Tovar-Restreppo - Castoriadis-Foucault-and-Autonomy-New-Approaches-to-Subjectivity-Society-and-Social-Change PDF

B L O O M S B U R Y STUDIES IN C O N T I N E N T A L P HI L OS O PH Y
Castoriadis, Foucault,
and Autonomy
New Approaches to Subjectivity,
Society, and Social Change
Marcela Tovar-Restrepo
B L O O M S B U R Y
C astoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonom y
“C o r n e liu s C astoriadis was o n e o f th e m o st o r ig in a l a n d im agin ative social

th in k ers o f th e tw en tieth cen tury. F o cu sin g o n th e th e m e s o f su b ject, soci
ety, a n d so c ia l c h a n g e , T ovar-R estrepo h as w ritten a lu c id a n d lively e x p o si
tion a n d d e fe n s e o f his e n g a g e d th in k in g. C o m p a r in g h im w ith F ou cau lt
s h e a rg u es that C astoriadis h e lp s to solve fu n d a m e n ta l p r o b le m s that
F o u c a u lt le f t u n reso lv ed . T h is is a n e x c e lle n t c o n tr ib u tio n in r esto r in g th e
im p o r ta n c e o f th e th in k er o f radical im a gin ation a n d radical dem ocracy!"
R ichard J. B ern stein , Vera L ist P r o fe sso r o f P h ilo so p h y , N e w S c h o o l For
S ocial R e se a rc h , N e w York, U SA
“In a d isc u ssio n o f th e h ig h est in te lle ctu a l quality, T ovar-R estrepo e x p lic a tes
Castoriadis* p rin cip a l ideas, p la c in g the d e v e lo p m e n t o f h is th o u g h t in its
historical a n d p o litica l c o n te x t, a n d e n g a g in g critically with the o n g o in g
d e b a te s su r r o u n d in g his work. In c o m p a r in g C astoriad is’ th o u g h t w ith that
o f th e m o r e w idely-know n F o u ca u lt, s h e u n c o v e r s th e str en g th s a n d w eak
n e sse s o f e a c h , an d p resen ts a p ersu asive ca se f o r the u n d er-recogn ized
valu e o f C astoriad is1 th o u g h t for u n d e rsta n d in g th e h u m an su b ject and
society, a n d as an in te lle ctu a l fo u n d a tio n for th e p o litic a l p r o je ct o f a u to n
om y. T h is b o o k is a n im p o r ta n t a d d itio n to th e g r o w in g b o d y o f sch olarsh ip
o n C astoriadis' th o u g h t a n d a valu a b le c o n tr ib u tio n to th e critical appraisal
o f F o u c a u lt ”
J e f f K looger, S w in b u rn e U n iversity o f T e ch n o lo g y , A ustralia, auth or o f
C astoriadis: Psyche, Society, A utonom y
“In a c lo s e r e a d in g o f th e se w orks, T ovar-R estrepo gives a rig o ro u s a n d pas

sio n a te a c c o u n t o f a fu n d a m e n ta l d e b a te i n F ren ch c o n te m p o ra r y
p h ilo so p h y .”
Fabio C iaram elli, P ro fe sso r o f L egal P h ilosop h y, U n iversity o f Catania, Italy
“T ovar-R estrepo’s r e a d in g o f C astoriadis, a lesser-k n ow n c o n tem porar)' o f

F ou cau lt, is clear, c o n c ise, a n d critically th ou gh t-p rovok in g."
V in cen t C rap an zan o, D istin g u ish ed P r o fe sso r o f C om p arative Literature
an d A n th ro p o lo g y at the G rad uate C en ter o f the City U n iversity o f
N e w York, U SA
C on tin u u m S tu d ies in C o n tin en tal P h ilo so p h y
S eries E d itor: J a m es Fieser, U n iversity o f T e n n e ss e e at M artin, USA
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field o f philosophical research.
Adorno's Concept o f Life. Alastair Morgan
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Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought, Michael Roubach
Deleuze and Guattari, Fadi Abou-Rihan
Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, Joe Hughes
Deleuze and the Unconscious, Christian Kerslakc
Deleuze, Guattari and the Production of the New, edited by Sim on O'Sullivan
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Derrida: Profanations. Patrick O ’Connor
Ί'/ie Domestication of Derrida, Lorenzo Fabbri
Encountering Derrida, edited by Simon Morgan Wortham and Allison Weiner
Foucault's Heidegger. Timothy Rayner
Gadamer and the Question o f the Divine, Walter Uimmi
Heidegger and a Metaphysics o f Feeling, Sharin N. Elkholy
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Kant, Deleuze and Architectonics, Edward Willatt
lsx>inas and Camus, Tal Sessler
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology, Kirk M. Besmer
Nietzsche's Ethical Theory, Craig Dove
Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Philosophy o f the Future, edited by Jeffrey Metzger
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The Philosofthy of Exaggeration, Alexander Garcia Düttmann
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Time and Becoming in Nietzsche's Thought, Robin Small
Who’s Afraid o f Deleuze and Guattari? Gregg Lambert
Zizek and Heidegger, Thom as Brockelman
Zizek's Dialectics, Fabio Vighi
Castoriadis, Foucault,
an d Autonom y
New A pproaches to Subjectivity, Society,
an d Social C hange
M arcela Tovar-Restrepo
Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN: I IB: 978-1-4411-3404-2

e-ISBN: 978-1-4411-5176-6
Library o f Congress Cataloguingnn-Publication Data

Tovar-Restrepo, Marcela.
Castoriadis. Foucault, and autonomy: new approaches to subjectivity, society, and
social change/M arcela Tovar-Restrepo.
p. cm . - (Continuum studies in Continental philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 978-1-4411-3404-2 (hardcover)
1. Castoriadis, Cornelius, 1922-1997. 2. Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984.1. Title.
B2430.C3584T68 2011
194—dc23 2011037081
Typeset by Dcanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai. India

For P ablo T ovar a n d M arfa d e l P ilar R estrep o
Contents
A cknowledgm ents viii
In tr o d u c tio n 1
C h a p ter 1: T h e S o cia lism e o u B arbarie P e r io d ( 1 9 4 9 -6 5 ) 9
C h a p ter 2: C o r n e liu s C astoriad is’ O n to lo g y o f C rea tio n 33
C h a p ter 3: A gen cy a n d A u to n o m y in C astoriadis 65
C h a p ter 4: M ich el F oucault: T h e G am e o f P ow er a n d R esistan ce 91
C h a p ter 5: S o c iety O ver th e Su bject 115
C h a p ter 6: C astoriadis versus F oucault: C o n c lu d in g Rem arks 133
Notes 141
Bibliography 151
In d e x 161
Acknowledgments
I w o u ld lik e to exp ress m y g ra titu d e to R ichard B e rn ste in , J o e l W h iteb ook ,

V in c e n t C rap an zan o, F abio G irald o, a n d A n d rea s Kalvvas, fo r th e ir steady
su p p o rt a n d in te lle ctu a l in te rlo cu tio n .
I w o u ld a lso lik e to than k Z o é C astoriadis, M yrto G o n d ica s, E nriqu e
Escobar, a n d David C urtis fo r le n d in g m e access t o p riv ileg ed in fo rm a tio n
ab ou t C o r n e liu s C astoriadis' life a n d p erso n a l arch iv es in Paris. L aurie
N a ra n ch , R afael M iranda, J o sé M alaver, J e f f K looger, a n d Suzi A d am s also
c o n tr ib u te d tow ard m a k in g this p r o je ct p ossib le.
I a m in d e b te d to S te p h a n ie D a m o ff w h o d id p rev io u s c o p y e d ilin g o f this
m an u scrip t a n d su ccessfu lly o v ercam e th e c h a lle n g in g task o f w o rk in g with
C o r n e liu s C astoriad is’ n e o lo g ism s.
Finally, f o r g e n e r o u s com p an y, jo y , a n d g o o d s e n s e o f h u m or, I w o u ld like
to than k m y fam ily a n d fr ie n d s w h o se p r e se n c e is th r o u g h o u t this w ork . I
am e sp e c ia lly grateful to P ablo Tovar, M aria d e l P ilar R estrep o, A na Maria
Tovar, S o fia Sam p er, E m ilio Sam per, J o r d i C astcllo, C arlos M oreno-
L e g u iza m ô n , a n d J o r g e G. C astaneda.
Introduction
Ici encore K a n t a v a it v u la chose, bien q u ’il l'a il travestie, lorsqu'il disait que
l'œ uvre d 'a rt est - présentation d a n s l'in tu itio n des Idées de la R aison ». Car ce
que l'a rt présente, ce n e sont p a s les Idées de la R aison, m ais le Chaos, l'Abîme,
le S a n s Fond, à quoi il donne forme. E t p a r cette présentation, il est fenêtre s u r le
Chaos, il abolit l'assurance tranquillem ent stupide de notre vie quotidienne, il
nous rappelle que nous v ivons toujours a u bord de l 'Abîme - ce q u i est le principal
savoir d 'u n être autonome.
C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘La C u ltu re d a n s u n e S o c ié lé D é m o c r a tiq u e ’
W hat art p resen ts are n o t th e Id eas of R eason fa s K ant b e lie v e d ] b u t the

C h aos, th e Abyss, th e G ro u n d lessn ess to w h ich it gives fo rm . A n d th rou gh
th is p r e se n ta tio n , it is a w in d ow o n th e C haos; it a b o lish e s o u r tranquil
a n d stu p id assu ran ce a b o u t o u r daily life; it r e m in d s us that w e forever
live at th e e d g e o f th e Abyss— w h ich is th e m ain th in g an a u to n o m o u s
b e in g know s.
C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘C u ltu re in a D em ocratic Society'
Hobbes a v a it raison, mais p a s p o u r ses raisons à lui. L a p e u r de la mort est la

piene angulaire des institutions. N on pas la peur d'être tué p a r le voisin - mais la
peur, tout à f a i t justifiée, que tout, même le sens, se dissoudra.
C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘P sychanalyse e t P o litiq u e ’
H o b b es w as r ig h t th o u g h for th e w ro n g r ea so n . F ear o f d e a th is in d e e d
th e m a in state o f in stitu tio n . N o t fe a r o f b e in g k ille d by th e n e x t m a n but
th e ju s tifie d fear that ev ery th in g , e v en m e a n in g w ill dissolve.
C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘Psychoanalysis a n d P o litics’

2 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonomy
M ich el F o u c a u lt an d C o r n é liu s C astoriad is’ so c ia l th e o r ie s a r o se as

p r o d u cts o f postw ar F re n c h m o d e r n iza tio n , a fr u itfu l m o m e n t fo r prolific
a n d m u ltifa rio u s in te lle ctu a l p r o d u ctio n s. T h e w ork o f b o th a u th ors was
in fo r m e d b y th e rapidly c h a n g in g c o n d itio n s e x p e r ie n c e d in F ran ce d u rin g
th e 1 9 5 0 s-7 0 s. M o d e rn ist view s, F ord ism , a n d in d u strialization transform ed
F ran ce in t o a n u rb a n c o u n tr y that n o lo n g e r r u le d c o lo n ie s a n d that was
a c q u ir in g n e w form s o f c en tra lized d e v e lo p m e n t a n d r eg u la te d labor
rela tio n s. A fter 1945, th e F re n c h state se t a b o u t d e s ig n in g a n d im p le m e n tin g
p o lic ie s a n d in stitu tio n a l a r ra n g em e n ts to e n su r e e c o n o m ic grow th and
fin a n cia l stability. N ew p attern s o f m ass p r o d u ctio n a n d co n su m p tio n
sig n ifica n tly c h a n g e d th e so c io e c o n o m ic F ren ch s c e n a r io w h ich b e c a m e a
c en tra l p r o b le m to b e analyzed in the lig h t o f s o c ia l a n d revolu tion ary
theory, fo r F ren ch th in k ers su c h as C o r n e liu s C astoriad is a n d h is g ro u p
S o cia lism e O u Barbarie (S o u B ).1
A flo u r ish in g in te lle ctu a l a tm o sp h e re a c c o m p a n ie d th e se c h a n g e s.
D u rin g th is p e r io d , F ran ce h o ste d rich d e b a te s a n im a te d by th e resu rg en ce
o f H e g e lia n is m after W orld W ar 11. F or m an y in te lle c tu a ls a n d leftists,
H e g e l’s Phenom enology o f Spirit w as a n im p o r ta n t so u r c e fo r a n e e d e d
ren ew al in th e social a n d p o litica l aren as, in c lu d in g M arxist historical
m aterialism (Poster, 1975, p p . 5, 5 1 -6 1 ; L ic h th e im , 1966, p. 8 1 ).
R e in tr o d u c e d in F ran ce by A le x a n d r e K ojève a n d Jean H yp p olite at
l'É c o le d e s h a u te s e tu d e s en sc ie n c e s sociales, a u th o rs lik e M au rice M erleau-
Ponty, J a c q u e s L acan , M ich el F ou cau lt, G illes D e le u z e , L ou is A lthusser, and
J a c q u e s D e rr id a b e n e fite d fr o m this d isc u ssio n . S tu d y in g H e g e l a llo w ed a
critical r e fle c tio n o n th e cru cial c o n te n ts p r e se n t at th e c o r e o f m o d ern ist
th o u g h t, su c h as th e C artesian legacy a n d s o m e rom an tic n o tio n s .2 T h is
d e b a te , a lo n g w ith the n e e d to r e s p o n d to th e e x h a u stio n of M arxism ,
in fo r m e d e m e r g in g tren d s that sh a p e d th e th e o r e tic a l a n d political F rench
m ilie u o f t h e 1960s a n d 1970s w h en F oucault a n d C astoriadis b e g a n to
p r o d u c e th e ir b o d ie s o f w ork. P h ilo so p h ic a l d e v e lo p m e n ts su c h as S artre’s
e x isten tia lism , M erleau-P onty's p h e n o m e n o lo g y , L acan's F reud ian
rein te rp re ta tio n , a n d e v en th e p r e c e d in g I.evi-Straussian structuralism —
just to n a m e afew — w ere so m e o f th e of'th eories p r o d u c e d c o n te m p o ra n eo u sly
w ith F o u c a u lt’s an d C astoriadis' w ritings.
Even th o u g h F o u ca u lt an d C astoriadis’ fo r m a tiv e a n d p ro d u ctiv e years
sh a red sim ila r c o n te x tu a l c o n d itio n s, th e ir in te lle c tu a l a n d private
trajectories greatly d iffe re d . C o m in g from d iffe r e n t e n v iro n m en ts a n d
p erso n a l b a c k g r o u n d s, th e ir work fo llo w ed d istin c t p ath s a n d b e c a m e c o n
so lid a te d th r o u g h d iffe re n t in stitu tion al d yn am ics, p o litic a l organ ization s,
a n d a c a d e m ic circu its. 4T h e way th e y rela ted to th e ir im m ed ia te in tellectu al
Introduction 3
c o n text a n d to t h e d e b a te s taking p la c c in F ran ce a n d ab road p roved to be

cru cial fo r sh a p in g th e ir d iffe r e n c e s an d sim ilarities, a n d to th e way they
w e re r e c e iv e d a n d p o s itio n e d a m o n g th e pu blic.
F rom e a rly o n , d iffe re n t p erso n a l an d political e x p e r ie n c e s in th e ir y ou th
c o n tr ib u te d tow ard sh a p in g th e ir p h ilo s o p h ic a l c o n c e r n s a n d critical
p ersp e c tiv e s. W h ile as a n a d o le sc e n t C astoriad is j o in e d leftist political
o r g a n iza tio n s a n d in itia ted a p r o lo n g e d m ilitan cy that e n c o u r a g e d his
in terest in so c ia l th e o r y an d , m o r e sp ecifically in M arxism , F ou cau lt tu r n e d
to m o r e p e r so n a l c o n c e r n s th at to o k h im in to th e stu d y o f p sy ch o lo g y and
th e e x p lo r a tio n o f in stitu tion al form s that d e a lt with m e n ta l disorders.
T h e ir in itial in tellectu a l in flu e n c e s an d tr a in in g r e fle c te d th e ir dissim ilar
in terests, u p o n w h ic h th ey also se t research a g e n d a s that they d e v e lo p ed
th ro u g h d iffe re n t p rojects. F ou cau lt r em a in e d w o r k in g in a c a d e m ic and
sch olarly e n v ir o n m e n ts w h ile C astoriadis tu rn ed to p o litica l o rgan ization s
that s o u g h t to critically r e fle c t o n revolu tion ary th e o r y a n d th e ir c o n se q u e n t
political m ilitancy.
C astoriad is was b o r n in C o n sta n tin o p le in 1922 an d lived in A th en s from
th e tim e h e w as th r e e m o n th s o ld . In w h at was th e n a sm all city, C astoriadis
sp e n t his c h ild h o o d in th e c o m p a n y o f his father, w h o h e d e sc r ib e d as a
V oltairean, an ticlerica l, an tim o n a rch ist d e m o c r a t w h o p r o fe sse d great
a d m ir a tio n fo r th e F ren ch , a n d h is m o th er, a p ia n ist w h o tau g h t h im m usical
skills. F rom h is y o u th , h e was fam iliar w ith F re n c h c u ltu r e. 1 lis father taught
h im F r e n c h by m a k in g h im d eclaim F r a n c o p h o n e p o etry a n d r e c ite Plato's
Apology w h ile h is fa th e r sh aved in th e m o r n in g .
C astoriad is was greatly in flu e n c e d by his fam ily. Early in his life h e
d e v e lo p e d a d e e p in te lle ctu a l curiosity. H e r ec a lle d bu yin g, at a g e 13, a
s e c o n d h a n d b o o k o n th e h istory o f p h ilo so p h y , w h ile h e also d e v e lo p ed
great p assion for M arxist theory. A s an a d o le sc e n t his p olitical in terests led
h im to se c re tly buy th e c o m m u n ist n ew sp a p er a n d in 1937, d u rin g h is last
year a t sc h o o l, to j o i n a sm all revolu tion ary c e ll o f th e C o m m u n ist Y ou th o f
G re ec e . T o g e th e r with o th e r th r e e c o m ra d es, h e fou g h t Ioan n is M ctaxas’
d ic ta to rsh ip (1 9 3 6 -4 1 ) un til h is p artn ers w ere arrested . In that sa m e year
C astoriadis e n te r e d th e law sc h o o l at th e A th e n s U niversity, w h er e h e
p u rsu ed a c a r e e r in e c o n o m ic s a n d political sc ie n c e .
In 1941, d u r in g th e G erm an o c c u p a tio n , h e j o in e d th e G reek C om m u n ist
Party w h er e h e f o u n d e d a jo u r n a l n a m e d N ea Epochi, a im e d at refo rm in g
th e party from w ith in . N e v er th e less, as tim e p a ssed it b e c a m e cle a r to him
th a t the G reek C o m m u n ist Party w as n o t an in d e p e n d e n t b o d y b u t was in
lin e w ith th e T h ir d In tern ation al, w h ich h e o p p o s e d . As a resu lt, in 1942
C astoriadis j o in e d th e leftist faction o f th e G r e e k Trotskyist party led by
Sp iros S tin as. H is m ilitan cy c o n tin u e d u n til t h e e n d o f 1 9 4 5 w h en h e le ft for

F rance in th e fa m o u s sh ip called M ataroa, a lo n g w ith o th e r in te lle c tu a ls like
K ostas A x e lo s.
S o m e m o n th s after h is arrival in F ra n ce, h e j o in e d th e Trotskyites and
o r g a n ize d th e S e c o n d W orld C on gress o f th e F ou rth In tern a tio n a l, h eld
in 1948. H ow ever, by that tim e C astoriadis m e t C la u d e L efort, with w h om
h e started q u e s tio n in g Trotsky’s c o n c e p tio n s an d later fo u n d e d th e g ro u p
S o c ia lism e o u Barbarie (1 9 4 9 -6 5 ).
In 1948, C astoriad is started w o rk in g at d ie T h e O rg a n isa tio n fo r E c o n o m ic
C o -o p era tio n a n d D e v e lo p m e n t (O E C D ), w h er e h e stayed u n til 1970.
In 1973, h e b e c a m e a p r a c tic in g psych oanalyst a n d p u b lish e d h is m ain
w ork, L 'In stitu tio n Im aginaire de la Société, in 1975.
C astoriad is n ever p u rsu ed a tradition al a c a d e m ic c a reer d e sp ite h is active
a n d p r o d u c tiv e in te lle ctu a l activity. H e was part o f t h e F re n c h jo u r n a ls
Textures ( 1 9 7 2 - 5 ) a n d Libre ( 1 9 7 5 -8 0 ), an d ta u g h t e c o n o m ic s at N an terre
(1974—6 ) a n d p h ilo so p h y at th e L’É c o le d e s h a u te s e tu d e s e n sc ien ce s
so c ia le s ( 1 9 8 0 -9 5 ).
U n lik e th e th en -em erg in g in tellectu a l figu res, C astoriadis d id n o t follow a
regular scholarly path. R ather than j o in in g r ec o g n ize d in tellectu al netw orks
o r m e e tin g the req u irem en ts o f a cad em ic life, C astoriadis was a h e te ro d o x
think er w h o c o n c en tra te d o n e lab oratin g o n his id e a s an d less o n p ositio n in g
th em . In term s o f c o n te n t. C astoriadis’ work was also singu lar an d did not
reflect flo u r ish in g tren d s o r id e o lo g ie s. It did n o t m e e t ex p ecta tio n s c o m m o n
to his im m e d ia te political a n d p osth u m an ist c o n te x t. O n th e contrary, h e
resem b led a F rench e n cy clo p ed ist w h ose work req u ires interdisciplinary
k n o w led g e a n d is n o t easily categorized . C orrectly d e sc r ib ed as a “penseur en
chaleur," C astoriadis ela b o ra ted a n d r efin e d his th in k in g as h e progressively
w rote a n d p u b lish e d h is oeuvre; w h ich precisely b e c a u se o f its h etero d o x y and
singularity can cau se so m e difficu lty to his readers.
F o u ca u lt, o n the o th e r h a n d , was a d iffe r e n t character. D e sp ite his
creativity a n d originality, his work drew m o r e d ir ec tly o n receiv ed th eo retica l
b o d ies, m e t w id esp read a c a d e m ic e x p e cta tio n s, a n d was in d ia lo g u e with
fa sh io n a b le poststructuralist au th ors. F o u ca u lt also r e m a in e d pai l of diverse
a n d r e n o w n e d a c a d e m ic circles, an d it w as n o t u n til later that his political
activities b e c a m e a n im p ortan t part o f his in te lle ctu a l life.
F o u ca u lt w as b o r n in P oitiers (F ran ce) in 1 9 2 6 a n d was raised in a
co n serv a tiv e a n d w ell-estab lish ed m iddle-class fam ily. In 1943 h e c o m p le te d
h is se c o n d a r y e d u c a tio n , a n d e n te r e d L 'É cole n o r m a le su p é rie u r e (F.NS)
in Paris in 194 5 . F rom 1949 to 1951 h e p u rsu ed h is stu d ie s in p h ilo so p h y
a n d e n te r e d th e p sy ch o lo g y p rogram , p r a c tic in g at th e Sain te-A n ne
psychiatric h osp ital. H e d e v e lo p e d an in terest in p s y ch o p a th o lo g y and
Introduction 5
c o n c lu d e d a d ip lo m a c o u r se in 1952. B etw een 1 9 5 4 a n d 1955 h e w ork ed at

th e U n iv ersity o f L ille an d at th e ENS, fo llo w ed b y w ork at th e U n iversity o f
U p p sa la (S w ed en ) a n d th e C lerm on t-F erran d U n iv ersity in 1 9 6 0 -6 . H e
later ta u g h t at th e U niversity o f T u n is (1 9 6 6 -8 ) a n d V in c e n n e s U n iversity
(1 9 6 8 ), u n til h e was e le c te d to th e C o llè g e d e F ran ce in 1969.
W hile te a c h in g , F o u ca u lt also d id rigorou s solitary research at libraries
su ch as t h e B ib lio th èq u e n a tio n a le d e F ran ce, w h er e h e sp en t lo n g hours.
H e b e c a m e a m ajor in tellectu a l figure a n d a p r o lific b est se llin g author. H is
first book s, su c h a s M adness a n d C ivilization p u b lish e d in 1961, w ere exten sively
review ed a n d sold o u t. H e also p u b lish e d a n d con trib u ted to w idely
r e c o g n i/e d jo u r n a ls su ch as Tel-Quel, Critique, a n d N ouvelle R evue Française.
In his y o u th , F o u ca u lt was n o t in te re ste d in p o litics. H e d e v o te d m ore
tim e a n d a tten tio n to his p erso n a l affairs w h ich h is b iograp h ers d escrib e as
d ep ressiv e e p iso d e s.4 H is p erso n a l c o n d itio n s k ep t h im im m er se d in private
affairs a n d in te lle ctu a l activities. In 1950 h e j o i n e d th e F re n c h C om m u n ist
Part) b u t n e v e r had a n active m ilitan cy a n d left a fter a few years. D e sp ite his
lack o f p articip a tio n in p olitical g ro u p s, h e w as in te r e ste d in leftist grou p s
a n d d e c la r e d h is sym pathy fo r p o litic a l cau ses. H e m a d e d ec la r a tio n s against
th e A lgerian a n d V ietn am wars a n d against racist p ractices tow ard im m igran ts
in F rance. H e also visited Iran to m e et A yatollah K h o m e in i an d initially
su p p o r te d the in te rim g o v e r n m e n t after th e Iran ian revolu tion .
F o u ca u lt’s m o r e active p o litica l life started w h e n h is in tellectu a l ca reer
w as c o n so lid a te d . It w as n o t u n til th e b e g in n in g o f th e 1970s that the
r e la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n F o u ca u lt’s p o litica l activity a n d in te lle c tu a l w ork
b e c a m e e v id en t. T h r o u g h his w ork with p rison ers at th e Group d'inform ation
su r les prisons— t h e p olitical w ork h e w as m o st d e v o te d to — F oucault
e x p a n d e d h is p o litic a l h o r iz o n a n d in c re a se d h is activism .
F o u c a u lt a n d C astoriad is n e v e r h e ld a p u b lic d e b a te a b o u t th e ir work.
In th e ir w r itin g s, m u tu a l q u o te s are n o n e x is te n t. It w as q u ite cle a r to th e se
liv in g a u th o r s th a t th e ir w ork a n d c ritic a l p e r sp e c tiv e s w e re far apart.
N e v e r th e le s s , d e s p ite th e ir g r ea t d iffe r e n c e s , a p a r a lle l r e la tio n sh ip and
c o m p a r is o n b e tw e en F o u c a u lt a n d C astoriad is is p la u sib le g iv en th at th e ir
th e o r e tic a l p r o d u c tio n s r e s p o n d to c o m m o n p h ilo s o p h ic a l q u estio n s.
T h e y sh a r e d sim ila r c h a lle n g e s a n d tack led c o m m o n p r o b le m s s e e k in g to
c o n te s t th e o r e tic a l le g a c ie s firm ly r o o t e d in th e ir in te lle c tu a l m ilie u . B oth
C a sto ria d is a n d F o u c a u lt so u g h t to c o n te s t m o d e r n is t a n d r a tio n a listic
p e r sp e c tiv e s that im p lie d u n ifie d a n d o b je c tiv e r e a litie s, a b s o lu te values,
a n d tr a n s c e n d e n t a l id e a s o r fo r m s o f s u b je c ts . T h e y o p p o s e d m e ta
p h y sica l p h ilo s o p h ic a l tr a d itio n s, c r itic iz in g an y u ltim a te a n th r o p o lo g ic a l
fo u n d a tio n , su ch a s r ea so n , o r an y tc le o lo g ic a l v isio n o f history o r h u m a n
p rogress.
A lo n g ill is lin e, th ey so u g h t to e x p la in reality as a social con str u c t th rou gh

r e p r e se n ta tio n , q u e s tio n in g view s that p r e su p p o se d total in d e p e n d e n c e
b e tw e en th e c o g n iz a n t su b ject and an a u to n o m o u s reality. T hey
a c k n o w le d g e d th e h istorical, c o n tin g e n t, a n d relative ch aracter o f social
fo rm a tio n s, a n d n e g a te d th e ideal o f u ltim ate, u n iq u e , an d o p tim a l form s
o f so c iety th a t r efle c te d th e so -ca lled e n d o f history.
C astoriad is a n d F ou cau lt a g r ee d that th e h u m a n su b ject, as w ell as his o r
h e r so c ia l reality, w as a p ro d u ct o f r ep re se n ta tio n a l activity, w h ere historical
a n d c u ltu r a l m e a n in g g a v e life to so c iety w h ile sh a p in g th e in d iv id u a l’s
subjectivity. E ven th o u g h they su p p o rte d this p r e m ise o n d ifferen t th e o r e
tical bases, b o th a u th ors d e fe n d e d th e in te rp re ta tio n o f social reality as a
r ep re se n ta tio n in v ested w ith m e a n in g that gave s e n s e to social p ractices
a n d in stitu tio n s. In th is resp ect, F ou cau lt was str o n g ly in flu e n c e d by the
lin g u istic tu r n te n d e n c y , w h ich d rove h im to d e fe n d th e discu rsive natu re
o f social fo r m a tio n s, w h ile C astoriad is fo r m u la ted an o n to lo g y o f creation ,
p o sin g n ew c o n c e p ts su c h as th e radical im agin ary a s th e so u rce o f im agin ary
social sig n ific a tio n s a n d social institution s.
In th is b o o k , I esta b lish a d ia lo g u e b e tw e en F o u c a u lt’s a n d C astoriadis’
b o d ie s of th o u g h t, d isc u ssin g th e ir p o te n tia litie s, lim itation s, and
c o n tr ib u tio n s w ith o u t o m ittin g th e ir d iffe r e n c e s a n d c o n v e rg e n c es. I fo c u s
o n th ree m a in n o tio n s that are cen tral fo r b o th sch o la rs’ th eories: the
su b ject, th e p r o d u ctio n o f social m e a n in g a n d r e p re se n ta tio n , a n d social
c h a n g e . I s h o w th e im p o r ta n c e o f th e se c o n c e p ts t o e a c h think er, e n a b lin g
a b e tte r u n d e r sta n d in g o f th e ir th e o r etica l c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d p o litic a l
im p lic a tio n s.
A fter e sta b lish in g the m ain p o in ts o f c o m p a r iso n , I argu e fo r C astoriadis’
p h ilo s o p h ic a l a n d th eo retica l p o s itio n , an d p r e se n t it as a n altern ative to
u n reso lv ed poststructuralist p rob lem s an d to w h a t C astoriadis saw as a
d e te rm in istic o n to lo g y e m b e d d e d in p o litica l relativism . T h is d iscu ssio n
o p e n s u p a n in v ig o ra tin g d e b a te a b o u t a u to n o m y , subjectivity, pow er, a n d
agency, p o in tin g o u t im p o rta n t lim ita tio n s p r e se n t in poststructuralism .
C astoriadis' th eo retica l to o ls allow an original e x a m in a tio n u n d e r th e lens
o f d e te r m in ism o f th o se n o tio n s as they o c cu r in F o u ca u lt’s work— an
u n p r e c e d e n te d analysis o f a w id ely read au th o r a b o u t w h om m u c h has b e e n
w r itte n d u r in g r e c e n t d e c a d e s. G iven th e e x te n s iv e lite r a tu r e availab le
o n F ou cau lt, I a ssu m e s o m e fam iliarity o n th e part o f th e r ea d er and
e m p h a siz e C astoriad is’ th e o r etica l trajectory, th o u g h I d o n ot in te n d to
c h r o n o lo g ic a lly trace his c o n c e p tu a l d e v e lo p m e n ts. My g oal is to en a b le
n e w u n d e r sta n d in g s o f subjectivity, so c ia l life, a n d tran sform ation th ro u g h
an altern a tiv e r e a d in g o f a g en cy an d a u to n o m y . N o n d e ter m in istic
Introduction 1
c o n c e p tio n s o f th e subject, society, an d social c h a n g e sh o u ld allow us to go

b e y o n d m e r e criticism a n d a ttem p t to preserve a n a u to n o m o u s p o sitio n
a n d a ttitu d e in the g e n e r a tio n o f k n o w led g e a n d s o c ia l theory.
T h e d isc u ssio n is d ivid ed in to six chap ters. C h a p te r 1 c e n te r s o n an early
p e r io d o f C astoriad is’ life as a y o u n g in te lle c tu a l m ilita n t in Paris w h en ,
to g e th e r w ith o th e r fig u r es lik e C lau d e L efo rt a n d Jean -F ran cois Lyotard,
h e fo u n d e d th e leg e n d a ry jo u r n a l Socialisme ou B arbarie (SB) in 1949. T h e
g r o u p o f t h e sa m e n a m e , c re d ited a s th e so u r c e o f in sp ira tio n in May 1968
b y D a n ie l C o h n -B e n d it (1 9 6 8 ), d e n o u n c e d so c ia list c o n tr a d ictio n s and
S talinist a u th oritarian e x ce sse s un til 1965 w h en it d issolved . T h e group
a d v a n ce d altern a tiv e leftist th in k in g by sh a rin g in an d d raw in g o n the
e x p e r ie n c e o f F ren ch factory w orkers. In this in itia l p e r io d o f his in te lle ctu a l
career, C astoriad is q u e stio n e d M arxism a n d se t th e fo u n d a tio n s fo r th e key
c o n c e p ts in his w ork, particularly t h e o r ig in s o f h is n o tio n s o f auton om y,
cre a tio n , a n d in d ete rm in a tio n . 1 analyze th e se c o n c e p ts in th e fo llo w in g
ch ap ter, b u ild in g a b rid g e b etw een th e se tw o m o m e n ts in C astoriadis’
d e v e lo p m e n t.
C h a p ter 2 traces th e c o n c e p tu a l path o f C astoriadis' o n to lo g y o f creation ,
w h ic h is k n o w n a s his m ain p h ilo so p h ic a l w ork a n d c o n tr ib u tio n . M ere I
p r e se n t its b a sic c o n c e p ts, e x p la in in g its F reu d ian an d p h ilo so p h ic a l roots.
T h e o n to lo g ic a l statu s g iv en to im a g in a tio n in th e form s o f th e radical
im a g in a tio n o f th e sin g u la r p sych e a n d th e so c ia l in stitu tin g /in s titu te d
im agin ary are also a p p ro a c h e d a n d d iscu ssed . T h is ch a p te r g o e s o n to
p r e se n t th e lea n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n o f the e x istin g -b e in g that su b stan tiates
b oth his c o n c e p t o f c r e a tio n a n d its in d e te r m in a te character. H e r e th e
r ela tio n b e tw e e n th e psychical a n d t h e social p o le s is e x p la in e d , in c lu d in g
th e stratification o f th e h u m a n p sy ch e, as w ell as c ritiq u e s m a d e to so m e o f
h is n o tio n s su ch as t h e m o n a d ic state o f th e p sy ch e o r lea n in g -o n d o c tr in e.
F u r th e rm o r e, as this ch a p te r draws o n C astoriadis’ m ain w ork. T he Im aginary
In stitu tio n o f Society, the social-h istorical is a d d r e sse d as a particu lar way to
re-con cep tu ali/.e so ciety a n d history. T h e social-h istorical is e x p la in e d as the
c r e a tio n o f th e a n o n y m o u s c o llectiv e th ro u g h th e e x istin g te n sio n betw een
its in stitu tin g a n d in stitu ted p o w er that d ista n c e s it fr o m the c o m m o n
p e r ce p tio n o f so ciety as a su m o f in d ivid u al in tersn b jcctiv e netw orks.
C h a p ter 3 fo c u se s o n th e prim ary in n ovative c o n tr ib u tio n s m a d e by
C astoriad is w ith h is n o tio n s o f th e su b ject, agen cy, the p r o d u c tio n o f social
m e a n in g and r ep re se n ta tio n , and social change. It d iscu sses th e
p o te n tia litie s, w eak n esses, a n d p r o b le m s related to th e se c o n c e p ts, in c lu d in g
critiq u es m a d e by le a d in g in te lle c tu a l figu res. It a lso e n g a g e s w ith d iscu ssion s
o f e m e r g in g sch olars w h o p o s e in te re stin g p o in ts o f r efle c tio n in r elation to
C astoriadis' theory. A s a corollary o f th e se d e b a te s, th e n o tio n o f a u to n o m y

is e x a m in e d as a social c r e a tio n th a t d o e s n o t c o n stitu te an u ltim a te o r
tr a n sc en d e n ta l fo u n d a tio n , w h ic h p o s e s a d iffe r e n t u n d e rsta n d in g o f the
n orm ative criteria in th e a n th ro p o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic a l realm s, r ed efin in g
th e e n c o u n te r b etw een n o r m a n d fact. U n r e so lv e d te n sio n s p r e se n t in
a u to n o m y a s b o th a su b jective in d ivid u al p r o je ct a n d as a c o lle ctiv e political
o n e , are a lso a p p ro a c h e d in th e lig h t o f c o n te m p o ra r y d em o cra tic political
system s.
C h ap ter 4 starts by d iscu ssin g F o u ca u lt’s work, p r o v id in g a co m p reh en siv e
overview o f his th eo ry a n d illustrating his d iffe r e n t stan ds o v er tim e with
resp e ct to t h e th r e e m ain p rob lem s with w h ich w e are c o n c e r n e d , It takes
in to a c c o u n t his d iffe re n t fo c i o f analysis: in th e 1960s, o n system s o f
k n ow led ge from an arch a eo lo g ica l perspective; in th e 1970s, o n th e g e n e a
logical a p p ro a c h to m od alities o f pow er; a n d in th e 1980s, o n te ch n o lo g ie s
o f the self, e th ics, an d fr ee d o m . It also review s fu r th e r a n d m o r e d e v e lo p ed
in sigh ts F o u ca u lt h ad in relation to pow er an d how th e p ro b lem o f d o m in a tio n
an d h e te r o n o m y is u n d e rsto o d in relation to C astoriadis’ u n d erstan d in g.
Im p ortan t n o tio n s that u n d e rlie b o th a u th ors’ w ork, su c h as h istory and
kn ow led ge, arc also tackled in a constructive co m p a riso n .
C h a p ter 5 c o n tin u e s d isc u ssin g F o u c a u lt’s d e v e lo p m e n ts, e x a m in in g his
in sig h ts fr o m a C astoridian p ersp ective a n d r ev ea lin g im p o r ta n t im p lica tio n s
an d lim ita tio n s o f his poststructuralist a ssu m p tio n s. F o u c a u lt’s sign ifican t
fin d in gs a n d w eak n esses are analyzed in r ela tio n to his a r g u m e n ts o n
fr e e d o m ; o n th e p ossib ility o f r ec o n str u c tin g ourselves; o n o u r ow n
subjectivity a n d su b jective c o n stitu tio n ; o n th e d iffe re n tia tio n b etw een
p o w er a n d d o m in a tio n ; o n th e p ro d u ctiv e c h a r a cte r o f pow er; an d o n the
c o n tin u o u s q u e stio n in g h e in vited . S tu d ie d w ith in th e F ou cau ld ian
th e o r etica l stru ctu re, th e se p r o b le m s a c q u ir e n ew m e a n in g s and
r ep er cu ssio n s in fe rr ed fr o m C astoriad is’ p osition .
Finally, th e c o n c lu sio n su m s u p th e affin ities a n d d iffe r e n c e s in F ou cau lt
an d C astoriad is’ w orks as th ey p rovid e a th e o r etica l basis for a critiq u e o f
F o u ca u lt’s legacy. It a rg u es fo r a C astoridian p o in t o f view that tack les the
q u estio n o f d e te rm in a c y versus in d ete rm in a c y in r ela tio n to au ton om y. It
sh ow s h o w t h e m a in c o n tr ib u tio n s m a d e by C astoriad is o n th e p ro b lem o f
subjectivity a n d su b jective c o n stitu tio n p rovid e fruitful m ea n s to c o n sid e r
n e w c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n s o f agen cy, au ton om y, a n d radical dem ocracy.
C astoriadis' u n iq u e id eas rein state th e p roject o f a u to n o m y — u n d e r m in e d
by th e so c ia l sc ie n c e s as a resid u e o f th e m o d e r n ist C artesian an d K antian
p h ilo s o p h ie s o f th e su b ject— w h ich th e n su g g ests n e w ways to r ed ir ec t social
th e o r y a n d social ch a n g e.
C h a p te r 1
T he Socialisme ou Barbarie Period

( 1949- 65 )
T h e sig n ifica n t rela tio n sh ip b etw een C astoriadis’ w o r k d u r in g th e S o cia lism e

o u B arbaric p e r io d an d his su b se q u e n t d e v e lo p m e n t is n o t se lf-ev id e n t for
e v er y o n e in te r e ste d in h is oeuvre. By in c lu d in g a partial su m m ary o f this
p rod u ctive m o m e n t in C astoriad is’ life , I in te n d to e m p h a siz e a crucial
r e la tio n sh ip h e always e sta b lish e d b e tw e en h is political c o n c e r n s and
activities a n d h is in te lle ctu a l p ro d u ctio n . In m y view, th e S o cia lism e o u
B arbarie p e r io d a llo w ed C astoriadis to id en tify th e m ain q u estio n s that
sh a p e d his later r e fle c tio n s an d gave birth to h is o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n . T his
c h a p te r a im s to illustrate th e way C o r n e liu s C astoriadis’ analysis o f
c o n ju n c tu r a l p o litic a l ev en ts le d h im to d e v e lo p an o r ig in a l c ritiq u e o f
d e te r m in istic c o n c e p tio n s o f history, theory, a n d society, as w ell as
r ev o lu tio n a ry th in k in g . C astoriadis’ m ain c o n tr ib u tio n s to th e p h ilosop h ic al
a n d p o litic a l field s, su c h as t h e o p e n -e n d e d creativity ol' history an d the
o n to lo g ic a l w eig h t o f im a g in a tio n — a d d ressed in C h ap ters 2 an d 3— find
th e ir o r ig in in th e c o n tr a d ictio n s a n d ap orias C astoriad is r e c o g n iz e d its he
p rogressively bu ilt a n o r ig in a l critiq u e o f M arxism a n d auth oritarian
so cia list r e g im e s. A s in tr o d u c e d in th is ch ap ter, m an y o f th e key n o tio n s
a n d p h ilo s o p h ic a l p r o b le m s th at C astoriad is d e v e lo p e d after S o cia lism e o u
B arbarie d isso lv ed , w e r e born o u t o f his c o m p r o m is e d p olitical m ilitancy. It
is th e case, f o r e x a m p le , that h is sh o p -flo o r e x p e r ie n c e s with factory w orkers
n o t on ly e n r ic h e d his analysis o f b u reaucracy a n d cap italism , b u t also set
th e b asis fo r la ter c o n c e p ts su ch a s h e te r o n o m y a n d auton om y.
A sy n th esis o f w hat I j u d g e as relevan t ev en ts fo r C astoriad is’ w ork d u rin g
th e S o c ia lism e o u Barbarie p e r io d are p r e se n te d h e r e . T h e ir p erio d iza tio n
is b ased o n a su cc in c t h istorical a c c o u n t o f th e g r o u p th at C astoriadis w rote
a b o u t (C astoriadis, 1 997m , p p . J- 3 4 ) , th o u g h h e n e v e r p u b lish e d a c o m p lete
history' o f th e grou p .
Early Productions o f C ornelius Castoriadis:

T h e Socialisme o u Barbarie Period: 1949-65
D u rin g th e preparatory d iscu ssio n s fo r th e S e c o n d C on gress o f the Fourth

In tern a tio n a l, C astoriadis a n d C lau d e L efo rt1 se t u p in A u gu st 1946, th ere
w as a te n d e n c y to criticize b u reau cratic fo r m a tio n s in revolu tion ary
org a n ism s w ith in th e C o m m u n ist Part)* (C P ).2 In 1947, th is te n d e n c y was
fo u n d in a d o z e n co m ra d es w h o p rogressively ra ised q u e stio n s a b o u t
relev a n t issu es rela ted to th e class stru ggle, r ev o lu tio n a ry theory, a n d the
c o n c e p t o f socialism .
In th e su m m e r o f 1948, w h en the g r o u p h a d d e c id e d to leave th e CP, the
b r e a k b e tw e e n T ito a n d th e C o m in fo r m in Y ugoslavia to o k p lace. T h e
c on troversy that T ito's affair b r o u g h t u p d e m o n str a te d th a t th e socialist
r ev o lu tio n in E astern E u r o p e a n c o u n tr ie s w as b e in g j u d g e d b ased o n ly o n
th e criteria o f n a tio n a liza tio n , private property, a n d p la n n in g a n d the
totalitarian p o w er o f th e Party as th e in str u m e n t for th e ir realization as
cen tral ob jectives o f th e r e v o lu tio n .3 T h is also c o n tr ib u te d to th e se ttin g up
o f th e g r o u p as a n in d e p e n d e n t organ ism that p u b lish e d th e first issu e o f
Socialisme o u B arbarie {SB ) in 1949.
T h is g r o u p , w h ich also c a lle d its e lf S o c ia lism e o u Barbarie (S o u B ) b ecam e
o n e o f th e m o st im p o r ta n t F re n c h in te lle ctu a l g r o u p s th a t critically su stain ed
a d ia lo g u e w ith postw ar cap italism . J o in e d by in te lle ctu a ls lik e je a n Francois
Lyotard, P ierre Sou yri, J e a n L ap lan ch e, a n d D a n ie l M oth é, S o u B started to
d e v e lo p th e ir w ork a r o u n d to p ic s th a t in flu e n c e d t h e F re n c h “N ew L eft.” 1
T h e sm a ll g r o u p (2 0 m e m b e r s) m e t b iw eek ly at L e T am b ou r C afé in
P aris to d isc u s s t h e p r o d u c tio n o f th e jo u r n a l a n d its revolu tion är)· project.
T h e ir in itia l w ork c e n te r e d a r o u n d t h e c ritiq u e o f th e b u re a u c r a cy in the
S oviet U n io n , t h e b u rea u cra tic n a tu r e o f C o m m u n ist p a rties, an d the
analysis o f th e w o r ld w id e ca p ita l c o n c e n tr a tio n p r o c e s s th at h a d crystallized
in to a n in tr a n sig e n t c o n flic t b e tw e e n tw o e x p a n s io n is t su p e r pow ers,
w h ic h w e r e c h a r a cte riz ed by th e in c r e a sin g b u re a u c r a tiz a tio n o f th e ir
s o c ie tie s as w ell as th e ir e c o n o m ie s . C o r re la ted issu es th a t also in sp ire d
th e m h a d t o d o w ith th e r e la tio n b e tw e e n c r itic a l so c ia l analysis a n d
r ev o lu tio n a r y p o litic s, th e r ela tio n s b e tw e e n in te lle c tu a l a n d m anu al
labor, a n d b e tw e e n th e party a n d th e m a sses, w h at it m e a n t to b e a m ilitan t,
a n d h o w to d e fin e a r ev o lu tio n a ry p r o je ct. S o u B a d d r e ss e d th e se q u e s tio n s
w ithin a critical p e r sp e c tiv e o f M arxism *, fr a m in g th e ir d isc u ssio n on
n a tio n a l a n d in te r n a tio n a l e v e n ts su c h a s t h e C o ld War, th e u n r e st a n d
p o p u la r m a n ife sta tio n s a g a in st th e c o m m u n ist le a d e r s h ip in s o m e E astern
E u r o p e c o u n tr ie s , th e im p lic a tio n s o f G aul 1ism f o r w ork in g-class p o litics.
The Socialisme o u Barbarie Period (1 9 4 9 -6 5 ) 11
th e A lg e ria n War, a n d th e tier s-m o n d iste in te rp re ta tio n s o f t h e A lgerian
Front N a tio n a l de Libération (F N L ), w h ic h was fa sh io n a b le a m o n g th e stu d en ts
a n d th e antiw ar m o v e m e n t.
U n til 1958, th e g r o u p o n ly p u b lish e d th e ir jo u r n a l, how ever, a t t h e e n d o f
that year th e y also m a d e a m o n th ly m im e o g r a p h e d su p p le m en t: Pouvoir
O uvrier (PC)). T h is su p p le m e n t tr ie d to a n im a te w ork ers’ revolutionary
r eflec tio n s a n d actio n s, o ffe r in g assistan ce to forw ard th e w orkers' struggles.
A r o u n d P O , d iscu ssion g r o u p s th a t w o u ld in flu e n c e fu tu re a c tio n s o f
stu d e n t—w o r k e r rebellions'* w ere se t u p in n u m e r o u s cities' a n d in die
P arisian L atin Q uarter (C urtis, 1988, p p . ix -x i; S c h n a p p a n d V idal-N aquet,
1971, p. 6 5 ).
T h e o r g a n iz a tio n a n d m ilitan cy o f th e g r o u p w e r e always q u e stio n s d ial
referred to t h e r o le o f revolu tion ary th eo ry an d its fo r m u la tio n . F or S ou B
th eo ry c la r ifie d the im p lic a tio n s o f w ork ers’ a c tio n s, fittin g th e m in to a
v isio n o f history-in -th e-m ak in g le a d in g tow ard so c ia l r ev o lu tio n a n d the
in stitu tio n o f d irect d em ocracy. T h e o r y w as an in str u m e n t for d e v e lo p in g
se lf-co n scio u sn e ss an d a se n s e o f c o n tin u ity fo r th e w orker. T h e revolutionary
m o v e m e n t th e r efo r e h a d to assim ilate th e m o d e s o f th o u g h t im p lic it in the
w orking-class a ctio n an d to b e g in r eth in k in g a b o u t th e c o n c e p tu a l c o r e o f
r ev o lu tio n a ry theory. In this se n s e , th e w orkers' org a n iza tio n s, a n d self-
d ir ec ted w ork er a c tio n s sh a p e d by the everyday e x p e r ie n c e o f w ork er
c o lle ctiv es, w e re e ffo rts to stake o u t a n ew p o litic a l terrain . S ou B h ad access
to th e w o rk ers a n d th e ir c o lle ctiv e e x p e r ie n c e s a n d d e m a n d s th r o u g h the
c o m p ila tio n , p u b lica tio n , a n d analysis o f w o r k e r a u to b io g r a p h ies, strike
rep orts, a n d p o sitio n p a p er s analyzin g p o litic a l a n d trade u n io n issues.
W ithin th is ap p roach , S ou B so u g h t to c o n te st t h e way socialism w as b e in g
e x p e r ie n c e d in U SSR , c o m p a r in g it to th e sim ilar p h e n o m e n o n p r o d u c e d
by th e W estern capitalist e x p lo itin g class. In flu e n c e d to s o m e e x te n t by Max
W eber, C astoriadis saw that th e b u reaucracy that h a d arisen in R ussia since
1917 was th a t o f a n e w r u lin g class, a n e x p lo itin g class as op p ressiv e as the
W estern b o u r g e o isie . T aking o f f from its first critiq u es o f Stalinist
bureaucracy, S ou B rad icalized th e ir p o sitio n by d raw in g a c o n n e c tio n
b e tw e en S ta lin ’s sta te a n d L e n in ’s theory o f o r g a n iza tio n . In b o th cases the
sa m e p r o b le m o p erated : th e w orkers w ere o b je c tifie d a n d se e n as passive
social e le m e n ts. C astoriadis saw this p ro b lem in b o th W estern capitalism
a n d th e R u ssian state, n o t sim p ly c o n fin e d to th e m e a n s o f p r o d u c tio n , b u t
also in th e b u reaucratic n atu re o f its so c ia l rela tio n s.
S o u B in te n d e d to m ain tain a n d reth in k th e revolu tion är)' p roject w hile
b e in g critical o f d ie official left, d ie e x p e r ie n c e s o f E astern E urop ean
c o u n tr ie s u n d e r th e R ed Army, T ito ’s Y ugoslavia, th e I lu n garian revolu tion
in 1956 a n d , as said, th e U SSR in g e n era l. C astoriad is was high ly critical o f

th e U S S R ’s au th oritative r e g im e an d c la im ed th a t t h e S oviet U n io n w as n ot
on ly a d e g e n e r a te w orkers’ sta te, b u t r e p r e se n te d a n e w fo r m o f class
o p p re ssio n . F or h im th e U SSR was n e ith e r a so cia list u n io n n o r a rep ublic.
In effe c t, w ith th e b e lie f that a critical e x a m in a tio n o f th e U SSR w as essen tial
in o r d e r to k e e p revolu tion ary th eo ry a s a c o h e r e n t o r ie n ta tio n fo r postwar
m ilitan ts, th e g r o u p so u g h t to d istin gu ish itse lf fr o m o th e r leftist grou p s,
in c lu d in g Trotskyism , by p o s itio n in g th em selv es id e o lo g ic a lly c lo s e t o the
w ork in g cla ss. T h e r eg im e in U S SR was in te rp re ted as a n e w type that had
n o th in g to d o with socialism a n d b e in g c o n stitu te d a r o u n d a bu reaucratic
a n d au th oritarian p arty T h e soviet system was t h e e n d state tow ard w h ich
W estern b u reau cratic cap italism was b e in g borne by th e lo g ic of
c o n c e n tr a tio n . T h e g r o u p rela ted th is b u rea u cra cy to th e structure o f the
L e n in ist p a r ty w h ere th e r e was a division o f in te lle c tu a l a n d m an u al work
leg itim a te d by th e left. In contrast, S ou B tried to reth in k socialism as a
d ir ec t d em ocracy. Its c o n te n ts d erived from th e grou p 's c lo s e analysis o f
w orking-class a c tio n s in o p p o sitio n to b o th capitalist org a n iza tio n and
c o n v e n tio n a l politics.
M ost o f th e ir an alyses w e r e b a se d o n t h e d e v e lo p m e n t c o u r se o f F ordism
in F ran ce a n d o th e r in te rn a tio n a l e x p e r ie n c e s th a t p ro v id ed th e m a
b r o a d e r s c o p e fo r th e ir th e o r etica l a c h ie v e m e n ts. By an alyzin g the effects
o f F ord ist in d u strial o r g a n iza tio n , S o u B so u g h t to u n c o v e r w h at th ey saw as
p o te n tia l fo r n ew p a tte rn s o f r ev o lu tio n a ry a c tio n th a t w e re p o site d in the
c o u r se o f everyd ay e x p e r ie n c e a t th e p o in t o f p r o d u c tio n . W h at m ad e
S o u B an e x a m p le o f a c o u n ter-h isto ry o f F o rd ism was th e a tte n tio n they
p a id to s o c ia l r ela tio n s, as w ell a s th e ir tr e a tm e n t o f th o s e r ela tio n s as
o r ig in a tin g a n ew r ev o lu tio n a ry p r o je ct w h ere se lf-co n scio u s historical
a cto rs w ere p rotagon ists. B ased o n th e a u to b io g r a p h ica l a c co u n ts th ey had
g a th e r ed o f w ork ers’ e x p e r ie n c e s in fa cto ries, S o u B r efo r m u la ted the
M arxist p r o b le m o f class fo r m a tio n a n d its r e la tio n to w ork er e x p e r ie n c e ,
r e th in k in g in th is way a b o u t p o litica l p o ssib ilities fo r c h a n g e (H astin gs-
K ing, 1999, pp. 4 5 -9 ).
C astoriad is saw w ork ers as creative p a r ticip a n ts in th e b u ild in g o f
so cia lism , w h ic h h e d e fin e d as p e o p le ’s c o n s c io u s org a n iza tio n o f th e ir
ow n life in all d o m a in s. H e n c e , S ou B tu r n e d to t h e trad ition o f w orkers'
c o u n c ils in fo r m in g th e ir c o n c e p t o f a r ev o lu tio n a ry o r g a n iza tio n . Cast
oriad is e m p h a s iz e d th e critical c o n c e p ts o f w o rk ers’ se lf-m a n a g em e n t a n d
a lie n a tio n a s m e a n s o f d e-b u rea u cra tizin g so c ia list m o v e m e n ts: socialism
sh o u ld n o t m e re ly try to transform rela tio n s at th e w ork p lace b u t sh o u ld
transform a n d d e m o c r a tiz e all areas o f social life . S o u B fo llo w ed a trajectory
that w e n t from a c ritiq u e o f S talin ism a n d L e n in ism to a critiq u e o f

c o n te m p o r a r y cap italism , e m p h a siz in g th e n e e d fo r o v e rtu rn in g all
a lie n a te d r ela tio n sh ip s a n d f o r c o m p r e h e n sio n o f th e subjectivity and
creativity o f th e w o r k in g class (C astoriadis, 1 9 7 9 d ).
D iverse so c io p o litic a l situ ation s w e re th e sc e n a r io an d c o n te n t o f th ese
C astorid ian r eflec tio n s. A ten tative a ttem p t to estab lish p e r io d s o f the
history o f S o u B can b e m a d e b ased o n th e d istin c t c o n te x tu a l c o n d itio n s
that th e g r o u p c o n fr o n te d a n d th e th e o r etica l d e v e lo p m e n ts b orn o u t o f
th em . T h r e e p e r io d s c a n b e d ifferen tia ted :8
a) A fu st p h ase from 1949 to 1953 w h e n th e g r o u p b egan q u e stio n in g and

d ista n c in g its e lf fr o m the tradition al leftist o r g a n iza tio n s an d id e o lo g y 9
a n d r e c o n sid e r in g th e revolutionär)· project. T h e ir o p e n in g d iscu ssion
r e fe rr ed to th e b u reau cratization a n d th e S talin ization o f th e revolu
tion , w h ic h was th e fo u n d a tio n a l sto n e o f th e g r o u p ’s c ritiq u e d u rin g
th is p e r io d . N ot o n ly th e U SSR a n d th e E astern E urop ean realities
se r v e d a s th e fo c u s o f analysis, o th e r im p o r ta n t ev en ts su ch as th e start
o f th e C o ld War, th e K orean W ar in 1950 a n d so m e F ren ch strikes that
fo llo w e d th e w orkers' m o b iliz a tio n s o f 1947, sh a p e d th e ir reflection s.
F u r th e rm o r e, d u r in g th is first p h a se , th e g r o u p c e n te r e d o n discus
sio n s a b o u t the “org a n iza tio n a l q u estio n ”: t h e structure a n d th e social
fu n c tio n o f S ou B . D ifferen t id e a s a ro u n d th e se top ics w e re discussed
a m o n g certain m e m b er s w h o la ter w o u ld lea v e th e g r o u p . U n til 1952
the g r o u p r e m a in e d sm all (th e y ca m e to b e o n ly 12 m e m b er s) a n d the
p u b lica tio n s, sm all in size, c a m e o u t in freq u en tly.
b) T h e s e c o n d p h ase was from 1953 to 1960 in w h ic h th e life o f th e g ro u p
w as r e a n im a te d a n d n e w m e m b e r s j o i n e d . T h e d e a th o f S ta lin , the
e n d in g o f th e K orean War, an d th e revolts o f East Berlin w orkers
in 1953, th e A lgerian W ar in 1954, th e H u n g a ria n w ork ers’ u p risin g
in 19 5 6 , a n d th e arrival o f d e G a u lle to p o w e r in 1958 w e re the m ain
e v e n ts that m o v ed th e g r o u p to d e v e lo p n e w p ersp ectives a n d restate
cer ta in p o sitio n s taken in th e past. T h e q u e s tio n s ab ou t th e political
a n d th e social w e re e n r ic h e d w ith n o t io n s o f se lf-m a n a g em e n t (a u to
gestion) . S ou B 's p u b lica tio n s so ld up to 1 0 0 0 issu es a n d n early a h u n d re d
p e o p le fr o m o u ts id e a tte n d e d th e ir p u b lic m e e tin g s . N e v e r th e le s s,
in 1 9 5 8 w ith th e arrival o f d e G a u lle to p o w e r a n d th e n e w c o m er s in to
th e g r o u p , th e org a n iza tio n a l q u estio n r ea p p e a re d a n d e n d e d with
th e d e fin itiv e scission o f C la u d e L efort an d H en ri S im o n .10
c ) T h e th ir d p e r io d w as fr o m the late 1950s to 1965 w h en m o r e splits
o c cu r r c d a n d m o r e radical th eoretical revision s w ere m ad e. T h e
g r o u p d iv id e d in to tw o at th e e n d o f 1 9 5 9 a n d th e b e g in n in g o f 1960.
S o m e m e m b er s, in c lu d in g C astoriadis, w ere in favor o f a m o r e radical
reje c tio n o f M arx’s e c o n o m ic theory' a n d cla ssica l p o sitio n s tow ards
p a u p e riz a tio n , e c o n o m ic crisis, th e grow th o f th e reserve industrial
arm y a n d th e role o f theory, w h ile th e rest w e r e in favor o f k e e p in g
M arxist p r in c ip le s. T h is d iscu ssio n lasted fo r th r e e years as b o th sid es
kept d isa g r e e in g u n til th e ir sp lit o c cu rred in 1963. T h e first g ro u p
kept S B a n d th e rest k ep t PO . A fter th e split th e g r o u p p u b lish e d six
issu es o f the review , th e last o n e o n Jun e 196 5 . SB c o n tin u e d fu n c
t io n in g un til 1966 w ith a c o n sid e r a b le read ersh ip : arou n d 1000 c o p
ie s s o ld p e r issu e a n d m e e tin g s w e n t u p to 2 0 0 p e o p le , N ev erth eless,
th e r e w a s a lm o st n o feed b a ck from th e m e m b e r s o f the g r o u p . T h e
w ork, in C astoriadis’ju d g m e n t, h ad b e c o m e solitary, acq u irin g a m ore
p h ilo so p h ic a l ch a r a cte r in an a ttem p t to retu rn to th e fo u n d a tio n s o f
th e c o n c e p tio n s o f so c ie ty a n d history. C astoriad is p r o p o se d th e n the
su sp e n sio n o f th e p u b lication .
T h e th r e e d iffe re n t m o m e n ts S ou B e x p e r ie n c e d w ere in r esp o n se to

p olitical a n d social ev en ts that raised a g e n e ra l c a ll to re-elab orate certain
asp ects o f th e revolu tion ary p roject th a t h ad started with th e U SSR rev o lu tio n
a n d that a p p e a le d to th e M arxist th e o r etica l m o d e l. As s e e n , w ithin F rance
th e r e w e r e m any p o litica l o rg a n ism s an d in te lle c tu a ls w h o e n g a g e d in this
en te rp rise in o n e way o r a n o th er , how ever, it is arg u a b le th a t S ou B w as a
u n iq u e co llectiv ity th at ad van ced a n ew p o litic a l p o s itio n th a t s o u g h t to
m a in ta in revolu tion ary activity w ith ou t m ystifying th e o r y o r a political
organ ism (e .g ., “th e Party” o r “w ork ers” o r g a n iza tio n s) a n d at th e sam e
tim e c r itic iz in g b o th capitalism a n d socialism . A s H astings-K ing (1 9 9 9 , p . 3)
reason ab ly arg u es, o f all th e p arties, org a n iza tio n s, a n d all th e m ed ia o u tlets
th at c o n stitu te d th e F ren ch L eft, o n ly S ou B d e v ise d a n analytical fram ew ork
that system atically a d d re ssed th e im p lic a tio n s o f bureaucracy, Stalinism ,
an d th e e m e r g e n t so c io e c o n o m ic order: th e im p le m e n ta tio n o f F ordism in
F rance. T h e y n o t on ly a d v a n ce d an alternative o f in te lle ctu a l a n d political
w ork w ith s h o p flo o r w orkers, b u t th ey also c o h e r e n tly assu m ed th is w ork
w ith all its c o n s e q u e n c e s at th e th eo retica l a n d p olitical level.
R e o p e n in g th e q u estio n o f society, history, a n d social tran sform ation ,
S ou B r e-elab orated “u n to u c h a b le truths” a b o u t so c ia lism , r e v o lu tio n , a n d
c o n v e n tio n a l “laws o f h istory a n d society.” S ta rtin g fr o m basic q u estio n s
raised by M arx, S o u B was a b le to reflect o n th e ir o w n b e lie fs a n d historical
c o n d itio n s t o r e d e fin e in a n origin al an d u n iq u e fa sh io n th e socialist and
r ev o lu tio n a ry project. T h e p olitical e v o lu tio n a n d c h a n g e su ffer ed by SouB ,
The Socialisme o u B arbane Period (1 9 4 9 -6 5 ) 15
a n d e sp e c ia lly by C astoriadis, to o k h im to a m ajor p h ilo so p h ic a l a n d political

e la b o ra tio n that w as origin al in its c o n te x t o f e m e r g e n c e . C astoriadis,
con trary to m a n y c o n te m p o r a n e o u s p rogressive in te lle ctu a ls, m a in ta in e d a
social c r itiq u e k n o w in g that a revolu tion ary p r o je ct in c lu d e d a d im e n sio n
that in v o lv ed a p erp etu a l, n ever fu lly c o n c lu d e d o r a c h iev e d e lu cid a tio n .
N e v er th e less, the ca teg o rica l r ejectio n o f the id e a th a t th e r e m ig h t b e a
c o m p le te theory, a n d that th e o r y is so v ereig n , did n o t a ssu m e in C astoriadis’
initial activity, th e allow an ce to “say j u s t anything."
T h r o u g h o u t th e revision o f S o u B ’s d iffe re n t d e v e lo p m e n ts d u rin g the
th r e e p h a se s in tr o d u c e d a b o v e , it is p ossib le to track n ot o n ly th e dynam ic
th is g r o u p a n d C astoriad is e sta b lish e d w ith c o n te x tu a l c o n d it io n s th a t
le d their w ork to d e v e lo p in th e way it did , it also allow s us to s e e h o w this
p rocess o f a ctio n a n d abstraction, e x p e r ie n c e d in d iffe re n t conjun ctu res,
p r o d u c e d th e th e o r etica l ro o ts o f futu re c o n c e p tio n s in C astoriadis. B earing
th e im p ossib ility o f d o in g a n exh au stive h isto r y o f S ou B in m in d , the
follow in g review o f th e history o f th e g rou p in te n d s to focu s o n m ain discus
sio n s that g a v e life to th e g r o u p a n d le d to C astoriad is’ m ain d evelop m en ts.
L e T a m b o u r C a fé (1 9 4 9 -5 3 )
T h e d isc u ssio n raised b y S ou B in their first p u b lic a tio n fin d s its r o o ts in the
political e x p e r ie n c e C astoriadis h ad w ith th e G r e e k C o m m u n ist P a m
d u r in g 1 9 4 4 /1 9 4 5 ." T h is e x p e r ie n c e le d h im to sy m p a th ize with Trotskyism
a n d h e lp e d to d e v e lo p h is early p o s itio n tow ard bureaucracy. U sin g
Trotskyists' last w ritin gs as a p o in t o f d e p a r tu r e , C astoriad is a r g u e d that a
critical e x a m in a tio n o f th e U SSR was essen tia l if M arxist revolu tion ary
th eo ry w as to p rovid e a c o h e r e n t p o litic a l o r ie n ta tio n fo r m ilitan ts. A lth o u g h
S o u B d e fe n d e d th e Trotskyist view in w h ich p olitical org a n iza tio n and
id e o lo g ic a l “corr ec tn e ss” w e re fu n d a m en ta l e le m e n ts o f revolutionary
p o litics, th e y also d isa g r e ed w ith his g e n e r a l c o n c e p tio n o f Stalinism .
C on trary to Trotskyist p rin cip les, th e g r o u p u n d e r sto o d b u reaucracy n o t as
a d ir ec t r esu lt o f Stalin b e in g in pow er, b u t as a p h e n o m e n o n lin k e d with
th e L e n in ist V an guard Party a n d its d ivision o f in te lle ctu a l a n d m anu al
w ork in revolu tion ary activities w h er e w ork ers c o u ld n e v e r tran scen d m e re
p r o leta r ia n co n scio u sn ess.
F or Trotskyists, th e Stalinists h ad lin e d u p o n th e sid e o f b o u r g e o is o r d e r
a n d r e p r e se n te d reform ism . Trotskyism e n v isa g e d a se c o n d rev o lu tio n as
th e w o r k in g class r e je cte d S talin ism an d r e-ap p rop riated th e revolutionary
c o r e o f M arxism . T h e ir tactic c o n siste d in su p p o r tin g th e CP to lake pow er
w ith th e h o p e that it w o u ld b e c o m e fra g ile a n d t h e c o n tr a d ictio n betw een
th e m o tiv a tio n s o f th e m asses fo r rev o lu tio n an d t h e real p olicy o f th e CP

w o u ld e m e r g e .
H ow ever, at that m o m e n t, the ev en ts taking p la c e in E astern E u rop e
d e m o n str a te d that th e CP in p o w er w as n o t transitory, w hat le d Castoriadis
to s e e b u reau cracy as a d o m in a n t a n d e x p lo ita tiv e class. W ith in th is
p e r sp e c tiv e , C astoriadis c o n sid e r e d r e o p e n in g th e R ussian q u estio n as a
priority. I la v in g this c o n c er n in m in d , in 1 9 4 8 C astoriad is a n d th e rest o f his
co m ra d es th at j o in e d S ou B p u b lish e d in M arch 1 9 4 9 th e text: Socialisme ou
Barbarie. A n Organ o f Critique a n d R evolutionary Orientation. C o n tin u in g the
M arxist analysis o f th e m o d e r n e c o n o m y a n d th e h istorical d e v e lo p m e n t o f
th e w orkers' m o v e m e n t, th e y a ttem p ted to r e s p o n d to n e w revolu tion ary
c h a lle n g e s, in c lu d in g a n ew d e fin itio n o f d ie w o r k in g class bureaucracy
(C astoriadis, 1997n , p. 3 6 ) .12
Initially, th e g r o u p c o n sid e r e d th em selv es to b e M arxists b u t sim u lta n eo u sly
they w ere o p e n to revising M arxist c o n te n ts i n th e lig h t o f cu rren t
so c io e c o n o m ic an d historical c o n d itio n s. A ffirm in g th e ir M arxist position
th ey wrote:
B e in g a M arxist sig n ifies for us situ a tin g o n e s e l f o n th e terrain o f tradi

tio n , p o s in g p r o b le m s starting a t th e p o in t M arx an d h is co n tin u a to rs
p o s e d th e m , m a in ta in in g a n d d e fe n d in g trad ition al M arxist p o s itio n s so
lo n g as a n e w e x a m in a tio n h as n o t p e r su a d ed u s that th e se p o sitio n s m ust
b e a b a n d o n e d , a m e n d in g th e m o r r ep la c in g th e m by o th e r s that b etter
c o r r e sp o n d to su b se q u e n t e x p e r ie n c e a n d to t h e n e e d s o f the revolution-
an· m o v e m e n t (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 o , p. 37).'*
T his p o s itio n tow ard M arxism r efle c te d th e ir u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e statem en t:

“W ith o u t revolu tion ary theory, no revolu tion ary a c tio n .” For them ,
th eo retica l e lab oration w as insep arab le from revolu tion ary activity.
E lab oration n e ith e r p r e c e d e d n o r fo llo w ed revolu tion ary activity: th e form er
w as sim u lta n e o u s with th e latter an d each c o n d itio n e d th e oth er. T h e y d id
n o t s e e th e o r y a s th e so v e r eig n system o f truths g iv e n o n c e an d for all. T h eory
fo r C astoriadis was n o th in g less a n d n o th in g m o r e than a project, a praxis
w ithin the ever-un certain a ttem p t to arrive at an e lu c id a tio n o f th e world.
As C astoriad is w o u ld a r g u e later o n ( 1988d, p. 2 9 ) , fo r th e g r o u p , praxis
a im e d at in d iv id u a ls b e c o m in g a g e n ts fo r the d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e ir ow n
auton om y. T h is praxis, w h ich c o u ld ex ist o n ly as c o n sc io u s activity, con stan tly
gave rise to n e w k n o w led g e an d th e o r ie s, given th at an ex h a u stiv e theory
c o u ld n o t e x is t an d o n ly m a k in g a n d d o in g c o u ld m ak e th e w o r ld speak.
W ithin th a t u n d e rsta n d in g o f theory, c o h e r e n t r ev o lu tio n a ry th eo ry for
C astoriadis h ad to start w ith a c o m p r e h e n siv e u n d e rsta n d in g o f capitalism .

