Master Thesis for the Global Master of Arts Program

Arctic melting, geopolitical shifts and emerging security issues: Russia’s

enhanced role under Mackinder’s perspective.

Prepared by: Lt.Cdr Ktenas Panagiotis (H.N)

Research Area: International Security

Professor: Taliaferro Jeffrey, PhD
“Ad Astra per Aspera”

Ktenas Panagiotis, 2014

 Contents

I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………… p.1
II. Building the Background……………………………………………….. p.5
Chapter 1- The ice melting- Why and When? …………………………………. p.5
Chapter 2- Determining the Arctic………………………………………………. p.6
Chapter 3- Establishing Mackinder’s world……………………………………… p.7
Chapter 4- Emerging Arctic interests…………………………………………… p.10
Chapter 4.1- Maritime interests…………………………………………… p.11
Chapter 4.2-Resource based economic interests-Oil, Minerals p.14
and Fish Stocks……………………………………………………………
Chapter 4.3- Military interests and geostrategic considerations……… p.17
Chapter 5- Comprehending Security attributes………………………………… p.19
Chapter 5.1-Institutional Framework regarding the Arctic Region… p.19
Chapter 5.2- Articulated Arctic Policies………………………………. p.21
Chapter 5.3-Existing Arctic Territorial Disputes…………………….. p.22
Chapter 5.4- Military expenditures……………………………………… p.24
III. Arguments and counter-arguments………………………………….. p.25
Chapter 6- Advancing our 1st level Argument / Geopolitics’ shift p.25
and Russia’s Dominance …………………………………………………………..
Chapter 7- Advancing our 2nd level Argument..…………………………………. p.30
Chapter 7.1 – Geopolitical dominance equals revisionism? ………… p.30
Chapter 7.2 – Emerging Interests plus Security attributes p.36
equals Security Reassessment?……………………………………………
IV. Analysis ……………………………………………………………………… p.38
Chapter 8 - Security Analysis – Based on Combined Reasoning – p.38
Geopolitics plus Emerging Interests………………………………………………..
V. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………… p.42
VI. Bibliography……………………………………………………………….. p.44
VII. Appendix…………………………………………………………………… p.48
- Graphical presentation of thesis’ argumentation……………………………… p.49-50
-Security Analysis Based on Quantitative Analysis – States’..…………………. p.51
Behavioral Model
VIII. Glossary……….…………………………………………………………… p.53
IX. Notes…………………….……………………………………………………… p.54
 I. Introduction

Global warming has raised serious concerns regarding environmental security, and

how it may propagate to the national security realm, affecting the balance of power between

state actors. Climate change is expected to influence the worldwide community in a

diversified manner and magnitude, being harsh with some but more reluctant –if not

beneficial- to others. Such a worldwide aftereffect has the potential to generate social and

political turmoil at the domestic and international level, bringing possibly the
socioeconomic system to the brink of collapse. This thesis examines the anticipated melting

of the High North, the potential shifts in geopolitical dynamics in the region -with a special

focus on Russia among the Arctic littoral states- and the subsequent emerging Arctic

security environment. As such, it takes for granted that the melting of the Arctic will happen

some time around or after the summer of 20301; the high likelihood of this coming to pass is

established in Section II, Chapter 2.

Beyond that core assumption, it is crucial to clarify that the term geopolitics is taken

in its pure form, as it was conceptualized by Mackinder, and in contradiction to Haushofer’s

“geopolitik”. Geopolitics’ theory in this thesis will be used per se, with all its flaws, past

criticism, but also any preceding predictability successes, even though it is widely

recognized that to a certain extent and in a varied degree geopolitics were shaped and

propagated in such a way, in order to suit and serve the strategic interests and the policy

planning of the great powers at any given time 2 . Such allegations don’t transform

geopolitics into an obsolete IR theory, diminishing its explanatory value. Geography’s

importance in modern politics has been finally restored in “the mountains of Afghanistan

1 Jacques C.J.Nihoul and Andrey G.Kostianoy, Influence of Climate Change on the Changing Arctic
and Sub-Arctic Conditions, (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series –C: Environmental
Security, Springer, May, 2008), p22
2 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, Rethinking Central Asia, (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2010), p.89

1
and in the treacherous alleyways of Iraq3”, a relief 3D map that geopolitics tries laboriously

to analyze.

The main hypothesis examined herein is as follows:

The melting of ice in the Arctic region (main reason) will provide a predominant

geopolitical role for Russia, offering the prospect to become a Superpower (first

intermediate claim/secondary reason of main claim), which in correlation with greater

emerging opportunities for major powers to advance their national interests, make territorial

claims, establish new sea lanes, benefit economically, and advance militarily (second
intermediate claim/tertiary reason of main claim), will increase the likelihood of economic

and security competition among great powers (main claim).

This argument implies four propositions, one for each logical step, that interlink our

reasoning-claiming 4 ; firstly that an alteration in geography leads to a shift of a State’s

geopolitical role; secondly that a geopolitically hyper-dominant and self assured State, will

be at least a partially revisionist one; thirdly, that an alteration in geography results in

alteration of core interests; and lastly emerging interests, might compete with existing ones

that favor status quo. The argument follows two casual pathways, and each one of them is

further consisted of two distinct logical steps (levels); firstly, that the Arctic melting will

transform Russia into a major geopolitical power broker, giving her the upper hand and the

option to challenge international power balance, affecting that way regional and global

security; secondly, that Arctic melting will give rise to new interests, that will be influenced

from Russia’s expanded geopolitical role and “security attributes5”, resulting in a security

reassessment.

3 Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, What the map tells us about coming conflicts and the
battle against fate, (Random House, 2012), p.17
4 A graphical presentation of our argumentation can be found in Appendix. An early on print out
can be helpful throughout the reading
5 More about security attributes and their role upon interests and security, in Chapter 5

2
 Following our argument, Russia’s inherited privileged geographical position upon

Mackinder’s Heartland, and the advent of a new Arctic Rimland due to the climate change

which will be occupied mostly by her, is expected that it will transform Russia once more

into a superpower that might result in a less secure environment in the High North and

elsewhere. The concealed assumption here is that a predominant state actor will attempt to

export its sociopolitical structure and economic dogma abroad, as the US does nowadays

with liberalism and USSR earlier did with communism. Russia has yet to adopt fully liberal

democracy as a mode of governance, and she doesn’t seem willing or capable to do so in the
near future. It is rather expected that an effort to export current authoritarian behavior in her

“zone of privileged interest6” will take place when she will have the power and opportunity

to do so.

Furthermore, a more self-assertive Russia may act as a partially revisionist player,

trying to rebuild its “Soviet Imperium”. The timing can be crucial; the power balance may

abruptly recline towards Russia, if it coincides with a tipping point in energy resources and

other factors. Speaking in celestial terms, Russia might be triggered instantaneously to

become a “Red Giant State” –not seen before upon Earth- rebuilding her superpower

eminence through fusion of crucial material from the Arctic region. Under such cataclysmic

events, Russia might integrate on the same state structure a vast continental and a major sea

power, a role that was kept for Germany according to Mackinder’s fears, and which may

finally give rise to a first class world power. The United States, successor of British Empire

and an insular state that nevertheless has extensive land resources and strategic depth,

managed to become a global power based on proper maritime power projection. Russia

instead, might become an “Insular Heartland”, reaching for the first time the High Seas on

multiple fronts.

6James Rogers, “Geopolitics and the Wider North”, The RUSI Journal, 157:6, 42-53, (2012), DOI:
10.1080/03071847.2012.750886, p.45

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 The Heartland theory of Mackinder, Spykman’s Rimland concept, and Mahan’s

maritime superiority will be examined for relevance to this case, and in our effort to support

the abovementioned reasoning. It is recognized that Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan didn’t

foresee –and certainly they couldn’t have done so, during their time- that the “fourth Arctic

North front” that enclosed Soviet Union, nowadays Russia, someday would have melted

away. They approached geography in a static rather than dynamic manner. “Geography is

changing7”, Derek Kane O’Leary proclaims and the northern periphery, which in ancient

times wasn’t “land in itself, but boundary of society8”, gains gradually in importance. A
basic assumption throughout this analysis will be that China’s role is expected to continue

expanding in the near future, while the current dominant role in world affairs of the Western

flank will gradually diminish, giving rise not necessarily to a new multipolar world. China’s

role as an emerging superpower will be slightly examined in relation with US’ role as a

declining one, in an effort to determine the opportunities that arise for current second tier

great powers, and in particular that of Russia’s.

The second step of our argument imposes the need to examine the link between

altered geography and interests. Will an ice-free North facilitate the emergence of new

interests? How are these interests going to interact with each other and with existing ones,

and what will be the outcome upon security? Will these interests compete or cooperate? In

order to further assess the hypothesis, we will proceed in two logical steps; firstly, a full

registration of emerging interests is needed, that are Arctic relevant; secondly, a close

examination of security attributes will provide insight regarding their influence upon

existing and emerging interests and Arctic security respectively, through States’ behavioral

shifts. Such security attributes in current thesis are regarded to be, the ongoing militarization

of the arctic region, the existing legal framework and the arctic institutionalization, the

7 Derek Kane O'Leary, Our Arctics, (Institute for Global Maritime Studies, Gloucester, MA, May,
2012), p1
8 Ibid, p3

4
national security policies that are on place, to mention just a few. This is going to be our

second line of defense.

The conclusion will argue that unique timing combined with adverse interests and an

enhanced Russian geopolitical role (more than ever), will subsequently result in power

rebalancing between States, and turn the tide towards confrontation rather than

collaboration. Arctic seems to be the absolute checkmate game.

II. Building the Background

Chapter 1- The ice melting- Why and When?

The uncertainty regarding ‘if and when’ the Arctic will be ice-free can easily render

states’ Arctic planning obsolete. Dissimilar predictions coming from different scientific

weather simulation models may freeze any decision-making process in respect to the Arctic.

The Arctic is expected to be completely ice-free as soon as the summer of 2030 9 . The

climate is becoming warmer due to anthropogenic carbon emissions, and the increase of

CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere has as a result the greenhouse effect. The trapped heat
is expected to increase the mean global temperature around 3 °C in the next 30 years, and

High North10 is “warming twice as fast as lower latitudes” 11 due to positive feedbacks.

