RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |1
RULE 88 PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF THE ESTATE The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable
1. ARKONCEL JR VS LAGAMON, 204 SCRA 560
FACTS:
The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate at Davao City,
leaving behind an estate with a probable value of about
P241,020.00. In the order dated April 1, 1977, the intestate
Court appointed Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., the eldest son, as the
judicial administrator without bond and ordered the issuance to
him of letters of administration. In the same order, the Court of
First Instance allowed him one year within which to dispose of
the estate and to pay the debts of the deceased.
On July 5, 1977, the intestate court issued an order giving notice
to all persons having money claims against the decedent
Casimiro F. Arkoncel, "arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the said
decedent, and judgment for money against him to file them in
the Office of the Clerk of Court within six (6) months after the
date of the first publication of the notice" in the Mindanao Mail,
a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of
Davao, wherein the notice was to be published once a week for
three consecutive weeks.
In compliance with the order of the intestate court, FNCB
Finance, respondent herein, filed its claim against the estate for
the payment of certain debts incurred by the decedent during
his lifetime.
On January 9, 1978, petitioner herein, in his capacity as
administrator of the estate of Casimiro F. Arkoncel and the
claimant FNCB Finance, assisted by their respective counsels,
entered into an amicable settlement in which the intestate Court
approved and directed the parties to strictly comply with the
terms thereof and the Judicial Administrator, "to pay the
amounts agreed upon out of the estate funds and/or properties
within 30 days from receipt" of the said order.
Thereafter, the claim of private respondent had remained
unpaid thirty (30) days after. Thus, private respondent filed with
the intestate court a motion for execution praying for the
issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy its claims which was
opposed by petitioner.
Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the questioned
order of December 13, 1978 granting the motion for execution
and the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on December 28, 1978 was
denied by respondent judge for lack of merit in an order dated
January 12, 1979 holding that "the order of this Court dated May
17, 1979 approving the amicable settlement voluntarily entered
into by the parties x x x is a perfectly valid order which was a
decision in itself based on the compromise agreement" . Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE PAYMENT
OF A DEBT IN AN ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS."
RULING:NO
settlement with the claimant FNCB Finance. He was not only
assisted by counsel but the agreement itself was confirmed by
the other heirs, the widow Maria V. Vda. de Arkoncel, Florencio
V. Arkoncel and Maria V. Arkoncel (Mesias). The other heir,
Nenita C. Valdez, was represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
David O. Montano who is at the same time counsel for the other
heirs and the judicial administrator. The agreement was
submitted to the intestate court for approval and it was duly
approved by the court a quo which incorporated the conditions
therein.
The court approves a compromise agreement when not
contrary to law, morals or public policy and renders judgment in
accordance therewith.
In the instant case, judgment was rendered in consonance with
the compromise agreement and the parties were enjoined to
comply with and abide by its terms and conditions.
The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is immediately executory unless a
motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken against
the order denying the motion. It then becomes ministerial for
the lower court to order the execution of its final executory
judgment.
Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary
action for specific performance, the compromise agreement is
part and parcel of the judgment, and may therefore be enforced
as such by a writ of execution.
Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated,
as in the case at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
move for its execution.
Petitioners claim that properties in custodia legis may not be the
proper subject of a writ of execution to satisfy a claim; that what
private respondent could have done was to ask the Court a
quo for an order requiring the administrator to pay the debt
and only if there are no sufficient funds on hand to pay the debt
may the court order the sale of the properties and out of the
proceeds, to pay the debt. This argument is untenable
inasmuch as the dispositive portion of the very order approving
the amicable settlement directs the judicial administrator to pay
the claim of FNCB Finance out of the funds and/or properties of
the estate, to wit:
"Conformably, the Judicial Administrator is
hereby directed to pay out of the estate funds
and/or properties the amounts agreed upon
within 30 days from receipt hereof."
Nevertheless, petitioner Judicial Administrator chose not to
comply with said order. Inasmuch as the compromise
agreement is part and parcel of the judgment and may, therefore,
be enforced as such by a writ of execution, the respondent judge
committed no reversible error in issuing the questioned writ of
execution.
2. Santos vs. Manarang 27 Phil 209
Facts:

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed
of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and
testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this
will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below,
and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife
and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my
creditors.
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in
favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907,
for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at
different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum
of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was
regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against
the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its
report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the
plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking
that the committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his
claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of
testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on
November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present
proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover
the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in
the court below, and now appeals to this court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s claim is within the purview of
the committee’s jurisdiction.
Ruling: YES
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein
he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay over to him
the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to
be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action
against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money.
Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to
real property or specific articles of personal property. When a
committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit
shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or
administrator upon a claim against the estate to recover a debt
due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and
possession of real estate and personal chattels claimed by the
estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ.
Proc.)
It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to
above that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a
system for the allowance of claims against the estates of
decedents. Those are at least two restrictions imposed by law
upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and
which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator
law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by
him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion
due his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over
the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is
sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is
insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735.
It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will
that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over
other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will
requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the
committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an insolvent
estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |2
If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the
source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from
four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon
actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion
is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been
distributed, what security have the differences against the
interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to
pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its
correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the claim?
Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an
executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a
debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere
permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the
contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial
committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of
the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably
adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the
debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as
parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an
appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to
examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him
in the dual role of a claimant and a judge. The law in this
jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The
most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition
of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code
providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs
by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force
by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid
without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or
total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under
a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the
amount of the legal portion can be determined.
Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent.
Under his first assignment of error he alleges that the committee
on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim
against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to
do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy,
either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a
release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when
the debt is anasset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of
a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866,
878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will
of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding
force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by
the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt
arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil
Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a
lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must
be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of
specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied
accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in
the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a
legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that
this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a
legacy.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as
partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly.
If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until
after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had
received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable

result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some
tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in
the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance,
can not be had before the court because the law does not
authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the
committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.
For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
3. WT CONSTRUCTION v. ULRIC R. CAÑETE, G.R. No.
157287, February 12, 2008
FACTS:
Juliana vda. De Cabahug filed a case for the settlement of the
estate of her deceased husband, Alberto Cabahug, before the
RTC Mandaue presided by public respondent, Judge Ulric R.
Caete.
Ciriaco Cabahug, the administrator of the estate and heir of
Alberto, was granted the authority to sell one of the properties
of the estate to defray the expenses for the payment of taxes
due from the estate.
Ciriaco entered into an Agreement for Sale of Land with
Downpayment with petitioner. In accordance with the
agreement, petitioner made a down payment of fifty percent
(50%) of the purchase price. The balance of the purchase price
was to be paid immediately after the land is free from all
occupants/obstructions. The contract likewise stipulated the
following:
5. That the seller shall undertake the clearing of the
land herein sold of its present occupants and/or eject the
squatters therein within a period of one (1) year reckoned from
the receipt of the advance payment, provided however, that if
the buyer will be the one to handle the clearing or ejectment of
occupants, all the expenses incurred thereto shall be charged
to and be deducted from the remaining balance payable.
6. Upon receipt of the 50% advance payment of the
purchase price, the buyer shall be authorized to enter the
property, utilize the same and introduce improvements thereon.
Subsequently, petitioner took steps in clearing the property of
its occupants by filing a complaint for ejectment in 1998 with the
MTC Mandaue. It was later discovered that Ciriaco did not
inform his co-heirs of the sale. He appropriated the amount paid
by petitioner, so public respondent issued an Order relieving
Ciriaco of his functions as administrator. Consequently,
Administrator Linda Cabahug-Antigue, along with her co-heirs,
demanded from petitioner the payment of the balance of the
purchase price. Referring to the provision of the agreement
relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price
conditioned upon the removal of occupants and obstructions in
the property, petitioner refused to pay the remaining balance.
Public respondent issued an Order stating:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, WT Construction is
ordered to manifest in court within five (5) days from receipt of
this order whether it wants the Contract of Sale rescinded.
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |3
If no manifestation is filed within said period, WT Construction
is further ordered to pay the estate of Alberto Cabahug the
amount of P4,259,400.00 less expenses incurred in the
ejectment case within a period of fifteen (15) days, otherwise,
failure to do so will prompt the court to issue a writ of execution
as prayed for by movant-administratrix.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Extension
of Time to Manifest Option to Rescind but was likewise denied,
and a Writ of Execution to implement the above Order was
issued by public respondent.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
claiming that the issuance of the writ. During the pendency of
the motion, the plaintiffs in the action for quieting of title, namely,
Antonia Flores, Andrea Lumapas, Emilio Omobong and
Constancia O. Tolo, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
contending that they have a right to a portion or to 4,690 square
meters of the subject lot. The group also moved for the quashing
of the writ of execution.
Public respondent then issued an Order denying petitioners
motion. Petitioner went to the CA on a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 but the CA dismissed the petition.
When the Order was issued, the petitioner had already obtained
a decree of ejectment from the MTCC. A week before the writ
of execution in the ejectment case was served on the occupants,
the estate was able to obtain its own Order from Judge Caete
denying the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and
ordering the latter, in view of the lapse of the grace period, to
pay the stated amount less expenses. On October 5, 2000, the
writ of execution was issued.
The determination of petitioner to resist payment of the balance
was as dogged as ever. In November 2000, it filed a motion to
quash the writ, citing the existence of a complaint filed by third
parties for ownership and possession of a portion of the property
in question and the failure of the estate to exclude another
portion from the computation of the balance as allegedly
stipulated in the sales agreement. In February 2001, some
parties sought to intervene in the Special Proceedings 3562-R
and asked, in so many words, that their interest in the purchase
price to be paid to the estate be recognized and respected.
On May 15, 2001, the assailed Order was handed down
denying the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, followed by the
Order of June 28, 2001 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied in a resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Petitioner argues as follows:
xxx
3. the writ of execution sought to be quashed by petitioner is
not one of those allowed to be issued by probate courts under
Section 6, Rule 88; Section 3, Rule 90 and Section 13, Rule 142
of the Revised Rules of Court;
ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT CAN DELEGATE THE
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE AMOUNT TO
BE LEVIED IN A WRIT OF EXECUTION TO THE SHERIFF
RULING: YES

As to petitioners argument that the probate/estate court cannot
adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties under the
deed of sale, the CA rightly found that this was a new issue not
raised in the probate/estate court. Furthermore, the deed of sale
in question is the sale of the property of the estate to pay for
taxes, a matter definitely within the power of the probate/estate
court to order.
It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce
obligations under such a deed of sale. Otherwise, they would
not be able to secure the proceeds to pay for the taxes and this
would defeat the purpose of the proceedings to settle the
estate. Stated otherwise, the power to enforce obligations under
the deed of sale of a property ordered sold to pay debts of the
estate is but a necessary incident of the power of a
probate/estate court to order and effect such sale in the first
place.
4. Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI Mindoro GR L-2020, December
29, 1949 Case Digest
Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent, was
a Spaniard and member of the commercial partnership "Aldamiz
y Rementeria." The other members were the brothers, Gavino
and Jose, surnamed Aldamiz. Santiago Rementeria died in
Spain in 1937, and probate proceeding No. 705 was instituted
in the same year in the Court of First Instance of Mindoro by
Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino
Aldamiz was appointed administrator and as such was
represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna up to January 21,
1947, when the order complained of was issued. In that order it
is said that "said attorney is the one who instituted this testate
proceeding ten years ago and has from its incipiency to the
present stage of the proceeding actively intervened in the
same."
On January 15, 1947, after ten years from the date of his
appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through his
attorney Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for the years
1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition with a view
to closing the proceedings. On said date, the court approved the
accounts but refused to approve the project of partition unless
all debts including attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of
partition, it was expressly stated that attorney's fees, debts and
incidental expenses would be proportionately paid by the
beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the
court refused to sanction this clause of the project. It is for this
reason that right then and there, Attorney Luna, to comply with
the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and filing a
written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and without
previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence
of his services and professional standing so that the court might
fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may
make payment thereof. This failure to file a written claim and to
notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or
fraudulent purpose but to an honest belief on the part of the
respondent attorney that such requirements were not necessary
under the circumstance.
In this connection, it must be stated, in justice to Attorney Luna,
that during the ten years that he served as attorney for the
administrator and during the twenty-five years as legal
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |4
consultant to Santiago Rementeria, Gavino Aldamiz and Jose
Aldamiz individually and as a commercial partnership under the
firm name "Aldamiz y Rementeria," he never took the trouble of
charging them for his professional services, thus showing
disinterestedness and extreme liberality on his part due to
friendship and other personal considerations toward his clients.
And it is to be observed further that even after ten years of active
work in the testate proceeding, when he wanted to close the $f
me and it was then time for him to demand payment for his
services, he showed no interest in demanding preferring to
leave the matter to future negotiation or understanding with the
interested parties. And when the amount of his fees was fixed
by the court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a substantial
reduction, he answered that it was not he who had fixed the
amount but the court, and advised his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no
objection to any reduction in amount and to any extension of the
time for paying what might be granted by the court. And again,
when Gavino Aldamiz paid him P5,000 on account, respondent
attorney told him that he would be satisfied with any additional
amount that Gavino might later desire to pay him. Only
subsequent occurrences which proved distasteful to the parties,
led them to take steps which culminated in the filing of the
instant civil action.
At the time respondent's evidence was submitted to the court,
the interested parties who were residing in the Philippines were
Gavino Aldamiz and his brother Jose Aldamiz. The others were
then residing in Spain. No written claim had ever been filed for
respondent's fees, and the interested parties had not been
notified thereof nor of the hearing, not even Gavino Aldamiz who
did not know when he was called to testify that he would testify
in connection with respondent's fees. The Court, after
considering the whole evidence presented, issued its order of
January 21, 1947, awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in
payment of his professional services, an aggregate sum of
P28,000 in the following manner:
For the institution, preparation of the pleadings in the
voluminous probate case, allowance of the will, project of
partition and the final closing of this proceeding, P15,000;
For the registration of a parcel of land of seventy-eight hectares
in favor of the testate, P5,000;
For three naturalization cases at the rate of P1,000 each,
P3,000; and
For services rendered in the deduction of inheritance tax from
P28,000 to P433.40 P5,000.
ISSUE:
1. WON the court erred in fixing the amount of
attorney’s fees?
2. WON issuing a writ of execution is proper in probate
proceeding.
HELD:
The correct procedure for the collection of attorney’s
fees, is for the counsel to request the administrator or executor
to make payment. If the judgment is rendered against the
administrator or executor and he pays, he may include the fees
so paid in his account as an expense of administration. If the
 RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |5

administrator fails to pay, the petitioner may file an action of Monica P. Ocampo, subsequesntly sold to ZEE2 resources,
against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator. Inc. (ZEE2). Silverio, Sr. filed an Urgent Application for the
issuance of TRO, restraining and or preventing Silverio, Jr.,
The order of execution is also null and void because a writ Monica, CITRINE, and their successors-in-interest from
of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by committing any act that would affect the tittles to the three
the Rules of the Court for property. ‘
the payment of debts and expenses of administration.
An omnibus order was issued by the intestate court acting
The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of
upon pending motions filed by the petitioner and respondent,
personal estate or real property of the
respectively, who are the central figures in the controversy over
deceased and all debts or expenses of
the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of
the sale or mortgage. On February 2011, Silverio, Sr. filed an urgent omnibus
Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs motion:
have entered into possession of their respective portions in the
a) To declare null and void the deed of absolute sale
estate prior to
dated September 16, 2010;
settlement and payment of the debts and
b) To cancel the TCT no. 006-2011000050;and
expenses of administration and it is later c) To reinstate the TCT no. 2236121 in the name of
ascertained that there are such debts and expenses SIlverio, Sr. and the intestate estate of the late Beatriz
to be paid, in which case “the court having jurisdiction of the S. Silverio.
estate may, by order for that purpose, settle the amount of their
several liabilities, and order how much and The intestate court rendered the now assailed orders granting
in what manner each person shall contribute, the preliminary injunction against Silverio JR., and declaring the
and may issue execution if circumstances require. deed of absolute sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void.

RULE 89: SALES, MORTGAGES, AND OTHER
ENCUMBRANCES OF PROPERTY OF DECEDENT
1) [G.R. Nos. 208828-29. August 13, 2014.]
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., petitioner, vs. RICARDO S.
SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC., MONICA P.
OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES, INC.,respondents.
FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will
on October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio
(son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son),
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio
(daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC.
NO. M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by
SILVERIO, SR.
The administrator first appointed by the court was
EDGARDO SILVERIO but by virtue of a joint /manifestation
dated 3 "November 1999 filed by the heirs of Beatriz S. Silverio,
the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO
SILVERIO was approved by the intestate court and in his stead,
Silverio, Sr. was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and
appoint a new administrator ensued between Silverio, Sr. and
Silverio, jr.
The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as
administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio,
Jr. In an Order in 2005, Silverio, Sr. was removed as
administrator and in his stead, Silverio, JR. was designated as
the new administrator. By virtue of the aforesaid order, Silverio,
Jr. on 16 October 2007 executed a Deed of absolute Sale in
favor of CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. (CITRINE) over the 'property
located Makati City. CITRINE became the registered owner
thereof. A Deed of absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor
The CA rendered decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale,
TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia
Property Valid. Silverio, Sr. contends that CA committed a
reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and
Cambridge properties on the ground that the intestate court
cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and
which does not include resolving issues of ownership.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the sale of the Intestate Estate by the
administrator is valid?
RULING: YES.
An administrator can validly sell the intestate estate under his
administration only by leave of court. While it is true that Silverio,
Sr. was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the
2008 decision, the permanent injunction by the CA, as explicitly
stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the 2006
omnibus order upholding the grant of letters of administration to
and taking of an oath of admiration by SIlverio, Jr., as otherwise
the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in
the same omnibus order allowing the sale of the subject
properties.
The CA, therefore, did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011
order of the intestate court annulling sale of the subject
properties. Respondents Ocampo, CITRINE and ZEE2 should
not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of the
administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith
that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the
intestate court under its omnibus order dated October 31, 2006
which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the
aforesaid sale.
2) [G.R. No. 75884. September 24, 1987.]

JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL
GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO ONG, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION and THE CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.
FACTS:
Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City identified as Lot No. 12,
Block 407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No.
1, Psd 15021, with an area of 3,660.8 sq. m., are covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the
name of 'Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go Ong' (Exh.
D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and
Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's
estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration
was registered on TCTNo. 188705 on October 23, 1979.
Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and
TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled and TCT No. 262852
was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh.
D-4). On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-
fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied
Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained
by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No.
188705 on the same date with the following notation: '. . .
mortgagee's consent necessary in case of subsequent
alienation or encumbrance of the property other conditions set
forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book Mo. XIX, of the Not.
Public of Felixberto Abad'. On the loan there was due the
sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to
collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint
alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which
the bank had allegedly promised to secure from thecourt. In
response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff
Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval,
adding that Julita Go Ong informed the defendant that she was
promised the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which
will also take charge of the interest of the loan.
"Concluding, the trial court ruled:
'Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is the
capital of the deceased husband brought into the marriage, said
property should be presumed as acquired during the marriage
and, therefore, conjugal property,
'After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's
husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her conjugal share,
together with the hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs.
Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963). Consequently, the mortgage
constituted on said property, upon express authority of plaintiff,
notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with
respect to her conjugal share thereon, together with her
hereditary rights.'"
On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed,
with modification, the appealed decision (Record, pp. 19-22).
The dispositive portion of the appellatecourt's decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff
shall be held in abeyance to await the final result of Civil
Case No. 107089 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, 6th
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |6
Judicial District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN THE
MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
ALFREDO ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX'.
In pursuance with which the restraining order of the
lower court in this case restraining the sale of the properties
levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full force and effect
coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No. 107089, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against
plaintiff-appellant.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision
dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the motion
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER
THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S
ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR
WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL
RULING:
Contract is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial
approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court .
The CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in
her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix
of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code
applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in
connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property
under administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt,
and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife
are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason
already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no
prejudice is caused others, including the government.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA
cannot be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage
constituted on the property under administration, by authority of
the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial
approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her
hereditary rights.
Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings
of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal
partnership property of the marriage is under administration.
While such may be in a sense true, that fact alone is not
sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and
voluntarily entered into by the petitioner.. Under similar
circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493
of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each have
the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private
respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her husband’s death, and her hereditary
rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent
(Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-
ownership formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners
(See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.).
3) [G.R. No. 27876. April 22, 1992.]
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita
Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN T.BAUN and
AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., defendants. CITY OF
DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
FACTS:
On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died intestate, leaving
several parcels of land containing 7,401 sq/m more or less. She
was survived by her husband Severo Maneclang and 9 children.
30 July 1947, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed
by Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with the
Court of First Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan. 7 of her 9
children were below 18 yrs. Old but No guardian ad litem was
appointed by the court for the minor children.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of
the intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No.
3028 asking the court to give him "the authority to dispose of so
much of the estate that is necessary to meet the debts
enumerated" in the petition. While notice thereof was given to
the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, through his counsel,
Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of
Margarita.
On 9 September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the
heirs, the intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the
administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the properties of
the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations"
referred to in the petition.
Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang, the new administrator
of the intestate estate, executed on 4 October 1952 a deed of
sale 1 in favor of the City of Dagupan, represented by its mayor,
Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion consisting of 4,515 square
meters of the aforementioned Lot No. 203 for and in
consideration of P11,687.50. This sale was approved by the
intestate court on 15 March 1954.
