Criminal liability of corporations is not a universal feature of modern legal

systems.1 Despite the fact that many scholars and jurists attempted to settle this
debate, it is still far from over. While most jurisdictions have already taken substantial
steps to address corporate killings, this issue remains to be a challenge.

In the United States, corporations are being tried for manslaughter or

homicide. However, some state courts ruled against corporate liability for homicide
where statutory language defined homicide as the killing of a (natural) person by
another.2 An example would be the case of People v. Rochester Rly and Light Co3 where
the Court of Appeals ruled that the statutory provision was intended to relate to
natural persons only4. As for manslaughter, it is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice.5 It is of two kinds, either voluntary or involuntary6.

1. Australia
Most criminal law in Australia is State law, and federal criminal offences are
confined to those enacted in relation to matters in respect of which the
Commonwealth does have legislative power.7 Their Criminal Code Act 1995 is very

http://repository.unn.edu.ng:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5214/IDEM%2C%20UDOSEN%20JACOB.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
2 People v Rochester Railway and Light Co 195 Ny 102 (1909); State v Pacific Powder Co, 226 Or 503 (1961)
3 (1909) 195 NY 102; 88 N.E. 22
4 That is, manslaughter required homicide, and by definition, homicide was essentially a human crime namely, the killing

of one human being by another and by adopting a construction societas delinqere non potest, the court held that
another meant another human being and nothing else.
5 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1112 18 U.S. Code § 1112
6 Ibid
7 https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-

Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf
limited in scope.8 Thus, we only have the state of Victoria as a model for the study on
how they deal with incidents of corporate killings.

THE MODEL LAW – CMCHA of 2007

The criminal liability that can be imputed against the corporation under this law
is directly against the corporation. It means that a person can file a criminal complaint
against a juridical person in the same way a criminal complaint is filed against a natural
person. 9 Necessarily, this means that a corporation may be prosecuted for homicide
same as a natural person using the Senior Management Test. It must be emphasized
that the Act is merely supplemental; thus, it does not preclude a person in filing a case
against the individual criminal liability of the directors or anyone else in an
organization. Thus, directors and other individuals may appear as co-defendants in
cases with their organizations; and, as individuals, they face the extra risk of
imprisonment.10

Senior Management Test

As already mentioned above, the Act introduced the senior management test.
The test accumulates the acts of the members of senior management of a certain
company, to determine whether the corporation can be convicted of manslaughter
according to the factors provided under the law. In other words, the law focuses on
the systematic failures to manage the safety in organizations.11 Before the enactment
of this law, the gross negligent conduct had to be directly attributable to an individual

8 tthe bulk of criminal law is State law, and the CCA itself only contains a limited range of offences, including, for
example, bribery of foreign public officials, offences against UN personnel, international terrorist activities and people-
smuggling, and some federal statutes are specifically exempt from s12.3)
9 About corporate manslaughter http://www.hse.gov.uk/corpmanslaughter/about.htm
10 A look at the new Corporate Manslaughter Act https://www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/content/look-new-

corporate-manslaughter-act
11 Ibid
representing the company’s directing mind before liability for involuntary
manslaughter can be established, this is known to be the identification principle.12 13

Requisites for CMCHA

Under the Act, there are two requisites that must concur before a person can
be allowed to file against a corporation for corporate manslaughter [homicide]. That
is, (a) a corporation causes a person’s death and (b) if it amounts to a gross breach of
a relevant duty of care owed by the organization to the deceased.14 Furthermore, an
organization can be considered guilty of an offence under this section only if the way
in which its activities are managed or organized by its senior management is a
substantial element in the breach referred above.15

Relevant duty of care means any of the following owed by the organization; a
duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the organization or
performing services for it; a duty owed in connection with the carrying on by the
organization of any other activity on a commercial basis, or the use or keeping by the
organization of any plant, vehicle or other thing.