On September 2012, the ice cap reached its lowest level, and was 3.4 million square

kilometers less than the average during period 1979-2004. The consequences of such

negligence to address the issue at hand are already evident; extended precipitation in some

9 Nihoul et.al, p22

10 The term “is used interchangeably with other terms such as the North… High Arctic, the
Northern Areas” that basically denote the term Arctic, and as such is not precisely defined (see
Willy Ostreng et.al, Shipping in Arctic Waters, A Comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and
Transpolar Passages, Praxis, p.98).
11 David Fairhall, Cold Front, Conflict ahead in Arctic waters, (I.B.Tauris, 2010), p.xv

5
regions, and drought on others, melting of ageless glaciers, and a rise to the world’s sea

level anticipated to be 50 to 90 cm in this century alone12. Multiyear ice will give place to

thin first year ice. Facilities and infrastructure near coastal and river regions will be

threatened, existing deserts will expand, thawing of soil on the sub-Arctic region will make

obsolete existing transportation roads based on permafrost. It is calculated that top 3 m or

more of perennially frozen soil will be ruined which will put in danger the foundations of

basic infrastructure on the Arctic region13. Such melting of permafrost is expected to release

methane in the atmosphere, which will consequently speed up the global warming process.
An initial approach in comprehending future developments and their implications

upon security could be to direct our research to environmental deviations that influenced

humanity in earlier times. The Earth’s climate has experienced high and low peaks that

could account for the decline of dynasties and civilizations, such as the Tang and Ming

Dynasties, and the Maya civilization. Sovereign states have had a short existence relative to

recorded human history, let alone compared to the Earth’s time scale, so little can be said

about earlier climatic experiences and even lesser regarding the way that nation-states might

respond to future climate changes. Current warming of the planet differentiates further; it is

for the first time human originated, and its repercussions could be unique in magnitude and

severity.

Chapter 2- Determining the Arctic

The Arctic is unique, “an ocean surrounded by a near-unbroken ring of land14”, with

few if any similarities even with Antarctica, which is a frozen continent surrounded by sea.

An uncertainty exists among scholars on the basic definition of what is finally called or

12 Trausti Valsson, How the World will change with Global Warming, (University of Iceland Press,
2006), p17
13 Nihoul et al, p4
14 Kaplan, p.91

6
perceived to be Arctic. The most common definition is “the region as the land and sea area

north of the Arctic circle (a circle of latitude at about 66.30 North) 15 ”. The Arctic is

surrounded by five Arctic littoral states that in an east-west direction are, Russia, Norway,

Denmark (Greenland), Canada and United States (Alaska). There are also Finland, Sweden

and Iceland that are considered to be Arctic states, but not littoral ones. In a North Pole

bird’s eye view the world looks much differently from the commonly accepted European

centered world based on Mercator projection. The Arctic holds some of the elements that are

usually met in closed seas such as the Mediterranean Sea. Still, as Scott G.Borgerson points
out correctly, the littoral states in Mediterranean Sea “have always had clearer historical

claims16” that in turn formulated a “complex network of interdependent ties, rivalry, and

exchange 17 ”. So, it will be more accurate to conceive Arctic as a region where “an

embryonic regionalism is underway18”, which will take its ultimate form when the Arctic

becomes ice-free. In the long term, the Arctic may finally act “as a body of water that [will]

link several large economies19”, and facilitate commerce through established trade routes,

becoming the heart of the High North.

Chapter 3- Establishing Mackinder’s world

In 1904, Halford J.Mackinder proclaimed a new era in which the epoch of

geographic exploration came to an end, and there was no unknown land left for states’ to

claim; the spaces were closed. He argued that “every explosion of social forces, instead of

being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be

15 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, (Congressional
Research Service, R41153, July 21, 2010), p1
16 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown, The Economic and Security Implications of Global
Warming”, Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2008), p73
17 O'Leary, p40
18 Ibid, p40
19 Borgerson, p73

7
sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and

economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence 20 ”. That way, he

recognized implicitly the role that remote places such as the Arctic might play in a

globalized world, which is interconnected. Disputes in different parts of the globe, might

influence indirectly Arctic security. In a closed space era, this might result in friction and

zero sum games. So it is expected that because of that closed spaces, security is destined to

‘suffer’ in the future, and exactly that “compression of geography… will provide optimal

circumstances for new and dangerous ideologies21”.

It can be difficult initially to imagine a world that will be Arctic ice-free and North

Pole centric. Even so, Heartland’s isolation -and concept- will change dramatically as the

Arctic ice melts, and Siberia/Russia will acquire a huge maritime front upon the Arctic.

Mackinder expressed that in a lucid manner, as the “geographical perspective” that

correlates with a particular generation. But Mackinder’s main achievement is that he offered

in a rather simplified manner “the regional structuralization of the Eurasian continent and

the identification of the functional value of its spatial elements 22”. He perceived Europe,

Eurasia, Near East and Africa, as constituting the World Island. Mackinder named the

region that is “detached from the general system of the ocean and river navigations23” as

Heartland. The basic characteristic of Heartland is that it doesn’t have any access to an

accessible Ocean, despite the fact that it is transversed by the large “Ob, Yenisei and Lena

Rivers [that] stream northward through Siberia to this coast 24 ”. To his understanding,

Heartland mainly consisted from Siberia, Russia, the Mongolian and Iranian Uplands, but

also a part of Eastern Europe (a position that was established in his later work). He

20 Halford J.Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, (National Defense University Press, 1942),
, p.176
21 Kaplan, p.123
22 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, Rethinking Central Asia, (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
& Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center, 2010), p.84
23 Mackinder, p.54
24 Ibid, p.54

8
recognized the importance that the European and Monsoon (Southeast Asia) Coastlands

have, an approach that was further elaborated later on by Spykman. These regions

differentiate from the Heartlands in respect to the navigability of their rivers from the oceans

and inwards, and the fertility of their lands due to the widespread rainfalls. Under these

privileged conditions, the coastlands “nourished their great populations25”.

Mackinder’s basic thesis was exactly that for a state to become powerful it needs

“fertility and line of communications - man power and facilities for its organization26”. The

greater the occupied territory, the more the available resources are, and the easier it becomes
to dominate; modern day Russia can be regarded a prime example. Neither Norsemen nor

Arabs managed to subordinate Europe, mostly because they didn’t have the fertile lands

needed to accommodate larger manpower. Eurasia, as Mackinder puts it, acted as a huge

corridor for the westward movement of humans and ideas, mainly nomads from Mongolia

plain that tried to expand and conquer ‘West’, reaching as far as the Hungarian plains. This

movement was facilitated from the geomorphology of Siberia and western Russia. The

central part of Siberia and the part of Russia beyond Urals Mountains are mostly steppes

with low grass, wheat and maize, which became the plain field that supported logistically

the above-mentioned movement. This “Great Lowland” is the heart of the Heartland. The

“climatic regime 27 ” further Mackinder argued, determined these regions, and as a result

determined the political organization of these vast spaces. The open space existing between

the southern part of the Urals Mountains and the Black sea, acted as a gateway through

which Turanian nomads arrived into the heart of Europe.

In World War I, Mackinder envisioned one great battle between a land-power and a

sea power. The former was embodied on Germany and the latter on the Great Britain.

Mackinder supported the idea that if Germany would manage to conquer the “World

25 Ibid, p.62
26 Ibid, p.24
27 Ibid, p.178

9
Island”, then she would have a greater land base to build its own sea power, and this

constituted one of Mackinder’s greatest fears. He argued that due to demographic factors

supported by the fertility of the land, the available resources, and mostly based on

quantitative reasoning, the World Island will finally dominate upon the outer insular belt.

Mackinder realized that there will be a permanent struggle for Eastern Europe between

Russia and Germany, and that it was in the best interest of the West to establish a buffer

zone of states between these two continental powers 28 . He posed a rhetorical question,

relevant to this thesis: “what if the Great Continent, the whole World Island or a large part
of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power?29”

Mackinder’s theory supports our first proposition’s principle; it couldn’t have been

differently because ‘geopolitics’ per se examines exactly that relation. Geography holds a

certain geopolitical value that benefits the nation-state that occupies it. We can induct

subsequently that an altered geography -due to ice melting- will result in an altered

geopolitical value. Mackinder made three basic points that will be useful in our

argumentation; firstly, that a spatially larger state has more resources to benefit from and as

a consequence it is easier to expand and dominate; secondly, land power is destined to

overcome sea power due to increased mobility; and thirdly, the continental power that has a

maritime front and manages to occupy Heartland and its vast resources, will become a world

power.

Chapter 4- Emerging Arctic interests

Few human constructed mega-infrastructures had altered history’s course as the Suez

and Panama Canals did. The huge ‘correction’ of geography wrought by men’s hands was

the motivating factor that determined subsequent events of history. A differentiated

28 Ibid, p.98
29 Ibid, p.49

10
geopolitical role, which was a direct outcome of an altered geography (first reasoning), but

at the same time old interests collapsed under the weight of emerging ones (second

reasoning). The geostrategic importance of Northeast Sea Passage cannot be denied. The

Northern route might be for Russia what was the Panama Canal for the US, the Suez Canal

for France and England, or the discovery of the Cape road to the Indies. Such events

transformed the balance of power in the past. In our current context, Russia may have the

opportunity to establish a direct route of communication between the Barents Sea and the

Pacific Ocean, circumventing closed seas such as the Mediterranean and Black Seas, places
where the West still has an upper hand and is further capable to enforce a containment zone.

Russia may achieve a long-term national vision; that of descending in warm water outlets

and the High Seas, establishing her “Mare Sovieticum30”. New commercial ports and routes

will emerge in the High North, from where Russia will export commodities and will project

sea power. This chapter will document if there are any emerging interests due to Arctic

melting (third proposition), that way it will be easier later on to progress our argument.

Chapter 4.1- Maritime interests

During a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opened the

Northern Sea Route to the West, and claimed that the Arctic region should become a region

of cooperation, a “pole of peace”31. Still, the western maritime companies didn’t pick up the

challenge; a bureaucratic Soviet state and an unfavorable tax regime were barriers to

involvement. The administrative situation hasn’t changed much since then, but as the ice

melts, Northern routes may become feasible. The melting of ice will have as a direct

consequence new sea-lanes to open for maritime transit through the North Sea Passage,

North West Passage and in a much later time through the Transpolar Route. Russia –like

Canada- proclaims that part of her northeast passage are internal waters. EU and US based

30 O'Leary, p60
31 Fairhall, p.xxviii

11
on security and trade considerations strenuously object that, and they consider Northern

Passages to be international straits.

New maritime routes may have as a result great cost savings for the maritime

industry and can reduce the travel time and fuel costs by 40% along some routes. The

distance between the port of Rotterdam and the port of Yokohama in Japan could be at least

4000 miles lesser through the North Sea Passage versus the Suez Canal. This in turn can

lead to an increased maritime trade for bulk cargo through the Northern Routes when

conditions will be appropriate. Nevertheless, a similar trend is not probable for container
ships due to time restraints and much needed predictability on arrival-departure times.

Additionally, trade flows of consumer goods are gradually moving away from China and

towards South America, Middle East and South Africa, and as a result the “polar route

looses its appeal32”. In spite of that, the Northern voyages have experienced a booming

period the last few years and a key advantage is that Northern Routes are away from current

geopolitical hot spots such as the Persian Gulf and regions that are pirate infested such as

the Horn of Africa and Malacca straits. In any case, trade flows will gradually alter in favor

of Northern Sea Routes despite initial inertia, and future technologic advancements will

certainly play a role. Going back in time, a similar inertia was noticed during the

technological advance from wooden ships to iron clads, where “for a time the sailing

clippers maintained their hold on the long haul routes33”, until the excavation of the canals

took place which shortened the routes duration and gave predominance to steam.