The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the land
and constructed thereon a public market, known as the Perez
Boulevard Public Market, at a cost of P100,000.00, more or less.
It has been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
property since the construction of the market. 2
Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate
were sold by the administrator pursuant to the same authority
granted by the 9 September 1949 Order. 3
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix of the
intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late
Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales made by
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |7
the previous administrator pursuant to the Order of 9 September
1949, cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and
damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun,
Marcelo Operaña and Aurora Pagurayan, Crispino Tandoc and
Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and Mercedes Uy Santos, Roberto
Cabugao, Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo Bravo and
Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino
Daroya and Marciana Caramat. 4 The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. D-1785. The cause of action against the City
of Dagupan centers around the deed of sale executed in its
favor on 4 October 1952 by former judicial administrator Oscar
S. Maneclang. In its Answer filed on 5 November 1965, 5 the
City of Dagupan interposed the following affirmative defenses:
(a) the sale in its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b)
plaintiff has no cause of action against it, or that the same, if
any, had prescribed since the complaint was filed thirteen (13)
years after the execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is barred by
estoppel and by laches; (d) it is a buyer in good faith, and (e) it
has introduced necessary and useful improvements and
constructed a supermarket worth P200,000.00; hence,
assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right to
retain the land and the improvements until it is reimbursed for
the said improvements.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid sale of a parcel of land by the
administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a petition
for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and
entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the
decedent.
RULING:
It does not follow that for purposes of complying with the
requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, notice
to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said
Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in writing,
must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the
court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and
cause notice to be given to the interested parties. There can be
no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or
by a guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may
be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case,
however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was
notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs,
Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of
legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining
seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad
litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then,
the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set
forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and
essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and
the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9
September 1949 granting the application, the sale in question
of 4 October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving
the sale are all void ab initio as against said children.
Severo Maneclang, however, stands on different ground
altogether. Having been duly notified of the application, he was
bound by the said order, sale and approval of the latter.
However, the only interest which Severo Maneclang would
have over the property is his right of usufruct which is equal to
that corresponding by way of legitime pertaining to each of the
surviving children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of

Spain, the governing law at that time since Margarita Suri
Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the
presumptive owners since they succeed to all the rights and
obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter's
death, are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortgage
and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the
manner provided by law.
While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was
actually issued on 9 September 1949, the same was secured
during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator Pedro
Feliciano. Even if it is to be assumed that Mayor Fernandez and
Councilor Guadiz induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the
property, the fact remains that there was already the order
authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a judge who was
lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed
to have acted in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his
official duty was regularly performed. It was not incumbent upon
them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed there was a
valid motion for authority to sell. Otherwise, no order of any court
can be relied upon by the parties.
4) [G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001.]
Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R SANDEJAS and ELIODORO
P. SANDEJAS SR. — ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO
R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND,
BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS; and
heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. SANDEJAS,
TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS
JR., all represented by ROBERTO R Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot
SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
FACTS:
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in
the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued
in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were
issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was
burned and among the records burned were the records of the
Court where Sandejas filed his petition.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene
and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging
that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina
4 parcels of land.
Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His
counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of
the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of
Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. The
lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas
to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15
days from receipt of the order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a
new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |8
Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received
any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of
Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs;
that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long
as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as
new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at
a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower
court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas asadministrator.
On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve
the deed of conditionalsale executed between Alex A. Lina and
Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract
between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a
contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the
ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate
of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from
the settlement court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Court approval is required in any disposition
of the decedent's estate.
2) Whether PROBATE COURT MAY APPROVE SALE
AND COMPEL EXECUTION OF THE SAME.
3) WHETHER APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF
SALE OF REALTY UNDER ADMINISTRATION;
SECTION 8, RULE 89 DISTINGUISHED FROM
SECTION 2 AND 4 OF THE SAME RULE.
HELD:
1) Court approval is required in any disposition of the
decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to
dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-
heirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can sell
their rights, interests or participation in the property
under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity
of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely
implies that the property may be taken out of custodia
legis, but only with the court's permission. It would
seem that the suspensive condition in the present
conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
2) Citing Gil v. Cancio and Acebedo v. Abesamis,
petitioners contend that the CA erred in clothing the
settlement court with the jurisdiction to approve the
sale and to compel petitioners to execute the Deed of
Sale. However, we hold that Section 8 of Rule 89
allows this action to proceed. Probate jurisdiction
covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates
(Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-
77) of deceased persons, including the appointment
and the removal of administrators and executors
(Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate court's
recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the
estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that
may flow from such settlement may be immediately
enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. In the
present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to

settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence,
that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the
settlement court. To require respondent to file a
separate action — on whether petitioners should
convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed
realty — will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of
the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
3) Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the
executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the
approval of a sale of realty under administration.
Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in
entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for
Approval. We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule
89 should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of
the same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor
or administrator to file the application for authority to
sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estate for
the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2); or for authority to sell real or personal
estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or legatees and
other interested persons, although such authority is not
necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of
administration (Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an
application to authorize the conveyance of realty under
a contract that the deceased entered into while still
alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file
the application, it stands to reason that the proper party
must be one who is to be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of
the suit.
5) [G.R. No. L-6306. May 26, 1954.]
FORTUNATO HALILI, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MARIA LLORET and RICARDO GONZALES LLORET,
administrator of the intestate estate of FRANCISCO A.
GONZALES, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The six parcels of land subject of the present action were
owned pro-indiviso by Maria Lloret and the estate of Francisco
A. Gonzales, of which Ricardo Gonzales Lloret is the judicial
administrator. On May 8, 1944, the judicial administrator filed a
motion in the intestate proceedings praying for authority to sell
the said parcels of land for a price of not less than P100,000, to
which Maria Lloret and the other heirs of the estate gave their
conformity. The court granted the motion as requested. Plaintiff
became interested in the purchase of said parcels of land and
to this effect he sought the services of Atty. Teofilo Sauco who
readily agreed to serve him and took steps to negotiate the sale
of said lands in his behalf. Sauco dealt on the matter with
Ricardo Gonzales Lloret. After several interviews wherein they
discussed the terms of the sale, especially the price,
Gonzales Lloret told Sauco that if plaintiff would agree to pay
the sum of P200,000 for the lands, he may agree to carry out
the transaction. Sauco broached the matter to plaintiff who
thereupon agreed to the proposition, and so, on June 17, 1944,
Sauco went to see Gonzales Lloret in his office in Manila
wherein, according to Sauco, it was agreed between them,
among other things, that the lands would be sold to the plaintiff
for the sum of P200,000 and that, after the execution of the sale,
the plaintiff would in turn resell to Ricardo Gonzales Lloret one
of the parcels of land belonging to the estate for an undisclosed
RULE 88 to RULE 90 – CASE DIGEST |9
amount. It was also agreed upon that, since the lands subject of
the sale were then in litigation between the estate and one
Ambrosio Valero, the deed of sale would include a clause to the
effect that, if by March, 1945, the vendors would be unable to
deliver to the purchaser the possession of the lands peacefully
and without encumbrance, said lands would be substituted by
others belonging to the estate, of equal area, value, and
conditions. It was likewise agreed upon that Sauco would
prepare the necessary documents, as in facts he did in the same
office of Gonzales Lloret.
After preparing the documents, Sauco gave an account to the
plaintiff of the result of his negotiations, and having signified his
conformity thereto, plaintiff gave to Sauco two checks, one for
the sum of P100,000 drawn against the Philippine National
Bank in favor of Maria Lloret (Exhibit B), and another for the
same amount drawn against the Philippine Trust Co. in favor of
Ricardo Gonzales Lloret. With these checks, Sauco returned on
the same date to the office of GonzalesLloret to consummate
the transaction, but as Maria Lloret was not then present,
Gonzales Lloret told Sauco that he could leave the document
with him as he would take care of having them signed by his
mother Maria, and that he could return the next Monday, June
19, to get them which by then would be signed and ratified
before a notary public. Since Sauco was then in a hurry to return
to Malolos, and besides he had confidence in Gonzales Lloret,
who was his friend, the former agreed and left the two checks
with the latter. But before receiving the checks,
Gonzales Lloret issued a receipt therefor, which was marked
Exhibit A. Of this development, Sauco informed the plaintiff in
the afternoon of the same day, emphasizing the fact that he
would return to the office of Gonzales Lloret to get the
documents on June 19.
Sauco, however, was not able to return as was the
understanding because he fell sick, and apprehensive of such
failure, plaintiff went on the next day, June 20, to the Philippine
National Bank to inquire whether the check he had issued in
favor of Maria Lloret had already been collected, and having
been informed in the affirmative, he next went to the Philippine
Trust Co. to make the same inquiry with regard to the other
check he issued against said bank in favor of Ricardo
Gonzales Lloret, and when he was informed that the same had
not yet been collected, he suspended its payment informing the
bank that, should the party concerned execute the deed of sale
for which it had been issued, he would reissue the check. The
bank accordingly suspended the payment of the check as
requested.
On the occasion of a visit which plaintiff paid to Sauco in
Malolos, the latter handed over to him the receipt Exhibit A with
the request that, in view of his sickness, he take charge of
getting the deed of sale from Gonzales Lloret. Plaintiff tried to
do so, but when he interviewed Gonzales Lloret, the latter
refused to give him the documents on the pretext that he did not
deal with him but with Sauco intimating that he would just wait
until the latter recover from his sickness. When Sauco got well
he tried to renew his dealing with Gonzales Lloret in an attempt
to get from him the documents duly signed and ratified before a
notary public, but the latter at first gave excuses for his inability
to do his part as agreed upon until he finally said that he could
not carry out the agreement in view of the fact that he had
received other better offers for the purchase of the lands among
them one for the sum of P300,000, plus a vehicle called dokar
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 10
with its corresponding horse. This attitude was taken by the
plaintiff as a refusal to sign the deed of sale and so he instituted
the present action making as party defendants Maria Lloret and
her son Ricardo Gonzales Lloret.
Ricardo Gonzales Lloret denied that a definite understanding
had ever been reached between him and the plaintiff or his
representative relative to the sale of the lands in question. He
testified that the documents marked Exhibits D and D-1 do not
represent the agreement which, according to Teofilo Sauco,
was concluded between them, intimating that said documents
were already prepared when Sauco went to his office to take up
with him the matter relative to the sale on June 17, 1944; that
Sauco, on that occasion, had already with him the two checks
referred to in the receipt Exhibit A, who insisted in leaving them
with him because he was in a hurry to return to Malalos, and in
so he accepted them by way of deposit and deposited them in
his current account with the Philippine National Bank in order
that they may not be lost; and that sometime in the morning of
the succeeding Monday, June 19, a messenger of the Philippine
National Bank came to see him to return the check issued in his
favor against the Philippine Trust Co. with the information that
the same had not been honored by the bank for the reason that
the plaintiff had suspended its payment which act he interpreted
as an indication that the plaintiff had decided to call off the
negotiation. In other words, according to Gonzales Lloret, when
plaintiff suspended the payment of the two checks on June 19,
1944, as in fact one of them had been actually suspended
because it had not yet been actually collected from the
Philippine Trust Co., the understanding he had with Teofilo
Sauco regarding the sale did not pass the stage of mere
negotiation, and, as such it did not produce any legal relation by
which the defendants could be compelled to carry out the sale
as now pretended by plaintiff in his complaint.