H e in tr o d u c e d th e c o n c e p t o f b u reau cratic c a p ita lism ,14 w h ic h referred to
a p e r io d o f cap italism th a t fo llo w ed m o n o p o ly cap italism a n d was
c h a r a cte riz ed by th e in crea sin g fusion o f th e e c o n o m y a n d th e state. T h is
p r o c ess o f fu sio n fo llo w ed a d ifferen t path in th e East a n d th e W est, a n d the
U SSR w as th e m o d e l fo r o u tr ig h t sta le a p p ro p ria tio n o f th e e co n o m y ,
fo llo w in g a p rocess se t in m o tio n by L en in an d ra d ica lized by Stalin.
C astoriad is argu ed that th e U SSR h ad n o th in g to d o with socialism but
was a type o f r eg im e c o n stitu te d a r o u n d a total fu s io n o f th e bureaucratic
party. T h e S o v ie t system w as th e en d -state tow ard w h ic h W estern b u reaucratic
cap italism w as b e in g b o r n e by t h e lo g ic o f c o n c e n tr a tio n , a n e w type o f
cap italism . Soviet cap italism was th e fu r th e st e x t e n s io n o f th e te n d e n c ie s
tow ard c en tra liz a tio n still laten t in th e m o r e fr a g m e n te d fo rm , th e W estern
form . H ow ever, from th e view p oin t o f rela tio n s o f p r o d u ctio n — an essen tial
p o in t in th e analysis fo r S ou B — th e r e was n o e sse n tia l d iffe r e n c e from
b u reau cratic capitalism .
S o u B saw th e c o r e o f th e p ro b lem in th e r ela tio n s o f p r o d u ctio n in both
th e cap italist a n d S oviet system s. T h e c en tra l c o n flic t w as g iv en in the
b u reau cratic capitalist rela tio n s o f p r o d u c tio n . For th e m th e F'ordist
d istr ib u tio n o f tasks, a n d th e ir r e c o n stitu tio n o n th e basis o f a bureaucratic
vision o f p r o d u c tio n fr e e o f h u m a n a g e n ts, was irration al b e c a u se it in volved
th e su b stitu tio n o f a m anagerial view o f th e factory for o n e d erived from
factory c o n d itio n s . F ord ist p r o d u ctio n e lim in a te d th e creative in teraction
o f w orkers. T h e c o n tr a d ictio n a n d so u r c e o f b u reau cratic capitalism 's
irration ality in th e factory e m e r g e d at th e p o in t o f c o n ta c t b e tw e en the
m a n a g eria l view o f p r o d u ctio n a n d actual p r o d u c tio n . For a ratio n a lized
p r o d u c tio n to take place in a factory, it w o u ld n e e d th e crea tiv e in v o lv e m e n t
o f w orkers w h o w o u ld e n a b le m an agers to c o p e — w ith in a lo g ic o f in te n se
ratio n a liza tio n — w ith th e p r o b le m s that c o n tin u a lly c h a n g in g rea lities pose
to p r o d u c tio n . T h e a n alogy b e tw e en this c o n flic t a t th e p o in t o f p r o d u ctio n
a n d th e e ffe c ts o f th e m on op oly-state fu sio n ch aracteristics o f bureaucratic
cap italism w as clear.
T h e R u ssian so c ie ty w as a so c iety o f e x p lo ita tio n in w h ic h th e working-
class, d e p r iv e d o f its ow n w o rk in g p rod u cts an d e x p r o p r ia te d o f th e d ir ec tio n
o f its o w n activity, h ad th e sa m e d e stin y a s i f it was u n d e r capitalistic
c o n d itio n s . R ussian b u reaucracy w as an e x p lo itin g class, w h ic h structure,
id eology, a n d m o d e s o f e c o n o m ic an d p o litic a l d o m in a tio n o f w h ich
c o r r e s p o n d e d to th e total c o n c e n tr a tio n o f th e cap ital in th e h a n d s o f the
slate. T h e r o le o f th is b u reau cracy h a d n o t o n ly a n e c o n o m ic character, b u t
also a p o litica l o n e . It e x p r essed th e m ost p r o fo u n d ch aracteristics o f
m o d e r n cap italist p rod u ction : th e c o n c e n tr a tio n o f p ro d u ctiv e forces, th e

lim itation o f private p ro p erty as th e base o f th e p o w er o f th e d o m in a n t
class, th e c o n so lid a tio n o f b u reau cratic c o rp u se s in the b ig c o m p a n ie s and
en te rp rise s, fu sio n o f m o n o p o lie s a n d th e sta te, a n d th e r u lin g o f e c o n o m y
(C astoriad is, [1 9 4 9 - 5 7 ] 1979a, pp. 2 8 7 - 3 0 5 ).
For S o u B , R ussia’s e c o n o m ic p r o c ess to o k p la c e b e tw e en tw o social
c a teg o r ie s. O n o n e sid e w e re th e e x ec u ta n ts, o r th e proletariat, m a d e u p o f
u n sk illed w o rk ers h a v in g o n ly th e ir lab or pow er a t th e ir d isp osal. O n the
o th e r w e re th e d irectors: b u reau crats w h o d id n o t p articip ate in m aterial
p r o d u ctio n an d w h o a ssu m ed th e m a n a g e m e n t o f an d c o n tr o l o v er the
w ork o f o th e r s.
A b u re a u c r a tic state h a d th e sa m e ch a r a cte ristic s o f im p erialism : the
m e rg e r o f e c o n o m ic stren gth an d state pow er (Castoriadis, 1988c, pp. 5 1 -2 ) .
T h is analysis o f b u reau cracy a n d th e R ussian r e g im e a llo w ed S ou B to
id e n tify t h e r ela tio n s o f p r o d u c tio n a s th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e d iv isio n o f
so c ie ty in cla sses. If trad ition al private p r o p e r ty w as e lim in a te d a n d yet, in
sp ite o f th a t, th e w orkers c o n tin u e d to b e e x p lo ite d , d isp o ssesse d , a n d
se p a r a ted fr o m th e m e a n s o f p r o d u c tio n , th e d ivision w ith in so ciety
b e c a m e t h e d ivision b etw een m an agers (o r d ir ec to rs) a n d e x e c u ta n ts in
th e p r o c e ss o f p r o d u c tio n . In c o n s e q u e n c e , th e d iv isio n o f c o n te m p o ra r y
s o c ie tie s in t o classes in b o th th e East a n d th e W est c o r r e s p o n d e d to the
sa m e fo r m s o f d o m in a tio n . In W estern cap italism a n d S oviet c o m m u n ism
sim ilar p h e n o m e n a h a d taken p lace— c o n c e n tr a tio n o f cap ital, e v o lu tio n
o f te c h n iq u e a n d o r g a n iz a tio n o f p r o d u c tio n , in c r e a sin g in te r v e n tio n o f
th e sta te, a n d e v o lu tio n o f th e great w o rk in g cla ss o r g a n iza tio n s— le a d in g
to sim ila r results: th e e sta b lish m e n t o f a b u re a u c r a tic la y er in p r o d u ctio n
a n d in o th e r sp h e r e s o f so c ia l life.
G iven th a t t h e d ivision o f c o n te m p o ra r y so c ie ty w as b ased o n th o se term s,
th e so c ia list rev o lu tio n — in th e C astoridian view — c o u ld n o t sto p at b arrin g
the b o sse s a n d “private” p r o p e r ly fr o m the m e a n s o f p r o d u c tio n , it also
h ad to g e t rid o f th e b u reau cracy a n d th e in flu e n c e th e la tter e x e r te d over
th e m ea n s a n d th e p r o c ess o f p r o d u c tio n . In o r d e r to a b o lish th e division
b e tw e en d ir e c to r s a n d e x ec u ta n ts, so c ia lism h ad to w ork u n d e r th e p rin cip le
o f self-m an agem en t: th e c o m p le te e x e r c ise o f p o w e r ov er p r o d u ctio n and
o v er th e e n tire ty o f social activities by self-ru lin g o rg a n s o f w orkers'
c o u n c ils .1' S elf-m a n a g e m e n t is w h at S o u B c a m e to u n d e rsta n d as socialism ,
r ejectin g th e d o m in a n t leftist fo c u s o n w h o o w n e d th e m e a n s o f p r o d u ctio n .
Socialism m e a n t th e self-ru lin g o f th e p roletarian s. In o th e r w ords, self-
g o v e r n m e n t fo r the w o rk in g class w o u ld req u ire c o n sc io u sn e s s o f itself, its
m ea n s a n d its g o a ls (C astoriadis, 1979a, p. 2 9 0 ).
For C astoriadis, in th e R ussian ease, th e revolu tion ary party was

r e s p o n sib le fo r th e lack o f th e p roletarian se lf-m a n a g em e n t. H ow ever, the
c o n c e n tr a tio n o f e c o n o m ic a n d p olitical p o w er in th e h a n d s o f th e B olshevik
party that thw arted th e attem p ts o f th e p roletariat to take o v er th e con trol
o f th e fa c to r ies, was also a resu lt o f th e passive p roletarian attitu d e that the
party was a b o v e th e class. In real socialism th e r e sh o u ld b e proletarian
m a n a g e m e n t at every level, e x e r c isin g p o w er w ith o u t b e in g d o m in a te d by
th e pow er o f th e party. T h e revolu tion ary o rg a n s c o u ld n o t b e govern m en tal
org a n ism s o r b u reau cratized w orker o r g a n iza tio n s th a t esta b lish ed a type o f
r elation w ith th e m asses w h er e th e d ir ec to rs w o r k e d sep arately from th e
w orkers, r e d u c in g w orkers to a passive r o le w h ere th e ir p o litic a l a c tio n was
d o m in a te d .
S o u B su sta in e d that revolu tion ary p o litic s o f t h e proletarian s sh o u ld b e
d e f in e d as th e activities that c o o r d in a te d th e w o rk ers’ e ffo rts to d estroy the
cap italist sta te. In c o n s e q u e n c e with th is p r in c ip le , th e revolu tion ary party
sh o u ld b e a c o lle ctiv e organ ism th a t w ork ed a c c o r d in g to a historical
program im p le m e n tin g th e p o litic s o f th e proletariat. T h e n e e d fo r a
r ev o lu tio n a ry party w o u ld o n ly d isap p ear after th e w o r ld victor)' o f rev o lu tio n
(C astoriadis, 1 9 7 9 c , p p . 1 0 3 -1 3 ).
Even th o u g h S ou B rejected th e L en in ist id ea o f in tr o d u c in g political
c o n sc io u sn e s s in to the p roletariat th r o u g h th e revolu tion ary party, still they
firm ly b e lie v e d in th e n e e d for a revolu tion ary part)’. T h e d ilem m a th at th e
c o n d itio n s o f th e Russian R ev o lu tio n a n d th e r ev o lu tio n a ry party p resen ted
to Sou B , w as th e real self-m a n a g em e n t o f th e r ev o lu tio n a ry organ ism s a n d
th e in terests th ey r e p r e se n te d . For th e g r o u p , t h e o n ly p la u sib le organism
w as o n e th a t r ep re se n te d t h e historical in te re sts o f th e p roletarian class
b a sed o n a p roletarian form o f orga n iza tio n . H ow ever, self-m a n a g em e n t
a n d its real revolu tion ary c h a r a cte r c o u ld n o t b e e sta b lish e d as an a priori;
it c o u ld o n ly b e ju d g e d a n d ev alu ated in daily e x p e r ie n c e a n d b e m o d ifie d
in its ligh t.
A lth o u g h S o u B was aware that th e r e was n o s o le rig h t p o sitio n toward
r e v o lu tio n , th e g r o u p d id n o t a cq u ire an an arch ist p o sitio n . T h e y c o n sid e r e d
th at th e ir b asic du ty w as t o p r o m o te th e w orkers’ in terests w h o se struggle
h ad b e e n k id n a p p e d by th e revolu tion ary bureaucracy. C la im in g that they
w ere th e o n ly g r o u p that c o u ld sy n th esize a n d in te g ra te th e proletarian
e x p e r ie n c e , th ey d e c la r ed in 1949 th e c o n str u c tio n o f th e revolu tion ary
party a s th e ir m ain responsibility' (C astoriadis, 1 9 7 9 c , pp. 1 1 7 -1 8 ).
T h e d isc u ssio n s th e g r o u p h e ld in r elation to th e organ ization al
q u estio n — th a t is, the d ir e c tio n o f r ev o lu tio n a n d th e o rg a n iza tio n s n e e d e d
for it— b r o u g h t u p w h at C astoriadis called in 1952 “th e p r o fo u n d a n tin o m y ”
in itia ted by M arxism . C astoriadis saw a c o n tr a d ictio n b etw een the

d e te r m in e d revolu tion ary societal fo r m s d e fin e d by M arxism a n d o th e r
p o ssib le a n d u n p r ed icta b le social o rg a n iza tio n s th a t w o u ld e m e r g e from
th e creativity o f th e m asses a s it w o u ld flou rish d u r in g an d after the
r e v o lu tio n . But th e g r o u n d b r ea k in g ch aracter o f revolu tion ary activity
r e s id e d fo r C astoriadis p recisely in th e fact th at its c o n t e n t w o u ld b e origin al,
u n fo r e se e a b le an d , m o st im portantly, a n e w c o lle c tiv e crea tio n that c o u ld
n o t b e d e te r m in e d by an y p r escrib ed program . T h is w o u ld b e c o m e a m ajor
a r g u m e n t i n C astoriadis' c ritiq u e o f M arxism .
In an y c a se , as said, S ou B b e lie v e d in th e n e e d fo r a revolu tion ary party
th at d ista n c e d itse lf fr o m “fix e d ” revolu tion ary program s b orn o u t o f
b u reau cratic e n titie s, a n d th at w h ich w o u ld take p a rt in b r in g in g a b o u t real
r ev o lu tio n a ry th eo retica l an d practical activities from th e proletarian
p ersp ectiv e. In o th e r w ords, S ou B sh o u ld lo o k forw ard to fin d in g a w ay to
w ork o u t r ev o lu tio n a r y activities a n d th e a n tin o m ic term s it r e p re se n te d . In
relation to th is issu e C astoriadis w rote in 1952:
T h e so le th eo retica l “answer" that can b e given consists in saying that the

solution o f this an tin om y [th e a n tin om y c o n te n d e d in M arxist revolution
ary activity] will d e v e lo p d u rin g the co u rse o f th e revolution b ecau se the
creative activity o f th e m asses is a co n sc io u s an d ration al type o f activity, and
h e n c e is essen tially h o m o g e n o u s with the activity o f co n sc io u s m inorities
ac tin g b e fo r e the revolu tion begins, but w h ose u n iq u e an d irreplaceable
co n trib u tio n consists of a n overthrow a n d a tr em e n d o u s en la rg e m en t o f the
very c o n te n t o f th e historical reason . . . T his th eoretical “solution" d o e s n o t
prescribe th em to us. O n th e contrary, it tells u s that th e c o n c re te c o n te n t o f
the rev o lu tio n outstrips ever)' advan ced analysis sin c e it consists in the posit
ing o f n e w form s o f historical rationality (Castoriadis, 19881, p. 199).
T h is p o s itio n was officially m a in ta in e d b y th e g r o u p for s o m e years, e v en

th o u g h th e r e w e re d iscu ssio n s in r elation to th is org a n iza tio n a l q u estio n ,
w h ich c a u se d th e temporal*)· d ep artu re o f C la u d e L efort.16 In Ju ly 1951,
L efo rt o p p o s e d the c o n str u c tio n o f a revolutionär}' party n e e d to con stru ct
a revolu tion ary party b ecau se it w as to o c lo s e to a b u rea u cra tic fo r m .17 In
L efo rt's p e r sp e c tiv e , th e jo u r n a l sh o u ld b e an o r g a n o f r eflec tio n , d iscu ssion ,
a n d in fo r m a tio n a n d n o t a n o r g a n iza tio n with a p ro g ra m m a tic a g e n d a that
p r o m o ted a d isc o u r se o f to ta lities (M olin a q u o te s Lefort (1 9 9 8 , p. 7 2 5 ) .18
C astoriadis an d the m ajority o f th e S ou B m e m b e r s did n ot a g r ee o n
d e v o tin g th e g r o u p ’s activity o n ly to th eo retica l d iscu ssio n s o r inform ative
issues. For C astoriadis, th eo retica l, p olitical, a n d practical tasks w ere ju st
d iffe re n t form s o f th e sa m e reality. I f th e g r o u p w as to take a p osition b efo re

an y p r o b le m that affected th e proletariat, th e g rou p sh o u ld assu m e a
practical a n d active p o s itio n (C astoriadis, 1979d, p p . 1 3 1 -4 3 ). In 1952, they
w o u ld still state that th e ir p rin cip al tasks w e re th e e la b o ra tio n o f a
revolu tion ary id eology, th e d e fin itio n o f a revolu tion ary p rogram , a n d the
p r o m o tio n o f their id e a s (C astoriadis, 1988f, p. 2 0 5 ). T o m e e t th o se p u rp oses,
th e g r o u p h a d e sta b lish ed tw o m ain ways o f w ork in g. S o m e session s— held
tw ice a m o n th — w ere d e v o te d to stu d yin g M arx a n d e c o n o m ic theory, th e
rest o f the session s— also ordinarily h e ld tw ice a m o n th — c o n g r e g a te d the
totality o f th e m em b ers to d iscu ss w h at w ere in th e ir o p in io n th e m ost u rg en t
political p ro b lem s. A m o n g o th e r top ics, they d e v o te d tim e to d iscu ssin g
w orkers’ u n io n s, d ie im p erialism o f the b u reau cratic Russia, w ork ers’ strikes,
a n d principally, th e e v o lu tio n o f th e e c o n o m ic s a n d th e futu re d e v e lo p m en t
o f the b u reau cratic cap italism w ithin th e two w orld p o ten cies.
In e ffe c t, C astoriadis so u g h t to fin d p o litic a l a n d so c io e c o n o m ic
fo u n d a tio n s for his th eo ry o f bureaucracy, an d a t th e sam e tim e sh ow how
it fitted in to a historical c o n c e p tio n o f m o d e r n society. F or h im it was clear
th at in the E ast a n d th e W est, ca p ita l c o n c e n tr a tio n a n d its in te rp en etr a tio n
with th e sta te , a s w ell as th e n e e d to e x e r c ise c o n tr o l o v e r all sec to r s o f social
life— a n d in particu lar o v er th e workers— in v o lv ed th e e m e r g e n c e o f a new
in sta n ce o f m a n a g in g p ro d u ctio n . In th is se n se , t h e fo llo w in g e v o lu tio n o f
th e se p h e n o m e n a in th e w orld-w ide sp h e re , c o n stitu te d a q u ery that
C astoriadis reso lv ed tryin g to ex p la in how , e v en th o u g h th e r e w e re str o n g
sim ilarities b e tw e en the E astern a n d W estern p o te n c ie s , th e ir d iffe re n c es
w o u ld lea d to an in tern ation al co n flict.
T h e g r o u p in te rp re ted th e K orean W ar as a n e v e n t that c o n fir m e d the
d ivision o f th e w orld in t o tw o c lo s e d z o n e s, w ith in w h ic h th e system o f
e x p lo ita tio n h a d a c h iev e d a relative c o n so lid a tio n . T h e y also c o n fir m e d the
in evitab ility o f war that c o n tin u e d a p h a se o f co m p a r tm e n ta liza tio n with
lo c a liz e d c o n ta in m e n t o f c o n flic t.19 S ou B s o u g h t to id e n tify the d e e p
c o n flic t b e tw e e n U .S. a n d USSR, by u s in g th e w o r d im p erialism . A s said, to
S o u B a n d e sp e c ia lly to C astoriadis, b o th o f th e se w e re form s o f bureaucratic
cap italism driven by th e g e n e ra l te n d e n c ie s o f ca p ita l a c cu m u la tio n and
c o n c e n tr a tio n o f w ealth. T h e U SSR sh ared th o s e co n stitu tiv e te n d e n c ie s
still laten t in th e b u reau cratic fo rm s o f capitalism : u n lim ite d e x p lo ita tio n ,
u n lim ite d r a tio n a liz a tio n , a n d u n lim ited terror. I n th e W est, c o n c en tra tio n
o f w ealth d r o v e th e tran sition from m ark et-b ased to m o n o p o ly capitalism
le a d in g to a final fusion o f m o n o p o lie s w ith s o m e sectors o f th e state in the
case o f the W est, o r th e total state in th e S oviet c a se . F o llo w in g th is lo g ic , the
e ffe c ts o f b u rea u cra tic cap italism w o u ld p r o d u c e an in te rb lo c con flict
a m o n g n a tio n a l a n d reg io n a l m o n o p o lie s for m aterials an d m arkets, both

fo r eig n a n d d o m e stic . T h e g r o u p ’s in terp reta tio n o f th is in te rb lo c c o n flic t
le d th e m to p o s e a p ossib le th ird w orld war.20
T h e K orean War n ot on ly rep resen ted th e u ltim a te form o f rivalry betw een
c o n te n d in g states in m o d e m society, it also r ep re se n te d a n antagon ism
b etw een tw o structural system s, e a c h b e in g a d iffe re n t stage in th e c o n c e n
tration o f th e forces o f p rod u ction . C on centration h a d g o n e w ell b eyon d the
classical m o n o p o ly stage an d h ad taken o n a d ifferen t role. In each country,
the state h a d b e c o m e the b ack b on e o f e c o n o m ic a n d social life.
In S o u B ’s view o n ly a war w o u ld b e th e r e so lu tio n o f d iffe r e n c e s a n d
sim ila rities b e tw e e n th e tw o p o te n c ie s in q u e s t io n (C astoriad is, 1988d,
p p . 84—5 ) . C astoriad is th o u g h t that a n e w e c o n o m ic crisis fo r cap italism was
in evitab le. W ith M arx’s th e o r y o f capital an d p o w e r c o n c en tra tio n p u sh ed
to its lim it21 an d two im p eria list su p e r p ow ers left as a resu lt o f t h e S e c o n d
W orld War, C astoriadis p o stu la ted that a ca ta stro p h ic w ar w o u ld d e v e lo p .
S ou B fell th a t th e K orean War w as th e c o n fr o n ta tio n th ey h a d p red icted ,
n e v e rth eless, a d iffe re n t reality in 1953 m a d e th e m c h a n g e th e ir m in d s and
restate their p o s itio n tow ard this issu e, r e c o g n iz in g th e ir fa lse in terp reta tio n
o f th e even ts.
T o recap: th e critiq u e o f b u reaucracy a n d th e d e g e n e r a tio n o f th e Russian
R ev o lu tio n d u r in g this p e r io d in sp ire d in C astoriad is the id e a o f proletarian
self-rule. It m e a n t that th e r e was n o proletarian co n sc io u sn ess, th a t the
w o rk in g cla ss c o u ld n ot e x er cise its p o w er th r o u g h any d e le g a tio n , a
d e le g a tio n to a party o r an y o th e r o rgan ism . T h r o u g h o u t this first p erio d
C astoriadis su sta in e d th e id ea o f a n e e d for a revolu tion ary party o r
o rg a n ism , a lth o u g h w ith several restriction s and rein terp retation s.
N e v er th e less, the a n tin o m y th at C astoriadis r e v e a le d w h en c o n fr o n tin g the
o r g a n iza tio n a l q u estio n in r elation to th e revolu tion ary d ir e c tio n , th e real
p roletarian c o n sc io u sn ess a n d in terests, a n d t h e role o f revolu tion ary
theory' le d c o n se q u e n tly to fu r th e r q u estio n s. T h is a n tin o m y m ean t,
sim u ltan eou sly, th e n e e d to q u estio n p rerevolu tion ary “truths” as w ell as
th e trad ition al c o n c e p tio n o f t h e n atu re, r o le , a n d statu s o f theory. T his
d e e p in te rr o g a tio n in itia ted d u r in g th e w in ter 1954—5 was e n r ic h e d by
strikes h e ld in F ran ce, E n glan d , a n d th e U .S., as w e ll as th e e v e n ts in 1956
in Russia, P o la n d , a n d H u n gary (C astoriadis, 1979b , p. 14).
N e w p e r sp e c tiv e s o f so cia lism (1953—5 / 8 )
A fter 1953 t h e g r o u p started a n e w p h a se . It grew in size w ith n ew m em b ers

w h o h e lp e d to reform u late so m e o f th e th eo retica l an d practical c h a lle n g e s
o f th e g r o u p , as w e ll as n o tio n s that h ad b e e n w o r k e d o u t in th e past years.

S in ce 1950 S ou B h ad cap tivated th e in te re st o f s o m e ex -m e m b e r s o f the
B ord igist U n io n d e G a u ch es C o m m u n istes22 a n d in 1952 J a c q u e s G autrat
(D a n ie l M o th é ), A n d r ée Lyotard, an d P ierre a n d M irrelle Souyri also
b e c a m e r e c o g n iz e d m em b ers.
D u r in g th is p h a se , th e g r o u p h a d d ista n c e d itself d e fin ite ly from
Trotskyism given th e ir cle a r p o sitio n s tow ard M arxism , th e U SSR , their
analysis o f c o n te m p o ra r y cap italism , a n d th e ir in terest in n ew types o f
p olitical actio n s. T h e y b e c a m e fo c u se d o n d ie analysis o f n e w political
ev en ts th a t o c cu rred in 1 9 5 3 -6 in E astern an d W estern E u ro p e, w h ich
a n im a te d th e m to reth in k th e h ierarch y o f e le m e n ts th a t sh a p e d their
c o n c e p tio n o f th e revolu tion ary p r o je ct a n d th e o r y o f d ie p roletarian
p o sitio n . T h e ir in terp reta tio n o f w orkers' a c tio n s an d resistance to
b u reau cratization a d d e d to th e th e o r etica l in te rr o g a tio n s in w h ich they
already e n g a g e d : the n atu re o f so c ia l p ro c esses a n d history; th e w orkers’
e x p e r ie n c e s an d th e ir prob lem s; th e p olitical p r o b le m s raised by an
in te rn a tio n a l situ a tio n c h a n g e d by S talin 's d ea th ; a n d th e p o ssib ilities raised
by the r e -e m e r g e n c e o f se lf-d irected p o litic a l actio n s.
Several e v e n ts strongly in flu e n c e d th e grou p . T h e u p risin g o f w orkers in
East B erlin23 d u r in g th e “J u n e D ays” (a g e n e ra l strik e in F rance w h ich sh u t
th e c o u n tr y d o w n b y p aralyzin g c o m m u n ic a tio n s ),21 th e .A lgerian War,
a n d th e e x p lo siv e a c tio n s in P olan d a n d H u n g a ry ( 1 9 5 4 - 6 ) 25 that revealed
th e crisis a ffe c tin g th e Soviet party, w ere a m o n g the p rincip al o n e s. For
Sou B , e v e n ts in P o la n d a n d H u n gary in d ic a te d a r eje ctio n o f co n v en tio n a l
p olitics a n d organ ization al form s, an d the e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w type o f
r ev o lu tio n a ry p o litic s that sh o u ld b e r ea d in lig h t o f a n e w revolu tion ary
th eo ry a n d c o n c e p ts o f se lf-m a n a g em e n t, so c ia lism , a n d revolu tion .
Sou B was en th u siastic ab ou t the n ew political p an oram a p resen ted in 1953.
T h e y a c k n o w le d g e d th e ir m istake in p red ictin g t h e K orean W ar g ivin g two
reasons. First, th ey r ec o g n ize d th e ir o verestim ation o f the in d e p e n d e n c e o f
the rulin g g r o u p s vis-à-vis the two blocs' (esp ecially th e U.S.'s) own populations.
For th e m th e U .S. e x er cise o f p o w er w as an artificial p h e n o m e n o n an d not
a n e x p r essio n o f social contradictions. Secondly, th e y argu ed that d ie cracks
in th e R ussian e m p ir e exp ressed in th e East B erlin revolt (1 9 5 3 ) played a
d ecisive r o le in haltin g the race tow ard o p e n war.26 A lth o u g h still in 1954 they
su stain ed th a t th ere was th e im m in e n c e o f a war b e tw e en the tw o blocs, they
also r ec o g n ize d th e slow dow n in th e race toward w ar in th e attem p t o f the
b lo c s to stab ilize th e ir relation s (C astoriadis, 1988h , p. 256).
M oreover, th e d e a th o f Stalin h a d c o n tr ib u te d greatly to p o litic a l c h a n g e s
in th e in te rn a tio n a l s c e n e , a n d to th e way th e U S SR w as r e sp o n d in g to
th e m . In th e S ou B p ersp ectiv e, th e USSR p r e te n d e d to lessen th e C o ld War

in o r d e r to c o p e with all th e crisis m a n ifesta tio n s in G erm any, C zechoslovakia,
P o la n d , a n d H un gary, w h ere the b u reau cracy h a d n o t b e e n a b le to e n su re
its p o w er (C astoriadis, 1976a, pp. 1 3 9 -4 1 ).
A ll th e se even ts, in c lu d in g th e F ren ch workers* m an ifestation s, sh o w e d
S ou B th a t w orkers h ad c o n str u c te d a relatively c le a r c o n c e p tio n o f their
o r g a n iz a tio n ’s in terests in o p p o sitio n to c o n v e n tio n a l bu reaucratic
o r g a n iza tio n s. W orkers o r g a n ize d th em selv es a lo n g d irect-d em ocratic lin es,
d e m a n d in g d ir ec t m a n a g e m e n t o f p r o d u c tio n . In this c o n te x t a u to n o m y 27
b e c a m e a c e n tr a l e le m e n t in th e S ou B le x ic o n . W orkers’ a c tio n s w e re
in te rp re ted as in d e p e n d e n t e x p r essio n s th a t w e re lin k ed to a d iffe re n t
vision o f r e v o lu tio n a n d socialism .
Socialism c a m e to b e u n d e rsto o d as d ir ec t d e m o c r a c y in stitu ted th rou gh
w ork er c o u n c ils , th e aim o f w h ich was n o t ju s t th e a b o litio n o f e x p lo ita tio n
b u t th e in stitu tio n o f social rela tio n s that e n a b le d c o lle ctiv e in flu e n c e over
society. In c o n s e q u e n c e , revolu tion ary th eo ry w as to h e lp avant-garde
m o v e m e n ts u n d erstan d th e c o n n e c tio n s b e tw e en e x p e r ie n c e a n d self
d ir ec ted p o litic a l a c tio n , a n d to s e e the p o te n tia l fo r tran sform ation in a
self-reflective way.
W h e n e x a m in in g h o w th e se n ew ela b o ra tio n s b y S ou B ev o lv e d in their
w ritin gs, it is in te r e stin g to take a c lo ser a n d m o r e th o r o u g h lo o k at th e way
th e g r o u p ju s tifie d th e ir a r g u m e n ts b ased o n e v e n ts that sp ark ed th e ir
r efle c tio n s, m a in ly th e o n e s in P o la n d a n d H un gary.
In 1952 r ela tio n s h a d tu rn ed te n se b e tw e e n th e G erm an b u ild in g trades
an d th e Part)· d u e to a n ew p la n n e d e c o n o m y s c h e m a an d th e r ed efin itio n
o f w ages. F actory w orkers, c o n str u c tio n w orkers, a n d m in e r s w ere in c o n flic t
with th e g o v e r n m e n t th a t tried to in tr o d u c e w ork q u o ta s a n d ask ed th e m to
p r o d u ce m o r e for less. T h e East Berlin c o n str u c tio n w orkers b egan a on e-
day strike o n 16 J u n e , w h ich in part tr ig g e re d th e larger g e n e ra l strike the
fo llo w in g day, in w h ic h m id d le class sec to r s also p articip ated .
A fter th e East Berlin even ts, a F re n c h strike t o o k p lace in 1953. It gave
ad d ition al a r g u m e n ts to S ou B to back th e ir h y p o th e sis a b o u t n ew w orkers'
e x p r essio n s th at w ere also taking p la c e in th e W est. T h is strike was
c a te g o r iz e d by S ou B as a trad e-u n ion betrayal, w h ic h d e m o n stra te d again
th e w orkers' self-organ ization an d th e re-ap p rop riation o f political sp aces
o f p rotests. S ou B h ig h lig h te d several cru cial p o in ts fo r th e ir analysis of the
F ren ch strike: th e sp o n ta n e o u s ch aracter o f th e strik e w h er e n o bu reaucratic
o r trade u n io n c o n tr o l h ad in te rv e n e d ; th e str o n g w ork ers’ u n io n that
r e fle c te d a class unity; th e d e m a n d fo r th e w orkers’ c o n tr o l over p rod u ction ;
a n d th e in te rp re ta tio n o f a n e w fo r m o f p olitics.28
T h e m e n tio n e d strikes c o n stitu te d two d iffe r e n t r esp o n ses to th e

leg itim a cy crisis o f c o n v e n tio n a l p olitics a n d th e b u reau cratic o rgan ization s
th at p r e te n d e d to r ep re se n t w orkers' in terests. T h is e n a b le d self-d irected
w ork ers’ a c tio n s to c o n tr o l th e ir life a n d erase th e hierarch ical structure
b e tw e en m a n a g e r s a n d workers. W orkers fo u n d e d m o r e d e m o c ra tic ways to
o r g a n ize th e m se lv es in c o u n c ils a n d d elib erative foru m s th r o u g h w h ich
real so cia lism c o u ld b e c o m e in stitu ted . T h is n e w g e rm o f p olitics w as for
C astoriadis th e w ork ers’ avant-garde to w h ich th e o r y sh o u ld c o n tr ib u te by
c o m p r e h e n d in g a n d in te rp re tin g th e everyday e x p e r ie n c e o f w orkers at the
p o in t o f p r o d u c tio n a n d its r elation to in d e p e n d e n t political action s.
T h e fo llo w in g years, 1 9 5 4 -6 , n e w ev en ts to o k p la c e to r ein fo rce S o u B ’s
in te rp re ta tio n s o f 1953 h a p p e n in g s, m ain ly the P o lish crisis a n d H un garian
revolt. T h e crisis in P olan d that S o u B an alyzed 29 c e n te r e d o n a se r ie s o f
ev en ts b e g in n in g with th e r eg a in e d p o w er o f W ladyslaw G o m u lk a in the
P olish C o m m u n ist Party (PZPR ) a n d th e cla sh e s i n P o zn a n . T h e o p p o sitio n
o f th e U S SR to G om ulka, g e n e r a te d by his d islik e o f th e m ost o r th o d o x and
pro-Soviet m e m b er s, an d his d esire for a m o r e in d e p e n d e n t c o u r se in
fo r e ig n p o lic y g e n e r a te d a str o n g te n sio n in P o la n d . It was e x p r e sse d a s tens
o f th o u sa n d s o f P o le s to o k part in p ro-G om ulka ra llies in G dan sk, Szczecin ,
a n d W arsaw o n 2 4 O cto b er 1956 (Kramer, 1 9 9 6 ). S ou B again in terp reted
this m a n ife sta tio n as th e crisis o f th e b u reau cratic r e g im e n s in P o la n d and
th e K rem lin . S o u B c o n sid e r e d it a revolu tion ary m o v e m e n t e v en th o u g h
w orkers’ c o u n c ils w e re n o t c o n stitu te d a n d real p o litic a l c h a n g e s w ithin the
party w e re n o t ach iev ed . N e v er th e less, th e se rev o lu tion ary fo r c e s q u e stio n e d
L en in ist id e o lo g y , g a in e d fr ee d o m o f e x p r e ssio n , an d p rep ared th e m asses
to fight th e Soviet m ilitary in terv en tio n s.
S o u B saw revolu tion ary p oten tiality in th is c risis a n d h o p e d fo r a n o p e n
a n d c r u d e c o n fr o n ta tio n b etw een th e m asses a n d th e G om u lk ist party, but
it n e v e r to o k p lace. F or S o u B th e retu rn o f G om u llk a to p o w er m e a n t the
r e n a sc e n c e o f the b u reau cratic tyranny. P olitically a n d e c o n o m ic a lly this
party r e p r o d u c e d totalitarian practices. It m o n o p o liz e d au th ority a n d did
n o t a llo w o t h e r political o rg a n iza tio n s to in te r v e n e in d ecisio n -m a k in g
p rocesses, esp ecially th e P arliam en t, w h ic h was totally c o n tr o lle d by the
g o v e r n m e n t (C astoriadis, 1976b , pp. 2 7 3 - 8 , 2 9 5 ). In th is se n se , th e P olish
crisis w as a germ for r ev o lu tio n an d a n o th e r sy m p to m o f th e crisis o f
so cia lism th a t S ou B c o u ld a d d to th e ir list; h ow ever, in th e e y e s o f th e g ro u p
it n e v e r a c c o m p lish e d th e sa m e revolu tion ary d e e d s th a t th e H un garian
R ev o lu tio n did .
T h e H u n g a ria n R e v o lu tio n in 1956 w as j u d g e d by C astoriadis as th e first
real r ev o lu tio n against b u reau cratic system s, th e first o n e th a t w o u ld initiate
fu tu re r e v o lu tio n s in th e East. C ontrary to th e P o lish case w h er e th e CP

d o m in a te d a n d asp h yxiated th e m o v e m e n t, t h e H u n garian w orkers
r ea ssu m ed th e ir p la c e an d v o ice in so c ie ty to o p e n up history a n d create
s o m e th in g n e w th r o u g h a c o lle ctiv e d e lib er a tiv e activity (C astoriadis, 2000a,
p. 7 8 ).30 1
T h e H u n g a ria n U p risin g b e g a n o n 2 3 O cto b er 1956 w h en th e w ork in g
class to o k o n an d in stalled a n ew g o v e rn m en t, la stin g 18 days b e fo r e b e in g
c ru sh e d by Soviet tanks. It b e g a n with a stu d e n ts’ d e m o n stra tio n to sh ow
sym pathy fo r th e p e o p le o f P o la n d w h o , th a t w e e k e n d , th r o u g h G om ulka
an d th e C en tral C o m m ittee o f the Polish U n ite d W orkers Party, had
r esolu tely r eb u ffed an a ttem p t by a d e le g a tio n o f S oviet lea d er s w h o w ere
again st th e m . S tu d en ts h ad d iffe re n t d em an d s: e le c t a n ew Parly lea d e r in a
n a tio n a l c o n g r e ss, re-establish frien d sh ip w ith th e S oviet U n io n o n th e basis
o f equality, w ithdraw S oviet tro o p s from H un gary, h o ld free e le c tio n s a n d
g u a r a n te e fr e e d o m fo r th e press (Fryer, 20 0 0 , p p . 1 - 6 ) . W orkers s o o n j o in e d
th is sp o n ta n e o u s m ovem en t. B oth factory w o rk ers’ c o u n c ils a n d district-
b ased w o rk ers’ c o u n c ils sp ra n g up d u r in g th e first p h ase o f th e 1956
revolu tion . T h e y d e m a n d e d self-m a n a g em e n t o f in d u stries, e lim in a tio n o f
rules a n d ex tern a l im p o sitio n s over w orkers, red u c tio n o f in c o m e
in e q u a litie s, a b o litio n o f c o n tr o l o v er p la n n in g an d g o v ern m en ta l processes,
a n d im p le m e n ta tio n o f n e w fo r e ig n p o lic ie s (C astoriadis, 1988g, p p . 5 7 -8 9 ).
T h e w o rk ers o r g a n ize d a nation -w id e political system b ased o n cou n cils,
a im in g to a d ir ec t ru le o f th e p rodu cers.
C astoriadis saw in th e w orkers’ c o u n c ils n e w fo u n d a tio n s fo r differen t
c o n c e p tio n s o f political power, e c o n o m ic p r o d u ctio n , an d labor.11 In his view,
th ey w ere im p o rta n t b e c a u se they w e re fig h tin g fo r a form o f direct dem ocracy
an d a truthfu l egalitarian organ ization , a n d they vin d ica ted self-m an agem en t
an d a b o lish e d labor norm s im p o se d from the to p . W orkers’ c o u n c ils w e re an
effort to a b olish th e division b etw een d irectors a n d th o se w h o w ere b e in g
d irected , a n d b e tw e en rep resentatives an d th o se w h o w ere b e in g rep resen ted .
T h e H u n g a ria n c o u n c ils o v er c a m e th e sep a ra tio n b etw een th e o p p o se d
term s o f th e tech n ica l d im e n sio n o f work an d p r o d u c tio n , an d th e political
d im e n sio n o f o th e r sp h e re s o f life. T h e y b e c a m e organ ization s o f self
m a n a g e m e n t a n d th e on ly legitim ate so u rce o f d e c is io n an d exp ression .
T h e H u n g a ria n affair serv ed S o u B ’s p u rp o ses to c o n firm th e ir th esis
a b o u t the e m e r g e n c e o f a n e w p h ase in th e p r o leta r ia n vision o f revolu tion ary
action . It p o s e d again th e p olitical q u estio n a b o u t w h at a revolutionary
m o v e m e n t m e a n t, a n d h o w history w as n o t d e te r m in a n t in t h e c o u r se o f the
social a n d p o litic a l form s, as s o m e M arxists arg u ed . T h e H u n g a ria n C o u n cils
w e re u n k n o w n a n d u n p r a ctic ed o rg a n iza tio n a l form s in E astern socialism
a n d W estern cap italism . T h e I lu n g a ria n C o u n c ils w ere a m an ifesta tio n , in

a c o n c r e te political fo rm , o f a n ew p olitics, an e m e r g in g self-ru lin g political
fo r m in th e se n s e that th ey e sta b lish e d a n d in stitu te d th em selv es as th e on ly
so u r c e o f le g itim a te political d é c is io n s an d n o r m s that r eg u la te d th e ir ow n
c o lle ctiv e b e h a v io r a n d life.
In th is lin e o f th in k in g , rev o lu tio n m e a n t n o t a state b u t a p rocess
e x p r e sse d in th e self-organ ization o f th e p e o p le . T h e form o f self-
o r g a n iza tio n e sta b lish e d by th e c o u n c ils d id n o t sim p ly m ean that p e o p le
h ad finally d isc o v e re d the b e st fo r m o f so c ia l o r g a n iza tio n , b u t th a t p e o p le
h ad rea lize d that that social form w as th e ir ow n activity o f self-organ ization
in a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e ir u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e ir h istorical situ a tio n , an d the
ob jectives th e y p o s e d fo r th em selv es (C astoriadis, 2 0 0 0 a , p p . 8 9 -1 0 1 ).
T h e 1 lu n g a ria n R evolu tion sh o w e d th a t it was n o t a p ro b lem o f k n ow in g
th e e x a ct c o n te n t o f a revolu tion ary social form . T h e r e w as n o su ch a th in g
as an a lread y g iv en fo r m u la o f w h at it w o u ld b e . T h e c o lle ctiv e a n d self-
g o v e r n in g activity o f p e o p le was th e way to d e c id e w hat type o f revolu tion
th ey d e s ir e d in stead o f h a v in g a totalitarian b u rea u cra tic social form . In
d o in g so, t h e H u n g a ria n R ev o lu tio n d estro y ed th e m ystification o f “S talinist
so cia lism ” a n d p o se d fu r th e r q u estio n s o f w h at r ev o lu tio n o u g h t to b e, what
was th e r o le o f revolu tion ary theory, a n d w h a t it m ea n t to transform the
in stitu tio n o f society.
A g r e a te r d ista n ce b etw een S ou B an d M arxism b e c a m e m o r e e x p lic it
after th e ir analysis o f th e 1953 a n d 1956 even ts— esp e c ia lly th e H un garian
R ev o lu tio n . T h e ir r esta te m e n t o f c o n c e p ts su c h as so c ia lism , revolu tion ,
r evolu tion ary activity', an d revolu tion ary theory, le d C astoriadis an d th e
g r o u p to n e w in te rp re ta tio n s o f so c ia l c h a n g e . T h r o u g h th e e x a m in a tio n o f
th e c o n t e n t o f so cia lism a n d revolu tion ary a c tio n s, C astoriadis se t th e basis
for his d e b a te against th e d e te rm in ism a n d in stitu tio n s w ith in M arxism and
p h ilosop h y.
M o v ed b y th e ir u rgen cy to d ista n ce th em selv es p o litic a lly from th e regim e
o f th e U S SR a n d its sa tellites in Eastern E u r o p e , C astoriadis a n d th e g r o u p
fo c u s e d o n a r eflec tio n m o r e in sp ire d by th e ir activism than by an in te n tio n
to d e v e lo p a p h ilo so p h ic a l a n d a n th r o p o lo g ic a l p la tfo r m to r e s p o n d to the
p o sed p r o b le m s. N e v er th e less, it is im p ortan t to n o te th at from th e
e x p e r ie n c e s o f 1953 a n d 1956 C astoriadis e x tr a c te d the raw m aterial for
fu tu re e la b o r a tio n s in r ela tio n to so ciety a n d history. T h e in c ip ie n t n o tio n
o f a u to n o m y that h e started to d e v e lo p as a sh o p -flo o r ca teg o ry e m er g ed
fr o m t h e w o r k e r s ’ s tr u g g le a n d t h e ir p o lit ic a l v in d ic a tio n s . It m a r k e d
a s ta r tin g p o in t in h is la t e r p h ilo s o p h ic a l e la b o r a tio n s in r e la tio n to
t h e a g e n c y o f th e su b je c t a n d s o c ia l tr a n sfo r m a tio n . In th e sa m e v e in ,
t h e p r o b le m o f r ev o lu tio n a n d its r e-c o n c ep tu a liz a tio n e m e r g e d from th e

v in d icatory m o v e m e n t in th e strikes in th e East a n d th e W est. T h e y w e re the
g e rm for th e later d eb a te a b o u t th e d e te rm in istic ch aracter o f history,
society, an d h is c o n c e p t o f creation .
A fter th e ir w ork o n th e H u n garian R ev o lu tio n , S ou B c o n tin u e d a three-
part se r ie s o f texts title d “O n th e C o n te n t o f S o c ia lism (I, 11, III)."52 T h e se
q u e s tio n e d M arxist p r in c ip le s a n d e c o n o m ic theory, an d e m p h a siz e d their
c o n c e p tio n o f so cia lism .33 T h e y also d isc u sse d a c tio n s th at e n a b le d w orker
se lf-m a n a g em e n t, d ista n cin g fr o m M arxism an d o th e r p o litica l p o sitio n s
h eld by leftist in te lle ctu a ls in F rance. S ou B b a c k e d th e se ela b o ra tio n s
th r o u g h a d ia lo g u e w ith th e w ork er avant-garde, T h e g r o u p c o n sid e r e d the
R en au lt fa c to r y a t B illacou rl a s a rep resen ta tiv e ca se to w ork w ith w h en
d e a lin g w ith capitalist lab or rela tio n s in F re n c h F ordism . T h e y w ere
c o n v in c e d th a t revolu tion ary th e o r y s h o u ld c o n c e n tr a te o n th e workers'
everyday m a n ife sta tio n s in o r d e r to m ak e e x p lic it c o n n e c tio n s b etw een
th e m a n d th e ir protest actio n s. T h e y so u g h t that th e ir th eo retica l project
sh o u ld p rovid e analytic to o ls th a t w o u ld assess n e w revolu tion ary c h a lle n g e s.
T h o s e r e s id e d in c r e a tin g a sc h e m a o f se lf-g o v er n in g revolutionär)· a ctio n
th at gave w a y to a critical social theory. T h e o r y h a d to grasp a n d elab orate
th e p o te n tia ls o f n e w revolu tion ary p olitics in te r p r e tin g its sp e c ific tim e,
c o n te n t, c o n te x t, a n d o w n p r o b le m s (H astin gs-K in g, 1999, p. 1 1 5 ).
A s se e n b e fo r e , for S o u B th e e m e r g e n c e o f th e n e w revolu tion ary politics
also b r o u g h t a n ew e m p h a sis in th e ir re-c o n c ep tu a liz a tio n o f so cia lism , a
w ork that C astoriad is an d th e g r o u p c o n tin u e d to d e v e lo p in 1 9 5 5 -9 . In the
series o f O n t h e C o n ten t o f S o c ia lism ’ th ey also a p p r o a c h e d p r o b le m s that
w ent from th e irrationality p r e se n t in th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f p r o d u ctio n at
capitalist fa c to r ies, to th e fu n d a m e n ta l d ivision in a ll c o n tem p orary societies:
th e division b e tw e en d irecto rs an d e xecu tan ts.
C o n c e r n in g w orkers’ m a n a g e m e n t o f p r o d u c tio n w ithin capitalist
o r g a n iza tio n , C astoriadis a r g u e d th a t th e real class stru ggle h ad its o r ig in in
th e w ork in factories. H e p o stu la ted a p e r m a n e n t c o n flic t b e tw e en the
in d ivid u al w ork er a n d th e in form ally se lf-o rg a n iz ed w orkers o n o n e han d,
a n d o n the o th e r b e tw e en d ie p r o d u c tio n p la n a n d th e p la n o f o rgan ization
im p o se d by th e com p an y. T h e a lle g e d capitalist ratio n a liza tio n o f w ork was
an absurdity fr o m th e p o in t o f view o f th e m a x im iza tio n o f p ro d u ctio n
b e c a u se it e x c lu d e d th e w orkers fr o m th e d ir e c tio n o f th e ir o w n w ork. In
th is se n se , C astoriadis d iffe re d from th e M arxist d e n u n c ia tio n s o f the
capitalistic factory, w h ich in h is view r e m a in e d su p erficial. T h e M arxist view
o f the ratio n a lity o f cap italist te c h n iq u e , w h ich p r e sc rib e d o n ly o n e type o f
fa c to iy o r g a n iza tio n , was for C astoriadis an an ti revolu tion ary ju d g m e n t.
O n c c again d iffe rin g w ith M arx a b o u t th e tr u e c o n te n t o f socialism ,

C astoriadis w e n t to argu e th at socialism w as n o t e c o n o m ic grow th n or
m a x im u m c o n su m p tio n n o r e x p a n s io n o f fr e e tim e as su ch ; it w as the
in stau ration o f p e o p le s ’ c o n tr o l o v er th e ir activities an d work. T h e program
o f th e so cia list rev o lu tio n a n d th e p roletariat’s o b jectiv e c o u ld n o lo n g e r be
m e re ly d ie su p p re ssio n o f private property, th e n a tio n a liza tio n o f th e m ea n s
o f p r o d u ctio n a n d p la n n in g , bu t, rather, w ork ers’ m a n a g e m e n t o f the
e c o n o m y a n d o f p o w e r (C astoriadis, 1997k, p . 4 4 ). T h e p roletariat’s
ob jectives c o u ld n o t b e a c h ie v e d by h a n d in g o v er p o w e r to a party, h o w ev er
r evolu tion ary an d h o w ev er proletarian this party w as at th e ou tset, because
this party w o u ld inevitably te n d to e x e r c ise its p o w e r o n its o w n b e h a lf and
w o u ld b e u s e d as th e n u c le u s fo r the crystallization o f n e w r u lin g grou p .
T h e realization o f socialism o n th e p ro leta ria t’s b e h a lf by any party or
b u rea u cra cy w h at so e v er w as a c o n tr a d ictio n in term s; socialism w as n o th in g
b u t th e m a sse s’ c o n sc io u s a n d p e r p e tu a l self-m an agerial activity. It was
e q u a lly o b v io u s that socialism c o u ld n o t b e “o b jectively” in sc r ib ed in any
law o r c o n stitu tio n s, in th e n a tio n a liza tio n o f th e m ea n s o f p r o d u ctio n , or
in p la n n in g , n o r e v e n in a law in stau ratin g w ork ers’ m a n a g e m en t.
T h u s b e g in n in g w ith a c ritiq u e o f bureaucracy, S o u B h ad s u c c e e d e d in
fo r m u la tin g a p ositive c o n c e p tio n o f th e c o n te n t o f socialism . T h e proletariat
c o u ld carry o u t the so cia list r ev o lu tio n o n ly if it a c ted a u ton om ou sly, i f it
fo u n d in itse lf b o th th e will a n d th e c o n sc io u sn e s s for th e neccssary
tran sform ation o f society. S ocialism c o u ld b e n e ith e r th e fated resu lt o f
h istorical d e v e lo p m e n ts, a vio la tio n o f history by a party o f su p e rm e n , n o r
still th e a p p lic a tio n o f a program d erived from a th e o r y that w as tru e in
itself. R ather, it was th e u n le a sh in g o f th e fr e e creative activity o f the
o p p r e sse d m asses. Su ch a n u n le a sh in g o f fr e e crea tiv e activity was p o ssib le
by h istorical d e v e lo p m e n t, a n d th e a ctio n o f a party b ased o n th is th eo ry
c o u ld facilitate it to a tr e m e n d o u s d e g r e e (C astoriadis, 1997k, p p . 4 6 - 8 ).
In th e fo llo w in g years, S o u B k ep t asso cia tin g so c ia lism w ith th e n o tio n o f
se lf-m a n a g em e n t an d d irect d em ocracy. T h e y a lso kept trying to o p e n the
n o tio n to o th e r r ea lm s o f everyday life w h ere so cia lism sh o u ld b e a im in g to
give m e a n in g to p e o p le ’s lives an d work; to e n a b le th e ir fr e e d o m , their
creativity, a n d th e m ost p ositive asp ects o f th e ir p erso n a lity to flou rish ; and
to create o r g a n ic lin ks b e tw e en th e ind ivid u al a n d th o s e a r o u n d th em , and
b e tw e en th e g r o u p an d society. T h e tasks o f revolu tion är)' th eo ry an d the
fu n ctio n o f th e revolu tion ary org a n iza tio n s h o u ld b e a p p re c ia te d in an
e n tire ly n e w way, u n d e rsta n d in g that for t h e w orker, th e u ltim ate prob lem
o f h istory w as an everyday p r o b le m . T h e real crisis 1 1 1 capitalist o rgan ization s
(private ca p ita lism in th e W est a n d b u reau cratic ca p ita lism in the East) was
n o t d u c to t h e an a rch y o f th e m arket o r to th e fa llin g rate o f profit; it was

th at cap italism w as th e u ltim a te n e g a tio n o f a u to n o m y , th e n e g a tio n o f
p e o p le 's c o n s c io u s d ir e c tio n o f th e ir ow n lives. T h e crisis ste m m e d from
th e fact th at th e system n ecessarily created a drive tow ard au ton om y, w h ile
sim u lta n e o u sly w as c o m p e lle d to su p p ress it (C astoriad is, 19971, p. 5 1 ).
S ocialism sh o u ld im ply th e o r g a n iza tio n o f a so c ie ty tran sp aren t to its
m em b ers, w h er e ind ividu als w ere ab le to assu m e th e d ir e c tio n o f th e ir life
w ithin a d e c e n tr a liz e d dem ocracy. T h e on ly total form o f d em o cra cy was
th erefo re a d ir ec t d em ocracy. T h is c o u ld on ly b e th e a ssu m p tio n o f pow er
by a fé d é ra tio n o f w ork ers’ c o u n c ils a n d th e in stitu tio n o f a cen tral assem bly
th at d id n o t p r e su p p o se th e d e le g a tio n o f p o p u la r p o w er b u t, o n the
contrary, w as a n e x p r essio n o f th a t power.
T h is type o f socialist org a n iza tio n im p lie d th e n t h e self-g o v ern in g action
o f th e w o r k in g class, th e re-ap p rop riation o f p o litic a l sp a ces that h ad b e e n
u su r p e d b y cap italist p ow ers as w ell a s by so cia list b u re a u c r a cies (C astoriadis,
19971, pp. 5 9 - 7 0 ) .
“A u to g estio n ” : T h e germ o f a u to n o m y (1 9 5 8 -6 9 )
A th ird p h a se in th e h istory o f S o u B b e g a n in 1958, a year in w h ich t h e final

sp lit w ith C la u d e L efo rt to o k p la ce, a n d a p r o fo u n d d ista n ce a m o n g the rest
o f m e m b e r s o f th e g r o u p started to e m e r g e . D u r in g this p eriod , C astoriadis
gradually sta r ted to fo c u s o n h is ow n in tellectu a l project. W ith o u t leavin g
asid e h is p o litic a l activism , h is in te re st started to c e n t e r o n th e d e v e lo p m e n t
o f his th e o r e tic a l ad van ces. H is p olitical an d th e o r etica l d iv e rg e n c e with
d e te rm in istic th e o r etica l p ersp ectives, su c h a s M arxism a n d structuralism ,
b e c a m e str o n g rea so n s to refin e his fram ew ork. A s tim e p a ssed C astoriadis
b e c a m e c o n v in c e d that th e c o m p o sitio n a n d ch a r a cte r S ou B h a d a cq u ired
p r o d u c e d in e ffec tiv e p olitical w ork. T h is p e r io d b r o u g h t o u t con troversies
a m o n g the m e m b e r s c e n te r e d o n C astoriad is’ m o r e radical q u e s tio n in g o f
M arxism , in particular, o n th e d irectio n that the th e o r e tic a l w ork w as taking,
all o f w h ich c u lm in a ted in e n d in g th e life o f th e g r o u p .
D iffe r e n t a n te c e d e n ts fram ed th is n ew phase: t h e A lgerian War, w h ich
b egan in N o v e m b e r 1954; th e M ollet g o v e r n m e n t (early 1956) that had
in itia ted a partial m o b iliza tio n in o r d e r to s e n d tr o o p s to A lgeria; th e d e m o n
strations by th e so ld ie rs that h ad b e e n c a lle d up fo r th e war; th e in c re a se of
sm all m o v e m e n ts w ith n ew d em a n d s— e sp e c ia lly in 1 9 5 7 in th e factories;
a n d th e arrival to p o w er o f d e G a u lle o n 13 May 1958.
In 1954, S o u B d e c la r ed th em selv es again st th e F re n c h state in th e war
with A lg e ria a n d the F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party' (P arti C o m m u n iste Français
[PCF] ) ’s a lig n m e n t w ith it.8411o w e ver, after th e 1 9 5 4 A lg eria n affair an d th e
1956 H u n g a ria n r e v o lu tio n , th e n e x t im p o r ta n t year fo r th e g rou p was
1958. In tliis y ea r th e in q u iry o f th e o r g a n iza tio n a l q u e s tio n re-em erg ed . It
e n d e d in S e p te m b e r o f th e s a m e y ea r w h e n Lefort an d S im o n left th e g rou p
d efinitively- N e v er th e less, alth o u g h th e se tw o losses w e re sign ifican t,
b e tw e en 1 9 5 8 a n d 1961 th e g r o u p grew in n u m b e r e x p a n d in g their work
in to th e p rovin ces with stu d e n ts a n d w orkers, e sp e c ia lly at R enau lt.
A fter th e split, th e w ork o f S ou B c e n te r e d o n d e G a u lle’s a c tio n s a n d o n
m o r e rad ical th e o r etica l revision s o f M arxist theory. G en erally, th e g ro u p
c o in c id e d in its rea d in g o f G aullism . It w as in te rp re ted as a p assage to
m o d e r n ca p ita lism w ith attem p ts to liq u id a te ch aracteristics o f th e previou s
r eg im e, o f th e F ren ch c o lo n ia list em p ire, a n d o f th e e c o n o m ic an d financial
ch aos.
In N o v e m b e r 1958, w h en d e G au lle a n d h is c o n stitu tio n w ere granted
app roval in a p leb iscite, the g r o u p saw as e v id e n t th e n e e d to in terp ret the
overall e v o lu tio n o f m o d e r n capitalist c o u n tr ie s w ith d iffe re n t to o ls o th e r
than the o n e s M arxism o ffe r e d .35 C astoriadis d e e p e n e d in h is critiq u es o f
th e classical M arxist p o sitio n s o n p a u p e riz a tio n , e c o n o m ic crises, th e grow th
o f th e r eser v e industrial army, t h e c o n c e p tio n o f im p erialism , a n d th e role
a n d c o n te n t o f theory. T h is g e n e r a te d a n o th e r d ivision in th e g r o u p b etw een
th e o n e s th a t b a c k e d C astoriad is’ p o sitio n s, a n d d ie o n e s w h o w e re against.
A n o th e r sp lit o c c u r r e d in 1 9 6 3 a n d m o r e m e m b e r s left th e g r o u p , Lyotard
a n d Souyri a m o n g th e m . Six m o r e issues o f SB (N o s. 3 5 - 4 0 ) w e re p u b lish ed
a fter this.
As n o te d , d u r in g th is p erio d C astoriadis’ w ork b e c a m e m o r e c e n te r e d in
h is d e v e lo p m e n t o f fo u n d a tio n s fo r a n ew c o n c e p tio n o f so ciety an d history,
b a sed o n h is c ritiq u e o f M arxism . H e p r o p o s e d th e su sp e n sio n o f the
p u b lica tio n in J u n e 196 7 , b e c a u se o f th e sterility o f S o u B activity w ithin the
c o lle ctiv e privatization o f so c iety (C astoriadis, 1979f, pp. 3 1 1 -1 7 ). M in or
activities c o n tin u e d u n til 196 9 , w h en th e g r o u p fin a lly d isap p eared .
Even th o u g h the w ork C astoriadis d e v e lo p e d a fter S ou B e n d e d is
c o m m o n ly se e n as u n c o n n e c te d to th is p rev io u s p e r io d , clearly, S ou B laid
d ie fo u n d a tio n fo r w h a t was to b e c o m e his m o r e m a tu r e p h ilo so p h ic a l work
in th e 1970s. C astoriadis’ e n c o u n te r with p sych oan alysis in th e late 1960s
le d h im to b e c o m e a p ra cticin g psychoanalyst in 1973, in flu e n c in g h is work
a n d c h a n g in g his r o u tin e s. T h is m ig h t have c a u se d a d iffe re n t e x p r essio n o f
h is p o litica l m ilitancy; how ever, h is p olitical c o n c e r n s r em a in e d at the
c e n te r o f h is reflec tio n s.
It can b e in fe rr ed that after Sou B , C astoriadis r ea lize d th e n e e d to d e e p e n
h is th e o r etica l analysis in o r d e r to ad d ress q u e s tio n s raised by h is p reviou s
w ork. W hat C astoriad is h ad started to e n v isio n as an ideal o f self-m a n a g em e n t

a n d th e in d iv id u a l’s c o n tr o l o v er th e d ifferen t s p h e r e s o f life , req u ired
m o r e r e fin e d th eo retica l to o ls to b u ild a c o h e r e n t th eo ry o f so ciety a n d its
su bjects th a t m a d e room for su ch n o tio n s. It in c lu d e d th e e v id e n t n e e d to
c o n te st w h at h e c a lle d d e te rm in istic in h e r ite d o n to lo g y — w h ere b e in g is
r e d u c e d to d e te rm in a c y — that h a d h id d e n th e crea tiv e ch aracter o f history,
favorin g tr a n sc en d e n ta l an d a b so lu te p r in c ip le s a n d social form s (as for
e x a m p le in M arxism ). T h e germ o f h is p roject o f a u to n o m y b orn o u t o f
SouB — m o r e exactly fr o m his analysis o f b u reau cracy a n d capitalism —
b e c a m e c o n su b sta n tia l to his o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n a n d h is ela b o ra tio n s on
h u m an im a g in a tio n a n d p sych ical r e p r e se n ta tio n , H is e x p e r ie n c e at SouB
o p e n e d u p the q u estio n a b o u t subjectivity a n d a g e n c y d ia l w e re necessarily
lin k e d to n e w social form s that im p lie d a n e x a m in a tio n o f d em o cra cy and
social in stitu tio n s. T h is w as th e c o r e w ork h e sta r ted to a c co m p lish from
1970s o n w a rd a n d w h ich b e g a n to crystallize in th e Im aginary Institu tio n s o f
Society.
C h a p te r 2
Cornelius Castoriadis’ Ontology of Creation
T he Im a g in a ry In stitu tio n o f Society (IIS) is th e resu lt o f C astoriadis' critiq u e o f

d e te r m in ism in th e o r ie s su ch as M arxism a n d structuralism with their
fu n c tio n a list a c co u n ts o f so c ie ty a n d th e su b ject. In th is w ork an d in th e six
v o lu m e s o f Les Carrefours d u Labyrinthe h e r e fin e s his th eo retica l app aratu s
to e x p a n d th is critiq u e. C o n tin u in g w ith th e lin e o f th in k in g that h e began
d e v e lo p in g w h ile w ork in g w ith S ou B h e a d v a n ces h is r e fle c tio n s o n the
p ro b lem o f a u to n o m y a n d th e m e a n in g o f r ev o lu tio n a n d dem ocracy.
T h is c h a p te r p resen ts th e m ain c o n c e p ts u p o n w h ich C astoriadis’ ontology'
o f c r e a tio n is bu ilt. By e x p la in in g C astoriad is’ r ein te rp re ta tio n o f the
F reu d ian le g a c y th r o u g h h is c en tra l n o tio n o f rad ical im a g in a tio n , it is
p o ssib le to s e e th e way in w h ich a n e w u n d e r sta n d in g o f subjectivity and
a g e n c y su b stan tiate h is rich n o tio n s o f im a g in a ry so c ia l in stitu tio n s a n d
au ton om y. I Iis an aclisis d o c tr in e , o r le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n , a b o u t th e
d iffe re n t r e g io n s o f th e self, are also d iscu ssed h e r e taking in to a c co u n t the
p rin cip a l c ritiq u e s o f so m e o f his key n o tio n s . T h is in te re stin g and
co n tro v ersia l le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n sh ow s how , in C astoriad is’ view,
d e te r m in ism h as to b e sw ep t o u t o f an y u n d e r sta n d in g o f history a n d so ciety
by b r in g in g in a n ew c o n c e p tio n o f cre a tio n . T h e c ir c le o f c r e a tio n illustrated
in th is c h a p te r sh ow s the w ay C astoriad is’ p r o je ct o f a u to n o m y a n d its d irect
relation to d em o cra cy in v o lv e b o th in d ivid u al su b jective c o n te n ts and
c o lle ctiv e so c ia l in stitu tio n s u n d e r sto o d as n o t to ta lly d e te r m in e d creation s
o f th e social-h istorical.
In T he Im aginary Institution o f Society C astoriadis se e k s to avoid th e traps o f
w h at h e ca lls th e tw o e x tr e m e s th a t ch aracterize c o n te m p o r a r y theory. O n
th e o n e h a n d , h e says, th e r e is positivism , sc ien tism , a n d ration alism ; o n the
o th er, irration alism , n aïve relativism , a n d hasty d e n u n c ia tio n s o f sc ien ce
a n d k n o w le d g e . In his view, b o th p o sitio n s sp r in g fr o m th e b e lie f that
th in k ers a n d so ciety w ill g e t away from th e q u e s tio n o f truth, e ith e r by
resolvin g it o n c e an d fo r all o r by d e c la r in g it v o id o f m e a n in g (C astoriadis,
[1 9 7 7 ] 1984a, p. x iii).
T h e w o r k C astoriadis d e v e lo p s b e g in n in g in th e 1970s is a n a ttem p t to

e lu cid a te t h e social-h istorical d im e n sio n o f so c ie ty a n d th e im a g in a tio n that
cre a tes so cieties: th e rad ical im a g in a tio n a n d th e so c ia l in stitu tin g imaginai*)'.
T h e social-h istorical d im e n sio n is e x p r e sse d in so c ie ty th r o u g h th e im agin ary
social sig n ific a tio n s that give life to social in stitu tio n s an d se n s e to social
crea tio n s. H e e x p lo r e s a n e w c o n c e p tio n o f the p sy ch ic a n d social p o le s o f
th e h u m a n b e in g , n ot by im p o r tin g r ed u c tio n ist a c c o u n ts o f c o n c e p ts from
o th e r so c ia l d isc ip lin e s, b u t ra th er by o ffe r in g a c o n s is te n t articu lation o f
d iffe re n t d o m a in s o f k n o w led g e. H e e n g a g e s p h ilo so p h y , p olitics,
a n th ro p o lo g y , a n d psych oanalysis, rigorou sly m a in ta in in g th e sp ecificity
a n d d iffe re n tia tio n o f e a ch d iscip lin e,
C astoriad is su bstantiates his o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n w ith the c o n c e p t o f
radical im a g in a tio n , w h ich he d e v e lo p s by b u ild in g on F r e u d ’s
p sych oan alytical fin d in g s. C astoriadis’ u se o f F r e u d ’s w ork e n a b le s h im to
e lu cid a te n o t o n ly th e n a tu re a n d ch aracter o f so c ia l in stitu tio n s bu t, equally
im p ortan tly, a n e w m o d e o f b e in g o f th e p sych e. C astoriadis d e v e lo p s th e
F reud ian u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s a n d its th eo retica l
c o n s e q u e n c e s in term s o f an u n d e te r m in e d a n d a fu n c d o n a liz e d p sych e
in to th e radical im a g in a tio n . H e q u estio n s in h e r ite d o r receiv ed o n to lo g y
a n d its c o n c e p tio n o f b e in g , tr a n sc e n d in g m a n y p o stu la tes o f W estern
ration alist p h ilo s o p h ic a l tradition that have d e f in e d h u m a n b e in g s w ithin
ration alist, lo g ic a l, an d d eterm in istic m o d els.
C astoriad is in co rp o ra tes F reu d ’s c o n tr ib u tio n s to a th e o r y of
in tersu b jeciivity th a t th e o r iz e s w h at W h ite b o o k (1 9 9 8 ) calls th e privatistic
ind ividu ality o f th c su b je c t.1W h ile d e e p ly critical o f a n y fo r m ofC artesian ism ,
C astoriadis avoids n aïve solipsistic o r in tersu b jectiv e a c co u n ts that fail to
r ec o g n iz e a h u m a n creative d im e n sio n . H e b u ild s o n F reu d ’s study o f the
u n c o n sc io u s a n d th e h u m a n m in d ’s cap acity to c re a te via r ep resen ta tio n s
o f psych ical reality, a n d gives it a n ew tw ist that e r a se s th e p ositivist traits and
d e te r m in istic a sp ec ts o f F reu d ’s origin al a c co u n ts. R ather th a n o verh au lin g
th e F re u d ia n legacy, C astoriadis revisits F r e u d ’s o r ig in a l psychoanalytical
assertion s w h ile o v e rc o m in g d e te rm in istic c a te g o r ie s d e fin e d w ithin
e n sem b listic-id en tita ry o r e n sid ic lo g ic . T h is lo g ic , w h ic h structures
m a th e m a tic s a n d is realized in set theory, is n o t e n o u g h in C astoriad is’ view
to ex p la in t h e m o d e o f b e in g o f th e p sych e an d social-h istorical in stitu tion .
It g overn s ev ery th in g th a t c a n b e c o n str u c ted a n d b u ilt u p by starting with
th e p r in c ip le s o f identity, c o n tr a d ictio n , a n d th e e x c lu d e d third, and
o r g a n ize s a n y th in g given by m e a n s o f u n ivocally d e fin e d e le m e n ts, classes,
rela tio n s, a n d p r o p e r tie s. It is a d e te r m in e d lo g ic th a t is n e v e rth eless p r e se n t
in e v er y th in g h u m a n s say o r d o , a n d is in stitu ted a n d sa n c tio n e d by society
Cornelius Castoriadis ' Ontology o f Creation 35
(C astoriadis, 1987; 1997p , p. 3 5 2 ). ln r eje ctin g th is stru ctu rin g an d o p e n in g

u p n e w o n e s , C astoriadis e x a m in e s tw o th e o r etica l p r o b le m s F reud w as n ot
ab le to e lu c id a te in a n ap p rop riate way: th e p sy c h e a s radical im a gin ation
a n d th e social-h istorical in stitu tio n as social im aginary.
T h e Radical Im aginary
C astoriadis b u ild s o n F reu d ’s assertion o f th e m a in e le m e n t o f th e psyche:

r e p re se n ta tio n . T h e F reud ian e lab oration o f th e u n c o n sc io u s allow s
C astoriadis to rew ork the c o n c e p t o f th e p sy ch e a s radical im a g in a tio n ,2 a
n o tio n th at c o n te sts th e tradition al u n d e r sta n d in g o f th e facu lty o f
r e p r e se n ta tio n in h u m a n b e in g s. R adical im a g in a tio n is d e fin e d as a
p e r m a n e n t flu x o f r ep re se n ta tio n , affect, an d in te n tio n n o t su b ject to
d e te r m in a c y (C astoriadis. 198 7 , p. 2 7 4 ). It s h o u ld b e u n d e rsto o d as th e
facu lty that p r e c e d e s th e d istin ctio n b e tw e en “th e real” a n d “t h e im agin ary”
o r “th e fictitio u s.” F u rth erm ore, it is a n ec essa ry p r e c o n d itio n f o r the
e x is te n c e o f “reality” as w ell as th e c o n d itio n fo r r eflec tiv e th o u g h t fo r th e
h u m a n b e in g an d , th e r efo r e, also fo r th e e x is te n c e o f s c ie n c e an d even
psych oan alysis (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 e , p. 1 33). T h e rad ical im a g in a tio n is o n e
o f C astoriad is’ m ain c o n c e p tu a l in n ovation s an d is “key in d e v e lo p in g his
o n to lo g y o f crea tio n an d his u n d e rsta n d in g o f au ton om y, w h ich are
p articu larly im p o rta n t in h is c o n tr ib u tio n to so c ia l theory.
C astoriad is ju stifie s th e term “im a g in a tio n ” by c itin g its tw o m ain
c o n n o ta tio n s: th e im a g e in its m o st g e n e ra l se n se , that is, th e fo rm , a n d the
id ea o f in v e n tio n or cre a tio n . H e u ses th e term “radical" to d iffe re n tia te his
c o n c e p t fr o m w hat h e calls “seco n d a ry ” im a g in a tio n , w h ich refers to th e
m o st c o m m o n p h ilo so p h ic a l form u lation : a sim p le im itative, rep rod uctive,
a n d / o r c o m b in a to r y im a g in a tio n .
T h e “Im agin ary” in A ristotle a n d Kant
C astoriadis d istin g u ish e s tw o m o m e n ts in p h ilo so p h y p r e c e d in g F reud

w h ere it is p o s sib le to id en tify efforts to d e fin e im a g in a tio n apart from th e
tradition o f th e sec o n d a r y im a g in a tio n . H e c red its A ristotle a n d K ant with
th e in tu itio n to d e fin e “im a g in a tio n ” apart from th e sh a d o w o f th e seco n d a ry
im a g in a tio n , th o u g h th e y la ter fell in lin e with trad ition al d e fin itio n s.
A ristotle's treatise De A n im a p o s itio n e d im a g in a tio n am ong the
p o te n tia litie s th r o u g h w h ic h th e a n im a ju d g e s , ca teg o r iz e s, an d p erceives
an entity. T h is im a gin ation is clo sely b o u n d to se n sib ility o r p e r ce p tio n ; it is
a faculty o n ly for b e in g s w ith sen sib ility an d w orks 0 11 on ly o b je c ts that can

b e p e r c e iv e d th ro u g h sensibility. Im a g in a tio n is n o t eq u iv a len t to se n sib ility /
p e r ce p tio n ; it is su b o r d in a te d to it. W hile th e p r o d u cts o f se n sib ility /
p e r c e p tio n will alm ost n e v e r b e “errors,” th e p r o d u cts o f im a g in a tio n arc
always “fa lse .” A ristotle ta lk ed a b o u t tw o m a n ife sta tio n s o f im a g in a tio n
w ith ou t m a k in g a cle a r d iffe re n tia tio n b e tw e e n them : o n e rela ted to
se n s ib ility /p e r c e p tio n , a n d th e o th e r to th in k in g . T h e fo r m e r p r o d u ce s a
false a n d in a ccu ra te c o p y o f th e se n s ib le /p e r c e iv e d , a n d th e latter refers to
the cap acity to e v o k e im a g es in d e p e n d e n tly o f a n d u n d e te r m in e d by
se n s ib ility /p e r c e p tio n . T h is last p ostu late sh ow s that for A ristotle,
im a g in a tio n was at the b a se o f r ep r e se n tin g o r th in k in g , that is, th e an im a
c a n m ak e r ep re se n ta tio n s o f th e w orld b e c a u se o f th e im a g in a tio n , n o t
b e c a u se t h e w orld can b e “im p la n te d ” o r in tr o d u c e d in th e in n e r subject.
H ow ever, A risto tle d id n ot p r o fo u n d ly d e v e lo p th is c o n c e p tu a l ela b o ra tio n ,
w h ich m ig h t have b e e n clo se to C astoriadis’ n o tio n o f radical im agin ation .
Kant, lik e A ristotle, first rela ted im a gin ation to se n s ib ility /p e r c e p tio n .
H e d e fin e d im a gin ation a s th e facu lty o f r e p r e se n tin g an o b ject even
w ith ou t its p r e s e n c e in in tu itio n . T h is Is in d ie tra d itio n o f th e “secon d ary
im a g in a tio n ,” sin c e it p r e su p p o ses that th e ob ject is already given , that the
o b ject has already b e e n fo rm ed . N e v er th e less, K ant w e n t fu r th e r w hen
c o n sid e r in g th e r e la tio n s b e tw e en im a g in a tio n an d u n d ersta n d in g . H e
d e v e lo p e d th e n o tio n o f “tra n scen d en ta l im a g in a tio n ,” a produ ctive
im a g in a tio n in w h ich th e syn th esis o f r e p r o d u c tio n in im a gin ation took
p la c e a p r io ri, that is, h e c o n c e iv e d im a g in a tio n a s a fu n d a m e n ta l pow er
p r e se n t a p riori in h u m an k n o w led g e. H ow ever, C astoriad is n o te s that this
c o n c e p tu a l c o n str u c tio n b e c a m e p rob lem atic w h e n K ant p u t sen sib ility as
the e m p ir ic a l p e r c e p tio n o f sen sa tio n s (th e recep tivity o f im p ressio n s) in
o p p o sitio n to th e p u re rep re se n ta tio n o f fo r m s (th e sp o n ta n eity o f
c o n c e p ts), leavin g im a g in a tio n b etw een th e tw o. C astoriadis n o te s that
K ant’s in tu itio n o f th e radical im a g in a tio n in fact b e c a m e o b sc u r e d in the
se c o n d v e rsio n o f th e Critique o f Pure Reason. T h e la tter d e v e lo p m e n ts o f his
th o u g h t n e g le c te d th e fo u n d a tio n a l r o le o f th e im a g in a tio n favorin g instead
a p p er c ep tio n .
C astoriad is offers tw o m ain reason s for th e h istorical o m issio n o f the
radical im a g in a tio n . T h e first h as to d o w ith t h e o n to lo g ic a l p rivilege o f the
th in g (in c lu d in g n o n m a te r ia l th in g s) in p h ilo s o p h y , a n d th e s e c o n d to
th e d ir ec t r ela tio n e sta b lish e d b e tw e en that w h ich is th o u g h t a n d that w h ich
is tru e. E ver sin c e th e a n c ien t G reek s, th in k in g has b e e n c o n c e iv e d o f as the
sea rch fo r tru th , w h ile a t th e sa m e tim e it h as b e e n rela ted to lo g o s o r
nou s— to t h e ratio, rea so n . O p p o se d to it, d o x a , o r o p in io n , h as b e e n
c o n sid e r e d a so u r c e o f errors o r “m istakes” a n d has b e e n rela ted to the

im p r essio n s o f t h e se n s e s a n d / o r to th e p r o d u c ts o f im a g in a tio n . T hu s,
tradition ally, th e truth a b o u t th e w orld a n d th e s e lf h a s h a d to b e lea r n e d
th ro u g h lo g o s an d nou s.
W ith rea so n given a cen tral p o sitio n an d tr ea te d as an u n q u estio n a b le
fu n d a m e n ta l, o th e r o n to lo g ic a l a ssu m p tio n s fo llo w e d , su c h as: “r e a so n can
r esid e in th in g s, id eas o r ob jects, in o th e r w ords, in substantial individuals,
th in g s ca p a b le o f id e a s” (C astoriadis, 1997e, p . 138). T h e history o f
p h ilo so p h y h as b e e n d e v o te d to a n e la b o ra tio n o f r e a s o n as th e d e te r m in in g
fact o f th e b e in g , w ith th e h u m a n b e in g c o n c e iv e d an d a p p ro a c h e d th ro u g h
ra tio n a list c a teg o r ie s. In th is se n se , th e c o n c e p tio n o f im a g in a tio n h as b e e n
u n d e r the a e g is o f rea so n in the W estern p r o d u c tio n o f k n o w led g e a n d the
analysis o f em p irica l reality an d its o b jectifica tio n .
A s e x p la in e d later, C astoriadis o p p o s e s th e ra tio n a list trad ition . For him ,
sen sib ility a n d p e r c e p tio n are part o f im a g in a tio n . It is im a g in a tio n that
a lo n e gives form a n d sig n ific a n c e to th in gs, w h ich have n o n e in th em selves,
a n d it is b e c a u se o f t h e radical im a g in a tio n that t h e su b je ct can give form
o r sig n ific a n c e . It is the su b je ct’s facu lty o f im a g in a tio n that g en e ra te s
r ep re se n ta tio n s from e x ter n a l e x c ita tio n o r in te rn a l p ressu res in th e subject,
or, to b orrow a m o r e p r e cise F ich tea n te r m , from sh o ck s (A ntoss)
(C astoriadis, 1989, p. 3 8 4 ). T h e su b je ct e x e r c ise s a k in d o f p ro d u ctiv e
im a g in a tio n th r o u g h e n c o u n te r s with ex tern a l o b je c ts o r in form ation that
g e n e r a te s m e a n in g .
F reu d an d C astoriadis: T h e fo u n d a tio n s o f th e r a d ica l im agin ary
T o e la b o r a te h is c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n o f im a g in a tio n , C astoriadis e n g a g e s with