The port facilities that were established during the Soviet era –and quite often in

total disrespect of feasibility, in a centrally planned economy-, are more or less obsolete

today, due to multiyear lack of maintenance after the collapse of USSR. Even the complete

32 The Maritime Executive, Arctic Shipping Route Plagued by Icebergs and Insurance, October 15,
2013 (accessed April 27, 2014); available from http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/Arctic-Shipping-Route-Plagued-by-Icebergs-and-Insurance-2013-10-
15/?goback=%2Egde_4213713_member_5795861240458797058
33 Fairhall, p.88

12
absence of piracy in the region nowadays, can change rapidly in the near future when the

route will become more lucrative. These routes may become main avenues for immigration,

smuggling, narcotics, and even terrorists’ attacks. The Arctic frontier may become a

lawlessness frontier. Technological advancements may determine the outcome. Russia,

South Korea and Finland seem to have a technological edge in respect to the Arctic. Such a

technological edge may have civilian and military applications. Military tactics in the

Arctic, which more or less are non-existent at the moment, may develop in compliance with

the technological breakthroughs. Technological innovations and new military dogmas might
become a decisive factor in achieving predominance in the Arctic’s harsh environment.

“Heartland is no longer a fortress34”, Hall argued in 1955, realizing that a less ice-infested

Arctic will end the era of isolation. Taking into consideration the almost non-existent road

and limited rail network in the Arctic and sub Arctic Circle, maritime transportation may

constitute the only affordable solution to an existing transportation problem of minerals and

oil between producing and consuming zones.

Russia is certainly eager to alter world maritime trade routes to her benefit. An open

Northern Sea Route will provide substantial revenues to the Russian economy, and will

boost its geopolitical role, diminishing at the same time the importance of the Suez and

Panama Canals. A potential Russian ‘monopoly’ of Northern Routes, will provide great

leverage upon states whose economies are based on maritime trade and foreign exchange.

This is probable due to the peculiarities of the Northeastern route and the continuous

Russian efforts to treat Arctic waters as her internal-territorial waters. In such a case, Russia

and in her effort to protect such a monopoly is expected to build a blue navy, that way

controlling the energy corridors and the market itself. In a future era of oil depletion,

Russian oil/gas reserves will enhance her role as energy arbitrator. However such an

outcome is not guaranteed due to multiple factors; inadequate infrastructure and investment

34Arthur R.Hall, “Mackinder and the Course of Events”, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.125

13
capital, ice coverage unpredictability, sunk costs for maritime companies, technological

advancements, geopolitical considerations from other states, and enlargement of existing

canals. Competition is not predetermined; firstly, current maritime interests may

repositioned inexpensively in northern latitudes if Russia doesn’t hinder such moves, and

the opposite seems more probable (to be a facilitator); secondly, emerging regional maritime

interests cannot compete with existing international ones, when international maritime

industry operates mostly based on ‘good relations’, unless regional interests become

protégées of the Russian state which seems improbable.

Chapter 4.2 – Oil, Mineral Interests and fish stocks

In an age with diminishing raw materials, how might a state with vast resources

behave? Let’s imagine Russia forty years from now, as being the only depositor of world’s

remaining resources that are placed in Arctic. How might an autarchic Russia use her natural

endowments and military power? The 2008 U.S Geological Survey (USGS) report regarding

the estimated reserves of undiscovered oil and gas in the High North raised great

expectations to the international community. The reserves of oil and gas in the Arctic are

estimated to be more than 30% of the total undiscovered globally. In particular, “the USGS

estimates that 90 billion barrels of oil, nearly 1700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44

billion barrels of natural gas liquids35”, remain to be found in the region. The crucial aspect

is that oil wealth is not evenly distributed across states. The lion share seems to fall in

Russian hands, mostly in the Barents Sea. The extraction of oil wealth is not going to be an

easy task, and moreover, there isn’t “legal clarity concerning ownership and regulation36” of

resources, in order for foreign companies to get involved in such projects. Russia’s

deficiency on judicial independence and democratic institutions, the extensive corruption

and the absence of diversity in her economy, are some of the prerequisites for a ‘resource

35 O’Rourke, p18
36 Fairhall, p.159

14
curse’ to nurture. Because of that, Chalecki expects that Russia could even be vulnerable to

“petro-statehood37”. Even if ‘resource curse’ seems not a probable scenario due to a strong

centralized state and a capable enough army to enforce its will, a ‘Dutch disease’ cannot be

ruled out. In fact, Russia’s overdependence in energy/mining sector for revenues is

problematic by any standards, potentially giving leverage upon her from exogenous

interests.

Russia’s dependence on technical expertise and capital investment from Western

companies is anticipated to mitigate security risks at least in the near future. Nevertheless,
the supplier base for the oil consuming countries will gradually move towards the North,

moving away from the Middle East region, which in turn “will change the geopolitics of the

world in a fundamental way38”. Beyond oil and gas, there are precious deposits of minerals

and non-minerals, such as gold, diamonds, nickel, zinc, copper and lead. The exploitation of

the natural resources provides Russia 11 percent of her GDP 39. Siberia is Russia’s treasury

box, waiting to be exploited. Minerals come second only to oil/gas exports, accounting for

17.7 percent of total exports, in 200540. Even so, and despite the fact that Russia has over

20000 minerals deposits, it seems that the remaining quality becomes less and less attractive

for extraction based on market economic criteria 41 . Fish stocks on the other hand, were

always an issue of confrontation. Past experiences could pour some light into future

developments. United Kingdom and Iceland, NATO allies, almost confronted each other in

the 70’s because of disputed fishing grounds42. The climate change will bring an alteration

on the migration pattern of straddling stock, moving from one country’s EEZ to another.

37 Elizabeth L.Chalecki, Environmental Security, A Guide to the Issues, (Praeger, 2013), p.51
38 Valsson, p119
39 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s Arctic Security Strategy”, Russian Analytical Digest No96, (May
12, 2011), p.11
40 Willy Østreng, Karl Magnus Eger, Brit Fløistad, Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl, Lars Lothe, Morten
Mejlænder-Larsen, and Tor Wergeland, Shipping in Arctic Waters: A comparison of the Northeast,
Northwest and Trans Polar Passages, (Springer, 2013), p.106
41 Østreng, p.120
42 Chalecki, p.84

15
Overfishing and a declined fish production-catch could be a reason for confrontation in the

far future. Russian fishing ports, such as Murmansk, Belomorsk and Arkhangelsk will gain

in importance43, altering existing maritime routes and military considerations.

Upcoming global energy insecurity is anticipated to give an upper hand to states that

are autarkic in oil and minerals. Russia is privileged due to the unexploited resources in

Northern Siberia. Russia could gain leverage upon energy dependent states and regions such

as the EU. How these states will respond depends on the power balance at the time in

question. It is expected that declining powers will try to hinder Russia’s ambitious plans,
while they are still powerful enough in relative terms vis-à-vis Russia. In the long term, the

abundance of resources will widen the economic gap, providing an opportunity for

increased Russian military expenditures; this already happened during the previous decade,

favored by the oil boom in prices. In the short term, Russia is expected to behave

cooperatively, as long as it needs western know-how, investment capital and open markets

for her raw materials. This is expected to change when Russia will become more self-

sufficient and self-assured.

Still, the causality of a wealthier Russia and a more aggressive one is not going to be

straightforward; economic interests may finally prevail upon national security interests,

peacefully forcing her to adopt a more cooperative stance in the Arctic region. Furthermore,

it is unclear for now if the anticipated increased wealth will finally translate into enhanced

Russian military capabilities. Besides, new technological advancements in the energy sector,

such as the recent breakthrough in shale gas exploitation, could easily reduce energy

dependency from Russia, consequently reducing Russian leverage44. Energy interests differ

from maritime ones, in a critical aspect. Energy reserves have a strategic importance in

Russian security planning. Furthermore, the energy sector has always been a closed club of

43Østreng, p.111
44Charles K.Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The geopolitics of Arctic melt”, International Affairs
85:6, (2009), p1220

16
multibillion-dollar empires, which lacked transparency and where long-standing

relationships weren’t the norm. As such, a military and economic confrontation deriving

from the oil and gas sector is more favorable due to the fact that Russia has an absolute

control upon oil/gas reserves and at the same time is the major stakeholder of the oil/gas

companies that have been destined to exploit them. The close relations among western

governments and energy companies’ goliaths might exaggerate such frictions.

Chapter 4.3- Military interests and geostrategic considerations

During the Cold War, the Arctic had to play a crucial role in national strategies. The

end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t diminish that role. As Derek K.

O'Leary argues “if the Atlantic Age has passed and the pivot to Asia signaled that the

Pacific Age is fully upon us, we may also ask if an Arctic Age will in this century entail

another oceanic orientation45”. The melting of the ice will present new options in military

planning at the strategic and tactical levels. The thickness of the ice and the noisy

underwater environment make the Arctic sea an excellent environment for nuclear ballistic

missile submarines (SSBN) to operate and hide, acting as a first strike nuclear weapon or a

deterrent one. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent obsolescence

of her conventional army forces, Russia still maintained her nuclear capabilities as a

measure of deterrence against a superior US army, in pure conventional military terms. The

North Pole is the most direct attack route, between Europe and North America. Beyond the

Kola Peninsula, which is the main naval base of Russia’s SSBN, the High north

accommodates a “chain of eleven forward bomber bases 46 ” that are dispersed along her

Arctic frontier. The geostrategic importance of the region is expected to rise further.

45 O'Leary, p2
46 Kristian Åtland, “Russia’s Armed Forces and the Arctic: All Quiet on the Northern Front?”,
Contemporary Security Policy, 32:2, (2011), 267-285, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2011.590354,
p.270

17
 One of the major concerns of Russian’s Navy planners has always been the

containment of the Northern Fleet in Kola Peninsula by NATO countries. Svalbard Island

will play a significant geostrategic role in the new Arctic era, because it is overlooking the

sea-gap connecting Barents Sea with the Atlantic Ocean. As Perry and Andersen write, the

Northern routes “include strategic choke points –such as … Russia’s Severnaya Zemlya and

New Siberian Islands in the Northern Sea Route- that could be blocked by adversaries.47”

The Tsushima naval battle in 1905, which resulted in the destruction of the Russian

Northern fleet squadron from the Japans after an all-around globe sail from St.Petersburg,
became part of the Russian military psych and one of its greatest fears. This incident created

a Russian “deep historical neurosis48” and a feeling of “claustrophobia.” Russian fears of

encirclement are not without merit. Military confrontation might become a self-fulfilled

prophecy, if it will be combined with emerging interests in the maritime and energy sector.

