Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

Maintaining The Rule of Law

Author(s): Peter Ingram
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 141, Special Issue: Philosophy and the Law
(Oct., 1985), pp. 359-381
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
University of St. Andrews
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ThePhilosophical Vol.35 No. 141
Quarterly
ISSN 0031-8094$2.00

MAINTAINING THE RULE OF LAW

BY PETERINGRAM

The rule of law has suffered Here I wishto

manyinterpretations.'
examineand developone ofthesimplest.The ruleoflawis tobe understood
in contrastto theruleof men.2And howis thedifference
firstand foremost
between theruleoflawandtheruleofmentobe mostaptly characterized?
Simply, thereis an opposition betweentheidea of actionswhichare an
expressionoftheagent'swillandtherefore also,toooften,
an expression of
hispartiality, or liability
irrationality to error,andtheidea ofactionsthat,
although theyarestilla person'sactions,areguidedandevendetermined by
lawas a securesystem ofrulesrepresenting abiding generalstandardsand
notimmediately embodying theparticular desiresofindividuals.Ofcourse,
legalrulesthemselves are byno meanspermanent; andtheyare created,
changedand abolishedby people.3They can reflectbiases,embody
misguided values,andexpress theirintentwrongly orambiguously; andthey
aresubjecttoerror ininterpretation andexecution. Nevertheless,as general
rules,lawsstrivetobe independent ofpersonal whims. More,they arenotso
muchsetapartfrom peopleas - ideally - setabovethem.The ruleoflawis
notmerely an alternativetotheruleofmen;moreimportantly itstandsfor
theprinciplethatlawis abovemen.Oncelawsarecreated theyacquirefrom
theircreators an authorityof theirown,whichis to a significant degree
independent.4
1
Fora treatmentofhistoricaldevelopments theideaoftheruleoflawsee F. A.
affecting
Hayek,TheConstitutionofLiberty (London,1960),especially162-75and234-49.
2 InhisclassicformulationDiceycontraststheruleoflaw"with every systemofgovernment
basedon theexercise bypersonsin authority ofwide,arbitrary,or discretionary
powersof
constraint". totheStudy
(Introduction oftheLawoftheConstitution
(London, 8thed.,1924),184.)
3 Ithastobe concededthatinthelastanalysislawisdetermined bymenand"behind therule
oflawtherecanbe concealed thebestandworst ruleofmen"(Gottfried Dietze,TwoConcepts
of
theRuleofLaw (Indianapolis, 1973),46. Butthisis toignoretheaspiration'theruleoflaw'
connotes.
4 The autonomy oflaw,as idealandfact,isonefocalpointforRobertoUnger's thought.The
dissolution
ofautonomy is thedissolution oftheruleoflaw:seeLawinModem (New
Society
York,1976),192ff.

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360 PETER INGRAM

Theseideasarenolonger novelorstriking. Butitisworth emphasizing at

thestartthissuperficially simpleunderstanding ofwhattheruleof law
A commitment
signifies. totheruleoflawis anacceptance ofa requirement
torespect therulesandputthemfully intoeffect.The claimonwhichthis
paperis founded canbe summarily stated:a legalsystem consiststypically
(although not exclusively)of rulesasserting a generalapplicability,5the
applicability of a rule as decisivein an appropriate kindof case is
acknowledged, andwithitsapplicability recognized itisappliedinpractice to
thisorthatactualcase.
The problem herefora theory oflawis twofold. Although an essential
beliefunderlying the rule of law is thatlaws are superiorto people,
nevertheless theyarebothcreated bypeopleandgiveneffect through human
willand agency.This necessary humanrelationship oflawraisesserious
In thispaperI wantto leaveasidethoseassociated
difficulties. withthe
humancreationand abolition of legalrulesto deal withthedifficulties
associated withtheadministration andexecution ofrules.In otherwords,
concentration willbe on themaintenance ofan establishedruleoflaw.The
purposeofthispaperassumesthatonthefoundation ofanestablished body
ofrulestheruleoflawis an enduring featureofsociallife,believed in (or
accepted) bythosewhooperate thesystem andbyatleastsomeofthosewho
aremerely subjecttothelaw;thisseemsa faircharacterization ofourown
andother western legalsystems. What,then, arethedifficultiesinupholding
theconcept oftheruleoflawas partofa descriptive analysisofourownlegal
system, andas a normative requirement fortheconcept ofa legalsystem as
such?
The objection totheidealpicture ofa society governed bytheruleoflaw
is thathumandecision-making playsdirectly a crucialroleat twopointsin
theutilizationofrules.First, itispeoplewhodetermine whichrule(orrules)
amongseveralis applicable; second,itis peoplewhomustdecidetoputan
applicableruleintopractice intheinstant case,andnottoignore itormake
an excuseforexemption from it.Thusitcanbe arguedthattheexecution of
lawis (orcouldbe) a deliberate actofchoiceforthosewhoarecharged with
administering thelaw.Ifthisobjection canbe upheld,a crucialelement in
theideaoftheruleoflawturns outtobelacking. Ofcourselawis a practical
instrument forpeoplein theirsociallives,butourconception ofitis as a
bodyof standards, principles and (ideally)generalrequirements. If the
objector'scaseis substantially correct, lawsare(orhavethepotential tobe)
individualsocialfeatureswhich, whileuseful, may- inpractice, whatever the
superficial
description - be employed orsetasideonanyoccasionas certain
5
See, forexample, ofLaw (New Haven,1964),46. For
Lon L. Fuller,TheMorality
as a moralidealtheconcern
generality mustbe withthedegreeofitthatlawshouldattain;
as suchis atleasttypical
generality oflaw.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 361

peoplethinkfit.Officials wouldbe abovetherules,nottherulesabove

The useoflawandtheforceofobligation
officials. wouldbe dependent on
an individual'swilland hisexerciseofpower.Andso theidea oflawsas
independent rules- crucialto the rule of law - wouldbe implicitly
destroyed, fortheconcept ofa ruleis notthatofa standard foractionwhich
we maytakeup orleaveas suitsus: a ruleis nota pieceofadvice.We can
makeandunmake rulesbut,oncemade,theyendureandbindus. It must
therefore be shownthatthetwogapsbetween a rule'sexistence and the
employment oftheruleina concrete case,onwhichtheobjection depends -
thegapbetween conceding thata ruleexistsanddetermining itsapplicabil-
andthegapbetween
ity,6 acknowledging itsapplicabilityandputting itinto
practice- are notalwaysor typically present, and do notconstitute an
obstacleto accepting theprinciple oftheruleoflaw.
To follow a rule,ormoreuniversally, tobe committed'to a system ofrules
as operativeforguiding behaviour, is toaccepttheprinciple thatlikecases
shouldbe treated Thatis tosay,I amfollowing
alike.7 a ruleifandonlyifI
treatallcasesthatfallundertheruleas theruledictates I shouldtreat them.8
Admittedly thisraisesatoncethequestion ofinterpreting whena particular
case actuallyfallsundertherule(or failsto do so); somecaseswillbe
included within,someexcludedfrom theambitoftherule:thisin shortis
theproblem of'hardcases'.9ButonceI haveaverred thatI amfollowing a
rule,andifI havedeclared thatI believetheinstantcasetofallunderit,I am
committed toapplying theruleinpractice toit,unlessI canappealtosome
excusingconditionto make 'a specialcase'. Exceptions mustremain
exceptions,however. Ifa ruleis toendureas a rule,ifitis tobe upheldas a
practicalrulethatactually guidesbehaviour, itmustbe appliedmoreoften
thannot(or at leastin significant cases).'1In sum,iflawsare rulesthey
requiretobe appliedtoevery
logically relevantcase;a failure ofapplication
6 ofa ruleis hardly DavidLyons's
Ofcoursetheexistence unproblematic. See,forexample,
treatmentofHart'sposition that"theexistence inEthics
ofa ruleisa speciesofsocialfact", and
theRuleofLaw (Cambridge, 1984),51ff.
7 Thisis simplytheapplicationoftheconceptual logicoftheterm'rule',nota dictate of
moralityorprudence. Thispointis insufficiently emphasized byHart:cf.TheConcept ofLaw
(Oxford, 1961),156.
8 Thisneedstobe
qualifiedbysaying thatwhatI do willbe partly oftherule:
constitutive
undercertainconditions myunderstanding of therule,as manifested bymyactions, will
contributetoanobserver's formulationofwhattheruleis.Theconditions include
certainly that
I shouldbe prepared to acknowledge thatI amfollowing a ruleandthattheruleshouldbe
publicnotprivate otherwise
(thatis,personal); thestatement ofa supposed rulewillcollapse
intobeinga meredescription ofregularity ofbehaviour,andbeyond intoa solipsistic
following
ofa private rulewhichwouldpresent all theproblems associatedwiththeprivate-language
argument.
9 Theideaof'hard cases'isbasedonHart'saccount oftheopentexture oflawinTheConcept
ofLaw,123ff.
10See Raz,The
J. Concept ofa LegalSystem (Oxford,1970),203-4.