ISSUE:
WHETHER A SALE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE
COURT IS VALID.
HELD:
The sale of properties subject to judicial administration can not
have any valid effect until it is approved by the court. Where the
terms that were made to appeal in the document of sale differ
substantially from the conditions prescribed in the authorization
given by the court for the sale of the properties, the document
cannot have any binding effect upon parties nor serve as basis
for an action for specific.
Both plaintiff and the defendants knew well that the properties
were subject to judicial administration and that the sale could
have no valid effect until it merits the approval of the court, so
much so that before the lands were opened for negotiation the
judicial administrator, with the conformity of the heirs, secured
from the court an authorization to that effect, and yet, as will be
stated elsewhere, the terms that were made to appear in the
document Exhibit D differ substantially from the conditions
prescribed in the authorization given by the court, which
indicates that said document cannot have any binding effect
upon the parties nor serve as basis for an action for specific
performance, as now pretended by the plaintiff, in the absence
of such judicial approval.
It should be noted that the lands subject of negotiation were
owned pro-indiviso by Maria Lloret and the estate of Francisco
A. Gonzales, and in that negotiation defendant
Gonzales Lloret was merely acting in his capacity as judicial
administrator. Being a co-owner of the lands, the consent of
Maria Lloret to the terms of the sale is evidently indispensable,
and yet there is nothing in the evidence to show that she has
ever been contacted in connection with the sale, nor is there any
proof that Gonzales Lloret had been authorized to conduct
negotiations in her behalf. What the record shows was that
Gonzales Lloret would take up the matter with Maria Lloret on
the date subsequent to that when the two documents were
delivered by Sauco to him (June 17, 1944), but this never
materialized because of the unexpected sickness of Teofilo
Sauco.
Let us now examine the terms of the authorization given by the
court relative to the sale of the lands in question, and see if the
same had been observed in the preparation of the deed of sale
Exhibit D. Let us note, at the outset, that the authorization of the
court refers to the sale of certain parcels of land of an area of
20 hectares situated in the barrio of Sabang, municipality of
Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, for a price of not less than
P100,000 with the express condition that the encumbrance
affecting those lands would first be paid. Analyzing now the
terms appearing in the document Exhibit D, we find that among
the lands included in the sale are lands situated in the barrio of
San Roque. This is a variation of the terms of the judicial
authorization. The document Exhibit D also stipulates that the
sale would be free from any encumbrance, with the exception
of the sum of P30,000 which is indebted to Ambrosio Valero, but
said document likewise stipulates that the possession of the
lands sold should be delivered to the purchaser sometime in
March of the next year and that if this could not be done the
lands would be substituted by others of the same area and
value, belonging to the estate of Francisco A. Gonzales. This is
an onerous condition which does not appear in the authorization
of the court. Of course, this is an eventuality which the plaintiff
wanted to forestall in view of the fact that the lands subject of
the sale were pending litigation between the estate and
Ambrosio Valero, but this is no justification for departing from
the precise terms contained in the authorization of the court.
And we find, finally, that the authorization calls for the sale of six
parcels of land belonging to the estate, but in the document as
drawn up by Sauco it appears that only five parcels would be
sold to the plaintiff, and the other parcel to Ricardo
Gonzales Lloret. Undoubtedly, this cannot legally be done for,
as we know, the law prohibits that a land subject of
administration be sold to its judicial administrator.
6. [G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998]
NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL
OLIVAN, respondents.
FACTS: In a complaint for specific performance filed with the
court a quo, respondents Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven
alleged that petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in
their favor a CONTRACT TO SELL involving Lot 2125 of the
Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters
at P150.00 per square meter. Respondents alleged that they
paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but petitioner, despite
demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 11
contract. Respondents therefore prayed that petitioner be
ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay
damages, attorneys fee and litigation expenses.
Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of
respondents and receipt of P300,000.00 as
downpayment. However, she put forward the following
affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract
formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s
father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that at the
time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the
pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell
was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity
of the contract petitioner had offered to return the downpayment
received from respondents, but the latter refused to accept it;
that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the
tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy
rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the
contract.
Private respondents presented the following documentary
evidences: (1) Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the
last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father)
to show that the property sold by petitioner was one of those
devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by
defendant for the downpayment in the total amount
of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand letters sent to
defendant (Exhs F & G).
Instead of submitting her evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer
to Evidence. Petitioner maintained that the contract to sell was
null and void for want of approval by the probate court. She
further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive
condition, which was the probate of the will of her father
Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private
respondents].
The court a quo granted the demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the
complaint in the following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was
consummated, no petition was filed in the Court with
notice to the heirs of the time and place of hearing, to show
that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of
properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested
parties must comply with the requisites provided by law,
(Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of Court) which are mandatory,
and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and
the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio.
Besides, it is axiomatic that where the estate of a
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into
any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate Court. As held by the Supreme Court, a
decedent’s representative (administrator) is not estopped
from questioning the validity of his own void deed
purporting to convey land. In the case at bar, the
[petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction, has
interposed the nullity of the contract as her defense, there
being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good
faith offers to return the money she received from the
[private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not
estopped from doing so and the action to declare the
inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is what
precipitated the filing of [petitioners] demurrer to evidence.
The Court of Appeals declared the Contract to Sell valid, subject
to the outcome of the testate proceedings on Demetrio
Carpenas estate. The appellate court set aside the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint and ruled as follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court
treated the contract to sell executed by appellee
(petitioner) as one made by the administratrix of the Estate
of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence,
its main reason for voiding the contract in question was
the absence of the probate courts approval. Presumably,
what the lower court had in mind was the sale of the estate
or part thereof made by the administrator for the benefit of
the estate, as authorized under Rule 89 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which requires the approval of the probate
court upon application therefor with notice to the heirs,
devisees and legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the
contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee
(petitioner) in her capacity as an heir, of a property that
was devised to her under the will sought to be
probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated
that appellee (petitioner) executed the contract in her
capacity as executrix and administratrix of the estate, a
cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would
unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to
appellants (respondents) was one of the other properties
given to her by her late father.
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of
the contract that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity
as executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her
father, but as an heir and more importantly as owner of
said lot which, along with other properties, was devised to
her under the will sought to be probated. That being so,
the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules
of Court which refer to a sale made by the administrator
for the benefit of the estate do not apply.
Under the foregoing premises, what the trial court should
have done with the complaint was not to dismiss it but to
simply put on hold further proceedings until such time that
the estate or its residue will be distributed in accordance
with the approved will.
While we find the contract to sell valid and binding
between the parties, we cannot as yet order appellee to
perform her obligations under the contract because the
result of the administration proceedings of the testate
Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we
shall confine our adjudication to merely declaring the
validity of the questioned Contract to Sell.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner contends that where the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court. [9] She
maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not
approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule
89 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the
estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations: xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner
argues that the stipulations in the Contract to Sell require her to
act in her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers
that her obligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 12
or executrix, the estate being the landlord of the said
tenants.[10] Likewise demonstrating that she entered into the
contract in her capacity as executor is the stipulation that she
must effect the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice
land to residential land and secure the necessary clearances
from government offices. Petitioner alleges that these
obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or
administrator of an estate, and not by an heir.[11]
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract to Sell executed by the
Petitioner and Respondents without the requisite probate court
approval is valid. YES.
RULING: As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7
of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because
petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller
of the subject parcel of land.[12] She also explained the reason
for the sale to be difficulties in her living conditions and
consequent need of cash.[13] These representations clearly
show that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under
probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
The SC emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir
or heirs from the moment of the decedents death. [14] Petitioner,
therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does
not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has
the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in
the estate of her late father.[15]
Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols,[16] the Court resolved an
identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession
of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the instant of the death of
the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted. And
Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner
of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion
which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the
estate while it remains undivided. xxx And according to
article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign
or mortgage his part in the common property, and the
effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted him in the partition
upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where
some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others,
sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court,
speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano,
said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof
was limited to the share which may be allotted to the
vendors upon the partition of the estate.
Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract
to Sell
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner’s offer to sell
is contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the Last
Will Testament of her father. [19]Consequently, although the
Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and
private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of
ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the
termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore,
there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the Contract
to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the
properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.[20]
Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her
representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as
initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege
on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the
private respondents who have relied on them.[21] Jurisprudence
teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a
party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of
its consequences.
7.) G.R. No. 158566 September 20, 2005
JOSEPHINE OROLA, MYRNA OROLA, ANGELINE OROLA,
MANUEL OROLA, ANTONIO OROLA and ALTHEA
OROLA, Petitioners,
vs. THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ), INC.,
EMILIO Q. OROLA, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ
and THE EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
CAPIZ, Respondent.
FACTS: On July 16, 1969, Trinidad Laserna Orola died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Emilio Orola and
their six minor children, namely, 10-year-old Antonio, 12-year-
old Josephine, 16-year-old Manuel, and other siblings, Myrna,
Angeline and Althea.
Emilio Orola, who, in the meantime, had married anew,
executed a waiver of all his rights and interests over the said
property in favor of his children by Trinidad Laserna, namely,
Josephine, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, all
surnamed Orola.
In 1973, Emilio Orola’s petition for his appointment as guardian
over the persons and property of his minor children was
granted.
Emilio filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the
estate of his deceased spouse, Trinidad Laserna, and his
appointment as administrator of her estate. RTC appointed
Emilio Orola as administrator of the estate of his deceased
spouse.
As such administrator of the estate, he opened an account in
the name of the estate with the PNB, embarked on sugar
production and, with prior approval of the court, negotiated with
banking institutions for financing loans to purchase the required
equipments. However, in 1976 and 1977, there was a sudden
collapse of the sugar industry. Emilio Orola found it necessary
to develop the swampy portion of the estate for the production
of fish. To finance the endeavor, he needed at
least P600,000.00. Emilio Orola filed a motion[8] in Sp. Proc. No.
V-3639 for authority to negotiate a P600,000.00 loan from the
Central Bank of the Philippines for the full and complete
development of the fishpond portion of the estate, and to
transfer the sugar account of the estate from the PNB to the
Republic Planters Bank (RPB).
