of the
30
Traffic Code of Cebu City; (emphasis supplied)
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and
progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain
objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance
the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to
fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the
burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing
the streets of the City of Cebu.
Legaspi’s attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague
and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny.1âwphi1 As can be readily seen, its text
was for thright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion
on the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any
vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which the OSG does not
31
concede, there was nothing that a proper application of the basic rules of
statutory construction could not justly rectify.
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by
Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to
protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be
heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and
that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver
or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest
such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance.
Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative
escape in the form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a
protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the
Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City
Prosecutor Felipe Belciña–officials named in the ordinance itself. The release
could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the
stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such
recourse did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the escape
clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by
clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle
owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or
obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver
to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his
violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the transgress or from
using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing
away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding,
but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the
vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The
owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be elevated
complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness. to and determined by no less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should
have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a
Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due process? lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the "interrelation and operation
of the integrated judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a
"becoming modesty" on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due process.
that the Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court
Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the absence of one or 34
sitting en bane to determine. Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that
both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due
process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only on
being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a
35
precedent binding on all.
civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of properties to answer
for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants found to be unsanitary or of
theaters showing obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisance per WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t10ns for review on certiorari for
32 33 their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003 by the
se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto.
Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
The clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 (and
of the vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same character as the SO ORDERED.
aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As
already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the
tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of
apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping
constitute a breach of procedural due process, forgiving the transgressors the
chance to reverse the apprehensions through a timely protest could equally
satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words, the prior intervention of a court of
law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty of due
process.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise,
the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.

Finally, Legaspi’s position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in the
Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the City of
Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being decided
differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly extends too
much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC–irrelevant, because the
connection between that case to these cases was not at all shown. For
another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had improperly acted for so
deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in these cases being already
pending in the CA. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should
have anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings the outcome of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 195003
1 Decree No. 87 (PD 87) to promote the discovery and production of indigenous
CITY OF BATANGAS, represented by Hon. Severina Vilma Abaya, in her
capacity as City Mayor of Batangas, Petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION and SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION
B.V., Respondents
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
The policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was not intended to
create an imperium in imperio and install intra-sovereign political subdivisions
2
independent of the sovereign state. As agents of the state, local governments
should· bear in mind that the police power devolved to them by law must be, at
all times, exercised in a manner consistent with the will of their principal.
The Case
3
This is a petition for review on certiorari (Petition) filed under Rule 45 of the
4
Rules of Court against the Decision dated May 25, 2010 (Assailed Decision)
5
and Resolution dated December 30, 2010 (Assailed Resolution) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 90373 rendered by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the
6
Decision dated June 29, 2007 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City (RTC), Branch 84 in SP. Civil Case Nos. 7924-7925, declaring
7
as invalid Ordinance No. 3, series of 2001, (Assailed Ordinance), enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of the City of
8
Batangas (Batangas City).
The Facts
Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its charter,
Republic Act No. 5495 (RA 5495). Under RA 5495, Batangas City constitutes a
political body corporate, and is endowed with powers which pertain to a
9
municipal corporation. The Sangguniang Panlungsod is the legislative body of
Batangas City.
Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a duly organized Philippine
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and distribution
10
of petroleum products. PSPC owns and operates a refinery situated in
11
Tabangao, Batangas City (Tabangao Refinery).
Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX) is a foreign corporation licensed to
12
do business in the Philippines. In furtherance of the mandate of Presidential
petroleum, the Department of Energy (DOE) executed Service Contract No. 38
(SC 38) with SPEX under which SPEX was tasked to explore and develop
13
possible petroleum sources in North Western Palawan. SPEX's exploration
led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural gas in the Malampaya
field off the shores of Palawan, which thereafter gave rise to the Malampaya
Project. The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer
offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field to
Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
14
On May 28, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed
Ordinance which requires heavy industries operating along the portions of
Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct
desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their
15
industrial facilities. The pertinent portions of the Assailed Ordinance state:
SECTION 3. - MANDATORY REQUIREMENT FOR THE APPROVAL OF
HEAVY INDUSTRIES ALONG THE BATANGAS CITY PORTION OF
BATANGAS BAY AND OTHER AREAS. - In addition to the requirements
provided by laws and ordinances, the City Government shall not grant permit or
clearance or its approval for any project or program involving the construction
or establishment of heavy industries along the Batangas City portion of the
Batangas Bay and other areas delineated as Heavy Industrial Zone without the
required DESALINATION PLANT for use of sea water instead of underground
fresh water for cooling system and industrial purposes.
SECTION 4. - GRACE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR HEAVY INDUSTRIES. - All
heavy industries already established or approved by the City Government prior
to the enactment of this Ordinance, including those to be established, are
granted a period of five (5) years, counted from the date of approval of this
Ordinance, to install [a] desalination plant.
SECTION 5. - AUTHORITY TO GRANT EXEMPTION FROM THE
CONSTRUCTION OF DESALINATION PLANT. - The City Mayor with the
concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod may grant exemption for a given
period to an industry from installation or construction of DESALINATION
PLANT on the basis of the following conditions:
5.1. The exemption will not adversely affect the environment, public health,
public safety and the welfare of the people, more particularly, the local aquifers,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
as shown by a comprehensive ground water assessment or comprehensive
hydrological study conducted by the industry and presented by the industry
applying for exemption.
5.2. The industry or proposed project will support economic-based activities
and provide livelihood, employment, vital community services and facilities
while at the same time posing no adverse effect on the community.
5.3. A public hearing is conducted.
5.4. Such other reasonable conditions which the City Mayor may require with
the concurrence of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
x x xx
SECTION 7. PENAL CLAUSE. -Any person who shall authorize the start of the
construction, development or operation of any project considered as heavy
industry without the approval of the government authorities herein mentioned
shall suffer an imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one
(1) year and a fine of ₱5,000.00.
If the violator is a juridical person or association, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the owner, President, project manager and/or persons directly in charge
of the construction, development and operation of the project.
SECTION 8. POWER OF THE CITY MAYOR TO ISSUE A CEASE AND
DESIST ORDER. - The City Mayor, upon knowledge of the violation of this
ordinance shall issue a cease and desist order for the stoppage of the
construction, development or operation of the project or industry and shall
exercise all powers necessary to give effect to the said order.
SECTION 9. ADMINISTRATIVE FINE. - An administrative fine/penalty of
₱5,000.00 per day of violation of this ordinance shall be imposed upon the
owner, President, project manager, and/or persons directly in charge of the
16
construction, development and operation of the project or industry.
The Assailed Ordinance was approved by the city mayor on June 7, 2001.
Heavy industries subject of the Assailed Ordinance had until May 28, 2006 to
17
comply with its provisions. Among the facilities affected by the Assailed
Ordinance is PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
Proceedings before the RTC
On May 23, 2006, PSPC filed against Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a Petition for Declaration of Nullity (PSPC Petition) before the RTC
praying that the Assailed Ordinance be declared null and void. The PSPC
Petition was raffled to Branch 84, and docketed as SP Civil Case No.
18
7924. Thereafter, SPEX filed a petition-in-intervention (Intervention) praying
19
for the same relief.
JG Summit Petrochemical Corporation (JG Summit) and First Gas Power
Corporation (First Gas) filed similar petitions docketed as SP Civil Case Nos.
20
7925 (JG Summit Petition) and 7926 (First Gas Petition), respectively. These
petitions were likewise raffled to Branch 84, and consolidated with the PSPC
21
Petition for joint trial.
For its part, PSPC averred that the Assailed Ordinance constitutes an invalid
exercise of police power as it failed to meet the substantive requirements for
validity.22 Particularly, PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance contravenes
the Water Code of the Philippines (Water Code), and encroaches upon the
power of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) to regulate and control
23
the Philippines' water resources. In addition, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to sufficiently show the factual or technical
24
basis for its enactment. In this connection, PSPC
alleged that the Assailed Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries, and
holds them solely accountable for the loss of water and destruction of aquifers
without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property rights without due
process of law.
25
On the procedural aspect, PSPC contended that the Assailed Ordinance was
not posted or published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
nor were public hearings or consultations involving concerned parties
26
conducted thereon. Further, there are no records showing that the Assailed
Ordinance, as approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, was forwarded to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Batangas after it was
approved by the city mayor, as required by Section 56 of the Local
27
Government Code (LGC).
SPEX essentially adopted the allegations of PSPC and prayed for the same
relief, asserting that it possesses material and direct interest in the subject
28
matter of the PSPC Petition.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In response, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained that
they have the power to enact the Assailed Ordinance pursuant to the general
29
welfare clause under the LGC. According to them, the rationale of the
Assailed Ordinance is to stop PSPC and other industries similarly situated from
relying "too much" on ground water as coolants for their machineries, and
alternatively promote the use of seawater for such purpose, considering that
30
fresh ground water is a "perishable commodity." Further, Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod countered that the "regulation or prohibition" on
the use of ground water is merely incidental to the main purpose of the
Assailed Ordinance, which is to compel heavy industries such as PSPC to
construct desalination plants. Hence, provisions having regulatory and
prohibitive effect may be taken out of the Assailed Ordinance without entirely
impairing its validity.
31
Further, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod took exception to
PSPC's allegations and asserted that the Assailed Ordinance had been
published in Dyaryo Veritas, a newspaper of general circulation in the area.
Moreover, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod claimed that a joint
public hearing on the Assailed Ordinance had in fact been conducted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, where PSPC
32
was duly represented. In addition, Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod argued that the requirement of referral of ordinances to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan applies only to tax and other revenue
33
measures.
Finally, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod averred that since
PSPC and SPEX, along with other concerned heavy industries, essentially
question the former' s authority to regulate and prohibit the use of fresh ground
water, they should have first referred their grievances to NWRB by filing a
complaint for adjudication on the threatened revocation of their existing water
34
permits.
On June 21, 2007, the RTC resolved the First Gas Petition by issuing a
35
Decision declaring the Assailed Ordinance null and void.
Subsequently, on June 29, 2007 the RTC rendered a Decision, this time
36
resolving the PSPC and JG Summit petitions. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:
It is evident that from foregoing factual milieu and parameters, the questioned
ordinance is INVALID, as it is hereby declared INVALID, in its entirety for want
of necessity and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating the
due process clause of the Constitution with respect to its (sic) Sec. 8, City
Ordinance No. 3, [s]. 2001. No pronouncement as to costs.
37
SO ORDERED.
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PSPC's witness Engineer Joeffrey
Caranto (Engineer Caranto) who conducted a hydrogeology study on the
Tabangao-Malitam watershed from which PSPC sources fresh ground
38
water. The RTC summarized the findings of said study in this wise:
1. A water balance x x x calculation of the Tabangao-Malitam groundwater
system shows that the natural recharge (replenishment) rate far exceeds the
current demand for water in the area. Hence, there is no threat of depletion of
the groundwater resource[s] in the Tabangao-Malitam [w]atershed that
purportedly may result from PSPC's deep well pumping.
2. Water levels in the PSPC wells have not lowered significantly over the last
three (3) decades, indicating that there is no substantial diminution of the
supply of groundwater.
3. Among the four PSPC wells, only one [1] well shows very slightly elevated
levels of chloride at 300 milligrams per liter which however is very low
compared to seawater (which measures 20,000 milligrams of chloride per liter).
The chloride levels in the other nearby PSPC wells are all within drinking water
standards and have not increased in the last four (4) decades of usage. This
indicates that salt water intrusion is not occurring in the PSPC
39
wells. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Panlungsod failed to consult the
NWRB before enacting the Assailed Ordinance, thereby encroaching upon its
40
authority.
Anent Section 8, the RTC concluded that the power granted to the city mayor
to cause the issuance of cease and desist orders against the use of ground
water without prior notice and hearing constitutes a violation of the due process
41
clause.
Proceedings before the CA
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed separate notices of
appeal from the decisions resolving the PSPC, JG Summit and First Gas
42
petitions.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The appeals against JG Summit and First Gas were raffled to the Fourth
Division (CA Fourth Division) and were docketed as CA-G.R. CV Nos. 90324
(JG Summit Appeal) and 90365 (First Gas Appeal), respectively. Meanwhile,
the appeal filed against PSPC and SPEX was raffled to the Tenth Division (CA
Tenth Division), and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 90373 (PSPC Appeal).
In the PSPC Appeal, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod, as
appellants, averred that the R TC failed to consider the testimonies of
barangay captains Joel Caaway and Calixto Villena of Barangays Tabangao
Aplaya and Pinamucan, respectively, who testified that some wells in their
43
areas had dried up, while others had begun to produce salt water. These
testimonies, according to Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, serve as sufficient factual bases for the enactment of the Assailed
Ordinance, as "there could be no higher degree of evidence than the actual
44
experience of the inhabitants in the area."
45
On May 28, 2009, the CA Fourth Division issued a Joint Decision resolving
the JG Summit and First Gas appeals. The Joint Decision affirmed the RTC's
decisions in SP Civil Case Nos. 7924-7925 (involving JG Summit and PSPC)
46
and 7926 (involving First Gas).
On October 15, 2009, the CA Tenth Division directed Batangas City and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod on one hand, and PSPC and SPEX on the other,
to file their respective memoranda on the filing of separate appeals, and the
implications of the Joint Decision of the CA Fourth Division on the resolution of
47
the PSPC Appeal.
48
In their Joint Memorandum, PSPC and SPEX averred that the Joint Decision
in the JG Summit and First Gas appeals bars a contrary decision in the PSPC
49
Appeal, pursuant to the principle of judicial stability. PSPC and SPEX further
contended that the filing of multiple appeals involving the same issues and
50
parties was tantamount to forum shopping.
In their defense, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod claimed that
the filing of separate appeals was made necessary by the fact that the
separate decisions of the RTC in SP Civil Case Nos. 7924-7925 and 7926
51
were issued more than fifteen (15) days apart.
On the basis of the submissions of the parties, the CA Tenth Division issued
the Assailed Decision dismissing the appeal filed against PSPC and SPEX for
lack of merit. The relevant portions of the Assailed Decision read:
City Ordinance No. 3, S.2001 contravenes Presidential Decree No. 1067,
better known as "The Water Code of the Philippines" as it is an encroachment
into the authority of the [NWRB]. The use of water resources is under the
regulatory power of the national government. This is explicit from the provisions
of the Water Code which states that -
"The utilization, explo[i]tation, development, conservation and protection of
water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the
government through the [NWRB]".
Although respondents-appellants insist that the city ordinance is not an
absolute prohibition but merely a regulation on the use of fresh groundwater for
cooling systems and industrial purposes the argument cannot justify the
attempt to usurp the NWRB' s power to regulate and control water resources.
Moreover, not only does the city ordinance prohibit or regulate the use of fresh
groundwater in disregard of previously granted water permits from the NWRB
but also directs the installation of desalination plants for purposes of utilizing
sea water, without the requisite water permit from the NWRB.
x x x The police power of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good. Without the concurrence of these two requisites, the ordinance will not
muster the test of a valid police measure and should be struck down. The trial
court aptly examined the city ordinance against the requirement of reasonable
necessity and correctly concluded that the subject ordinance failed to prove
that it was reasonably necessary to prohibit heavy industries from using ground
water and requiring them instead to construct desalination plants. There must
be a reasonable relation between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment. Arbitrary invasion of personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be allowed even under the
guise of protecting public interest. It has not been sufficiently demonstrated that
there exists no other means less intrusive of private rights that would equally
be effective for the accomplishment of the same purpose.
With the foregoing premises considered, there is no more necessity to address
the other errors raised in the instant appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 29 June 2007
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, in SP Civil
Case No. 7924, declaring invalid City Ordinance No. 3, S.2001 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
52
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod filed a Motion for
53
Reconsideration (MR) dated June 21, 2010, which the CA Tenth Division
subsequently denied through the Assailed Resolution. The CA Tenth Division
found that the MR merely reiterated the arguments relied upon in the appeal,
54
which were already passed upon in the Assailed Decision.
Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod received a copy of the
Assailed Resolution on January 13, 2011.
55
On January 25, 2011, Batangas City filed the present Petition. Notably, the
56
Petition does not name the Sangguniang Panlungsod as party, and only the
signature of then city mayor Severina Vilma Abaya appears on the Verification
57
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached thereto.
58
PSPC and SPEX filed a Motion for Additional Time dated April 1, 2011,
praying for a period of ten (10) days therefrom to file their comment.
59
Thereafter, PSPC and SPEX filed a Second Motion for Additional Time dated
April 11, 2011, praying for an additional period of seven (7) days to file said
comment. Finally, PSPC and SPEX filed their Joint Comment on and/or
60
Opposition to the Petition for Review on Certiorarz- (Joint
Comment/Opposition) dated April 25, 2011 on even date.
Batangas City failed to timely file its reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition,
prompting them to file a Manifestation and Motion for Extension of Time to File
61
a Reply (Manifestation and Motion) dated December 12, 2011. The
Manifestation and Motion prayed that it be granted twenty (20) days therefrom
62
to file its reply. Accordingly, Batangas City filed its Reply dated December 21,
63
2011 on even date.
The Issue
The sole issue for this Court's determination is whether the CA erred in
affirming the RTC Decision which declared the Assailed Ordinance invalid.
The Court's Ruling
Batangas City contends that it has the legal authority to enact ordinances in the
exercise of its police power for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of
64
its inhabitants. Thus, it asserts that it has the power to regulate PSPC's and
SPEX's right to use ground water, as continued use would be injurious to
65
public interest.
Further, Batangas City insists that there is factual basis to justify the enactment
66
of the Assailed Ordinance. As testified to by barangay captains Joel Caaway
and Calixto Villena, a gradual change in the quality and quantity of ground
water had taken place due to the increase in the number of industrial plants
67
along Batangas Bay. According to Batangas City, these testimonies should be
68
given more weight, since they are based on "actual facts and experience."
These assertions lack merit.
The amendment of the Petition should be allowed in the interest of justice.
At the outset, the Court notes that Batangas City erroneously referred to the
'Joint Decision issued by the CA Fourth Division in the JG Summit and First
Gas appeals as the subject of this Petition, instead of the Decision issued by
the CA Tenth Division resolving the PSPC Appeal. Batangas City sought to
correct this error in its Reply, thus:
1. After diligent and careful review [of] the Petition for Review submitted by the
undersigned, it was found out that there was an error which was inadvertently
committed in the first paragraph of the fifth (5th) page of the Petition;
2. The first paragraph on page 5 of the Petition for Review on Certiorari x x x;
xxxx
Should be amended to appear as:
"On June 13, 2007, herein Petitioner City Government of Batangas received
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84 of Batangas City
ruling in favor of Respondents, [PSPC] and Intervenor [SPEX] x x x. Petitioner
filed its Notice of Appeal x x x on 26 July 2007. The case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals and the Tenth Division rendered the 25 May 2010 favoring
[PSPC] and SPEx x x x. The City Government of Batangas filed a Motion for
Reconsideration x x x. The motion was denied by the Tenth Division of the
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated 30 December 2010 x x x. Hence, now
69
this Petition." (Emphasis omitted)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the
lack of any evidence showing that Batangas City's error resulted from anything
more than inadvertence, the Court resolves to permit the amendment of the
Petition in the interest of substantial justice.
The Assailed Ordinance is void for being ultra vires, for being contrary to
existing law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for
its enactment.
The requisites for a valid ordinance are well established. Time and again, the
Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Moreover,
substantively, the ordinance (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (iv) must not prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be
70
general and consistent with public policy; and (vi) must not be unreasonable.
Batangas City claims that the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes
a valid exercise of its police power. This claim is erroneous.
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
71
people. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty, police power primarily rests
with the State. In furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and
meaningful local autonomy, the national legislature delegated the exercise of
72
police power to local government units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such
73
delegation can be found in Section 16 of the LGC, which embodies the
74
general welfare clause.
Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is
incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the
75
State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general
welfare clause may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national
76
statutes. Thus, in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court struck
down an ordinance enacted by Batangas City which granted the Sangguniang
Panlungsod the power to fix subscriber rates charged by CATV providers
operating within the former's territory, as this directly violated a general law
which grants such power exclusively to the National Telecommunications
Commission. In so ruling, the Court stressed that municipalities are precluded
from regulating conduct already covered by a statute involving the same
subject matter, hence:
In De la Cruz vs. Paraz, we laid the general rule "that ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."
xxxx
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has
made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that
the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality,
under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct.1avvphi1 In Keller
vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the charter of a
municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which
are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as
it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general
statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of
statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared
the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for
this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the
municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV
operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance
or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid.
The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which
infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.
In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied
restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.x x
77
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this Petition, the Court is called upon to determine whether the control and
regulation of the use of water may be made subject of a city ordinance under
the regime of the Water Code - a national statute governing the same subject
matter.
The Water Code governs the ownership, appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
78
development, conservation and protection of water resources. Under Article
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
3 thereof, water resources are placed under the control and regulation of the
government through the National Water Resources Council, now the
79
NWRB. In turn, the privilege to appropriate and use water is one which is
exclusively granted and regulated by the State through water permits issued by
80
the NWRB. Once granted, these water permits continue to be valid save only
81
for reasons spelled out under the Water Code itself.
Conversely, the power to modify, suspend, cancel or revoke water permits
82
already issued also rests with NWRB.
On the other hand, the avowed purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, as stated in
its whereas clauses, is the protection of local aquifers for the benefit of the
83
inhabitants of Batangas City. Accordingly, the Assailed Ordinance mandates
all heavy industries operating along Batangas Bay to use seawater in the
operation of their respective facilities, and install desalination plants for this
purpose. Failure to comply with this mandatory requirement would have the
effect of precluding continuous operation, and exposing noncompliant parties
84
to penal and administrative sanctions.
There is no doubt, therefore, that the Assailed Ordinance effectively
contravenes the provisions of the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas
City the power to control and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue
of the provisions of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB. By enacting
the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted
to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra vzres.
Being ultra vires, the Assailed Ordinance, in its entirety, is null and void. Thus,
it becomes unnecessary to still determine if it complies with the other
substantive requirements for a valid ordinance - i.e., that the ordinance is fair
and reasonable.
In any case, it bears emphasizing that the measure of the substantive validity
of an ordinance is the underlying factual basis for which it was enacted. Hence,
without factual basis, an ordinance will necessarily fail the substantive test for
validity.
Batangas City's failure to prove the existence of factual basis to justify the
enactment of the Assailed Ordinance had already been passed upon by the
lower courts.1âwphi1 The Court quotes, with approval, the Joint Decision of the
CA Fourth Division:
To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must be a shown
reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent to the means adopted
by the law to attain it. In this case, as seen in the "whereas clause," the
purpose of the ordinance is to protect the environment and prevent ecological
imbalance, especially the drying up of the aquifers of Batangas City. In effect,
the drying up of aquifers is being blamed on the establishments and industries
such as petitioners-appellees here. It would have been acceptable had there
been a specific study or findings that the local government conducted (sic) and
not just its reliance on the complaints of some constituents who merely made
its conclusion that the drying up of wells or its salination was due to the "heavy
industries"' use of groundwater.
In addition, if appellants were convinced that those industries adversely affect
the environment and specifically the water resource in Batangas City, there
would be no exemptions, as provided in Section 5 of the Ordinance, as it would
negate the purpose of the Jaw.
It thus becomes apparent that the ordinance was come up with in an arbitrary
manner, if not based purely on emotive or flawed premises. There was no
scientific standard or any acceptable standard at all that the ordinance was
85
based on. x x x
While the Joint Decision resolves the JG Summit and First Gas appeals, these
cases, pertain to the same appeal filed by Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod from the Decision of the RTC nullifying the Assailed Ordinance. As
aptly put by the CA in the present case:
The factual antecedents and legal issues in the present CA-G.R. CV No. 90373
are identical to those of CA-G.R. CV Nos. 90324 and 90365. The assignment
of errors in the present appeal are but a restatement of the errors raised in the
two consolidated appeals cases, which errors have already been exhaustively
passed upon by the Court's Fourth Division in its Joint Decision dated May 28,
2009, weighing pieces of evidence that are now the very same pieces of
86
evidence presented for consideration in this appeal. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to
the findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been
affirmed by the CA; accordingly, these findings will not be disturbed. To be
87
sure, such findings are binding and conclusive upon this Court, and it is not
the Court's function in a petition for review on certiorari to examine, evaluate or
weigh anew the probative value of the evidence presented before the trial
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

88
court. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the Court finds that
none is present in this case.

Consequently, since it has been established that Batangas City did not have
factual basis to justify the purpose of the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City
cannot invoke the presumption of validity. As held in Ermita-Ma/ate Hotel and
89
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, which Batangas
City itself cites in its Petition, the presumption of validity ascribed to an
ordinance prevails only in the absence of some factual foundation of
90
record sufficient to overthrow the assailed issuance. In this case, the
presumption of validity ascribed to the Assailed Ordinance had been
overturned by documentary and testimonial evidence showing that no
substantial diminution in the supply of ground water in the TabangaoMalitam
watershed had occurred in the last three (3) decades, and that no threat of
91
depletion of ground water resources in said watershed existed.