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362 PETER INGRAM

requirestobe explained.
Yetalthough thenon-enforcement ofa ruleother
thanbymistake orignorance detractsfroma conceptionoflawas a bodyof
generalrules,exceptionsare properly made in appropriatecases. The
dictumthata rulelogically
requires tobe appliedto everyrelevantcase is
qualifiedby fourconsiderations: the phenomenon of hard cases, the
existenceof specialcases, the interactionbetweenlaws as rulesthat
mayhavea bearing
individually oneachother, oflawsto
andtherelationship
thesystem ofwhichtheyforma part.The pointto be madeis thatthe
toaccount
available
explanations forthesuperficial
exemption ofa casefrom
an applicable do notdetract
rulelargely frombutrather supporttheideaof
theruleoflaw.

II
Hardcaseshavebecomea perennial featureofjurisprudential thinking.
Theypresent a problem forphilosophers, byreasonoftheir for
implications
conceptuallogic and the increasingly important notionof contested
concepts;and theypresenta problemforlawyers, bothbecauseof the
didactic
importance ofleadingcases,whichoften devolve ondifficult
points
ofinterpretation(andnotinfrequently, through theirrationes,proveto be
sourcesoffuture hardcases),andbecauseofthelegalsignificance incourt
ofreported
practice cases,whichoften concern theresolution ofhardpoints.
Hardcaseshavethereby cometo possessa significance fortheory which
wouldnotinitially seemwarranted bytheiractualincidence in practice,
ifitis conceded- as itmustbe - thatnota fewhardpointsare
especially
raisednaively
or,worse,disingenuously. Itis important toaccordhardcases
theirproperplace;a misperception ofthefrequency ofoccurrence ofhard
casesmakesiteasiertoadopttheextreme (and,as I shallargue,erroneous)
thatpotentially
position everycase is genuinely hard,thattheproblem of
whichemerges
interpretation forhardcasesexemplifies a problemlatent
in
everyuseofthelaw."Inpractice, hardcasesareexceptional nottypical;
the
penumbra ofdoubtfortheruleoccasioned bytheopentexture ofconcepts
doesnotaffect thehardcoreofcertainty forlawyers. Andthishardcoreof
hasbeenrecognized
certainty byphilosophers too.12Overwhelmingly, most
1 Theplausibilityofsucha position isindicated, forexample,byAllanHutchinson andJohn
Wakefield's critical
treatment ofDworkin'swork.Theyarguethat"ifDworkin is tomaintain
anydegreeofconsistency orcoherence, hemusttreat allcasesas 'hardcases'".("Ahardlookat
'hardcases'",OxfordJournal 2 (1982),88.)
ofLegalStudies,
12 A rulehasa "coreof as wellas a "penumbra ofdoubt", andso thereare"clear
certainty"
central cases".(Hart,op.cit.,119.)Hartdoesnotestablish theextent ofthecoreofcertainty;if
"inthevastmajority ofcasesthattrouble thecourts" therulesallowofmorethanoneresult
(ibid.,12) he oughttobelieveittobe verylimited indeed.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 363

casesarenothard,eventhough therulethatstraightforwardly settles

present
casesmayitselfhavebeencreatedor developed in thesettlement ofsome
historic
hardcases.
In anyeventtheuse oflawdoesnotconsist justinthedeciding ofcases
thatcomebeforethecourts.Legal rulesfindtheireffectiveness in their
understanding andrepeated usebyordinary peopleintheir everyday livesin
a straightforwardandunquestioning way.'3 Whenthereis contact withthe
lawitis often relatedtorelatively
petty matters. Whensuchcasesreachthe
courts theyaredealtwithaccording toclearrulesandnotseldomina matter
of minutes.In the legal systemin whichtheyoccurtheycouldnever
orcoherently
realistically be settledanyotherway.Itis thisthattheconcept
ofa hardcaserequires: thatan alternative outcome haveinitialplausibility.
Anytheoretical mileagethattheremaybe inconsidering howa straightfor-
wardmatter oflawcouldbecomea hardcasecomesatthecostofdivorcing
boththecaseandtheruleorruleswhichmayapplyfrom an establishedand
complex background ofsocialinstitutions.
Allthisis nottodenythatanappreciable number ofhardcasesdo arisein
genuine fashion. However, thenumber thatsurvive as hardcasesinthelegal
processis diminished by the use of procedures, whichof courseare
themselves rule-based.Whenhardcasesariseinrelation totheunderstand-
ingoflawortheinterpretation ofthecase- whichruleis toapply, orhowa
ruleis to be read- mechanisms are provided byotherrulesin thelaw
whereby theapparent initial
hardpointcanoften be resolved orsidestepped.
(This foreshadows theimportance in a legalsystem ofrelationsbetween
rules,to be discussedshortly.) There are rulesof precedent, rulesof
analogy, rulesofinterpretation,
amongothers. Theremaybe rule-governed
reference to fundamental principlesunderlying thelaw,to thepractice of
otherlegalsystems, to therequirements ofinternational law- theseare
movesoutsidethelegalsystem whicharestillcontrolled bytherulesofthe
system. Andthereareother rulesofpractical legalreasoning - inshort,rules
abouttheuse ofrules.14 Wherea hardcasepresents withreference to the
understanding ofonerule,oras toa choicebetween rules,inisolation,the
problem maybe resolved whenreference is widenedto includea bodyof
rules.Wheredifficultiescannot be dealtwithina substantive wayinternal to
therulesthemselves whichdirectly relatetothecase,thereis scope(through
preordained methods offormal procedure) fora moreorless'mechanical'
outcometo be attempted. The problemmaynot be solved,but it is
sidestepped. Throughsuchprocedures theruleoflawis able to reassert
13 The principal
functions
ofthelawaretobe seen"inthediverse waysinwhich
thelawis
usedtocontrol, toguide,andtoplanlifeoutofcourt".(Ibid.,39.)
14 One wayof Hart'ssecondaryrulesis to describe
themas beingabout
characterizing
primaryrules.(Ibid.,92.)

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364 PETER INGRAM

itself
justwhenitseemsonthebrink offailure.
Ifhardcasesepitomize a gap
between theruleonpaperandinterpreting thatruleinpractice, itis a gap
onlyoccasionally present in reality.
The mechanism oflawconsists notin discreteapplicationsofindividual
rulesbut in instantiations of a coherent rule-processin whichmoves
between rulesarethemselves rule-governed. Proportionatelytherearefew
stubborn, conceptually hard cases wherethe judge does not have a
straightforward, legalrule-based procedure to follow(as opposedto the
simplistic exampleofbeingobligedto attempt to obeythedictates ofone
rulealone).Buteveninrelation toenduring hardcases,andinthecontext of
an adversarialprocess, although theremaybe roomfordoubt, andalthough
thereare actualoccasionswhenthescalesare evenly balanced,it is not
always difficult
todiscern whichsidehasthemarkedly stronger caseand,in
theframework ofthelegalsystem as a whole,howtherulesbearing on the
caseought(oroughtnot)tobe interpreted andapplied.15The obvious point
thatthereis a distinctionbetween notional conceivable)
(logically doubtand
reasonable doubtneedsyettobe stressed. Andevenreasonable doubtsand
arguments possessvarying strengths. The right answeris notalwaysto be
contrasted withan alternative thatis absolutely wrong;ratherit is an
outcome thatis tobepreferred toothers whichhavea weaker foundation, or
arelessfitting(withreference tothepresent bodyoflaw)orlessuseful(with
reference toconceivable future cases).The resolutionofhardcases,farfrom
beinga problem fora legalsystem, canservetostrengthen it,enabling itto
removeinconsistencies thathavearisenfrompastdevelopments and to
prepareitselfto deal withpresentand future socialchanges.This said,
however, it needsagainto be stressedthatin thevastmajority of the
applications oflawwhatever gaptheremaybe in terms ofconceptual logic
between thestatement ofa ruleanditspractical itis a gapthatis
utilization,
bridged automatically withno awareness ofanyconceptual problem.