The court granted the motion of the administrator and
authorized him to negotiate the loan through the Rural Bank of

Capiz and to transfer the sugar account of the estate to the RPB
in Roxas City.[9] Emilio then filed an application with the Rural
Bank for a financing loan of P600,000.00. However, the bank
informed him that the said loan would have to be processed by
the Central Bank and that it would take some time. He was
informed that there would be no need for the Central Bank to
intervene if the loan of P600,000.00 would be broken down into
three parts of P200,000.00, each to be applied for by three
applicants to whom the property to be used as collateral would
be leased by the estate. Emilio agreed and talked to his children,
Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, about the banks proposal. The
three siblings agreed.[10] The Estate of Trinidad Laserna,
through its administrator, Emilio, as lessor, and Josephine,
Manuel and Antonio, all surnamed Orola, as lessees, executed
separate contracts of lease over the aforesaid property of the
estate. On September 20, 1982, the intestate estate court
issued an Order approving the contracts.
However, it turned out that the lessees would not qualify for the
loans; the bank required a lease period of at least 10 years from
the time the court approved the same. On May 20, 1982, Emilio,
Antonio, Manuel and Josephine Orola filed
Manifestation[11] with the intestate estate court, praying that its
order be amended to state that the periods of the leases were
to commence from court approval of the said contracts.
However, on December 15, 1982, the estate, through Emilio, as
lessor, and Josephine, Antonio and Manuel Orola, executed
separate Amended Contracts of Lease[12] covering the same
property. The periods of the lease were extended to 12 years,
to commence from their approval by the intestate estate court.
The lessees were also authorized to negotiate loans for the
development of the leased premises not to
exceed P200,000.00, and to bind the leased premises by way
of real estate mortgage as security therefor.
On December 15, 1982, Emilio filed an Ex Parte Motion[13] in the
intestate estate court for the approval of the amended contracts
of lease appended thereto. On December 17, 1982, Angeline,
Myrna and Althea Orola filed their Joint Affidavit of
Conformity[14] to the motion. On December 17, 1982, the court
granted the motion of Emilio and approved the amended
contracts of lease.[15] Rural Bank notified Emilio that the loan
applications of his children had been approved.[16]
Antonio, Manuel and Josephine signed separate Promissory
Notes[17] on March 21, 1983 in which they promised and bound
themselves to pay their respective loans in 10 years in stated
annual installments. Antonio
Orola, for and in behalf of his father Emilio Orola, executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over Lot 1088 as security for the payment
of his loan.[18] Manuel Orola, also as attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the estate, likewise, executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of the Rural Bank over the said lots as security
for his loan.[19] Josephine Orola, as attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the estate, executed a separate real estate
mortgage agreement over a portion of Lot 1088 and Lot 1071
as security for her loan.[20] However, the real estate mortgage
contracts were not submitted to the guardianship and intestate
estate courts for approval. Neither were Myrna, Angeline and
Althea aware of the said loans.
R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 13
The net proceeds of the loan, in the total amount
of P582,000.00, were deposited in the Rural Bank on May 9,
1983 in Emilios account.[21] From the said proceeds, the Rural
Bank deducted the amount of P229,771.20, the accommodation
loan Emilio secured from the Rural Bank.[22] As of September 9,
1983, the balance of the said deposit amounted to
only P4,292.79.[23] Emilio, thereafter, failed to pay the
amortizations of the loans to the Rural Bank.[24]
This prompted the Rural Bank to write separate letters of
demand to Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, demanding
payment of the balance of their accounts within seven days from
the receipt thereof, otherwise the Rural
Bank would cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgages.[25] Emilio Orola pleaded to the Rural Bank not to
foreclose the mortgages. However, on June 15, 1985, the Rural
Bank filed an application with the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages
over Lots 1071 and 1088.[26] The lots were sold at public auction
on April 14, 1986 with the Rural Bank as the winning bidder. The
Sheriff executed separate certificates of sale in favor of the
a Rural Bank.
Thereafter, the guardianship court terminated the guardianship
and dismissed the case. On September 21, 1987, Josephine,
Myrna, Manuel and Antonio Orola executed a Deed of
Acceptance of Waiver or Donation in which they accepted their
father’s waiver of his rights, interests and participation over their
mother’s
estate.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/15856
6.htm - _ftn29
On October 1, 1987, Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna,
Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a Complaint against
the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and the Ex-Officio Provincial
Sheriff for the nullification of the Promissory Notes and Real
Estate Mortgages executed by Josephine, Manuel and Antonio
Orola, and the sale of the property subject of the said deed at
public auction. They alleged therein that they became the sole
owners of Lots 1088 and 1071 when their father executed a
waiver of his rights over the said lots in their favor; that the real
estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same
were never submitted to and approved by the RTC; that they
were deceived by their father into signing the contracts of lease
and amended contracts of lease, promissory notes and deeds
of real estate mortgages as security for the P600,000.00 loan
on the assurance that they would be benefited therefrom; that
they did not receive the proceeds of the said loans. As such,
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages and
the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null and
void.
In its answer to the complaint, Rural Bank averred that the RTC
authorized and even approved the amended contracts of sale
executed by Antonio, Manuel and Josephine Orola and the
defendant Emilio Orola; that the plaintiffs had agreed to the
execution of the mortgages of the property subject of the said
deeds, and conformed to the said amended contracts before
the RTC in the intestate estate proceedings approved the
same; they were also notified of the balance of their account,
and of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages,
and the subsequent sale of the property covered by the said
mortgages at public auction after they refused to pay their
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 14
account despite demands. As such, the plaintiffs were
estopped from assailing the real estate mortgages and the
extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the lots covered
by the said deeds at public auction.
In his answer to the complaint, Emilio Orola admitted that the
guardianship proceedings terminated on September 1,
1987. He alleged that he executed the Waiver of Right on
October 26, 1976 only because his brother and sister-in-law
required him to do so as a condition to their signing the partition
agreement, with their assurance that the said waiver would take
effect only after his death. Moreover, the plaintiffs had agreed
to the execution of the amended contracts of lease to facilitate
the early release of the loans as required by the Rural Bank.
RTC : favor of the plaintiffs and declared the loans as well as
the real estate mortgage null and void for failure to comply with
the mandatory requirements of Section 7, Rule 89, Revised
Rules of Court.
CA: reversed RTC; ruled that the intestate estate court’s
approval of the amended contracts of lease carried with it the
approval of the real estate mortgages executed by Emilio Orola
in favor of the Rural Bank. Angeline, Myrna and Althea even
conformed to the amended contracts of lease; hence, were
estopped from assailing them, as well as the real estate
mortgage contracts.
Hence, this appeal. The petitioners reiterate their argument that
respondent Emilio Orola, then administrator of the estate, failed
to comply with Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. They
aver that this provision is mandatory in nature, including the
fixing of a time and place for hearing of the motion for the
approval of the amended contracts of lease. They point out that
respondent Orola failed to file a motion for the approval of the
real estate mortgages. The petitioners insist that even if it is
assumed that the December 17, 1982 Order of the intestate
estate court approving the amended contracts of lease
authorized the constitution of real estate mortgages over the
real property of the estate, such order is void, as it authorized
petitioners Manuel, Antonio and Josephine Orola, and not the
respondent Emilio Orola, to mortgage the said property. They
insist that they are not estopped from assailing a void order
issued by the intestate estate court.
Respondent Rural Bank insists that the petitioners had been
benefited by the loans granted to them; hence, are estopped
from assailing the real estate mortgage contracts. Respondent
Orola, for his part, avers that the one-half undivided portion of
the property subject of the real estate mortgages was the
exclusive property of the deceased, and partly the conjugal
property of the respondent and the deceased. Moreover,
respondent Orolas share in the conjugal property was not the
subject of the intestate case, as it was not included as part of
the property given as security for the loans of the petitioners-
mortgagees.
ISSUES: WON the subject mortgages constituted over the
real estate properties are void for non-compliance with the
mandatory regulations of Section 7 Rule 89. YES
Ruling: Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that,
upon application of the administrator and on written notice to the
heirs, the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so
much as may be necessary of the real estate for the expenses
of the administrator, or if it clearly appears that such mortgage
would be beneficial to the persons interested:
Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through
personality not exhausted. When the personal estate of the
deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of
administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such
personal estate may injure the business or other interests
of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has
not, otherwise, made sufficient provision for the payment of
such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator and on written
notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the
Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to
sell, mortgage, or otherwise, encumber so much as may be
necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for
the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies,
if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or
encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons
interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in
the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage,
or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or
so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the
circumstances.
Section 7 of Rule 89 provides the rules to obtain court approval
for such mortgage:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition
setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the
expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the
personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts
as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is
necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for
hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature
of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and
place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the
persons interested, and may cause such further notice to
be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem
proper;
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator
shall give an additional bond, in such sum as the court
directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will
account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this
section have been complied with, the court, by order stating
such compliance, may authorize the executor or
administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in
proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed
necessary, and in case of sale the court may authorize it to
be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all
parties concerned. The executor or administrator shall be
furnished with a certified copy of such order;
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 15
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving
notice of the time and place of the sale shall be governed
by the provisions concerning notice of execution sale;
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the
order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or
administrator for such real estate, which shall be as valid
as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his
lifetime.
After the real estate mortgage is executed in accordance with
the foregoing regulations, the said deed must be submitted for
the consideration and approval or disapproval of the court. [37]
The records show that respondent Emilio Orola notified the
petitioners of his motion for the approval of the amended
contracts of lease. Although the motion was ex parte,
nonetheless, petitioners Angeline, Myrna and Althea Orola filed
their Joint Affidavit of Conformity, in which they declared that
they have no objection and voluntarily conform to the
amendment of the term from ten (10) to twelve (12) years and
freely give our consent to having the Lessees execute a real
estate mortgage over the leased property in favor of the bank.
However, the Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that
respondent Orola failed to secure an order from the
intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the
subject lots and execute a real estate mortgage contract in
favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the intestate estate
court approved in its December 17, 1982 Order was the
authority incorporated in the amended contracts of lease
respondent Orola gave to petitioners Josephine, Manuel and
Antonio Orola so that the said lots could be mortgaged to the
respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000.00 loan
under their respective names. In fine, the intestate estate
court authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to
mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural
Bank. Moreover, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate
may be authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage
real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the order of the
estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the
realty of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.
The respondents must have realized that the order of the
intestate estate court authorizing petitioners Manuel, Antonio
and Josephine Orola to mortgage the lots was void because
respondent Emilio Orola caused the real estate mortgage
contracts in favor of respondent Rural Bank to be executed by
his children, petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola,
“acting as attorneys-in-fact of the administrator of the
estate.” However, the estate court had not appointed
petitioners Antonio, Josephine and Manuel Orola as attorneys-
in-fact of respondent Emilio Orola empowered to execute the
said contracts. Hence, they had no authority to execute the
said Real Estate Mortgage Contracts for and in behalf of
respondent Orola, in the latter’s capacity as administrator of the
estate.
Worse, respondent Orola failed to submit the real estate
mortgage contracts to the intestate estate court for its
consideration and approval. Unless and until the said contracts
are approved by the intestate estate court, the same cannot
have any binding effect upon the estate; nor serve as basis for
any action against the estate and against the parcels of land
described in the said contracts belonging to it.