Final Note

While the Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the
pronouncements hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy industries to
be carte blanche to abuse their respective water rights at the expense of the
health and safety of the inhabitants of Batangas City, the environment within
which these inhabitants live, and the resources upon which these inhabitants
rely. The Court recognizes fresh ground water as an invaluable natural
resource, and deems it necessary to emphasize that Batangas City is not
precluded from exercising its right to protect its inhabitants from injurious
effects which may result from the misuse of natural water resources within its
territorial jurisdiction, should these effects later arise, provided that such
exercise is done within the framework of applicable national law, particularly,
the Water Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution
dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90373
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 165354 January 12, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The expropriator who has taken possession of the property subject of
expropriation is obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner for
the period of such possession although the proceedings had been discontinued
on the ground that the public purpose for the expropriation had meanwhile
ceased.
Antecedents
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government-owned and -
controlled corporation vested with authority under Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended, to undertake the development of hydro-electric generation of power,
production of electricity from any and all sources, construction, operation and
maintenance of power plants, auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, main
transmission lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the
purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek, spring and
waterfalls in the Philippines and to supply such power to the inhabitants
1
thereof.
In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San
Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines for
the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission
2
Project. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property, with a
total area of 14,257 square meters, which was registered under Transfer
3 16
Certificate of Title No. T-9696 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas.
On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the
4
Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an
easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving an area of only
5
6,326 square meters, more or less, alleging that it had negotiated with the
respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach
any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit the amount of
₱9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be
6
expropriated. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to
enable it to enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the
property; to demolish all improvements existing thereon; and to commence
construction of the transmission line project. It likewise prayed for the
appointment of three commissioners to determine the just compensation to be
7
paid.
8
In their answer with motion to dismiss, the respondents staunchly maintained
that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and
that the entry was done without their consent in the process, destroying some
fruit trees without payment, and installing five transmission line posts and five
9
woodpoles for its project; that the area being expropriated only covered the
portion directly affected by the transmission lines; that the remaining portion of
the property was also affected because the transmission line passed through
the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into three lots; that the
presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property
10
inutile for any future use and capabilities; that, nonetheless, they tendered no
objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not
only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose
11
potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project; and that
their property was classified as industrial land. Thus, they sought the dismissal
of the complaint, the payment of just compensation of ₱1,000.00/square meter,
12
and attorney’s fees; and to be allowed to nominate their representative to the
13
panel of commissioners to be appointed by the trial court.
In the pre-trial conference conducted on December 20, 1995, the parties
stipulated on: (1) the location of the property; (2) the number of the heirs of the
late Saturnino Q. Borbon; (3) the names of the persons upon whom title to the
property was issued; and (4) the ownership and possession of the
14
property. In its order of that date, the RTC directed the parties to submit the
names of their nominees to sit in the panel of commissioners within 10 days
15
from the date of the pre-trial.
The RTC constituted the panel of three commissioners. Two commissioners
submitted a joint report on April 8, 1999, in which they found that the property
17
was classified as industrial land located within the Industrial 2 Zone; that
although the property used to be classified as agricultural (i.e., horticultural and
pasture land), it was reclassified to industrial land for appraisal or taxation
purposes on June 30, 1994; and that the reclassification was made on the
basis of a certification issued by the Zoning Administrator pursuant to Section
3.10 (d) of the Amended Zoning Ordinance (1989) of the City of
18
Batangas. The two commissioners appraised the value at ₱550.00/square
19
meter. However, the third commissioner filed a separate report dated March
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
20
16, 1999, whereby he recommended the payment of "an easement fee of at
least ten percent (10%) of the assessed value indicated in the tax
21
declaration plus cost of damages in the course of the construction,
22
improvements affected and tower occupancy fee."
The parties then submitted their respective objections to the reports. On their
part, the respondents maintained that NAPOCOR should compensate them for
the entire property at the rate of ₱550.00/square meter because the property
23
was already classified as industrial land at the time NAPOCOR entered it. In
contrast, NAPOCOR objected to the joint report, insisting that the property was
classified as agricultural land at the time of its taking in March 1993; and
clarifying that it was only seeking an easement of right of way over a portion of
the property, not the entire area thereof, so that it should pay only 10% of the
assessed value of the portion thus occupied.
24
25
In the judgment dated November 27, 2000, the RTC adopted the
recommendation contained in the joint report, and ruled thusly:
The price to be paid for an expropriated land is its value at the time of taking,
which is the date when the plaintiff actually entered the property or the date of
the filing of the complaint for expropriation. In this case, there is no evidence as
to when the plaintiff actually entered the property in question, so the reference
point should be the date of filing of the complaint, which is May 5, 1995.
On this date, the property in question was already classified as industrial. So,
the Joint Report (Exhibit "1") is credible on this point. The two Commissioners
who submitted the Joint Report are government officials who were not shown
to be biased. So, that their report should be given more weight than the
minority report submitted by a private lawyer representing the plaintiff. In view
of these, the Court adopts the Joint Report and rejects the minority report. The
former fixed the just compensation at ₱550.00 per square meter for the whole
26
lot of 14,257 square meters.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondents: (1) just
compensation for the whole area of 14,257 square meters at the rate of
₱550.00/square meter; (2) legal rate of interest from May 5, 1995 until full
27
payment; and (3) the costs of suit.
NAPOCOR appealed (CA-G.R. No. 72069).
28
On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 27, 2000
of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied
6,326 square meters of the subject real property at the rate of ₱550.00 per
square meter and to pay legal interest therefrom until fully paid.
29
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal by NAPOCOR.
Issue
On December 3, 2012, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings stating that negotiations between the parties were
30
going on with a view to the amicable settlement of the case.
On January 3, 2014, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to
31
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to
reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was
no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement
32
of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that because
the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to
exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the
State was now duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the
dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Hence, NAPOCOR
prayed that the proceedings be discontinued "under such terms as the court
33
deems just and equitable," and that the compensation to be awarded the
respondents be reduced by the equivalent of the benefit they received from the
land during the time of its occupation, for which purpose the case could be
remanded to the trial court for the determination of reasonable compensation to
34
be paid to them.
In light of its Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings, NAPOCOR contends that the expropriation has become without
basis for lack of public purpose as a result of the retirement of the transmission
lines; that if expropriation still proceeds, the Government will be unduly
burdened by payment of just compensation for property it no longer requires;
and that there is legal basis in dismissing the proceedings, citing Metropolitan
35
Water District v. De los Angeles where the Court granted petitioner’s prayer
for the quashal of expropriation proceedings and the eventual dismissal of the
proceedings on the ground that the land sought to be expropriated was no
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
longer "indispensably necessary" in the maintenance and operation of
petitioner's waterworks system.
The issue to be considered and resolved is whether or not the expropriation
proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling of the Court
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of
36
NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon
such terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of
eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is "the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of
37
all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose." But the
exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely:
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be
38
paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied
conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
39
property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means "use by the public." However, the
concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the
40
benefit of the public. In Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of
41
Transportation and Communications, Justice Corona, in his dissenting
opinion said that:
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term "public
use" has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and
exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to
actual "use by the public" has already been abandoned. "Public use" has now
been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," and "public
convenience."
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the
public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
42
v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the
new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would
lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process
of law, and the judgment would violate the property owner's right to justice,
fairness and equity.
43
44
A review reveals that Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles is an
appropriate precedent herein. There, the Metropolitan Water District passed a
board resolution requesting the Attorney-General to file a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Rizal praying that it be permitted to
discontinue the condemnation proceedings it had initiated for the expropriation
of a parcel of land in Montalban, Rizal to be used in the construction of the
Angat Waterworks System. It claimed that the land was no longer
indispensably necessary in the maintenance and operation of its waterworks
system, and that the expropriation complaint should then be dismissed. The
Court, expounding on the power of the State to exercise the right of eminent
domain, then pronounced:
There is no question raised concerning the right of the plaintiff here to acquire
the land under the power of eminent domain.1âwphi1 That power was
expressly granted it by its charter. The power of eminent domain is a right
reserved to the people or Government to take property for public use. It is the
right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert either temporarily
or permanently its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account
of public necessity and for the public good. The right of eminent domain is the
right which the Government or the people retains over the estates of individuals
to resume them for public use. It is the right of the people, or the sovereign, to
dispose, in case of public necessity and for the public safety, of all the wealth
45
contained in the state.
Indeed, public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation;
hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and
should be granted. The Court has observed in Metropolitan Water District v. De
los Angeles:
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in
question for public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use.
That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot
be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That
must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of
the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for
some public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to
dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation
is not for public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation of the
appellate court to dismiss it.
In the present case the petitioner admits that the expropriation of the land in
question is no longer necessary for public use. Had that admission been made
in the trial court the case should have been dismissed there. It now appearing
positively, by resolution of the plaintiff, that the expropriation is not necessary
for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion on the
part of the plaintiff. The moment it appears in whatever stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use the complaint should
be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further
46
annoyance or litigation. (underscoring and emphasis supplied)
It is notable that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings in Metropolitan
Water District v. De los Angeles was made subject to several conditions in
order to address the dispossession of the defendants of their land, and the
inconvenience, annoyance and damages suffered by the defendants on
account of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the
trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession ordering Metropolitan Water
District to immediately return possession of the land to the defendants, and for
the determination of damages in favor of the defendants, the claims for which
must be presented within 30 days from the return of the record to the court of
47
origin and notice thereof.
Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the
ground that the transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property
had already been retired. Considering that the Court has consistently upheld
the primordial importance of public use in expropriation proceedings,
NAPOCOR’s reliance on Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles was apt
and correct. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped
the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with
the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public
purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in
favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public
use.
Unlike in Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles where the request to
discontinue the expropriation proceedings was made upon the authority
48
appearing in the board resolution issued on July 14, 1930, counsel for
NAPOCOR has not presented herein any document to show that NAPOCOR
had decided, as a corporate body, to discontinue the expropriation
proceedings. Nonetheless, the Court points to the Memorandum dated
49
December 13, 2012 and the Certificate of Inspection/Accomplishment dated
50
February 5, 2005 attached to NAPOCOR’s motion attesting to the retirement
of the transmission lines. Also, Metropolitan Water District v. De los Angeles
emphasized that it became the duty and the obligation of the court, regardless
of the stage of the proceedings, to dismiss the action "if it should be made to
appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some
51
public use." Despite the lack of the board resolution, therefore, the Court now
considers the documents attached to NAPOCOR’s Manifestation and Motion to
Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings to be sufficient to establish that the
expropriation sought is no longer for some public purpose.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings
subject to the conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the
return of the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out
that NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without
paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount
as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any
52
person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants
without payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the
middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively
rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for
NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the
possession of the property. There should be no question about the taking. In
53
several rulings, notably National Power Corporation v. Zabala, Republic v.
54 55
Libunao, National Power Corporation v. Tuazon, and National Power
56
Corporation v. Saludares, this Court has already declared that "since the
high-tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will
perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is
only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market
value of their property."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
There is a sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and took possession
of the respondents’ property as early as in March 1993 without the benefit of
first filing a petition for eminent domain. For all intents and purposes, therefore,
March 1993 is the reckoning point of NAPOCOR’s taking of the property,
instead of May 5, 1995, the time NAPOCOR filed the petition for expropriation.
57
The reckoning conforms to the pronouncement in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., to
wit:
Normally, of course, where the institution of an expropriation action precedes
the taking of the property subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of
the time of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules of Court,
the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned
on its deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the
property as provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the
proceedings.
There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the
case at bar is quite extraordinary in that possession was taken by the
expropriator more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this Court has
ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking,
not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, there is a
"taking" when the owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;
when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of
his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a
"taking" in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for
a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is
nothing without the inherent rights of possession, control and enjoyment.
Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property
or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
58
Constitutional sense." x x x.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay "just compensation" to
them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in
March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them
actual or other compensatory damages. This conforms with the following
59
pronouncement in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr.:
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private
property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion
of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
60
become improper for lack of the required factual justification.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually
lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its
use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the
dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during
the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings
as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For
that purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, with instruction to the court of origin to enable the parties to fully
litigate the action for damages by giving them the opportunity to re-define the
factual and legal issues by the submission of the proper pleadings on the
extent of the taking, the value of the compensation to be paid to the
respondents by NAPOCOR, and other relevant matters as they deem fit. Trial
shall be limited to matters the evidence upon which had not been heretofore
heard or adduced. The assessment and payment of the correct amount of filing
fees due from the respondents shall be made in the judgment, and such
amount shall constitute a first lien on the recovery. Subject to these conditions,
the court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for
damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the expropriation proceedings due to the
intervening cessation of the need for public use; REMANDS the records to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Batangas City as the court of origin for
further proceedings to be conducted in accordance with the foregoing
instructions; and ORDERS said trial court to try and decide the issues with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 150640 March 22, 2007
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, rep. by
BARANGAY CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA
SINDAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of
individuals without due process of law.
The Case
For review before the Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 are the
1 2
May 30, 2001 Decision and October 26, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
3
Appeals (CA), reversing and setting aside the August 2, 1990 Order of the
San Fernando, Pampanga Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43. The CA
Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2001
Decision and in effect, the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for
eminent domain.
The Facts
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council,
petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by
Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain
against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the
registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 117674-R. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6756 and
raffled to the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC, Branch 43. Petitioner sought to
convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road.
The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation were
stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6, as follows:
WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay
feeder road for the agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as
inlet for their basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before
they can reach the concrete provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and
money, not to mention possible damage and/or spilage [sic] on the products
consigned to or coming from, the market outside the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the
general welfare of the people residing therein social, cultural and health among
4
other things, beside economic.
Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and
nearest way to the municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the
trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of
5
the property.
On the other hand, respondents stated that they owned the 27,000- square
meter property, a portion of which is the subject of this case. In their
6
Memorandum, they alleged that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision
privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife. Prior to the filing of the
expropriation case, said subdivision was linked to MacArthur Highway through
a pathway across the land of a certain Torres family. Long before the passage
of the barangay resolution, the wives of the subdivision owner and the
barangay captain, who were known to be agents of the subdivision, had
proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a portion of
respondents’ property. These prospective buyers, however, never returned
after learning of the price which the respondents ascribed to their property.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private
use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They
contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II
Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road
being proposed to be built across the respondents’ land was to serve a
privately owned subdivision and those who would purchase the lots of said
subdivision. They also pointed out that under Presidential Decree No. (PD)
957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the
7
subdivision residents.
After trial, the court a quo ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises duly considered, the
herein plaintiff is hereby declared as having a lawful right to take the property
hereinabove described and sought to be condemned for the public purpose or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
use as aforestated, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the filing of the Complaint in this [sic] expropriation proceedings.
Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation, let three (3) competent and
disinterested persons be appointed as Commissioners to ascertain and report
8
to the Court the just compensation for the property condemned.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA held:
We are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the
right of way needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in
Section 29 of P.D. 957. Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is supposed
to benefit from this [sic] expropriation proceedings is in reality Davsan II
Subdivision as per the testimony of Ruben Palo, plaintiff’s own witness (TSN,
p. 12, December 115, 1986) [sic]. Appellants correctly stated that:
"The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, in effect relieved the
owners of Davsan II Subdivision of spending their own private funds for
acquiring a right of way and constructing the required access road to the
subdivision. It spent public funds for such private purpose and deprived herein
defendants-appellants of their property for an ostensible public purpose x x x."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
9
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of
eminent domain, (2) finding that the expropriation of the property is not for
public use but for a privately owned subdivision, (3) finding that there was no
payment of just compensation, and (4) failing to accord respect to the findings
of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the
proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public
purpose.1awphi1.nét
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a
sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a
public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon payment of just
10
compensation." It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on
a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual
members of the community to the great necessities of the whole
11
community." 1ªvvphi1.nét
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two
constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2)
that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due
process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is
susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited
meaning attached to "public use" is "use by the public" or "public employment,"
that "a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use
intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some
portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to
12
use the property after it is condemned." The more generally accepted view
sees "public use" as "public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies,
and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the
inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and
the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which]
contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
13
community." In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is
14
beneficially employed for the community."
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation
cannot depend on the "numerical count of those to be served or the smallness
15
or largeness of the community to be benefited." The number of people is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is
16
exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. Thus, the
first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the
expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated that expropriation ends with an order of
condemnation declaring "that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
17
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation."
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just
compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits
18
Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, just compensation has been
defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator," and that the gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but
the owner’s loss. In order for the payment to be "just," it must be real,
substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly
determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export
Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a
19
"reasonable time" from the taking of the property. It succinctly explained that
without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch
as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss.
Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must
immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing
Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the
20
final compensation until paid. Thus, any further delay in the payment will
result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the recent case
of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that "where the government
failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
21
the right to recover possession of their property."
Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the
expropriation authority should not further prejudice the owner’s rights by
delaying payment of just compensation. To obviate any possibility of delay in
the payment, the expropriator should already make available, at the time of the
filing of the expropriation complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal
valuation or the fair market value of the property per tax declaration whichever
is higher.
The delayed payment of just compensation in numerous cases results from
lack of funds or the time spent in the determination of the legality of the
expropriation and/or the fair valuation of the property, and could result in
dismay, disappointment, bitterness, and even rancor on the part of the lot
owners. It is not uncommon for the expropriator to take possession of the
condemned property upon deposit of a small amount equal to the assessed
value of the land per tax declaration and then challenge the valuation fixed by
the trial court resulting in an "expropriate now, pay later" situation. In the event
the expropriating agency questions the reasonability of the compensation fixed
by the trial court before the appellate court, then the latter may, upon motion,
use its sound discretion to order the payment to the lot owner of the amount
equal to the valuation of the property, as proposed by the condemnor during
the proceedings before the commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the final valuation of the land. This way, the damage and
prejudice to the property owner would be considerably pared down.
On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property
owner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of
public use and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on
22
them. It is settled that taking of property for a private use or without just
compensation is a deprivation of property without due process of
23
law. Moreover, it has to be emphasized that taking of private property without
filing any complaint before a court of law under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or
existing laws is patently felonious, confiscatory, and unconstitutional. Judicial
notice can be taken of some instances wherein some government agencies or
corporations peremptorily took possession of private properties and usurped
the owner’s real rights for their immediate use without first instituting the
required court action. Running roughshod over the property rights of individuals
is a clear and gross breach of the constitutional guarantee of due process,
which should not be countenanced in a society where the rule of law holds
sway.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of
sovereignty similar to police power and taxation. As a basic political unit, its
Sangguniang Barangay is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads
and other facilities for public use and welfare. Petitioner relied on the following
cases which held a liberal view of the term "public use" in recognition of the
evolving concept of the power of eminent domain: Seña v. Manila Railroad
Co.; Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis; Sumulong v.
Guerrero; Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals; and Manosca v.
24
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question
in this petition, however, is whether the taking of the land was for a public
purpose or use. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that
the taking of private property must be for a public purpose. A corollary issue is
whether private property can be taken by law from one person and given to
another in the guise of public purpose.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In this regard, the petition must fail.
Petitioner alleges that there are at least 80 houses in the place and about 400
persons will be benefited with the use of a barangay road. The trial court
believed that the expropriation "will not benefit only the residents of the
subdivision, but also the residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the residents
25
of the entire Barangay of Sindalan x x x." The trial court held that the
subdivision is covered by Sitio or Purok Paraiso which is a part or parcel of
Barangay Sindalan. However, this finding was not supported by evidence. On
the contrary, it is Sitio Paraiso which is within Davsan II Subdivision based on
the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Ruben Palo, as follows:
Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you have been residing at Sitio
Paraiso since 1973, is this Sitio Paraiso within the Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased that or at the time you purchased
it in 1972, I am referring to the lot where you are now residing, the Davson [sic]
Subdivision did not provide for a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio
road, am I correct?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you purchased a lot inside Davson
[sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from the developer of Davson [sic]
Subdivision that he should provide a road linking from the subdivision to the
barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: No, sir, because I know they will provide for the road.
Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they will provide for that road, you
mean to tell us that it is the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision who will
provide a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the proposed
road which will connect from Davson [sic] Subdivision to the barrio road of
Sindalan would benefit mainly the lot buyers and home owners of Davson [sic]
Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me that there is no portion of
Davson [sic] Subdivision which is devoted to the production of agricultural
products?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the subject of this case and sought
to be expropriated has not yet been opened and before a Writ of Possession
was issued by the Court to place the plaintiff in this case in possession, the
residents of Davson [sic] Subdivision have other way in going to the barrio
road?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness, how do you negotiate or go out of
the subdivision in going to the barrio?
Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr. Torres which is near the
subdivision in going to the barrio road, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the owner/developer of the
subdivision that he should provide for a road linking to [sic] his subdivision to
the barrio road because there is no available exit from the said subdivision to
the barrio road?
Witness: We have been telling that and he was promising that there will be a
26
road, sir.
Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to
serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other
residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by
the contemplated road to be constructed on the lot of respondents spouses
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. While the number of people who use or
can use the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public
use or purpose, the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of
respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is
27
not exercisable in common. Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the
subdivision’s owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide
road access to the subdivision in conjunction with his development permit and
license to sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be
relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way. In this factual setting, the
Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able to go to the barrio road by passing
through the lot of a certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is
that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan
II Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private
individual is clearly proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be
for public use or purpose. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on
expropriation was underscored, hence:
Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property,
public as well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore;
yet it has never been understood, at least never in our republic, that the
sovereign power can take the private property of A and give it to B by the right
of eminent domain; or that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or
that it can take it for public purposes, without the duty and responsibility of
ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the private property of one, for the
28
good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642) (emphasis supplied).
US case law also points out that a member of the public cannot acquire a
certain private easement by means of expropriation for being unconstitutional,
because "even if every member of the public should acquire the easement, it
29
would remain a bundle of private easements."
Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the expropriation is
expressed in Section 29, PD 957, which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or developer of a
subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure a
right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be developed
and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities
concerned.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot
owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a
right-of-way for them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide
an access road does not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents
of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his
obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is
patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of
an unlawful purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed
condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a
private individual without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would
constitute malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper remedy is to require
the Davsan II Subdivision owner to file a complaint for establishment of the
easement of right-of-way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code.
Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show that their lot is not a
servient estate. Plainly, petitioner’s resort to expropriation is an improper cause
of action.
One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public
use and with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a
deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good—which is public use—
and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these
safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null
and void, but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of
an individual’s basic right to property as well.
For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the
property owner and must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the
alleged public purpose behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for
in resolving complaints for condemnation, such that when a serious doubt
arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and the October 26,
2001 Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 218628 / G.R. No. 218631
EVERGREEN MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Respondent
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,Petitioner, vs. EVERGREEN
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation (Evergreen) is the
petitioner in G.R. No. 218628 while the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways
(RepublicDPWH), is the petitioner in G .R. No. 218631. Both challenge the 26
1 2
June 2014 Decision and the 25 May 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98157. The CA affirmed, with modification, the 30
3 4
June 2011 Decision and the 3 November 2011 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 166 of Pasig City in SCA No. 2641 for Expropriation.
The Facts
Evergreen is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Santolan, Pasig City, which covers an area of 1,428.68 square meters and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-114857 (Subject Property).
Republic-DPWH seeks to expropriate a portion of the Subject Property
covering 173.08 square meters (Subject Premises) which will be used for a
public purpose - the construction of Package 3, Marikina Bridge and Access
Road, Metro Manila Urban Transport Integration Project.
Based on the zonal, industrial classification and valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) of the real properties situated in Barangay Santolan,
Evangelista Street, in the vicinity of A. Rodriguez boundary where the Subject
Property is situated, the properties have an appraised value of ₱6,000.00 per
square meter. While Republic-DPWH offered to acquire the Subject Premises
by negotiated sales Evergreen declined this offer. Thus, Republic-DPWH filed
a complaint for expropriation on 22 March 2004.
Evergreen, in opposing the complaint for expropriation, alleged that the
conditions for filing a complaint for expropriation have not been met, and that
there is no necessity for expropriation. It argued that an expropriation of the
Subject Premises would impair the rights of leaseholders in gross violation of
the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts.
It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
In the alternative, in the possibility that expropriation is deemed proper,
Evergreen prayed that in addition to the payment of just compensation,
Republic-DPWH be ordered to (a) cause a re-survey of the remaining areas of
the Subject Property and draw a new lot plan and vicinity plan for each area;
(b) draw up a new technical description of the remaining areas for approval of
the proper government agencies; (c) cause the issuance of new titles for the
remaining lot; (d) provide new tax declaration for the new title; and (e) pay
incidental expenses relative to the titling of the expropriated areas.
On 19 August 2004, after depositing One Million Thirty Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Eighty Pesos (₱1,038,480.00)- which is equivalent to 100% of the
value of the Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of P6,000.00
per square meter - Republic-DPWH filed a Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession. On 6 December 2004, a Writ of Possession was issued by the
RTC. On 14 September 2005, RepublicDPWH filed a Motion for Issuance of a
New Writ of Possession as the first writ of possession was not implemented.
Subsequently, on 2 March 2006, Evergreen filed a Motion to Withdraw the
Initial Deposit. This was opposed by Republic-DPWH as it was not yet allowed
entry into the Subject Premises. On 21 April 2006, the parties entered into an
agreement allowing Republic-DPWH to enter into and/or possess the Subject
Premises. On 15 November 2006, the RTC granted the Motion to Withdraw
Initial Deposit.
During the pre-trial, Evergreen and Republic-DPWH agreed that the issue to be
resolved in the expropriation complaint was the amount of just compensation.
Three (3) real estate brokers/appraisers were appointed as commissioners to
determine the current fair market value of the Subject Premises.
On 15 October 2007, the RTC appointed the members of the Board of
Commissioners, namely: Norviendo Ramos, Jr., (later replaced by Atty. Jade
Ferrer Wy), the City Assessor or his representative, and the RTC Clerk of
Court of Pasig City. Thereafter, the Commissioners submitted separate
Appraisal Reports. Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. of the City Assessor's office
recommended the payment of ₱15,000.00 per square meter, Atty. Jade Ferrer
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Wy recommended ₱37,500.00 per square meter and Atty. Pablita Migrifio of
the Office of the RTC Clerk of Court of Pasig City recommended the amount of
₱30,000.00 per square meter for the Subject Premises.
The Ruling of the RTC
5
On 30 June 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision fixing the just compensation
for the Subject Premises at Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) per
square meter. The RTC directed Republic-DPWH to pay Evergreen the amount
of Three Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Twenty
Pesos (₱3,288,520.00), which was the amount due after deducting the deposit
made by Republic-DPWH which had already been withdrawn by Evergreen.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered fixing the
amount of just compensation for 173.08 square meters of the subject parcel of
land being expropriated at Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) per
square meter.
Plaintiff is directed to pay the said defendant the net amount of Three Million
Two Hundred Eighty Eight Thousand Five Hundred Twenty Pesos
(Php3,288,520.00) and subject to payment by defendant of any unpaid real
property taxes and other taxes and fees due.
Other claims of defendant [are] denied, for lack of merit.
Cost of litigation is ad judged against the plaintiff.
6 the issue regarding the interest on the amount of just compensation until final
SO ORDERED.
Both Republic-DPWH and Evergreen filed their respective Motions for Partial
Reconsideration. Republic-DPWH argued that the just compensation should be
fixed only at Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) per square meter while
Evergreen argued that the RTC erred in fixing the just compensation at merely
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00). Evergreen further asked for the
payment of consequential damages as a result of its lost income with its
billboard lessee a;nd decrease in value of the Subject Property and legal
interest on the amount of just compensation. In an Order dated 3 November
7
2011, the RTC denied the motions. Thus, both parties appealed to the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
8
In a Decision dated 26 June 2014, the CA increased the amount of just
compensation for the Subject Premises at Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(₱35,000.00) per square meter, or a total of Six Million Fifty Seven Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos (₱6,057,800.00). The CA held:
In their separate Commissioner's Appraisal Report, Atty. Wy and Atty. Pablita
Migrifio stated, that: (1) the selling price of the properties in the surrounding
area is within the range of ₱35,000.00 and ₱40,000.00 per square meter; and
(2) in 2000, the just compensation of a nearby property was ₱26,100.00 per
square meter as determined by RTC-Branch 70, Pasig City, and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Clayton Industrial
Corporation, et al. Thus, just compensation of ₱25,000.00 per square meter set
by the RTC, is far too low for a property expropriated in 2004.
Consequently, it would be more in accord with justice and equity to increase
the just compensation of the subject property to ₱35,000.00 per square meter,
agreed to by two of the three commissioners, Atty. Wy and RTC Clerk of Court,
Atty. Migrifio, for a total of ₱6,057,800.00 for the 173.08 square meters sought
9
to be expropriated.
The CA, however, denied the claim of consequential damages or interest by
Evergreen. The CA found that based on the records of the RTC, the Subject
Premises expropriated by the Republic-DPWH did not include and would not
encroach on the residential building and billboard owned by Evergreen.
Evergreen also failed to present any. evidence to prove that its remaining
properties would be adversely affected or damaged by the expropriation. As for
payment, the CA held that Evergreen is not entitled to such interest as
Republic-DPWH's payment was deposited in the account of Evergreen months
before it was able to take possession of the Subject Premises pursuant to the
Writ of Possession issued by the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both appeals are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 166, Pasig City, in SCA No. 2641, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the just compensation for the 173.08 square meters of the property
expropriated is ₱35,000.00 per square meter, or a total of ₱6,057,800.00,
minus the amount of Pl,038,480.00 paid over by Republic-DPWH in order to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
take possession of the expropriated property, and withdrawn by Evergreen
sometime on or after November 15, 2006. No costs.
10
SO ORDERED.
11
In a Resolution dated 25 May 2015, the CA denied the Motions for Partial
Reconsideration filed by both Evergreen and Republic-DPWH. Hence,
Evergreen filed with this Court its petition for review on certiorari dated 3
12
August 2015 while Republic-DPWH filed its own petition for review
13
on certiorari dated 29 July 2015.
The Issues
In its petition, Evergreen argues that it is entitled to the payment of interest for
the Subject Premises expropriated by Republic-DPWH:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT,
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR PAYMENT
OF INTEREST FOR THE PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED BY THE
14
RESPONDENT.
On the other hand Republic-DPWH raises the following arguments in its own
petition:
THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
I. THE JUST COMPENSATION FIXED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
A. THE COMMISSIONERS' REPORTS ARE MANIFESTLY HEARSAY AND
BEREFT OF ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE. THEREFORE, IT SHOULD BE
DISREGARDED PURSUANT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN NPC VS. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND NAPOCOR VS. DIATO-BERNAL.
B. SECTION 4, RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT MANDATES THAT
THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED AS OF
THE DATE OF THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY OR THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT, WHICHEVER COMES FIRST. HERE, THE AMOUNT OF JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY IS
BASED ON THE "CURRENT" SELLING PRICE OF COMMERCIAL
PROPERTIES.
C. THERE IS NO BONA FIDE VALUATION OF THE EXPROPRIATED
PROPERTY. THE COMMISSIONERS' REPORT HINGED COMPLETELY ON
THE VALUATION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (BOC) IN THE
LRTA CASE.
1. THE JUST COMPENSATION PRONOUNCED IN LRTA WAS NOT
INTENDED TO BECOME A PRECEDENT, MUCH LESS AN AUTHORITY TO
BE APPLIED INVARIABLY IN OTHER EXPROPRIATION CASES. THE JUST
COMPENSATION AWARDED THEREIN WAS A RESULT OF THE
DELIBERATION OF THE BOC IN THAT CASE PURSUANT TO THE
15
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES.
The Ruling of the Court
We partly grant the petitions.
AMOUNT OF JUST COMPENSATION.
First, we note that only questions of law should be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Factual findings of the lower courts will
16
generally not be disturbed. Thus, the factual issues pertaining to the value of
the property expropriated are questions of fact which are generally beyond the
17
scope of the judicial review of this Court under Rule 45. However, we have
consistently recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
The jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court
is limited to reviewing errors of law, and findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive upon the Court since it is not the Court's function to analyze and
weigh the evidence all over again. Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court
enumerated the exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are binding on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
18
would justify a different conclusion.
In this case, given that the findings on the amount of just compensation of the
RTC and CA differ, we find that a review of the facts is in order.
Just compensation has been defined as the fair and full equivalent of the
19
loss. More specifically, just compensation has been defined in this wise:
Notably, just compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court
repeatedly stressed that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the
owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the word
'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the
20
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
The determination of just compensation in· expropriation proceedings is
21
essentially a judicial prerogative. This determination of just compensation,
which remains to be a judicial function performed by the court, is usually aided
22
by the appointed commissioners. In Spouses Ortega v. City of Cebu, we held:
Likewise, in the recent cases of National Power Corporation v. dela
Cruz and Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, we
emphasized the primacy of judicial prerogative in the ascertainment of just
compensation as aided by the appointed commissioners, to wit:
Though the ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the
appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it
is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial
court may substitute its own estimate of the value, it may only do so for valid
reasons; that is, where the commissioners have· applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly
inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason
23
at all."
Both the RTC and the CA relied on the reports of commissioners Atty. Wy and
Atty. Migrifio to determine the amount of just compensation for the Subject
Premises. However, Republic-DPWH argues that the reports of these two
commissioners were not supported by any documentary evidence and were
based solely on opinions and hearsay. Further, Republic-DPWH argues that
the recommendations of Atty. Wy and Atty. Migrifio are incorrect as the value
given by said commissioners was computed at the time the inspection was
undertaken in 2008, and not at the time of taking, which was in 2004. It argues
that the basis of just compensation should be the value of the expropriated
property at the time of taking because the value of the property had already
been greatly enhanced since then.
We find merit in these arguments.
While Atty. Wy and Atty. Migrifio relied on several documents to support their
finding of just compensation, we find these to be insufficient and misleading. In
particular, they relied on the BIR Zonal Valuation for the year 2000, and the
2000 decisions of the trial court in Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) v.
Clayton Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Chua and LRTA v. Rodolfo L. See,
24 25
et al., which decision was affirmed by this Court in 2002. The reliance on
these cases was made by the commissioners because they involved similar
properties in the vicinity. In those cases, the amount of just compensation for
the expropriated properties was ₱26,100.00 per square meter, in addition to
the consequential damages or disturbance fee.
First, we note that while the amount of just compensation in this case is not an
authority to be applied blindly and invariably in other expropriation cases, this
Court has allowed reference to similar cases of expropriation to help determine
26
the amount of just compensation. However, the cases relied on by the
commissioners were decided in the year 2000, while the taking of the Subject
Premises in this case happened in 2004 when Republic-DPWH filed a case for
expropriation against Evergreen. Moreover, the BIR Zonal Valuations
considered by the commissioners were also for the year 2000. Evidently, these
reflect the value of the Subject Property in 2000. Just compensation must be
27
the value of the property at the time of taking. If there were other
documentary evidence to show the value of the property at a point nearer to
the time of the taking, in this case the year 2004, then consideration of year
2000 documents would not be fatal. However, if the only documents to support
the finding of just compensation are from a year which is not the year when the
taking of the expropriated property took place, then this would be plainly
inaccurate.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Next, while documentary evidence is indeed important to support the finding of
the value of the expropriated property, the commissioners are given leeway to
consider other factors to determine just compensation for the property to be
28
expropriated. In National Power Corporation v. Spouses Asoque, we upheld
the finding of the RTC therein and quoted:
x x x. Likewise, this Court takes cognizance of the fact that the
commissioner may avail or consider certain factors in determining the
fair market value of the property apart from the proffered documentary
evidences. Thus, the factors taken into account by the commissioner in
arriving at the recommended fair market value of the property at Php800.00 per
square meter, aside from the evidence available, were valid criteria or gauge in
the determination of the just compensation of the subject property. (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
This determination, however, should still reflect the value of the property as of
the date of taking. In this case, the commissioners found that the properties in
the area, as of the time of the ocular inspection in 2008, had a demand selling
29
price ranging from ₱35,000.00 to ₱40,000.00 per square meter. A reading of
their individual reports shows that they considered the location of the Subject
Premises, as well as its size and prospective uses, the neighborhood, and the
nearby establishments. This was well within their prerogative to do so, as we
have held that all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be
30
considered in determining just compensation. However, these must be the
conditions existing at the time the taking was made by the government. While
the size and location of the property would not have changed from the time of
taking until the time when the ocular inspection was conducted, the
establishments and neighborhood surrounding the property may have
undergone changes after the property was taken by the government. The
improvements introduced after the time of taking should not unduly benefit the
property owner by unnecessarily increasing the value of the property.
Unfortunately, in this case, all of the conditions they took into account in
determining just compensation did not reflect the value of the Subject Premises
at the time of taking. Documentary or otherwise, the commissioners failed to
rely on such evidence that would prove the value of the Subject Premises at
the time of the taking, which should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation. There was nothing to show the value of the property in 2004,
which was the year the taking of the Subject Premises took place. The BIR
Zonal Valuation and the court decisions were reflective of the value of the
property in 2000, four years before the taking of the Subject Premises by the
government. On the other hand, the ocular inspection was conducted in 2008,
four years after the time of taking. Clear factual evidence must be presented for
the correct determination of just compensation.
However, we cannot agree with the insistence of Republic-DPWH that the just
compensation for the Subject Premises is only Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00). As correctly found by the CA, this is merely the zonal valuation
of the commercial lots and therefore cannot be made as the sole basis for the
fair market value of the land. Zonal valuation, although one of the indices of the
fair market value of real estate, cannot by itself be the sole basis of just
31
compensation in expropriation cases.
Another argument of Republic-DPWH is that the commissioners erred in using
the land valuation and listing of commercial properties when the Subject
Premises were classified as industrial.
Again, we disagree. It has been settled that the value and character of the land
at the time it was taken by the government are the criteria for determining just
32
compensation. All three commissioners found that the property was located in
33
an area that was classified as commercial. It also found that the property was
34
best used as commercial. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the
commissioners who conducted an ocular inspection, and the lower courts
which affirmed the findings of the commissioners.
To recapitulate, we find that the commissioners and lower courts correctly
identified the Subject Premises as commercial, based on the value and
character of the land at the time of the taking. We also find that there was
sufficient evidence - documentary and those obtained through ocular
inspection - to support a finding of just compensation. However, we find that
the lower courts and the commissioners failed to consider the time of taking
when they arrived at their respective findings on the amount of just
compensation.
While remanding the case to receive evidence in order to determine the
amount of just compensation at the time of taking would enable the court to
clearly determine the amount of just compensation due to Evergreen, we find
that it would be prejudicial to both the government and Evergreen to do so.
Remanding the case would unnecessarily delay the payment of just
compensation due to Evergreen, and it would also increase the amount of
interest that would accrue against Republic-DPWH. Thus, we find that a finding
of just compensation based on available records would be most beneficial to
both parties concerned.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In 2000, this Court found that the just compensation for similar properties
situated in the vicinity was ₱26,100.00. In 2008, the commissioners found the
selling price of the properties in the surrounding area to be from ₱35,000.00 to
₱40,000.00 per square meter. The time of taking was in 2004, or right in the
middle of 2000 and 2008. Thus, we may consider the mean of the prices of the
properties for the years 2000 and 2008 to arrive at the amount of just
compensation in 2004. Taking the higher value of the range of price in 2008
and the amount of just compensation as affirmed by this Court in 2000, we find
that the amount of just compensation in 2004 is ₱33,050.00 per square meter
or a total of ₱5,720,294.00.
INTEREST ON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
Evergreen argues that it is entitled to legal interest on the balance of the just
compensation, computed from the time of the filing of the complaint until the
judgment attains finality.
We find merit in Evergreen’s arguments.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation." Just compensation in
expropriation cases has been held to contemplate just and timely payment, and
prompt payment is the payment in full of the just compensation as finally
35
determined by the courts. Thus, just compensation envisions a payment in
full of the expropriated property. Absent full payment, interest on the balance
36
would necessarily be due on the unpaid amount. In Republic v. Mupas, we
held that interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due if there is no full
compensation for the expropriated property, in accordance with the concept of
just compensation. We held:
The reason is that just compensation would not be "just" if the State does not
pay the property owner interest on the just compensation from the date of the
taking of the property. Without prompt payment, the property owner suffers the
immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income. The owner's
loss, of course, is not only his property but also its income-generating potential.
Ideally, just compensation should be immediately made available to the
property owner so that he may derive income from this compensation, in the
san1e manner that he would have derived income from his expropriated
property.
However, if full compensation is not paid. for the property taken, then the State
must pay for the shortfall in the earning potential immediately lost due to the
taking, and the absence of replacement property from which income can be
derived. Interest on the unpaid compensation becomes due as
compliance with
the constitutional mandate on eminent domain and as a basic measure of
fairness.
Thus, interest in eminent domain cases "runs as a matter of law and follows as
a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a
37
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking." (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, we find that there is still unpaid compensation due to
Evergreen. Republic-DPWH complied with Republic Act No. (RA) 8974,38 the
applicable law for expropriation in this case. Section 4 of RA 897 4 provides in
part:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is
necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any
national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the
appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings
before the proper court under the following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the
amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value
of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
xxxx
Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a writ of possession, the implementing agency shall
present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official
concerned.1âwphi1
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's
proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the
owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation
case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the
amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the
court. (Emphasis supplied)
Republic-DPWH had complied with the requirements of Section 4, paragraph
(a) of RA 8974 when it deposited the equivalent of 100% of the value of the
Subject Premises based on the BIR zonal valuation of the property for the
account of Evergreen. This deposit was made before Republic-DPWH was
able to take possession of the Subject Premises through the issuance of the
writ of possession. Verily, under the law, the initial payment is a prerequisite for
the issuance-of the writ of possession. However, this payment alone and by
itself does not constitute just compensation. We note that this is only the first of
the two payments the government must make. Section 4 of RA 8974
specifically provides that "when the decision of the court becomes final and
executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference
between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by
the court." Thus, under RA 8974, there must be a completion of two payments
before just compensation is deemed to have been made.
Therefore, while Republic-DPWH had made the deposit of the amount as
prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 4 of RA 8974, it still has not made
the constitutionally required payment of just compensation because the amount
deposited is much less than that adjudged by the court. The law requires two
payments to constitute payment of just compensation. Again, in Republic v.
39
Mupas, we have explicitly stated that the initial payment does not excuse the
government from paying the difference of the
amount adjudged and the interest thereon:
The Government's initial payment of just compensation does not excuse it from
avoiding payment of interest on the difference between the adjudged amount of
just compensation and the initial payment.
The initial payment scheme as a prerequisite for the issuance of the writ of
possession under RA 8974 only provides the Government flexibility to
immediately take the property for public purpose or public use pending the
court's final determination of just compensation. Section 4(a) of RA 8974 only
addresses the Government's need to immediately enter the privately owned
property in order to avoid delay in the implementation of national infrastructure
projects.
Otherwise, Section 4 of RA 8974 would be repugnant to Section 9, Article 3 of
the 1987 Constitution which mandates that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. To reiterate, the Constitution
commands the Government to pay the property owner no less than the full and
40
fair equivalent of the property from the date of taking.
Republic-DPWH avers that interest will only accrue if there is delay in the
payment of just compensation, and that in. this case, there is no such
unjustified delay because it has deposited the amount required by law before
taking possession of the Subject Premises.
We do not. agree.
Again, just compensation should be made at the time of taking, and the amount
of payment should be the fair and equivalent value of the property. In this case,
Republic-DPWH was able to take possession of the Subject Premises even
before making a full and fair payment of just compensation because RA 8974
allowed for the possession of the property merely upon the initial payment
which forms part of the just compensation. Thus, it is clear that the government
has not yet made the full and fair payment of just compensation to Evergreen.
As explained by this Court in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
41
Philippines, the rationale for imposing interest on just compensation is to
compensate the property owners for the income that they would have made if
they had been properly compensated - meaning if they had been paid the full
amount of just compensation - at the time of taking when they were deprived of
their property. The Court held:
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for prompt payment
and the necessity of the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the
payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled in this case
that:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to
be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
Aside from this ruling, Republic notably overturned the Court's previous ruling
in National Power Corporation v. Angas which held that just compensation due
for expropriated properties is not a loan or forbearance of money but indemnity
for damages for the delay in payment; since the interest involved is in the
nature of damages rather than earnings from loans, then Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code, which fixes legal interest at 6%, shall apply.
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation due to the
landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines
ruling, the Court fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed
from the time the property was taken until the full amount of just compensation
was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation
42
of the value of the currency over time. (Emphasis in the original)
The delay in the payment of just compensation is a forbearance of money. As
43
such, this is necessarily entitled to earn interest. The difference in the amount
between the final amount as adjudged by the court and the initial payment
made by the government - which is part and parcel of the just compensation
due to the property owner - should earn legal interest as a forbearance of
44
money. In Republic v. Mupas, we stated clearly:
Contrary to the Government's opinion, the interest award is not anchored either
on the law of contracts or damages; it is based on the owner's constitutional
right to just compensation. The difference in the amount between the final
payment and the initial payment - in the interim or before the judgment on
just compensation becomes final and executory - is not unliquidated
damages which do not earn interest until the amount of damages is
established with reasonable certainty. The difference between final and
initial payments forms part of the just compensation that the property
owner is entitled from the date of taking of the property.
Thus, when the taking of the property precedes the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the Court orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just
compensation from the date of taking whose interest shall likewise commence
on the same date. The Court does not rule that the interest on just
compensation shall commence [on] the date when the amount of just
compensation becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the Court's
decision or the finality of the eminent domain case. (Emphasis supplied)
With respect to the amount of interest on the difference between the initial
payment and final amount of just compensation as adjudged by the court, we
have upheld in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 45 and in
subsequent cases thereafter,46 the imposition of 12% interest rate from the
time of taking when the property owner was deprived of the property, until 1
July 2013, when the legal interest on loans and forbearance of money was
reduced from 12% to 6% per annum by BSP Circular No. 799. Accordingly,
from 1 July 2013 onwards, the legal interest on the difference between the final
amount and initial payment is 6% per annum.
In the present case, Republic-DPWH filed the expropriation complaint on 22
March 2004. As this preceded the actual taking of the property, the just
compensation shall be appraised as of this date. No interest shall accrue as
the government did not take possession of the Subject Premises. Republic-
DPWH was able to take possession of the property on 21 April 2006 upon the
agreement of the parties. Thus, a legal interest of 12% per annum on the
difference between the final amount adjudged by the Court and the initial
payment made shall accrue from 21 April 2006 until 30 June 2013. From 1 July
2013 until the finality of the Decision of the Court, the difference between the
initial payment and the final amount adjudged by the Court shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum. Thereafter, the total amount of just compensation
shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until
full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves as follows:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 218631 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
decisions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the just compensation for the 173.08
square meters of the expropriated property is ₱33,050.00 per square meter, or
a total of ₱5,720,294.00.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 218628 is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
(a) The claim for legal interest on the difference between the final amount of
just compensation of ₱5,720,294.00 and the initial deposit made by the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works