Factors to be considered to prosecute a corporation under

this law

Sec. 8 of the CMCHA clearly lays down the factors that need to be considered
how to assess the corporation’s failure to comply with their duty of care. To wit:

12 R v. P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd, 1991

13 The doctrine of identification is also the traditional method by which companies are held liable in most countries
under the principles of the common law. According to this theory, the solution for the problem of attributing fault to a
corporation for offences that require intention was to merge the individual within the corporation with the corporation
itself. https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/doctrine-of-identification/
14 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Paragraph 1, Subsection 1
15 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Para 1, Subsection 3
 “(1)This section applies where—

(a)it is established that an organisation owed a relevant duty of care to a person, and

(b)it falls to the jury to decide whether there was a gross breach of that duty.

(2)The jury must consider whether the evidence shows that the organisation failed to comply
with any health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach, and if so—

(a)how serious that failure was;

(b)how much of a risk of death it posed.

(3)The jury may also—

(a)consider the extent to which the evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies,
systems or accepted practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any
such failure as is mentioned in subsection (2), or to have produced tolerance of it;

(b)have regard to any health and safety guidance that relates to the alleged breach.

(4)This section does not prevent the jury from having regard to any other matters they
consider relevant.

(5)In this section “health and safety guidance” means any code, guidance, manual or similar
publication that is concerned with health and safety matters and is made or issued (under a
statutory provision or otherwise) by an authority responsible for the enforcement of any health
and safety legislation.”16

Thus, if there was a failure, how serious that failure was; how much of a risk of
death it posed. The jury may also consider the extent to which the evidence shows
that there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices within the
organization that were likely to have encouraged any such failure as is mentioned in

16 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/19
subsection 2, or to have produced tolerance of it. They may also have regard to any
health and safety guidance that relates to the alleged breach.17 18

Penalties under the law

Penalties will include unlimited fines, remedial orders and publicity orders. A
remedial order will require a company or organization to take steps to remedy any
management failure that led to a death. The court can also impose an order requiring
the company or organization to publicize that it has been convicted of the offence,
giving the details, the amount of any fine imposed and the terms of any remedial
order made.19 These are found to be sufficient so as not to make corporations
complacent in their duty of care.20 A number of cases have now been heard in the
Courts with some, although not all, leading to successful Corporate Manslaughter
convictions.21

____

Since the enactment of the CMCHA of 2007, there have been several studies
made to assess the impact of the law in prosecuting corporations. In 2012, Benjamin
Edward Haigh LL.M. from Durham University School of Law his work is entitled
“An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007): A Badly
Flawed Reform?”. While in 2016, Stuart Allan MSc, BSc from the University Of

17 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 Para 8

18 http://jlcjnet.com/journals/jlcj/Vol_3_No_2_December_2015/6.pdf
19 Corporate Manslaughter – FAQs http://www.hse.gov.uk/corpmanslaughter/faqs.htm
20 Corporate Manslaughter Act: Five years on http://www.foxwilliams.com/news/842
21 Corporate Manslaughter Prosecutions https://cqms-ltd.co.uk/news/landmark_corporate_manslaughter_case.html
Glasgow School Of Law wrote “The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007 or the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008: Corporate Killing and the Law”.

The central issue of Haigh’s paper is whether the CMCHA has overcome the
difficulties in prosecuting corporations using the identification doctrine.22 The paper
concluded that despite the fact that there is already an offence against the corporation
and the introduction of the “senior management” test which will aid the Courts in
determining the corporation’s liability, there is yet a case that will truly test the
effectiveness of the law. As the author says;

“the CMCHA does have some merits, but the central test is simply a gloss on the
identification doctrine and the same problems linger in the background. It is with
some concern and trepidation of what the outcome will be when it is finally tested
against a large corporation. It is contended that the same problems will exist
although we now have a new test to blame.”23

In Stuart’s paper, it included a study of other existing laws and existing cases
being tried under the CMCHA and it concluded that:

“Its impact on organisations…but it could be argued that it has achieved what is set
out to, that is, removed the explicit requirement to satisfy the identification doctrine

22 An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007): A Badly Flawed Reform?
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3518/1/Complete_PDF.pdf?DDD19+
23 Ibid.
 which provided to be such an insurmountable hurdle when prosecuting larger
organisations for corporate manslaughter.”24

On the other hand, it also criticized the law for limiting only the applicability of
the law to corporations and not against its directors or other representatives. Despite
these, still, this would not necessarily mean that a similar law would not that be
effective here in the Philippines. As both authors would seem to agree, the law is still
in its infancy and one cannot tell if it is an effective piece of legislation until there is a
true case that would require the senior management test.