III

To agreethattheruleis applicablein principle mightnot,it seems,

requireus in logicto agreeimmediately to applyit in anyrelevantcase.
Thereis thepossibility of an interposing
condition whichwillobligeor
permit us tomodifyan applicableruleorforestall
us from iteffect
giving at
all.As withhardcasesitcanbe feltthatreflecting
onthispossibility
brings
howoftenone sideeffectively
15 It can be forgotten concedestheotherside'scase and
argues,say,simply of sentence
formitigation or damages.In criminalcases,of course,a
number
significant ofaccusedpersonsnever
trytoarguea point(hardorotherwise)
andplead
guiltyattheoutset.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 365
out a characteristiclatentin everycase, as if everytimethata case came
before us, despite our acknowledgment of the relevantrule's clear
we were requiredto make a moreor less consciousdecision
applicability,
actuallyto put the rule intopractice.Certainlythereare legitimate special
cases. But theyare exceptions, notonlyas stated,butalso in thejustificatory
reasoningtheyemploy.They can onlybe made when thereare accepted
groundsfordoingso. These maybe substantive groundsas providedfor
eitherbyotherrulesofthesystemor bythewidersocialand moralcontexts
in whichexcusesand mitigating and excludingconditionsare assessedand
accepted.Such exceptionsmaybe properly describedas systematic. On the
otherhand, in some cases any substantive groundson whichto base an
exceptionmaybe indeterminable, and thesewillhaveto be characterized as
ad hocspecialcases whichare in thestrictest termsanomalies.
The characteristics of different special cases meritexploration.The
makingof a specialcase maybe supportedbyreference to some otherrule,
eitherone thatexplicitly governstheoperationofthefirst rule,or one thatis
implicitlypre-emptive. If thereference to theotherrulecannotbe seriously
placed in question,and indeedcan be said to be requiredbythesystem, the
'specialness'of the case disappears,fortheprocessstilltakesplace wholly
withintheframework ofrules.This kindofprocessservesto emphasizethe
distinction betweencontemplating theworkings of a singlerulein isolation
and considering a complexcase fromtheperspective ofan interactivesystem
ofrules.The scopeformakinga specialcase byreferences to otherruleswill
itselfbe rule-governed, perhapsexpressly, but oftentacitlythroughregular
procedurescreatedbycustomand practice.
Such apparentrule-exemptions willnotbe truespecialcases. These latter
can be brokendownintotwokinds.There are specialcases whichseem to
be rule-exemptions whenwe looksimplyat a strictinterpretation oftherule
or rulesthatare or could be directly involved:on theotherhand,ifwe look
moredeeplyintothelegal systemas a whole,withitsmoralprinciplesand
socialpurposes,thenwe shallfindthatwhatappearsto be an exemption on
thesurface,once understood moreprofoundly, ultimatelyremainsfaithfulto
the systemof rulesas a whole.
So it maybe indisputablethata specialcase bothis an exceptionto the
immediaterulein questionand cannotbe explainedwithreference directly
to anyotherrulesor regularpracticeswhichmightreasonably havea bearing
on theissue.For example,thereseemsno scopeforthetechnicalmanoeuvre
ofsuccessfully distinguishing thecase,in orderthata decisioncan be arrived
at on a rule-basis.16 Nevertheless,makingan exceptionis justifiedby

16
The techniqueofdistinguishing
is onewayofdealingwith"mistaken" and
precedents
lawfrom
forestalling outalonga wrong
setting path.See below,n.48.

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 366 PETER INGRAM

referenceto somepointaboutthesystemoflaw as a whole- perhapsto an

obvious,underlying principleof law,perhapsto some manifest purposeof
law,perhapsto thelegalnonsenseof decidingtheinstantcase in anyother
way.'7It is significantthatherereference has to be madeto thesystemoflaw
and notto anysingleruleor simplecollectionofindividual rules.Once again
thereis an important contrastto be madebetweenlookingat,so to speak,a
bundle of interacting rules and lookingat a legal system- an integrated
whole. Indeed, a fullunderstanding of the systemcannotbe achievedby
doing no more than examiningthe bearingsome rules have on others,
individually considered.The finaljustification and purposeof the system,
and the basic principleswhichare dearestto it,cannotbe graspedby the
apperceptionof discreterules.1'If there is some sense to a systemic
understanding of law,thenit makessense too to suggestthatsome special
cases, though'special' at the level of individualrules,neverthelessare
consistent withsomeunderlying principleorpurposeofthesystem, and thus
remaintrueto thesystem.Thereforethesecases arenotto be consideredas
'special' in any pejorativeway,as some of the special cases in the next
categoryoughtto be; theybetraythe letterof the law in orderto remain
faithful to its spirit.To theissues thispointraisesI shallreturnshortly.
Additionally itmustbe concededthattherearespecialcaseswhichremain
anomalous in the contextof the rules and the rule-system, however
understood.In thiscategory we findthespecialcases thatremainexceptions
to the law in both letter and spirit after all possible analyses and
interpretations of the systemas a workingsystemof rules.These special
cases cannotbe supportedbyreference to anyrulesofa substantivekind,or
to therelationships betweenrules,or to purposesorprinciples ofthesystem
as a whole. (Of coursetheyare supported, vacuously,by the discretionary
rulesthatpermitthemto happen.)It is not to be deniedthatthereare a
numberofirredeemably specialcases whichare onlyto be accountedforon
groundsunrelatedto rule-basedlaw- groundsofpublicpolicy,or morality,
or expediency, or even theindividualjudge's (or jury's)personalpredilec-
tions.Bythistime,however, iftheearliercomments ofthissectionholdtrue,
the numberof cases thatremainwithtruespecial-casestatusshould be
limited.
Evenwiththeseremaining specialcases,muchofwhatis decidedmustbe
in accordwithconsiderations ofreasonableness; muchofwhatis donebythe
17 More
widely,in a contextof consequentialism,
Neil MacCormickclaimsthatdifficult or
"less obvious" court decisionsare based on consequentialistreasons,or reasons of legal
principle,or "mostpowerfully" on bothsortsoperatingin combination.
See LegalReasoning and
Legal Theory (Oxford,1978), 206.
18 This is whyDworkinrequireshis judge Hercules to be "a lawyerof superhuman skill,
learning,patienceand acumen".(TakingRights (London,rev.ed., 1978), 105.)
Seriously

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 367
courtsorofficials makessensein a widermoral,socialorpolitical context,
and in the last resorthas to bow to the need foracceptability.9 This
acceptability mayadmittedly be ofa clearly non-legal kind.As withhard
cases,wherethereis a difference between thosewherewe can reasonably
makeouta primaface occurrence of"hardness" andthosewhereitis simply
stretching the boundsof credibility to do so (justin orderto makea
philosophical point),sowithspecialcaseswecanmakea distinction between
thosewherethereis genuine scopeinthesystem fora "special"decision and
thosewherean exemption couldnotbe madeand be acceptable in the
context of thesystem. (Of course,thedefactolimitsof acceptability are
alwayschanging; theywillnotbe thesameforall societies, orevenforone
society at different periods.)
It is implausible to suggest thatthereis alwaysa potential gapbetween
accepting theapplicability ofa ruleandactually applying it,as ifatfirst
sight
every casecouldbecomea specialcasebefore thefinaldecision wasreached,
oras iftosaythatsomething ought tobe doneisnotbyitself andonitsfacea
sufficient practical reasonforaction.Whilethereis alwaysthechancethat
any case will becomea specialcase through a perverseor mistaken
judgment, theuse ofsuchwordsshowsthatnotanyspecialcase shouldbe
regarded as validinmorethanthebarestformal sense.To speakofmistakes
andperverseness onlyconcedestheneedforacceptability. Itis notthecase
thatoneachoccasion wehavetochoosetoutilize theapplicability ofa ruleas
a practical reasonforactually applying it. On thecontrary, thegap that
reasonsupposedly hastobridgeis notthere;wehavetomakea decision to
createit.In an individual casewedecide- forsomeexceptional reason- to
derogate from therulewhichwewouldotherwise proceedstraightforwardly
toapply. Wearerequired inlegalorextra-legal waystojustify thecreation of
thisgap.The presumptive position is thatan applicable ruleoughtto be
applied.
The occurrence oftruespecialcasesis necessarily linked totheexistence
of discretion in the legal system.Special cases createdby the use of
discretion aremuchmorenumerous thanhardcases,andoccuratthelowest
levels;forexaniple, everydecisionofthepolicenottoprosecute, ornotto
pursuematters further, inthefaceofstrong evidence, is likelytoconstitute
thecreation of a specialcase. Clearly, theuse of discretion in eitheran
individual or systematic way- the latterthrough the development of
unwritten conventions ofpolice,administrative or constitutional practice-
derogates fromthecharacter of thelegalsystem as a system ofpublicly
ascertainable rules;andindividual discretion derogates from itscharacteras
19
readinga requirement
By constructively of reasonablenessintopermitted
administrative
action,forexample,thecourtsenablethemselves to relateseemingly
uncontrolled
discretion
to
a well-established
conceptin legal evaluation.