and Highways, in the amount of Pl,038,480.00 shall earn legal interest of
12% per annum from the date of taking or 21 April 2006 until 30 June 2013.

(b) The difference between the total amount of just compensation and the initial
deposit shall earn legal interest of 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until the
finality of the Decision.

(c) The total amount of just compensation shall earn legal interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 210218
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF ANTONINA
RABIE, represented by ABRAHAM R. DELA CRUZ, Respondents
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This petition for review on certiorari assails the 28 November 2013
2
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131335, dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR).
The Facts
NAPOCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation created
3 On 8 February 2012, the Board of Commissioners submitted its Report. On 17
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, as amended. Under the
4 May 2012, NAPOCOR filed its Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners’
EPIRA, NAPOCOR was tasked to perform the missionary electrification
function and to provide power generation and its associated power delivery
systems in areas that are not connected to the transmission system.
5 on the payment of rentals and the fact that NAPOCOR was not given the
On 1 December 2009, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against
respondents Heirs of Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the acquisition of the
822-square meter portion of Lot No. 1439, a residential lot located in Barangay
Lewin, Lumban, Laguna consisting of 12,657 square meters and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-9196, to be used as access road for the
Caliraya Hydro Electric Power Plant of the Caliraya Botocan-Kalayaan Build
Rehabilitate and Operate Transfer Project of the NAPOCOR. The case was
raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (trial court) and
docketed as Civil Case No. SC-4842.
6 total of Nine Million Forty-Two Thousand (₱9,042,000.00) Pesos. Defendants’
On 25 February 2010, respondents filed a Verified Answer, claiming that the
then current market value of the property was ₱10,000 per square meter on the
inner portion and ₱12,000 per square meter near the highway. Respondents
prayed, among others, for a just compensation in the amount of ₱1,250,700,
representing the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) zonal valuation for the
"actual area to be occupied" by NAPOCOR which is 2,274 square meters,
instead of 822 square meters only. In addition, respondents sought payment
for NAPOCOR’s alleged unauthorized entry and use of the property from 1940
to date.
On 5 July 2010, NAPOCOR deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank) the amount of ₱411,000 representing the BIR zonal valuation of
the affected portion of the subject property, which was ₱500 per square meter.
Respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit dated 15 November
7 8
2010, which the trial court granted in an Order dated 17 November 2010.
NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Issue Order of Expropriation dated 18 March
9
2011. NAPOCOR also filed a Motion for Annotation/Registration of Partial
10
Payment dated 7 June 2011.
11
In an Order dated 5 October 2011, the trial court granted the motions and
constituted the Board of Commissioners to assist the trial court in the
determination of just compensation for the affected portion of the subject
property.
Report objecting to the recommendation that the affected portion of the subject
property consists of 2,274 square meters and that the value per square meter
is ₱11,000. NAPOCOR also questioned the Commissioners’ recommendation
opportunity to be heard and to argue as to the amount of just compensation.
On 29 January 2013, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Eight Hundred Twenty Two (822) square meters of the land
owned by the defendants is hereby expropriated in favor of the National Power
Corporation effective December 2009 upon payment of the fair market value of
the property at Eleven Thousand (₱11,000.00) Pesos per square meter or a
claim that said property was occupied by plaintiff since 1940 is unrebutted,
hence, reasonable rentals of Twelve Thousand Pesos (₱12,000.00) yearly is
hereby awarded to defendants from the year 1940 to the present at a twelve
percent (12%) annual interest rate, until fully paid.
12
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
On 8 March 2013, NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order.
However, the trial court denied the motion in an Order dated 30 April
13
2013 which was received by NAPOCOR on 23 May 2013 and by respondents
on 15 May 2013.
On 22 May 2013, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending
14
Appeal. NAPOCOR filed its Comment/Opposition thereto on 4 June 2013.
15
On 6 June 2013, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal.
16
In an Order dated 18 June 2013, the trial court gave due course to
NAPOCOR’s Notice of Appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
The trial court set for hearing respondents’ Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal on 10 July 2013.
On 11 July 2013, the trial court issued an Order granting respondents’ Motion
17
for Execution Pending Appeal. The trial court held:
In determining the propriety of execution of its Order dated January 29, 2013,
pending appeal, showing good reasons as stated in the motion and while the
Court has its jurisdiction over the case and still in possession of original record
thereof or the record on appeal, the Court
18
grants the "Motion for Execution Pending Appeal."
On 12 July 2013, the trial court’s Officer-in-Charge issued a Writ of
19 20
Execution. Sheriff Raymundo P. Claveria issued a Notice addressed to the
President of NAPOCOR demanding payment of ₱9,042,000 and ₱12,000
yearly rentals plus 12% interest from 1940 up to the present until fully paid
within ten days from receipt thereof.
On 30 July 2013, NAPOCOR received a letter from the LBPNAPOCOR
Extension Office informing NAPOCOR of its receipt of a Notice of Garnishment
in the amount of ₱14,873,999.28 issued by Sheriff Claveria.
Aggrieved, NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
On 28 November 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition.
Hence, this petition filed on 23 January 2014.
On 22 October 2014, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion (to Dismiss and to
Cite Petitioner in Contempt), contending that NAPOCOR is guilty of forum-
21
shopping considering that there is another petition filed by NAPOCOR before
this Court (docketed as G.R. No. 214070). Respondents alleged that G.R. No.
214070 involves the same parties and the same facts and seeks the same
relief of preventing the implementation of the trial court’s Order dated 11 July
2013 granting execution pending appeal and the Order dated 29 January 2013
ordering NAPOCOR to pay just compensation to respondents.
In its 19 November 2014 Resolution, the Court noted the motion.
In its 29 September 2014 Resolution, the Court dismissed the petition in G.R.
No. 214070 for NAPOCOR’s failure to sufficiently show that the assailed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 April 2014 and 8 August 2014,
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The 15 April 2014 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals assailed in G.R. No. 214070 ordered NAPOCOR to submit an
affidavit containing a list of its assets and ordered Land Bank to submit a bank
certification containing a list of NAPOCOR’s bank deposits with Land Bank.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court still had jurisdiction when
respondents filed their motion for execution pending appeal on 22 May 2013,
or seven days after their receipt of the trial court’s order denying their Motion
for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, respondents’ motion for execution pending
appeal was timely filed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there exists good reasons for the trial court’s
order granting execution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed with
22
respondents’ invocation of Borja v. Court of Appeals, where petitioner’s
advanced age, together with the posting of a supersedeas bond, justified the
execution pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals rejected NAPOCOR’s argument that the alleged physical
and financial conditions of respondents do not outweigh the damages that it
would suffer in the event that the Order subject of the writ of execution is later
reversed, and that such conditions increase the risk that respondents would not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
be able to reimburse the amounts fixed in the Order. The CA held that "where
the executed judgment is reversed, x x x the trial court may, on motion, issue
23
such orders of restitution or reparation of damages x x x."
The Court of Appeals also held that NAPOCOR’s funds may be garnished as
"it would be absurd to rule that petitioner’s funds may not be garnished x x x
considering that the winning party would not enjoy the fruits of his victory, x x
24 25
x." The Court of Appeals cited Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, where the
Court held that "[i]t is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to
initiate expropriation proceedings x x x and then refuse to pay on the ground
26
that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken x x x x."
The Issues
The issues in this case are: (1) whether the trial court still had jurisdiction when
it ruled on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal; (2) whether there exists
good reasons for the execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal; and
(3) whether the NAPOCOR’s funds may be garnished or be the subject of
execution.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
Trial court had jurisdiction to resolve
motion for discretionary execution
Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary execution under Section
2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order after due hearing. Section 2(a), Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. –
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record
or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final
order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
In this case, the motion for execution pending appeal was filed by respondents
seven days after their receipt of the trial court’s order denying the motions for
reconsideration filed by both parties. Clearly, respondents filed the motion for
execution pending appeal before the lapse of the period to file an appeal,
which is fifteen days from notice of the order denying the motion for
27
reconsideration. Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction when
respondents filed their motion for execution pending appeal.
Further, prior to transmittal of the records of the case, the trial court does not
lose jurisdiction over the case and in fact, may issue an order for execution
pending appeal. Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A party’s appeal by notice of
appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in
due time.
A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with
respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal
filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the
subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by
the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39,
and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In this case, the trial court issued its Order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal on 11 July 2013. That Order expressly stated that the trial court
was still in possession of the original record of the case at the time. In fact, the
28
records were transmitted to the Court of Appeals on 19 July 2013. In other
words, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal before the transmittal of the records to the Court of Appeals.
Hence, contrary to NAPOCOR’s contention, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that the trial court still had jurisdiction when the motion for execution
pending appeal was filed and when the trial court resolved such motion.
Discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain proceedings
While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it issued the order granting
execution pending appeal, the Court holds that discretionary execution does
not apply to eminent domain proceedings. In Spouses Curata v. Philippine
29
Ports Authority, where movants alleged advanced age as ground for their
motion for discretionary execution, the Court found the trial court to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order granting execution
pending appeal. The Court held that discretionary execution is not applicable to
expropriation proceedings, thus:
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal
under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings.1awp++i1
As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court
held:
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an
order merely requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to
the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could
not be realized upon execution.
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale behind the doctrine
that government funds and properties cannot be seized under a writ of
execution, thus:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to
the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
PPA’s monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo, they are
exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out governmental
functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of
major ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the Department of
Transportation and Communication pursuant to PD 505.
xxxx
Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of
government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its
Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its
properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of
execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise
cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run
afoul of the established jurisprudence that government properties are
exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.
From the above discussion, we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in its July 24, 2000 Order directing the execution of the First
30
Compensation Order (July 10, 2000 Order) pending appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
31
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on the case of Borja v. Court of Appeals is
misplaced. Borja involved a complaint for sum of money totalling ₱78,325
representing unpaid commissions and damages. On the other hand, this case
involves expropriation proceedings, where the trial court fixed the just
compensation for the subject property at ₱9,042,000 and yearly rentals at
₱12,000 since 1940 plus 12% interest per annum for a total award of
₱14,873,999.28. The difference in the nature of the actions and the amounts
involved in Borja and in this case justifies the non-application of the rule on
discretionary execution.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Non-existence of good reasons for the execution pending appeal
The trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
specify and discuss any good reason required for granting execution pending
appeal.
32
In Villamor v. NAPOCOR, the Court discussed the requisites for execution
pending appeal, thus:
Execution pending appeal requires the observance of the following requisites:
(a) there must be a motion therefor by the prevailing party; (b) there must be a
good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) the good reason must be
stated in a special order.
The prevailing doctrine as provided for in Section 2, paragraph 3 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible only
when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality
or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good
reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution
lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party after the lapse of time
be unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may
have apparently no cause but to delay. Such reasons must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Were it otherwise,
execution pending appeal may well become a tool of oppression and inequity
instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice.
down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the trial court granted the motion for execution pending appeal
based on "good reasons as stated in the motion," without identifying and
discussing any of these alleged good reasons. A mere statement of"good
reasons as stated in the motion" does not suffice to justify execution pending
appeal. It is basic that the trial court should make a finding on whether the
allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal constitute good reasons
as required in Section 2 of Rule 39. The trial court should have expressed
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which the order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal was based, but it did not. Without such finding,
the allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal remain as
allegations. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in granting discretionary execution without stating and explaining clearly the
basis therefor.
In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the issue
of garnishment ofNAPOCOR's funds.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 November 2013 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131335 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The execution of judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general

rule and must, therefore, be strictly construed.1âwphi1 So, too, it is not to
be availed of and applied routinely, but only in extraordinary
circumstances.

