Hilarion, Jr.
and Enrico ORENDAIN, represented by
Fe D. ORENDAIN, petitioners, vs.
Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita
RODRIGUEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009
FACTS:
On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita
Rodriguez, died in Manila, leaving a last will and
testament. The will was admitted to probate. At the
time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory
or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely
free to dispose of her properties, without regard to
legitimes, as provided in her will. Some of Doña
Margarita Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the
properties and the income from her properties for
distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
Thus, the following pertinent items in the will paint
the desire of the decedent:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;
2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income
from specified properties, after the necessary
deductions for expenses, including the estate tax,
be deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be
placed in trust for perpetual administration
(pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from
the properties ought to be divided among, and
distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to
provide medical support to certain beneficiaries, to
be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank
mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Almost four decades later, herein petitioners
Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion
Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of
the decedent’s will, moved to dissolve the trust on
the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been
in existence for more than twenty years, in
violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
The trustees argued that the trust instituted may
be perpetual citing the case of Palad, et al. v.
Governor of Quezon Province where the trust
holding the two estate of one Luis Palad was
allowed to exist even after the lapse of twenty
years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trust may be perpetual.
Whether or not the named trustees may be
considered as heirs to the estate.
RULING:
The general rule remains that upon the expiration
of the twenty-year allowable period, the estate may
be disposed of under Article 870 of the New Civil
Code, which regards as void any disposition of the
testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than 20 years.
The Palad Case is not violative of such provision of
the law by the trust constituted by Luis Palad
because the will of the testator does not interdict
the alienation of the parcels devised. The will
merely directs that the income of said two parcels
be utilized for the establishment, maintenance and
operation of the high school.
Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus
to the socialization of the ownership of property
and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings
which give rise to agrarian troubles. The trust
involved in the Palad case covers only two lots,
which have not been shown to be a large
landholding. And the income derived therefrom is
being devoted to a public and social purpose – the
education of the youth of the land. The use of said
parcels therefore is in a sense socialized.
In the present case, however, there is a different
situation as the testatrix specifically prohibited the
alienation or mortgage of her properties which
were definitely more than the two (2) properties,
unlike in the Palad case. The herein testatrix’s large
landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a
trust because the ownership thereof would then
effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.
Apparent from the decedent’s last will and
testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set
of properties and the income accruing therefrom.
Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the
decedent intended any of the trust’s designated
beneficiaries to inherit these properties. Therefore,
the probate court must admit the case to
determine the properties to be subject to intestate
succession as well as the nearest relative of the
deceased that may inherit the said properties
under the perpetual trust.
EMILIO NATIVIDAD v. BASILIA GABINO 36 Phil. 663
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal, filed by the administrator of the
estateof the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes,
from the order of August 21, 1915, by which the
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
interpreting the true wishes of the testator,
expressed the opinion that the ownership and
dominion of the property mentioned in clause 6 of
the will should be awarded to Basilia Gabino,
subject to the reservation made in behalf of
Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio Natividad. Therefore
the trial court ordered an amendment made to the
fourth basis for the proposed partition of the
decedent's estate, presented by the testamentary
executor, and, as soon as such be made, a day set
for the hearing and approval of the proposed
amended partition.
The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid
and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died
in 1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who
married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died
in 1913, survived by two children Emilio and
Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador.
Tiburcio Salvador disposed of all his property in the
manner recorded in the will executed in legal form
on November 9, 1914, instituting as sole heirs his
grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both
surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In the sixth clause
of this will the testator left to Basilia Gabino the
legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this clause is as
follows:
"I bequeath to Dona Basilia Gabino the ownership
and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a
house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the
said district of San Nicolas and designated by No.
520, and in addition eleven meters by two meters
of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on Calle
Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part
of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said
property No. 520. If the said legatee should die,
Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this
house, together with the lot on which it stands, to
my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon payment by
the latter to the former of the sum of four
thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency."