F reu d , a th ir d th in k er w h o h ad an im p o r ta n t in sig h t o n th e radical
im a g in a tio n . F reu d ’s w ork was co n sta n tly c e n te r e d o n th e p r o b le m o f
im a g in a tio n , th o u g h h e n ever d e sc r ib e d it its s u c h in h is w ritings. T h e
tr ea tm e n t h e gave to th e id ea o f th e “m agical o m n ip o te n c e o f thou ght" or,
m o r e gen era lly , to th e se t o f p r o c esses d e sc r ib e d in T he Two Principles o f
M en ta l F u nctioning, p rovid es g o o d ex a m p les.
T h r o u g h o u t his w ork, F reud referred to th e im a g in a tio n by th e term
“phantasy,” a s if h e refu sed to c o n c e p tu a liz e it— a c c o r d in g to C astoriadis as
th e co n stitu tiv e e le m e n t o f the p sych e that e n a b le s it to create o r form
p h a n ta sies in th e psych ic apparatus. In a se n s e it c o u ld b e said that F reud
b e lo n g e d t o th e p h ilo so p h ic a l trad ition that su b o r d in a te d im a g in a tio n to
th e o b jectiv e real, b e c a u se h e always tried to trace th e e le m e n ts o f ph antasy
back to e le m e n ts o f th e real. ' F reud d e sc r ib e d “ph an tasy” as derivative o f a
real c x p c r ie n c e w ith a u th e n tic m aterial. It is a r ep ro d u c tio n o f an

u n c o n sc io u s c o m b in a tio n o f th in g s that have b e e n s e e n o r h eard previously,4
d ia l in n o w ay can b e th o u g h t o f o r c o n c e iv e d as a n o rigin al cre a tio n . F reud
r ep ea te d t h e m istak es o f A ristotle a n d K ant, su b o r d in a tin g im a gin ation to
rea so n . N e v er th e less, as w e sh all s e e , th e F re u d ia n e lu c id a tio n o f the
u n c o n sc io u s as h a v in g its o w n lo g ic m akes it p o ssib le for C astoriadis lo
re-ela b o ra te his c o n c e p tio n o f th e psych e, p articu larly th e c o n c e p t o f radical
im a g in a tio n , as a fu n ctio n a liz e d a n d n o t totally d e te r m in e d .
In d e ter m in a tio n an d a fu n ction ality in th e hum an p sy c h e
C astoriad is states that F reud d e m o n str a te d tw o im p o r ta n t facts w ith his

n o tio n o f th e u n c o n sc io u s. T h e first w as th a t p sy ch ica l r e p r e se n ta tio n in
h u m a n s w as n e ith e r fu n ctio n a l n o r totally su b o r d in a te d to b io lo g ic a l
substrata. H u m a n s, th r o u g h t h e facu lty o f r e p r e se n ta tio n , d iffe r from
o th e r liv in g b e in g s, w h ic h in te ra c t w ith th e ir e n v ir o n m e n t th ro u g h
c a n o n ic a l, sta b le , a n d fu n ctio n a l r e p r e se n ta tio n s, m e r e ly r e s p o n d in g to
th e b io lo g ic a l fu n c tio n s o f co n se r v a tio n a n d r e p r o d u c tio n . T h e se c o n d
w as that p sy ch ica l lo g ic c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to o r c o n c e iv e d o n ly in
d e te r m in istic lo g ica l term s.
A fu n ctio n a lity o f th e psyche
C astoriadis e x a m in e s F reu d ’s Three Essays on the Theory o f Sexuality, w h ere

sexu ality is sh o w n as g o in g b e y o n d b io lo g ic a l fu n ction ality. T h r o u g h the
c o n c e p ts o f b isex u a lity a n d th e p o ly m o r p h o u s p e r v er se , F reu d d e n a tu ra lized
h u m a n sex u a lity , sh o w in g that fo r h u m a n s th e r e is n o fix e d o r c a n o n ic a l
o b ject a n d a im for t h e sexual drive. F reu d sh o w e d that (1 ) fe m a le a n d m ale
id e n titie s a r e n o t natural id e n titie s w ith w h ich h u m a n s are b o r n a n d w h ich
have a sp e c ific b eh a v io r a n d d e sir e a tta ch ed to th em ; (2 ) se x u a l id e n tity in
h u m a n s, far from fu n c tio n in g on ly in th e ser v ic e o f sp e c ie s rep ro d u c tio n ,
is a fu n c tio n a l a n d n o t totally su b o r d in a te d t o its b io lo g ic a l substrata; and
(3 ) th a t h u m a n sex u a lity h as p o ly m o r p h o u s p erv erse character, in w h ich
th e p sych ical valuation o f th e sex u a l o b ject (p e r so n , th in g , o r id ea toward
w h ich th e se x u a l drive is d ir ec ted ) an d th e se x u a l aim (th e act that w ou ld
satisfy th e d rive) d o n o t refe r m e re ly to the g en ita l parts o f th e o p p o site sex
b u t to an y part o f th e b o d y (F reud , 1 9 6 2 , p p . 2 - 1 4 ) . F reud r e je cte d both
that e v er y o n e is b o r n w ith h e r /h is se x u a l in stin c t a tta ch ed to a particu lar
se x u a l o b je c t a n d th a t in d ivid u al sex u a lity is th e r e s u lt o f so c ia l as w ell as
natural c o n d itio n s.
T h e n o tio n o f th e p o ly m o r p h o u s p erv erse su p p o rts F reu d ’s initial

sta te m en t a b o u t d en a tu ra liza tio n o f h u m a n sexuality. D e m o n stra tin g how
th e p sy ch ica l valu ation o f the se x u a l o b je c t d o e s n o t refe r m e re ly to the
g e n ita lia , b u t rather to an y part o f th e body, F r e u d d e c la r ed a universal
d isp o sitio n to p erversion w h ich h e d e fin e d a s se x u a l activities w h ich e ith er
e x te n d , in a n an a to m ica l se n se , b e y o n d th e r e g io n s o f th e b o d y th a t are
d e s ig n e d fo r sex u a l u n io n , o r lin g er o v er th e in te r m e d ia te rela tio n s to the
sex u a l o b je c t w h ich sh o u ld n orm ally b e traversed rapidly o n th e path
tow ard th e final sex u a l aim {ibid., p. 1 6 ). T h e se th e o r etica l o b servation s
raise two c o n c lu sio n s: first, th e natu re o f h u m a n sex u a lity is n o t r e d u c e d to
th e p r e su m e d n orm al u n iversality o f th e h e te r o se x u a l fram e a n d , in
c o n s e q u e n c e , h o m o sex u a lity c a n n o t b e c o n s id e r e d a d e v ia tio n o r an
a b n orm al illn e ss in th e c o n v e n tio n a l way.5 A n d se c o n d , it is p o ssib le to
c h o o s e th e sex u a l o b ject in d e p e n d e n tly fr o m th e sex.
As a c o ro lla ry to h is in q u iry a b o u t sex u a lity F re u d c o n c lu d e d d ia l in
h u m an b e in g s th e r e ex ist b o th a bisexual n a tu re a n d p erverse p olym orp h ism
in love a im an d o b je c t, w h ich , as said , proved t h e d e n a tu ra lize d ch aracter
o f h u m a n se x u a lity w h ere th e r e is n o fix ed o r c a n o n ic a l o b je c t a n d aim fo r
th e sex u a l d r iv e. B ased o n this c o n c lu sio n , C astoriadis d e d u c e s th a t psychical
r ep re se n ta tio n in h u m a n s is n o t fu n ctio n a l o r totally su b o r d in a te d to
b io lo g ic a l substrata; th u s it d o e s n o t r e s p o n d m e r e ly to b io lo g ic a l fu n c tio n s
o f c o n se r v a tio n a n d rep ro d u ctio n .
Indéterm ination o f the psychical representation
T h e n o t fu lly d e te r m in e d ch aracter o f th e psychical rep resen tation is

r e-elab orated by C astoriadis based o n F reud’s w o r k in The Interpretation o f
Dreams, particularly F reud’s c o n c lu sio n s ab ou t t h e basic characteristics and
c o n stitu tio n o f u n co n sc io u s rep resen tation s. F rei id in terp reted dream s as
u n co n sc io u s m an ifestation s o f w ish-fulfillm erit, o p e r a tin g w ithin a n associat
ive rather th a n a d eterm in istic lo g ic. D ream s w e re g o v e rn ed by at least two
m e ch a n ism s, c o n d e n sa tio n a n d d isp la cem en t, that d em o n stra ted that
u n co n sc io u s rep resen tation s are n o t totally ru led by a d eterm in istic logic.
F reu d arrived at th e c o n c e p t o f c o n d e n s a tio n by stu d y in g th e rela tio n sh ip
b e tw e en th e m a n ifest a n d laten t c o n te n ts o f a d r e a m , that is, b etw een the
first a p p ea r a n c e o f th e d ream in th e d r e a m er ’s m in d a n d its real sig n ifica n ce,
th e th o u g h ts that are sh o w n th ro u g h th e w ork o f in te rp re ta tio n to lie
b e h in d th e d r e a m . O n e o f th e first c o n c lu sio n s F reu d drew was that a dream
c a n b e in te r p r e te d by analysis b e c a u se th e r e is n o u n iv o ca l, e x a ct, a n d
p recise r ela tio n b e tw e en its o r ig in a l a p p ea r a n c e a n d its m e a n in g .
Freud sh o w e d how th e latent c o n te n t is analyzed a n d b eco m es understood

rep lacing t h e m anifest c o n ten t. H e first add ressed this q u estion by observing
how. in the analysis o f a dream , various elem en ts m a y b e fo u n d to b e com b in ed —
c o n d e n sed — in to a disparate unity. In o th e r w ords, im ages o r id eas in the
dream can b e co m p osite figures co n ta in in g diverse e le m en ts o r m eanings.
D e sp ite tlie d iffe re n t ways in w h ich c o n d e n s a tio n w orks, w hat is key for
C astoriadis is th e c o n c e p t itse lf a s an e sse n tia l m o d e o f u n co n sc io u s
fu n c tio n in g . In c o n d e n s a tio n , a so le id ea r ep re se n ts several associative
c h a in s th at in tersect in the id ea. Each m a n ife st e le m e n t is d e te r m in e d by
several la te n t m e a n in g s, a n d e a c h m e a n in g , inversely, m ay b e id e n tifie d in
several e le m e n ts. F or F reu d th is m ea n t th at m a n ife st e le m e n ts d o n o t stan d
in the sa m e rela tio n sh ip to e a c h o f th e m e a n in g s fr o m w h ic h th ey derive,
a n d so they d o n o t su b su m e th e m after th e fash ion o f a c o n c e p t (L a p la n ch e
an d P on talis, 1993, p. 8 2 ).
T h e c o n d e n s a tio n p h e n o m e n o n d em o n stra tes h o w u n co n sc io u s repres
e n ta tio n s a r e n o t fully d e te r m in e d . T h e fact that th e m a n ife st e le m e n ts in
th e d rea m d o n o t have a sp ec ific a n d d e te r m in e d rela tio n sh ip to e a ch o f
the m e a n in g s from w h ich th ey d eriv e sh ow s d ia l the p r in c ip le s o f w hat
C astoriadis ca lls e n sem b listic-id en titary lo g ic d o n o t c o m p le te ly e x p la in the
m o d e o f b e in g o f u n c o n sc io u s rep resen ta tio n s. E ven th o u g h a n u n co n sc io u s
r ep re se n ta tio n is a d e te r m in e d p h e n o m e n o n in p sych ical life, w ith wish
fu lfillm e n t e q u iv a len t to u n c o n sc io u s d e te r m in ism , it still w orks th ro u g h
u n d e te r m in e d lo g ica l relation s, as d e m o n str a te d in th e c o n d e n sa tio n
m e c h a n ism . W ith this, F reud o p e n e d th e p ossib ility th at d e te r m in ism can
o p e r a te w ith o u t th e c a teg o r ie s o f c o n sc io u s lo g ic o r d e te r m in e d relations.
T h e p h e n o m e n o n o f d isp la ce m en t, e x p la in e d b y F reud first in T he Neuro
psychoses o f Defense, c o rr o b o r a ted this a r g u m e n t. E x p la in in g hysterical
sym p tom s in a p atien t, lie n o tic e d h o w a n act, o r an id ea, e x p e r ie n c e o r
fe e lin g that is in c o m p a tib le w ith th e patien t's c o n s c ie n c e can b e sep arated
in th e p a tie n t’s m in d in to its id e a a n d th e a ffec t atta ch ed to it. F reud
e x p la in e d th at th e d istressin g a ffect activated a d e fe n s e m e ch a n ism that led
th e p a tie n t to w eak en th e id ea in h i s / h e r c o n s c io u s m in d a n d attach its
a ffect to o ilie r id e a s that w ere n o t in th e m se lv es c o m p a tib le , m a k in g a “false
c o n n e c tio n ” that la ter w o u ld b e e x p r essed in th e h ysterical p a tie n t (F reud,
1984, pp. 4 7 ,5 2 ) . W h at is k ey for th is d iscu ssio n is that th e affective in ten sity
o f a n id e a c a n b e d isp la c e d o n to o th e r ideas.
Later, F reu d p r e se n te d this p h e n o m e n o n in T he Interpretation o f the Dreams
in th e analysis o f th e “N on-vixit" a n d “B otanical m o n o g r a p h ” d ream s. In h is
analysis o f th e latter, F reud sh o w e d h o w th e e s s e n c e o f th e d rea m th o u g h t
did n o t n e e d to b e r ep re se n te d by th e c en tra l e le m e n ts o f th e m an ifest
d ream , o r in d e e d b e in th e d ream at all, d u e to (h e d etach ab ility o f th e idea

a n d its e m o tio n a l ch a rg e. An id e a ’s em p h a sis, in te re st, o r in ten sity can be
d e ta c h e d fr o m it a n d p a ssed o n to o th e r ideas. H e also sh o w e d h o w th ese
id eas c o u ld se e m to b e origin ally o f little in te n sity b u t rela ted to th e first
id ea by a c h a in o f association s. F reud n a m e d this m e ch a n ism “d isp la ce m en t,”
d e m o n str a tin g that, as w ith th e c o n d e n s a tio n m e c h a n ism , th e r e is n o su ch
a th in g as a d ir ec t an d d e te r m in e d r elation b e tw e e n a sig n ifier an d its
sig n ified in th e p r o c ess o f u n c o n sc io u s r ep re se n ta tio n .
T h e referral stru ctu re in th e o p e r a tio n o f p sych ical rep re se n ta tio n was
fu n d a m e n ta l. F reu d c o n tin u e d to d e v e lo p th e c o n c e p t o f association as a
th eo ry a b o u t the m en ta l apparatus. In o r d e r to ex p la in h o w p e r ce p tio n s
are r e c e iv e d by th e h u m a n m in d a n d th e n lin k ed to g e th e r in the m em ory,
h e stated:
It is a fam iliar fa c t that w e retain p e r m a n e n tly so m e th in g m o r e than the

m e r e c o n t e n t o f th e p e r c e p tio n s w h ich im p in g e u p o n th e system Pcpt.
O u r p e r c e p tio n s are lin k ed w ith o n e a n o th e r in o u r m em o ry — first and
fo r e m o st a c c o r d in g to sim u lta n eity o f o c c u r r e n c e . We sp eak o f th is fa c t its
“a sso cia tio n ” (1 9 6 5 , p. 5 7 7 ).
U s in g th e associative m o d e o f psych ical o p e r a tio n , h e e x p la in e d the

m e c h a n ism s o f c o n d e n s a tio n a n d d isp la ce m en t, d e m o n str a tin g again that
e v en th o u g h in d ream s w ish fu lfillm e n t is a d e te r m in e d p h e n o m e n o n ,
p sych ical lo g ic d o e s n o t w ork th r o u g h d e te r m in e d relation s.
f o r C astoriadis, th is p ossib ility th a t a d e te r m in e d p h e n o m e n o n cou ld
have a n u n d e te r m in e d structure is key to th e fu n c tio n in g o f th e p sy ch e and
its lo g ic, th e p ro d u cts o f w h ich c a n n o t b e e x p la in e d o r u n d e r sto o d on ly
th ro u g h d e te r m in e d param eters.
P hantasy a n d radical im agin ation : D iffe r e n c e s b e tw e en

F reud an d C astoriad is
C astoriadis r elie d th eo retica lly o n th e u n d e te r m in e d n a tu re of u n co n sc io u s

lo g ic initially c o n c e p tu a liz e d by F reud to d e m o n s tr a te h is ow n h yp oth esis
a b o u t th e m o d e o f b e in g o f th e p sych e a n d its r ep re se n ta tio n s, th o u g h he
d iffers fr o m F reu d in cru cial a sp ec ts w h en d e fin in g psych ical rep resen ta tio n .
C astoriadis writes:
T h e u n c o n sc io u s, F reud w r o te, is un aw are o f tim e an d o f con tra d ictio n .

T h is d iz zy in g th o u g h t, a m p lifie d a n d m a d e e v en m o r e in sisten t by F reu d ’s
en tire w ork, h as b e e n a lm o st en tirely n e g le c te d — w h en it has n o t b e e n

m a d e to say th e o p p o site o f w hat it states, by tr a n sfo r m in g t h e psychical
ap p aratu s in to a real m a c h in e ry o r by r e d u c in g it to a lo g ic a l structure.
T h e u n c o n sc io u s c o n stitu te s a “p la c e ” w h ere (id cn tita ry ) tim e— as d e te r
m in e d by an d as itse lf d e te r m in in g an o r d e r e d su cc e ssio n — d o e s n ot
exist, w h er e co n tra ries d o n o t e x c lu d e o n e a n o th er ; m o r e precisely, w h ere
th e r e can b e n o q u estio n o f c o n tra d icto ry te rm s a n d w h ich , itself, is n ot
really a p la c e sin c e p la c e im p lie s o r d e r a n d d istin c tio n . . . . T h e u n c o n
sciou s e x ists o n ly as an in d issociab ly r e p r e se n ta tiv e /a ffe c tiv e /in te n tio n a l
flu x (1 9 8 7 , p. 2 7 4 ).
T h is u n d e te r m in e d lo g ic is, f o r C astoriadis, th e r esu lt o f th e b e in g o f the

p sy ch e, w h ic h is itse lf th e g e n e sis o f r e p re se n ta tio n , a rep resen ta tio n that
c a n n o t b e d isso cia te d from a ffect an d in te n tio n . A n a ly zin g a d ream , as a
g r o u p o f r ep re se n ta tio n s w h o se associative path is u n avoid ab le an d n o t
d e te rm in a b le , an d w h ich is, by im p lication , ch aracterized by overdctcr-
m in a tio n 1 d em o n stra tes th e creative faculty an d th e w ork o f th e p sych e, w hich
instaurâtes sym b olism . T h e work o f d ie p sych e acts a s instaurator o f q u id pro
qu o: it h as th e capacity to s e e in o n e th in g a n o th e r th in g, th e capacity to
p o sit th at w h ich is n o t, to se e in s o m e th in g that w h ic h is n o t th ere.
In C astoriad is’ view, th e d rea m p r e se n ts th e u n c o n sc io u s rep resen ta tio n
as it is. R elyin g o n this a rg u m en t, C astoriadis fo c u se s o n analyzin g the
p ro b lem o f th e psych ical rep re se n ta tio n a n d w hat it im p lies. H e n o te s how:
In g e n e r a l . . . all “sep arate” r ep resen ta tio n s th at w ak in g lo g ic necessar

ily d istin g u ish e s are certa in ly fo r m e d starting fr o m a n d in r elation to a
m in u te n u m b e r o f arch aic r ep re se n ta tio n s w h ic h were th e w orld fo r the
p sy ch e, w h ic h have b e e n sep arated d u r in g th e lo n g w ork o f th e form a
tio n o f th e in d ivid u al fo r the ends o f aw ake existence an d w h ich in turn refer
u s b ack to th e e n ig m a o f a n o r ig in a l rep re se n tin g -r ep re se n ta tio n . (1987,
p . 2 7 6 ).
C astoriadis’’ r efo r m u la tio n o f psych ical r ep re se n ta tio n lea d s to the m ain

c o n c ep tu a l d iffe r e n c e s b etw een h im a n d F reu d . C astoriadis con sid e r s
psych ical r ep re se n ta tio n — w h ich h e n a m es “radical im agin ation "— to b e an
im m a n e n t c o n d itio n , facu lty o r prop erty o f th e p sy ch e, p r e se n t b e fo r e any
o r g a n iza tio n o f th e drives o r any “real” e x p e r ie n c e , a n d th an k s to w h ic h th e
h u m a n b e in g can create h i s / h e r in d ivid u al a n d so c ia l reality. T h e p sy ch e is
creative a n d exists in a n d th r o u g h w h at it form s a n d h o w it form s. C astoriadis
w rites a b o u t rep resen tation :
T h e r e is n o possibility o f u n d e rsta n d in g th e p r o b le m a tic o f rep resen tation

if w e se e k th e o r ig in o f rep re se n ta tio n o u ts id e o f rep re se n ta tio n itself.
T h e p sy c h e is, to b e su re, “th e recep tivity o f im p r e ssio n s,” d ie capacity o f
b e in g -a ffe cte d by . . b u t it is also, an d m o r e im p ortan tly . . . th e em er
g e n c e o f rep re se n ta tio n as an irred u cib le a n d u n iq u e m o d e o f b e in g and
as th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f s o m e th in g in a n d th r o u g h its figu ration , its “b e in g
p u t in to im ages." (1 9 8 7 , p. 2 8 3 ).
As m e n tio n e d , con trary to this is th e F reu d ian p o sitio n , w h ich is m u ch

c lo s e r to a b io lo g ic a l d e te rm in ism an d w h ic h su b m itte d psychical life to
o b jectiv e reality, F reu d stru ctu red his th e o r y o f th e p sy ch e by se e k in g “real”
factors th a t w o u ld a c c o u n t fo r its h istory a n d o r g a n iza tio n .7
T h is th e o r e tic a l d iffe r e n c e b e tw e en C astoriad is a n d F reu d rests o n th e
d e g r e e to w h ich e a ch a u th o r in terp rets r e p r e se n ta tio n as d e p e n d e n t o n
th e b io lo g ic a l-co r p o r ea l d im e n sio n . For F reu d th e real first a n n o u n c e s
itse lf in t h e p sy ch e th r o u g h th e u n p le a sa n t a ffec t o f h u n ger, to w h ich th e
c h ild r e sp o n d s, d raw in g th e traces o f th e real by h a llu c in a tin g th e breast in
o r d e r to re-estab lish th e sta te o f p sych ic tranquility. F or F reud th is is the
origin al “p h a n ta sm ic ” rep re se n ta tio n that b e c o m e s th e p r o to ty p e for all
fu r th e r p h a n ta sy fo rm a tio n . A gainst this, C astoriad is a rg u es that the
h a llu c in a te d b rea st is a sec o n d a r y ph antasy that p r e su p p o se s a phantasy-
p h a n tasm atization . In o th e r w ords, th e p r e e x iste n c e o f th e radical
im a g in a tio n in th e p sych e m akes th e ph an tasy p o ssib le .
T h is th e o r e tic a l d iffe r e n c e is m a n ife st in e a c h a u th o r ’s tr ea tm e n t o f
im a g in a tio n . C astoriadis a rg u es that im a g in a tio n takes o n a cen tral r o le in
F reu d ’s th e o r y w h en ph antasy b e c o m e s an in h e r e n t e le m e n t o f th e psychic
life th at o p e r a te s after th e reality p r in c ip le h as b e e n e sta b lish ed . W ith the
in tr o d u c tio n o f th e reality p rin cip le, a d iffe re n t k in d o f th o u g h t activity is
sep arated fr o m th e e x p e r ie n c e o f reality w ith in th e p sych e an d w h ich
r em a in s su b o r d in a te d to th e p lea su re p r in c ip le . F reu d e x p la in e d th e origin
o f th e se r ep re se n ta tio n s, as w ell as t h e reason s w hy th ey d o n o t p ro d u ce
sc e n e s o f b io lo g ic a lly c a n o n ic a l satisfaction, by first c o n sid e r in g possible
answ ers s u c h as the “real” o r ig in fo r the p le a sin g r ep re se n ta tio n , and
th ereafter d eriv in g p h a n ta sies from certain p h y lo g en etica lly co n stitu ted
origin al p h an tasies. T h is, C astoriadis b e lie v e s, w as h o w F reud u n co v e r ed
th e creative ch a r a cte r o f im a g in a tio n .
T h e d iffe r e n c e s b e tw e e n C astoriadis a n d F r e u d as th ey c o n c e p tu a liz e
im a g in a tio n (ph antasy) a n d rep re se n ta tio n h a v e sig n ifica n t o n to lo g ica l
con seq u en ces. T hrough e sta b lish in g th e se d iffe r e n c e s w ith F reud ,
C astoriadis is a b le to b u ild his c o n c e p t o f radical im a g in a tio n an d set the
basis for w h a t h e ca lls a n ew o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n . In o r d e r to d e v e lo p his

o n to lo g y C astoriad is r elies o n c e again o n his e la b o r a tio n s o f th e m o d e o f
b e in g o f th e u n c o n sc io u s a n d th e o r iz e s a n e w way o f th in k in g w h er e w h at is
d e te r m in e d a n d m easu rab le is th o u g h t an d c o n c e iv e d in a n d sim u lta n eo u sly
w ith in d eterm in acy. T o su p p ort th is origin al v iew C astoriadis p o s e s the
c o n c e p t o f a m agm atic lo g ic , w ith ou t, how ever, d e n y in g th e always p r e se n t
c n sid ic lo g ic , assertin g that th e w orld in c lu d e s w ith in itse lf a d im e n sio n that
n o t o n ly le n d s itse lf to (is c o m p a tib le w ith ) an e n sid ic orga n iza tio n , but
c o rr e sp o n d s to su ch a n o r g a n iza tio n . T o b e su r e , the w orld in d efin itely
le n d s itse lf to e n sid ic o rg a n iza tio n s b u t c a n n o t b e e x h a u ste d in th em ,
lea v in g r o o m for a sim u lta n e o u s m agm atic m o d e o f b e in g that en ta ils a
d iffe re n t lo g ic (C astoriadis, 1997c, p. 3 6 4 ).
C astoriad is d e fin e s m a g m a as a sui g e n e r is m o d e o f o rgan ization
b e lo n g in g to a n o n e n se m b list diversity, a m o d e o f c o e x iste n c e w ith an
o r g a n iza tio n th a t c o n ta in s fra g m en ts o f m u ltip le lo g ic a l o r g a n iza tio n s b u t
w h ich is n o t r ed u c ib le to a lo g ica l orga n iza tio n . A m agm a c o n ta in s sets but
it is n o t r e d u c ib le to a se t o r th e su m o f its parts (C astoriad is, 1997g, p. 12).
T h is n e o lo g is m refers to a m o d e o f b e in g that is e sse n tia lly in d ete rm in a te
an d that r u le s o u t t h e p ossib ility o f total d eterm in acy. It is n e ith e r structured
as su ch in to d istin ct, id en tica l item s a n d fin ite m u tu al rela tio n s, n o r it is
c o m p le te ly c h a o tic o r sh a p eless. It h as a d im e n s io n that le n d s itse lf to the
possibility o f stru ctu rin g it in to id en tica l e le m e n ts an d th e ir sets, in o th e r
w ords, “A m a g m a is that from w h ich o n e can e x tra c t (o r in w h ich o n e can
c on stru ct) a n in d e fin ite n u m b e r o f e n se m b list o r g a n iza tio n s b u t w h ich can
n e v e r b e r e c o n stitu te d (id eally) by a (fin ite o r in fin ite ) e n sc m b list
c o m p o sitio n o f th e se organizations." (C astoriad is, 1987, p. 4 3 4 ). It is
p o ssib le to u n d e rsta n d a m a g m a by th in k in g o f a m u ltip licity w h ic h is n o t
o n e in th e r e c eiv e d s e n s e o f th e term b u t w h ich w e m ark o u t as such; a n d
w h ich is n o t a m u ltip licity in th e se n s e that w e c o u ld actually o r virtually
e n u m e r a te w h at it c o n ta in s, b u t in w h ich it is p o ssib le to m ark o u t in e a ch
case term s rhat arc n o t a b so lu tely j u m b le d togeth er.
M agm atic lo g ic b e c o m e s pivotal fo r C astoriadis' o n to lo g y o f crea tio n as it
c o n c e p tu a liz e s a m o d e o f b e in g n o t totally su b je cte d to determ inacy. It
tack les th e u n a v o id a b le an d ev er p r e se n t in d e te r m in a te character, n o t on ly
o f psych ical rep re se n ta tio n an d th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s, b u t o f th e totality
o f th e e x istin g -b e in g , th e o n to lo g ic a l c o n d itio n o f w h ich is n o t c o m p lete ly
d e te r m in e d d e sp ite its e n sid ic d im e n sio n . F or C astoriad is ev ery th in g that is
a n d e v er y th in g that is c o n c eiv a b le is a m agm a (C astoriadis, 1997j, p. 2 9 9 ).
In su m , C astoriad is rew orks F reu d ian p sych oan alytical in sigh ts to p r o p o se
n e w fo u n d a tio n a l c o n c e p ts su ch as radical im a g in a ry a n d m agm a, w hile
se e k in g to q u estio n th e in h e r ite d d e te rm in istic o n to lo g y th a t has in fu sed

W estern th o u g h t— from P lato to th e p r e se n t— w h e r e every th in g that is, is
d e te r m in e d . By g ivin g a n ew o n to lo g ic a l statu s to th e radical im agin ation ,
C astoriadis o p e n s u p a w h o le n ew p ersp ective o n B e in g , w h er e rationalist
e sse n c e s a r e c o n te ste d an d c r e a tio n is w hat d e fin e s o u r n a tu re, history, and
so c ia l in stitu tio n s. B ased o n th e c o n c e p t o f th e rad ical im a g in a ry C astoriadis
a c co u n ts fo r th e totality o f th e e x istin g -b c in g , e x p la in in g h o w w e b e c o m e
h u m an s w ith in a circle o f creation .
T h e Existing-Being
It is on ly th r o u g h radical im a gin ation that h u m a n s b e c o m e social b ein g s

w h o relate t o the n o n so cia l. Even th o u g h w h en th e o r iz in g th e radical
im a g in a tio n C astoriadis d ista n ces h im se lf from b io lo g ic a l d e te rm in ism , he
n ever n e g le c ts th e stro n g tics b etw een th e h u m a n psyche an d physical,
b iological, corp oreal reality, o r o th e r reg io n s o f th e self. Castoriadis
c o n c e p tu a liz e s th e totality o f the e x istin g -b e in g w ith its d ifferen t strata o r
r eg io n s th r o u g h a Icaning-on relation sh ip . In C astoriadis' o n tology, the
e x istin g -b e in g co m p rises th e strata o f th e ph ysical o r natural, th e living-
b e in g , th e p sych ical, the social-ind ivid ual, the social-historic, a n d the
individual a n d c o llectiv e auton om y. C astoriadis p o stu la tes th e se strata as
h e te r o g e n e o u s an d irred u cib le to e a ch oth er, b u t e a c h as n ecessary to en a b le
th e e m e r g e n c e o f the o th ers as a c o m p le te ly n e w creation : e a c h le a n e d 0 11
th e o n e that c a m e b e fo r e. T h e term s “h e te r o g e n e o u s" a n d “irred u cib le”

have to b e u n d e rsto o d in the ligh t o f C astoriadis’ c o n c e p t o f creation , w h ere
a crea tio n is c o n c e iv e d as a c o m p lete ly n ew th in g w h o se e x is te n c e was n e ith e r
p r e d e ter m in ed by n o r was a logical c o n se q u e n c e o f the e x is te n c e o f a n o th er
stratum . H ow ever, th e e x isten ce o f o n e stratum e n a b le s th e e x isten ce o f the
n ext, w h ic h e m er g es as a crea tio n e x n ih ilo — w h ich im p lies n e ith e r creation
cu m n ih ilo (w ith ou t m ea n s a n d c o n d itio n s) o r in n ih ilo (w ith ou t any point
o f r e fe r e n c e ). T h e creation lea n s 0 1 1 w hat is given , is c o n d itio n e d an d lim ited
by it, b u t is n o t d e te r m in e d by it. (C astoriadis, 1983; 1993c, p. 5 ).
In b rea k in g with th e tradition al p h ilo so p h ic a l d eterm in istv iew , C astoriadis
fo rm u la tes th e lea n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n o r a c c o u n t o f crea tio n n o t a s a lin ear
p r o c ess o r a se q u e n c e o f in e v ita b le a n d p r o g ressiv e c o n se q u e n c e s. In stead,
c a ch stratum e m e r g e s a s a n ew c r e a tio n that is n e ith e r a lo g ic a l c o n se q u e n c e
n o r a r esu lt with a sp ec ific aim . Each stratum can b e d e fin e d a s a “fo r -itse ir,
m e a n in g th at e a c h fo r m s its ow n w orld, satisfying its o w n g o a ls th ro u g h
a u to -r efe r en ce a n d c lo s e d a u to-reflexive p attern s. A “for-itsclf” cre a tes its
ow n c lo s c d w orld in c r e a tin g itself, a n d vice versa. A “for-itself" h as th e

cap acity o f se lf-alteration a n d h as th r e e essen tia l fa c u ltie s w ith ou t w h ich it
w o u ld n o t e x is t as a livin g b ein g : in te n tio n o f c o n se r v a tio n an d r ep rod u ction ;
affect referred to p le a su r e /d isp lea su r e or a ttra c tio n /re p u lsio n ; an d r ep resen
tation . R e p r esen ta tio n h e r e d o e s n o t m e a n a p e r fe c t c o p y o f th e ex tern a l
w o r ld , b u t th e p r e se n ta tio n th ro u g h w h ich the liv in g b e in g cre a tes its ow n
w o r ld , s ta r tin g from w h at a r e m e r e e x te r n a l s h o c k s (C a sto ria d is, 19 9 2 ,
p . 16).
C astoriad is d escrib es d ie m u ltip licity o f reg io n s o r strata o f th e b e in g as
follow s:
(a) T h e livin g-b ein g. Every livin g b e in g , from th e sin g le cellu lar level o n
to th e m o st c o m p le x o rgan ism , can b e c o n sid e r e d as a “fo r-itself’. T h e
liv in g -b ein g involves th e r efo r e a natural a n d b iological d im e n sio n .
As a “fo r-itself’, d ie livin g b e in g c a n n o t r e p r e se n t its e lf o u t o f its
ow n interior. A “fo r-itself’ c a n n o t b e c o n c e iv e d e x c e p t from w ithin. It
exists in a n d th ro u g h a p e r m a n e n t clo su re. H ow ever, its c lo su r e d o es
n o t m e a n th at th e r e is n o th in g “o u ts id e ”; c erta in ly th e r e is. T h e “for-
itse lf' e n c o u n te r s th e e x ter n a l th r o u g h w h a t C astoriadis calls a sh ock .
In C astoriad is’ view, n atu re d o e s n o t c o n ta in in form ation w aitin g to
b e g a th e r e d , it on ly a n n o u n c e s its p r e se n c e th r o u g h a s h o c k that d o e s
n o t m e a n in fo rm a tio n in th e strict se n se . T h e “for-itself* e n c o u n te r s
th e e x te r n a l, w h ich b e c o m e s so m e th in g o n ly a s th e for-itself fo rm s it.
T h is c a n b e c a lle d th e c o g n itiv e fu n c tio n o f th e livin g b e in g .
(b) T h e h u m a n p sy ch e. T h e h u m an p sych e is n o t d e fin e d by Castoriadis
as a h o m o g e n o u s w h o le , b u t as a plu rality th a t c o n ta in s variou s intra-
p sych ical “in sta n ce s” o r “p sych ical p e r so n s.” It refers in psych oan a
lytical term s to t h e e g o , id, a n d th e su p er-ego.
T h e sp ec ific ity o f th e h u m a n p sych e c o n sists in its d efu n ctio n a l-
iz a tio n in r ela tio n to iLs b io lo g ic a l c o m p o n e n t. In o th e r w ords, the
h u m a n p sy ch e d o c s n o t fo llo w fu n c tio n a l c a n o n ic p a ttern s that
r e s p o n d to b io lo g ic a l fu n ctio n s. It is in th e h u m a n p sych e w h ere the
rad ical im a g in a tio n a n d its q u id p ro q u o facu lty o p e r a te , e n a b lin g
u n fix e d r ep re se n ta tio n s a n d n o n c a n o n ic a l r esp o n ses, e n ta ilin g the
p r e d o m in a n c e o f rep resen ta tio n a l p lea su re o v er organ p leasu re.8
T h e h u m a n p sy ch e e x p e r ie n c e s a stratification p ro cess, fr o m a clo sed
m o n a d to a social ind ivid u al, as b riefly e x p la in e d later.
(c ) T h e s o c ia l ind ivid u al. T h is is th e in d ivid u al u n d e r sto o d as a social
p r o d u c t. It is th e tran sform ation o f th e h u m a n p sy ch e by society.
Society p ro d u ces social su bjects by p r o v id in g se n se , m e a n in g , o r
sig n ifica tio n to th e h u m a n psyche. As alread y said , b o th so c iety and

p sy c h e are irred u cib le, but also in d isso cia b le: so ciety m ust provide
so c ia l s e n s e in o r d e r fo r th e p sy ch e to survive; th e p sych e c a n n o t
live u n le ss it is so cia lized . T o b e su re, in d ivid u als are m a d e by so ciety
(C astoriadis, 1991c, p. 6 1 ).
(d ) T h e so c ie ty o r social-h istorical. S o c iety is c r e a te d by w h at C astoriadis
calls an a n o n y m o u s h u m a n c o lle ctiv e. It is a c r e a tio n th a t n o o th e r
o r d e r can a c co m p lish . T h e social-h istorical h a s tw o p oles: th e h u m an
p sy c h e an d society. T h e h u m a n p sy ch e is a social; it is n o t p r e d e stin e d
by n a tu r e to b e so cia lized . H ow ever, it b e c o m e s so c ia liz ed th rou gh
th e im p o sitio n o f society. It is th e social-h istorical th a t m akes it p os
sib le fo r a so c ie ty to stay to g e th e r a n d r e p r o d u c e itse lf th r o u g h o u t
tim e . T h is a m o u n ts to saying that th e h u m a n b e in g is a cre a tio n , that
it c r e a te s itse lf th r o u g h so ciety a n d vice versa.
( e ) T h e in d ivid u al a n d c o lle ctiv e au ton om y. A u to n o m y is o n ly p os
sib le th ro u g h se lf-re fle ctio n , d e lib e r a te se lf-g o v er n m e n t, a n d self-
tran sform ation in b o th th e in d ivid u al p sy c h e a n d society. As a social
in d iv id u a l, th e a u to n o m o u s su b je ct c a n b e c o m e s o o n ly th r o u g h
so c ia l in stitu tio n s that fo ste r an d e n a b le a u to n o m y . T h is is n o t to say
that su ch in stitu tio n s “c o m e first” o r that th e y n ecessa rily p r o d u ce
a u to n o m o u s su b jects. A u to n o m o u s su b jects a n d in stitu tio n s are
in te r d e p e n d e n t, how ever, as d isc u sse d later, n e ith e r in d ivid u al n or
c o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y is a fin ish e d sta g e o r sp ec ific state. A u to n o m y
r efe r s to a n e n d le ss p r o c ess by w h ic h b o th in d iv id u a ls a n d so c ie ty are
p u t in to q u estio n b e fo r e th em selv es an d a r c ab le to create n ew social
fo r m s a n d n ew a n d d iffe re n t subjectivities.
C astoriadis d e v e lo p s in m o r e d etail his e x p la n a tio n ab ou t th e totality o f the

e x is tin g b e in g u sin g th e a n la g e o r " lean in g on " e x p la n a tio n , d iscu ssin g
p ro p erties a n d p r o c e sse s taken p la c e in th e d iffe r e n t strata m e n tio n e d .9
H ow ever, e v e n th o u g h it is n o t p ossib le to th in k a b o u t th e h u m a n su bject
a n d so c ie ty w h ile ig n o r in g an y o f th e se strata, I a m fo c u s in g o n p rocesses
th at d ir ec tly d e a l with the h u m a n su b je ct fr o m t h e in c e p tio n o f its psyche
in to society· to its form s o f auton om y.
A c c o r d in g to th e an la g e o r “le a n in g o n ” e x p la n a tio n , th e su b je ct is a
so c ia l p r o d u c t, it c a n n o t ex ist o u ts id e society. In o r d e r fo r th e in d ivid u al to
b e c o m e a su b ject, its p sych e m ust c o m e in to th e so c ia l in stitu tio n s th rou gh
an im p o s e d a n d “u n n atu ral” stratification p r o c e s s a n d b e c o m e socialized .
O n c e a g a in , C astoriadis follow s F re u d ia n c o n c lu s io n s that are r e in te rp re ted
u n d e r n e w a n d d iffe re n t th e o r etica l p rin cip les.
T h e stra tifica tio n o f h u m a n psyche
C astoriadis resp o n d s to th e q u estio n : “h o w d o w e b e c o m e hu m ans?” by

u sin g th e lea n in g -o n ex p la n a tio n , w h er e d iffe r e n t reg io n s o r strata o f the
b e in g e m e r g e as n ew c rea tio n s that d o n o t fo llo w a n e n tire ly p r e d e te r m in e d
lo g ic o r p rogram . In th e ca se o f th e h u m a n p sy ch e, th is m e a n s th a t it is n ot
“naturally o r d a in e d ” to b e c o m e social. N e v er th e less, th ro u g h a p r o c ess o f
stratification th e h u m a n p sy ch e h a s to “e n te r ” so c ie ty o r risk d yin g. A n d
e v en th o u g h th e p sych e n ever gives u p its private w orld entirely, so ciety will
im p o se it s e lf o n it th r o u g h su b se q u e n t stages to w h ic h I w ill o n ly su ccin ctly
refe r h e r e .1"
F rom birt h th e h u m a n p sych e su ffers a p rocess o f stra tifica tio n , u n d e r g o in g
several stages. T h is stratification b eg in s as a c lo s e d m o n a d that bu rsts apart
d u r in g a triad ic p h a se a n d passes th ro u g h a n O e d ip a l sta g e, e n d in g as a
social in d ivid u al. T h is o ccu rs th r o u g h th e su b lim a tio n p ro cess, w h ic h can
o n ly take p la c e by m e a n s o f essen tia l c o n d itio n s th a t are rigorou sly ex tern a l
to it. S u b lim a tio n is th e taking u p o f psych ical fo r m s that are socially
in stitu te d or, in o th e r w ords, it is th e a p p rop riation o f th e so c ia l by the
p sy ch e th r o u g h th e c o n stitu tio n o f an in te rfa c e b e tw e en its private w orld
a n d the p u b lic o r c o m m o n w orld . By m e a n s o f su b lim a tio n , th e p sych e will
resh a p e its o w n drives b ased o n social c o n te n ts (C astoriad is, 1992, p. 8 ).
T h e m o n a d ic stage is ch aracterized as an a u tistic o n e ." H ere, th e su bject
c a n o n ly r e fe r to itself, a n d is u n a b le to p o sit a d istin c tio n w ith resp e ct to
itse lf an d e v er y th in g e lse. T h e r e is n o way o f se p a r a tin g r ep re se n ta tio n from
p e r c e p tio n o r sen sa tio n . T h e baby id e n tifie s itse lf a s th e breast, estab lish in g
n o d iffe re n tia tio n b e tw e en itself a n d th e m o th e r (o r h e r su b stitu te). T h e
baby e x p e r ie n c e s itse lf as o m n ip o te n t, in th e s e n s e that it is th e on ly so u rce
to satisfy’ its n e e d s, th e o n ly so u r c e o f p leasu re. T h is is the n atu re o f the
in itial p sy ch ica l m o n a d , w h ic h is c lo s e d u p o n itself, ab so lu tely e g o c e n tr ic ,
a n d a ll-p ow erfu l, a n d w h ich lives in th e fe lt e x p e r ie n c e o f th e original
id e n tity in w h ic h I= p leasu re= m ean in g= everyth in g= b ein g. T h is e x p e r ie n c e
im p in g e s o n th e h u m a n p sych e in a way th a t th e ph an tasy-scen e attem p ts
to r e p r o d u c e it a s b est it ca n , w h en ev e r it is p o ssib le . W h en this state o f
autism is b r o k e n by th e p r e se n c e o f th e “other" a n d sep a ra te o b jects, the
su b je ct r e s p o n d s by tryin g to r e c o n s titu te this in itia l w orld in term in a b ly
in p h an tasies.
O n c e th e p sych e h as b rok en u p its m o n a d ic sta g e , it w ill b e fo r ev e r throw n
o ff-ce n te r in r ela tio n to iLself: “o r ie n te d in te rm s o f that w h ich it is n o
lo n g e r . . . the psyche is its ow n lost object” (C astoriad is, 198 7 , p p . 2 9 6 - 7 ) . But
e v en th o u g h th is aim reig n s in th e fu llest a n d m ost in tractab le m a n n e r over
th e u n c o n sc io u s p rocess, th e p sych e m ust a c c e p t th is im p o sitio n — th o u g h

n o t c o m p le te ly — in o r d e r to b e in c lu d e d in th e w orld .
T h e fo llo w in g p h a se is th e triadic p h a se th a t b e g in s as th e m o n a d is
b rok en by t h e im p o sitio n o f th e o th e r (o th e r n e ss) o n th e su bject. T h is
o c c u r s th r o u g h a se r ie s o f b reak s in flic te d o n th e psych ical m o n a d , by
m e a n s o f w h ic h th e social in d ivid u al is c o n str u c te d as d ivid ed b e tw e en the
m o n a d ic p o l e 12 a n d th e series o f e x ter n a l c o n str u c tio n s im p o se d o n it. T h e
su ccessive fo r m a tio n s o f th e su b ject, w h ich m u st grad u ally e x te n d , take into
a c c o u n t b o th th e sep a ra tio n an d th e diversity im p o s e d o n th e p sy ch e, and
w h ich e x is t on ly as attem p ts to h o ld th is diversity togeth er. T h e se d ifferen t
restru ctu rin g ph ases c a n n o t b e se e n as d e v e lo p m e n ta l stages. T h e y im ply
th at th e p sy ch e m u s t b e c o n tin u a lly restr u c tu r e d a r o u n d the m on ad
n u cle u s. T h u s , th e r e arc m u ltip le in sta n ce s in th e h u m a n p sy ch e that
c o e x ist in c o n flic t, th o u g h n o t in total o p p o sitio n . In th e p sych ical apparatus
th e r e w ill b e a te n d e n c y tow ard c lo su r e o f e a ch in sta n c e , b u t at th e sam e
tim e a relative o p e n in g o f that clo su re. It is th is m o d e o f th e p sych e b e in g
in flu x that C astoriadis r e fe rr ed as m agm atic.
D u r in g th e triadic p h ase th e p sych e h a s to g ive u p its o r ig in a l o m n ip o te n c e
in o r d e r to "accept" th e oth er. Initially, th e baby c a n on ly grasp th e o th e r by
m e a n s o f th e s o le sc h e m a available: th e m o n a d ic sc h e m a o f o m n ip o te n c e .
In c o n s e q u e n c e , the im age o f the o th e r th a t g e ts c o n stitu te d th is way is,
th e r efo r e, t h e p ro jectio n o f th e baby's ow n im a g e o f itself. In th e triadic
p h a se th e b a b y ’s early imaginary' o m n ip o te n c e o v er t h e breast is forcibly
d isp la c e d b y th e o th e r — by the breast that tu rn s o u t to b e so m e tim e s
u n availab le. T h e baby th en p rojects o n to th e o th e r th e im agin ary sc h e m a
o f o m n ip o te n c e a n d esta b lish es th e fu n d a m e n ta l pattern o f ph antasy that
in c lu d e s th e su b ject, th e o b je c t, a n d the oth er. T h is triadic p h a se rep resen ts
o n ly th e first ste p in th e p sy ch e’s so c ia liz a tio n , in th e se n s e that th e p sych e
gives u p its o m n ip o te n c e . H ow ever, so c ia liz a tio n is on ly relative b ecau se
o m n ip o te n c e is sim p ly p r o je c te d o n t o th e o th er. T h e p sych e k e e p s this
im agin ary o th e r w ithin its grasp, c o n tin u in g to c o n tr o l th e o th e r th rou gh
its w ish es in ph antasy (C astoriadis, 1983, p p . 305—9 ).
It is n o t u n til th e O e d ip a l p h a se that the c h ild m u st c o n fr o n t a state o f
affairs that can n o lo n g e r b e m a n ip u la ted at w ill. It is at th is sta g e that th e
c h ild h as t o a ccep t th e e x is te n c e o f a n e x ter n a l, n o n c o n tr o lla b le "reality”
a n d is fa c e d w ith th e n e e d to j o in th e social w orld th a t is b e in g im p o se d . T h e
o th e r — th e m o th e r o r its su bstitu te— strips h e r s e lf o f h e r o m n ip o te n c e by
r e fe r r in g h e r s e lf to a th ir d party, s ig n ify in g to t h e c h ild th at h e r d e sir e
h a s a d iffe r e n t o b je c t th a n th e c h ild itself, a n d fu r th e r m o r e th a t s h e is the
o b je c t o f th e fa th e r ’s d e sir e. By in c lu d in g a th ir d party, th e m o th e r c ed es
o m n ip o te n c e to it. T h is third party will in turn sign ify to th e c h ild that no

o n e is a b solu tely o m n ip o te n t. It is th ro u g h th is m o v e m e n t that the c h ild is
fo r c e d to r e c o g n iz e the oth er, a n d h u m a n o th e r s, a s su bjects o f a u to n o m o u s
d esire w h o c a n in terrelate with o n e a n o th er in d e p e n d e n tly o f his or her will.
T h r o u g h th is u n d ersta n d in g the c h ild is th e n r e fe rr ed to so c iety as su ch , to
d ie c o lle ctiv e social in stitu tio n o f sig n ifica tio n (Ib id .). T h e O ed ip a l stage sets
b e fo r e th e c h ild th e u n avoid ab le fact o f th e social institution as th e grou n d
o f sig n ifica tio n , m ak in g th e c h ild realize that sig n ifica tio n d o e s n ot d e p e n d
u n iq u ely o n an y p articu lar p erso n . It is in th is w ay d ia l th e c h ild is ab le to
accom p lish th e su b lim ation p rocess, w h ich is n o th in g m o r e than b e c o m in g
socialized w ithin th e im agin ary in stitu tion o f h i s / h e r ow n society,
T h e m o n a d /m o n a d ic stage as a m a in p h a se in th e psych ical stratification
p rocess p o s e d by C astoriadis has b e e n m u ch d e b a te d . W hite-book's (1995,
p p . 177, 196, 197) m a in criticism referred to th e te n sio n e x is tin g b etw een
the m o n a d ic an d d ie social-h istorical. W h ite b o o k fo u n d th e radical
h e te r o g e n e ity that C astoriadis p o stu la tes b e tw e en th e se tw o th eoretically
in c o n siste n t. For W h ite b o o k it is n ecessary to f in d a d isp o sitio n in the
psych ical m o n a d th at e n a b le s its a ccess to th e so c ia l o r d e r w ith o u t im p lyin g
a v io le n t im p o sitio n o v er th e p sych e. In W h ite b o o k ’s view , C astoriadis has
drawn th e p ro d u ctiv e p o w er o f im a g in a tio n s o stro n g ly that h e c a n n o t
e lu cid a te th e m o n a d b reak u p . F rom th is a r g u m e n t, o th e r d ie o re tic a l fau lts
derive. A d ir e c t c o n se q u e n c e is that C astoriadis c a n n o t ultim ately avoid a
p sych oan alytically fo rm u la ted version o f su b jective id ealism . T h a t is, if the
p sy ch e p r o d u c e s ev ery th in g o u t o f itself, th e r e w o u ld b e n o way in w h ic h it
c o u ld m e e t an y th in g d iffe re n t from itse lf a n d its ow n p rod u cts. A n d
ad d ition ally, in a certain way, C astoriad is falls in to th e sa m e lin e o f th in k in g
o f Kant. G iven his lack o f e x p la n a tio n o f h o w th e p sy ch e le n d s itse lf to
so c ia liz a tio n , “th e fit b etw een p sy ch e a n d society rests o n n o m o r e than a
‘lu ck y’ a c c id e n t” (W h iteb ook , 1995, p. 197).
T h e s e critic ism s ig n o r e C astoriadis’ lea n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n a n d the way
h e e lu c id a te s th e rela tio n s a m o n g d ifferen t strata in th e c ir cle o f creation .
The id e a of lea n in g -o n c o n te sts trad ition al d e te rm in istic relation s
esta b lish ed b e tw e en p s y c h e /s o m a a n d p s y c h e /so c ie ty . T h e c o n c e p t o f
crea tio n d e fin e s th e n ew e m e r g e n c e o f o n e stratum from anoth er,
irred u cib le b u t in d isso c ia b le . As a crea tio n a stratum is s o m e th in g en tirely
n e w that d o e s n o t e m e r g e as a r efle c tio n o f a p rev io u s in stan ce, o r as a
rep ro d u c tiv e tran sform ation o r sim p le c o m b in a tio n o f e le m e n ts p r e se n t in
a p r e c e d in g stage.
B e in g is c r e a tio n , w h at C astoriadis ca lls a vis f o r m a n d P o r fo r ce o f for
m ation th a t is n ever c o m p lete ly e m b e d d e d o r e x h a u ste d in a d eterm in ate
se t o f form s. U n d e te r m in e d création , how ever, d o c s n ot m ean u n c o n d i

tio n e d , d e ta c h e d , o r w ith o u t con strain ts a n d rela tio n s. C reation in th e strict
se n s e p o s e s n ew laws th at are c o n d itio n e d b u t w h ic h are a-causal an d are n o t
e n tire ly d e te r m in e d . In o th e r w ords, it refers to a faculty o f m ak in g b e, o f
b rin g in g o u t o f a “fo r-itself’, n ew m o d e s o f b e in g , d e te rm in a tio n s, a n d laws
th at w ill h e n c e fo r th b e that s e l f s laws, d e te rm in a tio n s, a n d m o d e s o f b e in g .
u n d e r c e r ta in c o n d itio n s th e “in o r g a n ic ” c a n p r o d u c e th e “o r g a n ic ”: the
living b e in g b rings a b o u t th e a p p ea r a n c e o f laws a n d q u a lities that, as
su c h , h a v e n o m e a n in g in th e physical realm . It is im m ed ia te ly e v id e n t that
th e e m e r g e n c e o f the b e in g -fo r-itself (th e livin g b e in g , p sy ch e, th e social-
h istorical) e n ta ils a n essen tia l fr a g m e n ta tio n o f (otal B e in g /b e in g . . .T h e
fact o f c r e a tio n also h as w eighty o n to lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n . . . it en ta ils the
a b a n d o n m e n t o f the h yp er c a teg o r y o f d e te r m in a c y as a b so lu te . . . b u t it
is a lo g ica l error to th in k . . . that d u e to th is fact o n e m ust rep lace this
h y p er c a te g o iy by th e id ea o f a b so lu te a n d c o m p le te in d ete rm in a tio n .
My p h ilo so p h y is n o t a “p h ilo so p h y o f in d é te r m in a tio n .” C rea tio n m ean s,
precisely, th e p o s itin g o f n ew d e te r m in a tio n s— th e e m e r g e n c e o f new
form s, e id e , th e r e fo r e ip so fa c to th e e m e r g e n c e o f n ew laws— th e laws
a p p e r ta in in g to th e se m o d e s o f b e in g . A t the m o s t g e n e ra l level, th e id ea
o f c r e a tio n im p lie s in d éte rm in a tio n u n iq u ely o n ly in th e fo llo w in g sense:
th e totality o f w hat is n e v e r s o totally a n d ex h a u stiv e ly “d e te r m in e d ” that
m ig h t e x c lu d e (r e n d e r im p o ssib le) th e su r g in g fo r th o f n e w d e te rm in a
tio n s (1 9 9 7 c , pp. 3 6 8 -9 ).
C astoriadis adds:
W hat is th is “s e lf' that m akes itse lf b e, w ith ou t “yet" b e in g a d eterm in ate

s o m e th in g , b u t w h ic h is g o in g to d e te r m in e its e lf th u s a n d n o t otherw ise?
T h is is w h at I call th e g r o u n d less, th e C h aos, t h e Abyss o f th e (sin g u la r or
c o lle c tiv e ) h u m a n b e in g (ibid., p. 4 0 4 ).
C reation p r e su p p o s e s th e c h a o s from w h ich it e m er g es; it e m e r g e s to cover

that c h a o s that n e v e rth eless m an ifests itse lf in an d th r o u g h su ch an
e m e r g e n c e by c o n tin u in g to b e th e so u r c e o f its p e r m a n e n t alteration s.
T h is is w h a t th e c ir cle o f crea tio n is ab ou t, it c a n n o t a c co u n t for an origin ,
fo u n d a tio n o r c a u se o th e r th a n itself, w h ich is its o w n o r ig in . It d o e s n ot
p o s e an y k in d o f o p p o sitio n b e tw e en strata th a t w o u ld n o t p e r m it new
cre a tio n . T h e e m e r g e n c e o f th e livin g-b ein g m a k es e v id e n t th e irred ucible
ch aracter b e tw e e n th e p h ysical an d th e liv in g -b ein g strata, w h er e a I Ieg elia n

syn thesis is n o t p o ssib le , n ot th in k a b le. Strata c a n n o t b e c u t o r se p a r a ted as
d istin ct u n its, its in the ca se fo r e x a m p le , o f th e p h y sica l a n d th e b io lo g ica l,
w h ich are irr ed u c ib le b u t w h ich in th e totality o f c x istin g -b e in g c a n n o t be
th o u g h t o r c o n c e iv e d separately. C reation n o n e th e le s s p r e su p p o ses u n io n
a n d te n sio n in th e n e w e m e r g e n c e o f alterity, a d iffe re n tia tio n and
h e te r o g e n e ity that m akes itse lf o th e r than itself.
U n d e r sta n d in g b e in g as crea tio n p rovid es a n ew way to th e o r iz e the
te n sio n b e tw e e n p sych e an d society. T h e social fab ricates individuals, and
individuals a r e n o th in g but society. C astoriadis d o c s n ot postu late an ab solu te
polarity b etw een th e in d ivid u al a n d society, b u t a polarity b e tw e en psyche
a n d so ciety that is dynam ic. H e d o e s n o t p o stu la te a c o n tr a d ictio n b etw een
antithetical pail's th ro u g h w h ich syn thesis will p r o d u c e a n e w th in g.
O p p o sitio n s are c o n c e iv e d sim ultaneously, an d o n e e le m e n t refers t o the
o th e r in a c ir cle o f creation . T h e n ew creation s, th e n ew e m e r g e n c e s, are n o t
c o n se q u e n c e s, b u t rather new strata o f th e cx istin g -b ein g , radically d ifferen t
an d irr ed u c ib le to the previou s o n e s. C astoriadis an sw ered th e q u estion : can
the sa m e p r o d u c e a c o m p le te ly d ifferen t “other," b y e sta b lish in g a d ifferen ce
b etw een th e n e w u n d e rsto o d as a c o n s e q u e n c e (a n y p ossib le c o m b in a tio n o f
p reviou s e le m e n ts) an d th e n ew as a real oth er, a n alterity. C reation , as
C iaram elli (1 9 9 7 , p . 45) correctly puLs it, is a m a tter o f th in k in g, as th e very
ad ven t o f B e in g , th e m o v e m e n t o f an origin al self-p resu p p osition w h ereb y
w hat is su r g e s forth starting from an alteration o f itse lf a n d th erefore
p r o c ee d s fr o m a "self” that is n o t yet w h at it is g o in g lo b e c o m e.
C reation d o c s n o t necessarily p r o c e e d from so m e th in g e lse a n d d o e s n ot
have its o r ig in so m e w h er e e lse, it h as w ithin itse lf p recisely th e o n to lo g ica l
e n e r g y to d e ta c h itself fr o m itself a n d to e x is t its o r ig in . In th is se n se , the
o n to lo g ic a l g e n e sis is to b e e lu c id a te d as creation .
S p ec ific a lly r eferrin g to th e r elation o f p sy c h e to society, Castoriadis
writes:
[T h e p sy ch e] at all its stages carries th e traces o f its p o in t o f o r ig in , o f

a n in itial sta le in w h ich su b ject, w orld, a ffec t, in te n tio n , c o n n e c tio n ,
m e a n in g arc th e sa m e. T h e social ind ivid u al, a s so c iety p r o d u c e s h im , is
in c o n c e iv a b le “w ith o u t th e u n c o n sc io u s”; th e in stitu tio n o f society, w h ich
is in d isso c ia b le from th e in stitu tio n o f the so c ia l in d ivid u al, is the im p o si
tion o n th e p sych e o f an org a n iza tio n w h ich is e sse n tia lly h e te r o g e n e o u s
w ith it— b u t it to o , in its tu rn , “leans on" th e b e in g o f t h e p sy ch e (and
h e r e a g a in the term “le a n in g -o n ” takes o n a d iffe r e n t c o n te n t) an d m ust,
un avoidably, "take it in to a c c o u n t” (1 9 8 7 , p. 2 9 8 ).
P sych c a n d so c icty c a n n o t b e th o u g h t o f separately. It is n o t a m atter o f

e sta b lish in g im m a n e n t p o te n tia litie s in th e p sy ch e, o r a m e d ia tio n betw een
th e tw o. R a th er th e in d ivid u al is so c ia l, a fr a g m e n t a s it is e a c h tim e in stitu ted
(C astoriadis, 1997c, p. 377).
T h e p sy c h e is in n o way p r e d e stin e d by n a tu re to society, as C astoriadis
w rites, m a k in g r e fe r e n c e to th e A ristotelian p o stu la te a b o u t th e psyche
e x is tin g o n ly as “form ” o r “e n te le c h y ”:
T h e p sy ch e is a fo r m in s o far as it is f o r m in g ,. . . th e “e n te le c h y ” in q u es
tion h e r e is s o m e th in g en tirely d iffe re n t from th e p r e d e te r m in e d pred es
tin ation i n view o f an e n d , a d e fin ite telos. . . th is “e n te le c h y ” is th e radical
im a g in a tio n , p h a n ta sia su b jected to n o given e n d b u t the c r e a tio n o f its
e n d s , . . . th e living b o d y is th e h u m a n livin g b o d y in s o far as it rep resen ts
a n d r ep re se n ts itself, . . . it puts th in g s an d itse lf in to “im a g es” far b eyon d
w h at w o u ld b e r e q u ire d o r im p lie d by its “n a tu r e ” a s livin g b e in g . For the
living h u m a n bod y, that is to say, originally, for th e psych ical m o n a d , all
e x ter n a l calls, all e x ter n a l o r in tern al “sen sorial stim u la tio n s,” all “im p res
s io n s” b e c o m e representations (1 9 8 7 , p p . 3 0 0 - 1 ) .
Society, th e cu ltu r e p h e n o m e n o n , c a n n o t b e c o n sid e r e d a p re d e ter m in ed

te lo s fo r th e p sy ch e. T o su stain the contrary w o u ld b e to d e n y th e e x isten ce
o f radical im a g in a tio n an d its o n to lo g ic a l status.
T h is a r g u m e n t also in d ica tes h o w C astoriadis is n o t su sta in in g th e K antian
p o stu la te in r ela tio n to “th e lu ck y accident." It is th r o u g h rep resen ta tio n
that th e h u m a n b e in g has access to t h e w orld to u t cou rt. T h is d o c s not
m e a n that fo r C astoriadis n o th in g e lse exists b u t r e p re se n ta tio n . It w as Kant
w h o s h ift e d o u t the a p riori c o n d itio n o f e x p e r ie n c e , w h o b e lie v e d it was
so le ly o n t h e sid e o f th e su b ject, fo r g e ttin g that th e r e are also c o n d itio n s o f
e x p e r ie n c e o n th e sid e o f th e “o b je c t,” an d p la c e d ev ery th in g u n d e r the
sig n o f necessity. In C astoriadis' view, th e r e is n o se n s e in cla im in g to be
ab le to b r in g t h e u ltim ate facts u n d e r an y sort o f “necessity,” n o r in ca llin g
“a c c id e n t” that w h ich is n ea r o r far from th e c o n tin g e n t a n d the necessary,
w ith in w h ic h a lo n e th e c o n tin g e n t a n d the n ec essa ry are e ffectively actual
a n d th in k a b le (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 c , p. 3 6 6 ).
In C astoriadis' theory, p sy ch e a n d so ciety are m u tu a lly con stitu tive and.
thanks to L h e radical im a g in a tio n a n d its r ep re se n ta tio n a l capacity, both
can b e fa b rica ted as so cio-h istorical p rod u cts. T h e way C astoriadis th e o r iz es
th is asp ect, r e f le c t s t h e o r ig in a lity o f h is w o rk , w h e r e , a s d is c u s s e d la te r
in g r e a te r d e p th , n o t io n s s u c h a s th e so c ia l-h is to r ic a l a n d t h e im a g i
nary in stitu te d /in s titu tin g pow er c o m e in to his th e o r etica l fram ew ork to
c o n so lid a te a th e o r y o f c r e a tio n o f society, its r e p r o d u c tio n , its clo su re, a n d

its e m a n c ip a to ry potentiality.
T h e Social-Historical as th e A nonym ous