This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for courts look with
disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired
a final character. In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution
is "usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which
are yet to be ascertained on appeal."

The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the existence of
good reasons is indispensable to the grant of execution pending appeal.
Absent any such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, vs. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY,
and CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to
declare unconstitutional and illegal Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-
2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee, respectively,
which are being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
1
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance
2
No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section
3 of which provides:
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half
percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City Treasurer
which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City
Government. The special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under
a special account to be established for the purpose.
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax ( SHT ) shall be utilized
by the Quezon City Government for the following projects: (a) land
purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized housing
facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary cores,
medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-
private partners hip agreement of the Quezon City Government and National
3
Housing Authority ( NHA ) with the private sector.
Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly
paying the special assessment:
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment
tax as imposed by this ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be
availed of only after five (5) years of continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer
availing this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good standing as certified by the
City Treasurer and City Assessor.
The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid by the property owner, which shall be given as
follows:
1. 6th year - 20%
2. 7th year - 20%
3. 8th year - 20%
4. 9th year - 20%
5. 10th year - 20%
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may
not be continued by the subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in
good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in whatever legal capacity over the
4
subject property.
5
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 was enacted on
December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after when it was approved by
6
respondent City Mayor. The proceeds collected from the garbage fees on
residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked
special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
7
collections. Section 1 of the Ordinance se t forth the schedule and manner for
the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in
relation to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE AND
MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS
FOLLOWS: On all domestic households in Quezon City;
LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

ess than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00 Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter
residential property in Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of
01 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00 Title (TCT ) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax
which already included the garbage fee in the sum of
01 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
10
001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00 Php100.00.
501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on
February 5, 2014, which enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095
and SP-2235 and required respondents to comment on the petition without
11
necessarily giving due course thereto.
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
12
Respondents filed their Comment with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE February 17, 2014. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on
March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014, respectively.
ess than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00
Procedural Matters
1 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00
1 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00 A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
01 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP 100.00
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since
51 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00 they are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-
2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial function
On high-rise Condominium Units
because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the
SHT and the garbage fee, exacting from them funds for basic essential public
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- services that they should not be held liable. Even if a Rule 65 petition is
rise condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in
of the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an 13
Rosario v. Court of Appeals, has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in
additional garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for the interest of justice.
every unit already so ld or being amortized.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial
shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire prerogatives.
apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule
prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power
to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of
shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not the parties.
8
later than the first quarter installment. In case a household owner refuses to
pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2% per month
9 Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the
or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it
is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
person s or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and
the controversy en suing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
14
respective rights of the contending parties.
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must
be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon
City Council of the assailed ordinances was done in the exercise of its
legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.)
No.7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power
15
shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city. Said law
likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge ,
or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local
16
government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it
essentially seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of the
questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief, over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
17
jurisdiction.
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for
prohibition or mandamus, over which we exercise original jurisdiction, in cases
with far-reaching implications or one which raises transcendental issues or
18
questions that need to be resolved for the public good. The judicial policy is
that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot
be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling
circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.
19
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a
petition for prohibition may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person –
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions – who has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondents to
desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. In
this case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from
implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being
sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor
are performing ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one that an officer
or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon
20
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Respondent Mayor, as chief
executive of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such
21
duties and functions as provided for by the LGC and other laws. Particularly,
he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the city are
collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and
22
settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance. On
the other hand, under the LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be
collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay treasurer, or their duly-
authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of
ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of
23
real properties for taxation purposes are properly executed. Anent the SHT,
the Department of Finance (DOF) Local Finance Circular No. 1-97, dated April
16, 1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Identified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within
its jurisdiction which shall be subject to the levy of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian
concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the
effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands and registered
owners shall also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in
the city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local
sanggunian concerned of the list of lands affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:
a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real
Property Tax, SEF Tax and other special
assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office the
monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An
annual report should likewise be submitted to the
HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year
pursuant to Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in
which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct
recourse to us should be allowed. Aside from presenting a novel question of
law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the challenged ordinances
adversely affect the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City.
As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local
government units (LGUs).Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In
24
Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim , the Court cited the case of
25
Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp., where We
ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar . x x x This is in accordance with the well
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
26
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the
ground that, in relation to Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed
to allege his ownership of a property that has an assessed value of more than
Php100,000.00 and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what standing
or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents,
the petition is not a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that
petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it could only be surmised whether he is
a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured by the
judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a
real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
27
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized
28
grievance. The concept has been define d as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
29
as a result of the government al act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
30
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not
only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must be
shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some
31
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file
the petition. He is a real party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and
legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 because respondents did not
dispute that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon City
an d that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage
fee. He has substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to
stop future imposition. While he is a lone petitioner, his cause of action to
declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of paramount
interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis
pendentia. They claim that, as early as February 22, 2012, a case entitled
Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Herbert Bautista, et
al. , docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12- 7-820, has been pending in the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance
No. SP-2095. Relying on City of Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of
32
Taguig, et al., respondents assert that there is substantial identity of parties
between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil case
filed their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.
For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a
party in Alliance and does not even have the remotest identity or association
with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover, respondents’ arguments would
deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws
33
under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means "a pending suit" and is
variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
34
pendant. While it is normally connected with the control which the court has
on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more
35
interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court. In
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We
elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a
situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a
court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and
for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that
the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts
more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided
for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid
the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to
a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would
support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether
the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the
other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for
purposes of litis pendentia is inextricably linked with that of res judicata , each
constituting an element of the other. In either case, both relate to the sound
practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to
37
a cause of action that is before a court.
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest
between a party in the first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter
38
was not impleaded in the first case. Moreover, the fact that the positions of the
parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the
second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes
of determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia
39
.
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading
connected with the alleged civil case pending before the Quezon City trial
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
court.1âwphi1 Granting that there is substantial identity of parties between said
case and this petition, dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be
had in view of the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way
for us to determine whether both cases are based on the same set of facts that
require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if founded on the same
set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different.
Moreover, there is no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related
and/or intertwined with one another such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful, would amount
to res judicata in the other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
for his non-compliance with Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance
and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal,
the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim
40 41
, has been construed as mandatory considering that –
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes.
The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to
finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the
delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently,
any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the
public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be
42
done within certain time frames. x x x.
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market
43
Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of Hagonoy:
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law fo r parties to avail of their legal remedies
before competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed
aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government
is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and
provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its
revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue
measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law
provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue
44
measures and tax ordinances."
45
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones, held that
there was no need for petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts, considering that there was only a pure question
of law, the parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they had to
present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v.
46
City of Cagayan de Oro, We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the
more substantive matters. For the same reasons, this petition is an exception
to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers
and the collection of garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of
the Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the
latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public
services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on
property, idle land, business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA ) from the National Government. For petitioner, it is
noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City
Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund
housing for informal settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not
denied that its revenue collection in 2012 is in the sum of ₱13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by
the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
47
income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. According to
petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax
everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself
admits of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a
percentage of the assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision
every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the
property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property
tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its
reassessment every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of
48
the LGC.
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias
49 50
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc., People v. Siton, et al., and
51
Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino . They argue that the burden of
establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party
challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are
proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the
Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
53
Atienza, Jr. and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle
54
enshrined in Section 9, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides
for its own effectivity, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so
long as it is not punitive in character, citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of
55
Education, et al. and Askay v. Cosalan .[56]] Thus, Ordinance No. SP-2095
took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective
after its approval on December 26, 2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle
57
found in Sections 1 and 2, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2
58 59
(a) and 43 of R.A. No. 7279, or the "Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992 ( UDHA ).
60
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente, and
61
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc., respondents assert
that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real property owners without
discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could violate the equal
protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not
belong to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being
imposed is consistent with the UDHA. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect
SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than ₱50,000.00, the
questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding
₱100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the
total amount of the special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in
the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount
to a penalty imposed on real property owners due to the failure of respondent
Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their duty to secure and protect real
property owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the
expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be
viewed as a "charity" from real property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class
legislation that violates the right of property owners to equal protection of the
laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property not their own and pay
no taxes over law-abiding real property owners w ho pay income and realty
taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as
"nothing more than an advance payment on the real property tax" has no
statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be collected before it is due
because, under the LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax
based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is
made every three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn,
was based on Section 43 of the UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no
specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the ownership and
enjoyment of property bear a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously
doubtful and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should
provide funds for the housing of informal settlers and for home site
development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes, does not
mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the
benefit of another. At best, the principle that property ownership and enjoyment
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
bear a social function is but a reiteration of the Civil Law principle that property
should not be enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties and the
community, and that the use of the property may be restricted by police power,
the exercise of which is not involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT
collected. Bistek is the monicker of respondent City Mayor. The Bistekvilles
makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take the credit for the tax imposed
on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police
power, collects on the average from every household a garbage fee in the
meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per day compared with the sum of
₱1,659.83 that the Quezon City Government annually spends for every
62
household for garbage collection and waste management.
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee.
Even assuming that the garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct
duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject matter and is of a different
63
kind or character. Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo and Victorias
64
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc., there is no "taxing twice"
because the real property tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed
value, while the garbage fee is required on the domestic household. The only
reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and the
facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as
65
an exercise of police power. The cases of Calalang v. Williams, Patalinghug
66
v. Court of Appeals, and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
67
Jr., which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed
ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other
aspect of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee
only from domestic households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food
chains, and other commercial dining places that spew garbage much more
than residential property owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to
double taxation because garbage collection is a basic and essential public
service that should be paid out from property tax, business tax, transfer tax,
amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the
Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue
collection of the Quezon City Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A
small portion of said amount could be spent for garbage collection and other
essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage
68
fee under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts
sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid
waste management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste
69
Management (SWM) Fund created under Section 46 of the same law. Also,
according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S2235 is inconsistent
with R.A. No. 9003 for whil e the law encourages segregation, composting, and
recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and payment
of garbage fee; while the law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in
the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage, the ordinance skips such
mandate. Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage
fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had not yet
elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his realty tax which already
included the garbage fee.
The Court's Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed
valid.
An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of
reasonableness though is open to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to
the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in writing off an
ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be
prohibitive, arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which
has gained acceptance is that factors relevant to such an inquiry are the
municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made subject
70
to imposition.
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the LGU to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following requirements: (1) not
contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not
partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
71
consistent with public policy; and (6) not unreasonable. As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it was passed in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive ( i.e.,
involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
72
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test
73 74
of consistency with the prevailing laws. If not, it is void.
Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
75
Constitution. As to conformity with existing statutes,
Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
76
has this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid.
The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which
infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.
In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied
restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the
language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the
acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without
which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of
so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of
no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
They are so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to
detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under
our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True,
there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot
now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy
77
its will or modify or violate it.
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy
of ensuring the autonomy of local governments was never intended by the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create an imperium in imperio and install an
78
intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign state.
"[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as
local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state.
The legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the
State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right and duty to
administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power over
the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was
79
granted."
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is
80
called the power of subordinate legislation. "Congress enacted the LGC as
the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s
great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the
power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters
and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these
delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning
81
subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations."
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most
effective instrument to raise needed revenues in financing and supporting
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic services essential to the
promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
82
prosperity of the people. As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City
83
of Cabanatuan:
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the
scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice
and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection
of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation
assume s even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes,
fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, viz: "Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power
to create its own sources of revenue, to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with
the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments."
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can
be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting
decentralization of governance. For a long time, the country’s highly centralized
government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local
government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also "dampened the
spirit of initiative, innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local
development on the part of local government leaders." The only way to shatter
this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the delivery of
basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own
sources for the purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code that will,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy , set the guidelines and
84
limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x
Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of
85
Benguet that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays is summarized in Icard v. City Council of Baguio :
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with
no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an
intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris . Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the
municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in
the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring
supplied]
xxxx
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no longer
vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges." Nevertheless, such authority is
"subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
86
Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and fiscal matters.
Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such
power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the
87
statute. "Under the now prevailing Constitution , where there is neither a grant
nor a prohibition by statute , the tax power must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale
for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local
government units by directly granting them general and broad tax powers.
Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute
and unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while
the local government units are being strengthened and made more
autonomous , the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be
over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each
local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the
resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local
88
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just."
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its
own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall
accrue exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its resources
and assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise
89
or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions. The
relevant provisions of the LGC which establish the parameters of the taxing
power of the LGUs are as follows:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles
shall govern th e exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of
local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the
taxpayer’s ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic
policy, or in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions
shall in no case be left to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall
inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the
local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition
unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not
extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial
institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions
mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharage on
wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges
and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by
the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried
into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of local
government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for bridges
or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever
upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when
sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of
Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four
(4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum
products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or
exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as
otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire
and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this
Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for
the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof,
except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually
exported, except as otherwise provided herein;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business
Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810 and
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No. 6938)
otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines"
respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in
this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or
municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and charges
levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities
shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates
allowed for the province or municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%)
except the rates of professional and amusement taxes.
SECTION 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local
government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any
base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or taxed under
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other
applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust,
excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy:
Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall
not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses
the view that the use of property bears a social function and that all economic
90
agents shall contribute to the common good. The Court already recognized
91
this in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the owner, but also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the
needs of the other members of society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, no r injurious to the
right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional
rights, are subject to reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent
them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by law as the legislature, under the governing an d controlling
92
power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema
lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
93
people. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government in the exercise of
94
police power. In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that taxation may be
95
made the implement of the state’s police power.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5%
on the assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000.00. This special
96
assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or the UDHA. The
SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban development and housing
97
program. Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax . – Consistent with the constitutional principle
that the ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function and to
raise funds for the Program, all local government units are hereby authorized to
impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value of all
lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00).
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject
ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City
Government with sufficient funds to initiate, implement and undertake
Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing
Programs and Projects of the City Government, specifically the marginalized
sector through the acquisition of properties for human settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market
value of properties in the city[.]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged
to implement in their respective localities in coordination with the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council, the national housing agencies, the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other non-
98
government organizations. It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a
comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing program that
shall, among others, uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the rational
use and development of urban land in order to bring a bout, among others,
reduction in urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public
health, safety and ecology, and access to land and housing by the
99
underprivileged and homeless citizens. Urban renewal and resettlement shall
100
include the rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas and
the resettlement of program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of
101 102
the UDHA. Under the UDHA, socialized housing shall be the primary
103
strategy in providing shelter for the underprivileged and homeless. The LGU
or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and concerned
agencies, shall provide socialized housing or re settlement areas with basic
services and facilities such as potable water, power and electricity, and an
adequate power distribution system, sewerage facilities, and an efficient and
adequate solid waste disposal system; and access to primary roads and
104
transportation facilities. The provisions for health, education,
communications, security, recreation, relief and welfare shall also be planned
and be given priority for implementation by the LGU and concerned agencies in
105
cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is
levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the
police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with
public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to
the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real
property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their
property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and
safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them
law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional
limitations and is subject to the requirement that its exercise must be
109
reasonable and for the public good. In the words of City of Manila v. Hon.
110
Laguio, Jr.:
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights
of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in
xxxx
coordination with the NHA, are directed to implement the relocation and
resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros , railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
106
like sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. In coordination with the NHA, enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional
the LG Us shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
meet the basic needs of the affected families.
107 private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It
must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
within its power to impose. Aside from the specific authority vested by Section exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for
43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
be arbitrarily invaded.
services and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for
108
low-cost housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to
its socialized housing programs and projects.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due
111
process clause.
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their
police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be
precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the mean s employed are reasonably necessary for the
112
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real
property owners because it burdens them with expenses to provide funds for
the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class legislation since it favors
the latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
113
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The
guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
114
circumstances. Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to
115
give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The law
may, therefore, treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class
116
from another.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for
a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members
117
of the same class. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program, the disparities between a
real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too
obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the
meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally
exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to
118
favor one over another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free
119
to select the subjects of taxation. Inequities which result from a singling out of
one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
120
limitation.
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It
is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below
what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out by respondents, while the law
authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more than
₱50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed
value exceeding ₱100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the
ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the special
assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from
being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a
municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police power to protect public
121
health, safety, and welfare. As opined, the purposes and policy
underpinnings of the police power to regulate the collection and disposal of
solid waste are: (1) to preserve and protect the public health and welfare as
well as the environment by minimizing or eliminating a source of disease and
preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and ensure financial
stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of
all charges marshalled and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic
122
refuse disposal scheme.
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of
123
validity. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of U.S. cases
addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service and fees
124
have upheld the ordinances against constitutional and statutory challenges.
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of
125
garbage within its corporate limits. The LGC specifically assigns the
responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid waste to local governing
bodies because the Legislature determined that such bodies were in the best
126
position to develop efficient waste management programs. To impose on
local governments the responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them
127
the authority necessary to fulfill the same would lead to an absurd result." As
held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject
matter, the manner and means of exercising those powers, where not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the discretion of the
municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal powers
to the discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness
within which a municipality's exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or
128
upset by the judiciary."
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper
exercise of its corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is
empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds
129
for the genera l welfare of the city and its inhabitants. Section 16 of the LGC
provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare . – Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police
130
power of the State to LGUs. The provisions related thereto are liberally
interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
131
community. Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the public require but also what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests since the
132
Sanggunian is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the
provisions of the LGC and national policies, the LGUs shall share with the
national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
133
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction. In this regard, cities are
allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among
others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and
134
services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation. R.A. No. 9003,
135
or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, affirms this authority
as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their respective
jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national
government, other local government units, non-government organizations, and
136
the private sector.
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such
137
reasonable fees and charges for services rendered. "Charges" refer to
pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property, while "Fee"
means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a
138
business or activity.
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a
charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. The basis for this could be
discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines
in terms of population and urban geographical areas, apart from being
competent and efficient in the delivery of public service, apparently requires a
big budgetary allocation in order to address the problems relative and
connected to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the
effective system of waste management, public information programs on proper
garb age and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of waste
regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste
management system, the City Government through the Sangguniang
Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of reasonable fees or
charges for the garbage collection services for residential (domestic
household) that it renders to the public.
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In
139
Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas , the Court
had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared
that "if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is
merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the
imposition a tax."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that
the purpose and effect of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee,
and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption
that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities
does not decide whether the imposition is properly a license tax or a license
fee.1awp++i1 The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the
imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus,
"[w]hen no police inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any
standard set for the applicant to establish, or that he agrees to attain or
maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated, without
qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the
stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of
conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained
judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that
the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised."
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been
140
consistently treated as a fee and not a tax.
141
In another U.S. case, the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge"
rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which
had previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance
142
No. SP-2235 violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed
by a municipal corporation, it must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of
143
providing the garbage service. To pass judicial scrutiny, a regulatory fee
must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such
fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the
144
regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation.
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage
fee under Section 47 of R.A. No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees
in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing
a solid waste management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund
under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is
inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003, because the ordinance emphasizes the
collection and payment of garbage fee with no concern for segregation,
composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling
for the active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and
recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a
systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management program
which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation, collection, transport,
storage, treatment and disposal of solid waste through the formulation and
adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste
145
management. The law provides that segregation and collection of solid
waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically for biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable
materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or
146
city. Mandatory segregation of solid wastes shall primarily be conducted at
the source, to include household, institutional, industrial, commercial and
147
agricultural sources. Segregation at source refers to a solid waste
management practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials
found in soli d waste in order to promote recycling and re-use of resources and
148
to reduce the volume of waste for collection and disposal. Based on Rule
XVII of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
149
Administrative Order No. 2001-34, Series of 2001, which is the Implementing
Rules and Regulations ( IRR ) of R.A. No. 9003, barangays shall be
responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable,
150
recyclable , compostable and reusable wastes.
For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF), which shall receive
biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for
final segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be established in every barangay
151
or cluster of barangays.
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management
board, is mandated by law to prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan
152
consistent with the National Solid Waste Management Framework. The plan
shall be for the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes generated in its
jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its
jurisdiction; and place primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-
use, recycling, and composting programs while identifying the amount of landfill
and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which cannot be
153
re-used, recycled, or composted. One of the components of the so lid waste
management plan is source reduction:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a
program and implementation schedule which shows the methods by which the
LGU will, in combination with the recycling and composting components,
reduce a sufficient amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the
diversion requirements of Section 20.
The source reduction component shall describe the following:
(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at
source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources
necessary to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be
considered, provide d that such technologies conform with the
standards set pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this
Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of
solid wastes to be diverted from disposal at a disposal facility through
re-use , recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be
needed to implement re-use, recycling and composting.
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and
identification of rate structures and fees for the purpose of reducing the amount
of waste generated, and other source reduction strategies, including but not
limited to, program s and economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this
Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials
and products with reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and
increase the efficiency of the use of paper, cardboard, glass, metal, and other
materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall al so take into
account, among others, local capability, economic viability, technical
requirements, social concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental
impact: Provided , That, projection of future facilities needed and estimated
154
cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x
The solid waste management pl an shall also include an implementation
schedule for solid waste diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan
shall include an implementation schedule which shows that within five (5) years
after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid
waste from waste disposal facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting
activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided , That the waste
diversion goals shall be increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided ,
further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit from
implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed
the goal.
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste
155 156
characterization result that each LGU is mandated to undertake. In
accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of
the SWM Fund on the basis of their approved solid waste management plan.
Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees under Section 47 of the law,
which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local
government unit shall impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of
preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan
prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be based on the following
minimum factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.
The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting
the local fees. In determining the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include
only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the plan
and the setting and collection of the local fees.
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees . – The Local SWM
Board/Local SWM Cluster Board shall impose fees on the SWM services
provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized organization or unit. In
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
determining the amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster
Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and
implementation of the SWM Plan and the setting and collection of the local
fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private sector and civil
society groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Boar
d/Local SWM Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered by a
Contract or Memorandum of Agreement between the respective boa rd and the
private sector or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a
SWM Plan prepared pursuant to the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to
pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees and for project
sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to
the following minimum factors:
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste
b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the
following levels:
a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and
segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from
households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the
use of Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be
established by the respective SWM boards. The manner of collection
of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration of
respective Barangay Councils. However, all transactions shall follow
the Commission on Audit rules on collection of fees.
b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on
the barangay MRFs for the collection and transport of non-recyclable
and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary
landfill. The level and procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by
the Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by
LGU ordinances; however, payments shall be consistent with the
accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations
of contract or Memorandum of Agreement, the private sector or civil
society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping in
their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the paying public
or to the government.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality
or city to impose fees is limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable
and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the
collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes
from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the
use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent with
Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the
barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and special
wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the
garbage fee is the volume of waste currently generated by each person in
Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per day, and the
157
increasing trend of waste generation for the past three years. Respondents
did not elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific
types of wastes generated – whether residential, market, commercial,
industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural, agro-industrial,
institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such
amount pertains to the totality of wastes, without any distinction, generated by
Quezon City constituents. To reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

or city to impose fees extends only to those related to the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per
day refers only to non-recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain
the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be
equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and
158
not unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory.
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor
area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social
housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is
again quoted below:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise
condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of the
entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional
garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for every unit
already so ld or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units
shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire
apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule
prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction
between an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a
condominium, socialized housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most
likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is uniform and
does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
159
equitable.

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a
ess than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00 resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized housing project
has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike unit
01 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00 occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to
pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed
01 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized
001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00 housing project.

501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00 Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its
declared purpose of "promoting shared responsibility with the residents to
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City; attack their common mindless attitude in over-consuming the present
160
resources and in generating waste." Instead of simplistically categorizing the
payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered
ess than 40 sq. m. PHP 25.00 factors that could truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the
appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household age
1 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP 50.00 and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or
district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003
1 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP 75.00 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees may be
01 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PH₱100.00 computed based on minimum factors such as type s of solid waste to include
special waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the
51 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP 200.00 waste management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of
construction, cost of management, and type of technology. With respect to
utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to classify
On high-rise Condominium Units
consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
cost of service, the purpose for which the service or the product is received, the
quantity or the amount received, the different character of the service
furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a substantial
161
difference as a ground of distinction. [A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged
is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of classifications
and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable
and does not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination
to be unlawful must draw an unfair line or strike an unfair balance between
those in like circumstances having equal rights and privileges. Discrimination
with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without a
162
reasonable fact basis or justification.
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No.
SP-2235, which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an
interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged
against a household owner who refuses to pay the garbage fee herein
imposed. lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which
provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges.
– The sanggunian may impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of
the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid on time and an interest at the
rate not exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees or
charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case
shall the total interest on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six
(36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required
publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty
tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the garbage fee. Respondents
counter that if the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the Official
Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly,
Ordinance No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication while Ordinance No.
SP-2235 became effective after its approval on December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:
SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise
stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan
and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days
from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the
provincial capital or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and
in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit
concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting
of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the
provincial capital and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least
two
(2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not
later than five (5) days after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and
posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood
by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned,
and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book
kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local
legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper
of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances
shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the
sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities,
the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local
newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the
absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any
newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. –
Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial,
city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in
full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided,
however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places. (Emphasis supplied)

On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No.
SP-2095, which provides that it would take effect after its publication in a
163
newspaper of general circulation. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-
2235, which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides
164
that it would be effective upon its approval.

Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013, respondent City
165
Mayor approved the same.

