FLOW:

Reporter: RTC CA SC
Gyrl Jlaw Cef Gyrl
Pauline Cef Ramon Pauline
Manuel Gyrl Jlaw Manuel
Dale report on RA 8749
Ramon Pauline Gyrl Ramon
JLaw Manuel Pauline Jlaw
Dale report on PD 984
Cef Manuel Ramon Cef

REPORT:

1. GYRL

2. PAULINE

3. MANUEL

Pollution Adjudication Board vs CA and Textile Fishing Corporation

Script:

Topic: Ex parte cease and desist orders

1st speaker:
Can an ex parte cease and desist order be issued by Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board, a legal agency of
the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions?

2nd speaker:
Can Solar claim that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities.? Malalaman natin yan lahat, dito sa THE BUZZZZZZ
EXCLUSIVE!

1ST SPEAKER:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-
Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportion’s plant, directing Solar immediately to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were clearly in violation of
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.

 Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated
22 September 1988.

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  Pollution Adjudication Board (Pet) issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater
treatment facilities.
 Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against the Board

RTC RULING:
Dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned
Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent
Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic.

CA RULING:
Declared the Writ of Execution null and void. held that certiorari was a proper remedy
Second Speaker: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and
Writ of Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. YES.

SC RULING:
The SC held that Yes. Pollution Adjudication Board has the legal authority to issue ex parte cease and
desist orders under the following circumstances:

 Public Hearing. . . .Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes areof immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or
cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the
necessity of a prior public hearing.

Pollution Adjudication Board (Pet) claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to
issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that
such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum
permissible standards set by the National Pollution Control Commission (now, the Board). Petitioner Board
contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros
River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code.

First speaker:The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention that under the Board's own rules and
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the
inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

Inspection Reports in 1986 and 1988 shows that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
desist order issued by the Board.

Second Speaker: As to the second issue: Can Solar claim that the petition for certiorari was the proper
remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities.?Yes

The trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy
was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

Finally, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Order of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution,

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as well as the decision of the trial court dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice
to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a
public hearing before the Board.

4. RAMON

Technology Developers, Inc. vs CA, Judge Narciso Atienza, and Mayor Vicente Cruz, and the
Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan

First Speaker: Now, is a private corporation entitled to preliminary relief if an Acting Mayor of a city
orders the stoppage of its operations?

Second Speaker: That question will be addressed in the case of Technology Developers, Inc. vs CA,
Judge Narciso Atienza, and Mayor Vicente Cruz, and the Municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.

First Speaker: Petitioner is a private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal
briquette.

Respondents are the Honorable Court of Appeals, Judge Narciso Atienza, Acting Mayor Vicente Cruz,
and the Municipality of Sta. Maria. Bulacan.

It appears that petitioner received a letter on February 16, 1989, ordering full cessation of its operation
until it can comply with three requirements:

1. Building permit;

2. Mayor’s permit;

3. Region III DENR Anti-Pollution Permit.

Due to the lack of the second requirement, Mayor Cruz ordered the closing and padlocking of the
premises of petitioner’s plant, effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.

Second Speaker: Petitioner alleged that it was able to comply with the first and third requirements.
When it undertook to comply with the Mayor’s Permit, it was allegedly not entertained. Subsequently,
petitioner instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against
private respondent, wherein respondent judge immediately granted the preliminary mandatory
injunction petition.

First Speaker: During the trial proper, petitioner’s counsel failed to appear. The hearing proceeded with
and the Provincial Prosecutor presented the following evidence:

1. Report on the petitioner by one Marivic Guina wherein it stated that “Due to the manufacturing
process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may contain
particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people.”;

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 2. Three sheets of papers containing signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan;

3. Letter addressed to the Governor of Bulacan, complaining about the smoke coming from the
chimney of the company.

RTC RULING: The RTC, through Respondent Judge Atienza, set aside the earlier-issued Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and subsequently dissolved it.

CA RULING: Denied the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. Subsequently, it denied
the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

Second Speaker: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO PRELIMINARY RELIEF.

SC RULING: NO. Petitioner is not entitled to Preliminary Relief for the following reasons:

1. No mayor’s permit had been secured. Although petitioner was able to secure a Building Permit
and a Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution Permit, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution by virtue of his police
power. He may deny such application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same to avoid injury to the health of the residents of a community.

2. The letter petitioner received stated that the offensive odor of its fumes “not only pollute the air
in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area”. Thus, it was required to
present theabove-mentioned 3 requirements.

3. The action of Mayor Cruz was in response to the complaint of the residents of Brgy. Guying, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan.

4. The investigation report made by Marivic Guina stated that no proper air pollution device had
been installed.

5. The Building Permit presented by petitioner was obtained by an official in Makati, rather than
from the municipality of Sta. Maria.

6. The temporary permit to operate issued by the National Pollution Control Commission was only
good for 7 months upon its issuance on December 15, 1988.

Petitioner did not exert any effort to extend or validate its permit, much less to install any device to
control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community. Thus, the
petition is DENIED.