Collective’s C reation
P sy ch e an d so c iety
S u m m in g u p a n im p o r ta n t c o n c lu s io n o f th e p r e v io u s s e c tio n , it is cle a r
th at C a sto rid ia n th e o r y d o c s n o t take t h e su b je c t sim p ly as a “real” en tity
o r a s a n a b s o lu te g iv e n . T h e su b ject h as to b e “m a d e," it is a so c ia l a n d
h isto r ic a l c r e a tio n that b e c o m e s p o s sib le th a n k s to th e so c ia liz a tio n a n d
su b lim a tio n p r o c e sse s that th e n e o n a te h as to c o n fr o n t. S ociety, in the
le a n in g -o n th eory, is a n e c e ssa r y stra tu m for t h e su b je ct to su rvive, an d for
th e p sy c h e to fin d th e r e q u ir e d s e n s e fo r its fu n c tio n in g . C astoriad is
w rites:
. . . th e r e m u s t b e a so c ie ty in e x iste n c e , s o th a t th e se in e p t a n d in sa n e
b e in g s [n e o n a te h u m a n s] can survive a n d b e c o m e h u m a n , an d th e r e is
n o th in g in th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s cap ab le o f p r o d u c in g th e basic char
acteristics o f e v e iy society, that is, in stitu tio n s a n d im agin ary sig n ifica
tio n s. T h e psych e c a n n o t b e r ed u c ed to so ciety , e v en if th e socialized
su b ject is a lm o st n o th in g b u t su ccessive layers o f so c ia liz a tio n , b u t the
psych e a s su ch , in its d e p th , c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d o r c o n fin e d to so ciety
an d so c ie ty c a n n o t b e c o n fin e d to th e p sych e b e c a u se , y e t again , th e r e is
n o th in g w ith in th e h u m a n u n c o n sc io u s that can p r o d u ce in stitu tio n s-----
T h e o n ly th in g o n e can say is that th e r e m u st b e so m e so r t o f co rr esp o n
d e n c e b e tw e en th e d e m a n d s o f th e p sych e an d th e d e m a n d s o f society.
T h is c o r r e s p o n d e n c e is r e d u c e d to th e fact th a t in stitu tio n s a n d social
im a g in a ry sig n ifica tio n s m u st o ffe r m e a n in g to the so cializab le psyche;
th a t is, th ey m u st create for th e p sy ch e a daily w orld w h er e . . . distin ctive
h u m a n b e in g s e xist, w h ere all th e se are c o m b in e d an d in tertw in ed , a n d
w h ere, f o r th e socializable su b ject itself , life a n d e v e n d eath have a m e a n in g
(20 1 0 a , p . 156).
D e sp ite th e fact that so c ie ty w orks o n th e in d iv id u a l p sy ch e to p r o d u c e the

su b je c t, s o c ie ty is n o t m e r e ly t h e su m o f in d iv id u a l p sy ch es. S o c ie ty is
th e p r o d u c t o f a n a n o n y m o u s c o lle c tiv e a n d its in stitu tin g im aginary. W hat
th e rad ical im a g in a tio n is f o r th e sin g u la r p s y c h e , th e so c ia l in stitu tin g
im a g in a ry is for society. T h e latter is th e social d im e n s io n o f th e form er.
T o g eth er, w o r k in g in th e ir in d is so c ia b le a n d ir r e d u c ib le r ela tio n , th ey

c re a te in d iv id u a ls a n d society . 14 For C astoriadis it is im p o ssib le to c o n c eiv e
so c iety o u t o f th e p sy ch e a lo n e , b e c a u se th e u n c o n s c io u s d o e s n o t p r o d u c e
social in stitu tio n s by itself.
T h is creative c ir cle w h er e im a g in a rie s are a t w ork gives rise to the
im agin är)’ s o c ia l sig n ific a tio n s (ISS) a n d so c ia l in stitu tio n s. ISS are d e fin e d
a s c r e a tio n s o f w orld s o f s e n s e an d sig n ific a tio n s that e m e r g e from th e
radical im a g in a tio n an d th e h u m a n c o lle ctiv e im a g in a ry (C astoriadis, 1983.
p. 3 5 3 ). T h e s e im p o se so c ia l ways o f b e in g o n t h e in d ivid u al p sy ch e by
p r o v id in g s e n s e to th e su b ject a n d v a lid a tin g h i m / h e r as a social b e in g .
ISS c o n stitu te th e w eb o f m e a n in g s th a t p e r m e a te , o r ie n t, a n d d ir ec t the
w h o le life o f th e society, k e e p in g its u n ity an d in te rn a l c o h e sio n . T h e y give
so c iety n o r m s, valu es, la n g u a g e, to o ls, p r o c e d u r e s, a n d m e th o d s o f d o in g
a n d d e a lin g with th e w orld. T h e se c o n stitu te a n etw ork o f sig n ifica tio n s
c a lle d “a m a g m a o f ISS” th at is e m b o d ie d in d ie in stitu tio n o f a g iv en so ciety
(C astoriadis, 1997g, p. 7 ). T h is m agm a e sta b lish e s w h at is real an d w hat is
n o t, w hat is m e a n in g fu l an d w hat is m ea n in g less; it d e fin e s w hat th e c o n c ep ts
o f society, m an , w o m a n , c h ild , etc, are in a sp e c ific society. It answ ers
q u e stio n s r a ise d by every society: “W h o arc w e as a collectivity? W hat arc wc
fo r o n e a n o th er? W h ere an d in w h at are we? W hat d o w e want? W hat are we
lacking?” (C astoriad is, 1987, pp. 1 4 6 -1 4 7 ).
O n ly relative to th is m agm a o f sig n ifica tio n s is it p ossib le to un d erstan d
th e c h o ic e o f sym b olism m a d e by any society— in particular, th e c h o ic e o f
its in stitu tio n a l sym b olism — as w ell as th e e n d s to w h ic h it su b o rd in a tes
“fu n ctio n a lity ” (C astoriadis, 1997g, p. 7 ) . ISS give life , m e a n in g , an d identity
to social in stitu tio n s, w h ich can b e d e fin e d as sa n c tio n e d sym b olic netw orks
w ork in g a m o n g h u m a n c o lle ctiv es. ISS m ak e social in stitu tio n s in to
“e ffic ie n t ap p aratu s,” c o m b in in g fu n ctio n a l a n d im a g in a ry c o m p o n e n ts in
variable p r o p o r tio n s a n d rela tio n s. H ow ever, n e ith e r ISS n o r social
in stitu tio n s c a n b e c o n c e iv e d as system s th a t are s o le ly fu n c tio n a l, in te g ra te d
scries o f a r ra n g em e n ts g e a r e d to satisfying th e n e e d s o f society, n o r m erely
as in te lle c tu a l con stru cts. T h e y g o to g e th e r w ith t h e c r e a tio n o f a d rive for
d ie society, a g lo b a l in te n tio n , a ffec t o r a c lu ster o f affects, p e r m e a tin g the
w h o le o f so c ia l life (C astoriadis, 1997r, p. 3 3 6 ).
ISS d o n o t e x is t strictly sp e a k in g in th e m o d e o f r ep re se n ta tio n ; th ey are
o f a d iffe r e n t n a tu re . C om p aratively, th ey are la rg e r than a n y in d ivid u al
p h an tasy a n d have n o p r e c ise p la c e o f e x is te n c e . T h e y can b e grasped
o n ly in d ir e c tly a n d ob liq u ely , sin c e th ey d e n o te n o t h in g w h ile c o n n o tin g
ju s t a b o u t e v e r y th in g . C astoriad is d e sc r ib e s th e s o c ia l a s in ta n g ib le , flu id ,
c h a n g e a b le , d e ta c h e d :
T h e social is w h at is e v er y o n e a n d w h at is n o o n e , w hat is n e v e r ab sen t

a n d a lm o st n e v e r p resen t a s su c h , a n o n -b e in g th a t is m o r e real than
a n y b e in g , th a t in w h ich w e are w h o lly im m e r se d y e t w h ic h w e can n ever
a p p r e h e n d “in p e r so n .” T h e social is an in d e fin ite d im e n sio n , e v en if it
is w a lled in at every in stan t— a d e fin ite stru ctu re a n d at th e sa m e tim e
o n e that c h a n g e s, an o b je c tifia b le articu lation o f in d ivid u al ca teg o r ie s
a n d th a t w h ic h , b ey o n d all articu la tio n s, su sta in s th e ir u n ity (C astoriadis,
1987, pp. 1 1 1 -1 2 ).
T h ro u g h t h e w ork o f th e social im aginary, th e social m ea n s sim u lta n eo u sly

cre a tio n , p e r m a n e n c e , a ltera tio n , a n d d e str u c tio n o f social in stitu tion s,
T h e social as in stitu te d always p r e su p p o se s th e so c ia l as in stitu tin g,
s o m e th in g cap ab le o f c h a n g in g w h at is in stitu te d an d s a n c tio n e d by a
collectivity, a n d ca p a b le o f b r in g in g n ew fo rm s in to b e in g in o r d e r to exist
“w ithin" th e m . T h e social-h istorical d o e s n o t c r e a te , o n c e a n d fo r all, a new
o n to lo g ic a l type o f o r d e r characteristic o f th e g e n u s society. T h is type is
e a ch tim e m a teria lized th r o u g h d iffe re n t form s, e a c h o f w h ich e m b o d ie s a
cre a tio n , a n ew e id o s o f society. T h is c r e a tio n , u n d e r s to o d as th e w ork o f
th e social im aginary, o f th e in stitu tin g society, is t h e m o d e o f b e in g o f the
social-h istorical field. S o c iety is self-creation d e p lo y e d a s history (C astoriadis,
1993c, pp. 5 -7 ).
I f th e r e w e r e n o t always e m e r g e n c e o r crea tio n o f ISS o r social institution s,
history w o u ld b e th e c o n sta n t r ep etitio n o f th e sa m e . “H istory w o u ld be
im p o ssib le or in c o n c eiv a b le o u tsid e of the p ro d u ctiv e or creative
im a g in a tio n . . . as th is is m a n ife ste d an d in d isso lu b le in both historical
d o in g a n d in th e c o n stitu tio n , b e fo r e any e x p lic it rationality, o f a un iverse
o f sig n ific a tio n s” (C astoriadis, 1987, p. 1 4 6 ). T h e sa m e c o u n ts fo r cultural
diversity s in c e ISS an d so c ia l in stitu tio n s can, th r o u g h th e o n g o in g process
o f so c ia liz a tio n , p r o d u c e d iffe re n t social fo r m s a n d cultural d iffe re n c es.
W h at m a k es it p o ssib le fo r the ISS to fu n c tio n i n the social real is w hat
C astoriadis c a lle d le g e in an d te u k h ein . S ociety in stitu tes itse lf a s le g e in —
saying, la n g u a g e, system s o f m e a n in g — a n d te u k h e in — m aking, ord ered
p ractice, so c ia l orga n iza tio n . T e u k h ein is the id e n tita ry d im e n sio n (w hich
can b e te r m e d fu n ctio n a l o r in stru m en tal) o f so c ia l activity; le g e in is the
id en titary d im e n s io n o f social r e p r e se n tin g /sa y in g , w h ich p resen ts itse lf in
particu lar i n la n g u a g e in a s m u c h as la n g u a g e is also always n ecessarily a
c o d e , e v en th o u g h b o th lea n o n th e id en titary d im e n s io n th ey are already,
as su c h , so c ia l in stitu tio n s w h ere m agm atic lo g ic is also p resen t.
T h e o p e r a tio n s o f le g e in a n d te u k h ein are n ec essa ry fo r in stitu tin g society
a n d th e real ization o f its stability. T h e y b r in g in stitu te d so c ie ty in to e x isten ce .
W ith ou t th e in stitu ted m o m e n t o f stability th e r e c a n n o t b e a h u m an world;

leg e in an d te u k h ein to g e th e r p r o d u ce th e n ec essa ry “ration al adequacy" o f
w h at e m e r g e s fr o m the in trin sic a n d in h e r e n t m agm atic su bstratum o f
society.
In e ffe c t, th e ISS o f an y so c iety can b e in stitu te d b e c a u se th ey rely
sim u lta n e o u sly o n b o th e n sid ic a n d m a g m a tic lo g ic . D e sp ite th e m agm atic
n o n c o u n ta b lc a n d ever-ch a n g in g c h a r a cte r o f th e ISS, as w ell as their
a m b ig u o u s m o d e o f b e in g w ith w id ely sp read referrals, ISS are a m e n a b le to
o r g a n izin g o p e r a tio n s a n d stru ctu red orders. T h e fa c t th a t a m agm atic wray
o f b e in g c a n n o t b e fully r ec o n stitu te d from an id c n tita r y /e n se m b list o rd er
by r etr a c in g backw ard th e e x tr a c te d /c o n s tr u c tin g step s th a t w e re taken to
g e n e r a te it, as w ell as th e fa c t that it c a n n o t b e r e c o n str u c te d “analytically,”
that is, by m e a n s o f set-th eo retica l c a te g o r ie s an d o p e r a tio n s, d o c s n o t m ean
c o m p le te c h a o s. T h e social w orld takes in to a c c o u n t that th e o p e r a tio n s o f
id e n tita r y /e n se m b list lo g ic s a lso r e p r e se n t a r e d u c tio n a n d a n im p o sitio n
in to its n o n c o u n ta b lc m agm atic am biguity.
In su m , so c ie ty in stitu te s itse lf a s b o th a m b ig u o u s a n d certa in , c h a n g ea b le
a n d sta b le , u n p red icta b le a n d pred ictab le; it in stitu tes itse lf a t o n c e in
m agm atic a n d e n sid ic d im e n sio n s, carryin g b o th d im e n sio n s in itself, even
th o u g h its m o st a p p a re n t way o f b eh a v in g r e fle c ts an d resp o n d s to its
r e p r o d u c tio n n e e d , that is, th e clo su r e a n d fixation o f its ISS and
in stitu tion s.
Social C losure a n d A utonom y
S o c iety e sta b lish e s a n d creates a w'orld o f a u to -r efe r en ce . T h e “s e l f ’ o f the

society, th e in stitu te d im aginary, seek s p r o te c tio n again st transgrcssivc
te n d e n c ie s o f th e radical im aginary. It p e r ce iv e s any attack o n itse lf a s a
m o r ta l th r e a t to its identity. For this r ea so n , so c ie ty te n d s t o c lo s e in u p o n
itself. S o c ic ty as su c h , a s d o its so c ia liz e d in d ivid u als, o p era tes w ithin a
r ep re se n ta tiv e a n d c o g n itiv e c lo su r e , r e p r e se n tin g a n d sig n ify in g its w orld
th r o u g h th e c o n te n ts g iv en by ISS. It is th e w ay a so c ie ty g u a ra n tees its
lea r n e d m o d e o f b e in g as well as th e p e r m a n e n c y o f its in stitu tio n s. U p to
so m e p o in t, so c ie ty m ust p r o d u c e ind ividu als th a t e n su r e its rep ro d u ctio n
by c a n c e lin g an y type o f transgressive in te rr o g a tio n . T h is is w h at C astoriadis
calls c lo s u r e .1*
In an y c lo s e d society, an y q u estio n that its la n g u a g e can form u late m ust
also b e answ erab le w ithin th e m a g m a o f its ISS. T h is en ta ils that q u estio n s
c o n c e r n in g th e valid ity o f th e social in stitu tio n s a n d th e sig n ifica tio n s
c a n n o t b e p o sed . T h e e x c lu sio n o f su c h q u e s tio n in g is e n su r e d by the

e sta b lish m e n t o f a tr a n sc en d e n t, extra-social so u r c e o f in stitu tio n s and
sig n ifica tio n s, su c h as religion .
In th is way, so c ie tie s in stitu te th em selv es in a n d th ro u g h t h e c lo su re o f
m e a n in g , b e c o m in g h e te r o n o m o u s. T h e y avoid c a llin g in to q u estio n their
o w n in stitu tio n s an d th ey p r o d u c e c o n fo r m in g in d ivid u als fo r w h om
in te r r o g a tin g th e law is n ot m e re ly fo r b id d e n b u t in c o n c eiv a b le and
psych ically u n b e a ra b le (C astoriadis, 1997d, p. 8 6 ). H e te r o n o m y c o n ta in s o r
p r e su p p o s e s a u n itary o n to lo g y that is c o n su b sia n lia l w ith the p o stu la te o f
th e h o m o g e n e ity o f b e in g . T h e h o m o g e n e ity o f society, w h ich from the
p o in t o f v iew o f sig n ifica tio n sh o u ld n o t b e in te rr u p ted , is o n e c o n se q u e n c e
o f the u n lim ite d e x ig e n c y o f sig n ifica tio n as a r e s p o n s e to ch aos. S u ch a
r esp o n se e n ta ils th e p o s itio n in g o f an e x tra so u r c e for th e in stitu tio n (and
fo r sig n ific a tio n ) a n d th e r efo r e, th e o c cu lta tio n o f th e self-in stitu tion o f
society, th e c o v er in g o v er by h u m a n ity o f its o w n b e in g a s self-creation .
M isre co g n itio n by society' allow s it to p o sit its in stitu tio n o u t o f reach,
e sc a p in g its o w n a c tio n . T h is a m o u n ts to saying that it allow s so c iety to
in stau rate itself as a h e te r o n o m o u s so c iety in a cle a v a g e, it s e lf h e n c e fo r th
in stitu ted , b e tw e e n in stitu tin g so c ie ty a n d in stitu te d society, in th e co v erin g
o v er o f th e fact th a t th e in stitu tio n o f so ciety is self-in stitu tion , o r self
cre a tio n . “In p o sitin g its in stitu tio n as s o m e th in g im p o s e d 0 11 it by a so u rce
e x ter n a l to itself, so c iety covers o v er th e C h aos, or e sta b lish e s a co m p r o m ise
with it; it d e fe n d s itse lf against th e Abyss that it is in itse lf' (C astoriadis,
1 9 9 7 n , p . 3 3 8 ).
N e v er th e less, e v en th o u g h so c iety in stitu tes its e lf as h e te r o n o m o u s,
h e te r o n o m y is n e ith e r structural n o r d e te r m in a n t/d e te r m in in g in society.
T h e fact th at a so ciety w o u ld affirm iLs o w n in alterab ility in o r d e r to stabilize
itse lf d o e s n o t m ean th a t so c iety is n o t already a c r e a tio n . It cre a tes itse lf as
a h e te r o n o m o u s society, it m o v es w ithin th e circle o f a lread y a c co m p lish ed
c r e a tio n (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 h , p. 3 1 8 ).
E x p la in in g this r elation b etw een th e c lo su r e a n d th e o p e n n e s s that is
p r e se n t in e v er y society, C astoriadis ela b o ra tes o n a u to n o m y a s th e c o n d itio n
that o p p o s e s h e te ro n o m y . In IIS, C astoriadis p r e se n ts this c o n c e p t as a
rew ork in g a n d r e fin e m e n t o f his early c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y ela b o ra ted in
Sou B . E x p a n d in g o n w hat h e h a d p r o p o se d e a r lie r in r elation to a u to
m a n a g e m e n t a n d w orker’s self-d irectio n , h e e n g a g e s p sych oanalysis to
in c o rp o ra te it in to his o n to lo g y o f creation .
H e r e a u to n o m y is d e fin e d as th e break o f th e c lo su r e a n d h e te r o n o m y o f
society, w h ic h C astoriadis illustrates w ith th e e x a m p le o f a n c ie n t G reek s’
in ven tion o f d em o cra cy a n d p h ilo so p h y . 1 6 C astoriadis d iffe re n tia tes betw een
tw o in te r d e p e n d e n t an d m utu ally con stitu tive levels o f auton om y: the

individual a n d co llectiv e. In dividual a u to n o m y e m e r g e s o u t o f th e project
o f c o lle c tiv e auton om y. H e c o n c ep tu a liz es in d iv id u a l a u to n o m y with
r efe r e n c e to th e relation esta b lish ed b e tw e en th e c o n sc io u s a n d th e
u n c o n sc io u s, stressin g th e possibility o f in d iv id u a ls b e c o m in g c o n sc io u s o f
u n c o n sc io u s c o n te n ts, r e c o g n iz in g th e ir o r ig in a n d m o d ify in g them .
T h in k in g ab ou t in d ivid u al a u to n o m y a n d b e in g in psych oanalytic term s,
C astoriadis relies o n F reu d ’s p r o p o se d m a x im , “W h ere Id w as, E go shall
c o m e to b e .” C astoriadis in te rp re ts th is by saving:
F.go m u st take place o f Id— th is can m e a n n e ith e r th e su p p re ssio n o f

drives, n o r th e e lim in a tio n o r th e a b so rp tio n o f d ie u n co n sc io u s. It is a
m a tter o f taking th e ir p lace as an agency o f decision. A u to n o m y w o u ld th en
b e c o n sc io u sn e s s’s ru le ov er th e u n c o n sc io u s (1 9 8 7 , p. 102).
In o th e r w ord s, a u to n o m y “is th e esta b lish m en t o f a n o th e r r ela tio n b etw een

th e d isc o u r se o f th e o th e r a n d th e su b ject's d iscou rse," m e a n in g n ot the
r e je c tio n o f o th e r 's in flu e n c e , b u t a r e fle c tiv e a t titu d e tow ard it (ib id ., p.
104). A u to n o m y aim s a t r eflectiv e an d c o m m u n ic a tiv e n e g o tia tio n s betw een
th e su b je ct a n d th e other.
As previou sly s e e n , th e w h o le so c ia liz a tio n p r o c ess o f th e in d ivid u al has
m ea n t for h i m / h e r th e in tern alization o f social c o n te n ts an d ISS rep re se n te d
by the p r e se n c e o f th e oth er. T h e a c c e p ta n c e o f th e o th e r is initially
n ecessary fo r the p sy ch e to survive. A s a d ir e c t c o n se q u e n c e o f the
so c ia liz a tio n a n d su b lim ation p rocesses, the e n e r g e tic life o f th e individual
b e c o m e s r eg u la te d a c c o r d in g to an o r g a n izin g im a g in a ry that h as n e ith e r
b e e n c r e a te d by, n o r r e fle c te d o n , n o r e v e n c o n sc io u sly ap p ro p ria ted by the
ind ividu al. D esire a n d a ffect arc h c te r o n o m o u sly d e te r m in e d in th e subject.
W hat is e sse n tia l to h e te r o n o m y . . . o n th e lev el o f the ind ivid u al, is the

d o m in a tio n o f a n a u to n o m iz e d im agin ary w h ich h as assu m ed th e fu n c
tion o f d e fin in g fo r th e su b je ct b o th reality a n d d e sir e. T h e “rep ression
o f drives” as su ch , th e c o n flic t b etw een th e “p le a su r e p r in c ip le ” a n d th e
“reality p r in c ip le ” d o n o t c o n stitu te individual a lie n a t io n .. . . T h e im por
tant c o n flic t is th a t b e tw e en drives a n d reality, o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d die
im a g in a ry d e v e lo p m e n t w ithin the su b ject, o n t h e o th e r (1 9 8 7 , p. 103).
In d ivid u al a u to n o m y is a c h iev e d b y m a k in g cle a r th e o r ig in an d th e sen se

o f th e d isc o u r se o f th e oth er, a n d by a ffirm in g o r n e g a tin g its c o n te n t in as
m u c h as it is th e d isc o u r se o f th e oth er. T h r o u g h reflectivity a n d delib erative

activity, th e subject can a c h iev e a m o r e a u to n o m o u s sta g e in life. An
a u to n o m o u s in d ivid u al is n o t d e fin e d as a p e r so n w h o h as b e c o m e p u re
E go, b u t a p e r so n w h o q u estio n s w hat h as b e e n a cq u ired by e sta b lish in g a
r elation b e tw e en th e u n c o n sc io u s an d th e c o n sc io u s, b etw een lu cid ity and
d ie fu n c tio n o f th e im aginary, in a n a ttitu d e o f th e su b ject w ith r e sp e c t to
h im s e lf/h e r s e lf. In th is se n se , ind ivid u al a u to n o m y m ea n s self-regu lation ,
self-leg isla tio n , an d o p p o sitio n to h e te r o n o m y o r th e leg isla tio n o r
r eg u la tio n b y an oth er. C astoriadis d e sc r ib es a u to n o m y as th e law c r e a te d by
th e in d ivid u al, as o p p o se d to reg u la tio n by th e u n c o n sc io u s, w h ich is th e
law o f o n e , b u t n o t o f th e in d iv id u a l C astoriadis says "my d isc o u r se m ust
take th e p la c e o f th e d iscou rse o f th e o th e r o f a fo r e ig n d isc o u r se th a t is in
m e , r u lin g o v e r m e: sp ea k in g th ro u g h m yself' (ib id ., p. 1 0 2 ) . 17
H ow ever, in d ivid u al a u to n o m y d o e s n o t s u p p o se th e total c o n tr o l o f the

c o n sc io u s o v e r the u n c o n sc io u s, n o r d o e s it m e a n th e total e lim in a tio n o f
th e d isc o u r se o f th e o th e r . T h e se two w o u ld b e im p o ssib le an d u n h istorical
stages. For C astoriadis, individual a u to n o m y also d o e s n o t m e a n th e rational
m aster)' o f in n e r n a tu re o r o f th e u n co n sc io u s o r the total rep ressio n o f
h c te r o n o m o u s d esires. F u rth erm o re, individual a u to n o m y d o c s n o t su p p o se
a “total h u m a n being" o r an “a b so lu te su b ject” b e h in d it; th e u n co n scio u sly
d e te r m in in g d isc o u r se o f th e o th e r c a n n e v e r b e fu lly a p p ro p ria te d . 18
W hat a u to n o m y d o e s m e a n to C astoriadis is an e n d le s s p r o c ess th a t d o c s
n o t te r m in a te in a self-transparen t in d ivid u al o r society. A u to n o m y is an
attitu d e, a n in fin itely c o n tin u in g p r o je ct w ith o u t a d e fin a b le e n d slate.
In d ivid u al a u to n o m y is n o t eq u al to E go-con trol o f g iv e n rep ressive practices
o f a socially given E go-instan ce. It is n e ith e r restr icte d to a g r ea te r role for
the in d ivid u al rad ical im aginary . 1'1 It is m o r e sp ecifica lly ch aracterized as an
individual a ttitu d e that is in stitu te d an d b ack ed b y a n e n s e m b le o f social
im agin ary sig n s.
In d iv id u a l a u to n o m y m u st c o n ta in c o n sc io u s r eflectiven ess a n d the
cap acity fo r d e lib er a te action . C astoriadis sp eak s o f a type o f c o n sc io u sn e ss
that d o e s n o t m ean rational ca lcu la tio n o r r e c k o n in g (th e se last two
o p e r a tio n s c a n b e fo u n d in th e u n c o n sc io u s a s w e ll). In stea d , co n scio u sn ess
is w h ere reflexivity is at w ork in self-q u estion in g:
In r eflec tiv en ess w e have so m e th in g d ifferent: th e p ossib ility that the
activity p r o p e r to th e “su b ject” b e c o m e s a n “o b je c t,” the s e lf b e in g exp licitly
p o site d as a n on -ob jective o b ject o r as an o b je c t th a t is an o b ject sim p ly by
its b e in g p o s ite d a s su ch a n d n o t by n a tu re (1 9 8 9 , p. 159).
R e fle c tio n im p lie s th e p ossib ility o f q u e s tio n in g o n e s e lf a s rep resen tat
ional activity. It p r e su p p o ses a n d m aterializes th e ru p tu re o f functionality.
R e fle c tio n is an a ttem p t to break th e c lo su r e in w h ich in d ivid u als arc

n ecessarily im m e r se d as a result o f th e ir p erso n a l a n d social history, an d the
history o f th e social-h istorical in stitu tio n that h as h u m a n iz e d th e individuals.
T h is a tte m p t is always a c c o m p a n ie d by th e p o s itin g o f n ew th in k ab le form s
a n d figu res c re a ted by th e radical im agin ation . R e flec tiv e activity also m akes
p sych oan alytical activity p o ssib le , b u t psych oan alysis is m o r e than the
r eflec tio n o f th e su b ject ov er itse lf a n d its ow n fu n c tio n in g c o n d itio n s. It is
also a n o p p o r tu n ity fo r th e an alyzed individual to leave th e p ar a m e te r s o f
h i s / h e r a c q u ir e d p sych ical o r g a n iza tio n by o p e n in g h i s / h e r p sy ch e to a
n ew m o d e o f b e in g , a n ew history in w h ich th e su b je ct is its co-author . 20
C astoriad is’ d e fin itio n o f ind ivid u al a u to n o m y n ecessarily e n c o m p a sses
p olitical a n d so c ia l d im e n sio n s. T h e rea liza tio n o f a u to n o m y c a n n o t be
c o n c e iv e d in its full s c o p e e x c e p t a s a c o lle ctiv e e n te rp rise . C astoriadis
states:
If a u to n o m y is th e r ela tio n in w h ich o th e r s a r e always p r e se n t as the
o th e r n e ss a n d a s th e self-n ess o f th e su b ject, th en a u to n o m y can be
c o n c e iv e d o f , e v en in p h ilo so p h ic a l term s, on ly a s a social p r o b le m an d as
a s o c ia l r e la tio n (1 9 8 7 , p. 108).
D e fin e d as an in tersu b jective r ela tio n , in d ivid u al a u to n o m y can be
rea lize d o n ly as a m o m e n t o f th e social; it is th e so c ia l w h ich c o m p o se s and
also p r e su p p o se s intersubjectivity. T h e social is n o t th e su m o f in tersu b jective
netw orks (a lth o u g h it is that t o o ) , n o r is it th e ir sim p le p r o d u ct. H er e it is
w orth r e m e m b e r in g , b ecau se th e social-h istorical is th e a n o n y m o u s
c o lle ctiv e w h o le , th e im p e rso n a l-h u m a n e le m e n t th a t fills every given social
form ation b u t also e n g u lfs th em . It is th e u n io n a n d th e te n sio n o f th e
in stitu tin g a n d th e in stitu te d society, o f history m a d e an d o f history in the
m aking.
C o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y is th e a p p rop riation by th e in stitu tin g p o w er o f the
radical im a g in a ry to create in stitu tio n s a n d social im agin ary sig n ifica tio n s,
a n d to esta b lish p r o p e r laws a n d practices. It p r e su p p o s e s q u e s tio n in g o f
social in stitu tio n , an d th e crea tio n o f n ew sig n ifica tio n s, in stitu tio n s, and
political id e n titie s. It is th e e x p lic it r e c o g n itio n th a t social form s are self
g e n e r a te d w ith o u t attrib u tio n to e x lr a so c ia l so u r c e s. It is th e r ec o g n itio n
that so c ie ty an d history are social c re a tio n s a n d th at, as social collectives,
so c ie tie s a r e th e p r o d u ct o f su ch c re a tio n s an d o f th e ir o w n cap acity o f
a u to -in stitu tio n (C astoriadis, 1991c, p p . 143—7 4 ). In r ela tio n to this,
C astoriadis affirms;
U n til w h e n w ill h u m a n ity h a v e th e n e e d to c o n c e a l th e A byss o f the

w orld a n d o f it s e lf b e h in d in stitu te d sim ulacra? T h e r e sp o n se , if r esp o n se
th e r e b e, can c o m e o n ly o n th e c o lle c tiv e level a n d th e in d iv id u a l level

sim u lta n e o u sly . O n b o th levels, it p r e su p p o s e s a radical a lter a tio n o f
o n e ’s r e la tio n to sig n ific a tio n . I am a u to n o m o u s o n ly if I am th e o r ig in
o f w h a t w ill b e . . . a n d I k n ow m y se lf as su c h (1 9 9 7 h , p. 3 2 9 ).
T h u s, as s e e n , th ere is always te n sio n b e tw e en in stitu te d a n d in stitu tin g

society, b u t so c iety as a w h o le is usually unaw are o f it. If th e aw aren ess o f the
se lf-g en er a tio n o f so c iety ’s lim its a n d form s b e c o m e s in stitu te d a n d r o o ted
in its social im aginary, th en a n e w r ela tio n b e tw e en in stitu tin g a n d in stitu ted
so ciety h as a p p ea red : th is is th e w ork o f c o llectiv e auton om y.
C o llec tiv e a u to n o m y p r o d u c e s in d ivid u al a u to n o m y a n d is a t th e sa m e
tim e g r o u n d e d in it; th ey are tw o h a lv es o f th e s a m e w h o le . N e ith e r can
work a lo n e . Individual a u to n o m y lacks se n s e i f it is d e ta c h e d from a
c o llectiv e p o litica l project. As C astoriadis n o te d , w h o e v e r w an ts to b e c o m e
fr e e m u st b e n ecessarily in te r e ste d in the fr e e d o m o f o th e r s, m u st be
in te r e ste d in th e c o llectiv e d im e n sio n o f p olitics.
As d isc u s se d in th e fo llo w in g ch ap ter, th e c o lle c tiv e d im e n s io n o f
a u to n o m y is lin k e d by C astoriad is to th e id e a o f p o litic s a n d d em ocracy.
P o litics a n d d e m o c ra c y as c o r r e la te s o f a u to n o m y , are a b o u t au to-
reflexivity a n d o p e n n e s s to in stitu tio n s; th a t so c ie ty d o e s n o t h alt b e fo r e a
c o n c e p tio n g iv e n o n c e a n d f o r a ll o f w h a t is j u s t, e q u a l, o r fr ee , b u t ra th er
in stitu te s its e lf in su c h a w ay th a t t h e q u e s tio n s o f fr e e d o m , o f ju s t ic e , o f
e q u ity a n d e q u a lity m ig h t always b e p o s e d a n e w w ith in society. D e m o cra cy
is th e p r o j e c t o f b r e a k in g th e so c ia l c lo s u r e a i th e c o lle c tiv e le v e l by
a p p r o p r ia tin g t h e in stitu tin g p o w er to in stitu te s o c ie tie s th a t give th e ir
o w n rules.
T h e d e m o c r a tic p r o je ct as C a sto iia d is c o n c e iv e s it c o m e s straigh t o u t o f
h is w ork w ith S o u B . A s s e e n in C h a p ter 1, at th e e n d o f 1960s Castoriadis
fa c ed a n analytical c h a lle n g e that d e m a n d e d a c o m p r e h e n siv e th e o r y o f
so ciety a n d h istory th a t c o n te ste d d e te rm in ism a n d le ft o p e n r o o m fo r a
project o f au ton om y. T h e o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n that h e d e v e lo p e d by
in te g ra tin g p sych oanalysis in to h is w ork is th e r esu lt o f su c h q u estio n in g .
T h is in c lu d e d n o t o n ly h is le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n a b o u t the totality o f the
e x istin g b e in g a n d th e way d iffe re n t r e g io n s o r strata o f th e s e lf related
a m o n g th e m se lv es, but also a n o r ig in a l way to d e fin e cre a tio n , im agin ation ,
social in stitu tio n s, an d au ton om y. T h is ch a p te r has p r e se n te d th e c o n c ep tu a l
basis u p o n w h ic h C astoriad is’ p h ilo so p h ic a l a n d p olitical c o n tr ib u tio n s
stan d , w h ic h w e re initially e la b o ra te d in T he Im aginary Institution o f Society. It
is in this w ork th at C astoriadis p r e se n ts h is n ew u n d ersta n d in g s o f
subjectivity·— m a in ly in sp ired by F reu d ian p sych oanalysis— an d agency,

g ivin g im a g in a tio n an o n to lo g ic a l w eig h t. T h e w ay h e d e fin e s th e subject,
th e e x is tin g r ela tio n sh ip s b e tw e en p sych e a n d so ciety , a n d th e instituted
a n d in stitu tin g so c iety b e c o m e s pivotal for e n v isio n in g a n ew way to co n ceiv e
history, so c ia l c h a n g e , a n d creation .
C h a p te r 3
Agency and Autonomy in Castoriadis
In th e p rev io u s chapter, I p r e se n te d th e m a in c o n c e p ts o f C astoriadis'

o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n , e x p la in in g his ow n p articu lar d e v e lo p m e n ts su ch as
th e radical im aginary, th e in stitu te d a n d in stitu tin g im agin aries, a n d th e
social-h istorical. T h is ch a p te r fo c u se s o n C astoriadis' in n ovative n o tio n s o f
th e su bject: “agency, th e p r o d u ctio n o f social m e a n in g , an d social change".
It w ill also d iscu ss th e w eak n esses an d p o te n tia litie s o f th e se c o n c e p ts by
review in g c ritiq u e s m a d e by o th e r in te lle ctu a l fig u r e s from th e field s o f
p h ilo so p h y an d social a n d p olitical theory. A s a c o ro lla r y o f th e se d eb ates,
th e n o tio n o f a u to n o m y w ill b e e x a m in e d , p r e se n tin g so m e o f th e in h er en t
te n sio n s o f this c o n c e p t.
Agency and the Subject
As s e e n in C h a p ter 2 , th e c o n c e p t o f th e su b je ct is a p ivotal o n e for

C astoriad is as h e se e k s to o v e r c o m e o n to lo g ic a l d u a lism s w ith o u t falling
in to realist o r ration alist in te rp re ta tio n s. T h e su b je c t plays a cen tral role,
in v ested w ith creative a n d r ep re se n ta tio n a l fa c u ltie s th r o u g h w h ich
m e a n in g a n d social in stitu tio n s c o m e to e x is te n c e . T h o u g h C astoriadis
c e n te r s th e su b je ct in th e p h ilo so p h ic a l, a n th r o p o lo g ic a l, a n d political
terrains, h is c o n c e p tu a l e la b o ra tio n o f t h e su b je ct is a p ost-m etap h ysical
a ttem p t th at c o n te sts an y form o f tr a n sc en d e n ta lism . A s d iscu ssed ,
C astoriad is a p p ro a c h e s th e su b je ct as a so c ia l p r o d u c t w h ose su b jective
fo rm a tio n is th e resu lt o f th e su b lim a tio n p r o c ess a n d th e in tern a liza tio n o f
th e im a g in a ry social sig n ifica tio n s (ISS) by th e p sych e.
M oreover, C astoriad is rejects an y essen tia list o r te le o lo g ic a l vision o f the
su b ject a n d its h istorical d im e n sio n . E m b e d d ed in th e im agin ary o f society,
th e su b ject's h istorical d e v e lo p m e n t d o e s n o t su p p o se a natu ral or
p rogressive m o v e m e n t tow ard th e realization o f its e sse n c e . In C astoriadis’
c o n c e p tio n n o th in g refers to p ositivist o r ob jectivist versio n s in t h e history
o f a n th r o p o lo g ic a l o r p h ilo so p h ic a l th o u g h t. I Ic reje cts th e id ea o f a pu re,

abstract, d ise m b o d ie d ration al a g e n t as w ell a s stru ctu res that w ou ld
d e te r m in e th e su b je ct’s p sych ical r e p r e se n ta tio n s, social p ra ctices, o r
in stitu tio n s.
D raw ing o n Freud's w ork o n th e u n c o n sc io u s, C astoriadis fo rm u la tes a
theory' o f t h e su b je ct that c o n te sts th e lin gu istic-tu rn te n d e n c y w h ile
sim u lta n e o u sly b u ild in g an in n o v a tiv e th eo ry o f r e p re se n ta tio n . H e takes
in to a c c o u n t th e c o n sc io u s an d th e u n c o n sc io u s an d d erives sign ifican t
c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r a n u n d e rsta n d in g , n o t o n ly o f t h e p r o c ess o f su bjective
fo rm a tio n in th e ind ivid u al, b u t also a n e w m o d e o f b e in g o f th e p sych e and
th e social. H o w ev er C astoriadis u n d ersta n d s th e physical a n d b io lo g ic a l
d im e n sio n s o f the su b ject d ifferen tly than F reu d . H is fo r m u la tio n o f the
totality o f th e e x istin g b e in g ch aracterized by th e u n d e te r m in e d relation sh ip s
a m o n g its -different strata allow s h im to d isso c ia te from th e positivistic
asp ects o f F r e u d ’s w ork a n d p r e se n t a n ew way o f c o n c e iv in g th e h u m a n
p sy ch e as radical im a g in a tio n , a n u n d e te r m in e d a n d creative im agin ation .
As a c e n tr a l id ea in th e su b je ct’s d e fin itio n , th e radical im a g in a tio n
c o n stitu te s a particu lar characteristic o f th e h u m a n b e in g — h ow ever, radical
im a g in a tio n is n o t u n d e r sto o d as a n u ltim a te fo u n d a tio n o f th e su b ject. As
Kalyvas clarifies:
T h e p sy ch e d o c s n o t c o n ta in an a b so lu te m e a n in g th at is gradually ex ter
n alized a n d rea lized in th e form o f th e subject; it d o e s n o t co n sist o f an a
p r io ri ilia I is b o th lo g ica l a n d o n to lo g ic a l, a te m p o ra l a n d universal, always
th e sa m e , p e n e tr a tin g every h u m a n cre a tio n . T h e radical im a gin ation is
n ot so m e th in g lo c a te d b e n e a th o r b e h in d t h e su b ject as a sep arate and
in d e p e n d e n t entity. . . . [C astoriadis d o e s n o t] a r g u e that b e n e a th the
variou s sta g e s o f socia liza tio n th e r e is so m e th in g a u th e n tic w'hosc sca led
m o u th n e e d s o n ly to b e o p e n e d . . . . T h e p sy ch e is a psych oanalytical cat
e g o ry w ith o n to lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n s, n o t a m etap h ysical-tran scen d en tal
o n e (1 9 9 8 a , p. 181).
A s radical im a g in a tio n h as b e e n e x ten siv ely d e fin e d a n d d isc u sse d in

C h a p ter 2 , it is a p p o site to d iscu ss p recisely w h a t it is n o t, in th e ligh t o f
p o ssib le q u e s tio n s th a t can b e raised.
C astoriad is n e v e r p o s e s th e radical im a g in a tio n as a p rim ord ial e sse n c e ,
n o r as s o m e th in g w aitin g to b e “finally d isc o v e re d ” in th e su b ject. T h e
radical im a g in a tio n d o e s n o t p r e su p p o se an y ty p e o f d e v e lo p m e n t that
w o u ld m ark a n ew e p o c h in the life o f the sp irit in the H e g e lia n s e n s e , even
less s o in th e p h y lo g en etica l d e v e lo p m e n t in t h e F reud ian se n se . N or is
Agency a n d A utonomy in Castoriadis 67
th e r e a pre-established te lo s for th e su b je ct o r for society, o r a sin gle

c o n c e p tio n o f what it w o u ld m e a n fo r th e su b je ct to have a g o o d life . T h e
rad ical im a g in a tio n is a c o n d itio n fo r the su b je ct to rep re se n t iLs reality a n d
create in stitu tion s; it is also a p r e c o n d itio n fo r th e su b ject to b e c o m e
c o n sc io u s o f already b e in g a r e p re se n ta tio n , a so c ia l c r e a tio n th at can be
p u t in to q u e s tio n a n d th at can transform h im o r h e r s e lf a n d their in stitu tion s.
T h e radical im a gin ation d o e s n o t ex ist a lo n e a s an e ssen tia lity w ithou t
society. T h e fact th at th e radical im a g in a tio n m a k es it p o ssib le fo r the
p sy ch e to g e n e r a te m e a n in g d o e s n o t m e a n th a t th e p sych e a lo n e can
g e n e r a te in stitu tio n s. C astoriadis co n sta n tly r em in d s read ers that th e psyche
g e n e r a te s p h an tasies, b u t n o t social in stitu tio n s. T h a t is w hy h e em p h a siz e s
th e irred u cib ility o f th e social im a g in a ry a n d th e rad ical im agin ary in his
lea n in g -o n theory.
T h e le a n in g -o n n a tu re o f th e strata o f livin g-b ein g d e m o n stra te s h o w the
su b ject sh o u ld b e u n d e r sto o d as a social-h istorical cre a tio n , the resu lt o f a
su sta in e d c o n flic t b etw een th e in stitu tin g im agin ary an d th e instituted
im aginary— as d e fin e d in C h ap ter 2— that c r e a te s a n d sa n ctio n s th e ISS
a n d the so c ia l in stitu tio n s in w h ich th e in d iv id u a l is so cia lized . A s a social-
historical c r e a tio n , th e su b ject is th e p r o d u ct o f rad ical an d social im agin aries
that d o e s n o t have a p r e o r d a in e d fate. T h e fact th a t in C astoriad is’ th eory
th e p sy c h e is n o t natu rally p r e d e stin e d to b e so cia lized , a n d is n ever
c o m p le te ly so cia lized , d o c s n o t m e a n th at it isn ’t a n ecessary p o le fo r the
social-h istorical cre a tio n , 01 that it c a n n o t b e c o m e social. N o r d o e s it m ean
that C astoriad is was u n a b le 10 e x p la in th e m e d ia tio n b e tw e e n the individual
a n d th e so c ia l as 1 lab crm as has stated.
H a b erm a s fo u n d it illogical to e x p la in th e p r o c e ss o f so c ia liz a tio n as
b e g in n in g w ith a n a social in d ivid u al. In stead , H a b e rm a s p o stu la ted the
contrary. 1 1 c e x p la in e d socia liza tio n as a h a r m o n ic p rocess w h er e h u m a n s
tran sform fr o m a n origin al state a s a p r e lin g u istic livin g-b ein g in to social
in d ivid u als w h o in teg ra te in to th e ir co m m u n ity , o w in g to th e ir lin guistic
capacity:
T h e in d iv id u a tio n o f the n e o n a te , w h ic h w ithin th e w o m b o f th e m o th e r

has b e e n a n e x e m p la r o f th e sp e c ie s as a p re-lin gu istic livin g b e in g , and
th u s c o u ld b e e x p la in e d b io lo g ica lly in term s o f a c o m b in a tio n o f a finite
n u m b e r o f e le m e n ts q u ite adequ ately, o n c e b o r n c a n o n ly b e c o n c e iv e d
a s a p r o c e ss o f so c ia liz a tio n . T o b e su r e , h e r e so c ia liz a tio n c a n n o t b e
c o n c e iv e d as th e ad a p ta tio n to so c iety o f an alread y given individuality,
b u t a s th a t w h ic h itse lf p r o d u c e s a n in d iv id u a ted b e in g (H a b erm a s, 1996,
pp. 1 2 7 -8 ).
Im m e rsed a s h e is in th e lin g u istic tu rn , I la b e r m a s d o e s n o t se e an original

in d ivid u ality o r an origin al se lf-co n scio u sn ess in t h e h u m a n b e in g . In stead,
lie p osits intersu b jective p r o c e sse s w h ere r e la tio n s are sym bolically
m e d ia ted . 1 1 c a c c e p ts th e p r e m ise that th e in d iv id u a tio n o f th e su b ject is a
lin g u istica lly m e d ia ted p rocess o f socia liza tio n a n d th e sim u lta n eo u s
c o n stitu tio n o f a life history' th a t is c o n sc io u s itself. U n lik e C astoriadis,
I lab erm as d o e s n o t take in to a c co u n t th e u n c o n sc io u s d im e n sio n in this
p rocess. F or h im th e origin al h u m a n sp ecificity is restricted to a proto-
lin g u istic c o n d itio n th a t naturally e n a b le s th e su b je ct to e n te r the
so c ia liz a tio n p rocess in o r d e r to b e c o m e an in d iv id u a ted b e in g (I laberm as,
1992, p. 1 5 1 ),
A s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f th is p r e m ise, a n o th e r th e o r e tic a l d iffe r e n c e b etw een
H a b erm a s an d C astoriadis e m e r g e s. H a b e rm a s (1 9 8 7 ) q u estio n ed
C astoriadis' m e d ia tio n b e tw e en th e individual a n d so ciety by stating:
C astoriad is c a n n o t p r o v id e u s w ith a figu re fo r th e m e d ia tio n b e tw e en the
in d ivid u al a n d society. S o c iety breaks d ow n th e c h ild lik e m o n a d s and
transform s th em . T h e type p r o p e r to th e socially in stitu tio n a liz e d w orld is
im p r esse d u p o n th e in d ivid u al. T h u s th e p r o c e ss o f so cia liza tio n is d e p ic ted
o n th e m o d e l o f crafts p r o d u c tio n . T h e so c ia liz e d in d ivid u al is p r o d u ce d
a n d , as in D u rk h e im , rem a in s d ivid ed in to a m o n a d a n d a m e m b e r o f
society. [In C astoriadis] Intrapsychic c o n flic ts are n o t in tern ally lin k e d with
social o n e s; in stea d , p sy ch e an d so c iety stan d in a k in d o f m etap hysical
o p p o sitio n t o o n e a n o th e r (p . 3 3 4 ).
A s w ith W h ite b o o k ’s c ritiq u e o f th e m o n a d ic sta g e , th e H ab erm asian
p o sitio n a lso o m its th e an a clisis o r le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n that e lu c id a te s
th e r e la tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e p sych ical a n d t h e so c ia l p o le s o f the
in d iv id u a l. R ath er th a n o b se r v in g th e w ay C a sto ria d is th e o r iz e s the
r ela tio n b e tw e e n th e strata o f th e e x is tin g -b e in g in th e c o n te x t o f his
ontology' o f c r e a tio n , W h ite b o o k a n d H a b e rm a s lo o k a t th e r ela tio n sh ip
b e tw e e n s p e c ific strata (m e d ia tio n s fo r th e m ) in iso la tio n , d isr e g a rd in g
th e very n o tio n o f c r e a tio n , o r at b est, g iv in g th is c e n tr a l issu e in su ffic ien t
a tten tio n .
H ow ever, a n e n o r m o u s d istin c tio n sep arates their critiq u es. U n lik e
W h ite b o o k . I lab erm as rejects a n a c c o u n t o f th e in n e r n a tu re o f th e su bject
d istin ct fr o m its lin gu istic n a tu re, a substantive fact th at involves o th e r
th eo retica l c o n se q u e n c e s. C on trary to C astoriadis, H aberm as— w h o d o es
n o t a c c e p t th e F reu d ian n o tio n o f t h e u n c o n sc io u s as a way to ex p la in the
in n e r ex tra lin g u istic reality o f th e su b ject— c o n sid e r s th e su b ject as a
b io lo g ic a l liv in g b e in g e x e m p la r u n til it sm o o th ly e n te r s th e p r o c ess o f
so c ia liz a tio n a t birth. F or h im , th e o r ig in a l h u m a n sp ecificity is restricted
to a p roto -lin g u istic c o n d itio n . H e lim its h is ela b o ra tio n s a b o u t the
e x tra lin g u istic in n e r reality o f t h e su b ject to t h e lin g u istifica tio n o f th e

u n c o n sc io u s.
As D ew s (1 9 9 5 , p. 179) p o in ts o u t, so m e q u e s tio n s e m e r g e fr o m this
I la b erm a sia n p o sitio n , w h ere th e r e is n o p r e lin g u istic aw aren ess o f th e self.
E m p h a sizin g th is p o in t o f H ab erm as, D e w s writes:
W ith regard to t h e te n sio n b etw een c o n s c io u s an d u n c o n sc io u s, I Ial>

e rm a s’ th o u g h t is d ir ec ted tow ards r efle c tin g u p o n a n d e lim in a tin g the
u n c o n sc io u s so c ia l p ro c esses w h ic h h a m p er th e ration ality o f c o m m u n i
c a tio n , w h ile b e in g aw are that th is can n ever b e d efin itively ach ieved .
Finally, th e q u estio n o f th e g e n e sis o f lin g u istic in tersu b jectivity itself, and
in g e n e r a l o f th e historical tran sition from n a tu r e to c u ltu r e, is n o less o f
a p r o b le m for 1 laberm as. . . . T h e r e r em a in s t h e q u estio n o f . . . w h eth er
th e final a c h ie v e m e n ts o f co m m u n ic a tiv e ratio n a lity w o u ld sim p ly be
th e fu lfillm e n t o f a te n d e n c y p r e se n t in n a tu re fr o m th e very b e g in n in g ,
o r w h e th e r a cer ta in op acity o f natural c o m p u lsio n will always rem ain
o p p o s e d to, a n d cap ab le o f thw arting, th e str u g g le fo r ration al transpar
e n c y (p . 186).
H ab erm as, w ith o u t r eso lv in g th e q u estio n o f th e e x ter n a l a n d intern al

extralin guù siic realities o f th e su b ject, p r e se n ts a d e te r m in e d transition
from n a tu r e t o c u ltu re in th e h u m an su b ject. T h e I lab erm asian fram ew ork
c a n n o t a c c e p t an en tity w ith a n o n lin g u istic d im e n sio n that is n ot
p r e d e stin e d to b e a so c ia l b e in g its a n o r ig in a l su b ject.
On th e c o n tr a 1 7 , C astoriadis p osits th e e x is te n c e o f a n original
u n d e te r m in e d su b je ct p o sse ssin g an u n c o n s c io u s a n d n o n lin g u istic
d im e n sio n . He d istin g u ish e s clearly b e tw e en th e n o n lin g u istic , the
p r e lin g u istic , a n d th e lin gu istic d im e n sio n s o f th e in d ivid u al as h e ex p la in s
th e creative im a g in a tio n in a h olistic r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e p sy ch e and
th e so ciety . Far fr o m b e in g a m etap h ysical o p p o s itio n , the rela tio n sh ip
b etw een t h e psych ic a n d social p o le s o f th e in d ivid u al was e x p la in e d by
C astoriadis as a polarity w h ere th e p sy ch e a n d so c ie ty are n e v e r in total
c o n tr a d ic tio n o r o p p o sitio n . T h e o p p o site s are c o n c e iv e d sim ultaneously,
a n d o n e e le m e n t refers to th e o th e r in a m o v e m e n t o f cre a tio n . As
h ig h lig h te d in th e p reviou s chapter, p sy ch e an d so c iety to g e th e r create a
n ew o n to lo g ic a l level. T h e n e w crea tio n s, th e n e w e m e r g e n c e s , a r e n o t
necessary c o n s e q u e n c e s o f p reviou s strata b u t a r e n ew strata o f th e total-
b e in g , rad ically d iffe re n t from “th e p reviou s ones"; th is is h o w the
r e la tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e psych ic a n d th e so c ia l h a s to b e u n d ersto o d .
I la b e rm a s d isa g r e es with th is p o in t an d fu rth er states th a t in C astoriadis'
fo r m u la tio n o f p o litica l a u to n o m y h e “r e p la c es” th e self-in stitu tin g su bject
w ith th e se lf-in stitu tin g socicty, in w h ic h a u to n o m o u s a c tio n a sin tr a m u n d a n c

praxis is a ssim ila ted t o th e lan g u a g e-crea tin g , w o rld -p ro jectin g , world-
d ev o u r in g praxis o f th e so c ia l d e m iu r g e itself. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , H aberm as
argues, it fits th e p e r so n ifica tio n o f so ciety a s a d e m iu r g e that releases cvcr-
n ew w orld-types fr o m itse lf (H ab erm as, 1987, p. 3 3 2 - 3 ) .1 O n c e again
H a b erm a s d isregard s the r ela tio n C astoriadis e sta b lish e s b e tw e en the
p sy ch e a n d so c iety m isu n d ersta n d in g — a s Kalyvas (1 9 9 8 b , p. 17) n o te s— th e
in stitu tin g d im e n s io n o f a u to n o m y a n d h o w it su p p o s e s n e ith e r a h o m o
g e n o u s so c ia l su b ject n o r th e trad ition al n o tio n o f p o p u la r sovereign ty .2
Socicty is a n ew o n to lo g ica l level that m akes p o ssib le th e e x is te n c e o f the
h u m a n b e in g , w h ich h as to g o th r o u g h a p a in fu l so c ia liz a tio n p rocess that
is n e v e r c o m p le te d . It is th is ever p r e se n t d e fic it of so c ia liz a tio n o f th e psyche
that p rev en ts th e p e r m a n e n t clo su r e o f th e liv in g b e in g an d e n a b le s the
crea tio n o f social in stitu tio n s an d im a g in a iy social sig n ifica tio n s. F or this
rea so n , C astoriad is claim s th at in h u m a n s th e r e is n o t a n in h e r e n t d isp o sitio n
to socialization ; a c c e p tin g that th e contrary w o u ld c a n c e l o u t th e n o tio n o f
radical im a g in a tio n an d its e m a n c ip a tio n p o te n tia lity a n d creative agency.
T h e c re a tiv e p sych ical cap acity a n d its transgressive p o w er are in d e e d
cen tral q u a litie s o f C astoriadis' su b ject. T h is e x p la in s his r ejectio n o f the
su b ject as m e r e ly th e in scrip tio n o f cultural c o d e s , stru ctu res o f la n g u a g e,
o r p o w e r r ela tio n sh ip s, w h ich was th e view su sta in e d by p oststructuralist
th eorists. C astoriad is refu ses to c o n sid e r t h e su b je ct as a n e n tity e n tire ly
in fu se d by ex ter n a lly im p o se d social p r a c tic es a n d in stitu tion s. He
con troverts su c h in terp reta tio n s, b e c a u se th ey le a d to th e d isa p p e a ra n ce o f
th e su b je ct’s a g en cy a n d a u to n o m y an d p r o d u c e d social c o n fo r m ity and
h o m o g e n e ity (C astoriadis, 1997t, p p . 3 2 -4 3 ) .
A gency, f o r C astoriadis, refers to th e r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e individual
an d so ciety , an d to th e in d ivid u al’s se lf-co n stitu tio n w ithin th e ir sp ecific
social c o n te x t in o r d e r to b e c o m e su b jects o f a c tio n ca p a b le o f tran sform in g
their reality in a m a n n er free o f total d e te r m in a tio n . C astoriadis o p ts for
r eth in k in g a self-reflexive a g e n t cap ab le o f c o n c c iv in g an d tran sform in g
th e very w o r ld th a t h a d p ro v id ed it w ith its id en tity. H e se e s th e su b ject a n d
its su bjectivity as p r o b le m s th a t req u ire fin e th e o r iz a tio n , b e c a u se w ith ou t
it, every n o tio n o f eth ica l resp on sib ility v a n ish es a n d th e su b ject is r e d u c ed
to a fictio n , livin g in a w orld w h er e in d ivid u als a r e en sla v ed a n d o p p ressed
by society. A th e o r y o f su bjectivity is n e e d e d fo r C astoriadis in o r d e r to
e x p la in an y self-reflective cap acity that w o u ld a llo w th e su b ject to get
d ista n ce d from h i s / h e r su b jective c o n te n ts, as w ell as from society, in o rd er
to tran sform th em . H e aim s at b u ild in g a th eo ry o f subjectivity a n d a g en cy
th at e n a b le s a u to n o m o u s p ossib ilities fo r th e su b je c t an d h i s / h e r society.
In terestin gly, C astoriadis' u n d e rsta n d in g o f su bjectivity im p lie s b o th a

social co n stru ct, invisibly g o v e r n e d by social im agin ary sig n ifica tio n s, a n d a
self-reflective a n d transgressive p o te n tia l cap ab le o f c o n scio u sly m od ifyin g
social im agin ary c o n te n ts. Subjectivity is a c o n c r e te form o f psychical
o r g a n iza tio n sh a p e d b y in stitu ted im agin ary sig n ifica tio n s. H ow ever, it resists
fu ll p e n e tr a tio n by so c ia l c o n te n t. G iven his n e e d to k e e p a d ista n ce b etw een
th e su b ject a n d society' in o r d e r to m ak e room fo r a privatistic d im e n sio n
a n d for creative a g en cy in th e su b ject, C astoriadis rejects th e id e a o f fully
in te g ra te d a n d so c ia liz ed subjectivities. H e th e o r iz e s a p o ssib le in tro sp ectio n
for th e su b je ct to analyze h is /h e r ow n su b jective co n fig u r a tio n . T his
in tr o sp e c tio n w o u ld e n a b le a self-reflective d ista n ce in w h ich to se e h im or
h e r se lf its “an oth er.” T h e su b ject b e c o m e s c o n s c io u s th a t self-realization is
n o t a natu ral d e p lo y m e n t o f his o r h e r ow n e sse n c e , b u t is self-form in g and
v alu e-p ositin g w ithin a relative, historical, a n d cu ltu ral form ation .
In th is se n se , th e con stru ctivist p o s itio n taken b y C astoriad is tow ard the
su b ject is n o t e x h a u s te d in r e c o g n iz in g th e in d ivid u al on ly a s a b ea rer o f
society. O n th e contrary, h is th e o r etica l e x p la n a tio n aim s p recisely at
e q u ip p in g the su b ject with m ea n s o f resista n c e a n d cre a tio n , c r e a tio n o f a
n ew a n d u n d e te r m in e d c id o s.
In su m , C astoriad is ela b o ra tes a th e o r y o f th e su b je ct that takes psychical
stratification a n d su b jective fo rm a tio n in to c o n sid e r a tio n p rovid in g an
a c c o u n t fo r th e social im p o sitio n o n th e in d iv id u a l p sych e. L ikew ise, his
th eo ry o f t h e su b je ct carefu lly k e e p s in d ivid u al a n d social sp ace for a u to
r e fle c tio n a s a road to a g en cy a n d au ton om y. T h e p sych ical stratification o f
th e subject d e m o n stra te s h o w th e su b ject is im m e r se d an d g r o u n d e d in th e
social w orld , w h ile at th e sa m e tim e th e su b ject is a b le to sta n d apart from
th e so c ia l r ea lm an d b e c o m e a n e w cre a tio n . T h e su b je ct is n o t r e d u c e d to
a passive p r o d u ct o f su p e rio r forces that o p e r a te b e h in d its back. T h ro u g h
th e c o n c e p t o f au ton om y, C astoriadis reclaim s critical self-reflectiven ess
a n d th e su b je c t’s a g en cy an d cap acity to give itself its o w n laws a n d
in stitu tion s.
T h e C reation o f Social M eaning and

R epresentation: Im aginary Social Significations
a n d Social Institutions
C astoriad is’ ela b o ra tio n s o n th e c r e a tio n o f social m e a n in g a n d in stitu tion s

c h a lle n g e fu n ctio n a list, u n ilin e a l, a n d e v o lu tio n ist th e o r ie s o f cu ltu r e a n d
history. T h e y c o n te st id e a s su ch as th e “e n d o f history,” narratives o f social
r e c o n c ilia tio n , an d illu sio n s o f a c o m p lé té re-ap p rop riation o f social

in stitu tio n s from an a lie n a te d state to o n e o f c o n s c io u s co n tro l.
S o c ia l m e a n in g is c lo se ly lie d to C astoriad is’ th e o r e tic a l e la b o ra tio n
a b o u t r e p r e se n ta tio n a n d h is c o n c e p ts o f ISS a n d so c ia l in stitu tio n s. It
d e r iv e s fr o m th e r e p r e se n ta tio n a l a ctiv ities d e p lo y e d by th e in d ivid u al
rad ical im a g in a r y a n d by th e so c ia l im agin ary. T h e r a d ica l im a g in a tio n , as
th e fa cu lty e n a b lin g th e activity o f c o n s tr u c tin g sig n ific a tio n s a n d
p r o v id in g s e n s e to th e w orld , c o n stitu te s th e c o n c e p t to w h ic h the
e m e r g e n c e o f m e a n in g a n d in stitu tio n s is r e fe r r e d . 3 ISS a n d social
in stitu tio n s in sta n tia te socicty. T h e y a r c a lread y p r e s e n t in th e in d iv id u a ls
a n d th e so c ie ty c o m p o s in g a n d le g itim iz in g it; in o th e r w ord s, th ey are a
r e q u ir e d c o n d itio n fo r th e su b je c t a n d h is or h e r so c ie ty to c o m e in to
e x is te n c e .
Social in stitu tio n s a n d m e a n in g s are c rea tio n s th a t are n o t a b solu te, static,
o r u n c h a n g e a b le , n o r d o they h a v e a s in g le a n d d e fin ite e n d that d e te rm in e s
o n c e a n d fo r all th e social in d ivid u als th at have b e e n fabricated u n d e r their
grid s. T h o s e are se e n sim u lta n e o u sly as n ecessarily im p o se d o n th e su b ject
a n d , at th e sa m e lim e , as s o m e th in g fr o m w h ich so c ia liz e d in d ivid u als can
abstract a n d volun tarily transform th em selv es. T h is m ea n s that social
m e a n in g a n d in stitu tio n s that th e su b ject h as to a c c e p t are g iv e n s in society'
w ithin w h ic h the su b ject h as to b e c o m e fu n c tio n a l. H ow ever, they also
c o n stitu te a n o p tio n a l a n d d iscretion ary c h o ic e fo r b o th th e individual
su b ject a n d th e social collective.
In this u n d e r sta n d in g o f so c ia l m e a n in g a n d in stitu tion s, so c ie ty has
o n to lo g ic a l w eig h t, yet is n o t in v ested w ith su p r e m e pow ers that overru n
th e su b je ct entirely. C astoriadis’ alternative p r e v en ts m e a n in g and
in stitu tio n s fr o m b e in g u n d e r s to o d o n ly as p r o d u cts o f so c ie ty w h ere the
su b ject is a b lin d op erator, w h ose in te rv e n tio n a n d cap acity to create and
recrea te its ow n social in stitu tion s a n d p ra ctices is lim ited , o r w h o se ability
to tran sform th e m lack s se n s e b e c a u se it c a n n o t b r in g an y in n o v a tio n s o r
su bstantially d iffe re n t social form s in to b ein g.
By c o n sid e r in g social m e a n in g to b e a c r e a tio n th at e m e r g e s from the
social-h istorical w h er e its two p o le s, the p sy ch e a n d society, are a t work—
C astoriadis in volves su b je ct a n d so ciety e q u a lly in th e p rocess o f g e n e r a tin g
a n d in stitu tio n a lizin g SIS an d m e a n in g , w ith o u t c o n c e iv in g th e m as
d e te r m in e d o r fix ed . M ea n in g b e c o m e s, in th is fram ew ork, a m agm atic
o r g a n iza tio n that involves d iffe re n t d im e n sio n s— strata— th e r elation o f
w h ich is n e v e r g iv en in a m ath em atical 01 d e te r m in e d way, a n d w h ere n o n e
o f the strata ru les ov er the others.
T h e m agm atic o r g a n iza tio n o f social m e a n in g e x p r e sse s itse lf in society

th r o u g h so c ia l im agin ary sig n ifica tio n s that r esu lt from th e flow o f
r ep re se n ta tio n s, a ffects, a n d in te n tio n s (th e in d ivid u al im agin ary o f the
p sych e) a n d th e o p e n stream o f t h e a n o n y m o u s c o lle ctiv e (th e social
im a g in a ry ). T h e se sig n ifica tio n s are e n titie s a r o u n d w h ich th e m ean in g-
w orld o f so c ie ty is stru ctu red . T h e y a r e th e o r g a n iz in g p r in c ip le s b e h in d
th e rep re se n ta tio n o f the w orld o f o b jects a n d r ela tio n s a n d p rovid e the
k ern el a r o u n d w h ic h so c ie ty c r e a te s its reality a n d its in stitu tio n s. T h e y
a r e in te rtw in ed u n its o f rep re se n ta tio n s, affects, a n d in te n tio n s th a t c a n n o t
b e sim p lifie d in to so m e th in g like th e sig n ifie d in a sig n system . T h e se
sig n ific a tio n s can b e, b u t are n o t necessarily, g iv en to th e c o n sc io u sn e s s o f
in d ivid u al su b jects in society; th ey are n e ith e r n o e m a ta n o r n o e sis'
(C astoriad is, 19 8 7 , pp. 3 5 9 , 3 6 4 ).
In o th e r w ords, m e a n in g can b e u n d e r sto o d as e m b e d d e d in th e totality
o f so c ia l in stitu tio n s. S ocial m e a n in g is e v er y th in g that su p ersed es,
o v e rc o m es th e id en titary d im e n sio n (fu n ctio n a l-in str u m e n ta l) an d that
w h ich in d ivid u als from th at so c ie ty c o n sid e r as a v a lu e, that w h ich b e c o m e s
in stitu te d in th e so c ia l w orld th r o u g h the o p e r a tio n s o f le g e in a n d te u k h ein
(C astoriadis, 2 0 0 0 b , p. 2 0 2 ).
T h e o p e r a tio n s o f le g e in an d te u k h ein “articulate" th e a m b ig u o u s m agm a
o f im a g in a ry sig n ifica tio n s a n d in stitu te order. T h e y p r o v id e the necessary
stability fo r social m e a n in g to b e m a teria lized a n d to survive for th e instituted
society. T h e s e o p e r a tio n s are u sed by so c ieties a n d th e ir ind ividu als to
o r g a n ize , stru ctu re, a n d c o n tr o l th e ir w orld. T h e y act u p o n the in trin sic
am b ig u ity a n d c o n tin g e n c y p r e se n t in rela tio n s a m o n g d iffe re n t strata,
su ch a s t h e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n th e b io lo g ic a l a n d th e social w orld , o r in
th e r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en the flo w o f r ep r e se n ta tio n s a n d affects. Socially
in stitu te d sig n ific a tio n system s— la n g u a g e, m e a n in g (le g e in )— a n d socially
in stitu te d system s o f p ractice (te u k h e in ) are b u ilt o n a m b ig u o u s grou n d
th at allow s for alternative d e fin itio n s o f e le m e n ts a n d sets (C astoriadis,
1987, p p . 3 6 0 - 1 ) . T h e se e x p lic it organ ization al ste p s take up th e e v a n e sc en t
a n d in d e te r m in a te self-organ ization o f th e m a gm atically given a n d ex p a n d
o n it. In stitu ted e n se m b le s o f im agin ary sig n ific a tio n s b e h in d th e e x p lic it
o p e r a tio n s o f le g e in an d te u k h ein r e d u c e c o m p le x ity a n d in tr o d u c e
c o n tin g e n t con stru ction s.
H ow ever, w h ile the stability o f m e a n in g a n d o f in stitu te d so c ie ty is a
c o n stitu tiv e c o n d itio n o f p ossib ility for th e h u m a n w orld, in stitu tin g so ciety
co n sta n tly w orks tow ard c h a n g e an d in n o v a tio n . T h e w ork o f in stitu tin g
so c iety always b e g in s in a h istorical situ a tio n fr o m the basis o f in stitu ted
society, b u t its in n o v a tio n s c o n stitu te ir r e d u c ib le , n o n d e te r m in e d acts o f
p o sitin g a n d créa tio n (ibid., p. 3 6 9 ). In th is s e n s e , th e social-h istorical is

e x p la in e d a s o r d e r e d , se ttled , e n d u r in g , a n d sta b le th ro u g h th e op era tio n s
o f le g e in a n d te u k h e in , b u t at th e sa m e tim e as creative potentiality: the
so u rce o f c h a n g e an d t h e possibility o f n ew social form s.
T h is fram ew ork w h ere th e in stitu tin g /in s titu te d w orld , ra th er th a n a
c o n fr o n ta tio n o f c o n tin g e n c y a n d am b ig u ity v ersu s stability a n d certain ty in
th e c r e a tio n p rocess, presen ts th e se tw o pairs w ith o u t p o sin g th e m as
m u tu ally e x clu siv e . S ocial m e a n in g a n d r ep re se n ta tio n are sim u lta n eo u sly
c o n tin u o u s a n d d isc o n tin u o u s, c o n tin g e n t an d certa in , a m b ig u o u s a n d
u n a m b ig u o u s. A lth o u g h th ey a r c in stitu te d an d sa n c tio n e d by so c ie tie s
fo r th e p u r p o se s o f sig n ific a tio n a n d in te r p r e ta tio n , th ey are a n y th in g
b u t fix e d , territorialized , o r stab le. T h e y are m o b ile a n d flu id , y e t solid
e n o u g h to so c ia liz e a n d create in d ivid u als w h o c a n b e fu n ctio n a l w ithin
certain so c ia l o rd ers a n d rep ro d u c e th e ir co n stitu tiv e social im agin ary
sig n ifica tio n s.
H eteronom y, Autonom y, a n d Social C hange
C astoriadis co n sid e r s th e dyn am ics o f social c h a n g e as in h e r e n t in society.

T h o u g h so c ie ty is n o t always aw are o f it, it is c o n sta n tly in a te n sio n b etw een
p e r m a n e n c y an d c h a n g e , bcttvcen th e in stitu te d a n d in stitu tin g. S ocial
in stitu tio n s an d ISS survive th an k s to th e ir ow n c lo s u r e , how ever, th ey also
c o n ta in a drive fo r c h a n g e . D e sp ite th e fact that IS S have a static character,
w h ich r esp o n d s to th e ir self-rep ro d u ctio n a n d c lo su r e te n d e n c ie s , th ey are
also c o n sta n tly th r e a te n e d by th e in stitu tin g p o w e r a s a so u r c e o f irritation,
a d a p ta tio n , a n d in n o v a tio n (ibid., p. 371).
O n th e o n e h a n d , so c iety a im s to m aintain itse lf as naturally o r d e re d and
p e r m a n e n t. Social c h a n g e is always c o u n te r e d by d e fe n s e s th a t are h e ld in
by every so c ie ty a g a in st th r e a te n in g o r c o n tr a d ic tin g c en tra l sign ification s.
T h e se d e fe n s e s arc e x p r essed in its h e te r o n o m o u s sta te .’ Individuals are
always p r e p a r ed to r esp o n d a c co r d in g t o th e r u lin g im aginary, what
C astoriadis calls the radical g r o u n d p o w er o f society: a p o w e r that is im p licit,
im p e rso n a l, a n d n on -locatab le.
N e v er th e less, o n th e o th e r h a n d , so c ie tie s a r e always o n th e e d g e o f
in tern ally c o lla p s in g a n d p r o d u c in g c h a n g e s in th e ir p rin cip al in stitu tion s.
T h e d e fe n s e s u s e d by in d ivid u als an d in stitu tio n s to m ain tain th em selv es
fail b e c a u se o f th e o n g o in g th reats in m u ltip le d ir e c tio n s m a d e by the
in stitu tin g so c iety (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 1 c , p. 150). T h e radical im agin ary
p ro v id es t h e c o n d itio n s for co n sta n tly tran sgressin g th e se m a n tic an d social
c lo su r e o f in stitu te d society. T h e in n o v a tin g activity o f in stitu tin g socicty

n e v e r e n d s , a n d th e c lo su r e o f a given in stitu te d w o r ld is always in c o m p le te ,
d u e to th e m agm atic ch aracter o f its con stitu tive o n to lo g ic a l basis. In this
se n se , c h a n g e is in trin sic to th e social-h istorical a n d th e total clo su r e o f a
so c iety is im p o ssib le a n d ahistorical.
A u to n o m y
T h e key to so c ia l c h a n g e a n d e m a n c ip a tio n fo r C astoriadis is auton om y.