The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative
allegation that respondents did not comply with the posting and publication
requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to his
unsupported claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality

and legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the "Socialized Housing Tax
of Quezon City," is· SUSTAINED for being consistent ·with Section·43 of
Republic Act No. ·7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013,
which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon
City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.
Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums
of money collected relative to its enforcement. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance
No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
taking any further action to enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 182722 January 22, 2010
DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE, Represented by
Felicidad Ruiz, its General Manager, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,
DECISION
The clashing interests of the State and the taxpayers are again pitted against
each other. Two basic principles, the States inherent power of taxation and its
declared policy of fostering the creation and growth of cooperatives come into
play. However, the one that embodies the spirit of the law and the true intent of
the legislature prevails.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Section 11 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9282,[1] in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the
December 18, 2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), ordering
petitioner to pay deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time
deposits of its members for taxable years 1999 and 2000, pursuant to Section
24(B)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC), as well as the
delinquency interest of 20% per annum under Section 249(C) of the same
Code. It also assails the April 11, 2008 Resolution[3] denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (DCCCO) is a credit
cooperative duly registered with and regulated by the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA).[4] It was established on February 17, 1968[5]
with the following objectives and purposes: (1) to increase the income and
purchasing power of the members; (2) to pool the resources of the members by
encouraging savings and promoting thrift to mobilize capital formation for
development activities; and (3) to extend loans to members for provident and
productive purposes.[6] It has the power (1) to draw, make, accept, endorse,
guarantee, execute, and issue promissory notes, mortgages, bills of exchange,
drafts, warrants, certificates and all kinds of obligations and instruments in
connection with and in furtherance of its business operations; and (2) to issue
bonds, debentures, and other obligations; to contract indebtedness; and to
secure the same with a mortgage or deed of trust, or pledge or lien on any or
all of its real and personal properties.[7]
On November 27, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Operations
Group Deputy Commissioner, Lilian B. Hefti, issued Letters of Authority Nos.
63222 and 63223, authorizing BIR Officers Tomas Rambuyon and Tarcisio
Cubillan of Revenue Region No. 12, Bacolod City, to examine petitioners
books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes
for the taxable years 1999 and 2000.[8]
Proceedings before the BIR Regional Office
On June 26, 2002, petitioner received two Pre-Assessment Notices for
deficiency withholding taxes for taxable years 1999 and 2000 which were
protested by petitioner on July 23, 2002.[9] Thereafter, on October 16, 2002,
petitioner received two other Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency
withholding taxes also for taxable years 1999 and 2000.[10] The deficiency
withholding taxes cover the payments of the honorarium of the Board of
Directors, security and janitorial services, legal and professional fees, and
interest on savings and time deposits of its members.
On October 22, 2002, petitioner informed BIR Regional Director Sonia L.
Flores that it would only pay the deficiency withholding taxes corresponding to
the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, legal
and professional fees for the year 1999 in the amount of P87,977.86, excluding
penalties and interest.[11]
In another letter dated November 8, 2002, petitioner also informed the BIR
Assistant Regional Director, Rogelio B. Zambarrano, that it would pay the
withholding taxes due on the honorarium and per diems of the Board of
Directors, security and janitorial services, commissions and legal &
professional fees for the year 2000 in the amount of P119,889.37, excluding
penalties and interest, and that it would avail of the Voluntary Assessment and
Abatement Program (VAAP) of the BIR under Revenue Regulations No. 17-
2002.[12]
On November 29, 2002, petitioner availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts
of P105,574.62 and P143,867.24[13] corresponding to the withholding taxes on
the payments for the compensation, honorarium of the Board of Directors,
security and janitorial services, and legal and professional services, for the
years 1999 and 2000, respectively.
On April 24, 2003, petitioner received from the BIR Regional Director, Sonia L.
Flores, Letters of Demand Nos. 00027-2003 and 00026-2003, with attached
Transcripts of Assessment and Audit Results/Assessment Notices, ordering
petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes, inclusive of penalties, for the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
years 1999 and 2000 in the amounts of P1,489,065.30 and P1,462,644.90,
respectively.[14]
Proceedings before the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
On May 9, 2003, petitioner protested the Letters of Demand and Assessment
Notices with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR).[15] However, the
latter failed to act on the protest within the prescribed 180-day period. Hence,
on December 3, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CTA,
docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6827.[16]
Proceedings before the CTA First Division
The case was raffled to the First Division of the CTA which rendered its
Decision on February 6, 2007, disposing of the case in this wise:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Review is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. Assessment Notice Nos. 00026-2003 and 00027-
2003 are hereby MODIFIED and the assessment for deficiency withholding
taxes on the honorarium and per diems of petitioners Board of Directors,
security and janitorial services, commissions and legal and professional fees
are hereby CANCELLED. However, the assessments for deficiency withholding
taxes on interests are hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED TO PAY the respondent the respective
amounts of P1,280,145.89 and P1,357,881.14 representing deficiency
withholding taxes on interests from savings and time deposits of its members
for the taxable years 1999 and 2000. In addition, petitioner is ordered to pay
the 20% delinquency interest from May 26, 2003 until the amount of deficiency
withholding taxes are fully paid pursuant to Section 249 (C) of the Tax Code.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for a partial reconsideration, but it was denied by
the First Division in its Resolution dated May 29, 2007.[18]
Proceedings before the CTA En Banc
On July 3, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA En
Banc,[19] interposing the lone issue of whether or not petitioner is liable to pay
the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of
its members for taxable years 1999 and 2000, and the consequent delinquency
interest of 20% per annum.[20]
Finding no reversible error in the Decision dated February 6, 2007 and the
Resolution dated May 29, 2007 of the CTA First Division, the CTA En Banc
denied the Petition for Review[21] as well as petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[22]
The CTA En Banc held that Section 57 of the NIRC requires the withholding of
tax at source. Pursuant thereto, Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 was issued
enumerating the income payments subject to final withholding tax, among
which is interest from any peso bank deposit and yield, or any other monetary
benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements
x x x. According to the CTA En Banc, petitioners business falls under the
phrase similar arrangements; as such, it should have withheld the
corresponding 20% final tax on the interest from the deposits of its members.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse, where petitioner raises the issue of whether or
not it is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from savings
and time deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000, as well
as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC which reads in part, to wit:
SECTION 24. Income Tax Rates.
xxxx
(B) Rate of Tax on Certain Passive Income:
(1) Interests, Royalties, Prizes, and Other Winnings. A final tax at the rate of
twenty percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest from any
currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit
substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements; x x x
applies only to banks and not to cooperatives, since the phrase similar
arrangements is preceded by terms referring to banking transactions that have
deposit peculiarities. Petitioner thus posits that the savings and time deposits
of members of cooperatives are not included in the enumeration, and thus not
subject to the 20% final tax. To bolster its position, petitioner cites BIR Ruling
No. 551-888[23] and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006][24] where the BIR ruled that
interests from deposits maintained by members of cooperative are not subject
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
to withholding tax under Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC. Petitioner further
contends that pursuant to Article XII, Section 15 of the Constitution[25] and
Article 2 of Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938) or the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines,[26] cooperatives enjoy a preferential tax treatment which exempts
their members from the application of Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC.
Respondents Arguments
As a counter-argument, respondent invokes the legal maxim Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish). Respondent maintains that Section 24(B)(1)
of the NIRC applies to cooperatives as the phrase similar arrangements is not
limited to banks, but includes cooperatives that are depositaries of their
members. Regarding the exemption relied upon by petitioner, respondent
adverts to the jurisprudential rule that tax exemptions are highly disfavored and
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing power. In this connection, respondent likewise points out that the
deficiency tax assessments were issued against petitioner not as a taxpayer
but as a withholding agent.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
Petitioners invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888, reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-
591-2006], is proper.
On November 16, 1988, the BIR declared in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that
cooperatives are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and
time deposits of their members. The pertinent BIR Ruling reads:
November 16, 1988
BIR RULING NO. 551-888
24 369-88 551-888
Gentlemen:
This refers to your letter dated September 5, 1988 stating that you are a
corporation established under P.D. No. 175 and duly registered with the
Bureau of Cooperatives Development as full fledged cooperative of good
standing with Certificate of Registration No. FF 563-RR dated August 8, 1985;
and that one of your objectives is to provide and strengthen cooperative
endeavor and extend assistance to members and non-members through credit
scheme both in cash and in kind.
Based on the foregoing representations, you now request in effect a ruling as
to whether or not you are exempt from the following:
1. Payment of sales tax
2. Filing and payment of income tax
3. Withholding taxes from compensation of employees and
savings account and time deposits of members. (Underscoring
ours)
In reply, please be informed that Executive Order No. 93 which took effect on
March 10, 1987 withdrew all tax exemptions and preferential privileges e.g.,
income tax and sales tax, granted to cooperatives under P.D. No. 175 which
were previously withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955 effective October 15, 1984 and
restored by P.D. No. 2008 effective January 8, 1986. However, implementation
of said Executive Order insofar as electric, agricultural, irrigation and
waterworks cooperatives are concerned was suspended until June 30, 1987.
(Memorandum Order No. 65 dated January 21, 1987 of the President)
Accordingly, your tax exemption privilege expired as of June 30, 1987. Such
being the case, you are now subject to income and sales taxes.
Moreover, under Section 72(a) of the Tax Code, as amended, every employer
making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax at
the rates prescribed by Section 21(a) in relation to section 71, Chapter X, Title
II, of the same Code as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 and
implemented by Revenue Regulations No. 6-82 as amended. Accordingly, as
an employer you are required to withhold the corresponding tax due from the
compensation of your employees.
Furthermore, under Section 50(a) of the Tax Code, as amended, the tax
imposed or prescribed by Section 21(c) of the same Code on specified items of
income shall be withheld by payor-corporation and/or person and paid in the
same manner and subject to the same conditions as provided in Section 51 of
the Tax Code, as amended. Such being the case, and since interest from any
Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from
deposit substitutes are paid by banks, you are not the party required to
withhold the corresponding tax on the aforesaid savings account and time
deposits of your members. (Underscoring ours)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JR.
Commissioner
The CTA First Division, however, disregarded the above quoted ruling in
determining whether petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes
on interest from the deposits of its members. It ratiocinated in this wise:
This Court does not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent in his
Memorandum, nothing in the above quoted resolution will give the conclusion
that savings account and time deposits of members of a cooperative are tax-
exempt. What is entirely clear is the opinion of the Commissioner that the
proper party to withhold the corresponding taxes on certain specified items of
income is the payor-corporation and/or person. In the same way, in the case of
interests earned from Philippine currency deposits made in a bank, then it is
the bank which is liable to withhold the corresponding taxes considering that
the bank is the payor-corporation. Thus, the ruling that a cooperative is not the
proper party to withhold the corresponding taxes on the aforementioned
accounts is correct. However, this ruling does not hold true if the savings and
time deposits are being maintained in the cooperative, for in this case, it is the
cooperative which becomes the payor-corporation, a separate entity acting no
more than an agent of the government for the collection of taxes, liable to
withhold the corresponding taxes on the interests earned. [27] (Underscoring
ours)
The CTA En Banc affirmed the above-quoted Decision and found petitioners
invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-88 misplaced. According to the CTA En Banc,
the BIR Ruling was based on the premise that the savings and time deposits
were placed by the members of the cooperative in the bank.[28] Consequently,
it ruled that the BIR Ruling does not apply when the deposits are maintained in
the cooperative such as the instant case.
We disagree.
There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are
maintained in a bank. Rather, the ruling clearly states, without any qualification,
that since interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any
other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes are paid by banks,
cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest
from savings and time deposits of their members. This interpretation was
reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] dated October 5, 2006, which was
issued by Assistant Commissioner James H. Roldan upon the request of the
cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling on several issues, among which is the
alleged exemption of interest income on members deposit (over and above the
share capital holdings) from the 20% final withholding tax. In the said ruling, the
BIR opined that:
xxxx
3. Exemption of interest income on members deposit (over and above the
share capital holdings) from the 20% Final Withholding Tax.
The National Internal Revenue Code states that a final tax at the rate of twenty
percent (20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank
deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes
and from trust funds and similar arrangement x x x for individuals under
Section 24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under Section 27(D)(1).
Considering the members deposits with the cooperatives are not currency bank
deposits nor deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1),
therefore, do not apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of
primaries with federations, respectively.
It bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies in charge of
enforcing a law are entitled to great weight and consideration by the courts,
unless such interpretations are in a sharp conflict with the governing statute or
the Constitution and other laws.[29] In this case, BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and
BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony with the Constitution and the
laws they seek to implement. Accordingly, the interpretation in BIR Ruling No.
551-888 that cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax
on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members, which was
reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], applies to the instant case.
Members of cooperatives deserve a preferential tax treatment pursuant to RA
6938, as amended by RA 9520.
Given that petitioner is a credit cooperative duly registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC must
be read together with RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520.
Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of
the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical
vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the
attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
formation of cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their
growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them,
one of which is providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is
apparent in Articles 61 and 62 of RA 6938, which read:
ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. Duly registered cooperatives under
this Code which do not transact any business with non-members or the general
public shall not be subject to any government taxes and fees imposed under
the Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws. Cooperatives not falling under
this article shall be governed by the succeeding section.
ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with
both members and nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their
transactions to members. Notwithstanding the provision of any law or
regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall
enjoy the following tax exemptions; x x x.
This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized
that cooperatives exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary
objective of every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members
to enable them to attain increased income, savings, investments, and
productivity.[30] Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to
cooperatives would go against the very purpose of a credit cooperative.
Extending the exemption to members of cooperatives, on the other hand,
would be consistent with the intent of the legislature. Thus, although the tax
exemption only mentions cooperatives, this should be construed to include the
members, pursuant to Article 126 of RA 6938, which provides:
ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. In case of doubt as to the meaning
of any provision of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance thereof,
the same shall be resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their
members.
We need not belabor that what is within the spirit is within the law even if it is
not within the letter of the law because the spirit prevails over the letter.[31]
Apropos is the ruling in the case of Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[32]
to wit:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning
of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions,
to apply them just the same, [is] slavish obedience to their language. What we
do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
where these words import a policy that goes beyond them. While we admittedly
may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such
a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law
a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the
reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to
the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence,
a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the
spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within
the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
(Underscoring ours)
It is also worthy to note that the tax exemption in RA 6938 was retained in RA
9520. The only difference is that Article 61 of RA 9520 (formerly Section 62 of
RA 6938) now expressly states that transactions of members with the
cooperatives are not subject to any taxes and fees. Thus:
ART. 61. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with
both members and non-members shall not be subjected to tax on their
transactions with members. In relation to this, the transactions of members with
the cooperative shall not be subject to any taxes and fees, including but not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

limited to final taxes on members deposits and documentary tax.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or regulation to the contrary, such
cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax
exemptions: (Underscoring ours)
xxxx
withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of petitioners
members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000 as well as the delinquency
interest of 20% per annum are hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.

This amendment in Article 61 of RA 9520, specifically providing that members

of cooperatives are not subject to final taxes on their deposits, affirms the
interpretation of the BIR that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC does not apply to
cooperatives and confirms that such ruling carries out the legislative intent.
Under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by
reenactment, the reenactment of a statute substantially unchanged is
persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive
construction.[33]

Moreover, no less than our Constitution guarantees the protection of

cooperatives. Section 15, Article XII of the Constitution considers cooperatives
as instruments for social justice and economic development. At the same time,
Section 10 of Article II of the Constitution declares that it is a policy of the State
to promote social justice in all phases of national development. In relation
thereto, Section 2 of Article XIII of the Constitution states that the promotion of
social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Bearing in mind the foregoing
provisions, we find that an interpretation exempting the members of
cooperatives from the imposition of the final tax under Section 24(B)(1) of the
NIRC is more in keeping with the letter and spirit of our Constitution.

All told, we hold that petitioner is not liable to pay the assessed deficiency
withholding taxes on interest from the savings and time deposits of its
members, as well as the delinquency interest of 20% per annum.

In closing, cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax

treatment because of the vital role they play in the attainment of economic
development and social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the
government, the States power to tax must give way to foster the creation and
growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice Isagani A. Cruz: The
power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be
subordinated to the demands of social justice.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed December 18,

