FABIAN v. DESIERTO G.R. No.
129742 September 16, 1998 Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act
DOCTRINE: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through
a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders
of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
In line with the constitutional proscription which provides that no law shall
increase the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing
the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court,
are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
FACTS: PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction
project including those under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to
do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.
A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A.
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil
Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The
case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and
transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of
Agustin and in the order exonerated the private respondents from the
administrative charges.
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision
or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Ombudsman Act
RULING: NO.
Firstly, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et
al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court.
Secondly, the revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through
a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders
of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance
implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and
effect.

The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals
for final disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of
Appeals pro hac vice as a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice
to its requiring the parties to submit such amended or supplemental
pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem necessary and
proper.
SPS. ARGOVAN v. SAN MIGUEL CORP. G.R. No. 188767 July 24, 2013
DOCTRINE: GEN. RULE: While the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by
the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our
own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings.
EXCEPTION: In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is
committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may
take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Here, SMC resort to certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground of GADALEJ on
the part of the DOJ Secretary.
Hence, the procedure taken up by petitioner was correct.
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano
(Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and
softdrinks products, purchased beer products from San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) in the amount of ₱285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000. Petitioners paid
through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s Asia Trust
Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13
April 2000, the check was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written demands, petitioner failed to
make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners with the
Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.
On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and
damages against AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners
alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited
their bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by
payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute
a bar to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa.
On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the
criminal proceedings be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-
42386. SMC thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of
the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19 September 2002.
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review
challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution
dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a Resolution dated 15
December 2004.
Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for
certiorari on the ground of GADALEJ on the part of the DOJ Secretary. On 11
March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition.
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the civil case which is an
action for specific performance and damages involving petitioners’ joint
savings account, and the criminal case which is an action for estafa/violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovan’s current account. The Court of
Appeals belied the claim of petitioners about an automatic fund transfer
arrangement from petitioners’ joint savings account to Argovan’s current
account.
Petitioners contend that SMC’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was an
improper remedy because the DOJ’s act of sustaining the investigating
prosecutor’s resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings due to a valid
prejudicial question was an error in judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Petitioners further assert that nevertheless, an error of judgment is not
correctible by certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
which was to file an appeal to the Office of the President.
ISSUE: whether or not certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals
RULING: YES. The procedure taken up by petitioner was correct.

The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution

issued by the Secretary of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.

In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, we stressed that the resolution of the Investigating

Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the
power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who
may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus,
while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary,
it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction.

Also, in Tan v. Matsuura, we held that while the findings of prosecutors are
reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and
exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the
exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a
clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable
cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
DELOSO v. MARAPAO G.R. No. 144244 NOV 11 2005
DOCTRINE:
FACTS: It appears that petitioner filed a complaint with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the province of Agusan del Norte
against respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from interfering with
her tenurial rights, and that an order be issued fixing the sharing of the net
produce of the landholding between the parties and directing respondents to
account for the November 1994 harvest. Petitioner claimed that her first
husband, the late Primitivo Temple (Primitivo), entered into an agreement
with Lino Palomo, father of respondent Herminia P. Marapao, stipulating that
they would equally share the produce of the landholding. After the death of
Primitivo and her subsequent remarriage to Vicente Deloso in 1986,
petitioner averred that she continued to be in possession of the subject
landholding and to transact with the copra dealer on behalf of respondents.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that Primitivo was not a tenant
of the landholding but merely an overseer paid for the work he rendered.
After Primitivos death, his son, Alberto, was installed as overseer also as a
paid farmworker. Moreover, respondents alleged that when petitioner
remarried, she relocated to Gingoog City with her husband making her
allegation of personal cultivation of the landholding an impossibility.
The case was referred to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Butuan City for the purpose of determining, among others, whether
petitioner is indeed a tenant of the subject landholding. On the basis of the
report of its legal officer tasked to conduct an ocular inspection on the
landholding and to investigate the matter, the MARO found Alberto Temple
to be the tenant of the landholding.
The PARAD, however, reversed the finding of the MARO and declared that
petitioner is a tenant of the landholding.
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
affirmed the findings of the PARAD and ruled that the requisites of
agricultural tenancy are present. Specifically, the DARAB held that pesadas
and vales presented by petitioner indicate that petitioner shared in the
produce of the landholding and personally cultivated the same even after she
remarried.
Court of Appeals: reversed the decision of the DARAB. The appellate court
ruled that the findings of the legal officer who conducted an ocular inspection
of the landholding and interviewed the concerned persons, which findings
were affirmed by the MARO, should have been duly considered by the
DARAB.
MR was denied. Now, petitioner is contending that the petition filed before
the Court of Appeals was deficient in form and substance as it did not contain
a statement of facts, issues, and the grounds relied upon for the review. The
petition also allegedly failed to point out the findings of the DARAB which are
not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court allegedly violated
Sec. 10, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) as it
failed to first give due course to the petition before proceeding to resolve the
same. In so doing, the Court of Appeals allegedly denied her due process.
ISSUE: W/N the (1) petition filed before the CA is deficient in form and
substance and (2) that the CA failed to first give due course to the petition
before proceeding to resolve the same.
RULING: NO.
(1) An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals
that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of
facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition
particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the
decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was
attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court.
 The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the
DARAB in its assailed decision.

There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of

the Rules of Court. It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules
may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does
not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they
are used only to help secure substantial justice.

(2) With regard to the alleged failure of the Court of Appeals to first give
due course to the petition, Sec. 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies such
as the DARAB, the appellate court has the discretion to give due
course to the petition. It is also within the Court of Appeals discretion
to have the original records of the proceedings under review
transmitted to it.

Hence, petitioners contention that the appellate court deprived her

of the opportunity to elevate the records by deciding the case
without first giving the petition due course is, therefore, utterly
unmeritorious. The records of the Court of Appeals show that the
court decided the case on the basis of the pleadings filed by the
parties, such as the petition, motion to dismiss, comment, reply and
rejoinder, including the documents attached thereto. The pleadings
and annexes, which replicate approximately the entire records of the
DARAB, undoubtedly provided adequate basis for the resolution of
the case.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 13, 1999 is

AFFIRMED.