The executor of the estate of the decedent is the
decedent's own heir, Emilio Natividad, who in due
season and by counsel presented to the court for
its approval a proposed partition of the property
pertaining to the estate, setting forth in the fourth
basis the following relative to the legacy made to
Basilia Gabino:
"Summarizing the statements made in respect to
this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth
clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in favor
of Doña Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520
Calle Lavezares, and a general legacy in favor of
Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever
Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the
property upon which this right and legacy are
established belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad
who, by the express will of the testator, has been
made liable for these encumbrances."
By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the
legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the
proposed partition with regard to the adjudication
to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property
at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said
legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the
dominion and ownership of the same. For this and
the other reasons set forth, her counsel requested
that the testamentary executor be ordered to
amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition in
order that ownership and dominion, instead of
usufruct only, of said property be adjudicated to
the objector-legatee, Basilia Gabino.

After proper legal steps had been taken and the
written briefs of the parties and the schedule of the
proposed partition filed by the testamentary
executor had been examined, the trial judge issued
the order aforementioned. Appeal was taken by
counsel for the executor to this court, and a
transcript of the record of the proceedings below
was forwarded to the clerk of this court.
The only question raised by this appeal and
submitted to us for decision is: What construction
must be given to the above-quoted sixth clause of
the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?
A person is entirely free to make his will in such
manner as may best please him, provided the
testamentary provisions conform to law and meet
its requirements. He may impose conditions, either
with respect to the institution of heirs or to the
designation of legatees and, when the conditions
imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall
within the provisions of those articles of the Civil
Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be
governed by the rules therein prescribed for
conditional obligations. (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and
791.)
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the
decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed
to Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of
the property therein specified as to its location and
other circumstances, on condition that if the
legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be
obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the
testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to
hand over this property to the latter.
The condition imposed by the testator in the
double legacy mentioned depends upon the
happening of the event constituting the condition,
to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a
perfectly legal condition according to article 1114
of the Civil Code, as it is not impossible of
performance and is not contrary to law or public
morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code.
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other
legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the
property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his
turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee
Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the
double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of
the will, the first of these legacies being the
voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the
ownership of the said house, and the second, the
conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador,
Making use of his right, the testator provided in his
will that the dominion, that is, the ownership and
possession of his house situated on Calle Lavezares,
No. 520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419,
should be delivered as a legacy, provided that if the
legatee should die, this property instead of passing
to her successor, would revert to the testators's
grandson and heir, provided that he in turn would
pay to Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It
cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed
only the usufruct of the property because the plain
and literal meaning of the words employed by the
testator in the said clause sixth clearly shows
beyond all doubt the express wishes of the testator
who, establishing a voluntary reservation of the
ulterior and final disposition of the bequeathed
property, ordered that the legatee's right of
dominion should end at her death, and that on this
occurrence his wish was that the ownership of the
property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided
the latter in turn delivered said P4,000 to Lorenzo
Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee
Gabino.
If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are
to be complied with, it cannot be understood that
the testator meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino
the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by
unmistakable language employed in the said sixth
clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or
dominion of the said property language which
expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes
which should be complied with literally, because it
is constant rule, of jurisprudence that in matters of
last wills and testaments the testators's will is the
law.
It is true that the legatee could not make any
disposal of the bequeathed real property to be
effective after her death, nor could the property be
acquired from her by her heir through testate or
 intestate succession; but if we take into account
that the institution of donations and legacies
depends on the full free will of the testator, and
that if the testator intended no more than that
Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of the
property during her lifetime, this testamentary
provision is not contrary to law or to public morals,
inasmuch as the testator thereby intended that the
property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter
being obliged to make a monetary compensation to
Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the successor
of the legatee Gabino.
For the foregoing reasons, considering that the
order appealed from is in accordance with law and
that the several features of the sole assignment of
error made thereto are without merit, the said
order of August 21, 1915, must be affirmed, with
the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
RABADILLA vs. CA
FACTS:
 Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a
will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza, was instituted
devisee of Lot No. 1392 with an area of 511,855
square meters with the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to herein private respondent every
year during the latter's lifetime.