Russia’s feeling of encirclement found its way out from her peculiar standing

through the frozen north. H.P.Smolka, just before the outbreak of World War II, foresaw the

great importance of Murmansk as a year around ice-free port49. Future Russia, will certainly

gain a huge advantage at the tactical and strategic levels if she manages to “bridge” the

Northern fleet with that of the Pacific due to the Arctic melt. The Panama Canal was the

equivalent in US history that connected the east and west coast fleets, and gave rise to a

global maritime power. An Arctic ice-free ocean will bring closer opposite shores, creating a

sort of a ‘North Mediterranean’, eliminating obstacles and distances, establishing routes and

giving opportunity for new military strategies to be developed. However, current naval ships

are not ice capable, so such travel is prohibited at the moment; even with an icebreaking

escort there is a high probability of hull damage. Technological advancements in Arctic

military equipment could be a force multiplier for any navy, bringing forces to the rear of

47 Charles M.Perry and Bobby Andersen, Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region, (The Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., February 2012), p10
48 Fairhall, p.xxiii
49 H.P.Smolka, “Soviet strategy in the Arctic”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 16, No 2, (Jan 1938), p273

18
foes without early warning. NATO would have to figure out how to contain an extensive

Russian maritime front; Russian military planners would deal with how to defend it and

furthermore materialize Admiral Kuznetchov’s dream of a blue navy.

Chapter 5- Comprehending Security attributes

Charles K.Ebinger et.al argue that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic will rise

when there will be a “confluence of factors”: oil price rise, ice capable technology,
sustainable and environmental friendly commercial development, interest in new maritime

shipping routes, clear legal framework and established code of conduct 50 . In order to

properly assess the security situation that climate change will inflict in the Arctic region and

that will consequently add or subtract to the importance that is derived from Mackinder’s

quite deterministic geography and the emerging economic interests, it is crucial to examine

four security attributes that have a role to play; the institutional framework regarding the

Arctic, articulated national security Arctic policies, existing territorial disputes, and lastly

military expenditures. As Huebert eloquently puts it, “what are the states saying or doing51”

will determine the new security environment.

Chapter 5.1-Institutional Framework regarding the Arctic Region

The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum that consists of five Arctic littoral

states, the ‘Arctic Five’ - Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), and

Norway - plus Sweden, Iceland and Finland (altogether the Arctic Eight, A8). The Illulissat

declaration in 2008 gave the impression that Arctic rim powers prefer to treat the Arctic as a

closed group issue. An agreement reached in 2011, which put in place a legally binding

50 Ebinger et al, p1232

51 Rob Huebert, The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment, (Canadian Defence & Foreign
Affairs Institute, March 2010), p.5

19
Search and Rescue policy, further supports the notion of close cooperation among the Arctic

States. On the other hand, the lack of established enforcement mechanism it certainly limits

Arctic Council’s effectiveness. Reluctance from the US to include security issues on the

Arctic’s Council agenda is another major concern. Either way, a rational assumption can be

made here that the more institutionalized the Arctic environment becomes and the better

framed it is with legally binding agreements that are recognized by all stakeholders and

easily enforced by the international community, then the more secure it is going to be.

Under this scheme, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 52 (UNCLOS) has a
substantial role to play.

The existing institutional legal framework of UNCLOS and Arctic Council

determines the rights and obligations that Arctic States and international community have,

and provides the forum for dialogue, which in turn reduces security risks and the probability

of an unwanted military escalation. Even so, we expect that great powers such as the EU and

emerging ones such as China will attempt to modify existing Arctic Council’s framework to

include them. A potential effort to exclude certain states from the decision making process,

would probably lead some of them to adopt a more provocative and revisionist stance. A

possible new Arctic Council’s operational framework should include also a wider agenda,

including security issues. However, an enlarged in scope Arctic Council that would have the

authority to negotiate Arctic security issues could potentially limit the role of the UN and

other international organizations. Consequently, and looking in a macroscopic level such a

move could be characterized as counterproductive, but still favorable enough for a few

states. On the other hand, a further enlargement of the Arctic Council with new members,

without altering its agenda, could jeopardize the meaning of its existence; Canada and

Russia are reluctant to accept new members, due to the abovementioned concerns.

52UNCLOS is an international framework under UN that regulates the obligations and privileges
that states have upon sea and its resources.

20
 Chapter 5.2- Articulated Arctic Policies
There are differences among the official Arctic policies of the Arctic Eight

nations, having each one a special focus upon a distinctive area. The initial impression

that is given after a thorough study of these national security papers is an obvious

unwillingness to militarize Arctic and consequently transform into a confrontational

zone; still, they express their preparedness to act accordingly (or their willingness to be

prepared in order to act) in case it is needed. Russia’s policy documents are less
confrontational compared to the 1997 edition, and mainly focus on bi- and multilateral

cooperation as a mean to resolve global issues 53 . Their major concern is the proper

utilization of the energy resources that are regarded as strategic. Russia’s strong will to

improve the conventional capabilities of Russian army is expressed on her military

doctrine. Russia’s security policy does not rule out the use of military force and sees the

Arctic as an “area of potential conflict…along with the Middle East, Central Asia and the

Caspian Sea54”. Still, Russia’s expressed main goals are border protection and security,

and the creation of special Arctic forces capable of operating in the region55. The recent

reorganization of Russian Military Commands and their areas of responsibility further

support his argument. In particular, the Central Command that will be responsible for the

vast expanse of the High North will be finally situated in the South and won’t have “a

naval element of its own56”. These in turn tell us that Russians downplay the military

importance of the Arctic, at least for now. However, Russia’s military complex higher

degree of autonomy that is unaccountable to its citizens could be of major concern57.

53 Åtland, p.275
54 Fairhall, p.55
55 Åtland, p.276
56 Åtland, p.278
57 Åtland, p.274

21
 The Arctic strategies all have a common base; they recognize that the Arctic will

gain in geopolitical importance. Each state is compelled to take action early and be prepared

militarily and diplomatically. It is obvious that a potentially dangerous downward slope lies

here; a military build up and a new national security strategy may result into a vicious circle

of counterbalancing, which in turn creates a security dilemma. What that means is that

abovementioned national security policies will follow suit the aggressor; just one revisionist

state could transform the current ‘pacifist-like’ Arctic security policies into an escalating

scenario. Therefore, Arctic security policies tell us where we stand now, not where we will
be in the near future. But still they influence public perceptions and the decision-making

processes in at the governmental level.

Chapter 5.3-Existing Arctic Territorial Disputes

Existing territorial disputes seem unlikely to escalate into major conflicts in the

immediate future. This has to do mainly with the unwillingness from the Arctic states to

internationalize their disputes, which might become a backdoor invitation to emerging

stakeholders in Arctic affairs. They are making concerted efforts to safeguard their

privileged rights in the region. An exemplary example is the territorial settlement in the

Barents Sea between Russia and Norway, a long-standing delimitation dispute of their

shelves. It isn’t clear if the peaceful resolution of Norway and Russia’s territorial dispute in

Barents Sea was a Russian tactical one-time maneuvering or a strategic decision of a law-

abiding state, projecting cooperation as her mean to achieve her ends. Russia was the first

state to submit a claim regarding an expansion of its Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in

the UN’s Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 58, back in 2001. The

58 UNCLOS according to article 76, provides the right for each State to establish an Extended
Continental Shelf (ECS) as a zone based on the particular geomorphology of its seabed where it
can exercise limited sovereignty. Each State can submit such claims to UN’s Commission on the
limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), and the Commission “reviews the documentation and, by
two-thirds majority, approves its recommendations to the submitting State”, see O’Rourke, p7

22
planting of the Russian flag in 2007, on the bottom of the North Pole upon the Lomonosov

Ridge, was probably politically motivated to support such claims. Two of the regions that

Russia initially claimed to be continuations of her continental shelf, are situated in the

Arctic. In particular these are the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges; the former extends

and reaches the Northern part of Greenland (Denmark) and Ellesmere Island (Canada). Who

owns Lomonosov Ridge, owns also the North Pole, which in turn can be a factor of national

pride and could certainly boost political careers. Most importantly the Lomonosov Ridge

seems to hold huge deposits of oil and gas.

Furthermore, one of the remaining territorial boundaries disputes is that between US-

Russia in the Bering Strait. An agreement was signed for a final settlement just before the

collapse of the Soviet Union, in June 1990. According to this agreement, the maritime

boundary was clarified and four distinct zones where the Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ of

both states overlapped were resolved mostly in favor of US. The US Congress ratified the

agreement, but Russia –the successor state of Soviet Union, both in term of liabilities and

rights- denied to do so because the Russian political elite felt that the sovereign rights of

Russia were repudiated by the agreement, being the direct outcome of a unique historical

weakness of Soviet diplomacy.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has commented on many occasions that

Russia will resolve any remaining issues “in strict compliance with international law 59”.

This doesn’t preclude the fact that exogenous conflicts in relation to the Arctic region may

propagate easily there. Furthermore, Russia may exploit territorial differences among

NATO allies, using ‘divide and conquer’ logic. But she may even exploit longstanding

territorial disputes for domestic reasons, related to internal nationalistic pressures emerging

from her electoral body. Such an outcome, and when it will be left uncontrollable, could

exaggerate existing territorial disputes’ significance, escalating easily even into military

59 Fairhall, p.38

23
conflict. It is estimated that an unfavorable decision by Commission on the limits of the

Continental Shelf (CLCS) upon occupation of the Lomonosov Ridge and the North Pole,

will result in a zero sum psychology among Arctic state actors. In such a case, territorial

disputes can become hot spots in a series of provocations.

Chapter 5.4- Military expenditures

The recent economic resurrection of Russia’s economy was a direct outcome of

high-energy prices, which in turn resulted in a substantial increase in Russian military

expenditures. Part of the enlarged economic pie went towards military projects and

procurement of military equipment, including for improved Arctic capabilities. In 2011,

President Putin announced the creation of two Arctic brigades, adding “as for our own geo-

political interests [in the Arctic] are concerned, we shall be protecting them firmly and

consistently60”. In the same year it was announced that Russia would spend almost $730

billions procuring advanced weaponry until 2030 61 . Under this mindset, Russia has

reinitiated in 2007 strategic bomber flights above the Arctic and near the Canadian

Archipelago and northern Norway’s borders, an older Soviet era practice. The Northern fleet

becomes more assertive in the region, a trend that is expected to continue in the near future.

The deployment of the Borei class SSBN, when it will take finally place, will signal a

tipping point in regional military balance. This in turn explains, Canada and Norway’s

extensive military procurement program and the continuous efforts of the latter to raise a red

flag in NATO alliance regarding the grim future of the High North.

The harsh Arctic environment makes it difficult for any state to monitor and attain

full domain awareness, and could even hide ongoing militarization. Historical precedents,

human ‘hawkish’ agents such as Canadian P.M Harper, or Russian President Putin, and the

60 Thomas Grove, Russia Creates Two Brigades of Arctic Troops, Reuters, July 1, 2011 (accessed
April 27, 2014); available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/russia-arctic-troops-
idUKLDE76017D20110701
61 Åtland, p.268

24
fear of ‘lost opportunities’ might speed up such a process. A security dilemma62 could be the

outcome; militarize first before the opponent does, in order to gain a tactical advantage.