In dividual a n d c o lle ctiv e a u to n o m y arise from th e d y n a m ic e x er cise d
b e tw e en in stitu te d an d in stitu tin g society. A u to n o m y is th e u ltim a te g oal o f
so c ia l c h a n g e , as C astoriadis s e e s it, a valu e in its e lf th at can b e con trasted
to clo su r e a n d th e h c tc r o n o m o u s states o f so c ieties.
F u r th e rm o r e, u n d e r sto o d in term s o f au ton om y, social c h a n g e is plau sible
in a h e te r o n o m o u s so c ie ty w h o se m e m b e r s c a n b e c o m e aw are o f th e social
n atu re o f th e ir laws an d , th ro u g h social c h a n g e , b e c o m e c o n sc io u s auth ors
o f th e ir o w n m a n d a tes an d in stitu tio n s. C astoriad is b e lie v e s that social
c h a n g e c a n b r in g a b o u t e m a n cip a to ry so c ia l ord ers. T o break th e clo su r e o f
so c iety is to c h a n g e a given h e te r o n o m o u s r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en so ciety and
th e social im agin ary. In o th e r w ords, an y a ttem p t a t social c h a n g e , in c lu d in g
theory, s h o u ld b e g in w ith the p r e m ise that a lie n a tio n appears in th e r elation
sh ip b e tw e e n so c ie ty a n d th e social im aginary, b u t is w o/this r ela tio n sh ip .
C astoriad is gives in d ivid u al c h a n g e an d a u to n o m y psychoanalytical
em p h a sis. H e a p p ea ls to p sych oan alytic th eo ry to e x p la in a n in sta n ce o f
self-reflectivity th a t p e r m its th e in d ivid u al to esta b lish a d iffe re n t rela tio n sh ip
b etw een th e u n c o n sc io u s a n d c o n sc io u s. A c k n o w le d g in g th e fact that the
in d iv id u a l's c o n sc io u sn e ss c o u ld n e v e r e x h a u st its u n c o n sc io u s c o n te n ts,
C astoriadis d e fe n d s th e p sych oanalytical p r in c ip le th a t th e ind ivid u al can
b e c o m e c o n s c io u s o f th e o rigin a n d psych ical fu n c tio n o f th e ir wills, d esires,
a n d m o tiv a tio n s, a n d in so d o in g , b e c o m e m o r e a u to n o m o u s b e fo r e them .
T h is is to say that th e ind ivid u al has m o r e e le m e n t s o f ju d g m e n t, a n d can
m o r e p r o p e r ly d e c id e h is or h e r actio n s, w h en k n o w in g th e u n co n sc io u s
m o tiv a tio n s th a t lay b e h in d th em .
In r e fe r e n c e to social c o lle ctiv es, C astoriadis p o stu la tes so c ia l c h a n g e as a
p rod u ct o f social stru ggles over in stitu tio n s in an a ttem p t to a p p rop riate a
g rea te r a m o u n t o f in stitu tin g pow er, ga in m o r e p u b lic d e lib er a tio n , and
alter in stitu ted n o rm s a n d va lu es by p o sitin g n e w o n e s a c c o r d in g to the
c o m m o n e n d s th a t th e c o m m u n ity p osits fo r itself. H ow ever, it is im p o rta n t
to r e m e m b e r th at C astoriadis n e v e r p o stu la tes a natu rally given c o llectiv e
su b ject o r e v e n th e id ea o f p op u lar d o m in io n . T h e in stitu tin g pow er c a n n o t
b e lo c a tc d in o n e in sta n ce o f th e social o r in ca rn a ted by a tran scen d en tal

subjectivity. It is a n o n y m o u s, rea lized th r o u g h t h e p u rsu it o f an u n d e ter
m in e d n u m b e r o f particu lar e n d s , a n d esc a p e s all e ffo rts to circu m scrib e it.
W hile C astoriad is d iffe re n tia tes b etw een th e in d ivid u al a n d social form s
o f a u to n o m y , b o th o f th e m sim u lta n eo u sly r e q u ir e a c o lle ctiv e project o f
au ton om y, a s w ell as au to-reflective a n d a u to n o m o u s in d ivid u al id en tities.
N e ith e r c a n b e th o u g h t o f in d ep en d e n tly : th ey a r c m utu ally d e p e n d e n t. As
Kalyvas n o t e s (1 9 9 8 b. p. 18), C astoriadis a llu d e s to a c o n flic tu a l m o d e l o f
p o litic s w h e r e a n ew social e id o s d o e s n o t em erg;e fr o m sin g le individual
acts, d e c is io n s, o r in stau ration s o f p r o c e d u r e s. T h e y arc s e e n as an
u n in te n d e d e ffe c t o f p olitical a n d social stru g g les, a s th e b y-p rod ucts o f
a n ta g o n istic in te ra c tio n s that u n d e r certain c o n d it io n s can c o a le s c e in to a
d e lib er a te a n d lu cid project, a s in th e case o f th e p r o je ct o f a u to n o m y and
d em o cra cy (C astoriadis, 1991a, p. 2 2 2 ).
L egitim acy a n d n orm ative statu s o f au ton om y
T h e c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y in C astoriadis h a s a n orm ative character, th o u g h ,

as Kalyvas states (19 9 8 a . p p . 172, 1 7 9 ), it c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to a critical
n o r m restricted fo r use a s a p r in c ip le fo r te stin g th e valid ity o f ru les, laws,
a n d in stitu tio n s o f e x istin g d e m o c ra c ie s. A u to n o m y is a p o litic a l project.
T h is n orm ative ch aracter has, how ever, o p e n e d fu r th e r d iscu ssio n in
r elation to C astoriad is’ theory. T h e in te n tio n to in tr o d u c e a norm ative
stan dard w ith o u t fa llin g in to m etap h ysical o r fo u n d a tio n a l lin e s o f th in k in g
has b e e n in te r p r e te d a s c o n ta in in g u n reso lv ed te n sio n s, as H aberm as
(1 9 8 7 ), H o n n e t h (1 9 8 6 ), a n d P oltier (1 9 8 9 ) have n o te d .0
T h e c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y an d its statu s as a critical, im partial, and
n orm ative criterio n has b e e n q u e s tio n e d o n th e basis o f C astoriadis’
a p p ro a c h to th e p ro b lem o f validity. C o n sid e rin g C astoriad is’ a r g u m e n ts o n
validity, it c o u ld b e said that h e w as n o t ab le to o v e r c o m e relativism b e c a u se
it is n o t p o ssib le t o d eriv e a n orm ative p o litica l program o r stan d ard from
h is theory. T h is c ritiq u e is b ased o n th e fact that fo r C astoriadis, “m e a n in g
a n d valid ity are social-h istorical crea tio n s. T h e y c o n stitu te the m o d e o f
b e in g o f t h e in stitu tio n . . . .T h ey arc exp ressive o f th e fu n d a m en ta l fact that
e a ch so c ie ty is a b e in g -fo r-itself a n d that it creates a w orld o f its own" (1 997c,
p . 3 8 7 ).
U ltim ately, th e issu e u p o n w h ich th is critiq u e is b u ilt is n o n e o th e r than

th e lack o f a fo u n d a tio n to e q u ip C astoriad is’ c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y to
o p e r a te as a critical n orm ative stan dard. As Kalyvas (1 998a, p. 164) n o te s,
o th e r q u e s tio n s c o u ld b e raised a lo n g th is lin e o f argu m en tation :
If th e r e c a n b e n o ap p eal to s o m e th in g h ig h e r than effectively actual

in d ivid u als, n o r any o b jectiv e extra-social sta n d p o in t, n o r an y p rior tran scen
d e n ta l m o r a l order, given o u r partial in terests a n d su b jective p r eferen ces,
w hy a n d h o w can a u to n o m y claim th e p o sitio n a l statu s o f a critical norm ?
C astoriad is p u ts it th is way:
W hat c a n b e t h e m ea su re i f n o extra-social sta n d a rd e x ists, w h at cou ld

a n d s h o u ld b e th e law i f n o e x te r n a l n o r m c o u ld serve fo r it a s a term o f
c o m p a r iso n , w hat can b e life o v er th e A byss o n c e it is u n d e rsto o d that it
is a b su r d to assign to th e Abyss a p r e cise fig u r e, b e it th a t o f a n id e a , a
valu e, o r a m e a n in g d e te r m in e d o n c e a n d fo r a ll (Kalvvas, 1998a, p. 179,
q u o tin g C astoriad is (1 9 9 7 h , p. 3 2 9 ).
C astoriadis d o e s r ec o g n iz e the fact that th ere is n o a b so lu te ju stific a tio n for

au ton om y, a n d that its legitim ation can on ly b e fo u n d in th e social collective.
It is on ly th e social c o llectiv e that can legitim ate it . 7 H ow ever, to infer that his
th eo ry falls in to relativism b e c a u se h e d id n o t p r o v id e extrasocial standards,
ex tern a l n o r m s, o r p r e cise figures, ideas, values, o r m e a n in g s d e te rm in e d
o n c e an d fo r all th at c o u ld serve a s a term o f c o m p a r iso n is to m isu n d erstan d
h is c o n c e p tio n o f auton om y. A s d iscu ssed in p rev io u s se c tio n s, Castoriadis
aim s to avoid any form o f relativism by p r o p o sin g a postm ctap hysical form
o f a u to n o m y that d o e s n o t c o n ta in o r co n su lt a b so lu te a n d /o r ultim ate
fo u n d a tio n s. H e sh ow s, th r o u g h his c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y , h o w it is p ossib le
to c o n c e iv e a n orm ative stan dard that e n a b le s us to c h o o s e an d ju d g e
b etw een so c ia l in stitu tion s, w ith ou t p resu p p o sin g sp ecific c o n te n ts already
in fe rr ed o r kn ow n , r o o te d in tra n scen d en ta l o r u ltim ate p rin cip les. H e
ju stifie s a c o n c e p tio n o f th e n o r m o f validity that sim u lta n eo u sly presen ts a
d e fin e d critical criterion o f su p erio r validity a n d a c k n o w le d g e s its in h er en t
r ela tio n sh ip a n d con su b stan tiality w ith the social-h istorical ch aracter o f
m e a n in g .8 In o th e r w ords, C astoriadis ju stifie s th e su periority o f a u ton om y
as a n o r m o f validity by p r e se n tin g a n ew u n d e rsta n d in g o f it, a n d provid in g
a n ew way i n w h ich it sh o u ld b e a d d ressed in d ie realm o f p olitics . 9
C astoriad is is aw are that relativism is an ea sy p o s itio n to fall in to, o n c e it
is a c c e p te d lh at th e r e is n o fo u n d a tio n a l o r tr a n sc en d e n ta l p r in c ip le s that
c a n su b sta n tia te a so u r c e o f validity (1 9 9 7 c , p p . 3 8 8 - 9 ) . A gain st a relativist
p o sitio n th a t p r o c la im ed that d iffe r e n c e is in d iffe r e n t, h e e m p h a siz e s th e
d istin ctio n b etw een d e facto o r positive validity, w h ich is th e valid ity o f each
so c iety ’s in stitu tio n s fo r itself, a n d th e d e ju r e validity, w h ich allow s
q u e s tio n in g o f so c ie ty ’s p aram eters. 1 Ic writes:
W e raise th e q u estio n o f th e de ju r e validity o f this ru le [ o f d e facto o r

p ositive valid ity]. We ask ourselves: w h at ought we to th in k o f th is ru le and
w hat ought w e to make o f it? W e ack n o w led g e th e in fin ite variety o f historical
nomoi, a n d w e p o s e th e qu estion : D o all th e se nom oi have th e s a m e value,
a n d w h at nom os o u g h t w e to w an t fo r ourselves? T h a t is eq u iv a len t to saying
that w e in tr o d u c e (w e a c c e p t) th e m e la c a teg o r y o f th e de jure validity. It is
easy to sh o w that it is eq u iv a len t to th e in sta uration o f reflec tio n a n d
deliberation, b o th taken in th e radical se n s e (1 9 9 7 c , p p . 3 8 8 - 9 ) .
A s s e e n , C astoriadis ju stifie s w ith th e cap acity o f a u to -r efle ctio n and
d e lib er a tio n w h at lie th e o r iz e s as th e in n a te d isp o sitio n o f e v e iy h u m an
b e in g to re-im a g in e w hat a n o th e r h u m an b e in g h a s already im a g in e d {ibid.,
p. 3 9 0 ). B u t to avoid m isu n d e rsta n d in g , it h as to b e sa id that C astoriadis
d o c s n o t transform th is creative p o ten tia l o f t h e p sych e, u p o n w h ich
a u to n o m y is g r o u n d e d , in to an u ltim a te fo u n d a tio n . In stead , th e p rod u cts
o f th e p sy ch e— its creation s— are to b e e x a m in e d u n d e r th e criterio n o f
auton om y. T h e p sy ch e d o e s n o t c o n ta in an a b s o lu te m e a n in g th a t o u g h t to
b e g rad u ally rea lized in th e fo r m o f th e subject: it is n o t an a p riori. T h e
radical im a g in a tio n is n o t s o m e th in g lo c a te d b e n e a th o r b e h in d th e su bjec t
as a se p a r a te o r in d e p e n d e n t entity.
C astoriad is c o m p le m e n ts his su b stan tiation o f th e n orm ative c o n te n t o f
the c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y w ith th e c o lle ctiv e d im e n sio n o f au to n o m y : the
political a u to n o m y , w h ich h e lin k s to a n e w c o n c e p tio n o f p olitics and
d em ocracy. T h e se are ch aracterized by au to-reflexivity a n d o p e n n e s s to
in stitu tio n s. S o c iety d o e s n o t fr e e z e b e fo r e a c o n c e p tio n , g iv en o n c e and
fo r all, o f w h at is ju s t, e q u a l, o r fr ee , b u t rather in stitu te s its e lf in su ch a way
th at th e q u e s tio n s o f fr e e d o m , o f ju s tic e , a n d o f eq u ity an d eq u ality m igh t
always b e p o s e d a n ew w ith in th e fram ew ork o f th e “n o r m a l” fu n c tio n in g o f
society.
T h is o r ig in a l u n d e rsta n d in g o f d em o cra cy a r tic u la tes th e in stitu tin g /
in stitu te d p o w e r o f th e radical im aginary. D e m o cr a c y is th e fo r m that m akes
p ossib le p o litic a l a u to n o m y w h ere th e in stitu tin g p o w e r o f so c iety op era tes,
c r e a tin g a n d in stitu tin g n ew social in stitu tio n s in a c o n sc io u s, reflective,
a n d d elib erative way. C astoriadis d o e s n o t u n d e rsta n d d em o cra cy as a se t o f
p r o c e d u r e s, n o r c o lle ctiv e a u to n o m y as m e re ly t h e sim p le sovereign
m a n ife sta tio n o f m ajorities. H e c o n c e iv e s d e m o c r a c y as th e real possibility
o f a c o lle c tiv e subjectivity that q u e s tio n s a n d a d a p ts its in stitu tion s th ro u g h
th e e ffe c tiv e p articip ation o f its citizen s. It is t h e cap acity to r e fle c t as a
c o llectiv e a b o u t itse lf an d in terro g a te its laws an d create n e w o n e s. In this
se n se , C astoriad is again p ro v id es a ju stific a tio n o f c o lle c tiv e righ ts (o n e that
w o u ld e n c o m p a ss p r o c ed u r es a n d m e ch a n ism s) th a t g u a r a n te e s th e d e b a te
o f a r g u m e n ts a n d rea so n s in c o n d itio n s o f fr e e s p e e c h , fr e e th in k in g , and

fr e e e x a m in a tio n .
P u ttin g a sid e th e d iscu ssio n o f d em o cra cy fo r a m o m e n t, it is p o ssib le to
say that fo r C astoriadis t h e c o n c e p t o f a u to n o m y — b o th in d ivid u al and
c o llectiv e— as a corollary can b e se e n a s a n o r m o f validity d e fin e d as a
c o n d itio n a n d n o t as a fo u n d a tio n . C astoriadis m a d e it clear:
T o th e q u e s tio n “W hy au ton om y? W hy r eflec tio n ? ” th e r e is n o fo u n d a tio n a l
answ er, n o r esp o n se "upstream ." T h e r e is a social-h istorical condition: the
p r o je ct o f a u to n o m y , r e fle c tio n , d e lib er a tio n , an d rea so n have already b e e n
c rea ted , th ey arc alread y th e r e , an d th ey b e lo n g to o u r trad ition . But this
condition is n o t a fo u n d a tio n (1997c, p. 3 9 4 ),
It is a p p o site to r e m e m b e r that a u to n o m y is fo r C astoriadis a social-
historical c r e a tio n that c o n ta in s critical p o te n tia lity a n d m a k es room for
o v e r c o m in g h e te r o n o m y in society. N e v er th e less, its c o n d itio n o f crea tio n
d o e s n o t n ecessa rily leg itim iz e it. F or C astoriadis, c r e a tio n as su ch d o e s n o t
necessarily have an essen tia lly p ositive c o n n o ta tio n . C astoriadis r em in d s us
that M acbeth was a social c r e a tio n in th e sa m e way th a t A u schw itz was. S ocial
c re a tio n s d o n o t have a n in trin sic fo u n d a tio n o r legitim acy. H e is rightly
aw are that social c rea tio n s gain leg itim a cy o n ly to th e e x te n t that th e ir
a u th ors— o r participan ts in a social in stitu tio n — p r o v id e it. F or C astoriadis,
th e p r o je c t o f a u to n o m y is an e n d a n d a g u id e , b u t d o e s n o t involve
d e te r m in e d so lu tio n s. It d o c s n o t effectively resolve actual situ ation s (ibid.,
p. 4 0 0 ). T h e aim o f a u to n o m y to break c lo su r e d o e s n o t su p p o se in itse lf a
sp e c ific a n d d e te r m in e d so c ia l fo rm . A u to n o m y is a c r e a tio n a n d , as su ch ,
it is n o t an e v e n t b u t a c o n tin u o u s creative a n d d y n a m ic p rocess. T h is is why
a u to n o m y c a n n o t b e e q u a te d to sp e c ific h isto r ica l c o n te n ts o r ab solu te
form s. A s K lo o g e r (2 0 0 9 , p. 32 0 ) correctly states, a u to n o m y c a n n o t be
id e n tifie d so le ly w ith a sp e c ific in d ivid u al p sy ch e, o r society. A u ton om y
m u st b e u n d e r s to o d a s d istrib u ted a m o n g th e p sych ical an d c o lle ctiv e p o le s
to varyin g d e g r e e s, in variou s se n ses, a n d at v a r io u s m o m e n ts. A u to n o m y is
n e ith e r a n ecessary h istorical c o n s e q u e n c e o f p r e e x istin g cultural settin gs
n o r th e self-reflectiv e form s that p r o d u c e d this sin gu lar crea tio n in the
a n c ie n t G reek polis.
A u th o rs in sc r ib e d in a post-tran scen d en tal p h c n o m c n o lo g ic a l p ersp ective
have q u e s tio n e d th is c o n c e p tio n o f a u to n o m y as a rad ical crea tio n o r alterity
a n d a n u n p r e c e d e n te d form o f se lf-re fle ctio n w ith n o p rev io u s e x is te n c e in
an y o th e r historical a n d cultural c o n te x ts e x c e p t th e a n c ie n t G reek polis,
for e x a m p le , A rn a so n 10 (1 9 8 9 , 1994, 200 1 , 20 0 3 , 2 0 1 1 ), w h o e la b o ra te s o n
th e w ork o f E isen stad t (1 9 8 6 , 2 0 0 1 , 2 0 0 3 ) a n d th e c ivilization s o f axial
a g e a p p r o a c h (2 0 0 3 , pp. 2 2 7 - 8 ) .“ D raw ing o n th e h e r m en eu tic a l tradition
and th e r o le played by in terp reta tio n , he q u estio n s Castoriadis'

u n d e r sta n d in g o f that tra d itio n . A rn ason a p p re c ia te s th e im p o rta n ce o f
C astoriadis’· n o tio n o f th e im agin ary as th e creative e le m e n t p r e se n t in
cultural fo rm a tio n s, w h ich c o n tr ib u te s to th e analysis o f p attern s o f m e a n in g
at a civilization al level. H ow ever, h e states th a t t h e c o n c e p t o f im a g in a tio n
n e e d s to b e in te rp re ted in the lig h t o f a h e r m e n e u tic a l transform ation ,
r ela tin g it to th e c o n stitu tio n o f m e a n in g a n d p a tte rn s o f w orld in terp reta tio n
(1 9 9 4 , pp. 1 5 5 -7 0 ). U n d e rsta n d in g th e a r tic u la tio n o f cultural form ation s
as a n in te rc u ltu r a l h o r iz o n o f varying trans-subjective a n d trans-objective
c o n te x ts o f m e a n in g , A rn a so n states that th e civiliza tio n a l axial age m u st be
in te rp re ted w ithin th e in d ete rm in a te , a m b ig u o u s, a n d e n ig m a tic character
o f th e w o r ld (p . 2 3 2 ). In th is c o n te x t, A rn ason b e lie v e s C astoriadis fails to
a c k n o w le d g e th e p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l in te rp re ta tio n o f th e w orld as a sh a red
h o r iz o n , w h e r e th e h e r m en eu tic a l d im e n sio n o f creativity— o r b etter put,
the in te rp re tiv e e le m e n t o f crea tio n — is n o t a c k n o w le d g e d in h is o n to lo g y
(2 0 0 3 , p. 22 8 ; 20 1 1 , p. 1 15).
As A d am s (2005; 20 0 7 , p. 5 5 ) e x p la in s, th e cru cial d iffe r e n c e b etw een
C astoriadis a n d A rn a so n rests in th e ir a p p ro a c h e s to in te rp re ta tio n a n d its
lin k to th e w orld tout court. C astoriadis rep u d ia tes t h e h e r m e n e u tic a l asp ect
o f w orld in terp reta tio n w h erea s A rn ason se e s it a s cru cial. C on seq u en tly,
tiiis d iffe r e n c e also reflec ts th e ir d iv e rg in g u n d e r sta n d in g s o f a u to n o m y
an d th e social-h istorical as c r e a tio n . A rn ason (1 9 8 9 , p. 2 6 ) e m p h a siz e s the
c u ltu r o lo g ic a l a sp ec ts o f social-h istorical creativity, m e a n in g by th is that the
cultural c o m p o n e n t o f social in stitu tio n s .shou ld b e u n d e rsto o d from a
h e r m en eu tic a l p ersp ective rather th a n from an o n to lo g ic a l o n e (A rnason
q u o te d by A d a m s, 200 7 , p. 5 5 ) . A rnason states th at crea tio n is interp retive
a n d c o n te x tu a l, a n d d isp u tes th e c o n c e p t o f c r e a tio n in C astoriadis. For
A rn ason , c r e a tio n ex nihilo m u st p resu p p o se “so m e th in g " that is— how ever
creatively— in te rp re ted an d transform ed .
A d am s sh a res th is vision w ith A rn a so n a n d , ra th er th a n valid atin g th e idea
o f e x -n ih ilu m cre a tio n , s h e also prefers to talk a b o u t “c o n te x tu a l c r e a tio n ”
w h er e a h e r m e n e u tic q u alification is n e e d e d . 12 S h e argu es that Castoriadis
rejects th e f o llo w in g th ree lev e ls o f interp retive activity in h e r e n t to crea tio n
(2 0 0 5 , p. 3 5 ) : ,s First, in terp reta tio n in c lu d e s a creative m o m en t; se c o n d ,
u n d e te r m in e d SIS always req u ires in te rp re ta tio n a n d elab oration ; and
third, th e social-h istorical w orld o ccu rs in th e c o n te x t o f in terp reta tio n and
tran sform ation o f already e x istin g historical c o n ste lla tio n s o f m ean in g.
T h is o b ser v a tio n is a n c h o r e d by A dam s's critical p o sitio n b efo re
C astoridian n o tio n s o f c r e a tio n a n d “le a n in g -o n ”, a p o s itio n sh a red by
A rnason a n d o th e r critics p reviou sly d iscu ssed , in c lu d in g H ab erm as and
W hite-book. D e sp ite th e ir d istin ct th eo retica l tak es, th e ir c o m m o n critiq ue

refers to t h e r ela tio n sh ip s a m o n g strata a n d to th e id ea o f alterity and
c r e a tio n as a radical oth er, as an u n p r e c e d e n te d fo r m that d o e s n o t r esp o n d
to, n o r is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f, p reviou s social form s o r laten t m e a n in g s that
c o u ld b e in te rp re ted .
T h e se c ritiq u e s b o il d o w n to th e c h a lle n g in g C astorid ian id e a o f origin
that is p r e su p p o se d in th e c ir cle o f c r e a tio n a n d is th e c o n se q u e n c e o f his
a ttem p t to break with d eterm in acy. In o r d e r t o ap p recia te C astoriadis'
p o sitio n , o n e m u st n o t g e t tra p p ed in th e c h ic k e n a n d e g g q u e stio n , but—
as K looger (2 0 0 9 , p. 9 5 ) puts it— a c k n o w le d g e th e u ltim a te se r io u sn e ss o f
this r id d le w h ile d o d g in g its a p p a re n t insolu bility, I a g r ee w ith the
e x p la n a tio n C iaram elli (1 9 9 7 ) h as p ro v id ed in r e la tio n to origin . F ollow in g
C astoriadis, h e states:
T h in k in g o f th e o r ig in in a radical way a m o u n ts to th in k in g o f the
m o v e m e n t by w h ich w h at d o e s n o t p r o c e e d fr o m s o m e th in g else— w hat
d o c s n ot h a v e its o r ig in elsew h ere— c o m e s to itself, h as w ithin itse lf p recisely
th e o n to lo g ic a l e n e rg y to d eta ch itse lf fr o m itse lf a n d to ex ist a s o r ig in . In
its p r im o rd ia l se n se , th e n , o r ig in is self-otigin: it is, b e c o m e s, a n d is k n ow n
startin g from itself. T h is self-p resu p p o sitio n o f th e o rigin c o n stitu te s th e
very a d v e n t o f B e in g , its u n m o tiv a ted a n d p e r m a n e n t u p su rge, w h ich h as to
b e th o u g h t in term s o f cre a tio n . H u m a n c r e a tio n r e s p o n d s to th is o n to lo g ica l
g e n e sis, to its in d ete rm in a c y a n d its in c o m p lc tio n — a n d , co n seq u en tly , to
its tem p orality. At o n c e in d ivid u al an d c o lle ctiv e — th at is, b o th psychical
a n d social— h u m a n c r e a tio n a lo n e c a n give m e a n in g lo o n to lo g ic a l g e n e sis
(P- 4 5 ).
In C iaram elli view ( 1997, p. 6 4 ), C astoriad is’ o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n , w h ich
e m b e d s its o w n se lf-p r esu p p o sitio n a n d o r ig in , co n stitu tes h is m ajor
c o n tr ib u tio n a n d r e o p e n s q u estio n s th a t m o d e r n ratio n a liza tio n h a s d e n ie d .
H ow ever, th is u n iq u e way o f th in k in g o f th e B e in g n ecessarily p o s e s aporias
in h e r e n t to the in d ete rm in a c y a n d th e C h aos, th e Abyss, a n d th e G ro u n d
lessn ess fr o m w h ich h u m an ity e m e r g e s (1 9 9 7 h , p. 3 1 1 ). In c o n se q u e n c e ,
c r e a tio n a n d th e articu lation o f th e w orld are n o t a b o u t h a rm o n io u s,
sm o o th , a n d c o n tin u o u s p r o c esses— e v en th o u g h th e y d o in volve co n tin u ity
to a c e r ta in e x ten t.
N e v er th e less, this e x p la n a tio n d o e s n o t satisfy A rn a so n an d A d am s w ho,
in sp ire d b y H ab erm as, a r e in te re ste d in a th eo ry a b o u t the articu lation o f
th e w orld th a t draws o n m e d ia tio n a n d m u tu al u n d e r sta n d in g , ra th er than
o n an u n b r id g e a b le ch a sm o f radical alterity.14
I w ill a v o id the already d iscu ssed a rg u m en ts a n d r e sp o n se s C astoriadis
p resen ts b e fo r e this critiq u e. I lowcvcr, A d am s a n d A rnason in tr o d u c e n ew
e le m en ts that arc w orth discussing, su ch as m e a n in g a n d interp retation , and

th e e x istin g relation b etw een intercultural c o n te x ts, history, continuity, and
discontinuity. S m ith (20 1 0 ) also e c h o e s their in te re st in Castoriadis’ d evelop
m en ts. A s A rnason an d A dam s d o . Sm ith w ants to r ea d Castoriadis as a post-
H eid e g g e ria n h erm en eu ticist w h ose o n to lo g y d o e s n o t d o ju stic e to
in terp retation , especially, in relation to the n o tio n o f crea tio n (2 0 1 0 , p. 5 ) .,s
1 d isa g r e e with th e se sch ollars w h o a ttem p t to p la c e C astoriad is w ith in th e
h e r m e n e u tic a l a n d p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l tr a d itio n s an d th e ir later
d e v e lo p m e n ts. F u rth erm o re, I d o n o t a g r ee w ith A rn a so n an d A dam s, the
la tter o f w h o m states that C astoriadis: 1 ) is r elu cta n t to e x p lo r e th e im agin ary
d im e n sio n o f c o n te x ts o f m e a n in g a s d istin ct fr o m th e en sid ic (A dam s,
2 0 0 7 , p. 5 5 ) a n d , 2) “m isses th at e a c h so c iety in stitu te s d ie w orld in a
c o n c r e te , p o sitiv e se n s e that is im p o sed o n a b r o a d e r h o r iz o n ” (ibid., p. 5 8 )
b e c a u se h e rejects th e creative asp ects o f in te rp re ta tio n . My view is the
contrary, th a t is, C astoriadis th e o r iz e s th e creative fa cu lty a n d th e im agin ary
d im e n sio n o f m e a n in g , taking in to a c c o u n t th e e n sid ic lo g ic o f th e w orld
w ith o u t d e n y in g th e cen tral r o le o f in terp reta tio n .
T o b e su r e , in C astoriad is’ th eo ry e a c h so c ie ty in te rp re ts a n d elab orates
o n its SIS, its e x is tin g m e a n in g , a n d its social in stitu tio n s. “E ach a n d every
so ciety c re a tes, w ithin its c o g n itiv e c lo su r e o r its c lo su r e o f m e a n in g , its ow n
w orld ” (C astoriad is, 1991f, p . 3 7 ) . M oreover, C astoriad is a c ce p ts that
c rea tio n s e m e r g e w ithin already e x istin g h istorical c o n te x ts o f m e a n in g
th at leave r o o m fo r in te rp re ta tio n an d tra n sfo rm a tio n . H ow ever, in terp re
tation d o e s n o t refe r to im m a n e n t o r la ten t e le m e n ts, form s, o r rela tio n sh ip s
th r o u g h o u t history o r w ith in c u ltu r es. T h is is t h e m ain break Castoriadis
attem p ts to m ak e in r elation to in h e r ite d o n to lo g y . C rea tio n is n ot
p r o d u c tio n , n o t th e b r in g in g forth o f a n e x e m p la r o f a p r e e x istin g eid os.
T h e social-h istorical is n o t r ed u c ib le to o r d a in e d in te llig ib le e le m e n ts. It
is n o t c o n stitu te d by e le m e n ts that have b e e n c o m b in e d in a sp ec ific form
a n d th at c a n b e r e c o m b in e d in a n o th e r (ibid., p. 3 5 ) . As th e social-h istorical
d o m a in is d e fin e d as cre a tio n , s o is history. 1 1 is to ry is th e self-d ep loym en t
a n d self-alteration o f society, an a lteration w h o se v ery form s are e a ch tim e
the c r e a tio n o f th e so c ie ty c o n sid e r e d . C astoriadis p osits history as crea tio n
a n d d e str u c tio n o f form s, o r c id e (ibid., p. 3 4 ). N o n e th e le ss, th e social-
historical a s c r e a tio n ex-n ih ilu m d o e s n o t m e a n crea tio n in a w orld less
vacuum , it is n o t literally given o u t o f n o th in g . S o c ie ty le a n s u p o n the first
natural stra tu m in o r d e r to e r e c t an e d ific e o f sig n ific a tio n s in v ested with
m e a n in g u p o n w h ich n ew c rea tio n s can e m e r g e (ib id ., p. 41 ) . 16
In su m , e x -n ih ilu m c rea tio n s are c o n d itio n e d a n d lim ite d by the en sid ic
d im e n s io n an d th e e x is tin g in stitu te d w orld , w ith o u t b e in g d e te r m in e d
by th em . It is o n ly in th is se n s e that C astoriadis a c ce p ts that th e r e is

in te rp re ta tio n o r e v en tran sform ation o f th e in stitu te d w orld . H owever,
n e ith e r in te rp re ta tio n n o r tran sform ation in v o lv es im m a n e n t form s,
e le m e n ts, o r la ten t c o n te x ts o f m ean in g.
U n lik e A r n a so n , C astoriadis is n o t in te r e ste d in th e o r iz in g trans-cultural
e le m e n ts p r e se n t in so ciety th a t g u a r a n te e h isto r y a cer ta in continuity.
D e sp ite th e fact that for C astoriadis so c iety te n d s to h c tc r o n o m y and
c lo su r e , h is th eo ry a lso p rovid es c o n c ep tu a l in str u m e n ts with w h ich to
u n d e rsta n d m o m e n ts o f r u p tu re , so c ia l c h a n g e , d isc o n tin u ity , a n d creation .
T h e fact th a t so ciety a n d history arc sim u lta n e o u sly c o n tin u o u s and
d isc o n tin u o u s is p recisely sh o w n in w h at h e is p o in tin g o u t with t h e id e a o f
c r e a tio n a n d is im p lic it in o th e r c o n c e p ts su c h as S IS a n d social in stitu tion s.
W h ile a c k n o w le d g in g th e n ecessary c o n tin u ity fo r n e w c rea tio n s to occu r
th ro u g h t h e in stitu te d im aginary, th e d isc o n tin u ity b r o u g h t a b o u t th rou gh
th e in stitu tin g im agin ary m akes n ew c re a tio n s p o ssib le .
T h e se d iffe r e n t p ersp ectives arc also r e fle c te d in th e way C astoriadis and
A rnason u n d e rsta n d au ton om y. W h ile C astoriad is se e s th e e m e r g e n c e o f
a u to n o m y a s a c r e a tio n , r u p tu re , d iscon tin u ity, a n d o p e n n e s s in society,
A rn ason s e c s it a s part o f a c o n tin u u m w ith in the axial o f civilization s. For
th e latter, t h e p o lis is th e result o f a lon g-term p r o c ess ch aracterized by
form ative sh ifts, d iv e rg e n c es, a n d tu r n in g p o in ts w h ere th e p roject o f
a u to n o m y in th e p o lis q u a p o lis w as d e v e lo p e d th r o u g h a lo n g process
b e tw e en th e e ig h th a n d th e fifth c en tu r ie s B.C.E.
In o th e r w ords, A rn a so n (2 0 0 1 , p. 17 5 ) an d A d a m s (2 0 0 5 , p p . 2 5 -4 1 )
u n d e rsta n d a u to n o m y a s a c o n te x tu a l c r e a tio n w h er e intracu ltu ral asp ects
in th e plu rality o f a n c ie n t G reek p o le is are at stak e. By su sta in in g that self-
r eflectiv e p r a c tic es a n d th e e x p lic it q u e s tio n in g o f o n e ’s ow n social
in stitu tio n s p r e c e d e d t h e in v e n tio n o f a u to n o m y in th e a n c ie n t G reek polis,
th e y d isc u ss C astoriadis’ p o sitio n by w h ich th e crea tio n o f a u to n o m y is
lin k e d to th e in v e n tio n o f p h ilo s o p h y a n d d e m o c r a c y b e in g b o r n a t the
sa m e tim e a n d place in th e a n c ie n t G reek polis.
A rnason stu d ie s a variety o f self-reflective p ra ctices th r o u g h o u t history,
w h ere a u to n o m y an d h e te r o n o m y sh o u ld b e s e e n a s variously in tertw in ed
a n d m u tu a lly relativizin g asp ects o f h istorical p a ttern s (2 0 0 1 , p. 2 0 3 ). In his
view', C astoriad is p olarizes a u to n o m y a n d h e te r o n o m y as binary o p p o site s
a n d th e r eb y c o n s ig n s w o r ld history to a h e te r o n o m o u s state.
S m ith (2 0 1 0 , p p . 1 5 9 -8 9 ) backs A r n a so n ’s p o sitio n , a r g u in g that
a lth o u g h a u to n o m y can b e c o n sid e r e d as a va lu a b le regu lative id ea l, radical
o r total a u to n o m y is a n u top ia. C o n tra v e n in g w h a t h e se e s as a p olarization
p o sed by C astoriadis, Sm ith se c s relative a u to n o m y as th e o n ly realizab le
form o f a u to n o m y that can ex ist in c o n tin u o u s te n sio n w ith relative

h e te r o n o m y . 17 E ven th o u g h Sm ith correctly o b ser v e s that C astoriadis d o es
n o t p o s e a u to n o m y as a final state, h e read s a fa lse o p p o sitio n b etw een
h e te r o n o m y an d auton om y.
K lo o g e r (2 0 0 9 , p p . 2 8 8 -9 4 ) also d iscu sses C astoriad is’ id e n tific a tio n o f
the e m e r g e n c e o f th e p r o je ct o f a u to n o m y w ith d e m o c ra c y a n d , like
A rn ason , h e se c s th e in v e n tio n o f d e m o c ra c y a s a d e v e lo p m en ta l p rocess
w h er e th e p roject o f a u to n o m y a n te c e d e s th e in v e n tio n o f dem ocracy,
h o w ev er im p e r fe c tly in te rp re ted . N e v er th e less, h e a c k n o w le d g e s the
a n c ie n t G reek p o lis as u n iq u e an d fin d s n o h isto r ica l e v id e n c e o f sim ilar
sa n c tio n e d p ro jects o f a u to n o m y w ithin »he axial civilization s, K looger se e s
n o p rev io u sly o p e r a tin g o n to lo g ic a l p r e m ises that c e n te r o n c o n c e p tio n s o f
th e s e lf a n d its n a tu re, orig in s, cap acities, a n d r ela tio n s w ith th e w orld as
th e o n to lo g ic a l c o n c e p tio n s ch aracterized as a u to n o m o u s by C astoriadis.
F or K looger, e v e n th o u g h w ith in the axial c ivilization s th e r e c o u ld have
b e e n a sig n ifica n t e m e r g e n c e o f h e te r o d o x ie s that m a d e p o ssib le the
crea tio n o f a n im agin ary c o n d u civ e to a n d c o n siste n t with a p r o je ct o f
au ton om y, lie ac k n o w le d g e s n o n e w ith in th e se s o c ie tie s (ibid., p. 2 9 3 ).
K lo o g e r (ib id ., p. 2 9 2 ) reasserts th e n e e d to d iffe r e n tia te a u to n o m y a n d
h e te r o n o m y , d istin g u ish in g a u to n o m y from s h e e r self-reflexivity, n o t on ly
in term s o f th e o p e n -e n d e d c h a r a c te r o f th e a ctiv ities o f se lf-r e fle c tio n a n d
se lf-tr a n sfo rm a tio n that it in v o lv es, b u t in term s o f t h e se lf-u n d er sta n d in g
a n d in te n t o f th e se activ ities. A u to n o m y c a n n o t b e th e sa m e everyw h ere,
b u t th is d o e s n o t m e a n th at an y k in d o f se lf-r e fle c tio n q u a lifie s as
a u to n o m y . H ow ever, h e se c s a n e e d to m o d e r a te h e te r o n o m y in view o f
th e o b se r v a b le v a ria tio n a n d relativization o f s o c ia l in stitu tio n s a n d
s o c ie tie s , r e c o g n iz in g d iffe r e n c e s in th e way self-reflex iv ity can be
u n d e r s to o d a n d p r a c tic ed , tr ig g e r in g n e w r e la tio n sh ip s b e tw e e n sig n ifi
c a tio n s a n d s o c ie tie s (ibid., p. 3 1 5 ).
I fin d th is last p o s itio n o f K lo o g e r ’s m o r e c o n siste n t w ith C astoriadis'
u n d e r sta n d in g o f th e a n c ie n t G reek p o lis a n d th e e m e r g e n c e o f p h ilo so p h y
a n d d e m o c ra c y as germ s o f a u to n o m y that h a v e to b e d iffe re n tia ted as
alterity a n d n o t m e re ly as d iffe r e n t social p r o d u c ts o f t h e radical im aginary.
R ath er th a n tiy in g to fin d intercultural o r trans-cultural va rieties o f
a u to n o m y p ro jects th r o u g h o u t history, th e p o in t h e r e is to p o se a u to n o m y
as th e c riter io n that allow s its to d iffe r e n tia te a m o n g social form s,
a c k n o w le d g e d isc o n tin u ity a n d ruptu re w ithin history, a n d d istin gu ish
b e tw e en c lo su r e a n d o p e n n e s s in a society.
It is im p r e c ise to state th a t C astoriad is c o n fin e s h isto r y to h e te ro n o m y , o r
to state th a t h e p o ses p o la r itie s in th is resp ect. O n th e contrary, Castoriadis
c o n siste n tly ac k n o w le d g e s th e ever-presen t te n sio n in so c iety betw een

o p e n n e s s a n d c lo su r e , an d th e in stitu te d a n d t h e in stitu tin g. A u to n o m y
a n d h e te r o n o m y are always relative. H e te r o n o m y is, as K lo o g e r correctly
puts it, “th a t w h at n e e d n o t to b e, in o r d e r to b e, p r e se n ts its e lf as that w h ich
c o u ld n o t b e o th e r w ise ” (ibid., p. 3 2 5 ).
C astoriad is n ever p o s e d su c h a th in g as total a u to n o m y as a fin ish ed
m o d e l o f so cicty , o r as an a b so lu te o r tr a n sc en d e n ta l c o n d itio n that e m er g es
o u t o f n o th in g . T h e c o n te x tu a l c o n d itio n s th a t lim it c re a tio n s su ch as
a u to n o m y a r e n o t to b e u n d e rsto o d as a c c u m u la tio n s o f e v e n ts historically
e x p e r ie n c e d in a lin ea r c h r o n o lo g y that p r o d u c e c re a tio n s o r that w h ich
are creatively in terp reted . T o claim th at th e a n c ie n t G reek p o lis is t h e germ
o f a u to n o m y d o e s n o t m e a n that it w as o r ig in a te d by a cer ta in particu lar set
o f ev en ts a n d c o n d itio n s, o r that it r efle c te d a sp e c ific in terp reta tio n o f
laten t m e a n in g s p r e se n t across cu ltu res. A u to n o m y h as n o origin ; it is part
o f th e c ir c le o f c r e a tio n w ith in w h ich the in stitu te d a n d th e in stitu tin g
im agin ary o f so c ie tie s c re a te social form s as a m o d e o f b e in g o f th e social-
historical.
Finally, th e q u estio n a b o u t the leg itim a cy o f h e te r o g e n e o u s in tercu ltu ral
form s that o u g h t to b e a p p re c ia te d an d v a lu ed in th e ir singularity, p o se d by
A rn ason , c a n b e an sw ered p recisely by C astoriad is’ p o sin g o f a n orm ative
criterio n b y w h ich to c o m p a r e a n d d iffe re n tia te a m o n g d iverse so c ieties
w ith ou t fa llin g in to co g n itiv e clo su r e o r e th n o c e n tr ic p ersp ectives. T h e
rejection o f e th n o c e n tr ic ism is a d ir ec t im p lic a tio n o f au ton om y. It
p r e su p p o s e s the a n th r o p o lo g ic a l q u estio n that sto p s d iv id in g th e w orld
b e tw e en “u s ” a n d “th e m ”; u s b e in g th e o n ly true h u m a n b e in g s, th e o th ers
b e in g in fe rio r, savage, o r barbarian. A u to n o m y o p e n s u p q u estio n s about
ever)· so c ia l in stitu tio n a n d p rev en ts a s in g le r e p r e se n ta tio n o f th e w o r ld as
th e on ly m e a n in g fu l o n e . M oreover, a u to n o m y is n o t a m e r e w estern
E u r o c en tric p r e ju d ic e, e v en th o u g h it a r o se in th e west. For C astoriadis,
a c h ie v in g a u to n o m y m e a n s o v e r c o m in g r e lig io u s o r se c u la r fu n d a m e n ta
lism s, fo r m s o f m cssianism , o r “idyllic id eas o f a n A rcad ia.” It m ea n s the
a ccess o f a la rg e m ass o f p e o p le to a c o n d itio n o f lu c id self-reflective th o u g h t
th at p e r m its a com m on c o lla b o r a tio n w ith o u t th e to tem iz a tio n of
in stitu tio n s. T h is w o u ld e n ta il a w illful g u id a n c e o f th e p o ly m o r p h o u s
im p u lses o f p sych ic c h a o s tow ard p ath s that m ak e life p ossib le a n d en a b le
self-ru le. F u rth erm o re, a u to n o m y im p lie s th e cap acity to transfer the
narcissistic id e n tific a tio n s o f social g r o u p s (that is, so c ie tie s o r n ation s) to
m o r e g e n e r a l id en tifica tio n s, u n d e rsta n d in g th a t "the sin gu lar h u m a n ”
b e lo n g s to h u m a n ity (C astoriadis, 2010a, p. 1 6 3 ). A u to n o m y is th e correlate
o f tru e p o litic s, p h ilo so p h y , an d a n ew u n d e r sta n d in g o f dem ocracy.
A u to n o m y a s d em ocracy
A n a tten tiv e rea d in g o f C astoriad is’ w ork rev eals a n e w d e fin itio n o f
d em o cra cy as t h e self-in stitu tion o f so c ie ty in g r a in e d in his c o n c e p ts o f
cre a tio n , a u to n o m y , an d in stitu tin g a n d in stitu te d pow ers. T h e c o llectiv e
d im e n sio n o f a u to n o m y was lin k e d by C astoriadis to a n id ea o f p o litic s and
d em o cra cy w h er e so ciety is n o t fro zen in a c o n c e p tio n o f w hat is ju s t, eq u al,
o r fr ee , b u t rather in stitu tes itse lf in su c h a w ay th at th e q u e stio n s o f
fr e e d o m , o f ju s tic e , a n d o f eq u ity an d eq u a lity m igh t b e co n tin u a lly
r e c o n s id e r e d as part o f th e “n o r m a l” fu n c tio n in g o f so c iety (C astoriadis,
1 98 7 , p. 8 7 ).
D e m o cr a c y e n d o w s an exp an sive co llectiv ity w ith in c r e a sin g creative
p o w er w h er e in d ivid u als sh o u ld p articip ate w ith real c o n d itio n s— n o t on ly
form al c o n d itio n s— to m o d ify th e laws a n d d e c is io n s that c o n c e r n th e m as
social m e m b e r s o f a society'. D e m o cr a tic r e g im e s d o n o t p r e su p p o se a
natu rally g iv en c o lle ctiv e su b je ct o r th e id ea o f p o p u la r sovereign ty with
r ep re se n ta tiv e pow ers. It m e a n s th e c r e a tio n o f n ew social form s and
in stitu tio n s th ro u g h a p u b lic sp h e r e w h er e c o m m o n e n d s can b e articulated
d e sp ite th e m u ltip licity o f su b je ct’s p o sitio n s. F u r th e rm o r e, it p r e su p p o ses
the c o n stitu tio n o f a c o llectiv e subjectivity c a p a b le o f b r id g in g d ifferen t
social im a g in a ry sig n ifica tio n s a n d d ifferen t p o litic a l agen d as.
A d e m o c r a tic so c ie ty s h o u ld sim u lta n e o u s ly se p a r a te a n d a r tic u la te
th e th r e e s p h e r e s th a t C a sto ria d is d e s c r ib e d as th e so c ia l s p a c e s w'here
th e r e la t io n s h ip o f in d iv id u a ls a n d so c ie ty are p la y ed o u t: th e private
sp h e r e ( o i k o s ) , t h e p u b lic /p r iv a te s p h e r e ( a g o r a ), a n d th e p u b l i c /
p u b lic s p h e r e ( e c c le s ia ) . 18 A n e c e ssa r y c o n d it io n fo r a n a u to n o m o u s
so c ie ty is th a t th e e c c le sia truly b e a p u b lic s p a c e a n d n o t m e r e ly an
o b je c t o f p r iv a te a p p r o p r ia tio n by p a r ticu la r g r o u p s . T h e im p lic a tio n s o f
th is c o n d it io n a ffe c t th e o r g a n iz a tio n o f a ll p o w e r e x is t in g in so c iety . Ii
m e a n s th a t “c o n s titu tio n a lly ” sp e a k in g , th e le g isla tiv e , j u d ic ia l, a n d
g o v e r n m e n ta l p o w er s b e lo n g to th e p e o p le a n d are e x e r c is e d by the
p e o p le (C a sto r ia d is, 1 9 9 7 c , p p . 4 0 5 - 7 ) .
It is w ith th e a d v e n t o f dem ocracy, as e m b o d y in g th e g e rm o f a u to n o m y
in th e a n c ie n t G reek p o lis, that th e d istin ctio n betw 'een p o litic s a n d the
p o litic a l wra s sa n c tio n e d . C astoriadis u n d e rsta n d s th e m e a n in g o f p o litic s
{le politique) as th e e x p lic it c o lle ctiv e activity th a t aim s at b e in g lu cid
(reflective a n d d elib era tiv e) a n d w h o se o b je c t is th e in stitu tio n o f so c iety as
su ch . P o litic s p erta in s to ev ery th in g in so c iety th at p erm its p articip ation
a n d that c a n b e sh a red (C astoriadis, 1991c, pp. 1 6 0 , 1 6 9 ). Its o b je c t is to
create th e in stitu tio n s that ind ividu als in te rn a liz e in o r d e r to facilitate th e ir
a c c e ssio n to in d ivid u al a u to n o m y a n d e ffe c tiv e p articip a tio n in all form s o f

e x p lic it p o w e r in a society. T h e p olitical (la politique) , o n th e o th e r han d,
refers to th e e x e r c ise o f e x p lic it pow er, to th e d im e n sio n o f society
p e r ta in in g to th e e x is te n c e o f in stitu tio n s c a p a b le o f fo r m u la tin g e x p licitly
sa n c tio n a b le in ju n ctio n s (Ibid., p. 156). It is th is d istin c tio n th at is at stake
in the g e r m o f th e a u to n o m y p r o je ct p u rsu e d in th e a n c ie n t G reek p o lis
a n d d em o cra cy .
As K alyvas (2 0 0 8 , p. 29 7 ) has a ffirm ed , by in tr o d u c in g th e ideal o f political
a u to n o m y a s c o llectiv e self-d e te r m in a tio n C astoriad is m o v e s away from a
restrictive a n d lim ite d d e fin itio n o f d e m o c ra c y a s a stab le, con stitu tio n a l,
a n d always already in stitu ted r eg im e that translates itse lf in to a n u m b e r o f
criteria, p r o c e d u r e s , m e ch a n ism s, o r form s o f legality. W ith o u t r ed u c in g
d e m o c ra c y to ju rid ica l fo rm s a n d rules, d é m o c ra tie leg itim a cy is g r o u n d ed
o n p articip atory a n d in clu sive attrib u tes o f p ractices, n orm s, an d in stitu tion s
that h a v e a u to n o m y its a h ig h e r fo u n d a tio n a l p r in c ip le a n d evaluative
param eter. T h e transgressive a n d revolu tion ary n a tu r e o f a u to n o m y resides
in th e r e c o g n itio n that in stitu ted reality d o e s n o t e x h a u st a n d c a n n o t
e x h a u s t all fo r m s o f p olitical a c tio n that e m e r g e at th e e d g e s o f th e in stitu te d
n om os.
T h e a n c ie n t G reek crea tio n o f d e m o c ra c y is p r e se n te d as a germ that
ra ised the o n g o in g qu estion : W h at is it that th e in stitu tio n o f so c ie ty (i.e.,
laws, form s o f g o v e rn m en t, e tc.) o u g h t to a ch iev e? In sp ired by this a n c ie n t
G reek , C astoriad is favors d irect d e m o c ra c y o v er r ep re se n ta tiv e d em ocracy . 19
H e se e s n o “r ea so n a b le fo u n d a tio n s” to ju stify a n id e a o f rep resentative
d em o cra cy that on ly fin d s su p p o rt in a “m eta p h y sics o f p olitical r ep resen
tation" (C astoriadis, 1997d, p. 9 0 ). C astoriadis q u e s tio n s false a ssu m p tion s
p r e se n t in rep resen ta tiv e d e m o c r a c ie s su c h as e q u a l p articip ation . H e also
critics c o m m o n p ractices in rep resen ta tiv e d e m o c r a c ie s lik e b u reaucratic
practices, c o n c e n tr a tio n o f p o w er by social elites— usually political parties,
m o n o p o lie s , o r b u reau cratized b o d ie s that c la im to r ep r e se n t collective
interests— Fictitious sep a ra tio n o f p ow ers, th e illu sio n o f “e x p e rts” b e in g
th e fittest t o “m anage" political affairs, a n d t h e g r o w in g d ista n ce betw een
th e ca p a city to attain p o w er a n d the capacity to g o v e r n in today’s d e m o c ra c ie s
(2 0 1 0 b , p p . 2 0 6 -1 5 ).
In sh o r t, rep resen tative d e m o c ra c y h o ld s o n t o th e so p h ism o f full
p a r ticip a tio n a n d p o p u la r sovereign ty that, in reality, c itize n s c a n o n ly
e x e r c ise o n e d ay every few years, w h en th ey c le c t rep resen tatives w h o
actually d o n o t rep re se n t th em . For th is rea so n , C astoriad is su p p o rts d irect
d e m o c ra c y w h er e a g e n u in e b e c o m in g -p u b lic o f th e p u b lic /p u b lic sp h ere
c o u ld take p la ce, e n a b lin g th e re-appropriation o f p o w er by th e collective
th r o u g h th e u n fette re d circu la tio n o f politically p e r tin en t in fo rm a tio n , the

e ra d ic a tio n o f bureaucracy, th e d e c en tra liz a tio n o f d ecisio n -m a k in g , and
th e u n iv ersa l p articip a tio n in d e c isio n -m a k in g p r o c e sse s (1 9 9 7 c , p. 4 1 5 ).
By d ir ec t dem ocracy, C astoriadis d o c s n o t m e a n full tran sp aren cy o r the
sh e e r e x e r c is e o f c o lle ctiv e w ill. It d o e s n o t r ela te to a ration alist o r a
v olu n tarist u top ia. D ir e c t d e m o c ra c y is n o t a n a ïv e id e a l o f fu ll p o p u la r
sovereign ty w h er e th e d e m o s transp arently ru les a n d g o v e rn s itself,
e m b o d y in g in th is way th e p roject o f auton om y. It is a m istake to r e d u c e a n d
e q u a te d ir e c t d e m o c ra c y to a u to n o m y a s C o h e n (2 0 0 5 , p. 24) d o e s. C o h e n
a rg u es th at C astoriadis bu ild s two th e o r ie s o f d e m o c r a c y b ased o n d iffe re n t
u n d e r sta n d in g s o f au ton om y, o n e c o m p a tib le w ith th e key fea tu res o f
r ep re se n ta tiv e g o v e rn m en t an d th e o th e r n o t. In h e r view th is is s o b e c a u se
Castoriadis* critical rem arks a b o u t rep resen tative r e g im e s rest o n an overly
c o n c r e te , u n m e d ia te d , an d u n d iffer e n tia ted id ea o f p op u lar sovereignty.
It is p e r tin e n t to bear in m in d th a t p o p u la r so v e r eig n ty a n d particip ation
sh o u ld b e u n d e r s to o d in lig h t o f th e p roject o f a u to n o m y w h er e, lik e the
a u to n o m o u s su b ject, th e d e m o c ra tic su b ject w ill n e v e r a cq u ire a full identity
o r e x h a u s t the in stitu tin g pow er. T h e in stitu tin g so c ie ty c a n n e v e r b e fully
c o n ta in e d o r e x h a u ste d by th e in stitu ted society. T h e fully transp arent and
a u to n o m o u s society, w h ere th e in stitu te d p o w er h a s totally ap p rop riated
the in stitu tin g pow er, w o u ld sig n ify th e e n d o f history. But th e m o m e n t o f
a b so lu te c o in c id e n c e can n e v e r b e realized , an d w e arc o n c e again referred
to th e virtu o so c ir cle o f crea tio n w h ere a u to n o m o u s d e m o c r a c ie s are
cre a ted by a u to n o m o u s su b jects, w h o , in tu rn , c o m e to b e th ro u g h
d em o cra tic social in stitu tio n s that e n a b le au ton om y. It is in this se n s e that
fo r C astoriad is real d e m o c ra c y c a n n o t b e lim ite d to in stitu tion al and
p a rticip atory m e ch a n ism s that e n su r e every o n e ’s p articip ation — even
th o u g h it m u st also g u a r a n te e th em .
C astoriad is se e s d irect d e m o c ra c y as e n a b lin g m o r e a u to n o m o u s
c ollectives, w h ere th e r e is n o d ivision o f p o litic a l la b o r b e tw e en the
r ep re se n ta tiv e a n d th e rep resented,-" g iv en th at o n e can d e le g a te political
tasks b u t n o t rep re se n t o r b e r ep re se n te d in o n e ’s p o litic a l will. For
C astoriadis, in stitu tio n a lize d fo rm s o r m e ch a n ism s th a t e n a b le p e o p le to
m a n ife st th e ir o p tio n s (i.e ., e le c tio n s, r éfé re n d u m s, o r p leb iscites in
rep resen ta tiv e reg im es) are n o t e n o u g h . In stitu tio n s a n d participatory
m e c h a n ism s m ust n o t b e fe tish iz e d o r p r e v en t th e c o n sc io u s ap p rop riation
o f th e in stitu tin g p o w er by th e collectivity. C h a n g in g o r q u alifyin g th e
r elation b e tw e en r ep resen ta tiv es an d th e r e p r e se n te d , or b etw een
rep resen ta tiv e g o v e r n m e n ts a n d th e d isc o u r se o f p o p u la r sovereignty, as
C o h e n ( 2 0 0 5 , p. 3 2 ) su g g ests, arc n o t viab le o p tio n s for h im . C astoriadis
ru les o u t rep re se n ta tio n w ith ou t e x p la in in g h o w th is substantial c o m p o n e n t

o f m o d e r n d e m o c r a c ie s can b e rem o v ed fr o m th e sc a le an d c o m p le x ity o f
c o n te m p o r a r y d e m o c ra tic fo rm s o f g o v e r n m e n t. C o n siste n t w ith his
p o sitio n , h e refu ses to p rovid e m o d e ls o f d ir ec t-d e m o cr a tic in stitu tio n s or
fo r m s o f g o v e r n m e n t that w o u ld p r o d u c e a u to n o m o u s ind ividu als and
e n su r e th e cea seless e x er cise o f the in stitu tin g im aginary. U ltim ately,
d e m o c ra c y d e p e n d s u p o n an “e n o r m o u s p o p u la r m o v e m e n t” that seek s
a u to n o m y b rew ed th r o u g h th e P aid eia (C a sto ria d is, 2 0 0 7 , p. 7 4 ). T h is can
b e r ea d a s a th eoretically c o n siste n t b u t in c o m p le te an sw er th at says
ev ery th in g an d n o th in g .
N e v er th e less, d e sp ite th is j u s t c ritiq u e , i f w e a g r e e with C astoriadis that
“o u r p r o b le m is to in stau rate g e n u in e d e m o c r a c ie s u n d e r c o n te m p o ra r y
c o n d itio n s" (C astoriadis, 1997d , p. 9 9 ) , w e m u st k e e p in m in d that
a u to n o m o u s d e m o c r a c ie s are c o n c e iv e d as o n g o in g rather than fin ish ed
p rojects, w h e r e a u to n o m o u s p o sitio n s are relative to its in stitu tion s.
F o llo w in g th is sta tem en t, M o u ffe (2 0 0 7 ) is c o r r e c t w h en sh e refers to the
p roject o f d e m o c ra c y as a h o r izo n that c a n n o t b e strictly d e fin e d , b u t w h ich
in v o lv es n e w in stitu tio n s that r e fle c t plu rality in so c iety a n d se e k g en eral
in terests w h e r e th e c o m m o n g o o d is to b e d e f in e d by c itiz e n s (C astoriad is,
2 0 0 7 , p. 8 7 ). In h e r view , th is m ig h t in volve a m ix e d r eg im e o f b o th d irect
a n d rep resen ta tiv e fo rm s o f g o v e rn m en t that w o u ld k e e p a u to n o m y as a
fo u n d a tio n a l an d evalu ative p rin cip le.
I s e e M o u ffe ’s as th e o n ly p o ssib le an sw er to t h e q u estio n s C astoriadis
leaves o p e n . H ow ever, C astoriad is sh e d s so m e lig h t w h en h e c ite s the
r ed iscovery o f d irect d e m o c ra c y in m o d e r n h isto iy in p olitical c o lle ctiv e
p r o c e sse s o f radical self-co n stitu tio n a n d self-activity, su ch as th e Paris
C o m m u n e (1 9 9 1 b , p. 1 07). It is lik ew ise th e c a se w ith th e g r e e n , w o m e n ’s,
o r y o u th so c ia l m o v e m e n ts, w h ich h e c h a ra cterizes as c o lle c tiv itie s w h ose
o b je c t is e x p lic it self-in stitu tio n in th e a ttem p t to break h e te r o n o m y in
c o n te m p o r a r y d e m o c r a c ie s. T h e se m o v e m e n ts h a v e e n la r g e d th e p ractices
o f n ew p o litic a l wills, e x p a n d e d th e b o u n d a r ie s o f political sp a cc , and
im p le m e n te d — th o u g h o fte n precariou sly— e ffe c tiv e p olitical fo rm s o f
p a r tic ip a tio n th r o u g h d e lib e r a te c o lle c tiv e a c tio n s (C astoriad is, 2 0 1 0 c ,
p. 1 1 7 ). In Kalyvas’s (2 0 0 8 , p. 2 9 9 ) w ords, t h e s e c o u ld b e th e voluntary
p olitical a sso cia tio n s w h o se c o lle ctiv e c o n stitu te s th e in e sc a p a b le g ro u n d
u p o n w h ic h d e m o c ra c y is c o n str u c te d . T h e se c o n fr o n t us with th e ever
p r e se n t q u e s tio n e m b e d d e d in th e creative an d p ro d u ctiv e ch a r a cte r o f
society: W hat are th e social in stitu tio n s that u n d e r c o n te m p o r a r y c o n d itio n s
a llo w c r e a tio n to e m e r g e th r o u g h th e in c e ssa n t activity o f th e in stitu tin g
im aginary?
A s s e e n earlier, this q u estio n d o c s n o t h a v e a d e fin ite answer, a lo n g with

o th e r p r o b le m s that C astoriadis p o ses b e fo r e t h e in h e r ite d o n to lo g y o f
b e in g . C haracteristically, C astoriadis' th in k in g sp ark s c h a lle n g in g q u er ies
w h en e lu c id a tin g th e ex istin g b e in g , a n d e sp e c ia lly w h en a p p ro a c h in g
m o r e c o m m o n a n d day-to-day issu es that involve o u r q u o tid ia n p ractices
w ithin so c ia l in stitu tion s. S o m e o f th e se q u e s tio n s m ig h t e v e n b e s e e n as
in c o n c e iv a b le by th e in stitu te d k n o w led g e a n d o u r u n d e rsta n d in g o f ou r
prim ary in stitu tio n s, su ch a s c o n te m p o ra r y dem ocracy. T h is ch a p te r has
d isc u sse d s o m e o f th e d e b a te d asp ects a n d c ritiq u e s m a d e o f C astoriadis’
a rgu m en ts. M any o f th e se can b e an sw ered o r c o n te s te d by u sin g Castoriadis'
a rgu m en ts. O th ers— a c c o r d in g to s o m e th in k ers— r e m a in o p e n a n d c a n n o t
b e r e s p o n d e d to.
11ère I have tried to d o ju s tic e to th e m o st im p o r ta n t critical issues
p r e se n te d in r ela tio n to C astoriad is’ p h ilo so p h y . W h e th e r o n e a g r e e s o r n ot
w ith th e se d iscu ssio n s, w h at b e c o m e s cle a r is th e o r ig in a l ch aracter o f
Castoriadis* th in k in g that p rovid es u n p r e c e d e n te d an d u n iq u e o n to lo g ica l
e x p la n a tio n s, a n d brings fresh q u estio n in g s to d iffe re n t o rd ers o f know
le d g e a n d p o litics.
A sig n ific a n t c o n tr ib u tio n o f C astoriad is resid es in h is n o tio n o fa u to n o m y
a n d th e r e la tio n sh ip h e e sta b lish e s w ith a g e n c y to p r o d u c e an in n ovative
d e fin itio n o f dem ocracy. T h is p r e se n ts a d iffe r e n t u n d e rsta n d in g o f the
n orm ative criter ia in th e a n th r o p o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic a l realm s, allo w in g us
to r e d e fin e d e m o c ra tic so c ia l p ro jects an d d iffe r e n tia te social a n d cultural
p r a c tic e s w ith o u t fa llin g in t o n aïve a n d s o m e tim e s p e r v er se relativism .
By m ak in g th is c o n tr ib u tio n , C astoriad is d ista n c e s h im s e lf from p ost
structuralist p r in c ip le s th a t in f lu e n c e d w id e sp re a d u n d e r sta n d in g s o f
society, cu ltu re, an d the subject, su ch as F oucault’s a s e x p la in ed in C hapter 4.
C hapter 4
Michel Foucault: The Game of Power

and Resistance
U p lo n o w 1 h a v e p r e se n te d C astoriadis' d e v e lo p m e n ts, fo c u sin g o n th e

n o tio n s o f th e su b ject, th e p r o d u ctio n o f social m e a n in g , an d social ch a n g e.
T h is c h a p te r in tr o d u c e s a d ia lo g u e b etw een C astoriadis' th eo retica l b o d y
a n d F o u c a u lt’s p oststru ctu ralist d e v e lo p m e n ts, w h ic h h as b e e n a far m ore
in flu e n tia l a n d c o n te m p o ra r y c o rp u s in p h ilo s o p h y an d social sc ien ce s
sin c e th e 1970s. I first p rovid e a g e n e ra l o verview o f F o u ca u lt’s w ork,
illustrating his p o sitio n s o n key n o tio n s from th e 1 9 6 0 s to th e 1980s th at will
allow a su b se q u e n t c on stru ctive c o m p a r iso n w ith C astoriadis. I lo o k at
p r o b le m s th at w e re at th e c e n te r o f F o u ca u lt’s th e o r y a n d w h ich sh a p e d the
e v o lu tio n o f his w ork in th e poststructuralist in te lle c tu a l c o n te x t, su ch as
pow er, d o m in a tio n , history, a n d subjectivity . 1 H e r e , as w ell as in th e n ex t
ch ap ter, I in te n d to s e e h o w th e se p r o b le m s w e re d ifferen tly a p p roach ed
a n d a d v a n ce d by F ou cau lt a n d C astoriadis, p o in tin g o u t lim ita tio n s and
p o te n tia litie s o f e a ch a u th o r in o r d e r to create a fru itfu l d eb a te.
F o u ca u lt’s w ork is w id ely k n o w n a n d h as b e e n e x ten siv ely an alyzed in the
last thirty years. F or this rea so n 1 d o n o t in te n d to m ak e a n exh au stive
e x a m in a tio n o f h is total in te lle ctu a l p r o d u c tio n . As is ev id en t in the
fo llo w in g se c tio n s, m y in te rp re ta tio n o f F o u ca u lt is lim ite d to the p rincip al
q u e stio n s h e sh a red — in d e p e n d e n tly — w ith C astoriadis. My analysis o f
F ou cau lt r e lie s o n p rev io u s in terp reta tio n s— in m y view , ju s t a n d accu rate—
by o th e r sch o la rs w h o have tak en in to a c c o u n t a p sych oan alytical p ersp ective
in th e ir w ork . Prim arily, m y a rg u m en ts fo llo w early w ritin gs by D ew s (1984,
1987, 1 9 9 5 ) a n d W h iteb o o k (1 9 9 5 , 2 0 0 5 ), w h o sh o w th e p r o b le m s and
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f th e a b s e n c e o f th e p sych oan alytical p e rsp ectiv e fo r
F o u ca u lt’s th e o r e tic a l c o h e r e n c e a n d consistency.
92 Castoriadis, F oucault, a n d A utonomy
F oucault and Poststructuralism
D e sp ite a m b ig u ities and d isa g r e em e n ts in r ela tio n to th e term

p o ststru ctu ia lism . it is p o ssib le to say th a t it is n e ith e r a sim p le r ejectio n n or
e x te n sio n o f structuralism , b u t a series o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l r eflec tio n s o n the
structuralist program a n d its failu res a n d a c h iev e m en ts. F o u ca u lt never
a c c e p te d b e in g c a lle d a poststructuralist, how ever, a lo n g w ith o th e r auth ors
su ch as D errid a, h e reacted again st o n to lo g ic a l an d e p iste m o lo g ica l
p r in c ip le s th a t structuralist form alism h ad in h e r ite d fr o m th e F rench
in te lle ctu a l m ilie u (M erqu ior, 1986. p. 195).
As w ith stru ctu ralism , th e Sau ssu rean legacy m a d e its way in t o m a n y o f
th e a ssu m p tio n s F o u ca u lt r elied u p o n w h en h e was e la b o ra tin g early
c o n c e p ts su c h a s d isc o u r se o r e p iste m e . F o llo w in g th e p r in c ip le s o f the
reflexivity a n d referen tial!tv o f t h e lin g u istic sig n , h e d e n ie d a natural
p r e e x iste n c e o f id eas a n d ob jects th a t w ere to b e n a m e d by lan gu age;
conversely, it w as la n g u a g e th a t cre a ted c o n c e p ts. P oststructuralists c a m e to
b eliev e all h u m a n system s w ere socially c o n str u c te d w ithin a lin g u istic logic
a n d o p e r a te d lik e la n g u a g e. A s lin g u istic p r o d u c tio n s, th e social system s
th at h u m a n s in h a b ite d m a in ta in e d d iffe re n t a n d sp ec ific m e a n in g s and
v a lu es that stru ctu red social life in d iffe re n t cultural a n d historical
fo r m a tio n s. In c o n s e q u e n c e , th is p r in c ip le n e g a te d the false id eas o f
a u to n o m o u s a n d natu ral w o r ld s o f m e a n in g a n d valu es, w h ere truth o r
o b jectiv e reality c o u ld b e im p lie d .
T h e fu n d a m e n ta l criterio n fo r p oststructuralism b e c a m e the d e v e lo p m e n t
o f a n e p is te m ic a n d evalu ative plu ralism . U n ity a n d u n iversality w ere
in h e r e n tly o p p re ssiv e . S in ce n o c o n c e p tio n o f tru th c o u ld e v er ju stify the
un iversal valid ity that it c la im e d , su ch a claim c o u ld o n ly m ask a d e sir e for
pow er, th e w ish to u n ify coerciv ely a m u ltip lic ity o f sta n d p o in ts. Truth
b e c a m e an in stru m en t o f pow er. S p ecifically f o r F ou cau lt, it necessarily
im p lie d d o m in a tio n a n d u n ific a tio n (D ew s, 1987. p p . 2 1 7 -2 2 ).
F o llo w in g th e se p rem ises, th e o r etica l activity fo r poststn ictu ralists c o u ld
n o lo n g e r r e fe r to u n c h a n g in g ex tern a l a b so lu tes. Su ch reflexivity always
r em a in e d ten ta tiv e, in c a p a b le o f un iversal g e n e r a liz a tio n a n d fr a m e d in
h istorical d isc o n tin u itie s. P oststn icturalists saw t h e w ork o f analysis n o t as
linear, b u t a s an assem b la g e, a p a stich e c o m p r isin g d ifferen t figures, view's,
a n d o p in io n s. In th e ir view , the role o f c a u se o r e x p la n a tio n in th e o r y le d
to e v o lu tio n ist c o n c lu sio n s a n d w ork ed a g a in st th e p u rp o ses o f w h at, for
e x a m p le , F o u ca u lt called the genealogy' o f d iffe r e n c e , w h ich a ttem p ted to
estab lish a n d p reserv e th e singu larity o f even ts. T h eo ry , in F o u c a u lt’s
o p in io n , s h o u ld c o n c en tra te o n t h e d isc r ed ite d , th e n e g le c te d , a n d a w h o le
M ichel Foucault: T he Gam e o f Power a n d Resistance 93
ran ge o f p h e n o m e n a that h ad b e e n d e n ie d a history. T h e o r y sh o u ld not

have r o o m fo r co n sta n ts, e sse n c es, o r im m o b ile form s o f u n in terru p ted
c o n tin u itie s that h a d stru ctu red the past. In th is way, r eje ctin g u n ifyin g
m o d e s o f th eo ry as ration alist m yths, F o u c a u lt a n d poststructuralists
b e lie v e d it w as im p o ssib le to k n ow reality itself. M e a n in g a n d rep resen ta tio n
w ere always sh iftin g an d u n stab le, a n d th e su b ject, a p r iso n e r o f its ow n
d isc o u r se , c o u ld n ever know a b so lu te a n d v e rifia b le c o n te n ts o f reality (Best
a n d K ellner, 1991, p p . 9 , 11; Sarup , 1993, p. 5 9 ).
P oststructuralists c ritic ize d th e c la im th a t th e m in d h a d in n a te and
universal stru ctu res. In stead , th ey favored a h istorical view with d ifferen t
form s o f c o n sc io u sn e s s, id e n titie s, a n d sig n ific a tio n as h istorical p rod u cts
that v a ried over tim e. H ow ever, d e sp ite th e se critiq u es they reta in ed
stru ctu ralism ’s e lim in a tio n o f th e su b ject as th e c r c a to r o f reality. T h e y held
a n tih u m a n ist p o sitio n s a n d d e n ie d that a n in d iv id u a l’s in te n tio n s, p u rp oses,
a n d g o a ls w e r e p r o d u c ts o f a fr e e a g e n t w h o c o n tr o lle d th e ir o w n action s.
The su b je ct as th e kn ow in g, w illin g , a u to n o m o u s , self-critical, or
tr a n sc en d e n ta l e g o w as p u t in to q u e s tio n a n d , in c o n s e q u e n c e , a su b ject
ca p a b le o f d e te r m in in g truth in a way that a sso cia te d it with o n to lo g ic a l
sp e c ific a tio n s was d e e m e d invalid.
F or F o u c a u lt, th e w ay th e su b je ct w as c o n fig u r e d w ithin la n g u a g e and
system s o f m e a n in g a n d p o w er w ere con stitu tive p r o b le m s. T h is le d h im to
d e v e lo p a th eo ry o f d isco u rse, w h ich , as m e n tio n e d , an alyzed subjects,
c u ltu r e , a n d so c iety as se m io tic a lly stru ctu red so c ia l p h e n o m e n a . Socially
c o n str u c te d m e a n in g w as r e la te d to th e p a rticu la rities o f in stitu tion al sites
a n d p r a c tic e s that w e re at th e h eart o f th e su b je ctiv e fo rm a tio n o f individuals.
D isc o u r se w as a site a n d o b je c t o f str u g g le , w h e r e d iffe re n t g r o u p s strove
fo r h e g e m o n y a n d th e p r o d u c tio n o f id e o lo g y (B e st a n d K ellner, 1991,
p p . 2 0 -6 ; M erqu ior, 1986, p. 196).
In F o u c a u lt’s e a rly w orks th e su b je c t w as c o n s titu te d in a n d th r o u g h
p o w er -d isc o u r se fo r m a tio n s, a n d su b jectivity w as str u c tu r ed u n d e r the
a e g is o f a p ow er -d isc o u r se m a trix . T h e su b je c t w as situ a te d w ith in a social
a n d d isc u r siv e c o n te x t a n d c o u ld n o t b e a n y th in g b u t a lin g u istic possibility,
m e r e ly a lo c u s o f m u ltip le , d isp e r se d , o r d e c e n te r e d d isc o u r se s. T h u s fo r
F o u c a u lt, a s w ell a s for p oststru ctu ralists in g e n e r a l, th e fo c u s o f in te re st
m o v e d aw ay fr o m th e su b je ct as su c h . G iven its c o n stitu tiv e r o le , w h at
b e c a m e im p o r ta n t w as to d e c ip h e r th e fo r m a tio n o f d isc o u r se a n d its
m e a n s o f p o w e r ra th er th a n th e p r o b le m s o f su b je ct a n d subjectivity.
T r a n sc e n d e n ta lism w as n o t lo c a te d in th e su b je ct b u t in th e d isc o u r se
fo r m a tio n s, c r e a tin g in th is way a k in d o f C a rtesia n ism w ith o u t th e su b ject,
a s o fte n e m p h a siz e d .
F o llo w in g th is lin e o f a r g u m e n ta tio n , tw o fu n d a m e n ta l E n lig h te n m e n t

p r o p o sitio n s— t h e p o w er o f rea so n a n d th e c en tra l r o le o f h u m a n k in d in
d e te r m in in g its o w n d estin y a n d p rogress— w ere r e c o n s id e r e d as m e a n s o f
social a n d p o litica l c o n tr o l. P oststructuralists e lim in a te d th e p r in c ip le s o f
m oral au th ority an d tr u th -te llin g th a t m o d e r n ism p r o c la im ed . It u n d e rm in e d
the p r in c ip le s o f a u to n o m y a n d the a u to-reflexive su b je c t, the e m an cip atory
in te re st in th e past an d th e fu tu re, an d th e possibility· o f a political criticism
th at c o u ld g o b e y o n d m e re im m a n e n t social criticism . Social critiq u e h ad to
r e n o u n c e th e n orm ative m o m e n t w h ere th e r e w o u ld b e a d istin ctio n
b e tw e en b e tte r o r w orse fo rm s o f life.
F ou cau lt’s p o ststr u c tu r a list ro o ts
F o u ca u lt h a s b e e n w id ely r e c o g n iz e d as a rep resen ta tiv e o f poststructuralism ,

b e c a u se h e drew u p o n a n a n ti-E n lig h te n m e n t trad ition that rejected the
e q u a tio n o f rea so n , e m a n c ip a tio n , an d p rogress in a r g u in g th a t m o d e r n
form s o f p o w er an d k n o w led g e have served to create n e w form s o f
d o m in a tio n . H ow ever as n o te d , h e always r e je c te d th is id en tifica tio n
(F oucault, 1 9 8 3 a , p. 1 98).
F ou cau lt a b a n d o n e d certain asp ects o f structuralist analysis that d ealt
w ith the e lim in a tio n o f n o tio n s o f m e a n in g a n d th e c o n c e p tio n o f a form al
m o d e l o f h u m a n beh avior as ru le-g o v ern ed tran sform ation s o f m ean in gless
e le m e n ts. H e also so u g h t to avoid b o th th e p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l p roject o f
tr a cin g all m e a n in g b a c k to the m e a n in g -g iv in g activity o f a n a u to n o m o u s,
tr a n sc en d e n ta l su b ject, a n d th e a ttem p t to read o f f th e im p lic it m e a n in g o f
social p r a c tic e s as a h e r m e n e u tic a l e x e r c ise (D rey fu s a n d R abinow , 1983,
p .x x iv ).
F ou cau lt c o n c e n t rated o n d iffe re n t p r o b le m s a s tim e passed. F oucault's
early w orks w e r e c o n c e r n e d with th e r ela tio n sh ip s a n d fo r c e s th at co n stitu ted
a su b ject, ra th er th a n w ith a su b je ct w h o se r e a so n a n d a g en cy co n stitu ted
kn o w led g e a n d e n d o w e d th e w orld w ith m e a n in g . In tim e, F oucault m oved
from a m o r e lin gu istic an d d e te r m in a n t an alysis to o n e w h er e pow er
r ela tio n sh ip s w e re s e e n a s a n u ltim a te p rin cip le o f so c ia l reality. P ow er was
se e n by F o u ca u lt to b e everyw here a n d n o t ex clu siv ely in v ested in t h e cen tral
o r g a n izin g in stitu tio n s, su ch as th e state.
D u rin g th e m id 1960s his a tten tio n w as d ir e c te d a lm o st exclu sively
tow ard th e history o f discu rsive form ation a n d its. rela tio n sh ip with know
le d g e a n d pow er. F or m o st o f th e 1970s, how ever, t h e a u to n o m y o f d iscou rse
w as b lu r r e d a n d d issolved , a n d h e saw e p iste m ic stru ctu res as c o m p lete ly
m o ld e d by social forces. Finally, in his late w ork , th e p ro b lem o f th e
subject— w h ic h h ad lo n g b e e n v iew ed as an e ffe c t o r a con stru ct— e m e r g e d