2007 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and the April 11, 2008 Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the assessments for deficiency
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES
FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of
the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines
in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic,
taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members
are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC)
was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
1 and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for
their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a
supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down
allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint
along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to
submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of
warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several
occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his
car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
2
court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the
military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the
checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed
specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or
other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and
3
Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, it was
held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
4
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
5
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
6
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
7
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a
8 9
vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in
other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC
to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice
of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and
the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of
which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating
economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at
the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the
men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible
of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were
temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the
police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
10
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as
the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual
liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely
to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily
pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much
less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply
because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death,
if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a
dark street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is
different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any
individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can
sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era
of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own
complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and
eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search
done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home,
and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the
people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest.
It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences,
discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I
submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past.
They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66
(AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law
issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive
measures, the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in
our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a
dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren
advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely,
have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit
that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not,
therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in
all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional
challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants"
unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is
fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But
the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I
submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has
been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely
draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra)
there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big
Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases
the majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause".
What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed
men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the
citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They
likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed
actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation.
He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on
individual's right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted,
"so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same
lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to
fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is
once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has
been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and
make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as
the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual
liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely
to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily
pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much
less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every
individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply
because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death,
if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a
dark street as a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is
different. Military officers are systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to
actively ferret out suspected criminals by detaining and searching any
individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can
sustain such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era
of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own
complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and
eloquently. I am agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search
done therein, unreasonable and hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home,
and effects. (CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the
people to be left alone — on which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest.
It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences,
discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I
submit — to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past.
They first saw the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66
(AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH
CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED PERSONS AND CONDUCT
DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a martial law
issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND
AMPLIFYING PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-
4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly submit, repressive
measures, the same measures against which we had fought so painstakingly in
our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated a
dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren
advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely,
have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit
that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not,
therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in
all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes
checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional
challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints", have become "search warrants"
unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is
fine. And so is "a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But
the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the search(es) in this case reasonable? I
submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason: No search warrant has
been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely
draw(ing) aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra)
there, "or flash(ing) a light therein." (Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big
Brother watching every step we take and every move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases
the majority refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause".
What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed
men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the
citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an eyelash. They
likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed
actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation.
He can not be anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on
individual's right against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted,
"so my brethren go on, the former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same
lie that the hated despot foisted on the Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to
fall for it a second time around. Second, the checkpoint searches herein are
unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is
once again the "showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has
been "paper democracy", let this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and
make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL
MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they
PADILLA, J.: were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus
(hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial was seated at the rear thereof.
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
factual background of the case is as follows: accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the
in 1982 and 1985.
officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival
thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
stayed in that place for two (2) days.
alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the
Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A
From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles
teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed
City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on
that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It
13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number
8005 and Plate number AVC 902.
1 was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented
his passport.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation
(NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among
the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
2 hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
his possession prohibited drugs.
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with
Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense,
he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed
that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and
that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but
because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take
the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his
passport and other Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his
pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed
it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer
came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was
told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed
around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest
opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office,
he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation
when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2)
travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically
3
Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of
violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet
for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
6425, as amended.
4
SO ORDERED.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was
illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the
prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
5
seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant
may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
6
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which
7
allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search
warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused,
however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
8 had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the
are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula
9 officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
10
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
11
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs,
their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession.
Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the
very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to
Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain
13
a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, the police authorities conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San
Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous
drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben
who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended
and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-
spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to
secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a
routine check of the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers
therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of
the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of
accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only
managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide
his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to
hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when
required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal
effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in
requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the
wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain
hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears
with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to
hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information
received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant,
in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from intrusion even
by the king, has not only found its niche in all our charters, from 1935 to the
present; it has also received unvarying recognition and acceptance in our case
1 2
law. The present Constitution declares that —
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said right, among
3
others, "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or other government
authority to a search of his body, or his personal effects or belongings, or his
residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
4 14
legitimate arrest.
An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant of arrest.
Even without a warrant, an arrest may also be lawfully made by a peace officer
5 16
or a private person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested "may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
6
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." And it has been held
that the search may extend to the area "within his immediate control," i.e., the
area from which said person arrested might gain possession of a weapon or
7
destructible evidence.
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search has also been
8
held to be proper in cases of "search of a moving vehicle, and "seizure of
9
evidence in plain view." This was the pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267, 276, which drew attention to Moreno v. Ago
10 11 12
Chi; Alvero v. Dizon, Papa v. Mago, and an American precedent, Harris v.
13
U.S.
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under
circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in
accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some
felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a
crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the
occasion thereof, as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree. In that event, any
evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for
15
any purpose in any proceeding." But the right against an unreasonable
search and seizure may be waived by the person arrested, provided he knew
of such right and knowingly decided not to invoke it.
There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the continuing
validity of these established principles. However, the Court is divided as
regards the ultimate conclusions which may properly be derived from the
proven facts and consequently, the manner in which the principles just cited
should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are diametrically at
odds. What is certain, however, is that the soldiers had no warrant of arrest
when they conducted a search of Malmstedt's person and the things in his
possession at the time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the soldiers
could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a search
warrant everytime they establish a temporary checkpoint . . . (and) no judge
would issue them one considering that searching questions have to be asked
before a warrant could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to the search, a
warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in accordance with
the norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not committed, nor was he actually
committing or attempting to commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did
said soldiers have personal and competent knowledge that Malmstedt had in
fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that Malmstedt might
have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags; all they had was, in the words
of the Trial Court, "the hope of intercepting any dangerous drug being
transported," or, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, "information that
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
most of the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera) were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on July 6, 1988
17
also by the First Division. There, Aminnudin was arrested without a warrant
by PC officers as he was disembarking from an inter-island vessel. The officers
were waiting for him because he was, according to an informer's report, then
transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag confirmed the
informer's report; the bag indeed contained marijuana. The Court nevertheless
held that since the PC officers had failed to procure a search warrant although
they had sufficient time (two days) to do so and therefore, the case presented
no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the search of Aminnudin's
person and bag, the seizure of the marijuana and his subsequent arrest were
illegal; and the marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action
subsequently instituted against Aminnudin for violating the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this Court in which
apparently different conclusions were reached. It is needful to devote a few
words to them so that the relevant constitutional and legal propositions are not
misunderstood.
18
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15, 1988), the accused
boarded a "Victory Liner" passenger bus going to Olongapo from Baguio City.
She placed the plastic bag she was carrying at the back of the seat then
occupied by Obiña, an INP member "on Detached Service with the Anti-
Narcotics Unit." This avowedly aroused Obiña's suspicion, and at the first
opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously looked into the
plastic bag and noted that it contained camote tops as well as a package, and
that there emanated from the package the smell of marijuana with which he
had become familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta.
Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obiña accosted her, showed her his ID, identified
himself as a policeman, and announced his intention to search her bag which
he said contained marijuana because of the distinctive odor detected by him.
Ignoring her plea — "Please go with me, let us settle this at home" — he
brought her to the police headquarters., where examination of the package in
Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed contained marijuana. The
Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the
search justified, and the evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence
against the accused.
19
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6, 1990), two police
officers and a barangay tanod were conducting a "surveillance mission" at the
Victory Liner Terminal at San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not
only against persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there) but also on
persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on
information supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a person carrying a red
travelling bag . . who was acting suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag;
the person did so only after they identified themselves as peace officers; found
in the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one kilogram,
more or less; the person was then taken to the police headquarters at San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he was investigated; and an information was
thereafter filed against that person, Tangliben, charging him with a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon these facts it
was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a valid warrantless arrest and a
proper warrantless search incident thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from those in People v.
Aminnudin, supra. "In contrast" to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no
urgency as to preclude the application for and obtention of a search warrant, it
was declared that the Tangliben case —
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was an
informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana . .
. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant . . . To
require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug
pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers
of contraband goods, robber, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if
not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are
associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient evidence on
hand to enable the PC officers to secure a search warrant, had there been
time. But because there was actually no time to get the warrant, and there
were "on-the-spot" indications that Tangliben was then actually committing a
crime, the search of his person and his effects was considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance
20
instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al., decided on August 2, 1990, and People v.
21
Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August 20, 1990.
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by two members
of the INP, Davao Metrodiscom, and when he was accosted by the two, who
identified themselves as police officers, he suddenly fled. He was pursued,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
overtaken and, notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The buri bag
Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for which he could
produce no license or authority to possess, four rounds of live ammunition, and
a tear gas grenade. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition and convicted after trial. This Court affirmed Posadas' conviction,
holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a search without
warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag he had with him at the time. The Court cited with approval the
22
ruling of the U.S. Federal Supreme Court in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio, a
1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First
Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway going
towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by
informers that Maspil and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a
large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the
policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 o'clock in the early
morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by
Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans.
When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be
marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under
arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were
verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus
23
conducted, as being incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and declared
that, as in Tangliben, supra, Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante
delictotransporting prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. Again, the Court
24
took occasion to distinguish the case from Aminnudin in which, as
aforestated, it appeared that the police officers were aware of Aminnudin's
identity, his projected criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be
arriving, and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time and opportunity to
obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the Court found
that the officers concerned had no exact description of the vehicle the former
would be using to transport marijuana, and no inkling of the definite time of the
suspects' arrival, and pointed out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as
a passenger boat on the high seas whose route and time of arrival are more or
less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from or otherwise alter its
25
course, or select another destination.
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and seizure appears to
be People v. Lo Ho Wing; et al., G.R. No. 88017, decided on January 21, 1991
(per Gancayco, J.). In that case, an undercover or "deep penetration" agent,
Tia, managed somehow to gain acceptance into a group of suspected drug
smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia accompanied
Peter Lo to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him and other person empty the
contents of six (6) tins of tea and replace them with white powder. On their
return to Manila with the cans of substituted "tea," they were met at the airport
by Lim. As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM),
who had earlier been tipped off by Tia, and placed under arrest. As search of
the luggage brought in by Tia and Peter Lo, loaded on the group's vehicles,
quickly disclosed the six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of white
crystalline powder which, upon analysis, was identified as
metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim were indicted for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state witness. Lo and Lim were
subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the
questions raised by them in this Court on appeal was whether the warrantless
search of their vehicles and personal effects was legal. The
26
Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986), held
legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles and the seizure therefrom of
the dangerous drug, considering that there was intelligence information,
including clandestine reports by a planted spy actually participating in the
activity, that the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; that
the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity," and "it is not practicable
to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
27
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho Wing, facts
existed which were found by the Court as justifying warantless arrests.
In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly ascertained that the woman he
was arresting was in fact in possession of marijuana; he had personally seen
that her bag contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the
odor of marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and searched was acting
suspiciously, and had been positively pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in
both cases, the accused were about to board passenger buses, making it
urgent for the police officers concerned to take quick and decisive action.
In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting suspiciously, too,
and when accosted had attempted to flee from the police officers. And
in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was definite information of the precise identity
of the persons engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and
place.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the facts in the case
at bar make out a legitimate instance of a warrantless search and seizure,
there is, as earlier pointed out, a regrettable divergence of views among the
members of the Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that the appellant
should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There was in this case no
confidential report from, or positive identification by an informer; no attempt to
flee; no bag or package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive
indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of perpetrating the
offense for which he was subsequently prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers
searched Malmstedt's pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply
"fishing" for evidence. It matters not that the search disclosed that the bags
contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial information and
suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of a warrant or as an incident of
a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e., under circumstances sufficient to engender a
reasonable belief that some crime was being or about to be committed, or
adjust been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The search was therefore
illegal, since the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest of an individual
before a search of his body and his belongings may licitly be made. The
process cannot be reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken, and then an
arrest effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. An arrest
made in that case would be unlawful, and the search undertaken as an incident
of such an unlawful arrest, also unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the Narcotic Command
at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Malmstedt had, it is said, willingly admitted that
there were was hashish inside the "teddy bears" in the luggage found in his
possession — an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory examination
— does not help the cause of the prosecution one bit. Nothing in the record
even remotely suggests that Malmstedt was accorded the rights guaranteed by
28
the Constitution to all persons under custodial investigation. He was not
informed, prior to being interrogated, that he had the "right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice," and
that if he could not afford the services of counsel, he would be provided with
one; not does it appear at all that he waived those rights "in writing and in the
presence of counsel." The soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead
with the investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The admissions elicited
from Malmstedt under these circumstances, as the Constitution clearly states,
are "inadmissible in evidence against him.
29
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags, having been
taken in violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, are inadmissible against him "for any purpose in any proceeding."
Also pronounced as incompetent evidence against him are the admissions
supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the constitutional
rights of persons under custodial investigation. Without such object evidence
and admissions, nothing remains of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the evidence presented
by Malmstedt in his defense is feeble, unworthy of credence. This is beside the
point; for conformably to the familiar axiom, the State must rely on the strength
of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The unfortunate fact is
that although the existence of the hashish is an objective physical reality that
cannot but be conceded, there is in law no evidence to demonstrate with any
degree of persuasion, much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt
was engaged in a criminal activity. This is the paradox created by the disregard
of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The tangible benefit is that the
hashish in question has been correctly confiscated and thus effectively
withdrawn from private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a disapproval or a
disparagement of the efforts of the police and military authorities to deter and
detect offenses, whether they be possession of and traffic in prohibited drugs,
or some other. Those efforts obviously merit the support and commendation of
the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those efforts must take
account of the basic rights granted by the Constitution and the law to persons
who may fall under suspicion of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those
rights may not be justified by the objective of ferreting out and punishing crime,
no matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective might be.
Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed, may result in the
escape of the guilty, and all because the "constable has blundered," rendering
30
the evidence inadmissible even if truthful or otherwise credible.
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October 12, 1989 and
to acquit the appellant on reasonable doubt.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I believe represents
the correct application to the facts of this case of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the Rules of Court on searches and seizures. It is consistent with
my ponencia in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih v.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of the Court en
banc, and my dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA
311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665,
and Guazon v. De Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation made during
the deliberation on this case that some members of the Court seem to be
coddling criminals instead of extending its protection to society, which deserves
our higher concern. The inference is that because of our wrong priorities,
criminals are being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all
our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without apology that I
do not consider a person a criminal, until he is convicted by final judgment after
a fair trial by a competent and impartial court. Until then, the Constitution bids
us to presume him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak crudely or sport
tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own standards of propriety
and decorum. None of these makes him a criminal although he may look like a
criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance but it is also
so wrong.
On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some judges to
wink at an illegal search and seizure as long as the suspect has been actually
found in possession of a prohibited article That fact will retroactively validate
the violation of the Bill of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the
suspect is a criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession, not
the fact of illegal search and seizure.
This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of Moncado v.
People's Court, 80 Phil. 1, which was discredited in Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383, even before it was definitely rejected by an express provision in the
1973 Constitution. That provision, which has been retained in the present
Constitution, again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained "shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison our system of
criminal justice.1âwphi1 In the case at bar, the search was made at a
checkpoint established for the preposterous reason that the route was being
used by marijuana dealers and on an individual who had something bulging at
his waist that excited the soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause?
The ponencia notes that the military had advance information that a Caucasian
was coming from the Sagada with prohibited drugs in his possession. This is
what the military says now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It is
so easy to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should
readily accept it.
The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been influenced by
the subsequent discovery that the accused was carrying a prohibited drug. This
is supposed to justify the soldier's suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of
illegal possession that retroactively established the probable cause that
validated the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous tree
that washed clean the tree itself.
In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four years ago:
. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end
that all available evidence should be used.1avvphi1 It is also desirable
that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes,
when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it
may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can
attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly
accepts and pays and announces that in the future it will pay for the
fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that
some criminals should escape than that the government should play
an ignoble part.
If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I am "coddling
criminals," I welcome the accusation and take pride in it. I would rather err in
favor of the accused who is impaled with outlawed evidence than exalt order at
the price of liberty.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MINDORO, defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional
History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the
first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the
status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can
be made to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view
in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of
state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have
any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all
involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and
proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the
so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians"
with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional
questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes
of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away
form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the
following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for
the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro,
which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some
other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province,
no successful result will be obtained toward educating these
people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one
place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to
direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that
the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient
for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800
hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the
Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of
Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21,
1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro
issued executive order No. 2 which says:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current
series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the
Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of
Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the
revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the
Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later
than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative
Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in
paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same
province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of
public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their
dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished
in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is
being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must
be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No.
2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board
thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in
Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor
and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore,
becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by
provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section
2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation.
— Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions
lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation
upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to
Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to
use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916;
section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably
of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws
of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and
in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands
with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to
set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards
these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at xxx xxx xxx
hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW VIII.
LAW I.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid,
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on October 10, 1618.
March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest
of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
May 20, 1578,
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES). should have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and
egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with
and the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders those of the Spaniards.
of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, LAW IX.
with great care and special attention, to use all the means most
convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met
at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of
Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE
hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was
resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated
places divided and separated from one another by sierras and in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and
mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby
benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be
and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may
are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of cultivate them and profit therefrom.
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have
entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to xxx xxx xxx
execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such LAW XIII.
forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that
those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of
their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be
not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF
above has been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining
parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has
thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title. the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or the reducciones once
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that
the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent
to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because these
claims are often made for private interests and not for those of
the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with,
otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The
penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES,"
WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who
should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty
houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios;
and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be
more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty
indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor
and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the
presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by
Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At
Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at
Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit.
4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO
SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores,
or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and towns of
the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal,
trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome
nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and
useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would
leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and
mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services,
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of
their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which
we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the
commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated
in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts
take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail
themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As
regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos),
who are children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit
their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it
appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents.
(Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to
improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by
concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of
a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and
obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to
conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to
grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in
those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the
same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any
longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the
social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein
is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the,
metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those
degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but
the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the
punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those
which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of
isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable
state of things, taking into account the prestige which the country
demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in
enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all
who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the
premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question
which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious
opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of
the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous
conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the
Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of
the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as
also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable
necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the
said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only
form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these
objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from
this date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions
prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different
pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these
races — which may be divided into three classes; one, which
comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming
a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who
have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of
those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be published in their
respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the
provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of
having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive
character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall
proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest
to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations
for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of
means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished
before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal
year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the
remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the
first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services
other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile
lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be
obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute
necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the
least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be
made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations
based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty
which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell
the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall
be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed
other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as
well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with
deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of
the territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should
go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for
eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not
subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in
returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among
their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them
in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive;
support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect
for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to
natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they
want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families
of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them
security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their
harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years
and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that
those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect
such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province
or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit
the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of
constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in communication with one
another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns
be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the
good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the
putting of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the
towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment
of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages
offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next
April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the
Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office
shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which,
in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter
the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall
destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate
their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be
repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters
shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the
zones where such operations shall take place and everything
conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities,
and other subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other
subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall
give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that
is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of
the provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to
visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General,
Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall
attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the
chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a
complement to the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this
decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within
their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario
de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has
been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1
of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these
instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes
are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be
exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the
Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to
name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The
Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the
Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the
Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that
part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This
transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12).
It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the
Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish
a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have
general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are
represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec.
22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line
between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and
the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of
the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48
and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the
Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667,
relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger;
and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the
Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government
of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted
on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference
to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548,
549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the
provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-
Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan),
Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because
referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR
THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to
bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and
duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon
township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil
Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the
provincial governor is further authorized, when he deems such a
course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the
Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and experience
necessary for successful local popular government, and his
supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to
the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any
settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a
course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred
and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such
township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill,
the passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with
section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-
sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by
Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the
provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the
provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines
and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be
followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in
varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to
the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in
section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in
Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-
705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among
other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127,
128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian
Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word
"tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms
can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts
Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act
No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian"
shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of
1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec.
3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of
course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would
be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this
view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code
and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages,"
and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-
Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further
to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to
be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill,
the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the
Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones
Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial
district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other
acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative
Code. The first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the
provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the
Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-
government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still
a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons
some of who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the
law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical
conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law
relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n
the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact
designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as
the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R.
18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to
the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of
the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive
authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674,
and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code
of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes
to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . .
with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The
question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in
the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following
language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as
legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of
uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold
also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an
uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who
have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a
member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating
to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was
the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official
addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special
Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether
people who were originally non-Christian but have recently been
baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered
Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in
these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any
suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual
tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of
them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-
Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the
Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any
particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement
so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the
Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the
degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the
time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore,
you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the
benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced
Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to
remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or
what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are
requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-
General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will
have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the
provinces organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal
Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of
this court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate,
but while no other better classification has as yet been made the
present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term
carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the
Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is
indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination
will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of
religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was
the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the
cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the
Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found
in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11,
1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes"
from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue
has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who
profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula
tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean
that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-
Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others,
including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are
subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the
country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a
matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on
whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the
mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his
religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe,
would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt
from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office,
however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East
Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men
belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s
are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of the large
provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this
Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized
people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving
their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular
letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all
provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial
treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian
tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling
down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine
Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions
and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information
of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not
by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because
of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-
Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the
cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and
uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have
had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of
the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the
same law that governs the other members of that community and from
and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the
same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members
thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period
the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign
countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration
of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case
may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring
him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is
not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor
even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some
of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of
advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with
some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian
tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is
concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe,
their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically
the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized
non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting
Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable
Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations
is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief
of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of
a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The
precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled
to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he
commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself
liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General
Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is
probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that,
in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the
same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the
constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian
inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code which we
are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the
Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but
simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes
of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in
the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of
the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian
tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a
social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based
on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the
expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the
uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles
2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be
understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law,
but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and
unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the
individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than
De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,"
divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or
Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq).
The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the
classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of
the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War
Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and
Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows
that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term
"non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The
Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class,
are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in
his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage,"
"mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is
applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times
without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it
to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the
radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which
we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the
ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the
interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called
the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood
and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods
followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the
Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation
of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have
been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those
humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the
opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the
Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect
this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the
clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the
position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which
can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United
States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the
United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies
before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have
recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they
roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes
were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without
the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to
dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States
wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in
which this could be done. The United States recognized no right in
private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty
or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as
having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought
under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they
resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of
Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found
are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has
always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by
this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the
General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in
that government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and
their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New
Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different
superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as
wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed
to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within
the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good
reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to
the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff
[1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers
[1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616;
Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264;
Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204
U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest.
Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker
(1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United
States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority
to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give
to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
(U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United
States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon
return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George
Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to
the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators
are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn
from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had
adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to
maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from
the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being
guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and
restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The
substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members
of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or
escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian
Territory — had departed therefrom without permission from the Government;
and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had
issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators
to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had
caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater
importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court
reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly
tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the
government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the
Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the
reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not
, need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists,
and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision
concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the
United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where
he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United
States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution
or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of
the military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators,
under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the
relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to
do.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as
the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws
and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United
States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be
discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as
authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas
Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See
also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to
all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been
taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation,
without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once
so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own
good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form
the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is
for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when
once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully
planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for
the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in
the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could
not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is
contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided
its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule
will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided
by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true
distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection
can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852],
1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision
is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the
Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and
taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to
the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of
the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably
to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of
all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice
Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was
not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the
rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The
Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was
necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions
naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204
U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials
charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its
inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the
conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of
being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a
department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on
behalf of his unknown clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and
unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as
language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and
none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt
by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious
beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial
construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic
Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is
invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long
continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification
of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should
avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-
Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of
civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not
discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the
President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones
Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional
limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-
Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties,
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer,
Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness
that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of
high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can
understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the
more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have .
. . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p.
393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not
being forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of
the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to
ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under
conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by
others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is
a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the
injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and
rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially
of any free government existing under a written Constitution — to
interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very
well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of
its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at
times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the
general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by
reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual.
(Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of
like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this
Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the
citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an
for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose
one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things
which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted
Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2
Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana
[1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6
R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally
natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of
the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College
Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has
been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially
true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p.
371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and
customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means
simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the
situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is
not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification
must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be
made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen
Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those
portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said
Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the
Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may
be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications,
of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed
the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together
wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of
broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any
servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may
have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners
rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under
which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to
note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become
almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the
right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried
onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on
rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not
go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do
not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the
right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the
police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that
this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government."
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915],
31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set
apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort
the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement
of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully
method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the
Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the
motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were
taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to
13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site
selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the
clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to
be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the
requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest
after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He
also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the
period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution
definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that
segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of
the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to
the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over
those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence
of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize
them into political communities and to educate their children
with the object of making them useful citizens of this country.
To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a
burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will
commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of
all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration —
"the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality
and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on
by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of
seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public
health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions
to facilitate their development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another
among non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse
and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian
people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources,
especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of
private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been
continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they
may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are
still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild
habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to
understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them
politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them
under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work,
protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their
children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with
their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to
economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more
highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the
Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly
relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational,
agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards
the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue
the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by
non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a
systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence
between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United
States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise
Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan,
carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these
people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the
Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more
fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing
for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to
do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to
begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times,
"bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has
been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same
class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered
together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases,
and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people.
Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal.
Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes,
for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals
of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but
not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos.
But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence,
and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the
purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in
enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because
these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If
immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands
of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a
position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest
of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The
State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the
sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the
Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead
injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of
these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which
they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy
burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of
liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand
liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to
another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully,
how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due
process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived
of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons
who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise
liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea
of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case
at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to
the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will
mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of
coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with
national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has
tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people
under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the
signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will
become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been
accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the
backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a
certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured
by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of
the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we,
after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this
people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly
retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty
without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful
citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and
become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at
Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their
living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a
condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for
anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary
servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to
some other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this
connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move
from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the
entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation,
the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one
place to another on the public lands, why can not the government
adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the
public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public
as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For
as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return
to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is
provinced for, you can not make them live together and the noble
intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific
objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking,
to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain
localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens
certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law
provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this
law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without
question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak
and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous
official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the
enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people;
on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry
out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-
treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the
hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of
grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it
would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the
Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom,
may the right and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated
to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very
existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or
philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred
to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary
must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a
power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the
necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree
to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights
of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the
courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period
has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is,
indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a
law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of
doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude
which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government.
In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt
University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi.
Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis,
determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by
such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip
the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its
probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing
inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason
and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-
called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent
governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the
present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the
law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a
rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions
must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a
time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency
of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts
whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one
of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like
other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911],
222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this
case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to
upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental
policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and
bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as
progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the
Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall
be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:
I fully concur in the reasoning and the conclusions of Justice Malcolm as set
forth in the prevailing, opinion.
The words "non-Christian' have a clear, definite and well settled signification
when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective, applied to
"tribes," "people," or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and
provinces throughout the Islands.
Justice Malcolm, as I think, correctly finds that these words, as used in this
connection in our statute-book, denote the 'low grace of civilization" of the
individuals included in the class to which they are applied. To this I would add
that the tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribes is, or is
not of the "non-Christian" are, and throughout the period of American
occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in
civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community." (Cf. letter of Collector of Internal Revenue dated September 17,
1910, and set out in the principal opinion.)
The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found
to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraces with the
descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-
book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the
tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and
judicial, which control the conduct of the admitted civilized inhabitants of the
Islands; a made of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal
customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the
tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the
lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with members of the
tribe.
So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
inhabitants of particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of
such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group
or individual from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-
Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally
result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence
to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered to or maintained
allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a
mode of life independent of a apart from that maintain by such tribe, but a
mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare
of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
The contention that, in this particular case, and without challenging the validity
of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these
petitioners, as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes affected by
the reconcentration order, an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was
made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a
contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an order.
If the fifteen thousand manguianes affected by the order complained of had
attained that degree of civilization which would have made it practicable to
serve notice upon, and give an opportunity for a real hearing, to all the
members of the tribe affected by the order, it may well be doubted whether the
provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior would have been justified in
its enforcement By what proceeding known to the law, or to be specially
adopted in a particular case, could the offices of any province provide for a
genuine hearing upon a proposal to issue a reconcentration order upon a
head-hunting tribe in the north of the Island of Luzon; or upon one of the
nomadic tribes whose habitat is in the mountain fastnesses of Mindanao, and
whose individual members have no fixed or known place of residence, or upon
the fifteen thousand Manguianes roaming in the wilds of Mindoro.
Of course, friendly headmen or chief might and, as a rule, should be consulted,
after the practice in the United States when tribes or groups of American
Indians have been placed upon reservations; but since non-Christian head
men and chiefs in the Philippines have no lawful authority to bind their acts or
their consent, the objection based on lack of a hearing, would have the same
force whether the issuance of a reconcentration order was or was not preceded
by a pow-wow of this kind.
The truth of the mater is that the power to provide for the issuance of such
orders rests upon analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
freedom or action of children and persons of unsound minds is restrained,
without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general welfare.
The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is
properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individual are
found to be of such a low grade of civilization that their own wishes cannot be
permitted to determine their mode of life or place of residence.
The status of the non-Christian inhabitants of these Islands, and the special
and necessarily paternal attitude assume toward them by the Insular
Government is well illustrated by the following provisions found in the
Administrative Code of 1917:
SEC. 705. Special duties and purposes of Bureau (of non-Christian
tribes). — It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to
continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions
inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and to foster by all adequate
means and in a systematic, rapid, and completely manner the moral,
material, economic, social and political development of those regions,
always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between and complete fusion of all the Christian and non-
Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
SEC. 2116. Township and settlement fund. — There shall be
maintained in the provincial treasuries of the respective specially
organized provinces a special fund to be known as the township and
settlement fund, which shall be available, exclusively, for expenditures
for the benefit of the townships and settlements of the province, and
non-Christian inhabitants of the province, upon approval of the
Secretary of the Interior.
As I understand it, the case at bar does not raise any real question as to the
jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands in habeas corpus proceedings, to
review the action of the administrative authorities in the enforcement of
reconcentration orders issued, under authority of section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, against a petitioner challenging the alleged fact that he is
a "non-Christian" as that term is used in the statute. I, therefore, express no
opinion on that question at this time
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That
fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the
humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian
or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing,
at least, before they are deprived of their liberty
MOIR, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but may sense of justice
will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing may
strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority
of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the question
in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be, the legal and human side of
the case as it presents itself to my mind.
The facts are that one Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the Provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their
residence from their native habitat and to establish themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be
punished by imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears from
the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of
land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, on which about three hundred
manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in
prision at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. The
Manguianes used out a writ of habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they
are deprived of their liberty in violation of law.
The Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands makes return to the writ copied
in the majority opinion which states that the provincial governor of Mindoro with
the prior approval of his act by the Department Secretary ordered the placing of
the petitioners and others on a reservation.
The manguianes, it is stated on page 694 of the majority opinion, "are very low
in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive,
seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 (?). The manguianes
have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to
Act No. 547, have no progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
It may be well to add that the last P.I. Census (1903) shows that the Island of
Mindoro (not including smaller islands which together make the Province of
Mindoro) has an area of 3,851 square miles and a populations of 28, 361 of
which 7, 369 are wild or uncivilized tribes (Manguianes). This appears to be the
total Mangyan population of the province. The total population was less than
seven to the mile (Vol. 2, P.I. Census, pp. 30 and 407).
The Island is fertile, heavily wooded and well watered.
It has no savage population, but it is sparsely settled by Christian Filipinos
along the coast and by Manguianes.
The Manguianes roamed its mountains and valleys, fishing and hunting at will
long before Magallanes [Magellan] anchored his boats in the water of Cebu.
They have made little or no progress in the ways of civilization. "They are a
peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people," whom the Government of the
Philippines Islands would bring under the beneficient influence of civilization
and progress.
The law provides for it in section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and for
those who like Dadalos do not take kindly to the ways provided for civilizing
them section 2759 provides the punishment.
The attorney for the petitioners has raised various constitutional questions, but
only the fundamental one will be considered by me. It is that the sections of the
Administrative Code, 2145 and 2759, quoted in the majority opinion, are in
violation of the first paragraph of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, which reads as follows:
That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person therein the equal protection of the laws.
It is not necessary to argue that a Mangyan is one of the persons protected by
that provision.
The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is
similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made
all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into
these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the United
States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to
them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States
Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties,
reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected
form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were
larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but
in thousands of square miles.
The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a
certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of
the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the
rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from
their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800
hectares, he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process
of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law.
The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines."
They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos
whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and
must be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "bought
under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation.
Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return
of the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been
committed by these "peacefully, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
A memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands is
copied in extenso in the majority opinion, and from it I gather the nature of their
offense which is that —
Living a nomadic and wayfaring life and evading the influence of
civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon. No bringing any benefit to the State but,
instead, injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately
become of those people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are not fighting in court? They will ultimately
become a heavy burden to the State and, on account of their
ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want
to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right
conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way.
They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully,
how can they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the constitutional guaranty that "no person shall be deprived
of his liberty without due process of law" apply to a class of persons
who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise
liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea
of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case
at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to
the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will
mean that this people be let alone in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of
coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with
national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has
tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens.
There appear to be two intimations or charges in this memorandum; one is that
the Manguianes destroy the forest by making a caiñgin. What is a "caiñgin?"
Simply this. These people move their camp or place of abode frequently and
when they do move to a new place, it is necessary to clear the land in order to
plant corn and camotes (sweet potatoes) and they cut down the smaller trees
and burn these around the larger ones, killing them, so that they can plant their
crops. The fires never spread in the tropical undergrowth of an island like
Mindoro, but the trees within the caiñgin are killed and crops are planted and
harvested. This land may be abandoned later on — due to superstition, to a
lack of game in the neighborhood, to poor crops from exhausted fertility, or to a
natural desire to move on.
Granting that the Manguianes do make caiñgins or clear lands in spots and
then abandon them for the more fertile lands, which every man knows to be
just over the hills, we cannot see that they are committing such a great abuse
as to justify incarcerating them on a small tract of land — for incarceration it is
and nothing less.
The second intimation or charge is that "they will become a heavy burden to
the state and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those
who want to abuse them." They have never been a burden to the state and
never will be. They have not committed crimes and, when they do, let the law
punish them." The authorities are anticipating too much from these "peaceful,
timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people." Their history does not demonstrate that
we must expect them to commit crimes and jail them to prevent the possibility.
But the Secretary says "they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those
want to abuse them." Are they more liable to be subjected to involuntary
servitude when left free to roam their native hills and gain a livelihood as they
have been accustomed to for hundreds of years, than they will be if closely
confined on a narrow reservation from which they may not escape without
facing a term in jail? Is not more likely that they will be glad to exchange their
"freedom" on a small reservation for the great boon of binding themselves and
their children to the more fortunate Christian Filipinos who will feed them and
clothe them in return of their services.?
It think it not only probable but almost a certainty that they will be all be
subjected to involuntary personal servitude if their freedom is limited as it has
been. How will they live? There may be persons who are willing to lend them
money with which to buy food on the promise that they will work for them. And
if they accept the loan and do not work for the lender we have another law on
the statute books, Act No. 2098, into whose noose they run their necks, and
they may be fined not more than two hundred pesos or imprisonment for not
exceeding six months or both, and when the sentence expires they must again
go into debt or starve, and if they do not work will again go to jail, and this
maybe repeated till they are too old to work and are cast adrift.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It
does not appear they were ever consulted about their reconcentration. It does
not appear that they had any hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It
seems they were gathered here and there whenever found by the authorities of
the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they are "non-
Christian," and because the provincial governor ordered it. Let it be clear there
is no discrimination because of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one
who is not a Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild" or
backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian tribes are Moros,
Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes and various others, about one
millions souls all together. Some of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and
Ifugaos, have made great progress in civilization. The have beautiful fields
reclaimed by hard labor — they have herds of cattle and horses and some few
of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like the Aetas and the
Negritos, are very low in the scale of civilization, but they are one and all "non-
Christians," as the term is used and understood in law and in fact.
All of them, according to the court's opinion under the present law, may be
taken from their homes and herded on a reservation at the instance of the
provincial governor, with the prior approval of the department head. To state
such a monstrous proposition is to show the wickedness and illegality of the
section of the law under which these people are restrained of their liberty. But it
is argued that there is no probability of the department head ever giving his
approval to such a crime, but the fact that he can do it and has done it in the
present case in what makes the law unconstitutional. The arbitrary and
unrestricted power to do harm should be the measure by which a law's legality
is tested and not the probability of doing harm.
It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that
there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional
principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not
leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary
power, but that all in authority are guided and limited by these
provisions which the people have, the through the organic law,
declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised over
them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected
to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was intended
to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty,
or arbitrary spoliation of property.
As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or
unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular
individuals or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the
fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection clause
thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion. (Vol.
4, Encyclopedia of U.S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and
review the history of their development, we are constrained to
conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action
of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course,
not subject to law, for its is the author and source of law; but in our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and
for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition
and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always
be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of
final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the
responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate
tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of
opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which
are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and
equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of
Rights, the Government of Commonwealth "may be a government of
law and not of men." For the very idea that one man may be compelled
to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S., 374.)
It is said that the present law is an old Act being substance Act No. 547 of the
Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for
determination of its constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of
the lawmakers if the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life,
liberty, or property without due process law, it is void.
In may opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of
their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them
of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow
confines of a reservation is to invite disease an suffering and death. From my
long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime of title less
magnitude to take the Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have
reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to
transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which
they look down upon from their fields — than it would be to order their
decapitation en masse.
There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes
may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation
— in effect an open air jail — then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes,
who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands. All
of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the
department, have the power under this law to take the non-Christian
inhabitants of their different provinces form their homes and put them on a
reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the court will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine
Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be, subject to the
unregulated discretion of the provincial governor.
And who would be safe?
After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide
that some political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on
the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no
trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant
province and not within reach, and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
The case of the United States vs. Crook (Federal Cases 14891), cited in the
majority opinion, should be quoted at length. District Judge Dundy said:
During the fifteen years in which I have been engaged in administering
the laws of my country, I have never been called upon to hear or
decide a case that appealed so strongly to my sympathy as the one
now under consideration. On the one side, we have a few of the
remnants of a once numerous and powerful, but now weak,
insignificant, unlettered, and generally despised race; and the other,
we have the representative of one of the most powerful, most
enlightened, and most christianized nations of modern times. On the
one side, we have the representatives of this wasted race coming into
this national tribunal of ours, asking for justice and liberty to enable
them to adopt our boasted civilization, and to pursue the arts of peace,
which have made us great and happy as a nation; on the other side,
we have this magnificent, if not magnanimous, government, resisting
this application with the determination of sending these people back to
the country which is to them less desirable perpetual imprisonment in
their own native land. But I think it is creditable to the heart and mind of
the brave and distinguished officer who is made respondent herein to
say that he has no sort of sympathy in the business in which he is
forced by his position to bear a part so conspicuous; and, so far as I
am individually concerned, I think it not improper to say that, if the
strongest possible sympathy could give the relators title to freedom,
they would have been restored to liberty the moment the arguments in
their behalf were closed. no examination or further thought would then
have been necessary or expedient. But in a country where liberty is
regulated by law, something more satisfactory and enduring than mere
sympathy must furnish and constitute the rule and basis of judicial
action. It follows that this case must be examined and decided on
principles of law, and that unless the relators are entitled to their
discharge under the constitution or laws of the United States, or some
treaty, they must be remanded to the custody of the officer who caused
their arrest, to be returned to the Indian Territory which they left without
the consent of the government.
On the 8th of April, 1879, the relators Standing Bear and twenty-five
others, during the session of the court held at that time of Lincoln,
presented their petition, duly verified, praying for the allowance of a
writ of habeas corpus and their final discharged from custody
thereunder.
The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are Indians who
have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians now located in
the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from
the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and
had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then
endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they
were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the
laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their
liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The writ was issued and served on the respondent on the 8th day of
April, and, the distance between the place where the writ was made
returnable and the place where the relators were confined being more
than twenty miles, ten days were alloted in which to make return.
On the 18th of April the writ was returned, and the authority for the
arrest and detention is therein shown. The substance of the return to
the writ, and the additional statement since filed, is that the relators are
individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca Tribe of Indians;
that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated in some place
within the limits of the indian Territory — had departed therefrom
without permission from the government; and, at the request of the
secretary of the interior, the general of the army had issued an order
which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their
tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had
caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian reservation,
and that they were in his custody for the purpose of being returned to
the Indian Territory.
It is claimed upon the one side, and denied upon the other, that the
relators had withdrawn and severed, for all time, their connection with
the tribe to which they belonged; and upon this point alone was there
any testimony produced by either party hereto. The other matter stated
in the petition and the return to the writ are conceded to be true; so that
the questions to be determined are purely questions of law.
On the 8th of Mar, 1859, a treaty was made by the United States with
the Ponca tribe of Indians, by which a certain tract of country, north of
the Niobrara river and west of the Missouri, was set apart for the
permanent home of the aid Indians, in which the government agreed to
protect them during their good behaviour. But just when or how, or
why, or under what circumstances, the Indians left their reservation in
Dakota and went to the Indian Territory does not appear.
xxx xxx xxx
A question of much greater importance remains for consideration,
which, when determined, will be decisive of this whole controversy.
This relates to the right of the government to arrest and hold the
relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to a point in the
Indian Territory from which it is alleged the Indians escaped. I am not
vain enough to think that I can do full justice to a question like the one
under consideration. But, as the mater furnishes so much valuable
material for discussion, and so much food for reflection, I shall try to
present it as viewed from my own standpoint, without reference to
consequences or criticisms, which, though not specially invited, will be
sure to follow.
xxx xxx xxx
On the 15th day of August, 1876, congress passed the general Indian
appropriation bill, and in it we find a provision authorizing the secretary
of the interior to use $25,000 for the removal of the Poncas to the
Indian Territory, and providing them a home therein, with consent of
the tribe. (19 Sta., 192.)
xxx xxx xxx
The Poncas lived upon their reservation in southern Dakota, and
cultivated a portion of the same, until two or three years ago, when
they removed therefrom, but whether by force or otherwise does not
appear. At all event, we find a portion of them, including the relators,
located at some point in the Indian Territory. There, the testimony
seems to show, is where the trouble commenced. Standing Bear, the
principal witness, states that out of five hundred and eighty-one Indians
who went from the reservation in Dakota to the Indian Territory, one
hundred and fifty-eight died within a year or so, and a great proportion
of the others were sick and disabled, caused, in a great measure, no
doubt, from change of climate; and to save himself and the survivors of
his wasted family, and the feeble remnant of his little band of followers,
he determined to leave the Indian Territory and return to his old home,
where, to use his own language, "he might live and die in peace, and
be buried with his fathers." He also stated that he informed the agent of
their final purpose to leave, never to return, and that he and his
followers had finally, fully, and forever severed his and their connection
with the Ponca tribe of Indians, and had resolved to disband as a tribe,
or band of Indians, and to cut loose from the government, go to work,
become self-sustaining, and adopt the habits and customs of a higher
civilization. To accomplish what would seem to be a desirable and
laudable purpose, all who were able to do so went to work to earn a
living. The Omaha Indians, who speak the same language, and with
whom many of the Poncas have long continued to intermarry, gave
them employment and ground to cultivate, so as to make them self-
sustaining. And it was when at the Omaha reservation, and when thus
employed, that they were arrested by order of the government, for the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