Lastly, Samson Erhaze & Daud Momodu wrote an article in 2015, “Corporate
Criminal Liability: Call for a New Legal Regime in Nigeria” recognizes that the passage of
the Corporate Manslaughter Bill (2010), a law that was created based on the CMCHA
of 2007, will ameliorate the burden of ascertaining the guilty mind of a corporate body
and, it is humbly submitted, will go a long way in promoting a culture of self-
regulation, and corporate social responsibility in respect of systems and operational
safety.25

Criminal intent is not necessary to commit the crime of Corporate Homicide

(Ha? You already argued that there can be corporate mens rea so why are you
denying its necessity??)

The proponent would argue two points why corporation’s intent is no longer
necessary to prosecute a corporation for corporate homicide. First, there is a

24The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 or the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008:
Corporate Killing and the Law http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7376/1/2016AllanPhD.pdf P. 195

25 Journal of Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 3 (2), December 2015 taken from
http://jlcjnet.com/journals/jlcj/Vol_3_No_2_December_2015/6.pdf
diminishing need to have intent as basis for the prosecution of a corporation. This is
not to say however, that intent is no longer needed in other crimes. Second, being a
regulated under special law, intent is no longer needed as the law would effectively
make the crime mala prohibita.

Diminishing Relevance for Intent in Corporate Crimes

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. This latin maxim means that an act does not
make a defendant guilty without a guilty mind. For this reason, our Courts have
consistently held that corporations cannot be prosecuted directly since it lacks the
necessary mens rea, one of the essential elements required to prosecute a person for
criminal offence. (This is inconsistent with the previous paragraph. Be logically
consistent.) This supplies an important characteristic of a crime that ordinarily, evil
intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime, and accordingly, there
can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.26

This was clearly stated in the case of West Coast Life Insurance Co. v Hurd27 when
the court ruled that:

“It is undoubted that, under the Spanish criminal law and procedure, a
corporation could not have been proceeded against criminally, as such, if such an
entity as a corporation in fact existed under the Spanish law, and as such it could
not have committed a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent was
required. Criminal actions would have been restricted or limited, under that
system, to the officials of such corporations and never would have been directed
against the corporation itself.”

26 People of the Philippines v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1925)

27 West Coast Life Insurance Co. v Hurd G.R. No. L-8527 March 30, 1914
 Further in the case of People v. Tan Boon Kong,28 the Court ruled that “a
corporation can act only through its officers and agents, and where the business itself
involves a violation of the law, the correct rule is that all who participate in it are
liable.” It can be deduced from this ruling that the Court recognizes the fact that the
directors and agents, as natural persons, are the parties in interest for the purposes of
prosecuting a criminal complaint.

However, courts have no real theory of how corporations, which have no

bodies or minds, could instantiate either.29 The best that the courts have to pin
criminal liability upon corporations in our jurisdiction is the principle of respondeat
superior – which provides that an employer may be held responsible for the actions or
inactions of employees performed within the course of their employment. But even
that lone virtue is now threatened as respondeat superior, at this stage in corporate
history, increasingly produces outcomes at odds with any sensible notion of criminal
justice.30 (Really? Why?) It can also be said that this principle sometimes allow
corporations to get away from criminal liability especially in large corporations where
paper trail may be too complicated to find individuals who committed crimes
attributable to the corporation.31

28 54 Phil. Reports 607 (1930)