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368 PETER INGRAM

anykindofrule-based system at all. Butequally,discretion is a practical

necessity.Although it shouldbe avoided(according to the conceptual
demands of'legalsystem' andofwhatis involved in'following a rule')tothe
extentthatit is reasonably possibleto do so, it is usefulto distinguish
discretionthatis notdestructiveofrulesandtheir importance, as a matterof
from
principle, thatwhichis actually orpotentially destructive.
Discretion isrequired inpractice. Ifevery technical offence weretakenup
and prosecuted, thelegalsystem wouldbe overwhelmed to thepointof
collapsewithindays.The courtsmustnotbe overburdened withminor
cases,justso thattheycan function in moreimportant matters withthe
necessary effectiveness. Andfroma practical pointofviewit is wiseto
forbearfrom frequent prosecution ofthetrivial inordertoavoidantagoniz-
ing the ordinary personand alienating himfromthe system. Similarly,
permitting thepolicediscretion todisregard lesserinfractions ofthelawor
dealwiththeminaninformal way(a friendly warning, perhaps) allowsthem,
withlimitedresources, to geton withtheinvestigation of moreserious
crimes.Withcertain exceptionsthiskindofpractical discretion canbe seen
as contributing (ideally)to the overalleffective functioning of thelegal
system.Nor is discretion necessarily dysfunctional in relationto the
lawwhichis theobjectofitsexercise.
particular Havinga lawonthebooks,
as longas itis not"under-enforced", canarguably havedeterrent value.
In considering thephenomenon ofdiscretion intheexecution oflawitis
important not to becomecaughtup witha falseopposition between
discretionand rules.Although discretion visibly derogates fromthestated
rulesofa system, itfrequentlycreates andfollows unstatedrulesofitsown.
Theseunstated rulescanbe as consistent intheir application as manyofthe
statedrulesofa system, and sometimes theymaybe moreso. Andthere
seemsno reasonwhythepracticeof muchregulardiscretion cannotbe
assimilatedintheory tothebodyofcustomary rulespresent inanysystem. It
willalsobe foundthattheuseofdiscretionary procedures is ofteninaccord
withthesystem's principles;anditmaybe intended topromote them.The
positionwithdiscretion isthatwehaveoften (although bynomeansalways) a
derogation fromone (stated)rule in favourof other(unstated) rules.
However, thecontrast between statedandunstated rules,although itis of
somepracticaland legalimportance, maynotbe of deep philosophical
significance- thephilosophical analysis oflawis theanalysis notofwritten
lawsand regulations as suchbut of the "real"rulesthatconstitute the
normative system, thosenormswhichprescribe the actualbehaviour of
and whichpeopletakeaccountof to guidetheirbehaviour
officials in
conformity witheffective law.20

positionon theindividuation
20 This is close to a Benthamite oflaws. (See Raz, op.cit,71.)
Although theintellectual precondition that"reallaws"aretobe formulated
forindividuation in.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 369
Of course,a majoramountofdiscretion is stilldiscretion in thefullest
sense.2Fromthepointofviewoflegalsciencesuchstrong discretion hasto
be seen as arbitrary.
Nevertheless,although it has to existforpractical
reasonsin law, thisis precisely
the sortof discretion thatis frankly
disapprovedofbycriticsbothwithinandoutsidelaw,justbecauseitis not
basedon rules,or principles,
or anysortofascertainable standard thatis
independent ofthosepeoplewhomayexercise discretion.It detractsmost
fromtheidealoftheruleoflaw,andfroma strict
seriously legalpointof
viewitoftencondemns itself.

IV

The significance of theinteraction betweenlawsas discrete ruleshas

alreadybeenforeshadowed inprevious comments. A verycrudepositivism
seemstosuggest thatindetermining theoutcome ofa particular caseweare
toconsidertherulesoflawonebyonetoseeifitis this,orthat, oranother
rulewhichcoversthecase; andthenbyapplying theappropriate rule,we
executethe law. Takingrulesone by one, however, it mayclearlybe
impossibleto determine whichrulefinally shoulddecidethe outcome,
becauseto anyone case manyrulesmaybe relevant. In somecasesa fair
number ofrulesmaybe ofroughly equalrelevance, so thatnosinglerulewill
be clearly
pre-eminent. It is impossibleto applyas decisiveeveryruleto
everyrelevantcase.Rulescompete withoneanother in sucha waythatwe
apparentlycompromise: we applyone rulein thelightofothersandtheir
bearingon theindividual case,orwe applyseveralrulesconjointly, so that
theoutcome ofthecasewillnotbe atvariance withanyofthem.Law is a
systemofrules,andbybeingmembers ofthesamesystem rulesareinter-
onerulemaygovern
referring: theinterpretationofanother, a secondmay
determinetheadmissibility ofevidence andtherefore thefactsofthecase,a
thirdmaydictatetheseverity ofthesentence withinthepermitted and
limits,
so on.Boththeruleorrulesused,andtheinterpretation accordedtothem
andtothefactsofthecasethemselves willbe an outcome oftheinteraction
of a numberof different rules,sometimes as a matterof conscious
butoften,
deliberation; lessconsciously, theoutcome oftheinteraction may
be decidedinwhatseemsat first sighttobe a moreindeterminate way,by
thejudges'relianceontheirownexperience, evenbytheir"feeling" forthe
termsof guidancein act-situations rejectedby A. M. Honore,the problemof
is forcefully
alwaysremains:forhimlaws shouldbe individuated
individuation accordingto classeswhich
"reflectthe mattersabout whichlawyersargue and the categoriesin whichtheyteach or
expoundthelaw". ("Real laws",in Hackerand Raz (eds.),Law,Moralityand Society(Oxford,
1977), 111-12.)
21
See Dworkin,op. cit.,32-3.