purpose of being taken back to the Indian Territory. They claim to be

unable to see the justice, or reason, or wisdom, or necessity, of
removing them by force from their own native plains and blood
relations to a far-off country, in which they can see little but new-made
graves opening for their reception. The land from which they fled in
fear has no attractions for them. The love of home and native land was
strong enough in the minds of these people to induce them to brave
every peril to return and live and die where they had been reared. The
bones of the dead son of Standing Bear were not to repose in the land
they hoped to be leaving forever, but were carefully preserved and
protected and formed a part of what was to them melancholy
procession homeward. Such instances of parental affections, and such
love home and native land, may be heathen in origin, but it seems to
that they are not unlike Christian in principle.

And the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the
United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and ordered their release from custody.

This case is very similarly to the case of Standing Bear and others.

I think this Court should declare that section 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been
denied the equal protection of the law, and order the respondents immediately
to liberate all of the petitioners.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. L-69401
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS
MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING
USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI,
ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA
ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND,
REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES
GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS
COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST
LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS
SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine
marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound
occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search
1
of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which
was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese
Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons
fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last
part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the
invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose
was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately,
as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon
enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in
2 Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
a number of casualties.
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and
photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several
3
rounds of ammunition found in the premises.
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these
from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-
printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against
4
self-incrimination.
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return
of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to
Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial court, Zamboanga City. After
5
receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence of the parties, he
6
submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based.
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground
that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights.
This is confirmed by the said report and in fact admitted by the respondents,
7
"but with avoidance.
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of
the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant,
sought to justify their act on the ground that they were acting under superior
8
orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
9
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The
fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not
excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As
10
eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan:
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at
all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than
that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question
certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities
in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein
against the petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary
treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal
argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the
petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated
reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or
fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of
the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere
suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty,
they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution,
which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that
the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that, lacking
the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect
them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every
person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal,
ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still,
under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made
their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly
regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially during those tense and
tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law, which it
was their duty to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973
11
Constitution. In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil
courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable
cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the
raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the
petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in
fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every
opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried
that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have
surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There
was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly
processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing
their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and
seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal
arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force
their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the
ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the
Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any
12
of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, they
instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of
their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the
humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule,
revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may
enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the
13
Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule SO ORDERED.
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge
14
of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the
Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound
are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
15
These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
16
repressed. Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however,
they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as
17
the corresponding courts may decide.

The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the

petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v.
18
United States, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material."

The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations
should remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert
license to kill without trial. We must be done with lawlessness in the name of
law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the
first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring
19
opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, "It is time that the martial law regime's
legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the force
and rule of law."

All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic,
where every individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as
the guilty, including the basest of criminals.

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984,

is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are
inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 200370
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
1
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Mario Veridiano y Sapi
2 jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers
(Veridiano) assails the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and
3 instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of
4
Republic Act No. 9165.
In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
5 it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
Laguna, Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. The Information read:
That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province
of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1)
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2. 72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6 on January 15, 2008. After participating in the festivities, he decided to go
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the
7
offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello (PO 1 Cabello)
8
and POI Daniel Solano (POI Solano) to testify.
According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a
concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the
Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was
later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal
9
drugs.
P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02
10
Alvin Vergara (P02 Vergara) who were both on duty. Chief of Police June
Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
11
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he was not on
12
board. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
13
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the
14
15
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what
16
appeared to be marijuana." POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked
17
18 19
rights. He was then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO 1
20
Solano, who also placed his initials. PO 1 Solano then made a laboratory
examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to
21
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. The contents of the tea bag
22
tested positive for marijuana.
For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City
23
24
home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan. At around 10:00
a.m., the jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay,
25
Nagcarlan. Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being followed by three (3)
motorcycles, each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire.
26
When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists
27
flagged down the jeepney. Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and
28 29
frisked Veridiano. However, they found nothing on his person. Still,
Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
30
informed that "illegal drug was ... found in his possession. "
31
In the Decision dated July 16, 2010, the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying
32 50
and to pay a fine of ₱300,000.00. [warrantless] search was likewise illegal." Hence, under Article III, Section
51 52
2, in relation to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, the seized tea
Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a
33 53
arrested." He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in poisonous tree."
evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree. "[['34]] Veridiano further
argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is
35
custody. admissible in evidence, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to
54
preserve its integrity. The apprehending team did not strictly comply with the
On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
55
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over [the person of the Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.
36
accused]." Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question
37
any irregularity in his arrest. With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a
56
search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that Veridiano' comment on the petition. In the Manifestation and Motion dated August 1,
57
s "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he 2012, respondent stated that it would no longer file a comment.
38
consented to the warrantless search.
The following issues are for this Court's resolution:
39
On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming
40
the guilt ofVeridiano. First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in jlagrante delicto" of Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and
41
having marijuana in his possession. Assuming that he was illegally arrested,
Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may have attended Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for
his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
42 illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
the court. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to
the warrantless search because he did not protest when the police asked him
to remove the contents of his pocket.
43 The Petition is granted.

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the I

Resolution dated January 25, 2012.44 The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a)
the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal
45 liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the
On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally
inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in
46
violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He asserts Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid
47
that his arrest was illegal. Petitioner was merely seated inside the jeepney at arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his
the time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the
or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is
police officers reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime 58
48 "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."
or that he was committing a crime. Petitioner also asserts that reliable
information is insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a
49
valid warrantless arrest.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his
or her active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may
59
have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
60
accused."
Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not
preclude an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence
61
seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused
fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in atimely
manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences
of an illegal arrest.
62
As a component of the right to privacy, the fundamental right against unlawful
searches and seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
63
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches
and seizures, Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution considers any
64
evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible.
The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and
65
seizures. It is only directed against those that are
66
unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
67
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden.
68
In People v. Aruta, this Court explained that the language of the Constitution
implies that "searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless
69
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest." The
requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal
70
Procedure.
71
However, People v. Cogaed clarified that there are exceptional
72
circumstances "when searches are reasonable even when warrantless." The
following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid
down in jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful
73
arrest," (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,"' (3) "search of a moving
vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6)
74
"stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."
There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is
reasonable. In any given situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable ... search ...
is purely a judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon the unique
75
and distinct factual circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into "the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
76
searched, and the character of the articles procured."
II
Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals
concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in
77
his possession making the warrantless search lawful.
This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful
arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede
78
the search; "the process cannot be reversed." For there to be a lawful arrest,
law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may
also be effected without a warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act
79
test as explained in Cogaed:
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
80
view of the arresting officer."
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as
an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act
within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
81
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.
82
The warrantless search in People v. Racho was also considered
83
unlawful. The police officers received information that a man was in
possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler,
Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white
84
striped [t]-shirt." The police officers waited for the bus along the national
85
highway. When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and
86
waited along the highway for a tricycle. Suddenly, the police officers
approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of
87
having shabu in his possession. As Racho pulled out his hands from his
88
pocket, a white envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu.
In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that
Racho was not "committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the
89
time he was apprehended. Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a
90
tip. Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to
justify a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered
91
under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit
92
arrest. The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes
93
"immediacy in point of time." That a crime was in fact committed does not
94
automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the
crime is committed up to the point of arrest.
Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime.
However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.
95
People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of
the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for
96
violation of Republic Act No. 6425. He assailed the admissibility of dried
marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized
97
from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest. On appeal, the accused's
98
conviction was affirmed. This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was
justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers
had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the accused
killed the victim:
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of
the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente
and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a
warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
99
would have fled the law as his two companions did. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts
surrounding the commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v.
100
Warden.
In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers
suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the
101
Maguindano Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the authorities to
clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and
102
detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

103
restrained under a lawful court process or order. Furthermore, he was not Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure
104
arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest: specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the
110
right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk"
Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search
111
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers
to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be
105 112
escapee prisoner. (Emphasis supplied) afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot
113
produce a reasonable search.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante
114
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers conducted surveillance
committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug
115
did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that addicts. They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and
116
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers [was] walking in a swaying manner." Suspecting that the man was high on
relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient drugs, the police officers approached him, introduced themselves, and asked
117 118
to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be him what he was holding. However, the man resisted. Upon further
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's possession. 119
10
or is about to be committed. This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the police officers
120
justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section
121
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no In People v. Solayao, the police officers were conducting an intelligence
personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons within
122
just committed an offense. Caibiran. They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused
123
in a camouflage uniform. When the police officers approached, his
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must companions fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run
124
have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person away. One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the
125
sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. This Court likewise found
probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled
126
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. upon seeing the government agents."

III The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid
because the accused in both cases exhibited overt acts that gave law
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast
127
with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed was considered
requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.
as an invalid "stop and frisk" search because of the absence of a single
107 suspicious circumstance that would justify a warrantless search.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua as "the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
108 In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya
weapon(s) or contraband." Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" 128
109 would be transporting marijuana. A passenger jeepney passed through the
search is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."
checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then disembarked and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
129
signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. The police
officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor
Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of
130
their bags.
Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of
131
marijuana in Cogaed's bag. In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was
invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious
circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2)
132
men and search their belongings. Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act
133
indicating that he was in possession of marijuana.
Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney
who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion
to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in
a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the
police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to
infer anything suspicious.
IV
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as
consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the
prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing
134
evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be
"unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress or
135
coercion."
The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of
136
the circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into the environment in
which the consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police
137
procedures."
Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied
138
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. In Cogaed, this Court
observed:
Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a
coercive environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion
into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
139
presumed.
The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner
consented to the warrantless search.
V
Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle.
The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized when the
140
object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes. Police officers cannot
be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when
time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating
141
transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles. However, the
142
inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law
143
enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.
144
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Due to the
number of cases involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the
guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which
searches in checkpoints should be conducted.
145
Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional
circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and ensure their
146
safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival
147
is in danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a]
148
motorist'sright to 'free passage'" to a certain extent, they must be "conducted
149
in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine inspections must
be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers
150
carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.
151
In Valmonte v. De Villa, this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
152
search[es]." Thus, a search where an "officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
153
into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable.
However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint
when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
154
offense.
Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if
they are limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of
the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible
only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will
be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.
That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle
does not justify an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A
tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion.
Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based
on tipped information, there have been other circumstances that justified
warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.
155
In People v. Breis, apart from the tipped information they received, the law
enforcement agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused
that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
156
committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law
enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box
157
which the accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus,
one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the
158
way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and
159
leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.
160
In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a bag
containing illegal drugs was about to be transported on a passenger
161 162
jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." On the basis of the tip, a police
163
officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. Upon seeing
the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of
164
marijuana emanating from the bag. The tipped information and the police
officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the
165
warrantless search valid.
166 167
The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v. Libnao likewise
received tipped information regarding the transport of illegal drugs.
In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based
on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area where the
168
accused was arrested. On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers
noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks
169
carried by the accused.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers
exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches.1âwphi1 They had no
probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip
they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that
may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was
flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the
accused.
There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are
searches based on reasonable suspicion as in Posadas v. Court of
170
Appeals where this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused
who attempted to flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified
171
themselves.
On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened
172
security. In Dela Cruz v. People, the search conducted on the accused was
considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security
173
measures in ports. This case, however, should not be construed to apply to
174
border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable per se; there is a
"reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or
175
stop at airports or other ports of travel.
The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid.
Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is
rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section
3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction,
petitioner must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in
Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.
33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee, vs. VICTOR
COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their
autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged
compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than
real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform
what could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those
who traffic this scourge of society.
1
Squarely raised in· this appeal is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a
result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged
perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The
information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message.
The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag
that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under
intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised
of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the
Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate
"stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not
done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded
consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no
possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station
in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian
2 30
informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
3
transporting marijuana" from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
4
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
5
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." PSI
Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the
San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers
6
from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger jeepney from
7
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
8
passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and
9
Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
10
Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their
11
bags. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since
they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
12
Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three
13
bricks of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy
nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a
14
fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag." "SPO1 Taracatac arrested
15
[Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station." Cogaed and
16 17
Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags" inside the station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
18
bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected
19
marijuana fruiting tops," and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of
suspected marijuana.
20
21
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. PSI
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
22
Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
23
marijuana. The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total
24
weight of 8,091.5 grams. The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1
25 26
grams. The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams. A
27
According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,
28
"waiting for a jeepney to take him" to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could
29
buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger
brother’s friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and
31
Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s]
help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
32 33
sack." Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market. This
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac
asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not
34
know. SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy
35
to their conversation. Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and
36
Cogaed and brought them to the police station. These facts were
corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the
37
parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the
38
head." The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was
39
inside.
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and
Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
40
Republic Act No. 9165. The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and
SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by
law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a
dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred
twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
41
Drugs Act of 2002").
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City,
42 43
La Union. Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty. The case was dismissed
against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt
from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or
44 45
Republic Act No. 9344. Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision dated
May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one
46
million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just
alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that
47
called for his arrest." Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search
48
should also be considered illegal. However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
49
such irregularity" when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
50
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."
51
Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals
52
denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of
Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches
when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened
53
his bag." Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
54
DANGEROUS DRUGS.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid
search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect
55
to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.
We find for the accused.
II
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are
reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can
56
only be determined by a judge. The existence of probable cause must be
established by the judge after asking searching questions and
57
answers. Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the
law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
58
things to be searched.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
59
warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
60
allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account
the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
61
character of the articles procured." The known jurisprudential instances of
reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
62
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. (Citations omitted)
III
One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk".
"Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful
63
arrests under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest
require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to
64
ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
65
Appeals was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
66
information." This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be used
"[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the
city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search
67
warrant."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
68
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches ) are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:
COURT:

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly him in the passenger jeep?
based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have
personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they WITNESS:
should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a 83
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal A Not yet, Your Honor.
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:
69
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers were initially informed about
70
a place frequented by people abusing drugs. When they arrived, one of the COURT:
police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a
71
swaying manner." The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have
72
officers. These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
73
was high on drugs. These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers
74
"to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate." WITNESS:
75
In People v. Solayao, police officers noticed a man who appeared A No, Your Honor.
84
76
drunk. This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
77 78
suit." Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the
79 The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified
suspicion. After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
80 81 by the police officers otherwise.
"homemade firearm" in his possession. This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
82
search warrant first." This was also a valid search. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the
suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to 85
person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than
the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying
this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person
manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
and effects.
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding
something as well.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
86
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances
as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
87
police officers to inspect the same. (Emphasis supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable
ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
88
guilty of the offense with which he is charged."
89
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have
90
to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a "genuine
91 92
reason" to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
93
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
94
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
95
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
96
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution
97
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only
one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
98
search.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one
circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed
and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
V
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this
exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement
and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in
Malacat:
[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
99
officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the
100 101
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence
also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
102
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that
case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing
103
in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers
104
prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a woman crossing the
105 106
street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling
107
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The
108
bag contained marijuana leaves.
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
109
illegal. There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest
110
and the subsequent search and seizure. It was only the informant that
111
prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained was not
112
admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was
113
acquitted.
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not
the police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
114
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here,
the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin
115
as somebody possessing drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and
116
accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. Like in the
case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what
117
turnedout to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the searchand
118 119
seizure was illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.
120
People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case,
the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing
121
drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." One night, the police
received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
122
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and
123 124
parked" at the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at
125 126
the hotel was dealing drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was
127
carrying a juice box. The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he was
128
holding.
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about
Chua’s situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was
129
no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."
VI
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the
evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of
the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed
has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or
130
within the view of the arresting officer." Both elements were missing when
131
Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the
police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that
time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we
assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As
this court previously stated:
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
132
the constitutional guarantee. (Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of
aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a
constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-
examination: A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he
was somewhat frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he
ATTY. BINWAG: was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that,"
134
and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry."
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the
contents of their bags, is it not? For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a
WITNESS: police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be
searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of
his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable
A Yes, ma’am.
search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language
known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it There must be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully
not? understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
A Yes, ma’am.
VIII
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags? The Constitution provides:

A None, ma’am. Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
135
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the
contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
them, is it not? doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
136
Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage
A It seems they were frightened, ma’am. law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful
seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
137
opening the bags, is it not? and seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were
133
surprised. (Emphasis supplied) Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on
the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means
that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s
responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to
COURT:
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will
....
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek

to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 170180 November 23, 2007
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, v. CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
DECISION
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is
not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] Any evidence obtained
in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to
the basic principles of government.[2]
On appeal is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005,
affirming the Judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo,
La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165)[5] and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[6]
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2)
of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information[7] which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-
five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or
prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued with the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San
Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor
Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San
Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they
noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed
that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to
run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to
the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as
averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag
allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points.
On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out
the contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.[10] Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was
petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from
Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by
Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.[11]
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya),
the forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to
him for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and
contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana
was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police
officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of
the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.[12]
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he
testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from
his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner
claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink water and then
proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly approached him and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brothers
house. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag and
appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them.
After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was
restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who
carried the bag until they reached their destination.[13]
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the
tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper,
which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership
thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by his
arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east in
order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was
brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although
petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his
bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at
Mercados house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the
first time.[14]
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.
On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The
Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of
regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-
motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause
to arrest petitioner. It observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized
marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when
the existence of the seized prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-
appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was
taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant
Valdezs own testimony.[16]
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the
crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues,
albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against
him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his
bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for
being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the
absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the case have been
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.[17]
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however,
the Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review
is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case,
jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[18]
Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence
on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that
the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod
and asked to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without
explanation and taken to the house of the barangay captain. On their way
there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over the
contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first
time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on
the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners
arrest stands out just the same.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not
one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested.
By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he
alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.[20]
The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless
arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.[21] Here, petitioners act of looking
around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod
approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with
the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being
closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would
attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.[22] Of persuasion
was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz[23] that
[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances
because flight alone is inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an
innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,[24] [t]he phrase in his
presence therein, connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting
officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty
being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows
exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its
application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by
law.[25]
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
enough to validate his warrantless arrest.[26] If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case
was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on
petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v.
Ohio,[27] must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer
clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him.[28]
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot
be admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a warrantless
search which was not lawful.[29] As we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
following searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1)
search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4)
waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.[30]
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in
flagrante delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the
warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had
consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v.
Court of Appeals[31]
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a
consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the
following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a
public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence
of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[32]
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on
conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is
apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public
officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner
admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered
no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33]
As a result, petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
the warrantless search and seizure.[34]
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being
the fruit of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the
case of the prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly
establish the identity of the marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners
bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following
elements must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2)
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.[35] The
existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime.[36]
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to
prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same
one allegedly seized from the accused.[37] There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the
item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.[38] As we discussed in People v. Orteza[39], where we
deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements
necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied
with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People
v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or
paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to
comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for
laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated
marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held
that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the
accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the
drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu
were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable
doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the
accused due to the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the
records only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and
thereafter to the police station. The Joint Affidavit[40] executed by the tanod
merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to
the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt[41] issued by
the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs
supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when
petitioners bag was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who
actually opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material
inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to
its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not
know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police
authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana.
The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers who
conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was
the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the
crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time
they were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by
Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to
establish the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such [f]inds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is
denied.[42] We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners
testimony that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the
statement in full context.[43] Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings,
although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his bag, he
consistently denied ownership thereof.[44] Furthermore, it defies logic to
require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of chain
of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary
duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of
evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is
offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is
duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in
his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This
guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes
to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the
prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[45] Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most
primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated.
Nevertheless, this [c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as
its evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.[46] Moreover, where the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with
the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt,
the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not
satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of
conviction.[47]
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as an especially vicious
crime,[48] and one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our
society,[49] for those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of
the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of
law-abiding members of society,[50] whereas peddlers of drugs are actually
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

agents of destruction.[51] Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of

prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough.
However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate
the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accuseds right to be presumed innocent until proven to the
contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the
guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the
fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to
give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination
of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be
[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[52] In the same vein, let this
serve as an admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform
their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause;
and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his
continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

G.R. No. 205926 July 22, 2015
ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
1 2
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
3
October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the
4 Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered
Judgment dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner
Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of
5 "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging
Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of
around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer,
arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination
later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
8
shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence,
which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to
9
his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain
Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were
arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to
have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange
for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought
to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
10

th The RTC Ruling

That on or about the 30 day of July 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- 11
In. a Judgment dated July 28, 2009, the RTC found Comerciante guilty
named accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess any
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, and
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twelve
knowingly have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet (sic) each containing 0.15 gram (sic) and 0.28 gram (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and ordered him to pay a fine
12
(sic) of white crystalline substance with a total of 0.43 grams which was found in the amount of ₱300,000.00.
positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu", a dangerous drug. The R TC found that P03 Calag conducted a valid warrantless arrest on
Comerciante, which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu. In this
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6 relation, the R TC opined that there was probable cause to justify the
warrantless arrest, considering that P03 Calag saw, in plain view, that
Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he decided to approach and
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, apprehend the latter. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent
2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to
P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.
13
while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private
Aggrieved, Comerciante appealed to the CA.
Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
7
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
The CA Ruling
14
In a Decision dated October 20, 2011 the CA affirmed Comerciante's
conviction. It held that P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless
arrest of Comerciante, given that the latter was committing a crime in flagrante
delicto; and that he personally saw the latter exchanging plastic sachets with
Dasilla. According to the CA, this was enough to draw a reasonable suspicion
that those sachets might be shabu, and thus, P03 Calag had every reason to
15
inquire on the matter right then and there.
16
Dissatisfied, Comerciante moved for reconsideration which was, however,
17 18
denied in a Resolution dated February 19, 2013. Hence, this petition.
The Issue before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
9165.
In his petition, Comerciante essentially contends that P03 Carag did not effect
a valid warrantless arrest on him. Consequently, the evidence gathered as a
result of such illegal warrantless arrest, i.e., the plastic sachets containing
19
shabu should be rendered inadmissible, necessarily resulting in his acquittal.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
People of the Philippines, maintains that Comerciante's warrantless arrest was
validly made pursuant to the "stop and frisk" rule, especially considering that he
20
was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of illegal drugs.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
21
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such
search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable
22
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides
an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on
the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
23
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One
of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident
24
to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
25
reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision provides three (3) instances when a warrantless
arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)
arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; ( c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
26
another.
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

27
view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its xxxx
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating Q: Now how far were you when you saw this incident from these two male
28
that the accused had committed it. persons you already identified?

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the A: About ten (10) meters away ma'am.
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he knows for a fact Q: What were their positions in relation to you when you saw them in that
29
that a crime has just been committed. particular act?

A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there
A: They were quite facing me then.
could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03
Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing 0: What was the speed of your motorcycle when you were traversing this
around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City?
handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided
to effect an arrest. P03 Calag's testimony on direct examination is revelatory: A: About thirty (30) kilometers per hour, ma'am.

Pros. Silao: Q: And who was driving the motorcycle?