29 David H. Kistenbroker et al., Corporate Motive and Time Warner: Smoke and Mirrors Revisited, in PRACTISING L.
INST., SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2003, at 125, 129 (Jay B. Kasner & Bruce G.
Vanyo eds., 2003) (“Corporations may legally be people, but they are also legal fictions and only natural persons can
possess states of mind.”).
30 Corporate Criminal Minds by Mihailis E. Diamantis, University of Iowa College of Law
31 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and U.S. Att’ys, Bringing Criminal

Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), http:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-

fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/chargingcorps.PDF (“It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which
action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or
departments, and records and personnel may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries.
Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may
have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or retired.”); BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO
JAIL 113 (2014) (“[I]t can be hard to hold employees responsible.”). There are numerous examples. In 2010, Barclays
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with prosecutors in which it admits to having violated U.S. sanctions by
trading with enemy states. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 19, United States v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 1:10-cr-
00218-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ Documents/BarclaysBankDPA.pdf.
The judge expressed disbelief that that no individuals were being prosecuted, to which the prosecutor replied, “In every
case . . . we look. . . . But in this case, there . . . was not someone who we could prove to a court beyond a reasonable
 In the United States, exceptions to the general rule requiring intent can be
found as early as the mid–19th century. For example, in Barnes v. State, the
Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a conviction for selling liquor to a habitual
drunkard, absent evidence that the tavern keeper was aware of the fact. 32 In this case,
the accused was a natural person, but nonetheless, the Court has relaxed the intent
requirement. As Justice Cooley noted;

“I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent, but this is not by
any means a universal rule. . . . Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations as
this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them, the purpose being
to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation
impossible.”33 (Yes, because there is criminal negligence, i.e. culpa. But your thesis is about
Corporate Homicide and you want to argue that corporations are capable of intent. So are you
now changing your thesis to be about criminal negligence resulting in homicide?)

In Holmes’ view, criminal intent was not at all necessary to criminal liability
because the primary goal of the criminal law was to regulate conduct—not punish
morally culpable conduct.34 While multiple challenges have been made with regard to

doubt . . . had committed an offense.” Hearing at 5–6, United States v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 1:10-cr-002180-EGS
(D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2010). Similarly, after investigating General Motors for over a year, prosecutors entered into a deferred
prosecution agreement in which the company admitted it hid fatal ignition switch flaws in its vehicles. Press Release,
U.S. Att’y’s Office S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against General Motors and
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-general-motors-and-deferred. To critics seeking
individual liability, the prosecutor replied, “Criminal intent can be hard to prove. But if there is a case to bring, we’ll
bring it.” Drew Harwell, Why General Motors’ $900 Million Fine for a Deadly Defect Is Just a Slap on the Wrist,
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ business/wp/2015/09/17/why-general-
motors-900-million-fine-for-a-deadly-defect-is-just-aslap-on-the-wrist/.
32 Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849). See also Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. 489 (1864) (no knowledge required

for crime of selling adulterated milk).

33 People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (1884). Justice Cooley also noted in passing that one can be guilty of

manslaughter, a felony, though “his only fault is gross negligence” (52 Mich. 577).
34 Among other examples, he pointed out that, in Macauley’s draft of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), breaches

of contract for the carriage of passengers were made criminal—not because the carriers were morally blameworthy but
because harm could come to the passengers and civil remedies were ineffective (because the carriers were too poor to
sue) (Holmes, 1881, p. 40); see also Holmes, 1881, p. 50 (“[T]he tests of [criminal] liability are external, and independent
of the degree of evil in the particular person’s motives or intentions”).
the intent requirement,35 the proponent believes that there is a clear decline on the
strict requirement of culpable mens rea.

b) In any case, the elements of mens rea & actus reus are not necessary
under the proposal (????? You have to clarify your proposal at the
beginning. Do you want to criminally punish corporations because they
are capable of criminal intent? Or do you want to criminally punish them
despite lack of intent? Because if the latter, your previous repetitive
references to mens rea are insignificant)