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370 PETER INGRAM

decision.
right The interactionbetween rulesoccursintwoways:inoneway
severalrulesareseentohavea bearing on onecase;in thesecondway,in
law,someruleshavetheiruse in theircontrol ofotherrules.
For the sake of theoretical argument it couldseemusefulto talkof
deciding casesaccording to a singleruleand theactionit dictates as the
paradigm oflegalreasoning, and to claimthatwhenmorethanone rule
couldreasonably be dispositiveofthecasewe aredealing witha hardcase.
However, thisis nota usefulsimplification ofthereasoning processbuta
simplistic In actuality
falsification. anynumber ofrulesmaybe brought to
bearonthisorthatindividual casewithout always creatingtheproblem ofa
hardcase.Thisis sowhether wearetalking interms oftheplain,black-letter
rulesof law or therulesproducedbya jurisprudential reworking of the
system. On occasionrulesareincompetition orconflict witheachother, and
thenwe mayhavea hardcase,created notbythefuzziness oflanguage but
bythecomplexity ofa system oflawwhichcan bringrulesto bearfrom
severaldirections onthedetailsofa singlecaseinaninconsistent way.Hard
casesincludenotonlythosewherethequestion is whether orhowthisone
ruleapplies, butalsothosewhereitis rather whether rulea orruleborrulec
... applies.22 More often(in accordwiththepurported intentof legal
systems whichdisclaim, however disingenuously, thepossibilityofinconsis-
tenciesor gapsin thebodyoflawas a whole)severalrulesaretakentobe
employed togetherconstructively,as wherea number ofprecedents jointly
determine theoutcome ofa particularcase orwherea decisionis reached
withthehelpof analogousreasoning. How a numberof rulesare to be
employed in conjunctiondoesnotalwayspresent an awkwardness forthe
logicoflegalreasoning. The membership ofthebodyofapplicable rulesfor
thecase in questionmaybe straightforwardly determinable according to
rulesofpractice, andhowa number ofassociated rulesaretobe usedwill
oftenfollow setprocedures.Casesofthiskindcanseemcomplex enough on
thesurface, andwhilea thorough philosophicalanalysis ofwhattakesplace
couldturnoutto be evenmorecomplex, complexity is notofitselfeither
logicallyintractableorconceptually unclear.
Rulesandtheiruse aregoverned bysuperior rules;ina legalsystem they
occupyplacesin a hierarchy. Thispointhasbecomeso obvious(especially
sinceHart'sworkonprimary andsecondary rules,andonewayinwhichhe
differentiates thetwokinds)thatit hardlyneedsan extended account.23
Whena ruleinitsusualunderstanding failstobe applicable toa casein a
22
Is thecase to be decidedaccordingto theruleinA v B as citedbycounselfortheplaintiff,
or accordingto the rulein X v Y as citedby counselforthe defendant?
23 See above,n.14. Raz arguesthatHartdid notgo farenoughand that"legalsystems should
be regardedas intricatewebsofinterconnected laws".A hierarchyofruleswillbe constituted
in
the "geneticstructure" of a system.(Cf. Raz, op. cit.,183-5.)

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 371
clearwaywemaybe abletomoveforward toa solution
oftheproblem by,for
example, showing howtheapplication oftheruleintheinstantcaseis tobe
governed by thedictatesof somehigherrulewhichlaysdownrulesof
interpretationor rendersthecase suitableforreasoning byanalogy with
othercasesandrules.Higherrulesmaysetboundaries totheoperation of
lowerrules,as wellas governingtheir
interpretation;
theymayallowforpre-
emption ofsomerulesbyothers, orprovide reasonsforexclusions.24
They
oftenprovideforformalsolutions to the difficult
problemsthatwould
otherwise be raisedbythecontent ofsomerules,or byconflicts between
rules(including thoseimpliedbyprecedents).25 Byusingwhatamountto
procedural devicesanattemptis madetokeeplawas faras possiblea matter
offollowing rules- eveniftheyare "artificial"
rules- rather
thanleaving
legaldecisionsto individual
difficult humanjudgment enjoyingan unfet-
teredstrong discretion.26

"Itis ofcrucialimportance thatcasesfordecision donotariseina vacuum

butinthecourseoftheoperation ofa workingbodyofrules,anoperation in
whicha multiplicity ofdiverseconsiderationsarecontinuously regarded as
goodreasonsfora decision."27 Rulesinteractas a system.
Assuch,a bodyof
lawshaspurposes from
distinguishable thepurposes ofindividuallaws,even
whenthetwokindshappento coincide.Clearlytheyoftendo not.The
purposesofindividual lawsare logicallydistinctfromthoseofthesystem
becausetheformer are themselvesinstrumental forthelatter.A familiar
exampleillustrates the point:in attempting to sustaina viablesocial
utilitarianismit maybe pointedoutthattheexistence of avowedly non-
utilitarian
individualrulesis no rebuttal,
forrulesthatin theirdirectand
manifest function seemnon-or evenanti-utilitarian maybe constructively
incorporated into a utilitarian
system, because in indirectways,and
especiallyin theirinteraction
withotherrules,theymakea contribution to
thetotalutility of thesystem. (So, manyindividual rightsare notto be
as having
justified utilitarian
directly consequences; nevertheless
respectfor
24
Cf. Harton rulesofrecognition, changeand adjudication(op.cit.,89-96), althoughthese
are hardlyexhaustiveof thepossiblekindsof secondaryrules.
25
The moststraightforward exampleis therulethataccordspriority to thelaterstatuteover
thereis no equivalentruleto providean easyresolution
an earlierone. Interestingly, ofconflict
betweenprecedents.
26 Law is notjust a formal
systembut a formalistic one too,and thishas itsadvantages.
27
Hart,"Problemsofthephilosophy oflaw",EssaysinJurisprudence andPhilosophy (Oxford,
1983), 107.

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372 PETER INGRAM

rights generally, as a principle, mayhavea utilitarian contribution tomaketo

societyin augmenting the generalhappinessof the population.) The
manifest purposesofmanylawsarecertainly distinct in practice fromthe
waysin whichtheyareenvisaged as serving moredistant andlonger-term
socialpurposes(whichtheyoftendo in hiddenwaystoo).
In theproper execution oflaw,as wellas inomaking bluntpolicy decisions,
itis oftenthecase thatsuchhigher longer-termor purposes areaccorded
priority.So a rulemaybe derogated from inresponse towhatcanbe calleda
systemic demand.The higher of
purposes thesystem mustsometimes have
precedence, ifindividual rules,whilehaving functions of their own, are to be
seen- liketheruleoflawitself-as instrumental totheirachievement. Ifa
superficially "anomalous" judgement truly serves an overall purpose theof
system, as
it shouldnotbe seen contradicting the substantive pointofthe
ruleoflaw.Byunderstanding a system's purposes in a holistic fashion the
anomalous actcan be reincorporated into law as faithful to its reason and
logicalfoundation, andas emphasizing whatgivestheruleoflawpoint, even
though to
itmaynotseem be supportive of the ruleof law read literally.
Whatmakesa holistic approach toa legalsystem stillmoreplausible is a
considerationtheof nature and functions of principles of the kind which
Dworkin espouses.28 Principles toocanonlybe properly understood as the
of a
foundation legalsystem they if are referred tothe system as a whole (or
atleasta majorsection ofit)rather thantotheseorthosefewparticular laws.
Principles underpin thesystem as a wholeandthemselves coheretogether
systematically. They declare the values which the
pervade system andmake
senseofitsrules.Some individual rules will exemplify in a clear waythe
principles andvalues of the system; but on the whole the values ofthe system
willnotbe explicitly referred tobytherules.Rather, thesystem's valuesare
present inthespirit oftherules;anditsprinciples areimplied inthewaysin
whichthe rules are read and in the language of the judgments whichapply
them.
Decisionswhichin a crudely positivistic wayare to be understood as
anomalousmay not be in accord with the literallanguage of the rules;
nevertheless theymaybe coherent withtheunderlying principles of the
system, and thusfaithful to thesystem's rationale.29 The judgment which
to
seems defy the literalrules can still "ring true" in the system as the most
fittingway in the instant case of the
expressing system's values or confirming
itsprinciples. In difficult casestheruleoflawmayrequirea decision tobe
for
argued byprinciples rather than determined by rules.
28 See Dworkin,op. cit.,22ff.
"Choosingbetweenrivalpossiblerulingsin a givencase involveschoosingbetweenwhat
29

are to be conceivedas rivalmodels for,rivalpatternsof, humanconductin this society."

(MacCormick,op. cit.,104.)