 The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed
not only on the instituted heir but also to his
successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to
deliver, private respondent shall seize the property
and turn it over to the testatrix's "near
descendants."
 Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and
children, one of whom is herein petitioner.
 Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to
comply with their obligation, filed a complaint with
the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject
property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix.
 During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was
concluded between the parties wherein the lessee
of the property assumed the delivery of 100 piculs
of sugar to private respondent; however, only
partial delivery was made.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action stating that, “While there may be
the non-performance of the command as
mandated, exaction from them (the petitioners),
simply because they are the children of Jorge
Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint.”
 The CA, reversed the decision and held that the
institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of a
modal institution and a cause of action in favor of
private respondent arose when petitioner failed to
comply with their obligation under the codicil, and
in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate
of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has a legally
demandable right against the petitioner, as one of
the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
HELD:
YES.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that
successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants, in relation
to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs.
Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law,
without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from
the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 NCC, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to
his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
And since obligations not extinguished by death
also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil
on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised
Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every
year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involved to herein private respondent.
Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over
the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through
the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action
against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA
C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-
in-law by right of representation. Article 971
explicitly declares that the representative is called
to succession by law because of blood relationship.
The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. A widow of the
person represented cannot assert the same right of
representation as there is no filiation by blood.
Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived
by her husband, their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a
child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea
C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial
court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs
of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R.
Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4;
and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with
her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as
enumerated in Art. 887 being the widow or
widower of the son of the decedent and that at the
time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales
he had an inchoate or contingent right to the
properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir.
Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir
of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in- law either by her own right or by the
right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with
the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a
daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased
all the more confirms Our observation. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse
an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have
so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow
or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply
to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third
person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of
the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said
Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales
that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of
representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971
of the Civil Code, viz—
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction
of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox
Rosales is called to succession by law because of his
blood relationship. He does not succeed his father,
Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but
the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with
her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the
death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,
said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right
of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
Lapuz v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977. Jan. 31, 1972.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute
MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY,
respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were
married, that they lived together as husband and
wife continuously until her husband abandoned
her, that they had no child, that they had acquired
properties during their marriage, and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which
would order that Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio filed an answer and counter-claimed for
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with
Lapuz, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with Go Hiok.
Before trial could be completed, Carmen Lapuz died
in a car accident. Eufemio moved to dismiss the
petition for legal separation on two grounds: (1) the
petition for legal separation was filed beyond the
one-year period provided for in Art. 102 of the Civil
Code, and (2) the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.
Counsel for Carmen moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
dismissed the case, on the ground that the cause of
action did not survive.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the action for legal
separation was converted by the counterclaim into
one for declaration for nullity of marriage – NO
2. Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the
action involves property rights?
HELD/RATIO:
1. The respondent has acquiesced to the
dismissal of the counterclaim. The petition for legal
separation and the counterclaim to declare the
nullity of the self same marriage can stand
independent and separate adjudication. They are
not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of
nullity by the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-
supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for
nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
2. An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of
the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by
allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one
else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows
that the death of one party to the action causes the
death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona. The heirs cannot even continue the
suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during
the course of the suit. The action is absolutely
dead. In the absence of a statute to the contrary,
the death of one of the parties to such action
abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction,
both over the persons of the parties to the action
and of the subject-matter of the action itself.
The right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community
of property), the loss of right by the offending
spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to
inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as
well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent
one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by
their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities
are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a
claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a
party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of
Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation
is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during
the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
Baritua v. CA (Mar. 22, 1990)
Abraham F. Sarmiento, J.:
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
CAPTION/PROBLEM: Tricycle collided with bus,
tricycle driver died. Bus operator settled with
tricycle driver’s estranged wife. A year later, tricycle
driver’s parents sued bus operator for damages
alleging that the latter promised to indemnify them
for the death of the son, his funeral expenses and
the damaged tricycle (which was allegedly bought
with the parents’ money). Who is entitled to the
indemnity – the estranged wife or the parents?