External events might easily propagate into the Arctic region. Russia’s current superior

icebreaking fleet speaks for itself; the Arctic has a special importance in Russia’s foreign

policy, military and energy development planning. Nevertheless, what we are currently

experiencing in the Arctic region isn’t a full-scale militarization but rather a ‘soft

militarization’, which is self-restrained from becoming ‘hard’ one. No player seems willing

to spend more for arctic military equipment and training, when any gains -if any- can only
be seen far in the future. It appears more probable that when the time will be riper, only then

the Arctic States will increase such arctic expenditures, a cost saving approach based on

timely utilization of available resources.

III. Arguments - Counterarguments

The relation between the arctic melting and the emerging interests will not be

analyzed further, as it was already elaborated in Chapter 4, in the “Building the

Background” section of our current essay. We will focus instead in Geopolitics’ shift and

the implications upon Russia’s dominance.

Chapter 6- Advancing our 1st level Argument / Geopolitics’ shift and Russia’s

Dominance
A question immediately arises; is Mackinder’s geopolitics a relevant theory

nowadays, able to describe upcoming events in a rather fragile world? It can be even argued

62 The three main preconditions for being a security dilemma according to Shiping Tang, are
basically met here; we have an anarchic nature, and Arctic’s peculiarities could enhance it; there
is a gradual accumulation of military power; and lastly, Russia (or any other Arctic State) doesn’t
have malign intentions at least for now in respect to the region. See Shiping Tang (2011), The
Security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory of ethnic conflict,
Review of International Studies, 37, pp 511-536 doi:10.1017/S0260210510000616

25
that its core thesis, that of Heartland’s unique destiny, an area which is termed as the “region

to which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access 63 ”, loses its initial

meaning and in turn urges us to revise it. Even if Heartland term itself needs a reevaluation,

the importance that Heartland has upon the World Island doesn’t diminish but rather

expands in an Arctic ice-free era. Mackinder’s core thinking seems relevant today and may

provide hints about the emerging world and Russia’s unique role in it. Geopolitical shifts

and the Arctic’s riches may result in territorial claims by littoral states, which in their effort

to guarantee their survival and advance their power in a rather dynamic environment, they
will form new alliances and if environment permits even challenge the international status64.

The outcome could be an extensive power rebalancing which almost certainly will reshape

states’ borders. Such changes in geography will certainly “affect political constellations and

hierarchies65”.

The importance that Mackinder reserved for the land power vis-à-vis the maritime

power was based in the significance that he put in the railroad expansion and the mobility he

envisioned that such a development would finally provide. However even today, Russia’s

Heartland is underdeveloped and basic infrastructure is missing that would facilitate such

mobility. It seems that Mackinder was quite overambitious about Heartland’s future in

regards to mobility because he underestimated the technical difficulties that such

development meant. His era of high land mobility never arrived in this part of the world, and

transportation remains the weakest wheel of the Russian war machine as H.P.Smolka has

emphasized back in 1938 66 . In order to become a continental power as Mackinder

envisioned, Russia shall invest intensively in road and rail infrastructure. Only then can she

exploit fully the role that Heartland has to play. But can Russia become at the same time a

63 Mackinder, p.78
64 P.Siousiouras, D.Dalaklis, and P.Baxevani, “Arctic: A new field Geopolitical Fermentation”,
Naval Inspection, Hellenic Navy Journal, (July 2013), p.81
65 Christian Le Mière and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic opening, Insecurity and Opportunity, (Adelphi Series,
2013, 53:440), p.122
66 Smolka, p272

26
major maritime power and what are expected to be her relative gains in respect to other

great powers? Mackinder realized the serious implications for global stability that might

derive from a combination of maritime oceanfront with the pivot area under the roof of one

state; Germany was his main fear, but we can only assume that an ice-free Russia could

easily supersede it.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national adviser of US President Carter, defined Russia as a

“black hole”, due to the fact that geographically was inaccessible from the sea 67 , a

geographical determinism that precluded her from evolving into a sea power. Mackinder
had expressed a similar idea; that geography determines the kind of power that can emerge.

As a next logical step, he argued that marginal lands that possess a maritime front, such as

Europe, South East Asia and Near East, are inclined to become maritime powers. Russia on

the other hand, is inclined to become a major continental power, based on the strategic depth

of the Heartland and the abundance of her resources. However, what Mackinder couldn’t

foresee, was that Russia one day could gradually be transformed from an isolated heartland

and consequently a continental power, potentially into maritime power through the opening

of the Arctic Ocean. Russia will be neither an outer crescent country, insular from the rest

world due to an ocean as the United States is, nor an inner crescent state. It is clear that

emerging Russia won’t fall anymore into anyone of Mackinder’s categories; a revision is

much needed here. Russia is going to be a unique combination of the original Pivot area and

a newly appeared extensive northern oceanic front, becoming a ‘peninsular Heartland’

reaching directly the Arctic, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and indirectly the Mediterranean

Sea through the Christian orthodox geopolitical arc68. Furthermore, Iran and Afghanistan

67 Le Mière et al, p.121, as it was presented initially in Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand
Chessboard, (1997)
68 J. Anderson, in Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Assymetric Symphonia (Journal of
International Affairs), portrays Putin as a pragmatic politician that used the Church for political
ends and domestic ends (p. 188), still supporting the constitutionl separation of the church and
the State. Prof. Robert C.Blitt, in Russia’s “Orthodox” foreign policy, the Growing influence of the
Russian Orthodox Church in Shaping Russia’s policies abroad, presents in chapter 3.2.5.3 the
efforts of Patriarch Kirill to unite the Christian orthodox states and gain political leverage.

27
had always a prominent geopolitical role to play in Russia’s geopolitical calculations;

establishing political control over them, Russia could be able to reach the Indian Ocean. The

Arctic might become a new Rimland, with the importance that Spykman anticipated.

Mackinder cautioned that the nation that will combine the Heartland with an extensive

maritime front, based on the vast underground hidden resources, might become a “single

world empire69”, if it is not timely counterbalanced; a ‘Hyper-Empire’70. This in turn, raises

a crucial question regarding the combination in a single state structure of the continental and

sea based dominance and the effect of such an outcome upon the power balance and
collective security.

Where Mackinder’s theory lacks, Mahan and Spykman’s rationale supplement it.

Their distinct approaches can be crucial to our final understanding and they will further

support our argument that Russia has the potential to become once more a major

superpower. Spykman, a successor of Mackinder, believed that the efficient control of

Rimland, would lead to the domination upon Mackinder’s Heartland and as a direct

consequence that of the world71. Mahan instead, a predecessor of Mackinder and Spykman,

was an advocate of sea power and he compartmentalized world in a geographically similar

manner as Mackinder (the opposite is more true). Mahan was far from being considered a

pure geographic determinist; he meticulously examined the importance of other factors

beyond geography, such as “the physical conformation, extent of territory, number of

population, character of people, and character of government 72 ”. He recognized, as this

thesis does, that a constellation of factors determine the political outcome and he recognized

However, it seems that President Putin’s world geopolitical view wasn’t influenced in a great
extent by the Orthodox dogma because he early on realized that it wasn’t a viable tool to forge a
counter coalition against liberalism and western ideas abroad.
69 Mackinder, p.2
70 Hyper Empire as a term used in this paper is defined in the Appendix
71 Ismailov et al, p.89
72 Sumida, p 41 as it was initially maintained by William E.Lizey, Mahan on Sea Power (rev.ed)
(Norman, OK: U. of Oklahoma Press 1981; first pub 1947), p.316

28
the importance of the human agent, the “governmental factor73” that supplemented that of

geography. From the above, it is clear that Russia is in a unique position because three

quite distinct geopolitical approaches will finally converge upon her; and the vast

potential that she has to become finally a superpower, is based exactly on these. Spykman’s

Rimland that once could act as “bridgehead74” for US and British troops to land and attack

in the rear of the continental power, becomes less probable with a Northern Rimland open

for a Russian blue navy to develop. Such a navy could encircle Spykman’s Rimland from

the South when a continental army could exercise pressure from the North. In such a case,
no state situated in Rimland would have ever thought to confront the dominant Continental

Power or sign an alliance with an insular state, such as the US.

Relative gains matter on States’ calculations. Russia is expected to be the absolute

and relative winner, gaining the most in respect to any other arctic littoral state and in every

sector that we could thought of. Canada and the US might follow. When the time is ripe,

Russia may succeed abruptly and unconditionally to shift the geopolitical balance to her

favor, becoming an energy goliath and supporting consequently a vast war machine that it

could be almost unbeatable. Vast resources and logistics and an autarchic leadership have

been the elements of Russian victory historically. Under a ‘Mahanian’ approach, the

Russian leadership and its national vision will have also a crucial role to play in the future.

Taking Stalin as an example, in 1936 the Communist Committee decided due to political

and military motivations that a “large sea and ocean fleet” was crucial for the projection of

power by USSR75. Still, USSR’ naval future was finally restricted by two factors; firstly,

Stalin’s perception that a coastal navy was really needed rather than a blue ocean navy,

which would be capable to defend the motherland; secondly, due to absence of raw

73 Sumida, p 49
74 Arthur R.Hall, “Mackinder and the Course of Events”, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.111
75 Natalia I.Yegorova, “Stalin’s Conception of Maritime Power: Revelations from the Russian
Archives”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 28, No. 2, (April 2005), p.158

29
materials and technical expertise. The former proves the important role that human agents

have in an autarchic political system, where the latter that technical difficulties can hinder

progress but cannot forestall them if there is strong will in place from the leadership,

towards certain goals.

Several similarities ‘pop up’ right away, between the USSR and today’s Russia.

President Putin has centralized power, controlled the media and the economic structure, in

his effort to govern efficiently the Russian state. Such a political move, even if it looks

illiberal in Western eyes, was a crucial step towards Russia’s reemergence. Even so, exactly
this absolutism, based on an existing undemocratic logic that the ‘king must be right’, might

finally hinder any further progress. An essential point here is that Russia has to overcome

herself in order to become a major maritime power. The leadership and even more the

bureaucracy around it, are ‘historically trained’ to see Russia in continental terms, rather

than oceanic ones. Even if a unique opportunity surfaces for Russia to develop a blue navy,

this might not be fulfilled due to her historical momentum and the inherited common belief

of being a landlocked power. Human agency shall play a significant role in altering nation’s

course; a leader like-minded Peter the Great is what it needed.

Chapter 7- Advancing our 2nd level Argument

Chapter 7.1 – Geopolitical dominance equals revisionism?