a n d F o u ca u lt b e c a m e in te r e ste d in th e m o d a litie s o f m oral self-con stitu tion
a n d in w h a t lie te rm e d as “a e sth e tics o f ex isten ce ." T h is e v o lu tio n in
F o u ca u lt’s w ork has b e e n s e e n by s o m e a u th ors as a n in tern al con tra d ictio n ,
w h ich at o n e stage le a d to an a n n o u n c e m e n t o f t h e “d e a th o f m a n ,” w h ile
at a later s ta g e F o u ca u lt a d v o c a te d the p r o m o tio n o f n e w fo r m s o f subjectivity
w h ich r eq u ire d a p reviou s th eo retica l n o tio n o f t h e su b ject (W illiam s, 2001,
pp. 1 5 2 -8 9 ; D ew s, 1987, p. 2 3 2 ).
Initially, in T he Order o f Things (1 9 6 6 ), F o u c a u lt so u g h t to e x p la in the
e m e r g e n c e o f social sc ie n c e s, th e ir r elation sh ip w ith pow er, an d th e way
k n o w le d g e w as h istorically p r o d u c e d a n d v a lu e c h a r g ed th r o u g h the
c o n c e p ts o f e p iste m e a n d d isco u rse. E p istem e e v id e n c e d th e system ic
n atu re o f a ll k n o w led g e a n d referred to th e stru ctu res o f th o u g h t that typify
th e th in k in g o f a p articu lar age. A particu lar e p is te m e is always b o u n d to
give rise to a particu lar fo r m o f k n o w le d g e , h e c la im e d . T h e term “d isc o u r se ”
referred to t h e a ccu m u la tio n o f social p ractices (m o ra l, d o m e stic , political,
rep ro d u c tiv e , e c o n o m ic , an d in te lle c tu a l), c o n c e p ts,s ta te m e n ts , a n d b eliefs
th at w e re p r o d u c e d by a particu lar e p iste m e . It c o u ld b e u n d e r sto o d as
p r a c tic es th a t system atically form th e o b je c ts o f w h ich th ey sp o k e . D iscourse
was b o th th e p r o d u ctio n o f a sta te m en t a n d its social status, in c lu d in g its
in stitu tio n a l setting; it was d e sir e a n d p o w er a lread y in a c tio n (F oucault,
1970; 197 2 , p. 138).
T h e se tw o n o tio n s a llow ed F ou cau lt to r ed ir ec t h is th in k in g away from
m o d e r n ist id eas a b o u t truth o r reality, sh o w in g h o w a h istorically sp ecific
system o f n o rm -g o v ern ed social p ractices d e fin e d an d p r o d u c e d each
e p o c h ’s d istin ctiv e su b jects a n d o b je c ts o f k n o w le d g e an d pow er. In
c o n s e q u e n c e , h e p r o p o s e d a n ew k in d o f h istoriograp h y— first called
a r ch eo lo g y , th e n g e n e a lo g y — that c o u ld chart th e em ergen ce and
d isa p p e a ra n ce o f su ch system s o f p ractice a n d d e sc r ib e th e ir sp ecific
fu n c tio n (Fraser, 1989, p. 3 8 ).
B ased o n th e se p rin cip les, F ou cau lt d e v e lo p e d n ew c o n c e p tio n s ab ou t
g lob al a n d to ta liz in g form s o f k n o w led g e, tru th , history, con tin u ity, and
d isc o n tin u ity .2 H is w ork a tte m p te d to b reak d o w n th e th eo retica l form s o f
analysis, history, a n d so c iety as u n ifie d w h o le s g o v e r n e d by a cen ter, e ssen ce,
o r telos. F o u ca u lt sto o d again st universalism a n d saw th eo ry a n d h isto iy as
n o n e v o lu tio n a r y a n d fra g m en ted . H e stated th a t n o past era c o u ld be
u n d e r sto o d p u rely in its o w n term s, g iv en th a t h isto iy was, in a s e n s e , always
a history o f th e p resen t. H istoricism th e r efo r e r e p r e se n te d a danger.
T h is was in tim a tely related to w h a t F ou cau lt u n d e r s to o d as truth. H istory
a n d k n o w led g e w ere in tim a tely related to w hat truth r ep re se n te d in its
relative n a tu re an d character. C ulturally an d h istorically c o n str u c ted , truth

w as d e fin e d w ith in d iffe re n t e p iste m e s a n d / o r p o w e r regim es. F oucault
in siste d th at a ll r e g im e s o f p o w e r w ere also r e g im e s o f truth c o n stitu te d by
a system o f o r d e r e d p r o c ed u r es for th e p r o d u c tio n , r e g u la tio n , distrib u tion ,
circu la tio n , an d o p e r a tio n o f sta te m en ts. Truth w as d e fin e d as h a v in g a
circu lar r e la tio n with system s o f c o n tr o l th a t p r o d u c e d a n d su sta in e d it, a n d
w ith th e e ffe c ts o f p o w er that it in d u c e d a n d w h ic h in turn e x te n d e d it
(F o u ca u lt, 1980, p. 133). G iven th e e x is te n c e o f d iffe re n t r eg im es o f truth
a n d th e ir relativity, it fo llo w e d th a t n o h istorical p e r io d o r so ciety c o u ld be
ju d g e d as b e tte r than oth ers. F ou cau lt h im se lf r e c o g n iz e d that w hat h e had
w ritten was m e re ly fictio n , a c k n o w le d g in g that th e r e e x iste d th e possibility
fo r fic tio n t o fu n c tio n in tru th , o r fo r fictio n a l d isc o u r se to in d u c e effects o f
truth (ibid., p p . 1 4 3 -4 ).
W ith this ratio n a le, F ou cau lt d id n o t ap p roach truth from a p erspective
o f form al criteria a n d lo g ic a l c o h e r e n c e . In ste a d h e was in te re ste d in
q u estio n s su c h as: W h o is ab le to tell th e truth? W hat are the m oral and
eth ica l c o n d itio n s that e n title o n e to p r e se n t o n e s e lf as a truth speaker?
A n d w h at is th e r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en truth te llin g a n d th e e x e r c ise o f
pow er? (R ab in ow , 199 4 , p. 2 0 4 ).
F o u ca u lt’s c o n c e r n w as with th e history o f th e r ela tio n sh ip s that th o u g h t
m a in ta in e d w ith truth. H e sta le d that fa r fr o m th e c o n c e p t o f truth im p lyin g
d o m in a tio n an d fo r cib le u n ific a tio n , it w as p recisely c o n te m p t fo r truth
th at c h a r a cte riz ed th e arbitrary u se o f p o litica l pow er. A t th e base o f th is was
the ch aracteristic p ostsirticiu ralist resistan ce to t h e sta n d p o in t o f totaliza
tio n , w h ic h was u n d e rsto o d as rep ressive. In F o u c a u lt’s view , totalizin g
r e p r e se n te d “an a ttem p t to reveal d e te r m in a tio n s, a n d in s o d o in g
a p p ro p ria te the truth c o n te n t o f all o th e r p artial sta n d p o in ts, o n the basis
o f an an ticip a tio n o f a fu tu re n o n a n ta g o n istic society" (D ew s, 1987, p. 2 0 1 ).
As n o te d , F o u c a u lt read h u m a n ism from th is p e r sp e c tiv e , e q u a tin g it to a
p o litic a l r h e to ric an d p ra ctice th a t d e v e lo p e d a t th e b e g in n in g o f the
m o d e r n e r a in o r d e r to o p p o se w hat w ere essen tia lly p r e m o d e rn form s o f
d o m in a tio n a n d o p p re ssio n . F ou cau lt saw t h e m o d e r n su b ject as a h u m an ist
fic tio n an d w as critical o f the p h ilo so p h ic a l tra d itio n that lo o k fo r granted
that h u m a n su b jects w ere self-reflexive, r e sp o n sib le , a n d a u to n o m o u s. In
h is view, th e n o tio n o f a u to n o m y w as u n r e la te d to t h e critical cap acity o f
ju d g m en t, a n d h a v in g a h u m a n ist p o s itio n w as n o t a p rereq u isite for
critically a p p r o a c h in g social in stitu tio n s, social rela tio n sh ip s, p rison s, social
sc ie n c e , o r sexuality. T h e n o tio n o f critical th in k in g was g r o u n d e d and
c o n str u c te d a ro u n d th e id e a o f resistance to o p p r e ssiv e so c ia l fo rm s and
rela tio n s. S o c ia l criticism d id n o t arise from th e q u a lities an d c o n d itio n s
M ichel Fouca ult: T he Gam e o f Power a n d Resistance 97
that e n a b le d in d ivid u als to in terro g a te an d c h a n g e th e ir ow n ways o f b e in g

b ased o n n orm ative criteria that e sta b lish ed d iffe r e n c e s a m o n g cultural
practices.
F o u ca u lt d e v e lo p e d th e se g e n e ra l c o n sid e r a tio n s th r o u g h his various
p rojects. O v er tim e , h is w ork tran sform ed in s o m e o f its basic n o tio n s, but
m a in ta in e d a vivid th e o r etica l activity that in n o v a tiv ely q u e s tio n e d and
an alyzed form s o f p o w er p r e se n t in m o d e r n W estern so c ieties.
Early a n d Late Foucault: From A rchaeology

to the Technologies o f th e Self
Early w orks: F ou cau lt's a rch a eo lo g y o f k n o w led g e
In 1961 F o u ca u lt b e c a m e k n ow n in P aris with th e p u b lica tio n o f M adness

a n d C ivilization, In this b o o k h e sh o w e d h o w m a d n ess a n d “u n r e a so n ” w ere
c o n c e iv e d in th e se v e n te e n th a n d e ig h te e n th c e n tu r ie s, an d why th ose
c o n c e p tio n s d iffe re d from o th e r ways o f u n d e r sta n d in g m a d n ess in o th e r
h istorical p e r io d s. F o u ca u lt saw rea so n a n d m a d n e s s as p h e n o m e n a that
r esu lted fr o m historical p rocesses, an d n o t a s un iversal o r ob jective
c a teg o r ie s. U s in g this case h e illustrated th e way e p iste m e s w orked,
d e sc r ib in g h o w m a d n ess, poverty, a n d u n e m p lo y m e n t b e g a n to b e p e r ce iv e d
a ss o c ia i p r o b le m s. T h e m e a n in g a n d e th ic a l v a lu es lin k in g th e m d e te r m in e d
th e way th e se p h e n o m e n a w ere e x p e r ie n c e d in th is e p o c h (F ou cau lt, 1973a,
pp. 3 8 -6 4 ).
W riting th e history o f m a d n ess m e a n t carryin g o u t a structural study o f
th e h istorical e n se m b le — n o tio n s, in stitu tio n s, a n d ju r id ica l a n d scien tific
m easu res— th a t socially cre a ted th e m a d n ess p h e n o m e n o n w ith in a c o n te x t
w h ere irrational (m ad ) an d rational in d ivid u als w e re r ec o g n ize d and
d iffe r e n tia te d . In th is w ork F o u ca u lt w as a lso c o n c e r n e d with the
tran sform ation o f th e stru ctu res o f e x p e r ie n c e th r o u g h w h ich h u m a n s
b e c a m e a b le to th in k o f th em selv es a s th e su b jects o f p u rely proced ural
rationality, a n d to c o n sid e r o th e r “irration al” h u m a n b e in g s as th e p ossib le
o b je c ts o f enqu iry. For F o u ca u lt, fr e e d o m o f th e ration al s e lf w as n o t
im p aired b y th e irrup tion o f m ad n ess. In stead, m a d n ess was strip p ed o f its
p ow ers a n d p restige th r o u g h th e fo r m a tio n o f r ation al aw areness, m ak in g
it a n e w o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e (ibid., pp. 2 4 1 -7 8 ; D e w s, 1984, p. 8 9 ).
F oucault e x p la in e d th e e m e r g e n c e o f m a d n ess as a m o d e o f b e c o m in g ,
th ro u g h a discursive fo r m a tio n , a type o f su b je c t that h ad n ot existed
previously. H is target was n o t the study o f m a d n ess as a social p h e n o m e n o n ,
but its sc ie n tific categ o riza tio n a n d th e social c o n d itio n s that perm itted
su c h la b e lin g a n d v a lu e c h a r g in g . M a d n e ss w as an e x a m p le o f a m o d e
o f o b je c tifica tio n th at tran sform ed h u m a n b e in g s in to su bjects, and
sim u lta n e o u sly c re a ted in stitu tio n s th a t e n c o m p a ss e d , su sta in ed , a n d
r e p r o d u c e d th e m as su b jects (F ou cau lt, 1983b . p. 2 0 8 ).
Likew ise, F o u ca u lt stressed th e in stitu tion al a n d p olitical p r e co n d itio n s
f o r the e la b o r a tio n o f a fo r m o f k n o w le d g e in T h e B irth o f the C linic (1 9 6 3 ).
In th is c a se , th e s c ie n c e in q u estio n w as o n e o f th e bod y rather than o f th e
m in d . F o u c a u lt an alyzed th e sh ift from a p r e m o d e r n m e d ic in e to m o d e r n ,
r a tio n a liz ed , em p irically b ased m e d ic in e . H e a r g u e d that m o d e r n m ed ical
e x p e r ie n c e su ffered a refo rm u la tio n w h er e d ise a se s w e re c o n n o te d and
m e d ica lly cla ssified u sin g m e c h a n ism s that m a r k e d th e c o n c r e te sp a ce o f
d ie b o d y (1 9 7 3 b , p . 16).
I n th e se tw o first b ook s, F ou cau lt se t u p th e b ases o f his w ork o n k n o w led g e,
social p r a c tic es, an d pow er. D e e p e n in g his in te r e st, in 1966 h e p u b lish ed
T h e Order o j Things. T h e r e h e fo c u s e d o n th e p la n e o f r ep re se n ta tio n ,
revealin g th e m o d e o f c o n str u c tin g a n d n a m in g th e o b je c ts o f k n o w led g e
that p r o d u c e d m e a n in g , subjectivity, a n d sig n ifica tio n . H is aim was to show-
k ey e le m e n ts in p o w e r rela tio n s a n d th e ir d o m in a tio n effects, a n d illustrate
th e c o n flic t w ithin w h ich d isc o u r se s e m e r g e d a n d fu n ctio n e d .
K n o w led g e in flic te d d isc ip lin e, su rv eilla n ce, a n d r e g u la tio n . T h is c o u ld
b e s e e n in. certain e m p irical fo rm s o f k n o w le d g e su c h as psychiatry.
K n o w led g e d isc ip lin e s c o n str u c ted d iffe re n t w ays o f se e in g o r sp ea k in g
ab ou t th e ir o b je c t, d e lim itin g its b o u n d a rie s to d e fin e w h at w as tru e o r
false. F o u c a u lt saw this sa m e p r in c ip le w o rk in g in a ll social rep resen tation s.
1 1 c sh o w e d h o w th e m o d e o f rep resen ta tio n th at e x iste d in th e m edieval
a n d classical a g e s co n tra sted with th e m o d e r n a g e , w h ere d isc o u r se and
la n g u a g e g a v e birth to th e su b je ct as a n e p iste m o lo g ic a l category. A s is
w idely k n o w n , F o u c a u lt stated that b e fo r e t h e e ig h te e n th cen tury, m an d id
not ex ist as an y m o r e than th e p o te n c y o f life an d th e produ ctivity o f labor.
H e w rote th at m a n was q u ite a r ec e n t crea tu re (1 9 7 0 , p. 3 0 8 ). H e stated:
W h at is availab le to a rch a eo lo g ica l analysis is th e w h o le o f Classical kn ow l

e d g e o r ra th er th e th r e sh o ld that sep arates us fr o m Classical th o u g h t a n d
c o n stitu te s m od ern ity. It was u p o n th is th r e sh o ld that th e stran ge figure
o f k n o w le d g e c a lle d m an first a p p e a r e d a n d r e v e a le d a sp ace p r o p e r to
the h u m a n sc ie n c e s (ibid., p. xxiv).
By u sin g th e te rm “m an" to d e n o te subjectivity a s th e so u r c e a n d lo c u s o f

m e n ta l r ep re se n ta tio n s o f reality, h e e n d o r se d th e structuralist e lim in a tio n
o f th e c en tra l role g iv en to subjectivity. In th is se n s e social sc ie n c e s illustrated
h o w m an c o u ld b e both th e c o n stitu tin g so u r c e o f th e w o r ld ’s m e a n in g an d ,

at th e s a m e tim e , ju st a n o th e r natu ral o b je c t in th e w orld . A t th is tim e,
F o u c a u lt p r a ise d Lévi-Strauss’ a n th r o p o lo g y a n d p sych oan alysis b e c a u se ,
in his view, on ly th ey w e re a b le to e x p la in c o n sc io u sn e s s a n d its r ep resen
tation s o f t h e w orld in term s o f m o r e fu n d a m e n ta l p r in c ip le s. T h o u g h he
la ter m o d ifie d th is p o sitio n , e sp e c ia lly tow ard psych oanalysis, initially
F oucault d e fe n d e d th e id ea that th e se d isc ip lin es p rovid ed d e sc r ip tio n s o f
p sy ch o lo g ica l a n d cultural stru ctu res that w ere n o t th em selv es r ep resen
tation al b u t that w h ic h e x p la in e d th e fu n c tio n in g o f c o n sc io u s r ep resen
tation s {ibid., pp. 3 7 3 -8 7 ; G u ttin g, 199 4 , pp. 1 1 - 1 2 ).
In effect, Foucault followed this structuralist view, seeing the cogito as an
o u tm o d e d fo r m o f th o u g h t a n d sh o w in g that th e r e w as n o su b je ct o r o b ject
that w as n o t c o n str u c ted by a discursive fo rm a tio n . A s in structuralism , h e
b e lie v e d th a t th e e p iste m o lo g ic a l a p p ea l to a r ea lity o r p rin cip le o u tsid e
d isc o u r se la c k e d an y se n s e . For h im , it w as im p o ss ib le to step o u tsid e o f
d isc o u r se in o r d e r to c o m p a r e discu rsive r ep re se n ta tio n s with so m e th in g
o th e r than th em selves. A s stated by D ew s (1 9 8 7 , p. 184) a n d J a m e so n (1972,
pp. 1 9 2 -2 1 6 ) this illustrated h ow , ra th er th a n s u p p o r tin g th e tr a n sc en d e n c e
o f th e su b ject, F ou cau lt su p p o r te d th e tr a n sc e n d e n c e o f d isc o u r se w ith ou t
th e s u b je c t
In The Order o f Things, a s w ell as in h is la ter w ork T h e Archaeology o f Knowledge
(1 9 6 9 ), th e c e n te r o f F o u ca u lt’s atten tio n b e c a m e discursive p ractices and
th e r u les th a t g u id e d th e m . H e c a lle d th is a rch aeology, stating:
It is th e se r u les o f form ation , w h ich w ere n e v e r fo rm u la ted in th e ir own

rig h t, b u t are to b e fo u n d o n ly in w id ely d iffe r in g th e o r ie s, co n c ep ts, and
o b je c ts o f study, that I have tr ie d to reveal, by iso la tin g , a s a sp ec ific lo cu s,
a level th a t I call a r ch a eo lo g y (1 9 7 0 , p p . x i, 1 3 ).
F or F o u c a u lt th e se r u les d id n o t c o n fe r u p o n d isc o u r se a priori c o n d itio n s

for r ation al o p era tio n s; th ey h ad n o tr a n sc en d e n ta l status, n or w e re they
c la im e d to b e e x ter n a l to d isc o u r se o r to p r e fig u re it. H e th o u g h t o f th ese
ru les, w h ic h h e la ter c a lle d o p e r a tio n s o f p ow er, as m o d e s o f e x p e r ie n c e ,
system s o f m e a n in g , a n d ob jects o f k n o w led g e. T h e r o le o f th e a rch co lo g ist
was to e x a m in e d isco u rses a s p ractices th a t o b e y e d certain rules. T h e
fu n ctio n o f a rch a eo lo g y was to s e e h o w e n u n c ia tiv e m o d a lities m a d e it
p ossib le to sp eak o f th e su b je ct a n d how d isc o u r se s sp o k e th r o u g h subjects.
It r efe rr ed t o th e su b ject w h o w as in se r ted in th e field o f p ossib le
e n u n c ia tio n s , to th e p o s itio n o f the su b je ct e sta b lish e d by a discursive
fo rm a tio n <Foucault, 197 2 , pp. 1 3 8 -4 0 ).
D raw ing o n th e ru les o f d isc o u r se , F o u ca u lt w o r k e d o n th e c o n c e p tio n o f

a n ew h isto r y that w as c h a lle n g in g id eas o f c o n tin u ity a n d totality. F oucault
w rote: “A to ta l d e sc r ip tio n draws all p h e n o m e n a a r o u n d a s in g le c e n te r — a
p r in c ip le , a m e a n in g , a spirit, a w orld view , an overall sh ap e; a g en eral
h istory, o n t h e contrary, w o u ld d e p lo y th e sp a ce o f a d isp e r sio n ” ( ibid., pp.
5 - 1 0 ) . B a se d o n his a r g u m e n t a b o u t d ie historical c o n tin g e n c y o f k n o w led g e,
h e e x e m p lifie d h o w th e d isc o u r se s that d ic ta ted th e system o f o r d e r in the
m id d le a n d classical a g e s c o u ld b e se e n a s te m p o ra r y e p iste m o lo g ic a l
a rra n g em en ts. T h e term d isc o n tin u ity referred to p ro c esses o f transition
from o n e historical era to an oth er, in w h ich th in g s w e re n o lo n g e r p e r ce iv e d ,
d escrib ed , ch a ra cterized , a n d classified in th e sa m e way (F o u ca u lt, 1970, p,
5 0 ). D isc o n tin u ity c o u ld b e s e e n , fo r e x a m p le , in F o u ca u lt’s w ork o n
m ad n ess. F o r th is rea so n , th e a rch a eo lo g ist's m e th o d was to find
d isc o n tin u itie s w ithin th e m u ltip licity o f d isc o u r se s in a field o f k n ow led ge:
“a r c h a e o lo g y d o e s n o t have a u n ify in g b u t a d iversifyin g e ffe c t” (F oucault,
1972, p. 1 6 0 ). H ow ever, th e ru p tu res that m a d e p o s sib le th is discontin uity,
o r tran sition from o n e e p iste m e to a n o th er , w e re n o t given in a vacuum .
F o u ca u lt a r g u e d that th e se ru p tu res w e re p o s sib le o n th e basis o f th e rules
th at w e re in o p e r a tio n . D isco n tin u ity m e a n t n o t a b so lu te c h a n g e , b u t a
r ed istrib u tion o f th e e p is te m e ’s e le m e n ts. It w as n o t a b o u t th e instau ration
o f n e w ru les, b u t a discursive fo r m a tio n u p o n w h ic h truth a n d k n o w led g e
r e d e fin e d its b o u n d a ries. Su ch ru p tu res m a in ta in e d certain co n tin u ity and
o v e rla p p in g in th e transition fr o m m o d e r n s c ie n c e to cou n ter-scien ces,
w h ere the im p o r ta n c e o f th e p r o b le m o f r ep re se n ta tio n r em a in e d a t the
c e n te r o f t h e d iscussion.
W h at in te r e ste d F o u ca u lt w as o p e n in g th e stru ctu res to tem p oral
d isc o n tin u ity a n d sh o w in g sh ifts that d e te r m in e d the e n d le ss g a m e o f
discursive p ractices. D e co n str u c tin g history w as p a rt o f th e work o f th e new
h istorian s th a t in volved a b a n d o n in g th e sea rch fo r continuity. A s so m e
a u th ors h a v e p u t it, th is p r in c ip le r e se m b le d th e structuralist p erspective
that in v o lv ed a ffirm in g that history w as m arked b y gradual e ffa c e m e n t o f
d isc o u r se (B e st a n d K ellner, 1991, p. 44; D osse, 1997, pp. 2 3 8 -9 (vol. 2 ) ) .
T h is sta n d p o in t affirm ed th e p r e d o m in a n c e o f d isc o u r se o v er history. In
history, d iffe r e n t form s o f k n o w led g e w ere e q u a te d to d ifferen t perspectives,
r e c o g n iz in g in th is way t h e im p ossib ility o f h istorical o b jectiv e k n o w led g e
a n d h isto r ica l con tin u ity. H istory in tr o d u c e d d isc o n tin u ity in to o u r very
b e in g , d isr u p tin g its p r e te n d e d co n tin u ity (F o u ca u lt, 197 7 , p. 154; 1972,
p p . 1 3 0 -1 ).
A lo n g w ith his early w ork o n e p iste m ic r u p tu re s, F o u ca u lt th e o r iz ed
r ela tio n sh ip s w ith p o w er a s th e causal factors th a t lea d from o n e e p iste m e
to an oth er. Even th o u g h in T he Order o f T h in g s a n d T h e Archaeology of
Knowledge h is e m p h a sis w as o n k n o w led g e a n d se ic n tific d iscou rses, h e had
already b e g u n to e x p lo r e th e rela tio n sh ip o f p o w e r to th e se p h e n o m e n a . As
early as T h e B irth o f Clinic, h e was c o n c e r n e d with p o lic in g , su rv eilla n ce, and
d isc ip lin a ry apparatus. Later, F o u ca u lt’s e x p lic it r ec o g n itio n o f the
r e la tio n sh ip o f p o w er to k n o w led g e p r e se n te d p o w er as a p r e c o n d itio n o f
k n o w le d g e , ra th er than vice versa, w h ich h a d im p o r ta n t c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r
h is u n d e r sta n d in g o f th e social sc ien ce s. T h e m u tation s in d ifferen t
e p iste m e s th a t h e a d d ressed su g g e ste d th e e ffe c t o f p o w er in the g e n e ra tio n
o f n ew k in d s o f su bjects a n d n e w organ ization s o f rela tio n sh ip s b etw een
ind ividu als a n d in stitu tion s. T h e se o b serv a tio n s w e re m o st exp licitly
d e v e lo p e d in Discipline a n d P u n ish (1 9 7 5 ), w h er e h e w ork ed with the
c o n n e c tio n s b e tw e en m o d e m m e th o d s o f so c ia l c o n tr o l (su ch as th e p rison )
a n d th e e m e r g e n c e o f c rim in o lo g y a n d rela ted so c ia l sc ien ce s.
A t th e e n d o f th e 1960s, w h en the w ave o f structuralism b egan to su b sid e,
d isc o u r se c e a s e d b e in g th e m o st im p o r ta n t issu e in F ou cau lt's w ork, a n d
p o w er a n d its te c h n o lo g ie s o f th e bod y a c q u ir ed g r ea te r r elev a n ce. H e
a b a n d o n e d th e n o tio n o f th e e p iste m e an d m o v e d to a g e n e a lo g ic a l
p e r sp e c tiv e , a n im p ortan t sh ift fr o m th e a r c h a e o lo g ist’s a p p ro a ch . In 1970
h e b e g a n to m ak e th is tran sition th r o u g h a m o r e fo c u se d th e o r iz a tio n o f
m aterial in stitu tio n s a n d form s o f pow er. H e p la c e d m o r e e m p h a sis o n th e
m aterial c o n d itio n s o f d isco u rse, d e fin in g th e m as in stitu tio n s, political
even ts, a n d e c o n o m ic p ractices (F ou cau lt, 197 2 , p . 4 9 ).
T h is g e n e a lo g ic a l o r ie n ta tio n in sp ired F o u c a u lt’s p u b lication s o f the
m id se v e n tie s that b r o u g h t the b o d y in to h is analysis. H er e h e lo o k e d at the
r ela tio n sh ip s b etw een pow er, k n ow led ge, an d th e b o d y in m o d e r n society'.
T h r o u g h g e n e a lo g y , F ou cau lt tried to w id en h is s c o p e o f analysis, c en te r in g
o n fo rm s o f c o n tr o l that targeted the bod y a n d its c o n s e q u e n c e s o n individual
subjectivity. T h e se in q u iries, w h ich ch aracterized F ou cau lt's work in the
1970s a n d 1980s, in tr o d u c e d a n ew set o f c o n c e p tio n s a n d p rob lem s.
F o u ca u lt’s g e n e a lo g ic a l ap p roach to pow er
D u rin g 1 9 7 0 s the g e n e a lo g ic a l p e rsp ectiv e th a t F o u c a u lt a d o p te d gave

m o r e im p o r ta n c e to d isc ip lin e a n d sex u a lity a n d th e ir rela tio n s to th e
h u m a n bod y. F o u ca u lt d ir ec ted his g e n e a lo g ic a l in vestigation with the
in te n tio n o f lo ca tin g the p olitical e ffe c ts o f d isc o u r se o n th e h u m a n body.
I l e saw t h e b od y a s in v ested in, g o v e r n e d by, a n d tran sform ed by sp ecific
p o w e r r ela tio n sh ip s. T h r o u g h g e n e a lo g y h e stu d ie d th e p o w er p ro c esses o f
in stitu tio n a l p ractices w ith in w h ic h ob jects a n d su b jectivities w e re created .
G e n e a lo g )' w as u s e d to u n v e il t h e m a ter ia l c o n t e x t o f t h e c o n str u c tio n
o f th e su b ject, in a n a ttem p t to s e e th e p o litic a l c o n se q u e n c e s o f this
su b jectifica tio n w h ile fo c u sin g o n th e effccts o f c o n tr o l (F ou cau lt, 1980,

pp. 8 3 -5 ; D reyfus a n d Rabinow, 1983, p. 104; Best a n d Kellner, 1991, p. 4 7 ).
D iscipline a n d P u n ish c o n sid e r e d th e sp ec ific ca se o f th e c o n n e c tio n
b e tw e en m o d e r n social sc ien tific d isc ip lin e s a n d th e d iscip lin ary p ractices
u s e d to c o n tr o l h u m a n b o d ie s in t h e m o d e r n p e r io d . T h is w as e x em p lified
in the p r a c tic e o f im p r iso n m e n t, as c o n c e iv e d b y c rim in o lo g y a n d o th e r
social sc ien tific d isc ip lin es that d e a lt w ith c r im e an d p u n ish m e n t (for
e x a m p le , so c ia l p sy ch o lo g y ) (F ou cau lt, 1979, pp. 2 3 1 - 5 6 ) . P ractices su ch as
torture a n d the r eg u la tio n o f p rison ers, e x e r c is e d in in stitu tio n s su ch as
h o sp ita ls o r barracks, w e re m e c h a n ism s o f su rv e illa n c e , w h ich was th ou gh t
to b e e ffic ie n t a n d p rofitab le w h en it c a m e to m a n a g in g a p o p u la tio n .
S u rv e illa n c e a c ted as a n in sid e e y e, h avin g d ie sa m e e ffe c t as th e p a n o p tico n
o r th e F re u d ia n su p e r-e g o (ibid., p p . 1 9 5 -2 2 8 ).
F o u ca u lt sh ifte d h is e m p h a sis to p rocesses o f c o r p o r e a l r eg u la tio n a n d
c o n tr o l th at gave rise to b o d ie s o f k n o w led g e a b o u t th e o b je c ts they
c o n tr o lled . l i e w a n ted to illu strate h o w r ela tio n sh ip s o f p o w er p r o d u ce d
form s o f subjectivity th r o u g h te c h n iq u e s o f n o rm a liza tio n . H avin g b e g u n to
add ress th is in h is e a rlier work, F o u ca u lt r ea ffirm e d that p o w er a n d
kn o w led g e d irectly im p lie d o n e an oth er, h o ld in g a rela tio n sh ip o f m utual
d e p e n d e n c e a n d r e in fo r c e m e n t (ibid., p. 2 7 ). K n o w led g e c o u ld n o t exist
in d e p e n d e n tly o f pow er: th e ir d e p lo y m e n t w as sim u lta n e o u s. H e stated:
It is n o t th e activity o f th e su b ject o f k n o w led g e, th a t p r o d u c e s a c o rp u s o f
k n o w led g e, u sefu l o r resistan t to power, b u t pow er-kn ow l e d g e , th e p r o c esses
a n d stru g g les th a t traverse it a n d o f w h ich it is m a d e u p , w h ic h d e te r m in e s
th e form s a n d p o ssib le d o m a in s o f k n o w led g e (ib id ., p. 2 8 ).
D e sp ite t h e fact that b e c o m in g an o b ject o f k n o w le d g e r e p r e se n te d a
fo r m o f d o m in a tio n fo r F o u ca u lt (F ou cau lt, 1 9 8 3 a ), p o w e r a n d d o m in a tio n
also im p lie d crea tin g n ew d o m a in s o f k n o w led g e a n d p ractice. Power,
ra th er than b e in g m e re ly rep ressive, was also p rod u ctive; th e r efo r e, from
this p e r sp e c tiv e p o w e r c o u ld b e s e e n as p r o d u c in g realities, d o m a in s o f
truth, an d n e w o b je c ts o f k n o w led g e. P ow er w as n o t lo c a te d in an y single-
site; it was d isp er se d th r o u g h o u t th e social system . D ifferen tial pow er
r ela tio n sh ip s m a n ife sted in every a sp e c t o f cu ltu ral an d p o litica l life,
in volvin g a ll k in d s o f su b ject-p o sitio n s in d u c in g e ffc c ts that w e re n o t
p o ssib le fo r k n o w led g e to e n g e n d e r . P ow er w as n o t th e o r iz e d as a g r o u p o f
in stitu tio n s a n d m e ch a n ism s th a t e n su r e d the su b ser v ie n c e o f ind ividu als.
Its e x e r c ise w as n ot v io le n t n o r w as it by c o n se n t. It w as a total stru ctu re o f
a c tio n s that in cited , in d u c e d , a n d s e d u c e d (F o u ca u lt, 1978, p. 9 2 ).
In dividuals w e re th e v e h icle s a n d aim o f pow er, sin c e th ey w e re co n stitu ted
by t h e fo r ce o f its in flic tio n . In assu m in g su b ject-p osition s, both d o m in a to r s
a n d su b ju gators w e re c a u g h t w ithin th e sa m e m atrix o f p o w e r rela tio n sh ip s.
P o w er w as a strategic, m o b ile, fluid, an d c o n tin u o u s r ela tio n sh ip . It invested

in stitu tio n s a n d ind ividu als with p ossib ilities f o r a c tio n . It was n ever
station ary b u t was a lread y p r e se n t in a m atrix o f fo r c e s w h ich its e lf created
lin es o f d iv isio n , rela tio n sh ip s o f e x c lu s io n , c o d e s o f d isc ip lin e, a n d sites o f
su b jectio n {ibid., p p . 9 2 -1 0 2 ).
T h e te rm “b io -p o w er”, w h ich F o u ca u lt c o in e d in T he History o f Sexuality
V ol. I (1 9 7 8 ) w as b a sed o n t h e c o n c e p tio n o f p o w e r b e in g d isp ersed , fluid,
in d e te r m in a te , a n d p ro d u ctiv e o f ind ividu al's b o d ies, id en tities, and
in stitu tio n s (ibid., p p . 1 4 0 -1 , 1 4 3 ). B io-pow er r e fe rr ed to a p o w e r o v er life,
th e pow er to a d m in ister th e life o f ind ividu als a n d c o n tr o l in g e n e r a l. It
ta r g ete d n e w o b je c ts o f k n o w le d g e su ch as sexuality, o b je c tify in g th e m as
reso u r ce s to b e a d m in iste r ed a n d c o n tr o lle d . F o u ca u lt stated:
If w e can apply th e term o f bio-history to the pressures th rou gh w hich

the m o v e m e n ts o f life a n d the p rocesses o f h isto r y in te rfe re with o n e
anoth er, o n e w o u ld have to sp eak o f bio-pow er to d e sig n a te w h a t brought
life a n d its m ech a n ism s in to th e realm o f e x p lic it calcu lation s an d m ade
k n ow led ge-p ow er a n a g e n t o f transform ation o f h u m a n life ( ibid., p. 143).
T h is p r o b le m w as ex ten siv ely w ork ed o u t in T he History o f Sexuality. H ere

F o u ca u lt p r e se n te d a g e n e a lo g ic a l c ritiq u e o f so c ia l system s d u r in g the
se v e n te e n th a n d e ig h te e n th cen tu ries, a s w ell a s th e ir c o n so lid a tio n in
m o d e r n te c h n o lo g ic a l program s o f d e m o g r a p h ic ad m in istration and
c o n tr o l, w ith sexu ality a t th e c e n te r o f th e an alysis. Sexuality was treated its
a p ositive p r o d u ct o f pow er a c tin g th ro u g h its r ep re ssio n . P o ly m o rp h o u s
te c h n iq u e s o f p o w er w e re in sc r ib ed in th e b o d y th r o u g h th e d isc o u r se o f
m o d e r n sexu ality. S c ie n c e m a in ta in e d th e r o le o f c o n tr o l a n d norm alization
a n d r e in fo r c e d th e m e d ica liza tio n o f sexu ality (ibid., pp. 1 0 -1 3 , 1 2 9 -3 1 ).
H er e a g a in F ou cau lt r etu rn ed to th e id ea o f d isc o u r se p r o d u ctio n in
o r d e r to illu stra te th e e m e r g e n c e o f n e w social fo r m s, in th is case the “sexual
nature" o f h u m a n s, a n d its r e g u la tio n . H e w ro te: “T h e d e p lo y m e n t o f
sexu ality h a s its ow n rea so n for b e in g , n ot in r ep r o d u c in g itself, but in
p roliferatin g, in n o v a tin g , a n n e x in g , creatin g, a n d p e n e tr a tin g b o d ie s i n an
in creasin gly d e ta ile d way, an d c o n tr o llin g p o p u la tio n s in an increasingly
c o m p r e h e n siv e way” (ibid., p . 107).
N e v er th e less, its n o te d , F ou cau lt w as also aw are o f th e fo r c e s that o p p o se d
power, ch a r a cte riz in g th e se forces as a m u ltip le a n d m o b ile field o f
r ela tio n sh ip s a m o n g forces w h er e far-reaching b u t n ever c o m p le te ly stable
e ffe c ts o f d o m in a tio n w e re p r o d u c e d (ibid., p . 1 0 2 ). W h ere th e r e w as p o w er
th e r e w as resista n c e an d , th e r efo r e, th e p ossib ility to m od ify th e grip o f
p o w e r th r o u g h resistan ce (F ou cau lt, 1988b, p. 123). F ou cau lt u sed the
n o tio n o f resistan ce to d e sig n a te th e way in w h ich in d iv id u a ls c o u ld c o n te st

a n d e v en p ro v o k e certain c h a n g e s in attitu d es a n d p ractices w ithin
esta b lish ed p o w e r r eg im es an d social orders, fo r e x a m p le , th ro u g h his
c o n c e p t o f co u n ter-d isco u rses, w h ich m a teria lized an d e x p r essed ways o f
resistan ce to pow er. By criticizin g th e in stitu tion s th a t a p p e a r e d to b e neutral
a n d in d e p e n d e n t, a n d u n m a sk in g th e type o f d o m in a tio n th ey e x ercised ,
F ou cau lt a lso illustrated h o w p o w er c o n fr o n te d c o n te sta tio n an d c h a n g e : it
p r o d u c e d reverse d iscou rses, as in th e case o f h o m o se x u a lity in relation to
m o d e r n sexuality, o r strategies to c o u n te r d isc ip lin e a n d n orm alization .
T h e ways so c ie tie s an d in d ivid u als c o n te s te d p o w er an d esc a p e d
im p o sitio n s o f d isc o u r se a n d k n o w led g e o v er th e ir ind ividu ality a n d d e sir es
w as a c e n tr a l q u estio n th r o u g h o u t F o u ca u lt’s w ork . As D ew s (1 9 8 1 , 1987)
a n d Best a n d K elln er (1 9 9 1 ) have su g g e s te d , F o u c a u lt tried to r esp o n d
m o r e e x ten siv ely to this q u e s tio n in h is la ter w ritin gs by c h a n g in g his
e m p h a sis to th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f th e s e lf— th e ways ind ividu als transform ed
th em selv es— a n d p u ttin g asid e his in te re st in th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f d o m in a tio n
(th e way p o w e r was in flic te d by s o m e ind ividu als o n o th e r s).
T h e early w e ig h t given in h is stu d ies to th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f d o m in a tio n
an d th e w ay th o se te c h n o lo g ie s classified , o b je c tifie d , a n d n orm alized
su bjects, sh ifts in The History o f Sexuality (vols. 2 a n d 3) an d o th e r w orks
p u b lish e d i n 1980s. R ath er th a n fo c u sin g so m u c h o n th e way society
m o ld e d in d ivid u als th ro u g h p o w er m e ch a n ism s, h e b e c a m e m o r e involved
with th e w ay in d ivid u als fo r m e d th e ir ow n id e n tity a n d su bjectivity in
r esp o n se to c h a n g in g p o w e r an d truth regim es.
T h is sh ift a r o u se d n e w q u estio n s a n d top ics in r ela tio n to subjectivity, the
im p lic it r e la tio n sh ip b e tw e en so ciety a n d in d iv id u a ls, m e ch a n ism s o f
c h a n g e , fo r m s o f social criticism , an d p o litic s in g e n e r a l. S o m e o f h is last
w orks a d d re ssed th e se top ics in a n e w an d d iffe r e n t way, g e n e r a tin g a
c on troversy in r elation to h is e a rlier p osition s.
Last w o rk s o f F oucault
D u rin g th e 1980s F o u ca u lt’s a tten tio n m o v e d fr o m d ie g e n e a lo g ic a l focu s

o n m o d a litie s o f pow er to focu s o n te c h n o lo g ie s o f th e self, e th ics, and
fr e e d o m . F o u c a u lt sp o k e o f d iffe re n t typ es o f te c h n o lo g ie s: te c h n o lo g ie s o f
p r o d u c tio n , w h ich p e r m itte d ind ividu als to p r o d u c e , transform , o r
m a n ip u la te things; te c h n o lo g ie s o f sig n system s, w h ich p e r m it u s to use
signs, m e a n in g s, sym b ols, or sign ification ; te c h n o lo g ie s o f pow er, w h ich
d e te r m in e th e c o n d u c t o f in d ivid u als a n d su b m it th e m to cer ta in e n d s o r
d o m in a tio n ; an d te c h n o lo g ie s o f th e s e lf (F o u ca u lt, 1988c, p. 18).
T e c h n o lo g ie s o f th e s e lf b e c a m e th e m o st im p o r ta n t fo c u s o f his work. I Ic
d e fin e d th e se as p r a c tic es that p e r m itte d in d iv id u a ls to effe c t, by th e ir own
m e a n s o r w ith the h e lp o f o th e r s, a cer ta in n u m b e r o f o p e r a tio n s o n their
o w n b o d ie s a n d so u ls, th o u g h ts, c o n d u c t, a n d ways o f b e in g , so as to
tran sform th e m se lv es in o r d e r to attain a certain sta te o f h a p p in ess, purity,
w isd o m , p e r fe c tio n , o r im m ortality (ibid., p. 1 8 ). U s in g th is c o n c e p t,
F o u ca u lt a d d r e sse d G reek , R om an , a n d C h ristian c u ltu r es o f an tiq u ity in
th e last tw o v o lu m e s o f T he History o f Sexuality (1 9 8 4 ). B e g in n in g w ith early
C h ristian c u ltu r es, h e d e m o n stra te d h o w th e s e lf was a c o n stitu te d su bject
o f d e sir e. F ollow in g this p rocess, h e tra ced t h e m oral d im e n sio n s o f
C hristian, G re ek , a n d R om an c u ltu res a n d th e d iffe r e n c e s a m o n g th e m . He
was in te r e ste d in sh o w in g h o w (»reeks an d R o m a n s c o n c e iv e d a n d regu lated
p leasu re a n d d e sir e th ro u g h in stitu tion s su ch as m arriage, h etero-an d
h o m o sex u a lity , a n d form s o f th e ca re o f th e self. F o u ca u lt saw C hristianity
as c lo ser t o m o d e r n cu ltu r e than to th at o f th e G reek s o r R om an s, w h ich
sh a re d th e ir ways o f e x p e r ie n c in g th e b od y an d its p o ten tia l e x p r essio n s o f
b e a u ty w ith o u t a p p e a lin g to eth ica l in te rd ic tio n s. H e id e n tifie d in
C h ristian ity th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f a m o r e e th ic a l a n d a e sth e tic p ersp ective
tow ard sex u a lity in favor o f a h e r m e n e u tic s o f d e sir e, w h er e individuals
so u g h t in sex u a lity th e tru th o f th e ir b e in g . H e b e lie v e d that G reeks and
R om an s fo llo w e d a fr e e r p attern than C h ristians d id in term s o f th e ir form s
o f eth ics. In his view, th e way G reek s rela ted to t h e s e lf was m o r e reflexive,
a n d so ciety p la c e d a great e m p h a sis o n th e r esp on sib ility o f au to-regu lation
a n d th e e x p e c ta tio n th at o n e is th e m aster o f o n e ’s o w n desires. In o th e r
w ords, co n tra ry to th e C hristian trad ition , G re ek s an d R om an s (e x c e p tin g
slaves a n d w o m e n ) fo llo w ed a n auto-d elib erative sc h e m a (F ou cau lt, 1985,
pp. 7 8 -9 3 ) .
W ithin th is analysis F ou cau lt a ttem p ted to p r o d u c e a g e n e a lo g y o f
subjectivity. H e b e c a m e in creasin gly in te r e ste d in th e in d ivid u al’s capacity
fo r se lf-re fle ctin g a n d articu latin g his e x p e r ie n c e . F o u ca u lt u sed n o tio n s
su ch as t h e aesth etic th a t o p e n e d u p th e c h o ic e o f th e ind ivid u al. T h e
a e sth e tics o f e x is te n c e rela ted to a way o f life w h o se m oral valu e d id not
d e p e n d o n a c o d e o f b eh avior, b u t o n cer ta in p r in c ip le s in th e use o f
p lea su re (ibid., pp. 8 9 - 9 3 ) . In this way, F ou cau lt sh o w e d h o w G reeks and
R om an s e m p h a s iz e d th e ir o w n self-d irectio n , fo llo w in g o r m o d ify in g w hat
was given a s a ru le o r im p o sitio n . T h is o b ser v a tio n m arked fo r F o u ca u lt a
su bstantial c h a n g e w ith resp e ct to his p e r c e p tio n o f th e au to-d elib erative
a n d se lf-g o v er n in g su bject.
In his la te r w orks, F o u ca u lt e v o k e d a privatistic realm th at a llo w ed die
individual to se lf-r e fle c ta n d m ake p o litica l d e c isio n s. T h is w as also illustrated
10(3 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonomy
in h is text “W hat is E n lig h te n m e n t? ”originalIy p u b lish e d in 1984, w h er e h e

stated th e n ecessity to analyze ind ividu als as h isto r ica l p ro d u cts w h o sh o u ld
o r ie n t th e m se lv es tow ard se lf-co n stitu tio n a s a u to n o m o u s su bjects (1984,
p. 4 3 ) . T h is e c h o e d w hat F o u ca u lt also d e c la r ed in a 1983 interview , w h ere
h e e x p r e s se d h is d esire to d e a l w ith th e analysis o f reflexivity— a rela tio n sh ip
o f s e lf to s e lf— a n d , h e n c e , o f rela tio n sh ip s b e tw e e n fo r m s o f reflexivity a n d
th e d isc o u r se o f truth, form s o f rationality, an d th e e ffe c ts o f k n ow led ge
(1 9 8 3 a , p . 2 0 3 ).
In d iv id u a liza tio n was n o lo n g e r a o n e -sid e d p r o c e ss that was m e re ly the
e ffe c t o f pow er. In a p ositive eva lu a tio n o f th e in d ivid u al cu ltivation o f the
self, th e q u e s tio n b e c a m e th e c o n stitu tin g p r o c ess o f in d ivid u al subjectivity,
H e wrote:
P erhap s I ‘v e in sisted to o m u c h o n th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f d o m in a tio n a n d

pow er. I a m m o r e a n d m o r e in te r e ste d in d ie in te ra c tio n b e tw e en o n e s e lf
a n d o th e r s a n d th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f in d ivid u al d o m in a tio n , the history o f
h o w a n in d ivid u al acts u p o n h im self, in th e te c h n o lo g ie s o f th e s e lf (1988,
p. 19).
H e a d d e d : “n o w I am in te r e ste d , in fa c t, in th e w ay in w h ic h t h e su b je c t
c o n s titu te s h im s e lf in a n a c tiv e fa s h io n , b y th e p r a c tic e s o f s e l f ’ (1 9 9 4 ,
p. 1 1 ).
T h is in te re st h as b e e n in te rp re ted as th e sh ift in F oucault's fo c u s as h e

d e p a r te d fr o m su b jects d o m in a te d a n d o b je c tifie d by o th e r s th ro u g h
d isco u rses a n d p ractices (te c h n o lo g ie s o f d o m in a tio n ), to su b jects w ho
cre a ted th e ir ow n id en tities th ro u g h e th ics (te c h n o lo g ie s o f t h e self) (D ew s,
1 9 8 9 ). In th is lin e of th in k in g, F o u ca u lt also reev a lu a ted th e E n lig h te n m e n t
as a p ositive c o n tr ib u tio n to a critical p o sitio n toward social practices
(F ou cau lt, 1984, pp. 3 2 - 5 0 ) . In r e c o n sid e r in g t h e c o n c e p t o f th e su b ject
that h e h a d r e je cte d in his a n tih u m a n ist work, h e started u s in g w o rd s su ch
as fr ee d o m an d au ton om y, w h ich c o u ld o n ly b e c o h e r e n t with a type o f
su b ject th a t h e h a d n e v e r c o n sid e r e d b e fo r e. F o u c a u lt’s late e m p h a sis o n
subjectivity c o n fir m e d h is in te re st in pow er, b u t i n a m o r e lib er a tin g way
w ith w h ich ind ividu als c o u ld transform th e ir o w n su bjectivities. I l e wrote:
T h e p o litic a l, e th ica l, so c ia l, an d p h ilo s o p h ic a l p r o b le m o f o u r days

i s . . . to lib er a te us b o th from the sta te a n d th e type o f in d ivid u alization
w h ich is lin k e d to th e state. W e have to p r o m o te n ew form s o f subjectivity
th r o u g h th e refusal o f this k in d o f in d ivid u ality w h ic h h a s b e e n im p o se d
u p o n u s fo r several c en tu r ie s (1 9 8 3 b , p. 216).
T h e sh ifts in r e g a r d t o t h e s u b je c t a n d su b jectiv ity , a u to n o m y , fr e e d o m ,

a n d p o litic a l r e s is ta n c e g e n e r a t e d in c o h e r e n c ie s a n d p r o b le m s w ith in
F o u c a u lt’s th e o r e tic a l trajectory. A s D e w s (1 9 8 9 , 1987) e x p r e s se d ,
F o u c a u lt c o u ld n o t d e v e lo p c o h e r e n t n o t io n s o f th e s u b je c t’s a u to n o m y
o r e m a n c ip a t io n w ith o u t h a v in g w o r k e d th r o u g h a d iffe r e n t th e o r y in
h is p r e v io u s th in k in g o n su b je c t fo r m a tio n . F o u c a u lt, th r o u g h h is
life tim e w o r k , h a d th e o r iz e d th e su b je c t a s e n t ir e ly c o n s tr u c te d th r o u g h
so c ia l p r a c tic e s w ith o u t d e v e lo p in g a s o lid th e o r y o f in d ivid u al
s u b je c tific a tio n , w h ic h m a d e h im u n a b le to c o n c e iv e e m a n c ip a tio n
c o h e r e n tly .
In his la ter d e v e lo p m e n t F o u ca u lt w o r k e d w ith a n o tio n o f th e su bject
that im p lie d d im e n sio n s a n d a sp ec ts for w h ic h lie h ad n o ultim ate
e x p la n a tio n . W h en talking a b o u t th e p r o c e sse s o f g e n e r a tin g d ifferen t
su bjectivities, F o u ca u lt n e e d e d th eo retica l to o ls th a t w ere n o t available in
h is e a rlier w ork. In ter re la ted p r o b le m s th at w ere in tr in sic to h is subjectivity
a n d su b jectifica tio n c o n c e r n s w ere n o w u n re so lv e d a n d h ad n o satisfactory
e x p la n a tio n s. T h e early so cia liza tio n a n d su b je ctifica tio n p ro c esses w h ich
a n in d ivid u al m u st u n d e r g o in o r d e r to b e c o m e a m e m b e r o f society; the
su b je ct’s in te rn a liz a tio n o f social p ractices that c u ltu r e im p oses; an d the
n ecessary privatistic a n d reflex iv e d im e n sio n that th e individual req u ires
fo r a critical a u to -e x a m in a tio n o f so c ie ta l c o n te n ts— th e se w e re all p r o b le m s
that had n e v e r b e e n w ork ed o u t by t h e a u th o r th eoretically. T o talk about
a p r o c e s s th a t w o u ld fr e e th e in d iv id u a l fr o m so c ia l c o n str a in ts to
b e c o m e m o r e a u to n o m o u s, r eq u ire d th e o r etica l to o ls that F o u ca u lt n e v e r
ela b o ra te d .
In D ew s’ eyes, it w as im p o ssib le n o t to read F o u ca u lt’s later w ork as
a m b ig u o u s in r elation to p o w er a n d e m a n c ip a tio n , w h er e h is task was to
articu late th e c o n c e p ts o f subjectivity an d fr e e d o m in su ch a way as to avoid
an y s u g g e s tio n th a t su c h fr e e d o m h a d to have ta k e n th e form o f th e recovery
o f a n a u th e n tic natu ral s e lf (D ew s, 1989, p p . 3 8 - 4 0 ) .
T h is e v id e n t p r o b le m c o n se q u e n tly a ffec te d F o u c a u lt’s c o n siste n c y in
p rev io u s a sser tio n s a b o u t m e a n in g a n d social c h a n g e . A s will b e e x a m in e d
in d e ta il in C h ap ter 5 , w h e n review ed th r o u g h C astorid ian p r in c ip le s,
F o u ca u lt’s p o s itio n s reveal u n reso lv ed q u estio n s reg a r d in g th e th r e e central
n o tio n s o n w h ich w e c o n c e n tr a te o u r c o m p a r iso n . F u rth erm ore, F o u ca u lt’s
late turn c a n b e s e e n as h a v in g a n e ffe c t o n c o n stitu tiv e issu es in his work
su ch as pow er, history, d iscon tin u ity, an d tra n sfo rm a tio n , w h ile th e
C astorid ian p ersp ective p o ses in te r e stin g a n d e lu c id a tin g q u e stio n s fo r a
b e tte r u n d e r sta n d in g o f su c h n o tio n s a s w ill b e d isc u sse d in th e fo llo w in g
se c tio n a n d C h a p ter 5.
108 Castoriadis, Foucault, a n d A utonom y
Pow er/K now ledge, History, a n d Transform ation
As d e sc r ib e d in p rev io u s se c tio n s, b o th C astoriadis a n d F ou cau lt saw a n e e d

fo r g r o u n d b r e a k in g critical th in k in g that d ista n c e d th e m fr o m the
th e o r etica l in flu e n c e s o f th e ir form ative years. Even th o u g h F oucault
fo llo w ed a very d iffe re n t trajectory from th a t o f C astoriad is in r elation to
M arxism , h e n e ith e r su b scrib ed to M arxist id e a s 3 n o r en tirely e n g a g e d
structuralist p r in c ip le s. N o r did h e fit in to o th e r tr e n d s o f th e m o m e n t such
as p h e n o m e n o lo g y o r existen tia lism . F o u c a u lt’s w ork o f social criticism
in v o lv ed new' ways o f lo o k in g a t trad ition al p ro b lem s, o ffe r in g inn ovative
in te rp re ta tio n s o f k n o w led g e, social practices, a n d society.
H is su c c e ss in c o n fig u r in g an in flu en tial field o f p r o d u c tio n , se le c tin g
n e w o b je c ts o f inquiry, a n d se ttin g resea rch a g e n d a s lies in his u n iq u e way
o f r ela tin g issu e s o f d o m in a tio n , g o v e rn m entality, an d subjectivity as
articu lated by social in stitu tio n s at d ifferen t p o in ts in tim e. F o u ca u lt’s
e xtraord in ary ability to illustrate th e se c o m p o n e n ts as th ey m a n ife sted in
sp ec ific h isto r ica l fo r m a tio n s an d d isco u rses h as p recip ita ted read ers to
id e n tify th e m se lv es as social p ro d u cts o f relative a n d c o n d itio n a l d o m in a n t
form s th a t s h a p e d th e ir su b jective c o n te n ts, b o d ie s , a n d daily practices. T h e
e x e r c ise o f p o w e r is in fact his greatest p o le o f attraction.
A s s e e n , fo r F ou cau lt p o w e r was everyw h ere a n d n o t ex clu siv ely in v ested
in cen tra l o r g a n iz in g in stitu tio n s. It w as th e d r iv in g fo r c e o f so c ie ty and
social transform ation s: h u m an ity m o v ed from d o m in a tio n to d o m in a tio n
th r o u g h o u t tim e (Foucault* 1977, p . 140). H o n n e t h (1 9 9 8 , p. 158) w as righ t
to c o n firm h o w fo r F o u ca u lt a ll historical p r o c e s se s w e re a su cc e ssio n o f
fo r m s o f d o m in a tio n , d e sp ite h is d iffe re n t c o n c e p tio n s o v er tim e . K now ledge
p r o d u ctio n a n d strategies o f p o w e r w ere h is c en tra l r eferen ts b y w h ich to
j u d g e h istory, e v e n w h en h is in te re st m o v ed from t h e g e n e sis o f t h e c o n c e p t
o f su b jectivity to m o d e r n r ep re se n ta tio n s o f t h e subject a n d m orality.
F o u ca u lt’s th e o r y o f pow er— H o n n e th a d d e d — “regard s th e p r o d u c tio n o f
k n o w led g e a n d th e e x e r c ise o f d o m in a tio n sim p ly as d iffe re n t sid e s o f the
sam e p r o c e ss [su ccessfu lly c o m b in in g ] th e go a l o f a history o f in stitu tio n s
with the g o a l o f c o n c e p tu a l history” (1 9 9 8 , p. 158).
D iscipline a n d P u n ish a n d The History oj Sexuality c o n firm this, illustrating
sim u lta n e o u sly h o w m o d e r n fo rm s o f c o n tr o l also sh a p e d m o d e s o f c o n d u ct
a n d form s o f o p e r a tio n , as w ell as su bjectivities a n d corp oreal realities.
N e v er th e less, h istorical a c co u n ts su ccessfu lly u s e d by F o u ca u lt to d e v e lo p
his a r g u m e n ts d id n o t e sc a p e fu n c tio n a lism . A s H o n n e th stated (1 9 9 8 ,
p p . 1 6 3 ,1 6 5 ). F ou cau lt a r g u e d in favor o f a h istorically g u id e d fu n ctio n a lism
th at r e g a r d e d tradition s, id ea s, a n d v a lu e s o n ly fr o m th e p ersp ective o f the
fu n ctio n th e y p e r fo rm e d in a system atic p r o c e ss c h a r a cte riz ed by the

in crea se o r th e u se o f pow er; in o th e r w ords, a n a ly z in g social p ro c esses as
th ey m a x im iz e d c o n tr o l o r p refo rm a tted p o w e r o v e r society.
T h is is tr u e for th e d istin ct in terp reta tio n s o f historical m o m e n ts and
in stitu tio n s F ou cau lt m ad e. T h e way this a u th o r u n d e r sto o d historical
d isc o n tin u ity d e p e n d e d o n th e e m e r g e n c e an d d isa p p e a r in g o f system s o f
p ractices w h e r e th e ir social fu n ctio n b e c o m e s a c le a r criterio n that d e fin e s
historical ru p tu res. As in te r e ste d a s h e w as in c o n te s tin g m o d e r n ist view s o f
h istorical c o n tin u ity , a n d th erefo re r e d e fin in g h isto r ica l d isc o n tin u ity and
d isp er sio n , F o u ca u lt lin k s th e se last tw o c o n c e p ts to transitional
e p iste m o lo g ic a l a r ra n g em e n ts that th r o u g h d isc o u r se c h a n g e th e way the
so c ia l is p e r c e iv e d o r va lu ed . But d e sp ite th e se c h a n g e s, th e p r e d o m in a n c e
o f d isc o u r se o v er history can b e fo u n d th r o u g h o u t F o u ca u lt’s w ork and
to g e th e r w ith it, th e p r e d o m in a n c e o f pow er.
B oth p e r m a n e n c y a n d c h a n g e are sim u lta n e o u sly p r e se n t in w h at h e
c a lle d th e ru p tu res o f e p iste m e s o r th e e m e r g e n c e o f n e w g e n e a lo g ie s. Even
th o u g h t h e w ork o f th e h istorian is to fin d d isc o n tin u itie s w ith in the
m u ltip lic ity o f d iscou rses, F o u ca u lt d e fe n d s a t the sa m e lim e th e p rev a len ce
o f d isc o u r se a n d its c o n tr o llin g p o w er a s a c o n sta n t th r o u g h o u t history. A
p e r m a n e n t e sse n c e o f p o w e r is invariab le a n d c o n tin u o u s , d e sp ite c h a n g e s
in the way in stitu tio n s a n d p ractices rep re se n t it th r o u g h o u t tim e. Even
th o u g h fo r F o u ca u lt d ifferen t form s o f d o m in a tio n can b e id e n tifie d in
historical c h a n g e s, th e essen tia l ch aracter o f p o w er p ersists an d is ju st
d e p lo y e d in a d iffe re n t form . In th is se n se , it b e c o m e s hard to su stain that
historical ru p tu res o r d isc o n tin u itie s a r e in e s s e n c e a m e re rep etition .
T h o u g h th is a r g u m e n t again st F o u ca u lt is va lid , it c o u ld also b e sa id that
it r esp o n d s to o n e o f F o u ca u lt’s m a in goals: th e o r iz in g p o w er a n d its e ffects
on social rela tio n sh ip s, in stitu tio n s, a n d in d iv id u a ls w ith in a n ew
u n d e rsta n d in g o f history. O p tin g fo r a rea d in g th a t s e e s F o u ca u lt ju s t as a
th e o r ist o f p o w er— as h e h as b e e n r eg a rd ed a n d p r a ise d by m any— w e n e e d
to r e c o g n iz e h is origin ality a n d r e fin e m e n t w h e n sc r u tin izin g historical
fo r m a tio n s a n d th e ir e x p r e s sio n s o f pow er. In t h is se n se , F ou cau lt d o e s a
g rea te r j o b th a n C astoriadis, w h o n e v e r s o m e tic u lo u sly d issec te d pow er
a n d its m o d e s o f b e in g in sp ec ific SIS o r social in stitu tion s.
As se e n in p rev io u s ch a p ters, o n e o f C astoriad is’ m a in p riorities is givin g
a n e x h a u stiv e th e o r etica l a c c o u n t o f so c ia l in stitu tio n s. N ev erth eless, pow er
a n d d o m in a tio n rem ain tacit e le m e n ts that are n o t his m a in th eoretical
c o n c e r n s. W h e n c o m p a r in g F ou cau lt a n d C astoriad is in th is resp ect th e ir
d iffe r e n c e s b e c o m e e v id e n t in th e lev el o f a b straction e a c h a u th o r u s e d to
ap p roach t h e esta b lish ed rela tio n sh ip b e tw e en su b jects an d society. W hile
C astoriadis' e lab oration o n social in stitu tion s r esp o n d s to a n o n to lo g ica l

q u estio n , F ou cau lt rejected this sta n d , o p tin g to e la b o ra te a strategic
k n o w led g e b ased o n a p iece-by-p iece analysis o f pow er— a s h e d escrib ed
it— ra th er th a n o n a c o m p r eh en siv e, glob al, o r to ta liz in g e x p la n a tio n o f
social in stitu tio n s th at p r o m o te d m o d e r n ist id eals (F ou cau lt, 1980, p. 140).
For C astoriadis pow er is always p r e se n t in so c ia l life a n d is r eflected in
social in stitu tio n s an d SIS ,4 how ever, it is far from b e in g an o m n ip r e se n t and
pervasive e le m e n t. D e sp ite h is r eflec tio n s u p o n t h e e x istin g relation sh ip
b e tw e en subjectivity, su b o rd in a tio n , an d p rev a ilin g an d g o v e rn in g SIS,
p o w er a n d d o m in a tio n arc n ot c o n c ep tu a l in stru m en ts that C astoriadis finds
as p o te n tia lly e x p la n a to r y in th em selves. T h o u g h th e y play a relevant role in
d e v e lo p in g im p ortan t n o tio n s su ch as auton om y, h e d o e s n o t d iscu ss th em
in d ep th a s sp ec ific problem s. O n e c o u ld argu e th a t p o w er an d d om in ation
in C astoriadis are so m e h o w ov er sh a d o w ed th r o u g h o u t h is work; however,
this is n o t t o say that h e is totally fo r e ig n to this d isc u ssio n . T h e m o st sp ecific
c o n c ep tu a l term h e u ses to ex p la in th e se issu es is h eteron om y, a term h e
in tr o d u c e d early o n as a lien ation (1 9 8 7 , p p . 1 0 8 -1 0 ) a n d later fo rm a lized as
h e te ro n o m y , d e fin e d vis-à-vis auton om y. N o n e th e le ss, C astoriadis' n o tio n o f
h e te ro n o m y can b e b lam ed for n o t having b e e n m o r e ela b o ra ted o r
system atically a p p lie d in to sp ec ific social in stitu tion s. In th is respect,
F ou cau lt’s m astery at e x a m in in g te ch n iq u e s o f c o n tr o l a n d th e e ffects o f
pow er a r e g r ea te r than C astoriadis' an d o ffer tr e m e n d o u s potentiality. In
th e eyes o f s o m e critics, C astoriadis lacks a th o r o u g h analysis o f th is kind.
Kalyvas (2 0 0 2 , p. 7 7 ) stated th a t C astoriad is’ n o tio n o f h e te r o n o m y
rem a in s su p e rfic ia l, lim ite d , a n d derivative, w h ic h w e a k e n e d his political
project. H is u n d e r sta n d in g o f h e te r o n o m y p rev en ts h im fr o m g iv in g a solid
a c c o u n t o f d iffe r e n t fo r m s o f d o m in a tio n a n d asym m etrical p o w er rela tio n s.
Kalyvas a d d e d th a t C astoriad is’ critical view s o n issu es su ch as cap italism ,
lib eralism , a n d th e sta te rem a in so m e h o w d isp e r se d a n d in c o m p le te ,
m e a n in g b y th is that C astoriadis d o e s n o t e la b o r a te a r e fin e d a n d system atic
a c c o u n t o f fu n d a m e n ta l in stitu tio n s w h er e social in ju stic e is p e r p e tra te d by
th e im p o sitio n o f p ow erfu l a g en ts an d u n eq u a l r ela tio n sh ip s. T h isju d g m e n t
is valid d e sp ite th e fact th a t C astoriadis d o e s m ak e partial e ffo rts in h is later
w ritin gs to a p p ro a c h critiq u es o f th e state, cap italism , r elig io n , an d racism
in m o r e sim p le la n g u a g e a n d pragm atic term s. ’
C astoriad is’ th eo retica l in stru m en ts allow us to identify’ h o w th e in stitu ted
d im e n sio n m ay h a m p e r a n d co n stra in , th r o u g h th e e ffe c ts o f pow er, th e
creative cap acity o f in d ivid u als a n d so c ieties. H ow ever, h e d o e s n ot
u n d ertak e a d e ta ile d analysis o f th e ir m o d e s o f o p e r a tin g o r m ak e d escrip tive
a c co u n ts o f power.
I Ic ter o n o m y , for C astoriadis, m ig h t b e fo u n d in th e in stitu te d d im e n sio n

o f society, th r o u g h w h ich so c ie ty survives an d p r e se rv e s itself. D o m in a tio n
is e x p r e s s e d in th e so c ia l c lo su r e o f h e te r o n o m o u s form s lik e r elig io n .
H ow ever, co n tra ry to F ou cau lt, d o m in a tio n is n o t o m n ip r e se n t in th e
in stitu ted , o r b e tter p u t, th e in stitu te d is n o t o n ly d o m in a tio n . N egative
e ffe c ts o f d o m in a tio n c o m e in to p la y w h e n in stitu te d SIS o r so c ia l in stitu tio n s
o b scu re a n d ob stru ct th e in stitu tin g im agin ary a n d its p oten tia l to p u t in to
q u estio n o n e s e lf an d o n e 's ow n society. C astoriad is writes:
T o a b o lish h e te r o n o m y d o e s n o t sign ify a b o lish in g th e d iffe r e n c e b etw een

in stitu tin g so c iety a n d in stitu te d society— w h ic h , in an y case, w o u ld be
im p o ssib le — b u t to a b o lish the enslavem ent o f t h e fo r m e r to the latter. T h e
co llectiv ity w ill g ive itse lf its rules, k n o w in g th a t it itself is g ivin g th em
to itself, th a t th e se r u les are o r w ill always b e c o m e at s o m e p o in t inad
e q u a te , th a t it c a n c h a n g e th em — a n d th at th e y b in d it s o lo n g as it has
n o t c h a n g e d th e m in a regular w ay (1 9 9 3 a , p. 3 3 0 ).
In d e ed , as p reviou sly e x p la in e d , it is the a p p ro p ria tio n a n d e x er cise o f the

in stitu tin g p o w er by so c iety that e n a b le s in C astoriad is th e p ro d u ctio n o f
n ew in stitu tio n s a n d social im agin ary sig n ifica tio n s. By con trast, fo r F oucault
w h at triggers th e stru ggle again st p o w er a n d th e tran sform ation o f
in stitu tio n s is resistan ce an d its p rod u ctive c h a r a cte r th at it ex p r esses w ithin
o n g o in g str u g g le s that b o th m ain tain a n d d e sta b ilize form s o f d o m in a tio n .
W h a t is sh a red by th e in stitu tin g im a g in a ry in C astoriad is a n d the
r esistan ce to p o w er in F ou cau lt is th e ir capacity to q u estio n e x is tin g social
form s a n d g e n e r a te n e w a n d d iffe re n t o n e s. F or b o th C astoriadis and
F o u ca u lt th e se d rivin g fo r c e s o f c h a n g e are so c ia lly con stitu tive a n d
ind ividu als a n d c o lle c tiv e s n e e d th e m to tran sform w hat is n o r m a liz ed and
n atu ralized by society. F u rth erm o re, b o th th in k er s e m p h a siz e th e collective
a n d a n o n y m o u s ch aracter o f th e se c h a n g in g fa c u ltie s. F or th e m th e se c o m e
from b e lo w an d arc sim u lta n e o u sly everyw here an d n o w h e re , d isp ersed
a n d in flic te d from in n u m er a b le p o in ts, a n d at play in every individual.
T ran sform ation is n o t a ttrib u ted to a sp ec ific or p r iv ile g e d so c ia l actor, in
o r d e r to a v o id any cssen tia liza tio n o f a class o r id e n tity as th e u n iq u e bearer
o f ju s tic e o r w isdom .
Like in F o u c a u lt, h istorical ru ptu re in C astoriad is is rela ted to effecLs o f
d o m in a tio n a n d power. T h o u g h e x p la in e d th r o u g h very d iffe re n t co n c ep ts,
c o lle ctiv e c h a n g e in C astoriadis is lin k ed to h is c o n c e p ts o f h e te r o n o m y and
au ton om y, as w ell a s to th e in stitu ted an d th e in stitu tin g p o w e r o r im aginary.
T h e m o st im p o rta n t d im e n sio n o f historical c h a n g e that C astoriadis is
in te r e ste d in th e o r iz in g h as to d o with th e e x e r c ise o f th e c o llectiv e

in stitu tin g p o w e r that h as b r o u g h t a b o u t a u to n o m o u s in stitu tio n s su ch as
p h ilo so p h y o r dem ocracy. R ath er than c o n c e n tr a tin g s o m u c h o n the
h istorical c o u r se o f w h at C astoriadis se e s as h e te r o n o m o u s institution s
th r o u g h o u t history, h e is in te re ste d in c o n c e p tu a liz in g h istorical dis
co n tin u ity o n th e b ases o f h is n o t io n o f a u to n o m y . D isc o n tin u ity in history
is se e n by C astoriad is in th e crea tio n o f a n ew e id o s , m ost im p ortan tly in th e
crea tio n o f a u to n o m o u s form s that o v erc o m e h e te r o n o m o u s states o r form s
o f so c ieties. It is in th is c o lle ctiv e p o te n tia lity a n d ca p a city w h ere C astoriadis
se c s d isco n tin u ity . C on trary to w hat F ou cau lt se e s a s r ep etitio u s e x p r essio n s
o f p o w er th r o u g h o u t history, C astoriadis w an ts t o th e o r iz e th e break o f
h e te r o n o m y by p o sin g h is id e a o f a u to n o m o u s creation .
In th e ir resp e ctiv e fo rm u la tio n s it is p o ssib le to s e c h o w F ou cau lt and
C astoriadis in te n d e d to o v e r c o m e id eas o f history'an d c h a n g e that d e fe n d e d
u ltim a te so c ia l form s o r in volved a natu ral tr a n sc en d e n ta l te lo s in sp ir e d by
rationalist, m od ern ist, o r liberal views. H ow ever, it is a p p o site to observe
cen tral d iffe r e n c e s in th e se read in gs.
A s a r g u e d earlier, F o u ca u lt’s p o sitio n c o n ta in e d fu n ctio n a list and
d e te rm in ist traits rela ted to p o w er th a t a ffect t h e efficacy o f his critical
view s, his a c c o u n t o f history, a n d h is se n s e o f social an d individual
tra n sfo rm a tio n . D esp ite his orig in a lity a n d so p h istic a tio n F o u ca u lt was
u n a b le to th e o r etica lly su b stan tiate h is critiq u e o f so c ia l in stitu tio n s w ith ou t
fa llin g in to a form o f tra n scen d en ta lism o f p o w e r a n d d o m in a tio n . H e
la ck ed a c o n c e p tu a lly e q u ip p e d e x p la n a tio n th a t w o u ld allow a
d iffe re n tia tio n b e tw e en su b jectio n to pow er a n d n e c c s sa iy p ro c esses o f
so c ia liz a tio n . T h is is c o rro b o ra ted b y Said w h o , in sp ire d by D ew s, adds:
[F o u ca u lt] p erceives clearly th at in stitu tio n s are n o t m e r e im p o se d
con stru cts, y e t has n o app aratu s for d e a lin g with th is fact, w h ic h en ta ils that
fo llo w in g a c o n v e n tio n is n o t always e q u iv a le n t to su b m ittin g to a
p o w e r . . . B u t w ith o u t this d istin ctio n every d e lim ita tio n b e c o m e s an
e x c lu sio n , a n d every e x c lu sio n b e c o m e s e q u a te d w ith an e x e r c ise o f pow er
(1 9 9 4 , p. 151).
T hat F o u c a u lt d id n o t e x p lic itly p o s e u ltim a te fo u n d a tio n s a s g o a ls in
h istorical o r social tran sform ation , a n d fo u g h t any m oral o r eth ica l standard
im p o se d b y k n o w led g e o r d iscou rses, d o e s n o t m e a n that h e su ccessfu lly
saved h im s e lf fr o m fa llin g in to th e sa m e trap o f p o s in g a d e te rm in ist and
tr a n sc en d e n ta l e le m e n t in his theory. S u ch a sp e c t o f h is th e o r y is r eflected
in pivotal n o tio n s o f h is w ork as it will b e d isc u sse d in th e fo llo w in g chapter.
H a rin g la id o f f h e r e s o m e o f th e b asic n o tio n s th a t su p p o rt F o u c a u lt’s
theory, a c o n c e p tu a l g r o u n d h as b e e n o u tlin e d to d e e p e n its d isc u ssio n in
th e lig h t o f C astoriadis’ fram ew ork. In ter estin g m u tu al th eo retica l q u estio n s