HELD: Tricycle driver’s parents cannot claim
because they are not his compulsory heirs. His wife
and child are the compulsory heirs. Spouse concurs
with all classes of heirs but parents are compulsory
heirs only when decedent dies without a legitimate
descendant.
FACTS
• Nov. 7, 1979 - BIENVENIDO Nacario’s
tricycle collided with JB Bus No. 80 operated by
Jose BARITUA and driven by Edgar BITANCOR, along
the National Highway, San Cayetano, Baao, CamSur.
• Bienvenido and his passenger died because
of the accident.
• Bienvenido was survived by his estranged
wife ALICIA Baracena (with whom he had a child),
and his PARENTS, NICOLAS and VICTORIA Nacario.
• Mar. 27, 1980 – The bus company’s insurer
paid P18,500 to Alicia by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement wherein Alicia agreed to not to
prosecute Baritua and Bitancor for her husband’s
death.
o She executed a “Release of Claim” in favor
of Baritua, Bitancor, and the insurer releasing them
from all claims and damages resulting from the
accident which killed Bienvenido.
• Sep. 2, 1981 – Nicolas and Victoria filed a
suit for damages before the CamSur CFI against
Baritua and Bitancor.
o Parents alleged that Baritua went to
Bienvenido’s wake and promised them indemnity
for Bienvenido’s death, the funeral expenses, and
the damaged tricycle (which was bought from
money loaned by the parents to their son).
• CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that
the payment to Alicia (and the child) extinguished
any claim against Baritua et.al. for the death of
Bienvenido since Alicia and her child are the
preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of
Bienvenido.
• CA reversed the CFI, holding that:
o The parents brought the case in their
personal capacity and not as heirs.
o Alicia could not have validly waived the
claim of the parents since she was not the one who
suffered such damages.
o The parents were able to establish that they
bought the tricycle and Baritua et.al. failed to prove
otherwise, hence they must pay for the damage to
the tricycle.
o AWARD: P10,000.00 for the damage of the
tricycle, P5,000.00 for “complete” funeral services,
P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion
adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
• Baritua and Bitancor appealed to the SC.
• On the other hand, NCC 887 also provides
that the surviving spouse is also a compulsory heir;
and s/he is not excluded by the legitimate
children/descendants or by the legitimate
parents/ascendants.
• SC: “It is patently clear that the parents of
the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other
hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes
of heirs.”
• Therefore Bienvenido’s compulsory heirs
and successors-in-interest are Alicia and the child.
Nicolas and Victoria are not compulsory heirs.
Baritua et.al. were therefore correct in settling the
claim with Alicia, as she is the widow and the
guardian of Bienvenido’s child.
• Nicolas and Victoria can no longer recover
the purchase price of the tricycle and the funeral
expenses from Baritua et.al. since their obligation
has been extinguished with the payment to Alicia.
Their proper recourse is against the estate of
Bienvenido, since he is the alleged debtor.
DISPOSITION: Petition granted. CA decision set
aside, CFI decision reinstated.

ISSUE (HELD)
W/N Baritua et.al. are still liable to pay damages to
the parents despite the extra-judicial settlement
with the wife (NO)

RATIO
• NCC 1231(1): Obligations are extinguished
by payment or performance.
• NCC 1240: Payment shall be made to the
person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any
person authorized to receive it.
• It has been established that Baritua et.al.
have paid the claim to Alicia. The question now: Is
Alicia entitled to such payment?
• According to NCC 887, No. 2, legitimate
parents and ascendants become compulsory heirs
in default of legitimate children and descendants.
NCC 985 provides: “In default of legitimate children
and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion
of collateral relatives.”