Mead is right in stating that Westerners have misread the collapse of Soviet Union

and the end of Cold War as the end of geopolitics, when in reality it was Fukuyama’s end of

History of ideas 76 , even a temporary one as recent history has proven. In particular,

Fukuyama key thesis was that the final advent of the model of Western liberal democracy

76 Walter Russell Mead, “The return of Geopolitics, The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers”,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014 (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics

30
was the end point of the economic and sociopolitical evolution of humanity. Mead argues

that geopolitics was always present, and nowadays Russia, China and Iran could be

considered revisionist powers77, but with each one possessing different agendas; in the case

of Russia, Mead argues that what she wants is “to reassemble as much of the Soviet Union

as it can78”. Such revisionism, according to Mead, wants to challenge US power projection

in Eurasia and not directly confront her. Ikenberry instead, in his article “The Illusion of

Geopolitics”, portrays Russia (and China) as “part time spoilers at best79”. He bases his

argument on the superiority of the US and the liberal model, versus a non-existent
alternative from illiberal states such as Russia.

Ikenberry’s argument is faulty in three aspects; firstly, he overestimates US’ soft

power that can be projected abroad, or as he puts it Washington’s “unique ability to win

friends and influence states80”, when in the first place friends don’t exist in international

relations, but just converging short-term interests; secondly, even when he accepts that the

US will “come down from the peak of the hegemony”, he doesn’t recognize the fact that

China’s or Russia’s economic predominance will result in winning ‘hearts and minds’ of

state actors that were formerly US allies; thirdly, as a direct consequence of that, liberal

capitalist model and liberal democracy might loose their initial appeal. What Mead and

Ikenberry even more didn’t foresee is that the war of ideas is approaching once more, and

geopolitics is expected to be there to accommodate it. The liberal model is questioned

worldwide, despite Ikenberry’s arguments to the contrary, and 2008 financial crisis was a

turning point for the US and the world as a whole. The rise of nationalism and communism

77 With the term revisionist States we imply those States that are unsatisfied with and are
willing to challenge current international hierarchical structure and power balance.
78 Walter Russell Mead, “The return of Geopolitics, The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers”,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014 (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics
79 G.John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics, The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order”,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2014, (accessed May 7, 2014); available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141212/g-john-ikenberry/the-illusion-of-geopolitics
80 Ibid.

31
once more in Europe supports the above notion. Ikenberry is right that Russia or China

currently lack an alternative model, the “ideas, capacities, or allies” that could overthrow

Washington’s current predominance. This however doesn’t mean that they won’t challenge

US’ role. Russia’s endeavor to establish a new strategic vision and an ideology81 is an effort

to ‘procure an ideological weapon’, similar to the one that the Soviet Union once had. An

ideological weapon could be considered to be an advanced situated “parachute [army]

division 82 ”, securing positions and disrupting the “normal procedures in the rear of the

enemy 83 ”. Modern day liberal model of governance is exactly that; the moral veil that
dresses underneath US supremacy. As such, it isn’t seriously questioned as long as no other

ideology is readily available.

Equally important, is Russia’s own self-image in our understanding of its behavioral

attitude. The reality seems to be that Russia is meticulously carving a new image out of

nothing; Eurasianism84 seems to be a partial answer to her problem; the lack of strategic

vision, which is a direct inheritance of the sudden USSR collapse. A.Barbashin et.al argue

that Russian conservatism, dissimilar to western conservatism, gave birth to a modern

version of Eurasianism85. Based on the principles of Eurasianism as was formed just after

the 1917 October Revolution, and as an alternative to Bolsheviks ideology, its conceptual

originators believed that “Russia’s geography is its fate and that there is nothing any ruler

can do to unbind himself from the necessities of securing his lands86”. A.Dungin, the reviver

of Eurasianism, in his earlier writings depicted a struggle between “two types of global

81 Such as Eurasianism, which is further analyzed later on

82 Arthur R.Hall, “Mackinder and the Course of Events”, Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 45, No.2 (Jun., 1955), p.123
83 Hall, p.123
84 Eurasianism is a Russian school of thought initially coming from the 20’s that proclaims a
unique Eurasian identity for Russia, independent from European influences
85 Barbashin et al
86 Barbashin et al. This and other core principles that constituted Eurasianism were initially
published in a collection of articles titled “Exodus to the East”, by Georges Florovsky, Nikolai
Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitskii, and Petr Suvchinky

32
powers: land powers, or “Eternal Rome” which are based on the principles of statehood …

and civilizations of the sea, or “Eternal Carthage” which are based on individualism87”. In

the abovementioned dipole of moral vis-a-vis malicious, he further argued that “Eternal

Rome” which is represented by nowadays “moral Russia”, and in order to prevail upon

“Eternal Cartage” which is represented by the “malicious United States”, she must embrace

conservatism. This new Russia shall include Mackinder’s Heartland plus a possible

“protectorate over all EU members88”. Even if it is unclear to what extent Eurasianism as an

ideology has infiltrated into the Russian political thinking, still it gives a good hint upon the
ongoing struggle of ideas that is happening in domestic Russian political level. And as

Mackinder warned, when ideology prevails upon realism, hunger and turmoil lies ahead.

Neo-Eurasianism sees Russia as a continental power that has to fight back the global

maritime power; this indirectly excludes Russia from becoming a major maritime power. As

such, it is certainly a revisionist school of political thought. Furthermore, it supports our

earlier argument about leadership’s role, that if Russia wants to become a “Hyper-Empire”,

then the Russian bureaucracy should evolve and overcome the notion of a landlocked

empire.

Media on their part build perceptions, even quite often upon request. The

“perception of strategic finds 89” in relation to each state’s historical claims and national

identity, is what finally matters. Hence, a thorough examination of Russian media practices

may provide a few hints to Russia’s hidden objectives, answering the question; is or will

Russia become in the mid term a revisionist State, leading to a less secure Arctic?

E.W.Rowe et.al examined the framing of Arctic, which means how the Russian political

elite conceptualizes Arctic and how in turn the Russian media conglomerate narrates it

towards the domestic audience. Based on that, E.W.Rowe et.al elaborated upon nowadays

87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ebinger et al, p.1221

33
scenarios of Arctic scramble, concluding that are a direct outcome of the tradition of

classical geopolitics, or as they put it, the “geopolitical narrative90”. Nevertheless they point

out, that Russian policymakers “display a certain indifference” towards scenarios of future

Arctic conflict but they faintly distinguish an inclination towards cooperation. The media’s

de facto dependency on the Russian state 91 might give an extra weight to our earlier

observation. On the contrary, Russian academic circles seem to have a more “competition-

oriented approach92”. Such an internal dichotomy among different Russian domestic actors

and institutions creates an uncertainty about the preferred Arctic path that Russia should
follow. Furthermore, the Russian media -aka the Russian state- didn’t alter their posture

towards Arctic becoming a more confrontational one, because of crises developing

elsewhere (such as Georgia); a sort of Arctic isolation. Nonetheless, nobody can preclude

that in the near future Arctic will not be influenced negatively from external stimuli,

abandoning its current isolation from international affairs.

The Russian dichotomy goes up to the diplomatic level, affecting its stance; Russian

foreign policy balances between two different tracks, multilateralism and bilateralism. Even

if Russia initially favored bilateralism with her neighbors in order to project power and bend

easily their will to her own gain, an altered policy course has been noticed during the last

few years. In the post-Cold War era, “Russia has been more willing to work through

potentially restrictive international organizations 93 ”. The question is, if this could be a

strategic option hiding a long-term vision of a law-abiding state fully integrated in

international community or instead if it could be a tactical move based on necessity and well

calculated realism derived from Russia’s currently diminished status. If Russia choses

multilateralism, then revisionism becomes less probable and collective security may take the

upper hand upon power balance and confrontation; idealism in such a case wins. However,

90 Rowe et al, p.70

91 Roi, p.554
92 Rowe et al, p.74
93 Le Mière et al, p.124

34
the Russian participation in international organizational bodies shall not be misrepresented.

Russia’s posture won’t drift away from earlier long held positions. It is also unclear if

Russia makes use of such international institutions as a mean to project her power abroad,

and “influence over a number of extra-regional states, particularly those in Northeast

Asia94”, based on her natural resources and energy diplomacy.

Going deeper, Russia’s goals, expressed or thoroughly hidden, could provide a better

understanding. Could Putin’s regime goal be “to advance its interest in regime preservation

though domestic and foreign policies aimed at immunizing Russia from the ‘orange virus,
… and the survival of autocracy’95”? It seems plausible that any regime has an interest to

survive, and a semi democratic one even more. The Arctic in particular seems to be for

Russia not a pragmatic goal but rather a “patriotic desire to expand Russia’s frontiers 96”. A

revisionist stance might finally emerge not as a national need to expand based on a

favorable power balance and core national interests, but as a result of nationalism, weak

domestic political structures, and diplomatic avalanches; ‘save face’ considerations are

always inside politicians’ minds. Kaplan on his part argues that Russia doesn’t have any

other choice than to become a revisionist power, due to “ups and downs of Russian history,

… [and] its new geographical vulnerabilities97”, that compel her to regain control over the

Russian privileged space.

Any emerging power may be considered as a de facto revisionist power, at least

partially. This is so, because in a closed space as the one that Mackinder had envisioned in

1904, a zero sum game becomes the predominant school of thought. For one state to emerge

and expand, another state must decline and contract. Russia has realized that what she lost in

the blink of an eye back in the 90’s will be difficult if not impossible to regain, but if she is

94 Ibid, p.125
95 Michael L.Roi, p.556, as it is initially maintained at Ambrosio, T, Authoritarian Backlash:
Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009)
96 Trenin et al, p25
97 Kaplan, p.176

35
willing to do so, revisionism is the way ahead. However, and by definition, status quo

powers are the ones that initially designed and subsequently benefited from the “rules of the

game”, when the revisionist states are dissatisfied from existing world structure, and have a

desire to redraft it98. Consequently, Russia is in many aspects a status quo power, being one

of the prime architects of current post WWII world order. So it seems probable that Russia

won’t be willing to become a fully revisionist power because in such a case the outcome

might be against core interests, and risking a new world order that it could be worse than the

one existing. Russia isn’t either a partial spoiler because she has shown signs to cooperate
for international and regional stability through international organizations. She is rather a

partial revisionist power99, being in a track to regain part of her historical privileged space.