In our current penal system, crimes are classified into specific areas (e.g. crimes
against property, against persons, national security, etc.). These are either penalized
through the Revised Penal Code or other Special Penal Laws. Further, these crimes
are considered either Mala in Se or Mala Prohibita. The former would mean that crimes
committed are acts or omissions which are wrong or evil in its very nature. On the
other hand, mala prohibita crimes are acts or omissions that are not wrong or evil in
essence but are wrong or evil because they are prohibited by a special law. It is further
distinguished as:

“Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised

Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala
prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable

35Sayre argued that “[t]o inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused injury
through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own
enforcement. Francis Bowes Sayre, “Public Welfare Offenses,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 33, 1933, pp. 55–56, p. 56.
 only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is
whether the law has been violated.” 36

Specific crimes under the RPC are also being penalized without the required
intent for reasons of public policy.37 The distinction is relevant because while mala
in se crimes require intent as an indispensable element, mala prohibita crimes do not.
38
The proposal partakes of the nature of the latter because the crime as defined will
not require malice or evil intent. The presence of the elements, namely: (1) presence
of a relevant duty of care, (2) failure on the part of the corporation to provide or
observe such care, (3) the corporation has the power or authority which could have
prevented the incident or acts, and (4) such failure resulted to the death of a person,
will suffice to convict the accused corporation under the proposed law. (Why create a
special law instead of just making Article 365 of the RPC applicable to corporations?)

The public policy behind penalizing the crime as defined by the proposal has to
do with the concession and privileges granted by law to corporations which authorize
a legal existence of its own and limited liability for its officers. It is aimed at ensuring
that at the end of the day, a death that resulted from a corporation’s negligence
cannot be forgotten by the simple expedient of holding a particular officer or director
liable, to provide the aggrieved parties means to obtain justice beyond the negligent
actor, which in truth and in fact, has been acting for and on behalf of the corporation.
The proposal then works as a deterrent by changing the culture of the indicted
corporation and the behavior of employees. The crime defined carries with it a
substantial risk of great public harm and thus it serves to protect the consumers as
well.39

36 Garcia vs. CA and People; GR 157171; March 14, 2006

37 Garcia vs. CA and People; GR 157171; March 14, 2006
38 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/jan2006/166326.htm
39 Memorandum, From the Deputy Attorney General (June 16 1999), available at www.justic.gov/sites/degault/criminal-

fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps. PDF
 In conclusion, by considering all that has already been said by experts and
jurisprudence, the intent requirement should be treated as a general rule and not as a
universal rule. In other words, for our Courts to truly give the justice that the victim
of corporate killings deserves, it should recognize the fact that the requirement of mens
rea has been relaxed by other jurisdictions in order to promote the ends of justice.
This, we should reconsider too. For if culpable mens rea on the part of the defendant
were always to be strictly required, vicarious criminal liability of individual directors
for acts taken by others would be impossible. Similarly, criminal liability of a
corporation would be impossible.40

The earliest case of manslaughter in the US was in 1917. New Jersey Court of Appeals
considered that a corporation could be held liable since there is nothing in “the nature
of the crime, the character of the punishment, or the essential ingredients of the
crime” which makes it impossible for a corporation to be held liable.41

However, if the corporation proves that the high managerial agent having
responsibility over the subject matter of the offence employed due diligence to
prevent its commission - unless this result would be inconsistent with the legislative
purpose of the law violated, the corporation will not be liable.42

Most Australian states follow the English common law with regard to general
corporate criminal liability, through the Griffith Code43 or the Criminal Code Act of
1899.44 In the state of Victoria, corporations have been prosecuted for manslaughter
on three separate occasions.45