Q: Now on July 30, 2003 around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, kindly tell the A: Eduardo Radan, ma'am.
court where were you?
Q: When you spotted them as if handing something to each other, what did you
A: We were then conducting our patrol on a motorbike ma' am. do?

xxxx A: We stopped ma'am.

Q: And who were with you while you were patrolling? Q: And how far were you from them when you stopped, more or less?

A: Eduardo Radan, Ma' am. A: We passed by them for a short distance before we stopped ma'am.

Q: And who is this Eduardo Radan? Q: And after you passed by them and you said you stopped, what was the
reaction of these two male persons?
A: He is an agent of the Narcotics Group, ma'am.
A: They were surprised, ma'am.
Q: While you were along Private Road, Hulo, Mandaluyong City, what unusual
incident that happened if any? xxxx

A: We spotted somebody who was then as if handing a plastic sachet to Q: And what was their reaction when you said you introduced yourself as
someone. police officer?
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
A: They were surprised.
Q: When you say "nabigla" what was their reaction that made you say that they
were surprised?
A: They were stunned.
Q: After they were stunned, what did you do next, police officer?
A: I arrested them, ma' am. I invited them.
Q: What did you say to them? How did you invite them? In short, napakasimple
Lang ng tanong ko sa yo eh. Did you say anything?
Court:
Mr. Witness, stop making unnecessary movements, just listens.
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? May sakit ka ba o wala? Witness: Wala po.
Pros. Silao: Eh, bakit di ka makapagsalita?
Court: You keep touching your eyes. Just relax. Answer the question, ano
sinabi mo sa kanila?
Pros. Silao: Are you fit to testify? Wala ka bang sakit?
Witness: Wala po.
xxxx
Q: From what portion of his body, I am referring to Alvin Comerciante did you
recover the plastic sachet?
A: From his hand ma'am.
Q: Left or right hand?
Pros. Silao: You cannot recall? Hindi mo matandaan. Sabihin mo Kung Hindi
30
mo matandaan, no problem. Kaliwa, kanan or you cannot recall?
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that P03
Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with
reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and
while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour -
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small
plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt
act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing
"improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would
not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
31
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That his
reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow
officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the province are
insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante
32
was indeed shabu.
Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in
Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in
fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused had committed it. As already discussed, the
factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that P03 Calag had personal
knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante.
Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact,
33
have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a valid
"stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante untenable. In People v.
34
Cogaed, the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain "stop and frisk"
searches:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are
necessary for law enforcement.1a\^/phi1 That is, law enforcers should be given
the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should
be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern - based on facts that they themselves observe -
whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion
would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxxx
suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.
[35]] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around
with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute
criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances are not enough to create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine
reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In
this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed
unlawful.

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances
as probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Malacat v. Court of Appeals clarifies the requirement further. It does not have
to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine
reason to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him
is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from all criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, 'the Decision dated
October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

In his dissent for Esquillo v. People, Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution
prohibits "umeasonable searches and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G. R. No. 197788
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
DECISION
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 2011[2] and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion
Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him
to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on
getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the
accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may
have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the
contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones,
one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the
table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of Not
guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself
and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery
on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC
also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1)
day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance
with law.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition.
On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SHABU IS INVALID.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in
this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance
No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a
helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit
he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of
the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the
latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of
City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in
flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.[9]
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application
of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the
part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.[11]
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending
a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto,
or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act,
confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed
and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a
motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and
date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be
extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his
case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the
suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention
on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been
flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed
at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held
that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the
freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations
in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to
a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he
sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to
spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but
that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this
respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the
detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-
called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest.
x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary
traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to
such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
xxxxxxxxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come
to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977)
(per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was
not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
can petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic
citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or
intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by
the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there
would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the
police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain
view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently
discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must
be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the
instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to
take out the contents of his pocket.[18]
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and
the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the
defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was
alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid
consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]
In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a
full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police
officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take
him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x
x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate and
weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation,
however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In
Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer
because of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into
custody and transporting him to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that [t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the
arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the
grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a
relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . .
than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See
also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) (Where there is no formal
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to
take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence).
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at
413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car,
it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a
full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers
have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves
from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver,
Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a
patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they
may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a
Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a
full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident
to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was
stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive
speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the
passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[23] Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.[24]
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal
of the accused.[26]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 176077
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765
convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat,
Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
[METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.24 gram,
knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-
cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie
Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City
Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the
Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police
investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after
petitioners counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness.
The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father
and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan
City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in
Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and D-2) that per
qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white
crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06
gram then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to the test
for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police
Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution
further endeavored to establish the following:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose
Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called upon his
subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame
relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken
along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily
alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4).
Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4
Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo,
and herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team
boarded a rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify
the said informant and/or memorandum.
When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at
around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their
informant to the house of one Alias Abe. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself
at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group
deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered
window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he
saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to
be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while
Abe, on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily
handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter
was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under
arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3
Fernando Moran for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham
Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident of
Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]
Evidence for the Defense
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident
completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
alleged that at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while
he, together with his sister and father, were at the upper level of their house
watching the television soap Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion
downstairs prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside
were several male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as
raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for
alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these
officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner]
at the back when he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was
handcuffed and together with his father, they were boarded inside the police
vehicle. That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3
Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team
from their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was
transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained.
That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his
father was ordered to go home.[5]
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established
all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting
petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused
ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and penalized under the
provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of
aggravating circumstances. The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.
On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the
decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED
and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible
against him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements
necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
Hence, the petition raising the following errors:
1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO
DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM
OF SHABU TRADING ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH
CONVERTED THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A
RAIDING TEAM, CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH
WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED
FROM A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED
WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE
FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING
ARRANGED BY PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS
ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT
ANY WARRANT.
4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED
(SIC) OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT
OF THE PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND ARREST, IS CORRECT.[10]
Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the
subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of
dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching
television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged
into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic
sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping
through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his
house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the
act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se,
petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house
was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a
validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered
window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view
doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs
was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked
at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the
said evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his
detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished
accordingly.
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity
of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing
any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is estopped from assailing any
irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal
of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[12]
In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no
objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even
negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[13]
True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated
provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which
does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;[14]
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15]
In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in
flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless
arrest. The established facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station
were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to
verify the reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included
the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners window,
saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be
shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious
contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about
one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then
inched his way in the house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining
entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police officer. After which,
petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic sachets.
PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioners
contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights.[16] PO3
Antonio then took the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to
their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the
evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the name of the petitioner. The
heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest
of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was
then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view
of the arresting officer.
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the
established exceptions.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] The right against
warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure
is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.[19]
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-
sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily
surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure
made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not
only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the plain
view doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may
be introduced in evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the
petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,
which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the
ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioners
guilt of the offense charged.
As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper
procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting
serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.
Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment,
the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative
and quantitative examination;
x x x x.
Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.
x x x x.[21]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply
strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor
the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.[23]
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the
integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More
importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from
the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case
reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3
Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized
from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon arriving
thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the
evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of
the petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of
the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the
evidence for laboratory examination to the National Police District PNP Crime
Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by Police
Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the contents
of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[25]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been
established by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating
officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items
seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by
the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following
elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or
an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware
of being in possession of the drug.[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case.
Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a
satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the
accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]
It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are
police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner.[28] Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of
trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered
from witnesses who presented their statements live and in person in open
court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial courts are
in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from
rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite
statement from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from
untruth.[29]
In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
fact of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent
inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events
which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of
the records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to
disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged
against him.
Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely
denied the accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The
defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to
prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence.[30]
As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate
sentence imposed should, however, be modified.
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
x x x x.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalties shall be graduated as follows:
x x x x.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or
newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]
From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of
shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal
authority.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the

imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the
maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law;
hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 188611
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee v. BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant
DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in
Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated
November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San
Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the
proper government agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as
Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from
a passenger jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused
contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for
examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and
submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the
accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused
family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino.
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San
Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the
poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the checkpoint was
composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2 Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and
other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana,
the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met
with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and
one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an
O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned
himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc
found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other
passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the
said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already
being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest,
but one of the women got away.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police
station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the
opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later,
the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the
confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory
examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for
marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant,
together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the
poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers,
one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few
bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant
refused, but she was persuaded later when she was told that she would only
be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed
accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-
ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them,
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station.
When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at
the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the
bags which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the
owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags.
At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.[3]
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as
charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the
Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court
erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its
inadmissibility.[5] She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search
was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter
searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no
permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayocs purpose for
apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one
he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was
no probable cause for her arrest.[6]
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti
of the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by
Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the
custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses,
and articles. The said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after
seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this
directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items
allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution
failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited
drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless
seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that
appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on
reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into
the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also
argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her
arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and
participated in the trial and presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed
aside appellants argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed
and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after
confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was
practicable.[11]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had
successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of
bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying
the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants
warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of
the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be
delivered to a specified destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc
needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he
saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful
duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the
contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the
other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags.
Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto
at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local
police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more
than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other
recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents
of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a
search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check
the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney.
Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor
vehicle had already left the locality.[13]
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States
agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid
down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear
parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.
Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the
evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would
have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless
search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12
[now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[14]
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact
that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the
search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.[15]
In People v. Bagista,[16] the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures
admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a
warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to
be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime,
in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions
to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting
the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable
cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.[17] Without
probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the
person arrested.[18]
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.[19]
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.[20]
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis
of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained,
the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible
in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity.[21]
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be
obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile
structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since
they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.[22]
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is
valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to
leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search
under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its destination
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants
arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported
from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the
secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a
baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for
the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages
allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides
the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.[24]
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the search.[25]
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also
valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act
as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not
belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him.
This contention, however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of
prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of
ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.[26]
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack
of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.[27] Mere possession
and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.[28]
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are
rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs
of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular
individuals, but against public order.[29]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Jurisprudence defines transport as to carry or convey from one place to
another.[30] There is no definitive moment when an accused transports a
prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused
to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as
to the perpetration of the criminal act.[31] The fact that there is actual
conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was
committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is
reached.[32]
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave
rise to the disputable presumption[33] that she is the owner of the packages
and their contents.[34] Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her
uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie
Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is
but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be
taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked
from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to
give him the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey
without knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed
to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs,
instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all
dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the
very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further
provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately
brought her to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor
to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor
arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers.
The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana SO ORDERED.
fruiting tops.[36] PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley
Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that
appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from
the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not
render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items.[37]

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was
immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the
Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs,
which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence
establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellants arrest until the
prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable
ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean
that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The
justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the
custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even
assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should
have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the
quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is
deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on
the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of
police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly,
absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her

conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is
AFFIRMED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs SANTIAGO EVARISTO
and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece
Martires, Cavite, * in Criminal Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding the accused guilty of
illegal possession of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
accordingly sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the
appellants) reads:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses
SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the crime of
VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the
Municipality of Mendez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused being private persons not authorized by law
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their possession, custody
and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12
gauge home made shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver
(sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1) plier use (sic) in
the manufacture and repair of said firearms without any permit
or license from competent (sic) authority.
CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.
1 After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed
Cavite City, August 30, 1988.
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced,
with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective witnesses and
evidence to support their divergent versions of the events leading to the arrest
of the appellants.
A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses,
Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine
Constabulary, indicates that on the day in question, a contingent composed of
Romeroso and Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the
Philippine Constabulary, and two (2) members of the Integrated National
Police, were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about
5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity.
Proceeding to the approximate source of the same, they came upon one
Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo
prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate
perimeter of the house, specifically a cement pavement or porch leading to the
same, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and
Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members
were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt.
Vallarta immediately observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo
who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After
ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid
license to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited
for questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's
permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he
found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly
used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became
the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.
For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in
question, alleging that they were forcibly taken into custody by the police
officers and even subjected to physical and mental indignities. They denied
ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence,
contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the
prosecution witnesses and other police authorities.
decision dated 18 April 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D.
No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are
hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under Sec.
1 thereof. The full period of their preventive imprisonment shall
be deducted from the aforementioned penalty.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
2 these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this
Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F"
in evidence considering that those are illegally seized
evidence;
2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally
seized evidence are firearms as contemplated in Presidential
Decree No. 1866; and
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the
arresting officer's testimonies which are patently contradictory
3
and half truths (sic) testimonies.
First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III
of the Constitution, the relevant portion of which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) . . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit
are unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under
the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an
appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant
requirement. Among
jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in
4 5
Harris vs. U.S. and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. Thus, it is recognized that
objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence.
6
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by
the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to
apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is
clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the
house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent
and even accidental.
With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court
sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based
on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a
warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the
records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this
proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
"offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court
7
held in People of the Philippines v. Sucro, "an offense is committed in the
presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED
8
THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF."
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the
part of the peace officer of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the
perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to the records resolves said query.
Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants
who were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt.
Vallarta discerned the bulge on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation
along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's
professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules.
Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to
have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the
statute's coverage does not extend to firearms that are not functional or
serviceable. The Court does not agree.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF
FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
9
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It is clear that the law
makes no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the
possession of even a part of a firearm is sufficient to come within the
prohibitive ambit of the statute. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus.
Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, maintaining that these were inconsistent with each
other, thereby giving rise to the conclusion that the entire incident was a
contrivance on their part. Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in the
statement of the prosecution witnesses that there were only three (3)
individuals in the vicinity (aside from the peace officers) as opposed to the
testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a hostile witness, that aside
from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other people in the vicinity,
such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings
easily shows that the two (2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC
Vallarta, testified in a straightforward and candid manner, categorically
identifying the appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and
clearly narrating the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has
given no possible reason or motivation for these peace officers to make false
accusations against the appellants. Absent the presentation of such defense
evidence, the testimony of the peace officers should deserve full credence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in
Criminal Case No. NC-267 finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel
Carillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearms as
defined in Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental
paraphernalia found in the possession of the appellants, in favor of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) to be disposed of in accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinion
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the
firearms and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed
to its search and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and
open to eye and hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion
that the bulge in Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the
warrantless search of his person and the seizure from him of thepaltik.
This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also
dissented. As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not
come under any of the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5,
of the Rules of Court, where a warrantless arrest and search may be made.
Paragraph (a) and (c) are clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b)
because although it may be conceded that a crime had just been committed,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed
it. In fact, they were pursuing Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in
the air, and not Carillo, whose assistance they even sought. The circumstance
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

that the search resulted in the discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and
could not retroactively validate the warrantless search for it was clearly void ab
initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have
been used in evidence against Rosillo.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the
firearms and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed
to its search and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and
open to eye and hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion
that the bulge in Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the
warrantless search of his person and the seizure from him of thepaltik.

This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also
dissented. As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not
come under any of the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5,
of the Rules of Court, where a warrantless arrest and search may be made.
Paragraph (a) and (c) are clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b)
because although it may be conceded that a crime had just been committed,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed
it. In fact, they were pursuing Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in
the air, and not Carillo, whose assistance they even sought. The circumstance
that the search resulted in the discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and
could not retroactively validate the warrantless search for it was clearly void ab
initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have
been used in evidence against Rosillo.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners, vs. MORENO GENEROSO
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1 directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO
Court challenging the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the
2
resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No.
91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos,
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's
(petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in
the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
3
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
4
Police Station) to report the incident. Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier
5
(SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano
Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than
6 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
7 lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for
beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
8
Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to
9 On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack
Batasan Hills Police Station. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
10
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder
GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not
able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack,
to his damage and prejudice.
11
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
12
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station.
Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.
13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent
14
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. The court likewise denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65
16
preliminary investigation.
The Assailed CA Decision
17
of merit. The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid
warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly
state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
18
Resolution of April 17, 2008; hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE
POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE
THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest
warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to
the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which
actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the
terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident
happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime
scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest
as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the
crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly
issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The
criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach
this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was
employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition
has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by
fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and
establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench
and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case
presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the
current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of
19 20 21 22
1902, and the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of
the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
23
seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to
24
the writings of Sir Edward Coke and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. The
25
Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the
26
Crown to proclaim certain liberties under the feudal vassals' threat of civil
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

27
war. The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United
28
States Constitution. It provides:
29
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we
30
will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. [Emphasis supplied]
31
In United States v. Snyder, the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures
32
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. With regard to
an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
33
reasonableness.
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of
America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the
34
Spanish laws. These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based
35
on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.
36 37
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 37 of Act
No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest
without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
38
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., the Court held that in the absence of
any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law of
England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the
Philippines.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of
Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
44
Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through
the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our
jurisprudence.

39
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos that the rules on American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
40
warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason. It further held appropriate present application.
that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
41
Code which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
prevention of public offenses.

42 A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and
43
30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were
provisions taken from the Spanish Law. Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
45
the Philippines. In Fortaleza, the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law
for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the
case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a
defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent
who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear
whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may
be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided
the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime."
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of
Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may,
within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
46 47
In Santos, the Court cited Miles v. Weston, which ruled that a peace officer
may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable
ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a
felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a
probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable
cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in
good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with,
the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be
innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that
a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of
reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion"
was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would
48
be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach.
49
In The US. v. Hachaw, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a
Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the
Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which
aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the
rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the
arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was
committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of
the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of
50
Court as follows:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules
of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings
of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was
not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the
arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the
person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that
there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element
of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an
offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules
of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under
Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not
only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This
limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of
the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that
for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the
contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy;
and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be
based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on
his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and
(2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According
to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere
51
suspicion or hearsay.
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below,
starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the
offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on
how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within
his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
52
In Payton v. New York, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a
warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
53
Quinn, the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
54
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States that
the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to
55
"reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should
make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case
where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting
officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired
56
later.
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves
probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon
which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
57
particular offense involved.
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information
supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the
58
arresting officer need not verify such information.
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context
of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
59
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al., the Court held that personal knowledge of facts
must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
60
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat. In Buchanan v.
61
Viuda de Esteban, we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as
to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the
62
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At
this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in
detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
63
that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on
his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the
arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
64
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief or
65
reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is
invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and
the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its
existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within
their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on
the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a
limited time frame.
66
Hence, in Santos, the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect
too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle
reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make
proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the
67
escape of the criminal.
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as
our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant
to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
68
In Posadas v. Ombudsman, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor
Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the
crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
69
Similarly, in People v. Burgos, one Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly
recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm.
Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to
arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid
considering that the only information that the police officers had in effecting the
arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this
case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
70
In People v. del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense
has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the
crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
71
In People v. Cendana, the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing
of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed
sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
72
In Rolito Go v. CA, the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been
committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The
information upon which the police acted came from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife.
That information did not constitute "personal knowledge."
73
In People v. Tonog, Jr., the warrantless arrest which was done on the same
day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts
which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that
the accused was one of the perpetrators.
74
In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
75
In People v. Alvario, the warrantless arrest came immediately after the
arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court
held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the
information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man
who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless
76
arrest. In People v. Jayson, there was a shooting incident. The policemen
who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The
informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the
accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
77
In People v. Acol, a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the
policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims
saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing
his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the
policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the
arrest was valid.
78
In Cadua v. CA, there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery.
A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they
reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report
about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in
conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the
vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was
identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest
was held valid.
79
In Doria, the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness
the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from
a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed
by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that
a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated
in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria
looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident
report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police
headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where
P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's
seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the
driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita
III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with
the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of
the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case. However,
we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances"
under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the
80
Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts,
events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within
the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen
someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on
his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable
cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately
after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts
or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees
that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding
on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors,
interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy
imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would
necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances,
gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision
adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the
standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer
could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the
matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the
crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of
Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
81
misapprehended the facts in its decision. From a review of the records, we
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that
the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners.
82
Based on the police blotter entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in
for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated
that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along
Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two
(2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when
they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners'
admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
83
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, although they asserted that
they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal
84
Certificate that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date
of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made
about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular
line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of
right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib
(L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In
addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso
of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as
85
those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty.
86
Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when
the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
87
different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which
they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners,
we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances
qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
88
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, the police officers in the present
case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively
identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of
fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the
police officers.
89
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. where Tonog
did not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the
requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the
determination of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
90
personal assistance to the victim. This fact alone negates the petitioners'
argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed - the police immediately responded and had personal
knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of
the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while
a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it
took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest
proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the
circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of
the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking
of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
91
making the arrest. Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
92
submission is necessary.
93
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, SP02 Javier could
not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso'
s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a
simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would
produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would
only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen
have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the
alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to
by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at
the time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to
94
Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order
denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for
allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
95 96
Constitution and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and
hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this
Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision
that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the
proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we
uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its
denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and
hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City
Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation
1
Report, on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St.,
San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered
Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or
"wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out
where the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had
dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained
a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier
of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of
petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was
accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a
2 9
complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis
Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers,
that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before
an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his
gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information
3
for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional
Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the
Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with
the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper
4
preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the
omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed
no objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of
P100,000.00.
5
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in
order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case
was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved
6 7
the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Petitioner was
in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
8
leave to conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been
granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion
for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order granting leave to
conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15
August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an
10
Order, embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted
bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to
surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the
prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3)
petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation
dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23
July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order,
contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due
process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case
pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting
the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to
restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing
the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal
Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however,
of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty.
The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24
and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
11
November 1991.
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court
of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues
in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas
corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas
13
corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one
hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently
consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying
petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion
had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the
prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
14
decision dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the
offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
"freshly committed." His identity had been established through
investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station,
there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the
confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to
preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and
seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the
17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent
power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against
petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby
petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden),
the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the
15
trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" with the
trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On
14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to
hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders
from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first,
whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan
Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had
effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these
issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of
the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's
identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been
sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6)
days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General
16
invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., one of the seven (7)
cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
17
Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing
in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view
of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally
justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary
investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting
which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the
police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is,
in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-
six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of
petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of
the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing
crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense
for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously
commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one
had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed
against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section
5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the
meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who
had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal
18
knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that
Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. —
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint
or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer
or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a
proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in
case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as
provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he
walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in
fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that
he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was
admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a
crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule
112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without
any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning
demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out,
on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General
contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court
and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held
to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that
waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at
the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had
already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record
whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was
19
actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists to
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as
above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the
criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it
is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the
right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such]
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . .
20
. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for
preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v.
Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself
did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for
murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation
(attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we
conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a
preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed
without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five
(5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such
preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the
Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation.
Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the
Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was
applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must
be held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component
21
part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial
is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to
speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full
measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a
preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was already
arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
22
of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had
vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamusprecisely asking for a
preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People
23
v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail
and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
24
benefit of a preliminary investigation." In the instant case, petitioner Go
asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation
in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot
reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In
fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's
claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to
accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate
and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial
25
court.
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner
was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of
the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge
recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary
considering that no evidence at all — and certainly
no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It
follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in
the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor
having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's
right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be
released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner
remain entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that
petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the
merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in
26
abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. It
is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this
time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand,
the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on
hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the
constitutional point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to
27
by way of procedural due process. Petitioner was forced to undergo
arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with
extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the
courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and
screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the
trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and
just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest
and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
28
investigation. So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's
protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared
him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio.
During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through
counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary
investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing
29
objection." Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court
on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he
30
was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention. If he did not
walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it
was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have
waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the
judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner
remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the
evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable
belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for
cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny
the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of
due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or
culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons
well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this
point, could turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the
Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not
be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and
liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct
forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner
Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen
(15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal
case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion
of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a
cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release
shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue,
should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at
the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of
rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the
Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully
followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is
really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to
go back to square one.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been
moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial
administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully
inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has
received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete
objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and
persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is
particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those
unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike
the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a
poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be
presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence,
the importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the
foregoing observations because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's
decision.
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had
waived the right to preliminary investigation because he freely participated in
his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A
closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the
proceedings footnoted in theponencia, reveals that he had from the start
demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly
participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a
counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that
there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such
compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one,
so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that
the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay
entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the
Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his
precipitate and illegal action.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public
opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner
as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the
trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration,
remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point,
after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already testified, among them an
eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan
inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate
number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct
a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if
there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty
thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably
believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return
the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule
112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police
work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who,
seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to
verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering
the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the
crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July
8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for
frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991,
before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor, instead of
filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on
July 11, 1991 in the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion
for preliminary investigation and release on bail (which was erroneously filed
with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for
his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly
after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's
cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting
the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu
propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders
and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail.
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that
the trial of the case should be suspended and that the prosecutor should now
conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case.
In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23
SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet commenced because
motions to quash the information were filed by the accused. Lozada
vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego
vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are
also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact
been conducted before the informations were filed in court.
It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a
ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA
354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the
information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an
infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs.
Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important
than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary
investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail.
The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the
preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended,
but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The
parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more
importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's
determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose
the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an
application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the judge is under a
legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca,
63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472;
Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for
persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for
having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and
without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections
thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the
prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof
of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its
evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting
such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the
issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail
for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the
law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the
"petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that "petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person
into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked
into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified
by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was actually and
effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver
of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its
validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA
525).
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of
rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the
Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully
followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is
really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to
go back to square one.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been
moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial
administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully
inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has
received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful
not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete
objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and
persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is
particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those
unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike
the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a
poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be
presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence,
the importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the
foregoing observations because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's
decision.
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had
waived the right to preliminary investigation because he freely participated in
his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A
closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the
proceedings footnoted in theponencia, reveals that he had from the start
demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly
participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a
counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that
there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such
compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one,
so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that
the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay
entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the
Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his
precipitate and illegal action.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public
opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner
as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the
trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration,
remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point,
after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already testified, among them an
eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM
inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate
number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct
a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if
there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty
thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably
believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return
the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule
112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police
work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who,
seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to
verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering
the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who
was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the
crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July
8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for
frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991,
before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor, instead of
filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on
July 11, 1991 in the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion
for preliminary investigation and release on bail (which was erroneously filed
with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for
his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly
after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's
cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting
the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu
propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders
and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail.
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that
the trial of the case should be suspended and that the prosecutor should now
conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case.
In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23
SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet commenced because
motions to quash the information were filed by the accused. Lozada
vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego
vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are
also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact
been conducted before the informations were filed in court.
It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a
ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA
354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the
information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an
infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs.
Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important
than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary
investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail.
The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the
preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended,
but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The
parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more
importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's
determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose
the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an
application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the judge is under a
legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca,
63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and
Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472;
Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for
persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).
In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for
having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and
without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections
thereto.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II CONSOLIDATED CASES - MIDTERM

Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:

. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the

prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof
of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its
evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting
such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the
issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of
discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail
for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the
law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).

I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the

"petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that "petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person
into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked
into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified
by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was actually and
effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver
of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its
validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA
525).

I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.