can b e n o w id e n tifie d after g o in g th r o u g h a revision o f th e ir c o n c ep tu a l
ap p aratu s th at, far fr o m b e in g e x h au stive, allow s a com p arative d iscu ssion
b etw een t h e tw o au th ors. F u rth erm o re, m an y d iffe r e n c e s have b e e n
g e n era lly id e n tifie d as a so u r c e o f r e fle c tio n an d analysis for th e fo llo w in g
chapter.
114
C h a p te r 5
Society Over the Subject
T h e m a in c o n c e r n s that g u id e d F o u c a u lt’s w o r k w ere in tr o d u c e d in th e

p rev io u s ch ap ter. It a d d ressed s o m e fu n d a m e n ta l issu es in his p h ilo so p h y
su c h as p o w e r an d its im p lica tio n in h istorical d isco n tin u ity and
tra n sfo rm a tio n . D e ter m in ist an d fu n ctio n a list e le m e n ts w e re a p p roach ed
in h is fram ew ork , an d c o m m o n a litie s a n d d iv e rg e n c es with C astoriadis in
this r e sp e c t w e re p o s e d . T h e d iffe re n t im p o r ta n c e th at e a c h a u th o r gave to
p o w er m e d ia tio n w h en e la b o ra tin g o n social in stitu tio n s was con trasted ,
a n d a d isc u ssio n ab ou t th e c o n siste n c y an d critical ch aracter o f their
th e o r ie s w as in tr o d u c e d .
T h is c h a p te r in te n d s to lo o k d e e p e r in to th e p a r a lle l b e tw e en C astoriadis
a n d F ou cau lt, fo c u sin g o n the th r e e sp ec ific p r o b le m s o f m y analysis— the
su b ject, t h e p r o d u c tio n o f so c ia l m e a n in g a n d r e p re se n ta tio n , an d social
a n d cu ltu ral c h a n g e . In s o d o in g , I w ill evalu ate im p lic a tio n s o f F oucault
a n d C astoriad is’ p o s itio n s regard in g fr ee d o m a n d agency; th e p ossib ility o f
r e c o n str u c tin g o u rselves a n d o u r o w n su b je ctiv e /su b je c tiv ity con stitu tion ;
a n d th e critical p o te n tia l o f o u r in d ivid u al a n d c o lle ctiv e q u e s tio n in g to
transform so ciety . W h en F o u c a u lt’s p o sitio n in r ela tio n to th e se p r o b le m s is
stu d ie d fr o m th e C astoriadian p ersp ectiv e, it is p o s sib le to id en tify im p o r ta n t
th e o r etica l issu es th a t a ffect th e p o litica l c o n siste n c y o f F o u c a u lt’s work.
H er e I a r g u e fo r C astoriadis’ id e a s as an altern ative to th e u n reso lv ed
p r o b le m s w ith in F o u ca u lt’s d e v e lo p m e n ts o n society, th e subject, an d social
c h a n g e ; p r o b le m s th at C astoriadis saw as fo r e c lo s e d F o u c a u ld ia n p o sitio n s
e m b e d d e d in political relativism .
F o u c a u lt o n t h e S u b je c t
F o u ca u lt n e v e r a c c e p te d th e su b je ct as a p illar o f h is theory. D e sp ite the

sligh t th e o r etica l turn F o u ca u lt m a d e in his la ter w ritin gs in r elation to
su b jectifica tio n , lie r efu sed u n til th e e n d to b e c o m m itte d to a g en eral
o n to lo g y o f th e h u m a n su b ject. H e a ssig n ed n e ith e r o r ig in 110 1 e sse n c e to
th e su b ject, n o r gave th e su b je ct priority o v er d isc o u r se . Fraser ( 1989, p. 56)

su m m e d u p this p o in t, statin g that fo r F ou cau lt t h e su b ject c o n stitu te d on ly
a derivative p r o d u c t o f c o n tin g e n t a n d h istorical se ts o f lin gu istically in fu se d
social p r a c tic es that in scrib ed pow er rela tio n s u p o n b od ies.
F o u ca u lt’s p r o je ct c o n siste d in id en tify in g th e way in w h ich w h at was
c a lle d the su b je c t w as fo r m e d , r efo r m ed , d isp er se d , a n d r eg u la te d in
discursive reality. U sin g a r ch a eo lo g y h e c o n sid e r e d h o w th e stru ctu re o f
k n o w led g e d e lim ite d th e su b ject, a n d u sin g g e n e a lo g y h e stu d ie d th e way in
w h ic h th e b o d y o f th e su b je ct b e c a m e the site o f th e in sc r ip tio n o f k n o w led g e
a n d c o n tr o l.
Early, in The Order o f Things F o u ca u lt o p e n ly d e c la r ed , to g e th e r with
structuralists, th e d eath o f the su b ject. In d e sc r ib in g th e e m e r g e n c e o f
h u m a n sc ie n c e s, h e e x p lic a te d sim u lta n e o u sly h o w “m a n ” ca m e to life as a
discursive co n stru ct. F or F ou cau lt, w h at is c a lle d "m an” e m e r g e d as an
o b je c t o f analysis, o f sc ien tific in v estig a tio n , a n d a s a fin ite a n d historically
d e te r m in e d b e in g to b e stu d ied . T h is le d h im to c o n c lu d e t h e d e m ise o f
m a n as an e p iste m o lo g ic a l su b ject, b a c k e d by t h e th e n -e m e r g in g F rench
p o sth u m a n ism , in w h ich the su b je ct w as in te r p r e te d it s a n e ffe c t o f la n g u a g e,
d esire, a n d th e u n co n sc io u s. A s m e n tio n e d in C h a p ter 4, initially for
F ou cau lt, a n th r o p o lo g y a n d p sych oanalysis w e re u s e d to d e m o n stra te how
ih e se lf-g o v er n in g c o g ito o r tra n scen d en ta l g r o u n d o f m a n w o u ld n o lo n g e r
b e valid in so c ia l analysis.
P sychoanalysis a n d e th n o lo g y are n o t so m u ch tw o h u m a n sc ie n c e s a m o n g
o th e r s, but th ey sp a n th e e n tire d o m a in o f th o s e sc ie n c e s in th a t they
a n im a te its w h o le su rfa ce, sp read th e ir c o n c e p ts th r o u g h o u t it, a n d arc able
to propound th e ir m e th o d s of d e c ip h e r m e n t and in terp retation s
everyw h ere . . . N o t on ly are [p sych oan alysis a n d e th n o lo g y ] ab le to d o
w ith ou t th e c o n c e p t o f m an , th ey arc also u n a b le t o pass th r o u g h it, fo r they
always ad d ress th em selv es to that w h ic h c o n stitu te s his o u te r lim its. O n e
m ay say o f b o th o f th e m w hat Lévi-Strauss said o f e th n o lo g y : th a t they
d issolve m a n . (F o u ca u lt, 1970, p. 37 9 )
W h it e b o o k correctly n o te s h o w F o u ca u lt’s in itial a c k n o w le d g m e n t o f
psych oan alysis also h ad to d o w ith h is am b itio n to p u rsu e a d ia lo g u e with
u n re a so n , a th e o r etica l a n d practical program h e id e n tifie d in M adness a n d
C ivilization'. Initially F o u ca u lt saw in F reud a p o te n tia l so u r c e to co n trib u te
to h is o b je c tiv e , th o u g h h e la ter tu r n e d away fr o m e n g a g e m e n t w ith the
in n e r w orld o f th e psyche.
F o u ca u lt’s r efin e d c o n c e p tio n o f t h e su b je ct as a discu rsive p rod u ct n ever
im p lie d n o r a c c e p te d a n o n lin g u istic psych ical d im e n s io n s u c h as F r e u d ’s
n o tio n o f th e u n co n sc io u s. H ow ever, as W hite-book (2 0 0 5 , p. 31 5 ) argu ed .
Society Over the Subject 117
h e str u g g le d w ith this p ro b lem u n til th e e n d , le a v in g th e cxtralin guistic

d im e n sio n o f th e su b ject u n d e r th e o r iz e d . 2 For F o u c a u lt, th e c o n stitu tio n
o f the su b je c t always d e p e n d e d o n th e lin g u istic rela tio n sh ip s (discursive
a n d n o n d iscu rsiv c r ela tio n s). T h e su b ject c o u ld on ly b e e x p la in e d as a
lin gu istically m e d ia te d resu lt, a n e x ter n a l c o n str u c t in fu se d all th e way
th r o u g h b y society.
T h is F o u c a u ld ia n c o n c e p tio n o f th e su b jcct has b e e n ex ten siv ely analyzed
by d iffe r e n t a u th ors an d h as m an y d iffe re n t a sp ects. T h e p o in t th a t sh o u ld
b e e m p h a s iz e d is that in co n tra st to C astoriadis, F o u ca u lt refu sed to
r ec o g n iz e a n d th e o r etica lly articulate th e n o n lin g u istic d im e n sio n o f th e
su b ject, a n d in ste a d se t th e o r etica l c o n d itio n s th a t h a d p rob lem atic
c o n s e q u e n c e s fo r ad d ressin g the q u estio n o f su b jectifica tio n a n d ch a n g e.
C astoriad is’ refo rm u la tio n o f th e F reud ian u n c o n sc io u s a llow ed h im to
articu late a n u n d e rsta n d in g o f psychical r ep re se n ta tio n a n d subjective
co n fig u r a tio n .
In his a c c o u n t o f u n c o n sc io u s m an ifestation in th e o n e ir ic w orld, F reud
p r e se n te d a n e x p la n a tio n a b o u t th e n o n lin g u istic d im e n s io n o f th e su b je ct’s
p sy ch e. T h e o n e ir ic w orld fo llo w ed its ow n lo g ic th at d iffe r e d fr o m the
w ak in g c o n s c io u s life an d that w h ich d id n o t fo llo w lin g u istic, lo g ic, or
ration al pri n cip les. T h o u g h F reud states th a t d r e a m s can b e m a d e in tellig ib le
th r o u g h r ea so n , h e classifies th e m as p ro d u cts o f irrationality. W h at is at
stake in th e F reud ian a c c o u n t is n o t on ly a p articu lar u n d e rsta n d in g o f the
su b ject th at in c o rp o ra te s th e d ia lo g u e o f rea so n a n d u n re a so n in relation
to identity, b u t also a c o n c e p tu a l platform u p o n w h ic h a n ew u n d e rsta n d in g
o f m a d n e ss, path ology, an d n orm ality can b e d e r iv e d — all prim ary in terests
in F o u c a u lt’s work.
W h ile d r e a m s w e re n e v e r a c en tra l to p ic fo r F o u c a u lt, F reu d ’s app roach
to d ream s in volved issu es that F ou cau lt e x p lo r e d w h en h e w rote the
in tr o d u c tio n to I.udw ig B in sw an ger’s Dream a n d Existence. In W h ite b o o k ’s
view , in th is early text, F o u c a u lt h ad a su rrealist a n d fo rm a list p e rsp ectiv e in
w h ich th e o n e ir ic w orld is id e a liz ed an d r e p r e se n ts a p r iv ile g ed ep iste m ic
p o sitio n , given that it h as n o ration al c e n so r sh ip .3 F o u ca u lt v alorized the
d rea m a s a sp ec ific fo r m o f tra n scen d en t im a g in a ry e x p e r ie n c e w ith its
private a n d individual ch aracter that c a n n o t b e e x h a u s te d by p sych ological
analysis (1 9 9 3 , p. 4 3 ) . F o u ca u lt stated (1 9 9 3 , p . 3 5 ) th a t w ithin their
lin g u istic stru ctu re— w h ich gives life to dream s— th e g e n e sis o f dream s
reflects th e origin al free m o d e o f b e in g o f th e in d ivid u al that c o n stitu te s it,
a n d o ffe r s n e w p o s s ib ilitie s fo r th e in d iv id u a l. D r e a m s a r e a r e s u lt o f
t h e m in d 's cap acity to freely g e n e r a te n ew im a g e s that are n o t d erived
from th e real— in c lu d in g th e m em ory— that F o u c a u lt c a lle d im agin ation .
Im agin ation referred to th e m in d ’s sp o n ta n e o u s im age-creating capacity.

T h e im a gin ation is icon oclastic, w h ich m e a n s ii d estroys a n d c o n su m e s all
m erely g iv en im ages— in c lu d in g th e fu n d a m e n ta l rep resen tation s o f the
trib e a n d o f the self— p rojectin g a tra n scen d en t reality b ey o n d th em . Foucault
a d d e d th a t the im age c o n stitu te d a ruse o f c o n sc io u sn e ss in o rd er to p u t a
sto p to im a g in in g , w hat h e c a lle d the m o m e n t o f d isc o u r a g e m e n t in th e hard
lab or o f im a g in in g . T o b e a u th en tic m ea n t e x e r c isin g y o u r im agin ation to
tran scen d th e given s o f your situation an d assu m e y o u r destiny. T h e aim o f
psych otherap y, accordingly, sh o u ld b e to free th e im agin ary that is trapped
in th e im age— to free th e a lien ation o f th e im a gin ation (1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 1 -2 ).
In later w ritin gs F o u ca u lt a b a n d o n e d a system atic d e v e lo p m e n t o f direct
q u estio n s th a t e m e r g e d from th is early w ork. Sp ecifically, h e n e v e r to o k o n
th e c o n c e p t o f im a g in a tio n w ith all its c o n c e p tu a l c o n se q u e n c e s, possibly
b e c a u se o f th e c o n flic t h e e n te r e d in to w ith psych oan alysis an d th e social
sc ie n c e s, as W h ite b o o k (2 0 0 5 ) hits su g g ested . T h e s e th eo retica l p r o b le m s
r em a in e d tacitly p r e se n t in h is work.
T h e se e a rly ob servation s m a d e by F o u ca u lt can b e c o m p a r e d to
Castoriadis* p o s itio n in th is regard . C o m m o n a litie s can b e id e n tifie d , as
w h en F o u ca u lt, ad d ressin g t h e transgrcssivc d im e n sio n o f d ream s, h ad a
c eleb ratory view ab ou t t h e fa cu lties o f im a g in a tio n that w ere ca p a b le o f
fr ee ly p o s in g creative a n d self-g o v ern in g life altern atives to ind ividu als. To
a cer ta in e x te n t in th e in tr o d u c tio n to L ud w ig B insw anger’s Dream a n d
Existence, F o u c a u lt’s th o u g h ts r esem b le d C astoriadis' d iscu ssio n of
im a g in a tio n . B oth a u th ors a g r ee d ia l th e in d iv id u a l’s p sych e is cap ab le o f
fo r m in g r e p r e s e n ta tio n s in a q u id p ro q u o m o d e th r o u g h im a g in a tio n ,
o f r ep r e se n tin g a n d p r o je ctin g b e y o n d p r e se n t reality, p o sin g n ew o p tio n s
a n d ways o f b e in g . T h r o u g h im a g in a tio n th e su b je ct can d e-realize the real,
r ep r e se n t its ow n w orld , a n d e x p a n d it to th e c o lle c tiv e d im e n sio n .
T h is c o n c u r r e n c e allow s u s to o b ser v e fo u r r e la te d q u estio n s in w h ich
F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriadis greatly d iffe re d as th e ir w ork d e v e lo p e d . T h e se
d iffe re n c es can b e in ferred from th e th e o r e tic a l asp ects th a t w e have
e x a m in ed : 1 ) th e fram ew ork w ithin w h ich th ey in terp ret th e facu lty o f
psych ical r e p r e se n ta tio n , o r th e c o n c e p t of im a g in a tio n — c a lle d as su c h in
F o u ca u lt’s e a rly work— th e statu s th ey give to it, a n d th e r o le it plays in their
resp ective u n d e r sta n d in g s o f rep resen tation ; 2 ) t h e e x te n t to w h ich the
p r o d u cts o f im a g in a tio n c a n b e e valu ated as n ew c rea tio n s o r m ere
rep ro d u c tio n s; 3 ) th e w ay t h e n o tio n o f im a g in a tio n serves th e critical
ch aracter o f e a ch a u th o r's theory; a n d finally, 4 ) r etu r n in g to th e cen tral
issu e o f th is se c tio n , th e way th e se q u estio n s a ffe c t the n o tio n o f the
su bject.
As e x p la in e d in C h a p ter 2, C astoriadis se c s v a lu a b le e le m e n ts in F reu d ’s

Interpretation o f Dreams to su p p o rt h is o n to lo g ic a l n o tio n o f im agin ation ,
in v e ste d w ith th e cap acity to create n e w a n d n o t totally d e te rm in e d
rep re se n ta tio n s. F ou cau lt, o n th e contrary, d id n o t e n g a g e in a m o r e
p r o fo u n d th e o r iz a tio n o f im a g in a tio n n o r p e r ce iv e it as a key e le m e n t in his
u n d e rsta n d in g o f r ep re se n ta tio n . A s W h ite b o o k p o in ts o u t, the difficulty
w ith F o u ca u lt's p o s itio n in relation to rep re se n ta tio n is that it is m erely
d escrip tiv e a n d n o t w orked o u t th o ro u g h ly .4 In effe c t, F o u ca u lt d id not
c o n sid e r th e facu lty o f p sy ch ica l r ep re se n ta tio n a s a n ecessary p r o b le m to
b e d e v e lo p e d .
C astoriad is d erives a c o m p le te ly d iffe re n t u n d e r sta n d in g o f r ep resen
tation an d th e c r e a tio n o f m e a n in g , th e su b ject's so c ia liz a tio n in to social
m e a n in g , a n d its c o n se q u e n c e s for individual an d social tran sform ation . As
s e e n , C astoriad is se e k s a psych oanalytically in sp ire d e x p la n a tio n of
r ep re se n ta tio n c o h e r e n t w ith a p r o c e ss o f su b jectifica tio n w h er e th e in fa n t’s
p sych e g o e s th r o u g h progressive stages to b e c o m e a social entity. In d o in g
so, h e assign s a self-agen cy to th e su b je ct that is c a refu lly a rticu lated with
o th e r strata o r reg io n s o f b e in g . In term s o f th e su b jectification o r
so c ia liz a tio n p rocesses, F ou cau lt w as in te r e ste d b asically in th e e ffe c ts o f
pow er. As V isker (1 9 9 5 , p p . 9 8 - 9 ) su ggests, th e o r iz in g o th e r p rocesses
la ck ed s e n s e fo r h im . F or F ou cau lt, su b je ctifica tio n w as r e d u c e d to die
in c o rp o ra tio n o f certain form s o f p o w er that t h e in d ivid u al lea r n e d to
r ep ro d u c e. U p o n e n te r in g society, th e su b ject b e c a m e a p r iso n e r o f that
so c ia l o r d e r in w h ich it lea r n e d to fu n c tio n . F o u c a u lt h ig h lig h te d the
su b je ct form ation p rocess as th e assim ilation o f th e in d ivid u al in to society
w ith ou t th e in fu sio n o f an y p r e ex istin g privatistic fo rm . F ou cau lt stated:
T h e in d ivid u al is n o t to b e c o n c e iv e d as a sort o f e lem en ta ry n u cle u s, a

prim itive atom , a m u ltip le an d in e rt m aterial o n w h ich p o w er c o m e s to
fitsten o r against w h ich it h a p p e n s to strike, a n d in so d o in g su b d u es or
cru sh es ind ividu als. In fact, it is already o n e o f th e p rim e e ffects o f pow er
that cer ta in b o d ies, certain gestures, certain d isc o u r se s, a n d certain desires,
c o m e to b e id e n tifie d an d c o n stitu te d as in d ivid u als (1980, p. 9 8 ).
In th e su b jectifica tio n p r o c ess F o u ca u lt fo u n d fo r m s o f su b jectio n th rou gh

w h ich th e su b je c t in sc r ib ed w ithin itself n o r m a liz in g p r in c ip le s a n d m a d e
th e b o d y a tr an sm ogrifyin g site o f d iscip lin ary pow er. T h e sp ace o f interiority
o f th e su b je ct was carved o u t o f subjectivity by p o w e r ra th er th a n e x is tin g as
a d e e p so u r c e o f th e su b je ct’s u n co n sc io u s. T h e r e w as n o o p p o sitio n
b etw een th e in te rio r a n d th e ex terior, n o t b e c a u se th e in terior w as m e re ly
an e m p ty sp a c c , b u t ra th er b e c a u se in teriority w as n o th in g o th e r than the

in te r io r iz in g o f th e o u tsid e . As W illiam s (2 0 0 1 , p. 181) states, th is is how
F o u ca u lt p o litic iz e d th e c o n str u c tio n o f th e subject: all th a t is o u ts id e o f the
su b ject fo r m s a h in g e for interiority.
T h r o u g h o u t F o u ca u lt’s w ork, su b jects w e re p r o d u c ts o f n o r m a liz in g
p r a c tic es th a t e lim in a te d th e ir “p sy ch o lo g ica l irreg u la rities,” m ak in g d o c ile
in d ivid u als (1 9 7 9 . p. 170). T h r o u g h th e p a n o p tic effe c t, F ou cau lt sh ow ed
h o w t h e su b ject r eg u la te d h is o r h e r b e h a v io r autom atically:
I le w h o is su b je c te d to a field o f visibility an d w h o know s it, a ssu m es a

resp o n sib ility fo r th e c o n stra in ts o f pow er, h e m a k es th e m play sp o n ta n e
ou sly u p o n him self: h e in scrib es in h im se lf th e p o w er r ela tio n in w h ich
h e sim u lta n e o u sly plays b o th roles. I Ie b e c o m e s th e p rin cip le o f his ow n
su b je ctio n (ibid., p. 2 0 5 ).
F ou cau lt d e sc r ib e d p a n o p tic p o w er as a te c h n iq u e o f o verlap p in g

su b jectifica tio n an d o b jectifica tio n , as “th e su b je c tio n o f th o s e w h o are
p e r ce iv e d a s ob jects a n d th e o b je c tifica tio n o f th o s e w h o are su b je cte d ”
(ibid., pp. 184—5 ). In this se n se , su b jectifica tio n b e c a m e e q u a te d to
su b jection . F o u ca u lt w rote: ‘‘T h e m an w h om w e a r e in vited to fr ee , is already
in h im s e lf th e e ffe c t o f a su b je ctio n m u c h m o r e p r o fo u n d th a n h im s e lf ’
(ibid., p. 3 0 ).
Each h u m a n ind ivid u al w as s e e n as an e m b o d ie d n e x u s to b e transform ed
by th e d e p lo y m e n t o f e x ter n a l causal p ow ers. T h e su b jectification p r o c ess
w as r e d u c e d to th e ran ge o f su b ject-p osition s th a t th e discu rsive realm
a llow ed . B u t th e su b je ct w as n ever c o n sid e r e d a b le to assu m e an a u to n o m o u s
p o s itio n as a n a u to-reflexive e n tity fr o m w h ose self, e m e r g e d r u les o f
b eh a v io r o r p ow erfu l laws. A s s e e n , h e c la im e d th a t e v en a p erfectly realized
a u to n o m o u s subjectivity w o u ld b e a n o r m a liz ed form an d a p ro d u ct o f
d isc ip lin a ry d o m in a tio n .
D ew s (1 9 8 7 ) sh a res this u n d e rsta n d in g a n d o p in io n a b o u t F o u ca u lt’s
c o n c e p tio n o f th e su b ject. In D ew s’ view, F o u ca u lt w as im m e r se d in the
d esire to d isso lv e the p h ilo so p h ic a l lin k s b e tw e e n c o n sc io u sn e ss, self-
reflectio n , a n d fr e e d o m . By e sta b lish in g a d ir ec t r elation b etw een
su b jectifica tio n a n d su b je ctio n , F o u ca u lt d e n ie d th a t th e r e r em a in e d any
p rogressive p olitical p o te n tia l in th e id e a l o f an a u to n o m o u s ind ivid u al. For
F o u ca u lt a n y th eo ry o f self-d e te r m in a tio n h ad to b e a b a n d o n e d , b ecau se
th e free su b je c t w as in trin sically h e te r o n o m o u s. A n d th o u g h it c o u ld be
a r g u e d th a t F o u ca u lt in h is late w orks was m o r e in te r e s te d in th e su b je ct’s
ow n cap acity for c o n stitu tio n o r re-con stitu tion w ithin a fr e e r p osition ,
th e r e was n o r o o m for th e c o n c e p t o f self-agen cy. W ith self-co n scio u sn ess

a b o lish ed , w ith it w ent th e p ossib ility o f a self-ru lin g su b ject. T h e r e fo r e , the
aim o f p o litic a l a c tio n c o u ld n o t b e to e n h a n c e o r e x p a n d an y su p p o sed
auton om y.
T h e lack o f a drive th e o r y a n d a p sych oan alytical d im e n sio n in his work,
o r e v e n o f a p h e n o m e n o lo g y o f the p sy ch e, m a d e F o u ca u lt u n a b le to
in c o rp o ra te in to his th eo ry a n in d ivid u al site for th e p r o d u ctio n o f
subjectivity th a t was ca p a b le n o t on ly o f r ec e iv in g ex tern a l c o n te n ts, but
also o f e la b o r a tin g th e m a n d e v en c r e a tin g n e w a n d alternative o n e s . It was
e n o u g h to sta te that th e site o f p r o d u ctio n an d r e p r o d u c tio n o f subjectivity
(th e site o f p o w er itself) was a m o v in g su bstrate o f th e rela tio n sh ip s o f
fo r ce s, w h er e th e su b je ct was b o th a passive r e c ip ie n t a n d a p o ten tia l
resistance. Even th o u g h F ou cau lt c o n sid e r e d th e e m e r g e n c e o f new
su b jectivities th r o u g h th e se resistan ce p rocesses, th is form o f subjectivity
was d iffic u lt to fo llo w sin c e it w as n o t c o m p le te ly th eo retica lly elab orated .
W illiam s (2001 ) is righ t to sta te that w hat F o u ca u lt c a lle d “s o m e th in g in the
social b o d y w h ich in s o m e se n se s esc a p e s t h e r ela tio n sh ip s o f pow er, a
cen trifu g a l m o v e m e n t, a n in verse e n e r g y to p o w e r ” (1 9 8 0 , p. 13 8 ) rem a in e d
in a d eq u a tely th e o r iz e d , sin c e its o rigin an d c h a r a cte r is n o t e x p la in e d and
its th e o r e tic a l c o n te x t (F ou cau ld ian th eo ry itself) le ft n o room to in fe r it
(W illiam s, 2 0 0 1 , p. 183).
By n o t p r o v id in g a th e o r etica l a c c o u n t of: 1) t h e su b ject p reviou s to the
so c ia liz a tio n process; 2 ) th e psych ical c o n fig u r a tio n o f th e su b je ct as a new
b e in g c o n fr o n tin g society; a n d 3 ) the im p lie d intersu b jective p rocess
su ffer ed by all su b jects in so c ia liz a tio n , F ou cau lt w as le ft with n o m ea n s to
ex p la in th e psych ical p r o c ess u n d e r g o n e by th e su b je ct in th e crea tio n and
re-creation o f subjectivity. F u rth erm ore, F o u ca u lt's lack o f a psychoanalytical
p e rsp ectiv e also m a d e h im u n a b le to d istin g u ish b e tw e e n th e in te rio r and
e x te r io r su b jective c o n te n ts, o r to u n d e rsta n d th e p r o c esses th r o u g h w h ich
su b jects in terrorized e x ter n a l c o n te n ts a n d b u ilt a n ew subjectivity or
b e c a m e s o m e th in g d ifferen t from w h at th e ir so c ie ty h ad g iv en th em . T h e
d iffe r e n tia te d in d ivid u al an d social p o le s o f t h e p sych e ela b o ra ted by
C astoriadis d id n o t e x is t in the F o u ca u ld ia n view.
In r ela tio n to th e p ro b lem o f intersubjectivity, F ou cau lt left m ore
th eo retica l v o id s or, as D ew s (1 9 8 7 , p p . 1 9 8 -9 ) h as c a lle d th e m , in c o
h e r e n c ie s . In D e w s’ view, F o u ca u lt’s c o n te n tio n that su b jects c o u ld be
fo rg ed th r o u g h o b jectifica tio n — th ro u g h a n o n re c ip ro c a l pow er
o p e r a tio n — did n o t take in to a c c o u n t th e c o m p le x ity o f in tersu b jective
p ro cesses. I t was ab ove all in c o h e r e n t b e c a u se th e h u m a n b e in g c a n o n ly
a c q u ir e th e c o m p e te n c ie s that transform th em in to sp ea k in g a n d a c tin g
su bjects th r o u g h in teraction w ith o th e r su bjects. F o u ca u lt's a c co u n t o f a

u n id ir e c tio n a l su rveillan ce fa ile d to register th e fact that socialization
d e p e n d e d u p o n a m u tu al r ec o g n itio n o f su bjects. M oreover, th e recip rocity
th at F o u ca u lt did e v o k e w as n o t a k in d o f r e c ip ro c ity o f c o m m u n ic a tio n
b e tw e en e q u a l su b jects, b u t a recip ro city o f fo r ce th a t r em a in e d e m b e d d e d
w ith in a h ierarch y. T h u s, a lth o u g h the c o n c e p t o f recip ro city d id p la y an
im p lic itly critical role in F o u c a u lt’s w ork, it w as n o t a n o n c o e r c iv c
recip ro city that c o u ld b e m a d e th e g o a l o f p o litic a l str u g g le . F o u ca u lt saw
in te rsu b je c tiv e r ela tio n s as totally d e te r m in e d , r e n d e r in g th e su b ject
u n a b le to rew ork th em . In the p olitical aren a, in tersu b jectivity w as n o t a
p o ssib le sp a c e w h ere e q u a l an d d e m o c ra tic r ela tio n s c o u ld b e estab lish ed ,
n o r a m e d iu m fo r b u ild in g m o r e self-g o v ern in g so c ie tie s. O n the contrary,
h is view o n in tersu b jective relation s h ad to d o o n ly with o p p r e ssio n a n d
inequ ality; it left n o room fo r a political alternative.
F o u ca u lt’s n o tio n of the su b je ct h a m p ers a c o n siste n t political
u n d e r sta n d in g o f so ciety an d social c h a n g e . E sp ecially his n o tio n o f
resistan ce -as will b e d isc u sse d later- p reven ts h im fr o m fo r m u la tin g a m ore
c o h e r e n t p o litic a l alternative to e n v isio n a b e tte r w ay o f life.
N e v er th e less, it is u n d e n ia b le that, u p to a p o in t, F o u ca u lt th e o r iz e d a
p o ssib le tran sform ation o f p o w er r eg im es th r o u g h t h e p r o m o tio n o f n ew
form s o f subjectivity. H ow ever, th e way th e su b je c t c o u ld a c h iev e th is was
n e v e r fully e x p la in e d . In this regard, W illiam s (2 0 0 1 , p. 1 5 4 ) n o te d a
p a ra d o x th a t d id n o t favor a satisfactory p olitical r e so lu tio n in F o u c a u lt’s
w ork. W h ile the su b ject was e n u n c ia te d as th e p r iv ile g e d site o f p o litic a l
stru ggle, it was at th e sa m e tim e radically d isp la c e d an d erased . Likewise,
H a n (2 0 0 2 , p. 127) saw a c o n flic tu a l te n sio n b e tw e e n tw o in terp reta tio n s o f
su b jectifica tio n in F ou cau lt. O n the o n e h a n d F o u c a u lt se e s in th e su b ject
b oth : th e so u r c e o f p rob lcm a tiza tio n o f w h o h e o r sh e is, an d th e so u r c e to
transform itself. O n th e o th e r h a n d , c o n tr a d ictin g th e p reviou s statem en ts,
F o u ca u lt th e o r iz e s the su b ject as in se r ted in to a se t o f rela tio n sh ip s that
su b ject h im to pow er, en tirely d e fin in g th e c o n d itio n s o f p ossib ility fo r self-
c o n stitu tio n . T h is m a k es it d ifficu lt to say if for F ou cau lt, th e su b ject is a
c o n stitu tin g o r c o n stitu te d agen t.
W ith o u t d e n y in g t h e p o litic iz e d an d critical asp ect o f F ou cau ld ian
theory, o r its valu ab le e ffo rts to b reak w ith id e a lism o r m etap h ysics, the
d isa p p e a r a n c e o f th e su b je ct in F o u c a u lt’s th eo ry c a u se d p r o b le m s fo r his
in te re st in t h e su b je c t’s fr e e d o m , an in te re st m o r e c lea rly sta te d in his later
w ritings. In th is r esp e c t, C astoriad is’ view is m o r e fru itfu l g iv en that h e sees
the subject a s a fu n d a m en ta l e le m e n t fo r collective a n d self-en fran ch isem en t
th r o u g h so c ia l c h a n g e a n d auton om y.
R e p r e s e n t a t io n a n d S o c ia l M e a n in g in F o u c a u lt
F o u c a u lt’s c o n c e p t o f m e a n in g str e s se d th e so c ia lly c o n s tr u c te d n a tu re

o f reality. T h r o u g h o u t his w ork, h e m a in ta in e d th e poststructuralist
p r in c ip le th a t m e a n in g w as a relative an d h isto r ica l e v en tu a lity servin g
in stitu tio n a liz e d so c ia l ord ers. A s s e e n in C h a p te r 4 , so c ia l m e a n in g was
c lo se ly r e la te d to his c o n c e p ts o f e p iste m e , d isc o u r se , k n o w le d g e and
p o w e r r e g im e s, a n d social practices. M ea n in g s e m e r g e d th r o u g h d iffe re n t
c o n str u c tio n s a n d u ses o f d isc o u r se s a n d w ere a ss ig n e d to d e e d s, fa cts, and
o b je c ts by th e d o m in a n t d isc o u r se u s e d by a lin g u istic com m u n ity.
M oreover, F o u c a u lt u s e d th e n o tio n o f d isc o u r se to illu strate th e m o d e o f
c o n str u c tin g a n d n a m in g th e o b je c t o f k n o w le d g e , w h ic h also p r o d u ce d
su b jectiv ities a n d sig n ifica tio n .
A s a lread y s e e n , d isc o u r se w as b o th th e m o d e o f c o n str u c tin g sp ecific-
d o m a in s o r e p iste m es, a n d th e m e a n s o f c o n ta in in g the relation sh ip s
b e tw e en la n g u a g e a n d th e o b je c ts w h ic h c o n stitu te d k n ow led ge. T h e
e p iste m ic r u p tu re s that gave way to n ew discu rsive fo rm a tio n s, co n stitu ted
th e fo u n d a tio n o f his c o n c e p tio n a b o u t discu rsively cre a ted realities.
F oucault's e la b o ra tio n o f m e a n in g w as b ased o n th e id e a that d isc o u r se
(irr ed u c ib le to sp e e c h ) n o t o n ly w orked u p o n th e real, b u t co n str u c ted it.
F o u ca u lt c o n tr a d ic te d the structuralist p e r sp e c tiv e w h en in T he Archaeology
o f Knowledge h e clearly d e fe n d e d th e id e a that th e r u les o f fo r m a tio n o f
d isc o u r se s w e r e n o t un iversal an d im m u ta b le , n o r w e re th ey g r o u n d e d in
th e m in d . T h e y w ere sp e c ific to d iffe re n t discu rsive d o m a in s th ro u g h o u t
history. N e v er th e less, as B est an d K ellner (1 9 9 1 , p . 4 1 ) have o b serv ed , in a
way su ch r u les c a n b e se e n as an a priori o f all k n o w le d g e that co n stitu ted
th e s h a p in g o f th e p e r c e p tio n o f tru th a t d iffe r e n t h istorical m o m en ts.
T h e se r u les w e re th e fu n d a m e n ta l c o d e s th a t c o n str u c te d a n e p is te m e a n d
d e te r m in e d th e e m p irical o rd ers o f a particu lar historical era. T h e y w ere
always at w o r k a n d also d e fin e d p ra ctices a n d m orals. In o th e r words,
b e n e a th a ll th e rela ted m atrices o f p ractices th e r e w as th e lo g ic o f th ose
r u les by w h ic h m e a n in g w a s g e n era ted .
P ow er w as also d e e p ly in v o lv ed with r ep re se n ta tio n a n d th e g e n e r a tio n o f
so c ia l m e a n in g . In a society, d isc o u r se e n ta ile d p o w er b e c a u se th e ru les
d e te r m in in g d isc o u r se , e n fo r c e d n o r m s o f w h at w a s u n d e rsto o d as rational
o r san e. A ll d isco u rses w e re p r o d u c e d by p o w e r a n d th r o u g h social practices;
th ey w e re d issem in a te d th r o u g h variou s d im e n s io n s o f so c ia l life,
c o r r o b o r a tin g its sp ecific an d social-h istorical m e a n in g s.
F o u ca u lt’s u n d e rsta n d in g o f the social-h istorical ch aracter o f m e a n in g
a n d r ep re se n ta tio n r esu lted in a totally relativistic p o sitio n tow ard reality
an d in g e n e r a l tow ard d iffe re n t social ord ers. For F ou cau lt, that th e r e was
n o su ch th in g as a reality that was n o t c o n stitu te d b y e p iste in ic o r discursive
fo r m a tio n im p lie d th e relativistic n a tu r e o f m e a n in g a n d the possible
realities th a t c o u ld o r ig in a te from it. T h e d iv erse an d h e te r o g e n e o u s
sc e n a r io s w ith in w h ic h reality c o u ld b e played o u t h a d in e sse n c e th e sam e
n a tu re a n d valu e. T h e ir e m e r g e n c e a n d c o n fig u r a tio n c a m e fr o m d ie sam e
so u r c e a n d w o r k e d w ithin th e sa m e dyn am ic. In th is se n se , F ou cau lt d id n ot
w orry a b o u t th e m oral ran k in g o f social o r d e r s o r t h e a d eq u a te o r d istorted
ch aracter o f cu ltu ral r ep re se n ta tio n . H is in te r e st w as fo c u s e d o n p ractices
a n d d isc o u r se c rea tio n s w h er e th e e p iste m o lo g ic a l d im e n s io n w as su b su m ed
in relativism w h en it c a m e to ju d g in g righ t o r w rong.
T h is v ie w p o in t was c o h e r e n t w ith his p o litic a l p o sitio n tow ard any
n orm ative c riterio n as a le n s for o b serv in g , e v alu atin g, o r c o n te stin g any
social ord er. S in ce an y tran sform ation o r m o d ific a tio n to a certain pow er
r e g im e m e a n t th e rise o f a n ew p o w er structure fu ll o f m argin alizin g social
r ela tio n sh ip s a n d d ifferen t fo rm s o f su b je ctio n , an y p o litica l co m p r o m ise
w ith sp e c ific p o litic a l goals o r m oral m axim s m e a n t th e d iscrim in ation
again st s o c ia l sectors a n d in d ivid u als a n d r eq u ire d th e n orm a liza tio n o f
individuals. In th is se n se , F ou cau lt d id n o t give a n y c o n sid e r a tio n to the
ju d g m e n t o f p ractices su p p o rte d by c o m p le x e s o f social sig n ifica tio n s. As a
social-h istorical p r o d u ct r ep r e se n tin g cer ta in in terests, social m e a n in g
sh o u ld b e v ie w e d an d e x a m in e d — in F o u ca u lt’s o p in io n — w ith ou t having
any m oral ju d g m e n t o v er th em .
F u r th e rm o r e, sp e c ific asp ects o f th e c o lle ctiv e a n d in d ivid u al d im e n sio n s
o f se lf-a g en cy in m e a n in g g e n e ra tio n also r e m a in e d in su fficien tly th eo rized .
T h e social-h istorical field for F o u ca u lt was d e fin e d as s o m e th in g im p o sed
ra th er th a n a freely c r e a te d realm fo r se lf-co n stitu tio n . T h e so u r c e o f
d isco u rses w as d ilu te d th r o u g h th e w h o le society, a n d th e particu lar m eans
o f th e ir c r e a tio n n e v e r c o n stitu te d a m ajor c o n c e r n fo r F oucault. T h e
q u estion s: “W h a t e n a b le d h u m a n s to c re a te m e a n in g ? ” “W h at d iffe re n tia ted
h u m a n s as so c ia l beings?” a n d ,“h o w w e re h u m a n s a b le to p r o d u c e m e a n in g
a n d r ep r e se n t th e ir reality?” w e re n e v e r e x p lic itly p o s e d o r an sw ered by
F ou cau lt, d e sp ite the fact that a ll th e se q u e stio n s w ere at the h e a r t o f his
w ork an d co n tr ib u tio n s.
F o u ca u lt’s c o n c e p ts o f d isco u rse, e p iste m e , so c ia l practices, a n d s o forth,
im p lie d th at the m e a n in g a n d sig n ifica tio n th a t gave th e m life and
e n c o m p a ss e d th e m w ere already p r e se n t in society. T h e so u r c e o f m e a n in g
was taken a s a g iv en . W ithin h is fram ew ork, r e p r e se n tin g an d a ssig n in g
m e a n in g to reality w as n e v e r an alyzed d e e p ly e n o u g h by F ou cau lt.
T h e a ssertio n m a d e by D reyfus a n d R ab in ow (1 9 8 3 , p. x ix ) in th is resp ect
d id n o t s h e d lig h t o n t o th is q u estio n . Stating— as th e y did — that F o u c a u lt’s
Society O ver the Subject 125
g o a l w a s t o r e n o u n c e to a n y a tte m p t to u n d e r s ta n d a m e a n in g -g iv in g
su b je c t in a p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l s e n s e still p r e s u p p o s e d a n e x p la n a tio n o f
r e p r e s e n ta tio n in F o u c a u lt th a t in m y view was n o t r e fin e d o r satisfactory.
A s m e a n in g is in tr in sic to r e p r e se n ta tio n , it b e c a m e e v id e n t th a t F o u c a u lt
a lso le ft a v o id h e r e . H e d id n o t d isc u ss e x te n siv e ly e n o u g h h o w in d iv id u a ls
a lo n e , a n d in so ciety , g e n e r a te d a n d e x p e r ie n c e d th e ir o w n su b jective
reality. T h e p r in c ip le by w h ic h h e d e fe n d e d th e p o s sib le e x is te n c e o f the
m u ltip lic ity o f r e a litie s (d isc o u r se s, k n o w le d g e , a n d p o w e r r eg im es)
t h r o u g h o u t h isto r y p r e s u p p o s e d a ca p a city in h u m a n s to r e p r e s e n t o r
im a g in e th e ir ow n w orld-view s. In th is s e n s e , p sy ch ic a l r e p r e se n ta tio n
w as at th e h e a r t o f h is th eory, b u t F o u c a u lt n e v e r th e o r iz e d it in an
e x h a u s tiv e way.
By con trast, C astoriadis ela b o ra tes a th e o r y o f rep resen ta tio n th rou gh
w h ich h e d e fin e s t h e m ain d iffe r e n c e b etw een h u m a n s an d th e rest o f livin g
b e in g s. It is th r o u g h th e a fu n ctio n a l r ep re se n ta tio n o f th e h u m a n psyche
that h u m a n b e in g s g e n e r a te a ru p tu re w ith fix e d in stin ctu al regu lation s.
T h is is t h e ca p a city o f th e p sy ch e to create an im a g e o u t o f e x ter n a l stim uli
o n th e b o d y fr e e o f restrictio n by c a n o n ic p a tte rn s th a t o n ly o b e y b io lo g ic a l
n e e d s an d se e k th e ir satisfaction . A d irect c o n s é q u e n c e o f this singu lar
capacity— u n iq u e to h u m an s— is th e p r e d o m in a n c e o f rep resen ta tio n a l
p le a su r e o v e r o r g a n p leasu re, e v id e n c e d in th e se p a r a tio n o f sexu ality and
r ep ro d u c tio n . T h is e x p la in s w hy it is on ly h u m a n s w h o obtain p lea su re o u t
o f sex u a l fe tish ism , fo r ex a m p le.
C astoriad is’ e x p la n a tio n o f p sych ical r ep re se n ta tio n allow s h im to exp lain
th e e x is tin g rela tio n sh ip b e tw e en th e b io lo g ic a l a n d th e psych ical d o m a in s
o f h u m a n b e in g s w ith o u t fa llin g in to a d u alism o f so m a a n d p sych e.
C astoriadis r elies o n F reu d ian drive theory, in w h ic h b io lo g ic a l instin ctual
drives can on ly b e m a n ife sted in th e p sych e by m e a n s o f rep resen ta tio n .
Q u o tin g F reu d , C astoriadis affirm s th a t th e p sy c h e “su b m its th e drives to
th e o b lig a tio n o f a d e le g a tio n th r o u g h r e p r e se n ta tio n ” (1 9 8 7 , p . 2 8 2 ). T o
C astoriadis th is m e a n s th at in stin ctu al drives a n d th e afu n ctio n a lized
im a g in a tio n c a n n o t b e th o u g h t separately. T h e lea n in g -o n , o r anaclisis,
e x p la n a tio n allow s h im to estab lish a r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en the b iological
a n d t h e so c ia l that c a n n o t b e c o n c e iv e d as an e v o lu tio n a r y c o n se q u e n c e .
B od y a n d m in d are n ot a n tin o m ie s b u t are c o n n e c te d th r o u g h d ifferen t
strata o r r e g io n s o f b e in g .
I d isa g r e e w ith K lo o g e r (2 0 0 9 , p. 8 5 ) w h en h e stated that by ta k in g u p th e
F reu d ian le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n o r anaclisis, parts o f C astoriad is’ ow n
w ritings b etra y th e n e e d to r efo r m u la te th e W estern p h ilo so p h ic a l d ic h o to m y
b e tw e en p sy ch e an d bod y.’’ O n th e contrary, I fin d a great p o ten tia l in
C astoriad is’ a r g u m e n ta tio n to q u estio n W estern p h ilo so p h ic a l dualistic
trad ition s, p recisely b e c a u se o f th e way h e refo rm u la tes th is F reud ian

in sigh t. It is im p ortan t to recall that F reud in tr o d u c e d th e n o tio n o f
anaclisis*’ to e x p la in th e r ela tio n sh ip b e tw e en the se x u a l drives an d th e self-
preservative fu n ctio n s as th e fo r m e r initially le a n in g o n th e latter. T h o u g h
th e sex u a l d riv es are part o f t h e so m a tic d o m a in th ey b e c o m e in d e p e n d e n t
a n d are n o t r ed u c ib le to it. D rives are the “am b assad ors” to th e p sy ch e a n d
are c o n su b sta n tia l to psychical r ep re se n ta tio n . C astoriadis’ a d v a n ce in
r elation to F reu d ’s e lab oration o n rep re se n ta tio n is to o v e rc o m e Freudian
d e te r m in ism by p r o p o s in g th e c o n c e p t o f rad ical im a g in a tio n th a t en ab les
an u n d e te r m in e d rep re se n ta tio n in th e psyche.
F or C astoriadis th e b o d y a n d th e p sych e c a n n o t b e c o n c e iv e d separately.
T h e b o d y is u n d e r sto o d w ithin his th eo ry o f r ep re se n ta tio n . C astoriadis
c o n c e p tu a liz e s th e bod y a s an im agin ary crea tio n that lean s o n its physical
a n d b io lo g ic a l su bstrate w ith ou t b e in g c o m p le te ly d e te r m in e d by it. T h e
b o d y is a lread y a rep re se n ta tio n th at in ca rn a tes S IS th r o u g h su b lim ation
a n d so c ia liz a tio n th o u g h , in contrast to F ou cau lt, it is n o t e x h a u ste d by
th e m . D e sp ite th e fact that b o th a u th o rs a g r ee th at, th ro u g h rep resen ta tio n
in th e fo r m o f social c a n o n s, th e body, its n e e d s , p le a su r e s, a n d satisfactions
are c o n str u c ted , d e fin e d , an d given m e a n in g , o n ly C astoriadis b u ild s a
th e o r y o f r ep re se n ta tio n that tak es in to a c co u n t th e b o d y as a b iological
entity. F o u c a u lt’s theory, o n th e contrary, o b liter a tes the b io lo g ic a l
d im e n sio n o f th e body.
A s se e n in C h a p ter 4, th r o u g h his g e n e a lo g ic a l p e rsp ectiv e F oucault
fo c u s e d o n th e b o d y a n d ils rela tio n sh ip w ith r ep re se n ta tio n a n d subjectivity.
P rogressively lie c e n te r e d o n sex u a lity as a fertile realm in w h ich to analyze
th is triad a n d th e effects o f pow er. H e fo r m u la ted structural c o n c e p ts su ch
as b io -p o w er a n d w rote a b o u t b o d ie s a n d p lea su res, h ow ever, h e d id n o t
e x p lo r e th e b io lo g ic a l asp ects atta ch ed to sexu ality, n o r was th e r e any
scien tific a ttem p t to th e o r iz e it. W h iteb o o k (2 0 0 5 , pp. 3 3 4 - 7 ) illustrated
this w e ll, sh o w in g h o w fa r F o u c a u lt’s c o n stru ctiv ism w e n t w h e n h e a r g u e d
that a b io lo g ic a l substratum o f sexu ality is virtu ally an illu sio n . B ecau se h e
w a n ted to avoid th e d a n g er s o f naturalism an d essen tia l ism , th e som atic
d im e n sio n o f sexuality, b o d ie s, a n d p leasu res r e m a in e d u n e x p lo r e d .
S exu ality fo r F ou cau lt w as c o m p lete ly c o n str u c te d an d c a m e from the
o u tsid e as a p ro d u ct o f pow er. B o d ie s an d p le a su r e s c o u ld b e sh a p e d and
r esh a p e d th r o u g h c o n tr o l an d d o m in a tio n w ith o u t e v id e n t b io lo g ic a l
con strain ts. T h is w as c o n g r u e n t w ith F o u c a u lt’s m ain go a l o f m a k in g evid en t
th e ties e x is tin g b etw een th e body, r e p r e se n ta tio n , a n d subjectivity w ithou t
m a k in g a n y r o o m fo r sc ien tific o r n o r m a liz in g d iscou rses, as h e called
psych oanalysis.
H er e o n c e again th e d iffe re n t ap p roach to p sych oanalysis m a d e by

F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriadis are revealin g. F o u c a u lt’s r eje c tio n o f psychoanalysis
resu lts in a narrow a n d lim ite d e x p la n a tio n a b o u t the b io lo g ic a l d im e n sio n
o f th e h u m a n body, a n d its e x istin g relation to rep re se n ta tio n and
subjectivity. A s s e e n , F o u ca u lt w as relu ctan t to a d m it th e th e o r etica l n e e d to
e x p la in th e b io lo g ic a l c o m p o n e n t p r e se n t in e v er y h u m a n r ep re se n ta tio n ,
in th is e a se th e h u m an b o d y an d its d esires. O n th e contrary, C astoriadis
u s e s a n d rein terp rets F reud ian te a c h in g s a b o u t th e b o d y ’s in stin ctu al drives,
a d m ittin g t h e b io lo g ic a l an d natural d im e n sio n o f th e h u m a n bod y. Like
F o u ca u lt, C astoriad is d e fin e s th e bod y as a r e p re se n ta tio n , as a social
c o n str u c tio n , H ow ever, a s e x p la in e d in th is s e c tio n , C astoriadis gives an
im p o r ta n t p la c e to the b io lo g ic a l d im e n sio n o f th e b o d y a n d p ro v id es his
ow n o r ig in a l e x p la n a tio n ab ou t its r elation to th e psych ical rep resen ta tio n
a n d its su b jective c o n te n ts. In o th e r w ords, co n tra ry to F ou cau lt, C astoriadis
has a th e o r e tic a l e x p la n a tio n o f p sych ical r ep re se n ta tio n w h ere th e natural
a n d b io lo g ic a l reality o f th e h u m an bod y is a c k n o w le d g e d a n d taken into
a c c o u n t. T h is d e m o n stra te s h o w F o u ca u lt’s an d C astoriad is’ d iffe r e n t takes
o n p sych oan alysis favored a b e tte r articu lated e x p la n a tio n a b o u t th e subject,
m e a n in g , a n d rep re se n ta tio n in C astoriadis, w h ile in F ou cau lt it left
u n a n sw e re d q u e stio n s a n d th e o r etica l lim itation s.
Why Should We C hange?
S ocial c h a n g e an d p o litic s w ere controversial issu es fo r F o u ca u lt. H is

in te n tio n w as to d e n y a th eo ry o f m o d ern ist e m a n c ip a tio n an d to b u ild a
critiq u e o f social-h istorical fo rm a tio n s, e x p la in in g th e ir relative ch aracter
a n d au th o rita tiv e e ffe c ts o n in d ivid u als an d society1. T h e q u estio n is w h eth er
h is th eo ry is critical o r n o t, an d if so , to w hat e x te n t it can b e stated that his
p ro p o sa l is a c o n siste n t a n d all-en co m p a ssin g th e o r y that m ak e possible
critical p o litics.
F o u ca u lt has b e e n r eg a rd ed as a critical ico n in th e social sc ie n c e s and
p h ilo so p h y d u rin g th e last d e c a d e s. Rightly, th e lite r a tu r e has stressed the
origin al a n d prim arily critical in te n tio n o f F o u c a u lt’s w ork. C o m m o n
in te rp re ta tio n s n o te h o w F ou cau lt q u e s tio n e d w h a t was c o n c e iv e d as critical
a n d r ev o lu tio n a ry th in k in g a t his tim e a n d reev a lu a ted th e r o le o f
in te lle ctu a ls. T h e c o n sta n t in q u iry a n d th e r eflec tiv e a ttitu d e ab ou t
historically situ a ted p ractices h e c a lle d fo r have b e e n in te rp re ted as e c h o in g
le g a c ie s o f m ajor th in k ers su ch as K ant (R ab in ow , 1994) o r N ietzsch e
(Sluga, 2 0 0 5 ). L ikew ise, th e political c h a r a cte r o f h is th e o r y h as b e e n
an alyzed fo r its u n d e n ia b le eth ica l d im e n sio n (D avid son , 2005: B ern au er

a n d M a h o n , 2 0 0 5 ).
A u th ors, su c h a s R ajchm an (1 9 8 5 , p p . 3 4 - 8 , 9 3 - 1 2 3 ) , su m u p w ell, the
c o m m o n a r g u m e n ts in regard to F o u ca u lt’s p o litics. In th e ir view , F oucault
p r o p o s e d a n ew e th ic o f c o n sta n t d ise n g a g e m e n t fr o m c o n stitu te d fo rm s o f
e x p e r ie n c e in o r d e r to fr e e o n e s e lf fo r th e in v e n tio n o f n e w form s o f life . In
d e fe n d in g a h istorical n o m in a lism , F o u ca u lt in tr o d u c e d n ew u n d er sta n d in g s
o f p o litica l str u g g le , w ith o u t a p p e a lin g to a b so lu te s o r n o tio n s su ch as "pure
c o n sc io u sn e s s” to e n d d o m in a tio n . F reed o m lay in the cap acity to find
altern atives to particu lar form s o f d isc o u r se a n d b e in g . But w h at is m ost
im p ortan t to n o te h e r e , b e c a u se it co n stitu tes a m ajor d iffe r e n c e with
C astoriadis, is that F o u ca u lt’s c o r e p o litic s o f subjectivity fo u n d its r o o ts in
an analysis o f th e historical form s o f th e c o n stitu tio n o f th e su b ject w ithou t
p r o p o sin g an y p r in c ip le o r c o n d itio n to d iffe re n tia te a m o n g th e m . T h is is
con trary to w h at C astoriadis d o e s , w h o by p r o p o s in g h is c o n c e p t o f
a u to n o m y p ro v id es u s w ith a r e fe re n t to d iffe r e n tia te an d valu e su bjective
c o n te n ts a n d social-h istorical form s.
In sh o rt, F o u ca u lt’s u rgen cy to r e p la c e th e id ealist n o tio n o f final
e m a n c ip a tio n resu lts in a n o m in a list c o n c e p t o f e n d le ss revolt that
c o n stitu te s t h e b a c k b o n e o f F o u ca u lt’s p o litic s a n d th e critical ch aracter o f
h is theory.
A n alyzed from th e p ersp ective o f C astoriadis' p h ilosop h y, F oucault's
critical p o s itio n reveals an d c o n firm s th e o r etica l v o id s th at lim it its
p o te n tia lity a n d u n d e r m in e th e id e a o f social c h a n g e . O n e o f F o u c a u lt’s
critical pillars, his c o n c e p t o f resistan ce, c o n stitu te s a startin g p o in t for this
d e b a te . T h e reach o f th is n o tio n , w h ich p r e su p p o s e d c o n te stin g and
m o d ify in g p o w e r r eg im es a n d so c ia l ord ers, is w ell illu strated by w hat
F ou cau lt c a lle d counter-discourses. C ou n ter-d isco u rses m a teria lized and
e x p r e sse d w ays o f resistan ce th ro u g h th e ir p o te n tia l to su b vert n orm alized
su b ject id e n titie s, fo rm s o f c o n sc io u sn e ss, ob jects o f k n o w le d g e , a n d form s
o f d e sir e a n d p leasu re. I low ever, d e sp ite p r o m o tin g critical reflec tio n and
h a v in g a transgressive p o te n tia l, th e r e w as n o e x p la n a tio n o f w hy th ey w ere
d iffe re n t fr o m previou sly in stitu te d d isc o u r se s o r b io p o litic s. Fraser (1989,
p p . 5 5 - 6 6 ) h a s d e m o n stra te d th is p o in t in F o u ca u lt's work by a n alyzin g his
e la b o r a tio n s o n b o d ie s a n d form s o f p leasu res. S h e correctly n o te d that
th e r e w as n o e x p la n a tio n o f h o w b o d ie s a n d p le a su r e s e m e r g e d from
resistan ce a n d c o u n ter-d isco u rses that w e re d iffe r e n t from p rev io u s form s
o f sex u a lity e x p e r ie n c e d in n o r m a liz in g strategies a n d institution s.
F o u ca u lt’s tr ea tm e n t o f p o w er m a d e it d ifficu lt to estab lish dif feren tia ted
form s o f su b je c tio n , a n d th ereb y establish b e tte r o r w o r se social p ractices o r
relation s. H avin g d e fin e d pow er as an a ll-e n c o m p a ssin g an d strategic

c o n stitu e n t th a t m e d ia te d all social rela tio n s a n d stru ctu red so c ieties, it
b e c a m e d iffic u lt to d iffe re n tia te a m o n g so cio -h isto rica l fo rm a tio n s. P ow er
h ad n o s p e c ific g r o u n d in g an d , as a corollary, resista n c e had n o sp ec ific
lo c u s e ith er . F ou cau lt's c o n c e p t o f p o w er was to o g en era l, m ak in g difficult
to se e again st w hat p o w e r o p e r a ted . D id it o p e r a te again st a p ossib le freer
subject? O r, w o u ld th e r e b e any substantial d iffe r e n c e in case pow er was
c a n c elled ? C ertainly, F ou cau lt h a d n egative a n sw ers to th e se q u estio n s. In
h is theory, p o w er a c q u ir ed a n a lm o st m eta p h y sica l status, always b e in g
p r o d u c e d a n d r ep ro d u c ed . Even th o u g h h e sta te d that w h erever th e r e was
p o w e r th e r e w as resistance, h is th eo retica l m o d e l d id n o t e n c o u r a g e
resistan ce. T h e r e was n o p ossib le p o litica l a g e n d a a g a in st p o w er o r iLs abuse.
As S arup (1 9 9 3 , p p . 8 1 - 3 ) reiterated , F o u ca u lt refu sed to an sw er the
q u e stio n s o f w h a t sh o u ld b e resisted , o n w h at basis, an d w hat w o u ld we
e x p e c t to a c c o m p lish w ith acts o f resistance. N u ssb a u m (1 9 9 9 , p. 3) e c h o e s
th is o b serv a tio n , a d d in g that in F ou cau lt all in d ivid u als arc p rison ers o f an
a ll-e n v e lo p in g structure o f pow er, a n d an y r efo r m m o v e m e n t e n d s up
ser v in g p o w e r in new, in sid io u s ways.
As m e n tio n e d in C h ap ter 4 . th is F o u ca u ld ia n sta n ce w as a derivative
c o n s e q u e n c e o f his p o s itio n in r elation to n o r m a tiv e criteria. A s Fraser
(1 9 8 9 , pp. 1 9 -2 1 , 2 7 ) stated , F ou cau lt p r e te n d e d to g ive a n a c c o u n t that
was b o th p o litic a lly e n g a g e d an d n orm atively n e u tr a l, a ffirm in g that his
w ork la ck ed an y param eter u p o n w h ich a d iffe r e n tia te d ju d g m e n t c o u ld be
m a d e . T h is is d u e to the fa c t th a t h e refr a in ed fr o m o ffe r in g a n orm ative
ju s tific a tio n a n d valid ity to d iffe re n t p o w e r a n d k n o w led g e r eg im es. T h o u g h
F o u ca u lt d istin g u ish e d b etw een form s o f d o m in a tio n a n d social fo rm a tio n s
in history·— fo r e x a m p le , h is e x p lic it p r e fe r e n c e fo r sp ec ific values su ch its
th o se o f th e a n c ie n t G reek aesth etic o f e x is te n c e — h e did n o t se t th e
norm ative sta n d a rd that his th eo ry n e e d e d in o r d e r t o estab lish a criterion
to d iffe r e n tia te a m o n g th em . F rom th e sta te m e n t that th e r e c o u ld n o t be
pow er-free so c ie tie s, social practices, an d k n o w le d g e , it d o e s n o t follow that
all fo rm s o f p o w er are norm atively eq u ivalen t, o r th a t o n e c o u ld n o t object
to a form o f life sim ply o n the g r o u n d that it w as p ow er-lad en . But in any
case, i f it is a c c e p te d that p o w er is everyw here, t h e n , w e n e e d to d iffe re n tia te
a m o n g p o ssib le k in d s o f p o w er(s) a n d th e way p o w er (s) is in flic te d or
e x er cise d . W h ite b o o k u n d e r lin e s this a sp e c t by slating:
[B ]e c a u s e h e su sp ec ts that all fo rm s o f n o n n a tiv ity are m ask ed fo rm s

o f norm alization , F o u c a u lt c a n n o t a n d w ill n o t ad d ress th e q u e s tio n o f
h o w to e v a lu a te th e m . G iven , th e r e fo r e , th at th e e ffe c ts o f p o w er arc
in te n tio n a lly g e n e r a te d fo r p u rp o se s o f so c ia l e n g in e e r in g a n d that they

c a n n o t in an y se n s e claim to b e p o sitiv e , I d o n ’t s e e h o w th e th e sis o f the
p r o d u ctiv ity o f p o w e r p ro v id es a n an sw er to F o u c a u lt’s critics [in rela
tion to h is to ta liz in g view o f pow er) (W hite-book, n .d .)
O n ly w ith th e in tr o d u c tio n o f n orm ative n o tio n s c o u ld F o u c a u lt have

an sw ered in h e r e n t q u e stio n s in h is w ork, su c h as: w hy str u g g le and
resistan ce w e r e b e tte r th a n su b m issio n a n d h o w th e y d iffe r e d (Fraser, 1989,
pp. 2 9 -3 2 ).
T h e n orm ative d im e n sio n o f C astoriadis’ w ork c o n stitu te s a m ajor
d iffe r e n c e from F o u ca u lt, W h ile th e fo r m e r is a b le to in tr o d u c e th is
d im e n sio n in o r d e r to ju stify a n d give v a lu e to s o c ia l c h a n g e , th e latter
avoid ed it fo r fear o f fa llin g in to a narrative o f progressive h u m a n ism o r a
h istorical te le o lo g y m ark ed by id ealist, h u m a n ist, o r ration alist p rin cip les.
A u th o rs lik e S im o n s (1 9 9 5 , pp. 6 0 - 7 , 114) have ju s tifie d th e a b s e n c e o f a
n orm ative d im e n s io n in F o u ca u lt’s w ork. H e sta te s that in tr o d u c in g a
n orm ative d im e n s io n in F o u ca u lt’s th eo ry w o u ld have p r e su p p o se d u sin g
h u m a n ist p r in c ip le s th at a p p e a le d to u n iversalism s. C astoriadis con trad icts
th is a ssu m p tio n d e m o n stra tin g that n orm ative d iffe re n tia tio n betw een
social ord ers, SIS, in stitu tio n s, p o w er regim es o r e p iste m es, d o e s n o t
n ecessarily e n ta il un iversalist p rin cip les.
A s 1 h a v e sh ow n , th e n a tu re an d ch aracteristics o f th e p r in c ip le o f
a u to n o m y in C astoriadis allow u s to p o s e th e n o r m a tiv e q u estio n in a
d iffe re n t terrain th at d o e s n o t im p ly tr a n sc en d e n ta l fig u res, e th n o c e n tr ic
un iversalism s, o r o th e r m o d e r n ist traps that b o th a u th ors so u g h t to
c h a lle n g e . C learly, b o th F ou cau lt a n d C astoriadis sh a r e c o m m o n e le m en ts
in th e ir in te rp re ta tio n o f social c h a n g e . In their p o litic s o f subjectivity, b o th
a u th ors e m p h a s iz e au to-reflectiven ess, p e r m a n e n t q u e stio n in g , an d social
form s th at p r o m o te n ew p ractices a n d c o n c e p tio n s o f b e in g . B oth think
that d e sp ite th e c o n sta n t p r e se n c e o f pow er, p r a c tic in g lib erty m ay en a b le
n e w social form s. F u rth erm o re, th ey c o in c id e o n th e flu id natu re o f pow er
that c a n n o t b e r e ifie d o r a llo c a te d in sp e c ific r ela tio n sh ip s o r sole
in stitu tio n s. H ow ever, F o u c a u lt’s d e te r m in ism r e la tin g to p o w er b e c o m e s
e sp e c ia lly e v id e n t w h en ad d ressin g social c h a n g e , given that h e fo r ec lo ses
an y p o ssib ility to th e o r iz e a creative d im e n sio n in in d ivid u als o r so ciety that
c o u ld n o t o n ly rep ro d u c e p o w er b u t create so m e th in g new. M ean w hile,
C astoriadis fights d e te rm in ism in o r d e r to e lo q u e n tly articulate th e political
d im e n sio n o f his theory. H e also b rin g s forw ard a n orm ative d im e n sio n that
is th e o r e tic a lly c o h e r e n t w ith his p o sitio n , e sta b lish in g a n o th e r m ajor
d iffe r e n c e b e tw e en h im an d F ou cau lt. A cru cial e le m e n t th a t separates
th e m is th e ir d isa g r e e m e n t r eg a r d in g se ttin g p ar a m e te r s an d stan d ard s that

w o u ld a llo w ju d g m e n t an d p u t forw ard a n ew u n d e r sta n d in g o f d iffe re n c e,
as d o e s C astoriadis. In m y view , th e se tw o p o in ts m a k e C astoriadis’ critical
p e rsp ectiv e a better-articulated a n d c o n siste n t o p t io n w ith w h ich to evoke
a ctio n an d su b stan tiate social c h a n g e . A s B e r n ste in (1 9 8 4 , pp. 2 2 5 -3 1 ) has
c o rr o b o r a ted , F o u ca u lt le f t us w ith a n u n fin ish e d a n d n o t fu lly th em atized
eth ica l-p o litica l p ersp ectiv e, w h ere p r e fer en ce s fo r d esira b le social form s
a n d c h a n g e s are em p ty an d vacu ou s, given th a t w e d o n ot k n ow w h ich
p o ssib ilities a n d c h a n g e s are d esirab le o r why. W alzer (1 9 8 3 ) also se e s voids
in F o u c a u lt’s th e o r etica l an d p olitical p o s itio n in g . H e se c s it as a ch ild ish
o u tr u n n in g o f a c o n siste n t a r g u m e n ta tio n th a t s h o u ld su p p o rt an y political
stru ggle. R efer r in g to F ou cau lt, W'alzer stales:
O n e c a n 't b e d ow n cast, angry, in d ig n a n t. . . e m b itte r e d w ith reason u n less

o n e in h a b its s o m e so c ia l se ttin g a n d a d o p ts, h o w ev e r tentatively a n d criti
cally, its c o d e s an d c a teg o r ie s. O r u n less, a n d th is is m u c h harder, o n e
c o n str u c ts a n e w se ttin g a n d p r o p o ses n e w c o d e s a n d c a teg o r ie s. F ou cau lt
r efu ses to d o e ith e r o f th e se th in gs, a n d that refu sal, w h ich m a k es his
g e n e a lo g ie s s o p ow erfu l a n d so relen tless, is a lso th e catastrop h ic weak
n ess o f h is p olitical th e o r y (W alzer, 1983, p. 4 9 0 ).
As d isc u ssc d th r o u g h o u t th is b o o k , to th e q u estio n : “w h y s h o u ld we

c h a n g e ? ”, n e ith e r F o u ca u lt n o r C astoriadis h a s a n answ er b a sed o n
tr a n sc en d e n ta l criteria o r u ltim a te stan d ard s e m a n a tin g fr o m ab solu te
so u rc e s o r a u th o rities. N e ith e r o f th e m w ou ld r e s p o n d with arg u m en ts that
they w o u ld say ca m e from extrasocial so u rces. H ow ever, th ey d o n o t c o in cid e
in th e ir p olitical p rojects. F o u ca u lt e n c o u r a g e s p u r s u in g lo ca l resistan ce by
stratcgizin g again st any p o w er e x p r e ssio n . In th e ca se o f social th eo ry that
m e a n s u n m a sk in g th e m icrop h ysics o f p o w e r an d its e m b o d im e n t in m aterial
ob jects, h u m a n b o d ie s, a n d n o r m a liz ed daily p ractices. A s va lu a b le as it
m ig h t b e, it is eq u ally lim ite d n o t o n ly b e c a u se o f t h e way it is co n c ep tu a liz ed
b u t also b e c a u s e its sh ort-sigh ted h o r iz o n o f a c tio n . C astoriadis’ p r o je ct o f
a u to n o m y is articulated a n d r o o te d in his d e fin itio n o f radical dem ocracy.
C h a n g e d ir e c te d to w hat h e en v isio n s as a u to n o m o u s subjects an d collectives,
en ta ils social in stitu tio n s that allow effectiv e an d d ir e c t political participation
w h ere d e m o c ra tic self-regu lation a n d self-lim itation is p ra cticed . T h a t, h e
arg u es, is very d iffe re n t from th e political ap p aratu ses, m o n o p o lie s, and
in stitu tio n s that ru n a n d stru ctu re tod ay’s d e m o c r a tic o r sem id em ocratic
system s. P u ttin g th e m in to q u e s tio n a s a te n sio n b e tw e e n h e te r o n o m y and
a u to n o m y is co n su b sta n tia l w ith d em o cra tic transform ation s.
C h a p te r 6
Castoriadis versus Foucault: Concluding