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 373

VI

Thephilosophical objections concerning thegapbetween lawandpractice

aretheoretically correct andworth notingin so faras they represent logical
possibilities;buttheyserveto convince byemphasizing individual corres-
pondences between rulesandfacts whicharepossibleonlyattheexpense of
systemic coherence. Butlaws do form partof an actual and practical system.
The factthattheyconstitute a system isnota mereaccident oftheir common
originsora practical convenience dictatedbytheneedsofcourtadministra-
tion.Laws cohere,and theyareintended to; theyrepresent a striving
for
in a
consistency system, even if consistency is an impossible achievement in
practice.There is a pointto worrying aboutthe unityof a legal The
system.30
ruleof law itselfinheresin thesystem. A claimthattheruleof law is
dependent on, say, adherence to a moral principle, rather thandetermined
byaninternal necessity of law,is sustained rules
byviewing atomistically and
as theymight apply tocases individuallyconsidered. And it is truethatrules
can, so to speak,be pickedoffone by one. There is no self-evident
correspondence between ruleandreality; andthequestion ofrulesandtheir
standing is not the only problem: 'facts'too are indeterminate and are
equallysubjecttointerpretation. Thereseemno discernibly finite
limitsto
thewayinwhichevents intheworldmaybe interpreted forthepurposes ofa
rule,as longas we haveonlytheonerule(orpossibly a fewrules)toapply,
andas longas wecanset,ineffect, limits
arbitrary to the setofevents under
consideration. Indeed,we couldhaverulesthatwereas fixedandclearas
anyrulescouldeverbe, yetwe shouldstillbe ableto providealternative
descriptions ofthefactsso thattheywouldorwouldnotbe covered bythe
relevant ruleaccording to ourwishes.On a circumscribed levelofdiscrete
factsandruleswe candecidehowreality andrulearetocorrespond.
Thoughsomerulesmakesenseon theirown,manyrulesmakemore
30 Becauseofhis withtheunity oflawKelsen,formostofhiscareer, took
preoccupation
consistencytoan extreme, unrealistically
holding toanabsolute ofnon-contradiction
principle
as fundamental tolaw."Twonorms whichbytheirsignificancecontradict
andhencelogically
excludeoneanother, cannotbe simultaneously assumedtobevalid."(General ofLawand
Theory
State,translatedbyAndersWedberg(NewYork,1973),375.) In fact,Kelsen'sstatement
requiresonlyminor adjustment:ifa courtperceivestwonorms as apparently equaland
having
conflicting
bearing onthecasebefore it,itis required itsjudgment
through tobringan endto
thecontradiction. An amendedstatement mightread:twonorms whichseemto contradict
eachotherwillnotbe asumedtobe equally validforanyconcretecase.Contradiction
canbe
removed notbydeclaring onenormtobe invalid, butmoreeasilybyreinterpreting
a normso
thatitis no longerbinding fortheinstant case.However,theidealofconsistencyadvocated
hereis notso exclusive;itis intended onlyto bringoutthestrong drivelegalsystemshave
towards non-contradiction.

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374 PETER INGRAM

senseinthecontext oftheirsystem, andsomerulesonlymakesenseinthat

context.The atomistic approach torules,as hasbeenindicated, failstograsp
thesignificance of"system". The logicalpossibilitiesthatareconceivable ona
rule-by-rule basisarenotpossiblewithin a systemic approach. A system is
intended to be coherent. Thus someindividual interpretations offactsor
ruleswouldrequiresuchmajor- andultimately intolerable - adjustments
rightthrough thesystem thatthey couldnotbe compatible withitscontinued
identity, fora system is alreadycommitted in its established content to
certainlinesof interpretational approachto bothrulesand facts. The
secondary rules(inHart'sterms) ofa legalsystem contain many ruleswhich
arein wholeor in partdesigned to maintain coherence.3' But at a deeper
levelthantheexpressrulesserving thisfunction, theveryideaofa system
conceptually requirescoherence: thisis onenecessary condition ofa legal
system's identity;andtheagentsofa system thatis,so to speak, conscious of
as sucharetherefore
itself impelled topursueandmaintain coherence - itis
nota mereoptionforthemto chooseorreject.
Regarding the interpretations of factsand rules,whatseparatesthe
permissible from thelogicallyconceivable butimpermissible? The needfor
coherence is nota strait-jacketimprisoning constructive legalthinking for
ever.Systems changein content andstructure notjustbecause of external
politicaland legislative decisionsbutalso byreasonoftheirowninternal
dynamic. Legal rulesare open-textured, withinlimits;any systemhas
latitude,providing scopefordifferent approaches, varying understandings,
evensomekindsofinterpretative conflicts.32Butclearly notanything goes.
Permissible changehas to be consistent withpossibilities already latentin
thesystem. Someradicaldevelopments cannotbe predicted, butoncethey
have takenplace,withhindsight theycan seem almostan inevitable
outcome.33 On theotherhand,a system has a dynamic content ofitsown
whichconstrains humaninteraction with it.To saythat some judgments are
plausiblepossibilitieswhileothers the
arequite opposite is not a contingent
31"Thelawsindividuated bytheprinciples ofindividuation
should,as faras possible,
make
clearimportantconnectionsbetween variouspartsofa legalsystem."(Raz,op.cit.,145.)
32 Dworkin "thediscrimination
distinguishes thatrequires
judgment" (whichheallows)from
"thediscriminationthatexcludes
duty"(which he doesnot).(Op.cit.,71.)
33Therecouldbe a parallel
worthexploring between thedevelopment ofprinciples
ofa legal
systemand"thedevelopment ofan idea"as treated byCardinal Newman withreference to
The development
Christianity. ofan ideais "thegermination,growth andperfection ofsome
intheminds
living...truth ofmenduring a sufficient
period....Itsdevelopment... iscarried
onthrough andbodiesofmen;itemploys
individuals theirmindsas instruments,anddepends
uponthemwhileituses them."(JohnHenryNewman,An EssayontheDevelopment
ofChristian
ed.J.M. Cameron
Doctrine, 1974),99.)Theconstant
(Harmondsworth, problem,forNewman
in relation as muchas forDworkinin relation
to Christianity to law,is to distinguish
between
convincingly truedevelopments
andcorruptions,
betweenrightandwrong answers.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 375

value-judgment.Implausible forms
interpretations, ofreasoning,andjudg-
mentswillbe resisted bythesystem, bothbyitsexplicitrulesand byan
internalconceptual
logicgeneratedbyitsestablishedcontent.
Thispointis
nomorethananextension tolawoftherejection
ofHumpty Dumpty's claim
thata wordcanmeanjustwhathechoosesittomean.34 Aswordsbelongtoa
language,so thewordsofrulesbelongtoa legalsystem,whichafter allis no
morethana subdivision oflanguage,orperhaps(inWittgenstein'sterms) a
language game.Changesanddevelopments intherules,andtheirinterpre-
tationinthelanguage oflaw,havetobe accountable andexplicable (where
external is notthecause)largely
innovation interms ofthesystem itself-its
pasthistorical
evolutionandpresent conceptualstructure.

VII

The ruleoflawis in a majorwayself-supporting. Partlyitis so through

theverynotion ofa rule:forittobe possibletosaythata ruleexists requires
a degree(atleast)ofconformity to theruleas a necessary condition ofits
Thus,ifa legalsystem
existence.35 exists(andundertheassumption thata
legalsystem andessentially
necessarily - though notexclusively- consistsof
rules)thoserulesmustbe followed toa significant there
extent: willbe either
obedience tolaworregular punishment fordisobedience.36
Thisargument,
thattheeffectivenessofa legalsystem mustpartly consistinthefollowing of
rules,relatesonlyto theprocedural generalityoflaw;it saysnothing about
constancyorcoherence ofcontentina dynamic system.The present paperis
intendedto showthatthe rule of law is to an important degreeself-
supporting in its contenttoo. Not onlycan we dependon procedural
inthelawas significantly
regularity guaranteed byprocedural requirements
inherentintheideaoflawitself, butwherethereis anycommitment tolaw
we can relyalso on a conceptual
as a socialinstitution regularityin the
development ofcontent. A legalsystem is already
repletewitha content that
setslimitstowhatis possible;whatthelimits permitwillremain faithful
to
thesystem. These limitsaresetbythesubstantive contentofthesystem's
rules(bothstatedandinductive), byinternal rulesofreasoning peculiarto

34 in Wonderland
See Lewis Carroll:Alice'sAdventures and Through
theLooking-Glass,
ed.
RogerLancelyn Green(London,1971),190.Cf.LewisCarroll's Logic,ed. William
Symbolic
Warren BartleyIII (Hassocks,1977),232-7.
35 The existence of a ruleis grounded in socialfact:see above,n.6. But regularity
of
behaviour condition
is nota sufficient oftheexistenceoflaw:thisis onepointatleastonwhich
every ofKelsenmustsurely
interpreter agree.(See,forexample, Kelsen,op.cit.,41-2.)
36 Punishment oftheordinary citizenfordisobedienceis inanycaseobediencetothelawon
thepartoftheofficials enforcingthesanctions.