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 5. JLAW
Ernest Rodriguez, et. al.vs. Intermediate AppelateCourt, et. al.
G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987

Topic: Procedural and Technical Ploys in Court used to prolong the agony of a
community

1st Speaker (facts)

 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ ET. AL are residents of South Zuzuarregui Avenue,
Quezon City. They filed an action for abatement of a Public nuisance with
damages against Daytona Construction and Development Corporation.
 DAYTONA has a cement batching plant for the manufacture of road and
building concrete materials such as concrete aggregates the residents state
that effluence and sediment of the plant has run over to the adjacent lots
Cement dust has also caused pollution to the area the pollution has killed
many of the residents plants.
 Moreover, nearby residents claimed that their health has been affected, that
many of them were inflicted with respiratory diseases.

2nd Speaker
 Ruling of the Trial Court?
o Declaring the operation of the cement hatching plant of the defendant
corporation as a nuisance and ordering its permanent closure
o Further, it ordered, upon motion of Rodriguez et. al be granted
execution pending appeal because the continued operation of the
cement batching plant of the defendant poses a "great menace to the
neighborhood, both in point of health and property."

 However, DAYTONA here filed a filed a petition for relief --which was denied
by the lower court.

 Thereafter, DAYTONA filed a petition for injunction with the Intermediate

Appellate Court which found the petition unmeritorious.It then promulgated a
decision denying due course to Daytona’s petition.

 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Appellate Court,
defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court which also,
denied its petition for lack of merit. The petition for injunction having been
denied by both the IAC and this Court.

1st. Speaker

Now, DAYTONA pursued the remedy of appeal in respondent IAC. In the IAC, it
granted the petition for appeal.

RODRIGUEZ heard about it so they filed a filed on a motion for extension from April
18, 1986 or up to May 18, 1986 to file a motion for reconsideration.

DAYTONA opposed to the motion for extension.

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RODRIGUEZ ET. AL’S' counsel was surprised to receive on the IAC resolution,
denying the motion for extension.

SC: HELD:

1st The SC stated that a default order, being interlocutory, is not appealable but an
order denying a motion or petition to set aside an order of default is not merely
interlocutory but final and therefore immediately appealable.

Since the trial court's order of denying defendant's motion to set aside the order of
default was appealable but was not appealed by defendant, the necessary
conclusion is that the default order became final. Clearly therefore, IAC committed a
grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the finality of the default order. The
validity and finality of the default order was upheld by the judgment of the
Appellate Court in the injunction case by virtue of the principle of res judicata .

DAYTONA'S assertion in its Petition for Relief that the failure to file the answer was
caused by "the unforseen sickness of its corporate secretary who has custody of the
records necessary for the preparation of its defense was unconvincing since
DAYTONA did not identify the supposed corporate secretary or explain why the
records were in the possession of the corporate secretary instead of the counsel
handling the case.

2nd, There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue the
order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was a
need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of DAYTONA Construction
cement batching plant because it posed "a great menace to the neighborhood both
in point of health and property.

As pointed by Justice Javellana:

DAYTONA’S conduct here appears to me to be tainted with fraud and

intended simply to delay the disposition of the case. It manifested its intention to
elevate these orders to the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Yet, it did
nothing to this end. The purpose of the ploy is obvious. Once it had announced its
intention to go to the Supreme Court, it effectively suspended the proceedings in
the trial court, or, at least, that was the effect.

This enabled it to continue with its operations and it would have done so
indefinitely if it had not been declared in-default and private respondents allowed to
present their evidence. It is quite apparent that petitioner really had no intention of
elevating the case to the Supreme Court otherwise, it would not have allowed the
extended period given to it by the Supreme Court to lapse without filing the
petition. Or, if it was in good faith, there it should have informed the trial court that
it was no longer pursuing its remedy in the Supreme Court after it had decided that
it is no longer availing of such remedy. Instead, it concealed this fact from the trial

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court and the adverse party, and allowed matters to take their course. It was not
until it received the adverse decision that it frantically sought to set things right.

The court reinstated the Trial Court’s decision, granting the permanent
Closure of DAYTONA CORP.

6. CEFT
HENARES, JR. v. LTFRB
TOPIC: Is the right to clean air can be a subject of Writ of Mandamus compelling DOTC-LTFRB
to prevent the use of hazardous air pollutants (diesel/gasoline) to Public Utility Vehicles?

FACTS:
1st speaker:
Henares, Jr. alleged that according to several researches conducted, the use of diesel-powered
vehicles and other commercial gases produces more environmental hazards and is harmful to
health. He suggests to use Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) as alternative because it reduces the
production of air pollution. He want to compel LTFRB through a petition for Mandamus so that
PUVs would use CNG instead of diesel & gasoline. He alleges his right to file Mandamus based
on:
1. Sec.16, Article 2 of 1987 Constitution
2. SC’s ruling on Oposa v. Factoran
3. Sec. 4, RA 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999)

2nd speaker:
SolGen countered it with:
1. A writ of Mandamus is not the proper remedy because what should be required is a
ministerial act that an office or officer is mandated to do.
2. There is nothing in RA 8749 that prohibits the use of diesel and gasoline.
3. There is nothing in RA 8749 mentioning the use of CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs.
4. That the DENR is tasked to implement RA 8749 not the DOTC through the LTFRB.

SC:
NO. Henares, Jr. cannot compel the LTFRB to use CNG as alternative fuel through
Mandamus.
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty.
Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG.
Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are
to the environment, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.