Chapter 7.2 – Emerging Interests plus Security attributes equals

Security Reassessment?
Charles M. Perry et.al foresee a peaceful end for the Arctic region based on three

arguments; firstly, the majority of the Arctic wealth is located in undisputed sovereign

territories; secondly, the tools that UNCLOS provide for peaceful settlements and the

successful outcome and final resolve of long standing issues using as a case example that

between Russia and Norway for their overlapping EEZ; and thirdly “the sheer expense and

technical challenges involved in extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources” which

leads to collaboration and not confrontation100. However, Perry recognizes that low tension

could appear in the Arctic region, which could even turn into major crisis. Similarly,

Chalecki falls into the cooperative camp, when she states, “environmental security cannot be

98 Shiloh Rainwater, “Race to the North, China’s Arctic Strategy and its Implications”, Naval War
College Review, (Spring, 2013), Vol. 66, No.2, p.63, as it was initially maintained by A.F.K
Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago:Chicago Univ. Press, 1980)
99 Or mildly revisionist, a term used by Shiloh Rainwater to describe China’s arctic strategy
based on Iain Johnston’s proposed five levels of analysis. More at Rainwater, p.63
100 Perry, p3

36
addressed in an anarchic fashion 101”. What Chalecki implies is that if we really want to

address environmental changes of global scale then nations will have to cooperate out of

necessity at least. Still, the above arguments are to a certain extent flawed. Leaving aside

morality and idealism, and basing our argument on pure realism, then a power rebalancing

in the near future seems almost unavoidable and a major security crisis might be its direct

consequence. Crises quite often are triggered from a single point-event, a crisis’ incubator,

and propagate outwards like a thrown stone into the water. Even if a substantial part of the

undiscovered oil/gas resources falls into well defined territorial waters or EEZ, this can’t
preclude future tensions; firstly, because a major part of undiscovered energy resources is

expected to be found in still disputed continental shelves; secondly relative gains do matter

on States’ logic. Regarding the argument that Russia is currently dependent on western oil

extraction technology in order to further develop her fields, which in turn implies that the

cooperation path could be Russia’s only available option, still this fact didn’t finally hinder

Russia from exercising a firm “political and financial control102” over her energy sector.

And she further seems willing to use such power as past experience has shown as leverage

upon dependent countries. Additionally, Chalecki’s argument doesn’t stand against scrutiny

because environmental degradation isn’t a new phenomenon. Nations have failed to address

and mitigate the consequences of climate change when the time was ripe.

Scott Borgerson assesses future developments in international relations after the

arctic melt using different lens; not surprisingly, his results are that of anarchy and rivalry.

He argues that the lack of “overarching political or legal structures” will inevitably lead to a

“diplomatic gridlock103”. From the moment that new stakeholders will step up on the arctic

arena such as China, and preexisting vested interests might be questioned, such as energy

security, freedom of seas and unimpeded trade, then new disputes might emerge and older

101 Chalecki, p.13

102 Fairhall, p.22
103 Borgerson, p.72

37
ones could reshape. Scott Borgerson further argues that Arctic’s Council mandate prohibits

addressing security issues; an arctic security forum might be crucial in coping with future

security challenges. Going one-step farther, he advocates the idea that even UNCLOS is

unsuitable to address the geographic peculiarities of Arctic north. Existing but still hidden

oil wealth underground, the sea-lanes that can bridge Pacific and Atlantic Ocean, makes

Arctic “a key emerging pressure point in international affairs104”. In our security analysis

that follows we will further elaborate upon Borgerson’s argument and the quantitative

analysis in Appendix provides a practical mean to understand the correlation between

geopolitics and emerging interests, and their respective outcome (cooperation-

confrontation).

IV. Security Analysis

Chapter 8 – Based on Combined Reasoning - Geopolitics plus Emerging

Interests

Russia’s political system, being in transition phase from autarchic to become more

democratic, will determine much. Researches have shown that such transitions, usually lead

to an aggressive stance105, and as a consequence domestic insufficiencies are externalized. A

common characteristic among autarchic states is that people usually consent to 180 degrees

diplomatic turns in foreign policy, even if such direction inversions might have huge

consequences upon society106. So, an autarchic administration is unpredictable on its ‘social

behavior’ towards other states, avoiding easily legalities and disrespecting international

104 Borgerson, p.73

105 Roi, p.557
106 Ibid., p.557

38
norms. The centralization of power back to Moscow, has to do with two interdependent

factors; firstly, with regime’s willingness to preserve itself by controlling bureaucracy and

the distribution of internal power; secondly, with the concept that Russian people are

‘socially trained’ to ‘perform’ better under such centralized autarchic regimes. Currently, it

is unclear if such a move will assist Russia or inadvertently lead her straightforward into

‘resource’s curse hug’, further alienating the provinces from the central state. But now, it is

more than obvious why Russian administration is against western liberalism; it sees

liberalism as a potential factor that could dissolve current societal fabric and the domestic
distribution of power, fears that do have some merit. This in turn gives us a hint about

upcoming trends. We might expect that Russia will gradually become more illiberal as long

as she is willing to reestablish herself to a predominant role in world affairs as the one she

enjoyed during the Soviet era. As Stalin did once, Arctic once more will be the ‘spearhead’,

the fundamental motivational factor in psychological and materialistic terms to expand her

reach worldwide.

Arctic security must also be examined in relation to global security107. China’s role

will certainly dictate the behavior of Russia and the rest. In a cautious but quite

deterministic manner Mackinder foresaw that an alteration of the occupier of the Pivot area

it won’t alter the outcome, which is the emergence of a powerful state. Russia could feed

China with the much-needed raw materials through the Northern maritime route, a move

that would make any US strategy of China’s containment almost obsolete. Combined

Russian and Chinese naval forces could even constitute a “fleet in being108”, a unified fleet

that could be gathered in short notice and create a sizeable and respectable force in the

region, as Julian Corbett had envisioned for the US. Russia and China are already deepening

their economic relations 109 . So, Arctic will determine the effectiveness of US’ regional

107 Roi, p.552

108 Kaplan, p.111
109 Rainwater, p.72

39
strategy, and most importantly in a time period that China’s superseding role will coincide

with that of an ice-free Arctic. The US and the European allies have the greatest interest to

get Russia on board, if they really want to have a chance to counterbalance forthcoming new

world order based on China’s predominance.

Vested interests may bring together opposing forces, dissimilar looking states, even

if there are core incompatibilities among their political systems and the level of their

democratization. Democratic France and autocratic Russia did so in 1895, in an effort to

counterbalance Germany in the European continent110. It cannot be discarded the option of

a closer future cooperation between Russia and the rest Arctic littoral states, in an effort to

contain the Chinese’s hunger for resources and economic expansion. Kaplan supports the

idea that it might be in US interests to cooperate closely with Russia in an effort to contain

emerging China, based on the argument that “pressure on land can help the United States

thwart China at sea111”. In such a case, Russia once more will become a second military

front, as it did happen during WWII. The flip side of the coin could be a close cooperation

between Russia and China in an effort to reduce “western democratic influence and [instead]

favor the promotion of an alternative model of authoritarian capitalism 112 ”. Under this

perspective, crises like the one in Ukraine (2014) shall not govern future events; in the

hierarchy of global interests, the western camp must foresee that Russia and Arctic have the

outmost priority. Russia, as the current occupier of Heartland has the power to act as arbiter

and influence the destinies of the world113. Unquestionably at the end it’s a matter of choice;

which state do we really want to be Heartland’s occupier, that of Russia or China instead?

And the problem remains almost the same since Mackinder’s era; how two major

continental powers –Germany (EU) and Russia- could be kept apart?

110 Mackinder, p.107

111 Kaplan, p.203
112 Roi, p.556
113 Hall, p119

40
 Our initial hypothesis was based on two distinct reasonings, geopolitics and

emerging interests. Even if geopolitics seems to be clearly on Russia’s side114, this can’t also

be said for emerging interests and the relevant security attributes. Emerging interests, either

economic or national-strategic, will be influenced from a ‘basket’ of security attributes.

What can be said with some certainty is that Russia has the potential to gain the most out of

an Arctic era. This means that she will be a relative winner versus the rest. However, we

can’t be sure about the proper utilization of her accommodating opportunities, due to

domestic inefficiencies that have already been analyzed. Furthermore, and regarding the
security question, it isn’t sure that emerging interests will compete with older ones,

questioning that way status quo. Taking as an example the maritime sector, it is expected

that existing southern trade routes will be peacefully and gradually replaced by the Northern

routes, if and when an Arctic Ocean free of ice becomes a reality. Maritime companies will

transfer their operations to the High North, due to cost effectiveness. Maritime countries,

being nowadays in a vantage point because they are situated on the main trade route that

starts somewhere in Mediterranean Sea or Atlantic Ocean and ends in South China Sea, will

not have any other option than to comply with nature’s caprices. Even if an economic

competition is expected, this could be far away from military confrontation. The outcome

might be completely different if Russia exercises a monopoly in Northern Sea route,

implementing high rates for foreign commercial vessels. Still, such a strategy seems almost

suicidal and Russia is in a great need to develop her Northern frontier, and western capital

seems to be a prerequisite. The same logic hides behind the energy sector, with a substantial

difference though. Russia sees energy as a strategic sector that could provide diplomatic

leverage, and because of that, it is totally controlled by the state. Energy is going to be a

sector of competition and cooperation at the same time. Russia’s close dependency in high-

energy prices for state’s revenues, further imply that crises in oil-infested regions might be

114 We assume here that Russia will act as revisionist, when the time will be ripe for her to do
so.

41
on her own interest. The security attributes could influence either way the security in the

region and the emerging interests. A mega migration pattern due to the climate change will

be directed mostly towards Siberia, a bad omen for region’s security. Such movements will

certainly influence the indigenous people and their way of life. Siberia might become one of

the last arable lands that will be called to accommodate an even larger world population, if

IPCC’ predictions of a “need to increase [food production] by 55 percent by 2030 115” turn to

be real. Russia’s decision to ban the export of maize and wheat in 2007 due to low

production that year, is still a reminder of the multiple natural endowments that she possess
because of geography. It is also a reminder of the multilayer approach that Russia might

follow, in a case that she decides to subdue her foes, using even food as a foreign policy

tool116.

V. Conclusion

Geopolitics isn’t a panacea, a tool that can be used to determine the outcome of each

one of the existing or emerging political issues. Even if it has conceptual flaws, the real

treasure is hidden behind its obvious simplicity. According to geopolitics, Russia will have

once more the opportunity to become a superpower due to tangible resources and privileged

position, in the coming Arctic era. In a rather ambiguous international environment,

geopolitics remains important because it provides concrete facts. What geopolitics doesn’t

describe are the intangible variables that could unquestionably influence the outcome.

However, in Russia’s case seems probable that she might finally overcome internal and

external impediments and achieve once more a predominant role in world affairs. If Russia

will evolve into a Hyper-Empire is difficult to say, and certainly a favorable geography

115 Chalecki, p.19

116 Chalecki, p.86

42
can’t be enough. It seems certain though that such a route will certainly include periods of

instability and insecurity that will closely correlate with Arctic’s issues, intermixed with

global ones117. This correlation will become more intense as long as the arctic region turns

to be more ice-free. Human expansion in the Arctic region will result in an even more

closed world as it was initially envisioned by Mackinder; or isn’t so? Geopolitics main flaw

is its closed-three dimensional approach. The word itself is deriving from the Greek word

“Γη», meaning earth that is fixed by definition. But, it is time for humanity to conceptualize

world differently, in an opened-three or even four dimensions. Moving our theater of

political action away from earth and towards universe, a new wide-open world arises. What

is suggested here is that sooner than we may anticipate rapid technological advancements in

space industry will force humanity to address terrestrial political issues through

‘Cosmospolitics’. The new Indies will be the closest planets in our Solar system, and the

Silk Route will be through the interstellar medium.

