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EVANGELINE LADONGA VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141066

February 17, 2005

Facts:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No.
284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990
and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990
issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED
ACCOUNT”; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated
demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by
Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the
Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is
not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. The RTC
rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced
but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of
Batas PambansaBilang 22 as conspirator.

Held:

The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt
act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute
or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only
semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose
People vs. Simon

234 SCRA 555(1994)

Facts:

Herein accused Sunga was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment
alleging he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer
in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory
examination, were found positive for marijuana. After his rearrest following his escape from
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, he pleaded not
guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, after which trial on the merits
ensued and was duly concluded. Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez’ testimony, claiming that he
saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the
one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. On the other
hand, Sunga alleged that on the day in question, he was watching television when three
persons, whom he had never met before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they
would just inquire about something from him he boarded a jeep with them. He was told that they
were going to Camp Olivas, but they were taking a different route. He was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. He was ordered
to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times
and was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to
him. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office becausehe could no longer endure
the maltreatment. Trial Court rendered judgment convicting accused and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.

Issue:

Whether or not the use of the penalty found in the Revised Penal Code is considered as an
offense “punished or punishable” by the Revised Penal Code.

Held:

No. It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition
and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a special law
if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports or
borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense
in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite
simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor,
although it adopts the Code’s nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law
of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder an
offense “punished or punishable” by the Revised Penal Code.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prisioncorreccional, to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Thus, the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs
Act of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous
Drugs Act an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Dunlao vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: An information was filed against Petitioner Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. for violating
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, in an information
which reads: "That on or about a week prior to October 25, 1986, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- mentioned accused,
with intent to gain for himself, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously purchased and received
dismantled farrowing crates made of GI pipes, valued at P20,000.00, knowing the same to be
the subject of thievery, thereby committing an act of 'fencing,' in violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law of 1979, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof Lourdes Farms, Inc.,
represented by Lourdes Du.”

Under Presidential Decree 1612, "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.”

Dunlao argues that the prosecution failed to establish the fact that, in receiving and possessing
the subject items, he was motivated by gain or that he purchased the said articles.

ISSUE: Whether intent to gain need to be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as
P.D. 1612?

RULING: NO, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as
P.D. 1612. The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in
se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids the, called "acts
mala prohibita." This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful
act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts
mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the
intent of the offender is immaterial.

[In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said: "On
the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly
established by the People's evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent
court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores
the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt
acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what
was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent
court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the
judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even
at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up (People
vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised
Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like
the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58)
because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs.
Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra. at p. 52)."]
Zari vs Flores

FACTS: In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court, petitioner Hon.
Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI. City Court of Quezon City, recommended the
dismissal from the service of respondent Mr. Diosdado S. Flores Deputy Clerk of Court of
Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
"1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967, (Criminal Case No. Q-7171), Branch IV, Court of First
Instance, Quezon City), a crime involving moral turpitude. He was sentenced to pay a fine of
P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Official Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Persistent attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in cases
pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the undersigned and to my
present deputy clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.

On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as Deputy Clerk of Court upon
request of the undersigned primarily to dissociate myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores,
which I strongly disapproved of, and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer
with unquestionable integrity. After his transfer, as can be seen from his handwritten notes, he
persisted in taking this unwarranted course of action in at least three (3) cases of
Branch VI.

3. Gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of
strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated
March 11, 1976."

In his answer, Flores alleged that his conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether crime of libel includes moral turpitude?

RULING: YES, the crime of libel includes moral turpitude.

'Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. 'Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve
moral turpitude are adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax, barratry, bigamy,
blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium, dueling, embezzlement, extortion,
forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public
records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under
promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, estafa thru falsification of public
document.

Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of
Quezon City presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe
disciplinary measures. In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A.
Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character
and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record." This averment is not true
because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a
sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.

The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence
adduced during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)

Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a
prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective
local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.”

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found
guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral
turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.

From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be
gleaned that “the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derivedfrom the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property
received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property
as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in
time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded
one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they
owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals.”

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one
of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala
prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala
prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstance
G.R. No. 110592; January 23, 1996
PEOPLE VS. VELASCO

FACTS:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial Court of Manila was
appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,”
in violation of Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972” (R.A. 6425).

Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991. Velasco was
caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a designated poseur-buyer. Five more
decks were found in her pockets.

Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as evidence against her
since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest. Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly,
appellant questions the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her
possession.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having been acquired
through a warrantless arrest.

2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest when
done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may be done if the person to be
arrested is actually committing, has committed or attempting to commit an offense.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up cannot be justified
under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish that the members of the buy-bust
team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.

2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for in R.A. 6425,
agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing directive, since the amount of shabu
involved in the instant case is only 0.8020 gram, the proper imposable component penalty is
prisioncorreccional to be applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be taken
from the medium of prisioncorreccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to
four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is arresto mayor, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months.”
R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts with exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows
that retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.
Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.
RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by the new
legislation.

At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over
the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court
(RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425
before amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement
of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of
inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.

People v. Bracamonte
G.R. No. 95939; June 17, 1996

FACTS:

On October 6, 1987, appellant FlorentinoBracamonte, together with Manuel Sapon and Ernie
Cabral, stood charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide after they were positively
identified by VioletaParnala, the owner of the house and the mother of one of the victims.

Parnala and her husband arrived home from the Kingdom of Jehovah’s Witnesses and were
confounded when their housemaid refused to heed their call from the outside. Parnala was surprised
to see three men emerge from inside the house. The three men then dashed off.

Found inside the house were the bodies of 6-year old Jay Vee and the Paranala’s housemaid,
Rosalina. Some items, amounting to P1,100, were also found to have been missing. Thus, the
charges.

Cabral was tried and convicted of the crime in 1989 while Sapon and Bracamonte were at large until
the latter’s arrest in October of the same year. Appellant Bracamonte denied the charges and
interposed the defense of alibi. Appellant also contended that there was no circumstantial evidence
that will link him in the crime and that Parnala couldn’t possible know him to merit identification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bracamonte’s defense of alibi and Parnala’s lack of personal affiliation with
Bracamonte are worth discharging the appellant of the crime.

RULING:

It has been said that the defense of alibi is inherently weak since it is very easy to concoct. In order
that this defense may prosper, it must be established clearly and convincingly not only that the
accused is elsewhere at the time of the commission of the crime, but that likewise it would have
been physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity thereof. In the instant case, appellant
Bracamonte tragically failed to show, by clear and convincing proof, that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the victims’ house at the time the crime was committed.

Positive identification by an independent witness who has not been shown to have any reason or
motive to testify falsely must prevail over simple denials and the unacceptable alibi of the accused.
Appellant himself admitted that he was not aware of any reason or motive why Parnala should testify
against him. There is also nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires that in order for there to
be a positive identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must know the latter personally. If
this were the case, the prosecution would rarely get any conviction since, in most instances, the
perpetrator of the crime is unrelated to the victim. The witness’ degree of closeness or familiarity with
the accused, although may be helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for purposes of
positive identification.

The Court noted that appellant, together with his two (2) other co-accused, were charged and
convicted of robbery with double homicide. The charge and the corresponding conviction should
have been for robbery with homicide only although two persons were killed. In this complex crime,
the penalty prescribed in Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not affected by the number of
killings accompanying the robbery. The multiplicity of the victims slain, though, is appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine
whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy
causes or for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worthy
purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within
reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy.

Facts:

This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for violating
P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of
their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.

In 1985, the petitioners, officers of SamahangKatandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive
for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.

The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, a
contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for
violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.

P.D. 1564 provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive


contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional
Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the Integrated
Reorganization Plan.

In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose.

Held/Ratio:

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and
independently of each other.

In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious
purpose” is not interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.

The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is acquitted of
the offense charged.

SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,


vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,respondents.
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002

FACTS:

On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and
congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the
following laws:

1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and


2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.

Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province.
Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province
while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.

The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating
in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course
of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain
Province.

Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-
Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the
province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC
Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the
canvassing site.

Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some
groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed
that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in
fact, the petitioners were among them.

COMELEC’s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the
respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but
it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon.

Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC:

No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and
ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case,
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or
despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is the
mass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by
the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims.

Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg.
No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec.
27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively.

Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate during elections
whereas, the violation of Sec. 232, which enumerates the personswho are not allowed inside
the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and cannot be
punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same law.

Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a
criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political offices or police force from
intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity except to vote or
maintain public order.

In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce
the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice
any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are
deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.

"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

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