2.) It bears stressing that respondent Orola had no right or
authority to mortgage the realty belonging to the estate. He
derived his authority from the order of the estate court which had
jurisdiction to authorize the real estate mortgage thereof under
such terms and conditions and upon proper application. Any
mortgage of realty of the estate without the appropriate authority
of the estate court has no legal support and is void. The
purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The
real estate mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial
foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described
therein at public auction, can thus be attacked directly and
collaterally.
Contrary to the contention of respondent Rural Bank, the
petitioners were not estopped from assailing the real estate
mortgage contracts, the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the
sale of the property to respondent Rural Bank.
Although the records show that petitioners Josephine, Manuel
and Antonio Orola received the proceeds of the loan from
respondent Rural Bank, the amount was deposited by
respondent Emilio Orola in his savings account with respondent
Rural Bank. He was obliged to deposit the said amount in the
estates account with the Republic Planters Bank, as ordered by
the intestate estate court. Worse, respondent Rural Bank
applied P229,771.20 of the loan proceeds to liquidate the
accommodation loan it granted to respondent Emilio Orola.
There is no showing in the records that the intestate estate court
ever authorized the use of the proceeds of the loan to pay
respondent Emilio Orolas accommodation loan. The loan
proceeds were to be used to develop property belonging to the
estate into a fishpond from which income could be generated.
Of the net proceeds of the P582,000.00 loan, only P4,292.79
remained as of September 9, 1983. Respondent Emilio Orola
failed to pay the amortization of the loan for the respondent
Rural Bank of the estate.
Had the real estate mortgage contracts been submitted to the
intestate estate court for consideration and approval after
proper notice to the petitioners, the court would have been
apprised of the terms and conditions contained therein, and that
about one-half of the loan would be used to pay the
accommodation loan of respondent Emilio Orola.
Petitioners Manuel, Josephine and Antonio Orola executed the
amended contracts of lease, the promissory notes and the real
estate mortgages upon the prodding of their father, respondent
Emilio Orola, and upon the suggestion of respondent Rural
Bank, solely to facilitate the speedy approval of the loan of the
estate, which was to be the ultimate beneficiary thereof. The
petitioners acted on the belief that the loan would be used to
develop the swampy portion of the realty into an income-
generating fishpond, impervious of the fact that almost one-half
of the proceeds of the loan had been used to pay the
accommodation loan of respondent Emilio Orola.
8.) GR NO. 156403 MARCH 31, 2005
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 16
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR
PAHAMOTANG-BASA, petitioners, vs. THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS OF ARTURO
ARGUNA, respondents
FACTS: On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was
survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight
(8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon,
Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and
Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang.
Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City
(intestate court) a petition for issuance of letters administration
over the estate of his deceased wife.
In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and
Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears
that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an
earlier case
On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order
granting Agustin’s petition.
Thereafter, Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin
executed an Amendment of Real and Chattel Mortgages
with Assumption of Obligation. It appears that earlier, or on
December 14, 1972, the intestate court approved the mortgage
to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an obligation in
the amount of P570,000.00. Agustin signed the document in
behalf of (1) the estate of Melitona; (2) daughters Ana and
Corazon; and (3) a logging company named Pahamotang
Logging Enterprises, Inc. (PLEI) which appeared to have an
interest in the properties of the estate. Offered as securities are
twelve (12) parcels of registered land.
Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition for Authority To
Increase Mortgage on the above mentioned properties of the
estate. The intestate court granted said petition.
On October 5, 1974, Agustin again filed with the intestate court
another petition, Petition for Declaration of Heirs And For
Authority To Increase Indebtedness, whereunder he alleged
the necessity for an additional loan from PNB to capitalize the
business of the estate, the additional loan to be secured by
additional collateral in the form of a parcel of land registered in
the name of Heirs of Melitona Pahamotang. In the same petition,
Agustin prayed the intestate court to declare him and Ana,
Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein
petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as the only heirs of Melitona.
The intestate court granted Agustin authority to seek additional
loan from PNB in an amount not exceeding P5,000,000.00 to be
secured by the land covered by OCT No. P-7131 of the Registry
of Deeds of Davao Oriental, but denied Agustin’s prayer for
declaration of heirs for being premature.
On October 22, 1974, a real estate mortgage contract for
P4,500,000.00 was executed by PNB and Agustin in his several
capacities as: (1) administrator of the estate of his late wife; (2)
general manager of PLEI; (3) attorney-in-fact of spouses
Isabelita Pahamotang and Orlando Ruiz, and spouses Susana
Pahamotang and Octavio Zamora; and (4) guardian of
daughters Concepcion and Genoveva and petitioners
Josephine and Eleonor. Offered as securities for the additional
loan are three (3) parcels of registered land covered by TCTs
No. T-21132, 37786 and 43264.
On February 19, 1980, Agustin filed with the intestate court a
Petition therein praying for authority to sell to Arturo Arguna
the properties of the estate covered by TCTs of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao City, and also TCT of the Registry of Deeds of
Davao del Norte.
On February 27, 1980, Agustin yet filed with the intestate court
another petition, this time a Petition To Sell the Properties of the
Estate, more specifically referring to the property covered by
OCT No. P-7131, in favor of PLEI.
In separate Orders both dated February 25, 1980, the intestate
court granted Agustin authority to sell estate properties, in which
orders the court also required all the heirs of Melitona to give
their express conformity to the disposal of the subject properties
of the estate and to sign the deed of sale to be submitted to the
same court. Strangely, the two (2) orders were dated two (2)
days earlier than February 27, 1980, the day Agustin
supposedly filed his petition.
In a motion for reconsideration, Agustin prayed the intestate
court for the amendment of one of its February 25, 1980 Orders
by canceling the requirement of express conformity of the heirs
as a condition for the disposal of the aforesaid properties. The
intestate court granted Agustin’s prayer.
Hence, on March 4, 1981, estate properties were sold to
respondent Arturo Arguna, while the property covered by OCT
No. P-7131 was sold to PLEI. Consequently, intestate court
approved the deeds of sale in their favor.
Thereafter, three (3) daughters of Agustin, namely, Ana,
Isabelita and Corazon petitioned the intestate court for the
payment of their respective shares from the sales of estate
properties, which was granted by the intestate court.
Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject
properties of the estate was never satisfied. Hence, mortgagor
PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage.
Petitioner Josephine filed a motion with the intestate court for
the issuance of an order restraining PNB from extrajudicially
foreclosing the mortgage. Intestate court denied Josephine’s
motion. Hence, PNB was able to foreclose the mortgage in its
favor.
Petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister
Susana Pahamatong-Zamora, filed motions with the intestate
court to set aside its Orders but the intestate court denied the
motions.
In a Decision dated August 7, 1998, the trial court in effect
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring the Mortgage
Contracts of July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974, as well as the
foreclosure proceedings, void insofar as it affects the share,
interests and property rights of the plaintiffs in the assets of the
estate of Melitona Pahamotang, but valid with respect to the
other parties. It also declared the deeds of sale in favor of
defendants Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. and Arturo
Arguna as void insofar as it affects the shares, interests and
property rights of herein plaintiffs in the assets of the estate of
Melitona Pahamotang but valid with respect to the other parties
to the said deeds of sale.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition.
It is petitioners’ posture that the mortgage contracts dated July
6, 1973 and October 22, 1974 entered into by Agustin with
respondent PNB, as well as his subsequent sale of estate
properties to PLEI and Arguna on March 4, 1981, are void
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 17
because they [petitioners] never consented thereto. They assert
that as heirs of their mother Melitona, they are entitled to notice
of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court seeking
authority to mortgage and sell estate properties. Without such
notice, so they maintain, the four orders of the intestate court
dated July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25,
1980 andJanuary 7, 1981, which allowed Agustin to mortgage
and sell estate properties, are void on account of Agustins non-
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court.
Prescinding from their premise that said orders are completely
void and hence, could not attain finality, petitioners maintain that
the same could be attacked directly or collaterally, anytime and
anywhere.
For its part, respondent PNB asserts that petitioners cannot
raise as issue in this proceedings the validity of the subject
orders in their desire to invalidate the contracts of mortgage
entered into by Agustin. To PNB, the validity of the subject
orders of the intestate court can only be challenged in a direct
action for such purpose and not in an action to annul contracts,
as the petitioners have done. This respondent adds that the
mortgage on the subject properties is valid because the same
was made with the approval of the intestate court and with the
knowledge of the heirs of Melitona, petitioners included. [9]
Upon the other hand, respondent Heirs of Arturo Arguna
likewise claim that petitioners knew of the filing with the intestate
court by Agustin of petitions to mortgage and sell the estate
properties. They reecho the CAs ruling that petitioners are
barred by laches in filing Civil Case No. 16,802. [10]
ISSUE: W/N the orders of the intestate court granting Agustin’s
petitions for mortgage and sale were null and void for lack of
compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof. YES
RULING: In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made
a factual finding in its decision of August 7, 1998 that petitioners
were, in fact, not notified by their father Agustin of the filing of
his petitions for permission to mortgage/sell the estate
properties. The trial court made the correct conclusion of law
that the challenged orders of the intestate court granting
Agustins petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with
the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which respectively read:
Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or
other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies
through personalty not exhausted. - When the personal
estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts,
expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the
sale of such personal estate may injure the business or
other interests of those interested in the estate, and
where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient
provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and
legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees,
and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize
the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or
otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of
the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose
of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly
appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance
would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a
part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered without injury to those interested in the
remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage,
or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate,
or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under
the circumstances.
Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as
beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. -
When it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the
real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs,
devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the
court may, upon application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees
and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole
or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such
authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the
provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds
shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in
the proper proportions.
Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell,
mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. - The court
having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real
estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it
appears necessary or beneficial, under the following
regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written
petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased,
the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of
the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other
facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for
hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the
nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the
time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by
mail to the persons interested, and may cause such
further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as
it shall deem proper; (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order
authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was issued
by the testate or intestate court without previous notice to the
heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not
only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order
of the court authorizing the same.[11]
Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are
mandatory and failure to give notice to the heirs would invalidate
the authority granted by the intestate/probate court to mortgage
or sell estate assets.
Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the
several petitions filed by Agustin with the intestate court to
mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife.
According to the trial court, the [P]etition for Authority to
Increase Mortgage and [P]etition for Declaration of Heirs and for
Authority to Increase Indebtedness, filed by Agustin on July 16,
1973 and October 5, 1974, respectively, do not contain
information that petitioners were furnished with copies of said
petitions. Also, notices of hearings of those petitions were not
sent to the petitioners.[14] The trial court also found in Civil Case
No. 16,802 that Agustin did not notify petitioners of the filing of
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 18
his petitions for judicial authority to sell estate properties to
Arturo Arguna and PLEI.[15]
As it were, the appellate court offered little explanation on why
it did not believe the trial court in its finding that petitioners
were ignorant of Agustins scheme to mortgage and sell the
estate properties.