We are standing in a crossroad; if we will look back, only two decades ago, lays in

dereliction the communist ideology; looking ahead, as international community, we are

ready to depart from pure capitalism but still without having a clear flight plan. The chosen

track will drive our futures and the future of the arctic. Staying on the current track, the

outcome might be similar with the one that led into two previous World Wars and a Cold

War, as two trains that “are on the same line, but in opposite directions 118 ”. Recent

Ukrainian crisis reinforces the belief that “geopolitics… [are] replacing ideology 119 ”.

Society is an on Going Concern120, and has momentum, Mackinder argued correctly121.

117 Huebert, p.5

118 Mackinder, p.104
119 Kaplan, p.175 a statement made by Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union
120 Hall, p.117, according to Arthur R.Hall, Mackinder perceived Going Concern to be a great
state and its overgrown economic structure, “whose momentum was such that it was in constant
danger of destruction by collision with some other Going Concern in war or of disintegration in
revolution”
121 Mackinder, p.8

43
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 Argument (Line of attack) divided in two Reasonings,
VII. Appendix each one further divided in two distinct levels

...because of Arctic Melting

1st proposition (Main Reason) 3rd proposition
altered geography  altered geography
differentiated geopolitical then then emergence of new
1st level
importance interests
1st Reasoning- Russia will 1st 2nd 2nd Reasoning-Emergence
gradually overcome in intermediate intermediate of new regional and global
geopolitical importance any claim/ claim/ interests, unevenly
other State –both in relative secondary tertiary distributed that will
and absolute terms-, proving reason reason compete with status quo
to be a unique opportunity
to become a hyper-Empire Related
4th proposition
then new interests  compete
2nd proposition with existing interests that
a geopolitical dominant then
2nd level favor status quo
state  will be a
revisionist one ...then Security and
Economic Competition
(Main Claim based on
Secondary and Tertiary
Reasoning)
-What does Mackinder say
about the relation of geography
and geopolitics?
-Which States will gain
geopolitically the most?
-Will Russia’s geopolitical role
be enhanced?
-What does it take for Russia to
become a global power or a
hyper-Empire?
-Does Mackinder, Spykman and
Mahan’s theories converge in
Russia’s case?
-What are the obstacles in such
a course?
-Could it happen an extreme
shift in power balance and in a
short time frame? Then what?
-Will a dominant Russia be also
a revisionist one? What does
work towards or against such
stance?
-What are Russian goals? Is in
their interest to compete than
cooperate?
-Does her political system,
influence future developments?
Any other attributes?
-Is Russia going to export her
semi democratic-authoritarian
political system abroad?
-Are available options for status
quo powers in order to
counterbalance? Balance of
power vis-a-vis collective
security
-Does world moves to a
multipolar, bipolar or unipolar
one?
Argument (Line of attack)
Questions to be answered
...because of Arctic Melting
(Main Reason)
then then
1st level
1st Reasoning- Russia will 2nd Reasoning-Emergence
gradually overcome in of new regional and global
geopolitical importance any interests, unevenly
other State –both in relative distributed that will
and absolute terms-, proving compete with status quo
to be a unique opportunity
to become a hyper-Empire
2nd level
then
then
...then Security and
Economic Competition
(Main Claim based on
Secondary and Tertiary
Reasoning)
-How do interests correlate with
geopolitics?
-Towards collaboration or
confrontation? Introducing a
quantitative approach (matrix
based) and another one based on
combined reasoning
-Do we have another historical
example of such environmental
change and that magnitude? If
yes, what happened?
-Do we have another historical
example of geography change,
human initiated (Canal, Mega
infrastructures)? If yes, what
have happened?
-What are existing Arctic
interests? Introducing,
economic and strategic
interests.
-What are the emerging ones?
-Are they competitive or
cooperative?
-How do we evaluate their
influence upon security?
Introducing security attributes,
such as legal framework,
territorial disputes, military
procurements, arctic security
policies.
50
 Security Analysis Based on Quantitative Analysis – States’ Behavioral Model122

The utility of any theory is linked to its predictability. It is common among IR

scholars to overlook such an elemental use, and rather address political theory as a mean of

categorization and explanation of different social and political phenomena. However, IR

field that way is reduced from what it should have been, meaning a tool for policy and

decision-making. It is upon us to realize that we have to overcome existing division lines

between realism, idealism, constructivism, critical IR theory and their sub categorizations123.
Such theories mostly base their explanatory power in human’s nature duality and their

fundamental difference is that they bid on different sides of human nature, believing that it

will finally prevail as a behavioral norm in modern states’ affairs. Only then we will be able

to establish an Integrated International Relations theory, which will be based on a States’

Behavioral Model. Such a theory will accept the importance of human agents, geopolitics,

outside stakeholders, first level variables and much more, and will integrate them altogether

into a computer simulation model with different weight ratio for each variable.

Instantaneously, questions arise such as, how we choose the attributes and most importantly

weight them. The weight ratio of each variable can be determined by examining earlier

cases and it can be improved later on, through a feedback analysis loop. An equally

important question is what do we expect the outcome of such an equation to be? As a first

step, a basic model is presented here relevant to our arctic case. We examine the probability

of two possible outcomes, that of conflict or cooperation. Real life is certainly more

122 In current appendix, a primitive model is presented in an effort to quantify the relation
among emerging interests and geopolitics, and their subsequent influence upon the Arctic
security environment. Its accuracy is questionable, due to the complicated systems that are
involved and the fact that a vast number of intermediate variables are interlinked, not clearly
though. Fuzzy logic could be the appropriate mathematical model to assess different outcomes
in IR field.
123 For an introduction on how and why liberalism became the mainstream theory after the end
of Cold War, and the importance of geopolitics as a theory with explanatory power upon modern
politics see Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, What the map tells us about coming
conflicts and the battle against fate, (Random House, 2012), Chapter 1

51
 complicated, having more outcomes and falling usually somewhere between. It is rational to

expect that a confluence of parameters will correlate in many different ways, yet a model

shall be developed keeping in mind simplicity. In our arctic model we use four inputs-

variables that are weighted differently; geopolitics, maritime interests, energy & mineral

interests, geostrategic & military interests. That way we are consistent with what has been

presented earlier in Chapter 4. As we can see in the following table, we consider that

geopolitics has the greatest role to play in Arctic’s future, with energy, maritime and

military interests following (Column 1). For each one variable is given a range of
Probability of Conflict occurrence Pcf (max-min), which is vaguely estimated based on our

research so far (Column 3). It is estimated that geopolitics and maritime interests are prone

for conflict, when energy and maritime interests are inclined towards cooperation, with the

latter being more cooperative than the former (0.20-0.35 versus 0.20-0.70). Energy’s

variable probability Pcf has a wider gap, almost 0.5 units (0.70-0.20), moving all the way

from the cooperative into the conflict spectrum. This is so because of the unpredictability of

sector’s influence upon security. In Column 4, the Probability of Cooperation Pcp is

presented, as supplementary to Pcf but it isn’t further used in our model.

States’ Behavioral (1) (2) Probability (3) Probability (4) Probability of (5) Mean Probability (6) Weighted Mean
Model Weighted of Conflict Pcf of Cooperation Conflict after of Conflict after Security Probability of Conflict
Ratio Wr (min-max) Pcp (1-Pcf) Security Attributes1 Attributes * are included after Security Attributes *
are included Pf (min- Pfm =(min(4)+max(4))/2 are included
max) Pfwm =(5)*(1)

Geopolitics 0.35 0.60-0.85 0.40-0.15 0.65-0.90 0.775 0.271

Maritime Interests
0.20 0.20-0.35 0.80-0.65 0.10-0.25 0.175 0.035
Energy &minerals
Interests 0.30 0.20-0.70 0.80-0.30 0.30-0.60 0.45 0.135
Geostrategic/
Military Interests 0.15 0.60-0.70 0.40-0.30 0.65-0.75 0.70 0.105
1. Security attributes are regarded to be the extent of arctic institutionalization, arctic security policies, existing Weighted mean
territorial disputes, militarization and migration, as were presented in Chapter 5 probablity of conflict 2=
2. The closer the weighted mean probability of conflict gets to 1, then the likelihood for security competition among (0.271+0.035+0.135+0.105)
great powers gets higher. The lowest value can be 0, which means a fully cooperative environment. / (0.35+0.20+0.30+0.15)=
0.546

52
 In Column (4), the probability of conflict with the security attributes included Pf is

calculated. Security attributes as were presented in Chapter 5, have a minimum upward

trend effect upon military interests and geopolitics’ Pcf. Maritime interests are influenced

positively, and are expected to present a downward trend, giving a Pf somewhere around

0.10-0.25. Security attributes are expected to close the wide gap of energy’s Pcf, stabilizing

the effects of energy sector upon arctic security (Pf =0.30-0.60). In Column (5), the mean

probability of conflict with the security attributes included Pcm is calculated, in an effort to

eliminate the extremes. Finally, in column (6) the total weighted mean probability is
presented, that gives us a 0.546 or 54,6% probability of conflict. This outcome, even if it is

in many ways subjective, yet it has an objectivity that it is derived from our earlier analysis.

Concluding, the chances are splitted among arctic cooperation or confrontation, but still

inclined slightly towards the latter.

VIII. Glossary-Terms

Hyper-Empire term is used in current thesis as an expression to describe a

superpower that has evolved from a regionally cultivated nation-empire, incorporating

the following attributes; a combination of Thalassocracy and continental Empire, able to

project power effectively worldwide; expanding outwards but not just in the periphery

through direct occupation, coercive actions or cultural affinity, and enclosing politically

or militarily populations that are ethnically and culturally distinct under a semi

democratic-authoritarian political structure; and succeeding all the above mainly due to

unprecedented natural endowments and a predominant geopolitical role. What our term

implies is that Hyper Empire is the power that will control successfully the World Island

and the Oceans around it at the same time. Hyper Empire can’t be a nation state, because

it can enclose ethnically diverse populations. It distinguishes from an Empire in the

53
political power source, which isn’t either oligarchy or monarchy, being simultaneously

territorial and hegemonic in nature and concentrating enough power to challenge

international institutions such as the UN. Hyper Empire can’t either be a federation of

states because its constituents’ parts would have to transfer in a central authority their

sovereignty rights –possibly involuntarily-, becoming that way members of a larger state

structure. In Russia’s case, a Hyper Empire means a revival of defunct Soviet Union

Federation under democratic authoritarianism, with ex-Soviet states members

participating either unwillingly from fear of repercussions or due to cultural affinity, and
an established protectorate upon European states; is a post modern Russia that could

evolve into a maritime and continental superpower capable enough to efficiently

command Mahan’s High Seas and Mackinder’s World Island. The opposite end of a

Hyper Empire can be argued to be a Hyper Power based on liberalism, such as the US is

regarded to be nowadays.

XI. Notes

54