Remarks
S h arin g th e s a m e social an d h istorical c o n te x t, F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriadis

p r e se n t u s w ith tw o d iv e rg in g in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e ir c o m m o n c o n d itio n s
o f th e o r e tic a l p r o d u c tio n . T h e y e n v isio n e d n e w a n g le s from w h ich to
a p p ro a c h so c ia l p ractices a n d in stitu tio n s w ith in th e ir substantially d istin ct
fram ew orks, e a ch o f th em w ith its ow n lim ita tio n s an d con trib u tio n s.
T h e c ritiq u e o f p o w er a n d its m o d e o f b e in g at d iffe re n t m o m e n ts in
history w as F o u c a u lt’s m ain c o n tr ib u tio n . Justifiably, his u n d e rsta n d in g o f
pow er, its ca p illa ry n a tu r e a n d the in sid io u s w ays in w h ich it op erates,
g a in e d h im w id e r ec o g n itio n as th e th e o r ist o f p o w e r p ar e x c e lle n c e . In a
b rilliant in te lle c tu a l e x e r c ise , F o u ca u lt w as ab le to illustrate th e d e p lo y m e n t
o f poststru ctu ralist p r in c ip le s in cen tral social in stitu tio n s. U sin g pow erful
rh etorical a c c o u n ts o f w hat h e c a lle d th e “d isc r e d ite d ” a n d "m argin alized”
in history, h e d e m o n str a te d th e p o te n tia l m e a n in g o f w h at is h id d e n or
o v e r lo o k e d in society, an in sig h t that w as r efle c te d in m u ltip le n ew research
a g e n d a s.T h e ca teg o r ie s h e bu ilt to stu d y th e te c h n iq u e s o f p o w er a n d its
d o m in a tio n effects, from th e h u m a n bod y a n d fo r m s o f p lea su re to form s
o f govern m entality’ are p o te n t a n d allow m e tic u lo u s analysis o f q u otid ian
p r a c tic es th a t b e c a m e n atu ralized a n d n o r m a liz ed . R easonably, social
scien tists h a v e ex ten siv ely u s e d his c o n c e p tu a l a p p aratu s a n d m e th o d s as a
"toolkit"— a s w as F o u c a u lt’s in te n tio n — in th e ir a n th ro p o lo g ic a l, so c io
lo g ic a l, p h ilo so p h ic a l, an d historical stu d ies.
O n th e o th e r h a n d , C astoriad is’ m ajor c o n tr ib u tio n is h is o n to lo g y o f
crea tio n a n d the p roject o f au ton om y. H is c r itiq u e o f d e te rm in ism present
in t h e W estern o n to lo g ic a l trad ition m a k es his w ork u n iq u e a n d o r ig in a l. It
also p r o v id e s a r e n ew e d se n s e o f critical th in k in g , w h er e a g en cy a n d self-
d e te r m in a tio n are at th e c o r e o f h is n o tio n o f p o litic s an d radical
dem ocracy.
By c o m p a r in g c en tra l n o tio n s in b o th fram ew orks, this b o o k h as illustrated
h o w F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriadis su b stan tiated th e ir w ork b ased o n c o n flic tin g
c p istc m o lo g ic a l p ersp ectiv es a n d d istin ct c o n c e p ts o f subjectivity, auton om y,

agency, pow er, an d so c ia l c h a n g e . In d o in g so , social a n d historical
d e te r m in ism h as b e e n an alyzed as a c en tra l ch aracteristic o f F o u ca u lt’s
work, c o n tra stin g it to C astoriadis’ o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n — p r e se n te d h e r e as
a radical altern a tiv e to F o u ca u lt’s m o r e w idely a c c e p te d th in k in g.
F o u ca u lt d e p a r te d fr o m e p iste m o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic a l relativism , le a d in g
to a lin g u istic id ealism that d e n ie d th e w orld any e x te r n a l reality in d e p e n
d e n t o f la n g u a g e o r d isc o u r se , a n d that d e n ie d th e su b ject an y a g e n c y in
d ie c r e a tio n o f social reality. G o in g in a d iffe r e n t d ir ec tio n , C astoriadis
so u g h t to d e v e lo p a m o r e critical th eo ry w ith an o n to lo g ic a l b ack grou n d .
H e p o stu la ted an e x p la n a tio n o f th e totality o f th e existin g -b ein g , in w h ich
d iffe re n t strata o f b e in g in tera cted to c re a te th e so c ia l w orld o f th e su b ject,
w h ere th e su b je c t c o u ld b e rec u p er a ted as th e a u th o r o f his o r h e r own
reality. T h is o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n m a k es a str o n g c o u n te r b a la n c e to
F o u c a u ld ia n p ersp ectivism w h ile still o p p o s in g total e p iste m o lo g ic a l
objectivism .
M ost sign ifican tly, F o u ca u lt’s a n d C astoriad is’ d istin c t takes o n subjectivity
a n d a g e n c y r e fle c t o n th e d iffe re n t critical a n d p o litic a l p o te n tia litie s
d e r iv e d fr o m th e ir th e o r ie s. F o u ca u lt’s lack o f a c o m p r e h e n siv e th eo ry o f
intersubjectivity— that fin d s its corollary in his fa m o u s “d eath o f m a n ”—
o b liter a ted th e n o tio n o f a u to n o m y a n d u n d e r m in e d the su b je ct’s agency.
F o u ca u lt’s n o tio n o f a g en cy was ex h a u sted in h is id e a o f a resistance
a n c h o r e d in th e d e te rm in istic a n d pervasive ch a r a cte r o f p o w er that
d o m in a te d an y p o ssib le su b jective c h a n g e o r h isto r ica l ru p tu re. T rap p ed in
relativism , th e type o f social c ritiq u e o r resistance that d erives from his work
lacks a n orm ative stan d ard by w h ich to d e fin e h u m a n righ ts an d distin guish
a m o n g c o lle ctiv e c h o ic e s, social p ractices, form s o f life , a n d d iverse cultural
form ation s.
M ore produ ctively, C astoriadis d e v e lo p s an o n to lo g y th at u s e s a
p sych oan alytical e x p la n a tio n o f the in tersu b jective p ro c esses to n o t on ly
p rovid e an a c c o u n t o f individual subjectivity, b u t also p o s e an original
n o tio n o f a g en cy . E q u ip p ed w ith a n o n d e te r m in e d an d creative agency,
C astoriadis’ su b je ct is a b le to j u d g e a n d o p t a m o n g social in stitu tio n s and
p ra ctices w h e r e a u to n o m y w orks a s both a n orm ative stan dard a n d a political
o p tio n .
T h e su b stan tial d iffe r e n c e s b e tw e en F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriadis have b e e n
stu d ied th r o u g h an analysis c e n te r e d o n th r e e m a in n o tio n s: th e subject,
th e p r o d u c tio n o f social m e a n in g an d r ep re se n ta tio n , an d social a n d
cultural c h a n g e .W h e n a p p r o a c h in g F o u c a u lt’s a n d C astoriad is’ sim ilarities
a n d d iv e r g e n c e s in r elation to th e su b ject, th e ir r e c e p tio n o f psychoanalysis
Castoriadis versus Foucault: C oncluding Remarks 135
has b e e n id e n tifie d as a m ajor p o in t o f d iffe re n c e. C astoriad is’ reform u lation

o f F re u d ia n p r in c ip le s allow s h im to th e o r iz e a so c ia lly c re a ted su b ject that
c o u ld b e c o m e d e ta c h e d fr o m its o w n p e r so n a l a n d so c ia l id e n tity to en a b le
se lf-re fle ctio n a n d creation . H e r e , his c o n c e p t o f radical im a gin ation is an
origin al c o n tr ib u tio n in th e ligh t o f his a ttem p t to break th e w estern
p h ilo s o p h ic a l d e te rm in istic o n to lo g y from P lato to o u r days.
F o u ca u lt r ejected any c o n tr ib u tio n from F reu d . A fter a n am b ig u o u s
r e la tio n sh ip with F reu d ’s w ork, h e c o n c lu d e d that psychoanalysis
r e p r e se n te d a n o th e r way o f n o r m a liz in g a n d c o n tr o llin g individuals.
N e v er th e less, F ou cau lt's d isc e r n in g in te llig e n c e d id n o t ig n o r e subjectivity
as a cen tral q u e s tio n to a c h ie v e his th e o r etica l g o a ls. H e p a id m u c h a tten tio n
to su b jective c o n te n ts o f in d ivid u als a n d th e way p o w e r m o d e le d th em . But
h e lack ed th e th e o r etica l to o ls to satisfactorily e x p la in th e in tersu b jective
d im e n sio n th a t ind ivid u al subjectivity p r e su p p o ses. In o th e r w ords, even
th o u g h su bjectivity w as cen tral to F ou cau lt, h e n e v e r e x p la in e d su fficien tly
th e relation al p r o c ess b e tw e en in d ivid u als an d so c ie ty that sh a p es, inform s,
a n d c o n stitu te s th e ir su bjectivities. Subjectivity in F o u ca u lt is lim ite d to the
im p o sitio n o f e x ter n a l social fo r m s o f pow er. H is d esire to d isin teg r a te the
a u to n o m o u s ration al e g o a n d d e f e n d d c c c n te r c d a n d plu ral form s o f
subjectivity to o k h im in to a form o f tr a n sc en d e n ta lism w h ere th e su bject
c o u ld on ly b e c o n c e iv e d a s a p r o d u c t o f o m n ip o te n t, o m n ip r e se n t, a n d , in
a way, h o m o g e n e o u s power.
F o u ca u lt th e o r iz e d n e ith e r a sp a ce n o r a n in sta n ce w h ere ind ividu als
c o u ld r ation ally d ista n ce a n d e m a n c ip a te th em selv es in a n a u to n o m o u s way
from th e c o n te n ts p rovid ed by society. S e lf-re fle c tio n was n e v e r an in sta n ce
e la b o ra te d th e o r etica lly by F ou cau lt to a c co u n t fo r its a p p ea ra n ce in any
d e c is io n tak en by the su b ject. F o u ca u lt su s p e c te d th a t th e p r o m ise o f the
b e n e fits o f the e x e r c ise o f rea so n h ad totalitarian im p lication s, an d argued
in favor o f a plurality o f “form s o f rationality” th a t w o u ld c o m p e te and
o verlap a s in str u m e n ts o f d o m in a tio n .
T h e C astorid ian n o tio n o f th e su b ject as a n u n d e te r m in e d e n tity with
irred u cib le a n d in d isso lu b le in d ivid u al a n d so c ia l p o le s strongly contrasts
w ith the a b se n t c o n c e p t o f th e su b ject in F o u ca u lt. C astoriadis c o n te sts this
structuralist an d p oststructuralist view by s e e in g th e su b ject as a creative
se lf, m e d ia te d by social in stitu tio n s. U s in g th e F reud ian n o tio n o f the
u n c o n sc io u s, C astoriadis rew orks th e p r o b le m o f p sych ical rep resen ta tio n
in o r d e r to e x p la in th e creative ch aracter o f th e h u m a n b e in g . I lis co n c ep t
o f radical im a g in a tio n su p p o rts h is id ea o f in d e te r m in a tio n m a n ife sted and
e x p r e sse d i n th e social-h istorical d im e n sio n o f society, as w ell as in iLs ISS
a n d social in stitu tion s.
F u rth erm o re, his ela b o ra tio n s o n th e in d ivid u al a n d social p o le s o f the

su b ject th r o w s lig h t o n th e o ld p r o b le m in th e so c ia l sc ie n c e s o f w h eth er
the su b ject s h o u ld b e c o n sid e r e d a n in d ivid u al a g en cy o r a co llective
p r o d u ct, a n d t h e false b e lie f that so c iety is t h e sum o f in d ivid u al subjectivities.
H ere, C astoriad is in tegrates psych oan alytic c o n tr ib u tio n s in to an
a n th r o p o lo g ic a l a n d so c io lo g ic a l a c c o u n t. U s in g p sych oan alysis h e e x p la in s
how th e in d ivid u al c o n stitu te s h is subjectivity by in te r io r iz in g ex tern a l social
c o n te n ts g iv en by its so c iety to e n su r e th e p e r m a n e n c y o f th e in stitu te d
im aginary, b u t a t the sa m e tim e c a n re-im agin e su c h c o n te n ts a n d r ed efin e
th e m from a self-ru lin g position .
In th is s e n s e , C astoriad is’ n o tio n o f subjectivity su b sta n tia lly d iffers from
F o u ca u lt’s. C astoriadis offers an e x p la n a tio n o f th e stratification o f the
in d ivid u al p sych e an d its su b jective c o n te n ts, a n d also— contrary to
F ou cau lt— p o sits an in d ivid u al sp a ce fo r r e fle c tio n an d th e p ossib ility for
e m a n c ip a to ry tran sform ation a t th e in d ivid u al a n d th e so c ia l levels.
C astoriad is’ a n d F o u ca u lt’s d iffe re n c es w h en th e o r iz in g th e su b ject arc
d irectly lin k e d to th e ir d istin ct c o n c e p tio n s o f m e a n in g an d r ep re se n ta tio n .
T h e ir p e r sp e c tiv e s w ith regard to th e se issu es are contradictory. E ven
th o u g h th e y a g r ee d o n th e social n a tu re a n d t h e historical a n d dyn am ic
ch aracter o f m e a n in g an d , m o st im portantly, n e ith e r d e fe n d e d a u n iq u e
id e a l m o d e l o f society, C astoriadis d e b a te s th e F o u c a u ld ia n a p p ro a c h to
m e a n in g . F o u ca u lt in te rp re ted m e a n in g w ith in a “h o m o g e n o u s pluralism"
w h er e m u ltip le so c ia l m e a n in g s o r sig n ific a tio n s are always a m ere
r e p r o d u c tio n o f p o w er effects. O n th e contrary, C astoriadis e sta b lish es
stan d ard s by w h ich to d iffe re n tia te a m o n g social o r cultural sign ification s
o r m e a n in g s.
C astoriad is’ th eo ry of psych ical r ep re se n ta tio n e x p la in s m e a n in g
g e n e r a tio n a n d its a fu n ctio n a l a n d n o n c a n o n ic character. I le is n o t satisfied
w ith statin g that social m e a n in g is im p o se d o n in d iv id u a ls in o r d e r to k eep
so ciety to g e th e r a n d fu n c tio n in g , e v en th o u g h h is th eo ry e x p la in s the
fu n ctio n a l a sp ec ts o f m e a n in g a n d its u n ifyin g role w ithin social in stitu tion s.
F u rth erm o re, h e is e a g er to d e m o n stra te h o w m e a n in g is »indeterm inably
o r ig in a te d by social ind ividu als a n d their c o lle ctiv es, an id e a that is
c o m p le m e n te d by his n o tio n s o f c r e a tio n a n d a u to n o m y . W h ile F oucault
saw m e a n in g a s d e te r m in e d by its p o w er to d o m in a te a n d c o n tr o l ind ividu als
a n d society, C astoriadis re-elab orates m e a n in g as a social c r e a tio n th a t is n o t
totally d e te r m in a n t o r d e te rm in e d .
C astoriad is d o e s n o t b eliev e that b e c a u se so c ia l in stitu tio n s a n d their
con stitu tive m e a n in g s are historically c o n tin g e n t a n d socially c re a te d , and
plural form s o f m e a n in g have to b e u n d e rsto o d w ith o u t u n iversalizin g, it
m ust n ecessa rily b e c o n c lu d e d that ev ery th in g is (m e a n s) th e sa m e. In o th e r

w ords, a c c e p tin g th e se tw o facts d o e s n o t ju stify a naïve relativistic p o sitio n
b e fo r e , f o r ex a m p le, so c ia l in stitu tio n s o r cu ltu rally d iverse practices.
M oreover, in a c k n o w le d g in g th at th e social leg itim a tio n o f an y ISS,
in stitu tio n , o r social fo r m a tio n is p rovid ed by th e so ciety th a t cre a tes and
e x p e r ie n c e s th em , C astoriadis d e fe n d s a n o r m a tiv e stan dard by w h ich to
critically e x a m in e social a n d cultural c o n te n ts o f d iffe r e n t so c ie tie s w ithout
a c c e p tin g o r relyin g o n e th n o c e n tr ism , evolu tion är)', o r c o lo n ia list views.
As e m p h a s iz e d th r o u g h o u t th is b o o k , a ll th e se m o v es le d F o u ca u lt and
C astoriadis to very d ifferen t political p o sitio n s. T h e relativistic and
d e te r m in istic asp ects o f F o u ca u lt’s d e v e lo p m e n ts e n d e d u p in w hat
C astoriadis ca lls th e g lo rifica tio n o f e clec ticism , con form ity, sterility, and
banality, a n d th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f th e critical fu n ctio n o f th in k in g
(C astoriadis, 1997t, p. 4 2 ). A s m an y tim es c ritic iz e d h e r e , the d eterm in istic
r o le th a t F o u c a u lt assig n ed to p o w er r u led o u t a p la u sib le p o litic a l alternative
that c o u ld c o n s id e r social c h a n g e fr e e o f d eterm in acy.
Even th o u g h in F ou cau lt th e discursive c o n str u c tio n s e m b e d d e d in
su b jectivities o r k n o w led g e regim es c a n b e resisted , m o d ifie d , a n d c h a n g e d
in a m o m e n t o f o p e n n e s s th is p ossib ility d o c s n o t have su ffic ien t w eig h t in
F ou cau lt’s e la b o ra tio n . T h e lim its se t to p ossib le tran sform ation s o f form ative
e le m e n ts o f d isco u rses illustrate this p o in t. A lth o u g h th e r e can b e c h a n g e s
th ro u g h w h a t F o u ca u lt c a lle d counter-d iscursive p ra ctices, th e a e sth e tics o f
e x iste n c e , t e c h n o lo g ie s o f th e self, o r form s o f d e sir e , the q u estio n rem ains:
“w hat d o e s this c h a n g e m e a n o r im ply?”. O n e th in g is clear: c h a n g e d o e s
n o t im p ly th e e m e r g e n c e o f an y th in g u n p r e c e d e n te d that d o c s n o t sim p ly
r ep ro d u c e w hat was already b e n e a th e x istin g social con ten ts.
F o u ca u lt d iffe re n tia ted a m o n g h istorical form s o f d o m in a tio n a n d in his
later w ritin g s h e a p p ea le d to a p ossib le su b jective rec o n str u c tio n o f
ind ividu als to live b etter form s o f life , d iffe re n tia tin g in th is way b etw een
“w orse” a n d “b e lter ” ways o f livin g. H ow ever, h e n e v e r su b stan tiated this
p o sitio n . F o u ca u lt d id n o t p rovid e an a rticu la ted th eo retica l bod y that
ju s tifie d a n orm ative stan d ard to value fo rm s o f life; to u n d e rsta n d how,
th r o u g h p r o c e sse s o f su b jective tran sform ation , in d ivid u als c o u ld b rin g
n ew a n d fr e e r su b jective co n ten ts; o r to a c k n o w le d g e social c h a n g e .
In su m , it is p o ssib le to say that w h en th in k in g a b o u t p o ssib ilities o f
c h a n g in g o r o v e r c o m in g p o w er fu l a n d c o n tr o llin g so c ia l form ation s,
F ou cau lt le ft th eo retica l voids, particularly as illu strated in his n o tio n o f
resistan ce. D e sp ite th e critical p o te n tia lity o f r esista n c e a n d th e p roclaim ed
p ro d u ctiv e c h a r a cte r o f pow er, it h as to b e r e c o g n iz e d th a t h e fr a m e d th ese
n o tio n s w ith in a c o n te x t o f d e te rm in a tio n that le ft him u n a b le to ex p la in
w hy d iffe r e n c e s in, for e x a m p le , n e w form s o f b o d ies, desires, a n d /o r

d isco u rses c o u ld b e d istin g u ish e d a n d w hy th e y w e r e essen tia lly d ifferen t.
T h is p o s itio n is a lso r e fle c te d in F o u ca u lt’s u n d e r sta n d in g o f th e social
role o f theory. As a poststructuralist, h e o n ly b e lie v e d in local resistan ce
a n d r e je cte d th e id ea o f m a c ro p o litics o r a rad ical p roject o f social
r e c o n s tr u c tio n . In his eyes, th e o r y is a n in str u m e n t in the service o f a
particu lar str u g g le . H e w arn ed a b o u t th e d a n g e r o f in te lle ctu a ls b e in g
a g e n ts th at r e p r o d u c e d th e system o f p o w er th e y w e re im m e r se d in , w h ere
th e ir id e a s o f social resp o n sib ility o r c o n sc io u sn e s s w e re s h a p e d by that
very system . T h e o n ly p ossib le role o f in te lle c tu a ls for F ou cau lt was to
stru ggle a g a in st th e form s o f p o w er that im p r iso n e d th e m by r ev ea lin g and
u n d e r m in in g p o w er w h er e it was m o st in sid io u s (F ou cau lt, 1977, pp.
2 0 5 -8 ).
F o u ca u lt d e fe n d e d in te lle c tu a ls w h o u s e d th e ir sp ec ia liz ed w ork and
e x p e rtise to carry o u t a p o litic a l stru ggle a g a in st p o w e r w ith in their particu lar
social se ttin g s. I Ic saw th eo ry a s a local p ra ctice d ista n c e d from a totalizin g
th e o r etica l project. T h is co n stitu tes a n o th e r th e o r e tic a l a n d political
d iffe r e n c e b e tw e e n F o u ca u lt a n d Castoriadis» w h o , fr o m h is early works,
d e fe n d s t h e id e a o f a th eo retica l a n d p olitical p r o jc ct that, a s a p r o d u ct o f
its social c o n d itio n s o f e m e r g e n c e , w ork ed as a n in sta n c e to critically reflect
u p o n th e m a n d p r o m o te a u to n o m o u s ch an ges.
C astoriad is an d F ou cau lt n e g a te d th e b e lie f th a t th e r e is a totalizing,
c o m p le te , a n d d e fin itiv e k n o w led g e. H ow ever, C astoriad is d o e s n ot sh are
F o u c a u lt’s p o s itio n r eg a r d in g th e r o le o f theory. A s B e rn ste in (1 9 9 5 ) rightly
p o in te d o u t , C astoriadis se c s th eo ry as a social p r a c tic e. 11c term s th e work
o f clarifyin g from w ithin history an u n d e r sta n d in g o f w h at b e in g in history
m e a n s, e lu c id a tio n . T h e activity o f e lu c id a tio n is c o n so n a n t w ith the
in d e te r m in a te n atu re o f history (B ern stein , 1995, p. 2 0 3 ): it d o e s n o t have
a g r o u n d in g o rigin or a d e te rm in a te telos, n o r d o e s it se e k tran sp aren cy o r
master)'. In th is se n se , C astoriadis d ista n ces h im s e lf from se e k in g the
m o d e r n ist to ta liz in g p r o je ct o f k n o w led g e. H e c o n te m p la te s a n o th er
possibility: a c k n o w le d g in g th e u n d e te r m in e d c h a r a cte r o f th e social-
h istorical a n d th e in c o m p le te an d e n d le ss n a tu re o f k n o w led g e a n d theory
still leaves room to r ec u p er a te a critical n o r m a tiv e p olitical in sta n ce
u n d e r sto o d in term s o f auton om y.
L in k in g th e p roject o f a u to n o m y to th e p r a c tic e o f th eo ry is c o n siste n t
with his o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n . As s e e n , w ith o u t g r o u n d in g it in m etap hysical
m o d e s o f th in k in g , th e critical ch aracter o f C astoriad is’ th e o r y r esid es to a
great e x te n t in h is p r o je ct o f au ton om y. H is n o t io n s o f su b ject, subjectivity,
a n d su b je ctifica tio n , as w ell a s that o f th e in stitu tin g a n d in stitu te d p o w er o f
th e social im a g in a tio n , su b stan tiate th e n o r m a tiv e ch aracter o f a u ton om y

a n d e x p lic a te social tran sform ation . As d isc u sse d in th is text, C astoriadis
d e v e lo p s th r o u g h h is w h o le th eo retica l w ork, t h e n o tio n s th a t F o u ca u lt
failed to th e o r etica lly sustain in h is later p e r io d . C astoriad is p ro v id es a solid
n o tio n o f th e su b je ct e q u ip p e d with th e ca p a city to reflect, q u estion ,
d e lib er a te, a n d create; a c o n siste n t th eo ry o f p sych oan alytically e n g a g e d
su b je ctifica tio n , that a llow ed an u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e in d ivid u al a n d social
p o le s o f t h e subject; a log ica lly articu lated social-h istorical d im e n sio n w h ere
d ie in stitu tin g a n d in stitu ted p o w er o f so c iety c a n in te ra c t a n d overcom e
h e te ro n o m y ; an d a n orm o r stan d ard o f su p e rio r validity that allowrs u s to
p o litic a lly d isc e rn , d e b a te , a n d o p t o u r social in stitu tion s.
In c o n s e q u e n c e , th e c o m p a r iso n b e tw e en F o u ca u lt a n d C astoriad is sh ow s
w hy C astoriad is falls n e ith e r in to d e te rm in istic c o n c e p tio n s o f so c ie ty and
th e h u m a n su b ject n o r in to relativistic p o sitio n s. Even th o u g h t h e project
o f a u to n o m y in C astoriadis c a n e v o k e fu rth er p h ilo s o p h ic a l a n d political
d isc u ssio n s that arc far from b e in g totally c o n c lu siv e , it g o e s fu rth er an d is
m o r e p ro d u ctiv e. C astoriadis articulates in a m o r e c o n s e q u e n t a n d
c o m p r e h e n siv e way th e critical status o f th e o r y that g o e s b e y o n d a
fa sh io n a b le “p o m o ” a c a d e m ic p osition .
C astoriadis, w ith o u t th e F o u ca u ld ia n sh o r tc o m in g s, is a b le to m ove
forw ard a n d lin k his th eo retica l a n d p olitical activity to h is vision o f a new
o n to lo g y , w h e r e th e h u m a n b e in g is u n d e r sto o d in a c o m p le te ly new
m a n n er; a n d th e d e te r m in e d a n d th e u n d e te r m in e d can b e c o n c ep tu a liz e d
a lo n g w ith a sp e c ific so c ia l a n d p o litic a l project. It is th r o u g h elu cid a tio n
that C astoriad is b u ild s an o n to lo g y that th e o r iz e s sim u lta n e o u sly th e
in h er en tly am b ig u o u s, u n d e te r m in e d , an d c o n tin g e n t ch aracter o f a given
o r g a n iz a tio n o f the w orld— th e m agm atic— w h ile a lso c o n te m p la tin g its
d e te r m in e d , p recise, an d p red ictab le d im e n sio n — th e id e n tita r y /
e n se m b list.
H e p r e se n ts a th e o r y o f c lo su r e an d o p e n n e ss, p e r m a n e n c y a n d c h a n g e ,
h e te r o n o m y an d au ton om y, w h ere a p ostm etap h ysical d c c e n tc r c d n o tio n
o f c o lle c tiv e self-in stitu tion is at th e c o r e o f radical d e m o c ra tic politics.
W ith o u t a p p e a lin g to a n a b solu te so u r c e o f u ltim a te au th ority th a t w o u ld
g r o u n d o n c e a n d for all n orm ative p r in c ip le s, it p r o v id e s e n o u g h norm ative
a n d sta n d a rd so u rc e s to evalu ate social c h a n g e a n d valu e social practices
(Kalyvas, 1 9 9 8 a , p p . 1 7 6 -7 ).
D ista n ce d from p oststructuralism , C astoriad is p ro v id es a sin g u la r r esp o n se
to th e sa m e critiq u es th is in tellectu a l m o v e m e n t m ad e in r elation to
m o d e r n ist, ration alistic, objectivist, a n d positivists view s. M ore in te r e stin g is
th e fact th a t h e ren ew s th e n o tio n o f critical th in k in g a n d radical c h a n g e
w ith in a so c ia l c o n te x t an d a historical m o m e n t w h er e th is go a l h as b e e n
su n k in d isillu sio n m e n t, n aïve relativism , c o n fo r m ism , a n d in sign ifican cy,
as C astoriad is p u ts it.
T h e o n to lo g y o f cre a tio n , w h ich in C astoriad is’ view m ig h t b r in g new
p olitical p e r sp e c tiv e s a n d m o r e d e m o c ra tic and a u to n o m o u s social
in stitu tio n s, p o s e s n o m in o r c h a lle n g e to th e w ay w e u n d e rsta n d society
a n d t h e B e in g . A s fo r A ristotle, for C astoriadis “B e in g ” is C h aos, Abyss, a n d
G ro u n d le ssn e ss. It en ta ils th e c o n tin u o u sly su s p e n d e d fragility and
p r e ca r io u sn ess o f m e a n in g an d o f o u r c a th e c te d o b jects, w orks, affects,
a n d d esires: th e m ortality o f th e S e lf (C astoriadis, 1 9 9 7 q , 136). N o n eth ele ss,
“Being" is a lso c r e a tio n a n d u n d e te r m in e d im a g in a tio n , w h ich fin d their
b e st e x p r e s sio n in A rt a n d P o litics, as C astoriadis k n ew it.
Notes
Introduction
1Aglietta (1987) and Lipietz (1996) analyze die impact o f Fordism and its
conséquences in terms o f consum ption patterns and production, as well as
on labor relations through managerial schem es and wage regulations. From a
distinct point o f view, Ross (1999) makes an interesting examination o f crucial
cultural transformations that took place in France from the mid-1950s to the mid-
1960s. showing how those were key elem ents in shaping the French intellectual
and artistic productions in the following decades.
- Taylor (1979) discusses in depth Hegelian issues that influenced French debates
during this period.
5 Bourdieu (1993) showed how bodies o f knowledge understood as historical
and cultural productions are shaped and structured by political affairs, social
conjunctures, and networks o f legitimized agents in public and academic spheres.
Boschctti (1988) followed these prem ises and illustrated Sartre’s case in France.
1Macey (1995) and Eribon (1991) agree on this historical account.
Chapter 1
1Lefort was a French sociologist and philosopher who worked widi Merleau-Ponty
and who co-founded SB.
2 At this tim e the Communist Party (CP) had some 700 militants in France.
1Yugoslavia, as well as Russia’s other satellite countries, was considered as a country
where the revolution had not b een totally successful because the CP had not
nationalized everything in the very beginning and because it had kept in place a
few ministers who did not formally belong to the CP (Castoriadis, 1997m, p. 4).
'All these intellectuals were influenced by different theoretical trends being
discussed in France at that m om ent. In the case o f Castoriadis* early writings,
besides Marx it is possible to say that Max Weber an d Merleau-Ponty had som e
influence. Adam s (2007, pp. 4 6 -7 ) alludes further to the influence Castoriadis
received from Schelling, Fichte and Heidegger, primarily during his Soldi
period. I am not especially interested in tracking the effects o f these thinkers in
this chapter. It is m ore pertinent for my argum ent to exam ine how Castoriadis’
militancy and his analysis about the socio-political context, led him to reinterpret
revolutionary actions and socialism, openin g up a new theoretical path that
would distance him from Marx and other inherited philosophical traditions.
As H on n eth (1986. pp. 62 -7 8 ) argues, it is especially interesting how, at this
142 Notes
stage, Castoriadis prepares the ground for a particular interpretation o f the

category o f praxis that he will connect to a w hole theory o f society, introducing
revolutionary action as the pivotal idea that aims at autonomy.
In his work, Castoriadis acknowledges Merleau-Ponty’s contributions. Later
o n Castoriadis distances him self from Merleau-Ponty. See his texts: “The
Sayable and the Unsayable: H om age to Merleau-Ponty" (Castoriadis, 1984b)
and “Merleau-Ponty and the W eight o f the O ntological Tradition" (Castoriadis,
1993b). Adams (2011) presents an elaborate discussion about Merleau-Ponty
and Castoriadis.
’ T he extensive and com plex analysis Castoriadis m ade of Marxism started to be
d on e at SouB but did n ot conclude there. I do not intend to make an exhaustive
review o f his entire critique to Marxism here. I will restrict myself to the main
Marxist notions that Castoriadis ju d ged as deterministic and which, in his view,
deserved to be reconceptualized.
e Cohn-Bendit, the important student leader o f May* 08, wrote in his book on
May 1968 about the debt o f the left-wing alternative to Socialisme ou Barbarie
saving: ‘I am not and do n ot want to be—anything but a plagiarist when it comes
to preaching o f revolutionary theory’ and ‘the views we have been presenting
are those o f I’. Chaulieu.’ (Paul Chaulieu was on e o f Castoriadis’ pseudonyms.)
(Cohn-Bendit quoted by Curtis, 1988, p. x).
7 T he group established contacts with similar organizations in other countries and
helped to found what becam e “Solidarity”in England, which eventually inspired a
like-named group in Philadelphia. T he West Indian historian C.L.R. James was an
important figure to SouB who worked together with Raya Dunayevska, Trotsky’s
former secretary.
* It is clear that any attempt to divide the life and work o f SB into periods carries
serious problem s in reflecting the real developm ents and dynamic o f the group.
As noted previously, this artificial division m ade here has expository purposes.
It was m ade o n the basis o f a first attempt suggested by Castoriadis (1997m.
pp. 1-34). Another attempt at SouB periodization was don e by Gottraux (1997).
Castoriadis publicly disagreed with its content and questioned its veracity.
,J ‘During this period [1949-53] the immediate public of the group and the
review was made up o f what was left o f the old-style ‘ultra left' groups: Bordigists,
Council Communists, a few anarchists, and som e offspring o f the 1920s German
“leftists." T hese groups were breaking up or disappearing at a rather rapid pace’
(Castoriadis, 1997m, p. 5).
10 Lefort and Sim on formed a group called Information set Liaisons Ouvrières
(ILO), which later was named Information set Correspondance Ouvrières (ICO).
T he position formulated by Lefort was published in SB No. 26 and reprinted
in 1979 (Lefort, 1979).
11 T he Greek Civil War (Decem ber 1944-Januarv 1945 and 1946-9) was a two-stage
conllict during which Greek communists unsuccessfully tried to gain control of
Greece.
12 Originally published as “Socialisme o u Barbarie," SB No. 1 (March 1949).
It was originally translated as “Socialism Reaffirmed" by Bob Pennington and
printed as Solidarity Pamphlet in 1961. Later reproductions quoted here were
published as “Presentation of Socialisme o u Barbarie: An Organ o f Critique and
Notes 143
Revolutionary Orientation”(Castoriadis, 1997ο, pp. 35-40) and "Socialism or
Barbarism"(Castoriadis, 1988i. pp. 76-106).
1:1This was originally published in S ß N o. 1 (March 1949).
11 Castoriadis started to develop his theory o f bureaucratic capitalism in the first
six issues o f SB in the following articles: “Editorial: Socialisme ou Barbarie"
(N o. 1); “I-es Rapports de la Production en Russie" (N o. 2); “La Consolidation
Temporaire du Capitalisme Mondial" (N o. 3); “L'Exploitation de la Paysannerie
sous le Capitalisme Bureaucratique” (No. 4): and “La Bureaucratique Yougoslave"
(N o. 5 /6 ) .
’’This notion appeared in the Castoridian publications as early as 1949. Born out
o f the major political events in France and abroad, this notion cam e to life as
a logical and consequent resolution o f the political diagnosis that Castoriadis
and his colleagues had made about con temporär)'societies. Later on, this notion
would becom e central in his major political and philosophical work. Castoriadis
refined it., inspired by political developm ents as well as by other theoretical
influences such as psychoanalysis. T he notion o f self-management Castoriadis
worked with at this point in time could be seen as the roots o f his later notion o f
autonomy; however, the theoretical content it embraced in 1949 is far from what
Castoriadis would conceptualize as political collective and individual autonom y
16 Castoriadis cites pseudonyms such as Chaze and Vega as members that were in
disagreem ent with the general position o f the group.
17 Later on , Claude Lefort, whose pseudonym was “Montai,” would publish his
position toward these issues in 1979 in Eléments d ’une Critiqué à ta Bureauaatique
(Lefort, 1979).
Molina (1998) quotes Lefort from the texts: L'Anti mythes (“An interview with
Claude Lefort") No. 14, 1975, p. 4 and Eléments d ’une Critiqué à la Bureauaatique
(Paris: Gallimard, 1979).
These opinions were expressed in SB No.3.
20 This thesis was sustained by the group since 1949 in their first issue and also in
the text “La Consolidation Temporaire du Capitalisme Mondial" (SB No.3).
*' Here Castoriadis makes reference to Marx's interpretation o f the process of
concentration that would n ot stop until a single capitalist or group o f capitalists
predominated.
'n Raymond Hirzel (Bourt Gaspardd), .Albert Maso (Vega), Jacques Signorelli
(Garros) and Martine Gautrat. Georges Petit also jo in e d the group in 1951 and
by the en d of 1952, Henri Sim on was a member.
-'T his event refers to the uprising that took place in Berlin during June 1953,
especially from the 8-1 8 when 60% o f workers at the “Stalinallee" (an East German
construction project started in 1949 in Stalin's honor) rejected the majority of
the working norms im posed by the government. This resulted in a strike against
the Party and official Unions. More than 10,000 people participated in this
uprising.
This strike took place from 5 August to 12 August ( 1953) when a com m ittee of
Force Ouvrière militants at a Bourdeaux PTT (Postes, Telephone, Telegraphe)
office launched a protest against the Laniel government's attempt to cut public
sector workers’ salaries and retirement benefits. This strike paralyzed the mail,
telephonic communications, and all public transportation.
144 Notes
w These refer to workers' manifestations against labor conditions im posed by

their governments. T he claims o f the Hungarian revolt were mainly for self-
management in productive units, reduction o f inequalities am ong labor wages,
control over planning processes, a new government com position, and a new
orientation o f the foreign policy.
This was first indicated in SB No. 12, “N ote sur la Situation Internationale,” and
later on in 1954 in "Situation de l'Impérialisme et Perspectives du Prolétariat,” in
SB No. 14 (April 1954).
27 As noted previously, som e years later in Castoriadis’ work, autonom y would
becom e an important concept reworked in the light o f psychoanalysis.
28 These issues were published in SB No. 13 and No. 14.
T he most detailed analysis about this crisis was published in SB No. 21.
90 These elaborations were exposed in SB Nos. 13,14, and 20.
:MFurther elaborations about this topic were published in English as "On the
Content o f Socialism I and II" in Political and Social Writing, Vols. I and 2.
1,2 "Sur le Contenu du Socialisme I” was published in SB No. 17 (July 1955); "Stir
le C ontenu du Socialisme II" was published in SB No. 22 (July 1957); and “Sur
le Contenu du Socialisme III: La Lutte des Ouvriers Contre l'Organisation de
l'Entreprise Capitaliste” was published in SB N o. 23 (January 1958). For English
translations, see (Castoriadis, 1997k and 19971).
MSmith (2010. p. 173) identifies four stages in Castoriadis' move from socialism to
autonomy from 1955 to 1979.
M What the Algerian War meant for SouB, and the position o f the group before
colonial relations will be addressed in more detail later on.
r‘ This p osition was argued by Castoriadis in SB N o. 31 (D ecem ber 1960), No.
32 (April 1961), and N o. 33 (D ecem ber 1961). T h ese texts were reprinted
as Le M ouvement Révolutionnaire sous If Capitalisme Moderne (vols. I, II, and III)
and in Political and Social Writings, Vol. 2. 19.5.5-1960: From the Workers' Struggle
A gainst Bureaucracy to Resolution in the Age o f Modern Capitalism (Castoriadis.
1988c).
C h a p te r 2
1W hitebook ( 1998, p. 143) notes that on e of the major symptoms o f our times is the
abstract negation o f Cartesianism with the rush into intersubjectivity.. . . Whether
it em anates from Lévi-Strauss and structuralism, o r from Wittgenstein and
Habermas, the attempt has been to absorb the individual into the transindividual—
the subjective into the intersubjective—so thoroughly that the m om ent of
privatistic individuality drops out almost completely I resulting] in a superficial
view o f human creativity.
2 It is important to note that Castoriadis does not equate radical imagination to the
unconscious.
1For exam ple, when Freud explained the Oedipal C om plex h e traced it back to
the murder o f the primal father. All his developm ents on the original phantasies
followed this sort o f theoretical path, induced by his positivislic intention of
making psychoanalysis a formal science.
Notes 145
1Freud makes this observation in his letters to Fliess dated on May 2,1897 and May
25, 1897 (Masson, 1985).
5 Although later in his theory about sexual developm ent Freud called hetero
sexuality the “normal” state o f human sexuality, there is no doubt that h e intended
to change the conventional moral perception o f homosexuality.
' Dreams are characterized by overdetermination (m eaning that a signifier always
points to several signifieds), as well as by underdetermination (a signifier is not
the only o n e possible for any signified) and oversymbolization (a signified can be
indicated by several signifiers) (Castoriadis, 1992, p. 9).
7 For exam ple, Freud's initial belief in the positive reality of the event that
corresponds to the traumatic memory o f neurotics, o r his initial treatment o f the
topic o f seduction scenes o f a child by an adult, or the search for the primal scene
as a real event (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 281).
* This predom inance is connected to what Freud calls the magical om nipotence
o f thought within the unconscious where if a desire arises the representation
that fulfills it also appears. This is not to say that the organ pleasure dimension
disappears.
9 See for exam ple Castoriadis’ discussions with Francisco Varela on the living-
being and biolog}· in "Life and Creation: Cornelius Castoriadis in Dialogue with
Francisco Varela” (Castoriadis, 2011).
10 Castoriadis proposes an original process to explain the stratification o f the
human psyche, explained in more detail in Chapter 6 o f The Imaginary Institutions
o f Society. W ithout doing justice to its complexity, I will only make brief reference
to the different stages involved in such process centering on its most original and
controversial aspects.
11 As discussed in the following chapter the m onad concept can be highly
controversial. For example, I-aplanche (1980) observes that it is not possible to
think about a primary unrepressed unconscious in psychoanalytical theory. In
his eyes this would be equivalent to posing a false statem ent about the place of
the biological dim ension. For him it is through the original repression that the
unconscious is constituted.
'2 It is important to remember that the psyche will never lose the tendency to lock
everything up in order to return to an impossible m onadic state—and when it fails
to do so, will appeal to its substitutes: hallucinatory satisfaction and phantasy.
,3 Castoriadis also used the term libido formandi as specific to the human domain
(1997b, p. 342).
11 As said, Castoriadis docs not establish an absolute polarity be tvve en the individual
and society. T h e individual or subject, as well as any f orm o f intersubjectivity, are
already social.
'’’This is what Castoriadis calls closure. T he term closure here is given the very
precise m eaning it enjoys in algebra. An algebraic field is said to be closed when
every algebraic equation that can be written in this field, with the elem ents o f this
field, can be solved with elem ents from the sam e field (1997d, p. 87).
16Castoriadis also considers ruptures to closure in Western Europe in the eleventh
century, with the creation o f com munes that vindicated forms o f auto-government,
the renaissance, the workers’ movements, and other movements, such as those of
feminists and ecologists (Castoriadis, 1997a, pp. 103—27).
14(5 Notes
17 T he terni “discourse" cannot be taken in its narrow sense. It implies

representational and affective referrals that make up the world into which the
psyche is .socialized.
18 Deliberative activity and self-reflection does not suppose or m ean in Castoriadis
the goal o t becom ing self-transparent. It is impossible for an individual to become
so given the existence o f the unconscious. Therefore conscious and unconscious
activities are indissociable.
|,J This does not mean that the radical imaginary does n ot count in the exercise of
autonomy. It is understood here that there could n ot he autonomy without the
explicit exercise o f the radical imaginary.
20 Castoriadis also understands psychoanalysis as an activity that promotes the
em ergence o f reflexive and deliberative subjectivities. For him this is the end and
the goal o f analysis.
C h a p te r 3
1 See J. Bernstein’s analysis of Habennas' critiques o f Castoriadis (Bernstein, 1989).
2 1will return to this discussion and its relationship to democracy later o n addressing
the notion o f popular sovereignty and its relationship to autonomy.
5 It would n ot be exactly correct to define radical im agination as the point o f origin
o f cultural representation, since for Castoriadis understanding the emergence
o f a creation or a new stratum in the totality o f the existing-being is not about
establishing “origins” or exact inaugural moments. It is about understanding
the advent o f som ething com pletely new; in this sense, the creation o f meaning
entails an essential fragmentation o f total B e in g /b ein g given in a magmatic order
as explained in Chapter 2.
* Noesis is the particular intentional act itself; a norm a ( plural, noemata) comprises
all that which makes the act to be as if it were o f an object experienced in a
certain wray (Mautner, 1998).
' There has always b een and always will be a dim ension o f the social institution
in charge o f this essential function: to reestablish order, to ensure the life and
operation o f society against whatever, actually or potentially, endangers them.
This fact is o n e o f the roots o f explicit power (Castoriadis, 1991c, p. 154).
'' Castoriadis presented and responded to the observations o f these authors in an
interesting discussion in "Done and to be D one” (1997c, pp. 385-98).
7 Kalyvas (li)98a. p. 162) is right when he notes that Castoriadis only provides good
reasons to prefer the value o f autonomy as a normative standard.
n A more extended discussion about m eaning and validity can be found in ‘‘Done
and to be D one” (Castoriadis, 1997c, pp. 385-98).
9 Kalyvas (1998a, p. 168) has called attention to this issue, suggesting that the
redefinition o f the encounter between norm and fact enables us to understand
the tensions present in Castoriadis between facticity and validity.
10 I will discuss here only the m ain theoretical intention of Arnason’s project. His
analyses are m uch comprehensive than the ones explored here, however, my
interest lies in showing what I see as the principal theoretical difference from
Castoriadis that reflects in their understandings o f creation and history.
Notes 147
11 This framework studies the civilizations associated with the major world religions
that provided the basis for divergent historical paths. Civilizations refer to the
cultural m o d es o f interpretation that first arrived with the onset o f writing
and which interacted with particular processes o f state formation to produce
distinct cultural com plexes. Civilizations are perpetually self-transforming and
develop n ot in isolation hut through interaction with others. This civilizational
analysis aim s to identify com m on trends while avoiding, 1) the discredited
evolutionary theory o f western civilization as a universal normative standard,
2) the idea o f distinct civilizations that develop in isolation from each other,
and 3) n otion s o f civilizations as engaged in a perpetual clash (Dclanty, 2010,
pp. 4 6 -7 ).
12 For Adams (2005) a m ore moderate idea o f creation is desirable. She states that
the n otion o f contextual creation docs not preclude the idea o f creation sui generis
and does not compromise the recognition o f ontological novelty (p. 26).
15 Adams (2005. p. 35) states that Castoriadis does not acknowledge hermeneutical
con tribu dons because he associates this tradition with Gadamerand H eidegger and
the with philosophical task o f discerning an ultimate truth through interpretation,
som ething that is at odds with his ideas o f creation and autonomy.
" Adams states that an aspect o f Arnason’s articulation o f the world is the idea—
drawing on Habermas—o f mutual understanding. Where Habermas poses
hom ogeneity to mutual understanding, Arnason is more interested in paying
due respect to its heterogeneous m odalities and intercultural aspects . . . the
challenge is to rethink the idea o f the “other"—and m utual understanding—such
that there is neither the unbridgeable chasm o f radical alterity nor the quashing
of différence by the assimilation o f the same (2007, p . 58).
15 Smith (2010) makes a parallel between Cornelius Castoriadis’ and Charles Taylor's
inquires in to the philosophical questions: W ho am I? W ho are we? And how are we
to live? By identifying their commonalities and differences. Smith moves beyond
these authors to build his own arguments about these perennial questions.
“ This will b e discussed later when the questions o f representation, meaning, and
the body are approached.
17 Smith (2010) refers to the term “oblique autonom y” discussed by Adams in a
2006 conference paper.
"'Castoriadis notes that this distinction makes sense, abstractly speaking, for all
societies. It permits the interpretation o f societies according to the distinction or
articulation they institute am ong these three.
19 Castoriadis acknowledges here the obvious difference in scale between the
Athenian democracy and contemporary democracies. He dismisses its “sophisms"
all argum ents against direct democracies based on issues o f numbers or
dim ension, arguing that it could be possible to instauratc direct regimes in cities
o f 40,000—50,000 inhabitants, as Athenians did during the classical period.
20 Castoriadis accepts the Greek notion o f “magistrates" that, as delegates, would
be taking care o f the division o f political tasks— n ot the division o f political
labor in direct regimes, however, he does n ot elaborate on this issue to dem on
strate how and why these cannot be assumed as a form o f representation (1997c,
pp. 407).
148 Notes
C h a p te r 4
1W hitebook. J. (unpublished manuscript) states that there are two possible ways
to look at Foucault’s developm ents over lime. T he first on e claims that Foucault’s
career consisted in a series o f radical breaks that tend to be seen as a product
o f his intellectual flexibility, open-mindedness, self-critical honest)·, or in a few
cases, as attem pts to resolve theoretical problems h e confronted. T he second
on e— the on e W hitebook subscribes to— argues that the series of radical breaks
in the developm ent o f Foucault’s career are more apparent than real, and that
they are in fact generated by the foundational position he defended in "Madness
and Civilization " that overvalued a romantic-transgressive thesis that he never
gave up completely. In this sense, Foucault's radical breaks are only apparent.
and they really represent an attempt to escape the inconsistencies generated by
his continuing adherence to a transgressive approach reflected in his view on
power, normality, and pathology.
2 In relation to the idea o f historical discontinuity, Foucault was influenced early
on by G eorges Canguilhem, who developed a new structural history' o f science
that stated that science did n ot progress by gradual evolution, but involved a
series o f discontinuities.
1An interesting article by B objessop (2006) argued that despite Foucault's explicit
rejection o f Marxism, papers such as “Society Must Be Defended," “Securité,
Territoire, Population” (1977), and “Naissance d e la Biopolitique’’ (1978)
marked a turn on issues o f governmentality where this position is attenuated and
it is possible to identify resonances between him and Marx.
* According to an unpublished interview with the author by Enrique Escobar
(Paris, 2003), Castoriadis never denied the role o f power in society nor sought
to theorize a powerless social formation. He declared him self surprised at being
attentively read by som e anarchists since, as he said, he never agreed with their
position regarding power (Escobar, 2003).
r‘ See the following articles by Castoriadis: “T he Crisis o f Culture and the State"
(1991a), “Reflections on ‘Rationality’ and ‘D evelopm ent’” (1991e), “The
Institution o f Society and Religion" (1997h), and “Reflections on Racism"
(1997s).
C h a p te r 5
1 Unpublished manuscript byJoel Whitebook.
- W hitebook (n.d.) saw' Foucault’s position toward Freud as an ambivalent, never
entirely resolved tension. According to him , Foucault initially praised the founder
o f psychoanalysis for haring been the first to re-establish the dialogue with unreason
after the Great Confinement. However, Foucault could not develop a systematic
relationship with psychoanalysis because it conflicted with his temptation to
valorize transgression. Despite Foucault’s intellectual sophistication and early
insights into the need to theoretically articulate an extra-discursive dimension,
h e never addressed this question, which generated inconsistencies in his work.
' Ibid., pp. 37-40.
Notes 149
' Ibid., p. 38.

’ Klooger (2009. p. I l l ) added interesting observations about the idea o f
“leaning-on" in Castoriadis and proposed “a general division o f the concept" that
would differentiate the relationships between psyche and body and psyche and
society o n on e hand, and between self and environm ent on the other.
11T he idea o f anaclisis was introduced by Freud to describe the original relationship,
in the youn g child, between the sexual drives and the self-preservative functions.
Arising from a specific site in the organism (an erotogenic zon e), the sexual
drives at First prop themselves on the self-preservative functions, and only later
becom e independent. The self-preservative function thus sometimes offers its
own object to the sexual drive; this is what Freud calls “anaclitic object-choice."
Like the notion o f “deferred action" (Nachträglichkeit), that o f “anaclisis" or
“leaning-on" or “propping" (Anlehnung) constitutes a major theoretical concept
that always remained latent in Freud’s own work. . . . The German substantive
A n/fhnungis derived from the verb Sichanlehnung, m eaning to “lean on” or “prop
oneself on" . . . .What it describes is the support that sexuality derives, at the
beginning, from various functions and bodily zones related to self-preservation:
the m outh, the anus, the musculature, and so on. It is thus intimately bound
up with the Freudian conception o f infantile and adult sexuality as a much-
broadened sphere, far more comprehensive than the genital alone, and indeed
extending to the entire body.
T he notion made its appearance in the first edition o f “Three Essays on the
Theory o f Sexuality " . . . and was further explicated in later revisions o f that
work(Laplanche, n.d.).
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Index
ag e n cy , c o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y ,
d e m o c ra c y 90 p o litic s a n d d e m o c r a c y 62
F o u c a u lt's n o t i o n o f 134 s o c ie ty a n d h is to r y 6 1 -2
o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n 33, 63 c o u n te r- d is c o u r s e s 128
s elf-ag e n cy 1 1 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 4
SouB 32 d e m o c ra c y ,
s u b je c t, a n c ie n t G r e e k c r e a tio n o f 87
C a s to r ia d is f o r m u la tio n 66 c o n te m p o ra ry 90
c re a tiv e p s y c h ic a l c a p a c ity a n d d ir e c t 8 7 -8
s o c ie ty 70 i n s ti tu te d /in s ti tu ti n g p o w e r 7 8 - 9 , 88
h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 6 5 -6 P a ris C o m m u n e 89
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n 6 6 -7 p o litic s a n d p o litic a l, d is tin c tio n o f 8 6 -7
se lf-re fle c tiv e c a p a c ity 7 0 -1 r e p r e s e n ta tiv e 87
so c ia l-h is to ric a l c r e a tio n 67 d ir e c t d e m o c r a c y 8 7 -8
a n a c lis is see le a n in g -o n e x p la n a tio n th e o r y D iscipline a n d P u n ish 1 01-2
T he Archaeology o f Knowledge 9 8 - 1 0 0 , 123 d re a m s 3 9 - 4 1 , 1 1 7 -1 8 , I 4 5 n . 6
a u to g e s tio n p h a s e . S o u B 13
A lg e ria n W a r 30
F o u c a u lt’s w o rk ,
C a s to ria d is th e o r e tic a l a n a ly sis 3 1 -2
T he Λ n h a M logy o f Knowledge 9 8 -1 0 0
G a u llis m 31
T he B irth o f the Clinic 98
M a rx ist th e o ry , re v isio n s o f 31
D iscipline a n d P un ish 1 0 1 -2
g e n e a lo g ic a l a p p r o a c h , p o w e r 1 01-4
T h e B irth o f th e C linic 98
T he H istory o f Sexucdily,
b u r e a u c r a tic c a p ita lis m 12, 1 7 -1 8 , 21,
b io -p o w e r 103
I 4 3 n . 14
d is c o u r s e p r o d u c t io n 1 0 3 -4
su b jec tiv ity , s h ifts in 104
C a s to ria d is vs. F o u c a u lt, M adness a n d C ivilization 9 7 -8
c p is tc m o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic al T h e O tder o f T hings 9 8 -9
re la tiv is m 134 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u r s e 95
F r e u d 's w o r k 135 p o s ts tr u c tu r a lis m ,
in te rs u b jc c tiv ity 134 a e s d ie tic s o f e x is te n c e 95
m a in c o n t r ib u ti o n 133 e n l i g h t e n m e n t p r o p o s itio n s 94
m e a n in g a n d r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 136 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u r s e 95
p o litic a l p o s itio n s 137 h u m a n is m 9 6 -7
p sy c h o a n a ly sis 1 3 5 -6 la n g u a g e 92
r o le o f th e o r y 138 re a lity 9 2 -3
162 Index
s u b je c t 9 4 -5 T h e Im aginary In stitu tio n o f Society ( 1IS) 33

th e o r y o f d is c o u rs e 93 im a g in a ry s o c ia l sig n ific a tio n s (IS S),
tru th 9 2 ,9 5 - 6 d e f in itio n 55
p o w e r a n d e m a n c ip a tio n 107 h is to r y 56
te c h n o lo g i e s o f t h e s e lf 105 in s titu tin g p o w e r 74
ty p e s, te c h n o lo g ie s 104 le g e in a n d ic u k h c in 5 6 -7
F r e n c h F o r d is m 2 ,1 2 ,2 8 m a g m a o f s ig n if ic a tio n s 55
F r e n c h in te lle c tu a l g r o u p see S o c ia lis m e o u m a g m a tic a n d e n s id ic d im e n s io n s 57
B a r b a ric (S o u B ) s o c ia l m e a n i n g 72
im p e ria lis m 1 8 ,2 1 ,3 1
G a u llis m 10, 31 in d iv id u a l a u to n o m y ,
c o n s c io u s r e f le c tiv e n e s s 6 0 -1
I la b e rm a s ia n f ra m e w o rk , d e m o c ra c y 87
C a s to ria d is c o n c e p tio n 6 9 -7 1 E go a n d Id 59
p ro c e s s o f s o c ia liz a tio n , in tc rs u b jc c tiv ity 61
in d iv id u a l-s o c ie ty m e d ia tio n 68 in s titu te d s o cie ty ,

s o c ia l in d iv id u a l, lin g u is tic a u t o n o m o u s s o c ie ty 88
c a p a c ity 6 7 -8 c o lle c tiv e a u t o n o m y 62
p sy ch e a n d s o c ie ty 6 9 -7 0 h e te ro n o m y 5 8 , 111
h e te r o n o m y see also so cia l c h a n g e in te rs u b je c tiv ity 61
C a s to ria d is u n d e r s ta n d in g 110-11 le g e in a n d ic u k h c in 5 6 - 7 , 73
vs. h o m o g e n e ity 58 so cia l c lo s u r e 75
in s ti tu ti n g /in s ti tu te d so cie ty 111 i n s titu tin g society,
p o w e r a n d d o m i n a ti o n 1 10 a u t o n o m o u s s o c ie ty 88
so c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 139 c h a n g e a n d in n o v a tio n 73

so c ie ty 58 c o lle c tiv e a u t o n o m y 62
T h e H istory o f Sexuality, h e te ro n o m y 5 8 , 111
bio-power 103 s o c ia l-h is to ric a l 56

d is c o u r s e p r o d u c t io n 103—4 so cia l m e a n i n g 73—4
s u b je c tiv ity s h if ts in 101 in tc rs u b jc c tiv i ty,
h u m a n psyche, C a s to ria d is vs. F o u c a u lt 134
a f u n c tio n a lity 3 8 -9 F r e u d ’s s tu d y 34
C a s to ria d is v s. F r e u d c o n c e p ts 4 2 -4 in d iv id u a l a u t o n o m y 61
in d é te r m in a ti o n 3 9 -4 1 p o litic a l a r e n a 122
so cie ty see im a g in a ry so cia l ISS see im a g in a r y so cia l s ig n ific a tio n s (ISS)
s ig n ific a tio n s (ISS)
s tra tific a tio n , k n o w le d g e ,
le a n in g - o n e x p l a n a ti o n , c r e a tio n s u b je c t, s t r u c t u r e , a n d in s c r ip tio n o f 116
5 0 -2
m o n a d ic s ta g e 4 8 -9 le a n in g -o n e x p l a n a ti o n th e o ry ,
O e d ip a l p h a s e 4 9 -5 0 b io lo g ic a l- s o c ia l r e la tio n s h ip 125
p s y c h e t o s o c ie ty re la tio n 5 2 -4 I la b e r m a s ia n p o s itio n 68
s u b lim a tio n p ro c e s s 48 id e a o f 149n. 6
tr ia d ic p h a s e 49 liv in g -b e in g 67
W h ite b o o k 's c ritic is m 50 so c ie ty 54
h u m a n s e x u a lity 3 8 -9 s tr a tif ic a tio n , h u m a n p sy ch e 48
T h e H u n g a r ia n R e v o lu tio n 2 5 , 2 7 - 8 , 31 le g e in 5 6 -7
Index 163
L e T a m b o u r C a fé p h a s e , S ouB , tria d ic p h a s e 49
b u r e a u c r a ti e c a p ita lis m 1 7 -1 8 W h i te b o o k 's c ritic is m 50
K o rean W a r 22 T he O rder o f T h in g s 9 8 -9
M a rx ism 16 e p is te m e a n d d is c o u rs e 95
re v o lu tio n a ry p o litic s, p r o le ta r ia n s 19
T ro tsk y ism 15 p h a n ta s y 3 7 - 8 see also ra d ic a l
im a g in a tio n
M adness a n d C ivilization 9 7 -8 p o s ts tru c tu ra lis m ,
m agm a 4-! a e s th e tic s o f e x is te n c e 95
M a rx ist th e o ry , re v isio n s o f 31 e n l i g h t e n m e n t p r o p o s itio n s 94
e p is te m e a n d d is c o u rs e 95
o n to lo g y o f c r e a tio n see also so cia l c h a n g e h u m a n is m 9 6 -7
c lo s e d so cie ty . la n g u a g e 92
c o lle c tiv e a u to n o m y 61—2 re a lity 9 2 -3
h e te ro n o m o u s 58 s u b je c t 9 4 -5
in d iv id u a l a u to n o m y 5 9 -6 1 theory· o f d is c o u r s e 93
c o n t e m p o r a r y th e o ry , e x tr e m e s o f 33 tru th 9 2 .9 5 - 6
F r e u d ’s p s y c h o a n a ly tic a l fin d in g s 3 4 -5 P ouvoi r O uvrier ( P O ) 11
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n , p o w e r a n d d o m i n a ti o n .
A ris to tle v ie w 3 5 -6 C a s to ria d is w o rk ,
d e f in itio n 35 h e te ro n o m y 1 1 0 -1 1
f o u n d a t io n s o f 3 7 -8 in s titu tio n s 1 1 0 -1 2
h is to ric a l o m iss io n o f 3 6 -7 F o u c a u lt's th e o ry ,
K a n t’s i n t u iti o n 36 h is to r ic a l d isc o n tin u ity ' 109
o n to lo g ic a l a s s u m p tio n s 37 H o n n e th v iew 108
p h a n ta s y 4 1 -5 in s titu tio n s 112
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 3 8 -4 1 r u p tu r e s o f e p is te m e s 109
s o c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n o f so c ie ty 34 th e o r iz i n g p o w e r 109
IS S 5 5 -7
so cia l in s titu tio n s (S I) 55 ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n ,
s tr a ta , e x istin g -b e in g , A ris to tle v ie w 3 5 -6
fo r-itsc lf 4 5 -6 d e f in itio n 35
h e te ro g e n e o u s 45 f o u n d a t io n s o f 3 7 -8
h u m a n psyche 46 h is to ric a l o m is s io n o f 3 6 -7
in d iv id u a l a n d c o llectiv e K a n t’s i n t u iti o n 36
a u to n o m y 47 o n to lo g ic a l a s s u m p tio n s 37
ir r e d u c ib le 45 p h an tasy ,
liv in g -b e in g 46 C a s to ria d is vs. F r e u d c o n c e p ts 4 2 -4
so cia l in d iv id u a l 4 6 -7 m agm a 44
so cie ty a n d s o c ia l-h is to ric a l 47 u n c o n s c io u s lo g ic 4 1 -2
s tr a tif ic a tio n , h u m a n p sy c h e , p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n ,
fo r c e o f f o r m a tio n 5 0 -1 a f u n c tio n a lity 3 8 -9
le a n in g - o n e x p la n a tio n , c r e a tio n 5 0 -2 C a s to ria d is vs. F r e u d
m o n a d ic s u ig c 4 8 -9 c o n c e p ts 4 2 -4
O e d ip a l p h a s e 4 9 -5 0 i n d é te r m in a ti o n 3 9 -4 1
p s y c h e t o s o c ie ty re la tio n 52—4 r e p r e s e n ta tiv e d e m o c r a c y 87
s u b lim a tio n p ro c e s s 48 R u ssian b u r e a u c r a c y 1 7 -1 8
164 Index
so cia l c h a n g e , d ir e c t d e m o c r a c y , w o r k e r c o u n c ils 24
C a s to ria d is ’ a u to n o m y , I iu n g a r ia n C o u n c ils 2 6 -8
A d a m s view 8 0 -3 P o lish crisis 25
A rn a s o n v ie w 7 9 -8 3 p r o le ta r ia n m a n a g e m e n t 19
a u to - r e f le c tio n 78 s e lf - m a n a g e m e n t 18
C ia r a m e lli’s view 81 u n to u c h a b le tr u th s 14
c iv iliz a tio n a l a x ia l a g e a p p r o a c h 80 U SS R 1 1 - 1 2 ,1 7
d e ju r e v a lid ity 78 S o c ia lis m e o u B a r b a r ie (S o u B )
d em o cracy 7 8 - 9 .8 6 - 9 0 a u to g e s tio n ,
h e r m e n e u ti c a l tr a n s f o r m a tio n 80 A lg e ria n W a r 30
h e t e r o n o m o u s s o c ie ty 75 C a s to ria d is t h e o r e tic a l a n a ly sis 3 1 -2
h e te ro n o m y 84—5 G a u llis m 31
K lo o g c r view 7 9 ,8 4 M a rx is t th e o r y , rev isio n s o f 31
le g itim a tio n 7 7 ,7 9 c a p ita lis t o r g a n iz a tio n 2 8 -9
n o rm a tiv e d im e n s io n 7 6 - 7 ,1 3 0 c o n t e n t o f s o c ia lis m 29
p s y c h o a n a ly tic th e o r y 75 O n th e C o n te n t o f S o cia lism (I, II, III) 28
relativ ism 77 d e a th o f S ta lin 2 3 -4
S m ith v ie w 82 d e c e n tr a l iz e d d e m o c r a c y 30
C a s to ria d is vs. F o u c a u lt 134, 137, 139 E a s t B e rlin e v e n ts 2 3 -4
d e fe n s e s 74 F o rd is m , i n F r a n c e 12
F o u c a u lt's w o rk , F r e n c h s tr ik e 24
n o r m a tiv e c r ite r ia 1 2 9 -3 0 in itia l w o rk a n d issu es 10-11
p o litic s 1 2 7 -8 L c T a m b o u r C afé,
pow er 1 2 8 -9 b u r e a u c r a ti c c a p ita lis m 1 7 -1 8
re s is ta n c e a n d c o u n te r -d is c o u r s e s 128 K o re a n W a r 22
subject 322 M a rx ism 16
W a lz e r v ie w 131 r e v o lu tio n ä r) 1 p o litic s, p r o le ta r ia n s 19
so c ia l-h is to ric a l 7 4 -5 T ro tsk y ism 15
s o c ia l m e a n in g . m ista k e a c k n o w le d g m e n t, K o re a n
C a s to ria d is v s. F o u c a u lt 136 W ar 23
C a s to ria d is ' w ork, phases 1 3 -1 4
le g e in a n d te u k h e in , o p e r a tio n s o f 73 P o lis h crisis 25
m a g m a tic o rg a n iz a tio n 73 Pouvoir O uvrier ( P O ) 11
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 1 2 5 -6 s e lf-o rg a n iz a tio n , w o rk in g c la ss 27
a n d r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 74 S o c ia lis m R e a ffirm e d 1 4 2 n . 12
s o c ia l in s titu tio n s 72 in U SS R 1 1 -1 2
sta b ility 7 3 -4 w o rk e rs ’ c o u n c ils , tr a d itio n o f 1 2 -1 3 , 2 6
F o u c a u lt's w o rk , s o c ia liz a tio n , p r o c e s s of,
body a n d psyche 126 in d iv id u a l- s o c ie ty m e d ia t io n 68
d is c o u rs e a n d p o w e r 123 s o c ia l in d iv id u a l, lin g u is tic
e p is te m ic r u p tu r e s 123 c a p a c ity 6 7 -8
p sy ch ic al r e p r e s e n t a ti o n 125 society,
p s y c h o a n a ly s is 127 B e in g 140
se lf-a g e n c y 124 d e m o c ra c y 7 8 .8 6
s o c ia l p r a c tic c s 1 2 3 -4 h is to r y 8 2 -3
so cia lism , h o m o g e n e ity 58
C a s to ria d is d e f i n iti o n 12 T h e 1 I u n g a r i a n R e v o lu tio n 27
Index
in d iv id u a l a n d 6 8 , 70 p a n o p tic p o w e r 120
in s titu te d s o c ic ty w e in s ti tu te d society p o w e r, e f f e c ts o f 119
in s titu tin g s o c ic tv see in s titu tin g so cic ty p sy c h o a n a ly sis a n d e th n o lo g y 1
K o rean W a r 22 p s y c h o lo g ic a l irr e g u la r itie s 120
p o litic s 86 r e c ip r o c ity 122
p o w e r a n d d is c o u r s e 123 s o c ie ty a n d so cia l c h a n g e 122
psych e a n d 5 2 -7 , 6 9 -7 0 W illiam s view 121
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n 67 s u b je c tific a tio n ,
R u s sia n so c ic ty 1 7 -1 8 F o u c a u lt's v ie w 10 7 , 11 5 , 117
s o c ia l c h a n g e 74 g e n e a lo g y 102
s o c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 3 2 , 47 in t e r p r e ta tio n s 122
s o c ia lis m 30 p a n o p tic p o w e r 12 0
s o c ia l m e a n i n g a n d in s titu tio n s 72 power, effects of 119

SouB 31 s o c ia l-h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 139
s u b je c t a n d 71 s p a c e o f in t c r io r i ty 1 1 9 -2 0
th e o r y o f d is c o u r s e 93 a n d s u b je c tio n 120
S o v iet c a p ita lis m 17 s u b je c tiv ity
s tr u c tu ra lis m 30 body 101
s u b je c t, C a s to ria d is p o w e r 110
C asto riad is* w ork , C a s to r ia d is ' u n d e r s ta n d in g o f 71
agency 70 d e m o c ra c y 7 8 ,8 6
c re a tiv e p s y c h ic a l c a p a c ity a n d F o u c a u lt p o w e r 108
so cie ty 70 g e n e a lo g y 105
h is to ric a l d im e n s io n 6 5 -6 in d iv id u a liz a tio n 106
im a g in a tio n 118 in s titu tin g p o w e r 76
le a n in g o n e x p la n a tio n 47 T h e Order o f T hings 98
ra d ic a l im a g in a tio n 6 6 -7 p o w e r-d is c o u rs e m a tr ix 93
so c ia l-h is to ric a l c r e a tio n 67 p o w e r, r e la tio n s h ip s o f 102
u n c o n sc io u s 66 p s y c h o a n a ly s is 136
F o u c a u lt's w o rk , s p a c e o f in t c r io r i ty 119
Dews’ view 120-1 tr a n s c e n d e n ta lis m 135
F re u d ’s a p p ro a c h 117 tr a n s f o r m a tio n o f p o w e r 12 2
im a g in a tio n 118 w o rk in g c la ss 13
o n e iric w o rld a n d d re a m s 117
T h e O rder o f T h ings 116 te u k h e in 5 6 -7

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B L O O M S B U R Y STUDIES IN C O N T I N E N T A L P HI L OS O PH Y

“C o r n e liu s C astoriadis was o n e o f th e m o st o r ig in a l a n d im agin ative social

“In a c lo s e r e a d in g o f th e se w orks, T ovar-R estrepo gives a rig o ro u s a n d pas­

“T ovar-R estrepo’s r e a d in g o f C astoriadis, a lesser-k n ow n c o n tem porar)' o f

Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy

© Marcela Tovar-Restrepo 2012

All rights reserved. N o part o f this publication may be reproduced

B r itis h L ib r a r y C a ta lo g u in g -in -P u b lic a tio n D a ta

ISBN: I IB: 978-1-4411-3404-2

Library o f Congress Cataloguingnn-Publication Data

Typeset by Dcanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai. India

A cknowledgm ents viii

C h a p ter 1: T h e S o cia lism e o u B arbarie P e r io d ( 1 9 4 9 -6 5 ) 9

C h a p ter 2: C o r n e liu s C astoriad is’ O n to lo g y o f C rea tio n 33

C h a p ter 3: A gen cy a n d A u to n o m y in C astoriadis 65

C h a p ter 4: M ich el F oucault: T h e G am e o f P ow er a n d R esistan ce 91

C h a p ter 5: S o c iety O ver th e Su bject 115

C h a p ter 6: C astoriadis versus F oucault: C o n c lu d in g Rem arks 133

I w o u ld lik e to exp ress m y g ra titu d e to R ichard B e rn ste in , J o e l W h iteb ook ,

C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘La C u ltu re d a n s u n e S o c ié lé D é m o c r a tiq u e ’

W hat art p resen ts are n o t th e Id eas of R eason fa s K ant b e lie v e d ] b u t the

C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘C u ltu re in a D em ocratic Society'

Hobbes a v a it raison, mais p a s p o u r ses raisons à lui. L a p e u r de la mort est la

C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘P sychanalyse e t P o litiq u e ’

C o r n e liu s C astoriadis. ‘Psychoanalysis a n d P o litics’

M ich el F o u c a u lt an d C o r n é liu s C astoriad is’ so c ia l th e o r ie s a r o se as

c o n text a n d to t h e d e b a te s taking p la c c in F ran ce a n d ab road p roved to be

Sp iros S tin as. H is m ilitan cy c o n tin u e d u n til t h e e n d o f 1 9 4 5 w h en h e le ft for

c o n c lu d e d a d ip lo m a c o u r se in 1952. B etw een 1 9 5 4 a n d 1955 h e w ork ed at

A lo n g ill is lin e, th ey so u g h t to e x p la in reality as a social con str u c t th rou gh

c o n c e p tio n s o f th e subject, society, an d social c h a n g e sh o u ld allow us to go

C astoriadis' theory. A s a corollary o f th e se d e b a te s, th e n o tio n o f a u to n o m y

T he Socialisme ou Barbarie Period

T h e sig n ifica n t rela tio n sh ip b etw een C astoriadis’ w o r k d u r in g th e S o cia lism e

Early Productions o f C ornelius Castoriadis:

D u rin g th e preparatory d iscu ssio n s fo r th e S e c o n d C on gress o f the Fourth

in 1956 a n d , as said, th e U SSR in g e n era l. C astoriad is was high ly critical o f

that w e n t from a c ritiq u e o f S talin ism a n d L e n in ism to a critiq u e o f

a) A fu st p h ase from 1949 to 1953 w h e n th e g r o u p b egan q u e stio n in g and

T h e th r e e d iffe re n t m o m e n ts S ou B e x p e r ie n c e d w ere in r esp o n se to

a n d e sp e c ia lly by C astoriadis, to o k h im to a m ajor p h ilo so p h ic a l a n d political

th e m o tiv a tio n s o f th e m asses fo r rev o lu tio n an d t h e real p olicy o f th e CP

B e in g a M arxist sig n ifies for us situ a tin g o n e s e l f o n th e terrain o f tradi­

T his p o s itio n tow ard M arxism r efle c te d th e ir u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e statem en t:

C astoriadis h ad to start w ith a c o m p r e h e n siv e u n d e rsta n d in g o f capitalism .

m o d e r n cap italist p rod u ction : th e c o n c e n tr a tio n o f p ro d u ctiv e forces, th e

For C astoriadis, in th e R ussian ease, th e revolu tion ary party was

in itia ted by M arxism . C astoriadis saw a c o n tr a d ictio n b etw een the

T h e so le th eo retica l “answer" that can b e given consists in saying that the

T h is p o s itio n was officially m a in ta in e d b y th e g r o u p for s o m e years, e v en

d iffe re n t form s o f th e sa m e reality. I f th e g r o u p w as to take a p osition b efo re

a m o n g n a tio n a l a n d reg io n a l m o n o p o lie s for m aterials an d m arkets, both

N e w p e r sp e c tiv e s o f so cia lism (1953—5 / 8 )

A fter 1953 t h e g r o u p started a n e w p h a se . It grew in size w ith n ew m em b ers

o f th e g r o u p , as w e ll as n o tio n s that h ad b e e n w o r k e d o u t in th e past years.

th e m . In th e S ou B p ersp ectiv e, th e USSR p r e te n d e d to lessen th e C o ld War

T h e m e n tio n e d strikes c o n stitu te d two d iffe r e n t r esp o n ses to th e

fu tu re r e v o lu tio n s in th e East. C ontrary to th e P o lish case w h er e th e CP

a n d W estern cap italism . T h e I lu n g a ria n C o u n c ils w ere a m an ifesta tio n , in

t h e p r o b le m o f r ev o lu tio n a n d its r e-c o n c ep tu a liz a tio n e m e r g e d from th e

O n c c again d iffe rin g w ith M arx a b o u t th e tr u e c o n te n t o f socialism ,

n o t d u c to t h e an a rch y o f th e m arket o r to th e fa llin g rate o f profit; it was

A th ird p h a se in th e h istory o f S o u B b e g a n in 1958, a year in w h ich t h e final

“In a c lo s e r e a d in g o f th e se w orks, T ovar-R estrepo gives a rig o ro u s a n d pas

B e in g a M arxist sig n ifies for us situ a tin g o n e s e l f o n th e terrain o f tradi

In g e n e r a l . . . all “sep arate” r ep resen ta tio n s th at w ak in g lo g ic necessar

se t o f form s. U n d e te r m in e d création , how ever, d o c s n ot m ean u n c o n d i