Aside from merely quoting the orders of July 18,
1973 and October 19, 1974 of the intestate court, the Court of
Appeals leaves us in the dark on its reason for disbelieving the
trial court. The appellate court did not publicize its appraisal of
the evidence presented by the parties before the trial court in
the matter regarding the knowledge, or absence thereof, by the
petitioners of Agustins petitions. The appellate court cannot
casually set aside the findings of the trial court without stating
clearly the reasons therefor. Findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight, and absent any indication to believe
otherwise, we simply cannot adopt the conclusion reached by
the Court of Appeals.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined the
right.[16] The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for
which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held barred.[17]
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating
laches against petitioners. The element of delay in questioning
the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking.
Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to
mortgage and sell the estate properties. There is no indication
that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified petitioners
of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although
petitioners finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions
filed by their father, and eventually challenged the July 18, 1973,
October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981
orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged
decision of the appellate court when they (petitioners) actually
learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate court.
Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners
acquired knowledge of those orders, their alleged delay in
impugning the validity thereof certainly cannot be established.
And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against
them.
RULE 90: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE
ESTATE
1.) [ G.R. No. 209651, November 26, 2014 ]
MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, AND THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T.
MARCELO, NAMELY, KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA
MELINDA J. MARCELO REVILLA, AND JOHN STEVEN J.
MARCELO, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
FACTS: The facts herein occurred in two stages: (1) the first
litigation between two of Jose Marcelo, Sr.'s (Jose, Sr.)
compulsory heirs, his sons, Edward, (ascendant of herein
petitioners, heirs of Edward T. Marcelo, Katherine J. Marcelo,
Anna Melinda J. Marcelo Revilla, and John Steven J. Marcelo)
and respondent Jose, Jr., for the appointment of regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate; and (2) after Edward was
appointed regular administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate and
Edward's death in 2009, respondent Jose, Jr.'s revival of his
pursuit to administer his father's, Jose, Sr.'s, estate.
These details of these stages follow:
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was
survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George,
(3) Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr.
Initially, petitioner Marcelo Investment and Management
Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition for the issuance of Letters
of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. before the RTC. At
first, Helen, along with her brother, Jose, Jr. separately opposed
MIMCO's petition; the two prayed for their respective
appointment as administrator. Edward opposed Helen's and
Jose, Jr.'s respective petitions for issuance of Letters of
Administration in their favor and Edward himself prayed for his
appointment as regular administrator. Ultimately, MIMCO,
George and Edward banded together: (1) opposed Helen's and
Jose, Jr.'s petitions, and (2) prayed for Edward's appointment
as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate.
On 21 September 1989, pending issuance of letters of
administration, the RTC appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as
special administrators.
In an Order dated 13 December 1991, the RTC appointed
Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate upon the
posting of a bond amounting to THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00).
Jose, Jr. filed successive motions: (1) motion for
reconsideration of the 13 December 1991 Order; and (2)
omnibus motion alleging the RTC Acting Presiding Judge Efren
N. Ambrosio's (Judge Ambrocio) unusual interest and undue
haste in issuing letters of administration in favor of Edward.
The RTC, through Judge Ambrosio, denied Jose, Jr.'s motion
for reconsideration. The letters of administration 1992 issued in
favor of Edward T. Marcelo is maintained with full force and
effect. The letters testamentary issued in favor of Special
Administrator, Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. as well as the bond posted
by him are hereby ordered cancelled. Likewise, the Special
Administrator, Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. is hereby ordered to forthwith
deliver to the regular administrator the goods, chattels, money
and estate of the deceased in his hands.[4]
Adamant on his competence to better administer his father's
estate, Jose, Jr. appealed Edward's appointment as regular
administrator to the Court of Appeals, however, the appellate
court affirmed in toto[6] the Orders of the intestate court.
The question of who between Edward and Jose, Jr. should
administer their father's estate reached the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 123883 (Jose Marcelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and
Edward Marcelo): The Court did not find reversible error in the
appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 43674. The Court
affirmed the RTC's and the appellate court's separate rulings of
Edward's competence and better suited ability to act as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate.
Thereafter, Jose, Jr. persistently opposed Edward's actions as
administrator and his inventory of Jose, Sr.'s estate. He filed a
new motion upon which the court a quo ordered:
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 19
Considering oppositor's insistence on the submission by
regular administrator of a true and updated list as well as
current market values of all real estate and personal
properties of the decedent, the [c]ourt directed herein
oppositor [Jose, Jr.] to inform the regular administrator of
such data to aid the regular administrator in the preparation
of a complete and accurate inventory of the real and
personal properties comprising the estate of Jose, Sr.
As regards oppositor [Jose, Jr.'s] prayer for the submission
by regular administrator of a true and complete accounting
of the subject corporations reckoned from the death of
[Jose, Sr.] up to the present, the [c]ourt likewise sees no
need therefor as said corporations are not parties to the
case and have separate and distinct personalities from the
stockholders.
With respect to the project of partition, it appears that
regular administrator had already furnished oppositor
[Jose, Jr.] with a copy thereof. Considering however
oppositor [Jose, Jr.'s] oral motion for regular administrator
to identify the heirs of the decedent and to secure their
conformity to the project of partition, oppositor [Jose, Jr.] is
given ten (10) days from receipt of the project of partition
bearing the conformity of the heirs within to (sic) to
comment thereon. Thereafter, the parties are directed to
submit their project of partition for approval and
consideration of the [c]ourt.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
Edward filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that: Oppositor
[Jose, Jr.] now conforms to, and has accordingly signed, the
attached "Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P.
Marcelo, Sr. as of July 26, 2000" x x x. Regular Administrator
[Edward] respectfully prays that the Liquidation, duly signed by
all four (4) compulsory heirs, be approved as the project of
partition of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo Sr. and moved for the
approval of the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose,
Sr. as the project of partition of the Estate of Jose, Sr.
The RTC issued an Order approving the partition of Jose, Sr.'s
estate as proposed by Edward.
On 14 September 2001, the RTC archived the intestate
proceedings, S.P. Proc. No. Q-88-1448, pending Edward's
submission of proof of payment of estate taxes as directed in
the 16 February 2001 Order.
On 3 July 2009, Edward died. Jose, Jr. moved to revive the
intestate proceedings involving his father's estate, S.P. Proc.
No. Q-88-1448, and moved for his appointment as new regular
administrator thereof.
Petitioners MIMCO and heirs of Edward, joined by George,
opposed Jose, Jr.'s motion and nominated Atty. Henry Reyes
as regular administrator in Edward's stead.
The RTC issued the assailed Order, now appointing Jose, Jr. as
regular administrator of Jose, Sr.'s estate and ordered him to
give a bond in the amount of P200,000.00.
Petitioners appealed the RTC's Orders before the appellate
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Jose, Jr.'s appointment as
new regular administrator.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the appointment of a regular
administrator is unnecessary where there remains no pending
matter in the settlement of Jose, Sr.'s estate requiring attention
and administration. Specifically, petitioners point out that there
is no existing or unliquidated debt against the estate of Jose, Sr,
the settlement thereof being already at the liquidation, partition
and distribution stage. Further on that, the liquidation and
proposed partition had long been approved by the probate
court.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of a regular administrator is still
necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution stage of
the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.'s estate. YES
RULING: The settlement of Jose, Sr.'s estate is not yet through
and complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and
distribution stage.
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for the Distribution and
Partition of the Estate. The rule provides in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. x x x
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
xxxx
SEC. 3. By whom expenses of partition paid. If at the time of the
distribution the executor or administrator has retained sufficient
effects in his hands which may lawfully be applied for the
expenses of partition of the properties distributed, such
expenses of partition may be paid by such executor or
administrator when it appears equitable to the court and not
inconsistent with the intention of the testator; otherwise, they
shall be paid by the parties in proportion to their respective
shares or interest in the premises, and the apportionment shall
be settled and allowed by the court, and, if any person interested
in the partition does not pay his proportion or share, the court
may issue an execution in the name of the executor or
administrator against the party not paying for the sum assessed.
In this case, we observe that the Liquidation of the Inventory of
the Estate, approved by the RTC in its Order dated 16 February
2001, is not yet in effect and complete. We further note that
there has been no manifestation forthcoming from any of the
heirs, or the parties in this case, regarding the completion of the
proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In fact, as all
parties are definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate
proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.
For clarity, we refer to the Liquidation of the Inventory of the
Estate, which was divided into two (2) parts: (1) Settlement of
the Claims against the Estate, and (2) After Settlement of the
Claims, distribution of the remaining assets of the estate to the
four (4) compulsory heirs. The same document listed payables
and receivables of the estate.
There has been no showing from either of the parties that the
receivables of, and claims against, Jose, Sr.'s estate has been
actually liquidated, much less, if an offsetting occurred with the
companies listed in the inventory on one hand, and Jose, Sr.'s
estate, on the other. Although the Marcelo family, in particular
the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold equity in the corporations
mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations
are family owned by the Marcelos', these corporations are
different juridical persons with separate and distinct
personalities from the Marcelo patriarch, the decedent, Jose,
Sr.[18]
More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be
effected, the actual partition of the estate, where each heir
separately holds his share in the estate as that which already
belongs to him, remains intangible and the ultimate distribution
to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate
taxes.[19]
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 20
Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.'s
estate states that the valuation amount of the shares of stock as
listed therein is based on par value, which may have varied
given the passage of time. The same document delivers a very
important notation that the equal distribution of the listed assets
of the estate will depend on the actual selling price of these
assets less taxes and other deductions:
Above assets will be distributed equally by the four (4)
[compulsory heirs] depending if these will be sold or not. It is
very important to note that equal distribution will be based on
actual selling price minus taxes and other deduction if any, on
the above inventories of estate properties. [20]
To date, more than a decade has passed since the intestate
proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the
estate's assets.
From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate
proceedings involving Jose, Sr.'s estate still requires a regular
administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining
assets to the heirs of the decedent.
2.) Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the
general disqualification of those who wish to serve as
administrator:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of
(c) understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of
preference in instances when there is a contest of who should
be appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
spouse, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the surviving
spouse, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for the administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Consistent with Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, not
only is George the eldest son of Jose, Sr. and, therefore, his
most immediate kin, he has, moreover, been chosen by the rest
of the heirs of Jose, Sr. to perform the functions of an
administrator. In this regard, in addition to George and the heirs
of Edward, Helen executed an Affidavit to manifest her
opposition to Jose, Jr. and to support the appointment of George
and herself as joint administrators, a copy of which was given to
the [Court of Appeals.] we thus issue Letters of Administration
to George to facilitate and close the settlement of Jose, Sr.'s
estate.[28]
2.) [G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001]
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO,
and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra
were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322
square meters located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate on 09 February
1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement,
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged
an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property
with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several
lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share
alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered
under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land
area of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No.