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376 PETER INGRAM

thesystem as wellas standards ofreasoning ofordinary

typical discourse,
andbythosegeneral principles whichinhere ina system andmakesenseof
its content and purposes.Movesoutsidetheselimitsare illegitimate, in
termsofa deepanalysis ofthesystem. Thatis notto saythattheymaybe
madeanomalously and remainunrectified, butthisis no morethanthe
elementary distinctionbetween andinfallibility
finality pointed outbyHart
(although he failedto concedethedifficulty createdbythewayin which
mistaken decisionsatthehighest legallevelsareself-legitimating,becoming
theprospective standard ofcorrectness within thesystem).37The plausibility
ofthetwogapsofreasoning whichcreatethepossibility ofhardandspecial
casesas a universalpossibilityforanyapplication oflegalrulesdependsona
failureto perceivethe controlling weightof the established substantive
content oflaw.Thiscontent servesnotonlytoregulate butalsotoconstitute
conceptually mostofthemovesutilizing rulesand theircontent thatare
possibleandlegitimate within thesystem.
Consequently, manyhardandspecialcasesthatarelogically conceivable
are so onlywhenno regardis paidto thecontent of a legalsystem as a
An attempt
totality. to createthemwithin a particular
system canoftenbe
dealtwithsummarily, sometimes by beingexpressly ruledout of order,
sometimes byunequivocal argument basedonestablished fundamental rules
of the system.38 In its use law verylargely confirmsits ownprocedure,
content andinterpretation, andis therefore It cannotserve
self-reinforcing.
as a toolforindividualstousejustas they likeunlessthereis a radicaldenial
ofitsexisting content,andthereby a denialoftherules(andwhatitis to
follow rules),andso as a finalconsequence an abnegation ofthelawitself.
Evenself-legitimating judgments havetoremain theexception: thescoreis
whatthescorersaysitis,butonlyontheassumption thathisdeclaration of
thescoreis itself guidedbyrules.39
typically
The waysinwhichweconsider hardandspecialcases,andtheweight we
assigntothemintheworkings ofa legalsystem,willbe determinative ofour
viewof law. True hardcases - thoseofwhichthelaw (as a whole)is
genuinely notdispositive - are settledin theendaccording to extra-legal
whichin our owndayare usuallythoseof politics,
criteria, morality,or

37 See Hart: The Concept

ofLaw, 138ff.
38
Forexample, theinadmissibility
although ofhearsayevidence mayoften presenta hard
moralcase,onlyexceptionally
(attheborderline)doesitpresent eventhebeginnings ofa hard
legalcase.Therearesimplyfewopenings incriminallawfortypical
hearsay tomakea claimto
be heard,despitethecomplexity
ofpermitted exceptions.
39 In thecontext
oftheEnglishlegalsystemHart'suseas illuminatingofthepointthatina
game"thescoring ruleremains
whatitwas"before a scorer's
mistake (op.cit.,139)issurprising.
Sometimes theproblemforjudgesis howto restore thestatusquoanteby curtailing or
eliminatingthechangeintherulesthathasbeenbrought aboutbya 'wrong' decision.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 377
economics. (Specialcasesarejustified alongthesamelines.)Ifevery caseis
potentiallyhardor special,politics, morality, andgeneraldictates ofpolicy
are potentially presentto dictateeverydecisionof law. As a matter of
realism,extra-legal considerations maybe capableofimpinging on
decisively
anyday-to-day application of law; but the finalanalysisof legalcases
declareswhether theycanbe thereproperly - insucha waythatlawallows
politicsand morality to comeintolegaldecisions without from
detracting
whata legalsystem is allabout- andwhether wecanarguesuccessfully that
manylogically conceivable decisionscouldnotconstitute legaljudgments in
morethanmerename,andmaterially wouldrepresent interferencewiththe
legalprocess.Interms oflawsuchjudgments wouldbe mistaken andwrong,
subverting theideaoflawanddevaluing theruleoflaw.
Thusthepossibilities forinternal criticismoflegaljudgments, andindeed
forconstitutional criticism oflegislativeand administrative developments,
willbe affectedbya theory ofhardandspecialcases.A constrained theoryof
hardcaseswillassumethatmostcasescanbe settled instrictlegalwaysand
willbe morelikelyto denominate as illegitimatemanyof theinfluences
whichcan affectdecisions.The contentand procedureof law will
themselves provide internal grounds formaterialcriticismoftheday-to-day
workings ofthelegalsystem. If everycase couldbe hardor specialthere
wouldbe no possibility at all forthiskindofinternal criticism.
Everycase
wouldhaveto be acceptedand fitted intothe system - and couldbe
welcomed theoretically - as longas theargument supporting thejudgment
hada kindofbarelogicalcogency.4 To thecontrary, a widetheory ofhard
cases providesforthe modification and creationof new rulesin ways
contrary totheruleoflaw;anda widetheory ofspecialcasesdetractsfrom
the ruleof law by allowinganynumberof exemptions thatcannotbe
authorized initsterms.
Law notinfrequently confronts newcasesandnewkindsofcases.As a
practicalmechanism forsocialcontrol and guidance(however defined) it
needsflexibility.Butitneedsconstancy too.Finnishaspointed outthat
theRuleofLaw involves certain ofprocesswhichcanbe
qualities
systematicallysecuredonlybythe ofjudicialauthority
institution
anditsexercise equippedandmotivated
bypersonsprofessionally
toactaccording tolaw.41
Lawrequires humanmediation ofanappropriate
kind;andtheexperienced
willbe ablebothtogobeyond
judiciary narrow formulaeandtobe restrained

40We couldcreateor modify an appropriate

ruleto accommodate theoutcome.Cf. Ludwig
Philosophical
Wittgenstein, (Oxford,2nd ed., 1958), ??, 201ff.
Investigations
(Oxford,1980), 271.
41 J. M. Finnis:NaturalLaw and NaturalRights

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378 PETER INGRAM

from overmuch newinterpretation.42Ifjudgesexercise a restrained

flexibility
it is nota productof theirindividual willsas ordinary people:a proper
is an outcome
flexibility oftheirtraining in law,theirknowledge ofit,and
theirexperience inadministering it.Judges maymouldsomeofthelawinto
newforms, buttheydo so as judges;andas suchtheyhavealready been
mouldedbythelaw as wellas educatedintothesociallydefined roleof
judge.
The narrowing downofthescope,apparently provided bytheory,forhard
andspecialcasesis alsointended toshowthata so-called viewof
positivistic
law as a logicalsystem of rulescan be upheldas the'centralcore'for
understanding lawas a working institution.
Differing theoretical
declarations
of how manyhard and specialcases therereallyare and opposed
interpretationsofhow,at a deeplevel,we aretoanalyse thedisposition
of
typicallegal cases serveto confirm or refutepositivism. A generous
conception ofproblemcases allowsforwhatis essentially an extra-legal
dispositionofmanycases;and theuniversal viewthatall casescouldbe
treatedas hardorspecialcompletely destroys theidealofusingrulesexcept
as a facultative opentoa court.The following
rationalization ofruleswould
becomea choicenotan obligation. Thisis nottheflexibility oflaw.A legal
system'srulesandprinciples,itscontent andprocedures, reasons
provides for
decisions,notexpostfactorationalizations.Although hardandspecialcases
cannotbe altogetherexcludedfrom law,theycanbe seentooccupyonlya
smallpartofthewholelegalprocess.The judgments inothercasescanbe
accounted forthrough theidealofa system thatworks andgoverns
logically
in a materialwaytheprocessoflegalreasoning, itsconcrete outcomes in
individualcasesanditsabstract development in legalthinking.Thisis the
ruleoflaw.

VIII

Although thispaperhas notconcerned itselfdirectlyin detailwitha

structural oforthodox
analysis legalreasoning,itclearlydemands a viewof
thelegalprocessas typically
working outinwaysnecessarily determined by
systematicreasoning to law.Equally,itrejectstheclaimthatlegal
internal
arealways
decisions theoutcome ofthemechanical applicationofrules.This
positionmayappearto be nottoo farremoved fromDworkin's, as that
involves
a claimthatthereisvirtually
alwaysa rightanswer (inlegalterms)to
every Indeed,whileitwouldseemthattherearerather
legalproblem.43 more
42
Ibid.
43 "Forallpractical
purposes, willalways
there be a right intheseamless
answer webofour
law."(RonaldDworkin, "No right
answer?"inHackerandRaz (eds.),op.cit.,84.)