Germany

40 The Changing Role of Criminal Law in Controlling Corporate Behavior by James M. Anderson, Ivan Waggner p. 29
41 State v Lehigh Valley Railroad Co 90 NJL 372 (1917), 274
42 http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cp26.htm#sdfootnote329sym
43 The original Griffith Code did not contain any principles of corporate criminal responsibility, and the result was that

corporations could not be made criminally responsible at all. In 1978 Queensland added section 594A to its code making
procedural provision for the prosecution of companies only for strict liability offences. See Criminal Law Officers
Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys General General Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Chapters 1 &
2 (1992) Part 5 “Corporate Criminal Responsibility” at 107-109.
44 Criminal Code Act 1899 https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/inforce/2018-02-12/act-1899-009
45 http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cp26.htm#sdfootnote329sym
 In this jurisdiction, corporations are still treated under the traditional meaning
of corporations, which is a fiction of law with no physical body to act and be
penalized for its wrongdoings. It remains loyal to the maxim societas delinquere non potest
(meaning a corporation cannot commit crime). 46
What is unique about Germany is
that they have a very good administrative penal-law.47 This basically means that the
acts of the representatives or directors are automatically considered those of the
corporation if the crime could have been prevented by the corporation.48

Nigeria

In Nigeria, their criminal code recognizes that corporations can be prosecuted

for statutory offenses. Most of which are regulatory regimes designed to protect
health and safety, environment, food and drugs.49 With this, it shows that while
corporations can be criminally liable, it only holds true when a crime is statutorily
provided.

____
Since the enactment of the CMCHA of 2007, there have been several studies
made to assess the impact of the law in prosecuting corporations. In 2012, Benjamin
Edward Haigh LL.M. from Durham University School of Law his work is entitled
“An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007): A Badly
Flawed Reform?”. While in 2016, Stuart Allan MSc, BSc from the University Of
Glasgow School Of Law wrote “The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act
2007 or the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008: Corporate Killing and the Law”.

46

http://repository.unn.edu.ng:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5214/IDEM%2C%20UDOSEN%20JACOB.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
47 G. Stessens, op. cit, note 97 at p 508
48 J. Hirsch, Criminal Liability of Corporations (eds H de Doelder & Klaus Tiedemann, Kluwer Law Int l 1996) p 38.
49

http://repository.unn.edu.ng:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/5214/IDEM%2C%20UDOSEN%20JACOB.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
 The central issue of Haigh’s paper is whether the CMCHA has overcome the
difficulties in prosecuting corporations using the identification doctrine.50 The paper
concluded that despite the fact that there is already an offence against the corporation
and the introduction of the “senior management” test which will aid the Courts in
determining the corporation’s liability, there is yet a case that will truly test the
effectiveness of the law. As the author says;

“the CMCHA does have some merits, but the central test is simply a gloss on the
identification doctrine and the same problems linger in the background. It is with
some concern and trepidation of what the outcome will be when it is finally tested
against a large corporation. It is contended that the same problems will exist
although we now have a new test to blame.”51

In Stuart’s paper, it included a study of other existing laws and existing cases
being tried under the CMCHA and it concluded that:

“Its impact on organisations…but it could be argued that it has achieved what is set
out to, that is, removed the explicit requirement to satisfy the identification doctrine
which provided to be such an insurmountable hurdle when prosecuting larger
organisations for corporate manslaughter.”52

On the other hand, it also criticized the law for limiting only the applicability of
the law to corporations and not against its directors or other representatives. Despite
these, still, this would not necessarily mean that a similar law would not that be
effective here in the Philippines. As both authors would seem to agree, the law is still

50 An analysis of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007): A Badly Flawed Reform?
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3518/1/Complete_PDF.pdf?DDD19+
51 Ibid.
52 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 or the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008:

Corporate Killing and the Law http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7376/1/2016AllanPhD.pdf P. 195

in its infancy and one cannot tell if it is an effective piece of legislation until there is a
true case that would require the senior management test.

Lastly, Samson Erhaze & Daud Momodu wrote an article in 2015, “Corporate
Criminal Liability: Call for a New Legal Regime in Nigeria” recognizes that the passage of
the Corporate Manslaughter Bill (2010), a law that was created based on the CMCHA
of 2007, will ameliorate the burden of ascertaining the guilty mind of a corporate body
and, it is humbly submitted, will go a long way in promoting a culture of self-
regulation, and corporate social responsibility in respect of systems and operational
safety.53

53 Journal of Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 3 (2), December 2015 taken from
http://jlcjnet.com/journals/jlcj/Vol_3_No_2_December_2015/6.pdf