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 379

genuine hardcasesthanDworkin wouldallow,thecrucialdifference liesin

determining howtherightansweris arrived at. It is all too easyto treat
Dworkin's "principles" as simply another form ofrules."The argument that
principles are distinct from rules in so faras theycarry'weight' is hardly
convincing: competing rulesmaybe weighed too,anda principle maybe so
clearlyappropriate to a case as to be ofitwithout
dispositive moreado.
Dworkin's use oftheideaof'fit'is moresuggestive, forthisindicates the
philosophical way forward to understanding howjudgments canbe deter-
minedbytheneedforcoherence inlaw.45 Legalreasoning isnotexclusively a
of the
matter applying syllogism to factsand rules of The
law.46 picture that
casesaredecidedrightly bydiscovering therulewhichcorresponds bestwith
thefacts(or,forthatmatter, byinterpreting thefacts to correspond with
best
a chosenrule)belongstoanapproach toruleswhichisbothmechanical and
atomistic;and itis theunderstanding of which
positivism is held by itscritics.
Problem casesmustbe dealtwith;butwhendifficulties arisethelegaltaskis
tosettlethemnotbygetting rulesandfactstocorrespond butbyobserving
thevalueofsystemic coherence andtheneedtorespect, contribute to,and
strengthen in the
consistency legalsystem. The rule of law is maintained and
developed of
bytheuse legal rules in the of a
context system. means This
employing a processofreasoning anddecision-making thatis coherent, not
justinterms of how rules immediately affectedfitthe facts but alsoin terms
ofhowthisorthatuseoftheruleslinks, initseffect,withtheunderstanding
and purposesof theotherrulesin thesystem and of thesystem itself.
to of
Fidelity theidea rule-following pay must attention to the content and
interpretation as
of rules well as to the requirement to follow authorized

44 J.W. Harrisreduces thedifference between rulesandprinciples to oneof"descriptive

convenience" whichappears tobe "a matter ofstyle (London,1980),
only".(LegalPhilosophies
176.)Raz makesthedifference merely oneofdegree:rulesprescribe specificacts,principles
unspecific actions.("Legalprinciplesandthelimits oflaw",YaleLawJournal, 81 (1971-72),
838.) I havenottreated theotherdistinction Dworkin drawsbetween rulesandprinciples,
concerning their as partsofthelaw,becauseitis notgermane
validation tothepresent topic.
45 Dworkin's original
presentationoftheideaof"fit" interms of"theseamless web"(Taking
RightsSeriously,115-23)islatercomplicated bytheaddition ofa second"dimension" - a moral
one- totheinitial legaldimension: "iftwoormoretheories eachprovide an adequatefit...
thenthetheory amongthesethatis morally thestrongest provides even
thebestjustification,
though itexposesmoredecisions as mistakes thananother" 340).Thatis tosay,oncea
(ibid.,
certainthreshold offitis reached,moralcriteria mayoutweigh indetermining
legalcriteria a
court'sdecision.
46Indeed,there isnotmuchdifficulty inshowing thatlegalarguments employ valid
a logically
form likethesyllogism. The problem is to showhowthemajorpremise (law)andtheminor
premise (fact)cometo'match'so thatthecourtcanproceed The truth
toa conclusion. ofthe
conclusion dependson showing thatbothpremises aretrue,inMacCormick's phrase, "given
criteriaadoptedforlegalpurposes" (op.cit.,27). It is thisphrasewhichholdsthekeytothe
problem butwhichunfortunately is hardly devoidofproblems ofitsown.

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380 PETER INGRAM

procedures, and to therelationships amongrulesand betweenrulesand

system as wellas between rulesandfacts.
Can thisargument be vitiatedbyrecallingthatthehighestcourtsofthe
landcan seemingly deliveras binding anyjudgment thatmightcometo
mind?Therecanbe no legalcheckonthehighest legalinstitutions,
though
politicsand prudencemayexercisea powerful restraininginfluence.A
decision thehighest courtsmakemaybe mistaken interms ofpastlaw,butit
stands,anditcansetthelawforthefuture. Intheworstcase,itcertifies
itself
Ifthisisa truepicture
as correct.47 weshouldbebeyond worrying aboutrules
atall,letaloneproblem cases.Is theruleoflaw- vacuously- nothingmore
thanwhatthemembers ofthehighest courts
shalldetermineittobe through
theiractions?
If a judgmentof the highestcourtsis ipsofactoguaranteedcorrect,
describing it as "infallible"
maybe inappropriate ratherthanfalse.Butto
describeitas (possibly) "inconsistent" is decidedlynotinappropriate.The
"mistaken" judgment atthehighest levelis final,
andithastostandlegally,
although it maybe effectively quashedbypolitical meansofa formal (or
revolutionary) kind.Nevertheless, somejudgments plainlybecomelegal
deadends.Whilea judgment mayretain itsownindividual standingas the
lawfuldecisionfora particular case,as a precedent an inductive
suggesting
ruleforthesystem itmaybe overruled orbypassed bythejudgment ina later
case.48If the self-consistency of a legal systemlies in coherence, the
coherence thatrequiresexamination is notthatofa staticsystem butofa
dynamic one.Somestriking decisionsthatmight havelookedmistaken atthe
timefrom thepointofviewofa staticsystem turnoutinretrospect tohave
beeninharmony withthegeneral movement ofthelaw(andnotjustbecause
oftheirownself-confirming poweras leadingcases).Andas a counterpart,
otherdecisions thatseemeddictated bythelawoftheir timeturnedouttobe
unfruitful.
To an extent courtshaveto anticipate developments in thelaw
and, morewidely,in society, in the hope thattheirdecisionswillbe
prospectively as wellas retrospectively coherent: judgments mayonlybe
vindicated by historical developments subsequentto them.49 Withthis
47 Whatmight becalledthe'decertification' - forexample,
ofa decision whentheLawLords
overrule a previous decisionas madeperincuriam - leavestheearlierdecision
intact;itis in
effecta choicemadebytheLords,andnota ruling theyarecompelled tomake.
48 A notuncommon inthelegaljournals
title isonthelinesof"AvB: thepaththelawdidnot
take".
49 "[T]herelevant arethoseofthegeneric indeciding
involved oneway
consequences ruling
ortheother, notjustthespecific effectsofthespecific
decisionontheindividual The
parties."
instantcaseis tobe treated "ina wayinwhichitwillbe justifiabletotreatfuturelikecases".
(MacCormick, op.cit.,150.)Forthehardconsequentialist,however,althoughdecisionsmaybe
justifiablein termsof envisaged consequences, theyare onlyfinally bytheactual
justified
consequences.

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 MAINTAININGTHE RULE OF LAW 381
consideration we leavetheconfines oflawproper, forwe haveto see legal
developments as partofa widersocial,political andhistorical picture.
As an institution
forthepractical governance oflifeinsociety lawcannot
be a self-containedlogicalsystem. Thisis,onemight say,theAchilles' heel
oftheruleoflaw.Actsofthecourts, inso faras they involvedecisionswhich
cannotbe shownto be in somesenseforeordained by thecontent and
proceduresof the law itself,are as muchlaw-making as acts of the
legislature.Law-creation of anykind- however necessary forlaw as a
practicalsocialsystem - hasseriousimplications foritsautonomy. Although
itis governedbyconstitutional procedures, law-making cannot be partofthe
ruleoflawsinceitmoreorlessfreely determines thesubstantive natureof
theruleoflaw.The legislative processallowsforintervention inthelogicof
the law. Constraints on law-making theremaybe, but withinthese
constraintspoliticalactorshavewidepowersto create,changeandabolish
theprocedures and content of law as theythinkfit.For thisreasonthe
politicalprocesscannotbe seenas partoftheruleoflaw,or morethan
nominally subjecttoit;indeed, ina senseitcontradicts theruleoflaw,which
allowslegalactstobe determined andjustifiedonlybyreference tolaw.
Nevertheless itshouldbe notedthatthelegalsystem itself
is resistant
to
radicallegislative
changebecauseofitsnature as a developed system ofrules
withan extensive content (andnotjustbyreasonofjudicialattitudes). New
creates
legislation newrulesandmayrepealsomeoldones,butotherwise, as
long as the legal systemendures,even the mostmajorchangesare
incorporated intoan established, massive legalbody;and theyarethereby
subjectto interpretativeprocedures fortheirapplication whicharealready
provided in theexisting ruleoflaw.

Belfast
Queen'sUniversity,

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