107442 and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square
meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot[2] to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.[3]
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia
Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered
by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT
No. 186059[4] was issued in the latter’s name. On 07 October
1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title filed in
Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No.
107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
Sale dated 25 June 1987[6] in favor of herein petitioner
resulting. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was
legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under
the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano’s lifetime,
Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his
children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore
claim against Graciano’s estate or against herein petitioner’s
property.
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision holding that the deed
of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 21
Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property between them,
the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of
sale; that the deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of
the New Civil Code; Although the deed of sale cannot be
regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded
as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
lower court’s decision ratiocinating: it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of
the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction
when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. X X X Thus
the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance. What the court should have done was
merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted
for that purpose. X X X
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of
general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent
to any of the heirs? NO.
RULING:
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
X X X a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
XXX
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term special proceeding may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings,
no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.[9]
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person
such as advancement of property made by the decedent,
partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions
as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision[11] contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in
its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil
Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out
said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as
to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
Natcher.
At this point, the appellate courts disquisition is elucidating:
Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the
estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at
hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes
of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject
property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-
appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary
action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance.[12]
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo[13] and Mendoza vs.
Teh[14] that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a
mode of practice which may be waived. [15]
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein
private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the
decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in
its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of
advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated the long standing principle that although generally,
a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership,
yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership. [16]
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the
legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. [18] The net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the property owned
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 22

by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate
thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can
be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. [19]
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and
proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court
sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the
prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and
adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related
matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosarios
estate.
3. G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006
the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the
accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the
decedent’s estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated
under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While
petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt
and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain
expenses" including those related to her father’s final illness and
burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner
and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to
settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot
be done in an action for partition.

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner, In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure

vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must
FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or
FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents. before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a
bond conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations.
FACTS: Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion PETITION DENIED.
(now both deceased) had six children. In1955, Leandro
executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of
his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two 4. G.R. No. 169454 December 27, 2007
parcels of land in the name of "Leandro Figuracion, married to
THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA
Carolina Adviento". Lot 707 was sold by Leandro to a certain
AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO,Petitioners, vs.
Lazaro Adviento. What gave rise to the complaint for partition,
HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD
however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister,
ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO,
respondent Mary, over the other lot. Respondent Carolina
FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-
adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules
MANALO, Respondents.
of Court, the entire Lot sold to the Advientos, which she later
sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria.
FACTS: Spouses Doronio, now both deceased, were the
registered owners of a parcel of land. The spouses had children
In 1971, petitioner and her family went to the US where they
but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however,
stayed for ten years. Returning in 1981, she built a house made
that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both
on the half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share
deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case
of the realty taxes thereon. It was sometime later that this
are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio,
dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of
while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.
all properties held in common by her and respondents. In 1994
petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC for partition, annulment
In 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias was
of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
executed by spouses Doronio in favor of Petitioner and the
against respondents. On the other hand, respondents took the
latter’s wife, Veronica.
position that Leandro’s estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place.
It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is
And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to
the one covered by an OCT. However, there is a significant
the estate was necessary for such settlement.
discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent
property at the eastern side. Based on a certain OCT, the
The RTC dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance
adjacent owners are the Najordas, whereas based on the deed
and damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs
of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is the sps.
prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement
Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private
proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should
document as it was never notarized.
first be effected.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the

On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioner’s action for
property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation
partition for being premature.
because it stated that sps. Doronio instead of the Najordas, is
the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action of partition is appropriate in
Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated
this case?
the possession of sps. Doronio of the eastern half of the land.
They are the ones who have been possessing said land
HELD: NO. Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an
occupied by their predecessors, the sps. Doronio.
accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and profits) in
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 23
Eager to obtain the entire property, petitioners filed before the
RTC a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of
Donation". No respondents were named in the said petition.
During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the
petition.12 After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition
was eventually granted. This led to the registration of the deed
of donation, cancelling the OCT and issuance of a TCT under
their names.
The heirs of sps. Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the
form of a petition in the same Petition Case. The petition was
for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered
the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in
the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the
registration of the private deed of donation and that such be
cancelled. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners (defendants). CA
reversed the RTC decision, declaring the appellants as rightful
owners of one-half of the property now covered by the same
TCT. The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the
technical descriptions of the property. The appellees are hereby
directed to execute a registerable document conveying the
same to appellants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try and hear
the instant case.
HELD: No. An action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires
the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions
as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order
of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings."
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in
its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil
Case for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is
not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila
branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by
the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner
Natcher.
We likewise find merit in petitioners’ contention that before any
conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may
be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.
5. G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED MERCEDES CANO. FLORANTE C.
TIMBOL, administrator-appellee, vs. JOSE CANO, oppositor-
appellant.
FACTS: The intestate Mercedes Cano died leaving as her only
heir her son Timbol then only 11 years old. Respondent Cano,
brother of the intestate, was appointed administrator.
Respondent Cano, filed a petition, proposing that the
agricultural lands of the intestate be leased to the administrator
Respondent Cano for an annual rental of P4,000, this rental to
be used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of
land taxes and dues to the government which was approved by
the court. The court, upon motion of the administrator and the
conformity of the minor heir and his uncles, approved the
reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the
intestate leased to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and
the conversion of 30 hectares of the agricultural lands into a
subdivision.
Upon motion of the administrator, a project of partition was
approved, designating Timbol the sole and exclusive heir of all
the properties of the intestate. Timbol was appointed
administrator in place of Respondent Cano. He presented a
motion, which he modified in a subsequent one, alleging among
other things (a) that the area destined for the projected
subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9 hectares and
(b) that the plan submitted be approved. The motions were
approved but the approval was immediately thereafter set aside
to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee
Respondent Cano to formulate his objections to the motions.
Cano's objections are (1) that the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and would
deprive his tenants of their landholdings, and (b) that he is in
possession under express authority of the court, under a valid
contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily
upon a simple petition.
The court granted the motions of the administrator, overruling
the objections of Jose Cano, in the order now subject of appeal.
Appellant claims that the consideration of the motions of the
administrator is without due notice to him, who is lessee is a
violation of the Rules of Court. This objection lost its force when
the court, motu proprio set aside it first order of approval and
furnished copy of the motion to appellant and gave him all the
opportunity to present his objections thereto. Appellant also
argues that the court below, as a probate court, has no
jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his rights under the lease,
because these rights may be annulled or modified only by a
court of general jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not such court has no jurisdiction, as a
probate court, has no jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 24
rights under the lease, because these rights may be annulled or
modified only by a court of general jurisdiction.
HELD: NO. Appellant’s arguments are without merit. In
probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of
the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration
to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id.,
Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears
and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule
87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14);
authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate
(Rule 90, Sec. 2); directs the delivery of the estate to those
entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). It has been held that the court
acts as a trustee, and as such trustee, should jealously guard
the estate and see that it is wisely and economically
administered, not dissipated. (Tambunting vs. San Jose, G.R.
No. L-8152.)
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and
the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir.
Here, appellant Cano, who was the administrator at the time the
lease was granted, is null and void not only because it is
immoral but also because the lease by the administrator to
himself is prohibited by law.(See Arts. 1646 and 1491, Civil
Code of the Philippines). And in view of the declaration of the
court below that the lease is null and void, which declaration we
hereby affirm, it would seem proper for the administrator under
the direction of the court, to take steps to get back the lands
leased from the appellant herein, or so much thereof as is
needed in the course of administration. The court order
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
6. G.R. No. L-852 March 19, 1949
LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA, Plaintiffs-
Appellees, v.ISAAC BONILLA and SILVINA
ORDA�EZ, Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS: Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel
of land (homestead) as evidenced by an OCT (4905), consisting
of 7 hectares. That Casimiro Evangelista was married to
Leonida Mari plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 and during
their marriage and while living together as spouses they begot
two children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista all surnamed
Evangelista. Casimiro Evangelista died intestate on or about
1938 and his the property in litigation was acquired on January
23, 1935 as per OCT homestead patent.
Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro
Evangelista executed a declaration of heirship known. Said
Deogracias Evangelista sold the property in question to the
defendants spouses, Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordañez,
cancelling the OCT and issuance of TCT to spouses Bonilla.
The defendant did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother of
Deogracias Evangelista at the time when he bought the land as
Deogracias Evangelista was living with his grandfather, Matias
Evangelista and that Caridad Evangelista was living with her
mother Leonida Mari; Judge Catalino Buenaventura gave
judgment for plaintiff without costs. This is an appeal from that
judgment. The gravamen of appellants contention is good faith.
They cite three decisions one of which is Castillo vs. Valdez, 53
Phil., 120 wherein the court said:
“A purchaser for value who takes property upon the faith of the
certificate so issued acquires a good title. Any other conclusion
would be wholly inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the
Land Registration Law. Of course so long sa the property
remains in the hands of the person who has acquired title
irregularly he can be made to surrender the certificate to be
cancelled. But it is not so with an innocent purchaser for value.”
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant spouses have a right over the
said property which they purchased in good faith.
HELD: No. Appellants citation do not fit into the facts of the
present case. Good faith affords protection only to purchaser for
value from the registered owner. Deogracias Evangelista,
defendants grantor is not a registered owner. The land was and
still is registered in the name of Casimiro Evangelista. In no way
does the certificate of title state that Deogracias owned the land.
If as is probably the case defendants relied on the court order
adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate in the
distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court their
innocence avails them less as against the true owners of the
land. That was a summary settlement made on the faith and
strength of the distributes self-serving affidavit; section 4 of the
above-mentioned rule provides that, "If it shall appear at
anything within two year after the settlement and distribution of
an estate . . . that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or
other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the
court in the manner herein provided for purpose of satisfying
such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss
the adjudication and the rule under which it was made gave
them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril.
A judicial partition in probate proceeding does not bind the heir
who were not parties thereon. No partition judicial or
extrajudicial could add one iota or particle to the interest which
the partitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the
nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the
co-owner may convey to the other more than his own true right.
A judicial partition in probate proceeding is not final and
conclusive and not being of such definitive as to stop all mean
of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful
share such co-heir may still within the prescriptive period bring
an action for reivindicacion in the province where any of the real
property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspective of
public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of
the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of
prescription even after a partition judicial or extrajudicial has
been had."
7. G.R. NO. 165744 AUGUST 11, 2008
OSCAR REYES v. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, and RODRIGO REYES
FACTS: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes
(Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes (both deceased). Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar,
and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance
Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 25
their family. Although Pedros estate was judicially partitioned
among his heirs, no similar settlement and partition appear to
have been made with Anastacias estate, which included her
shareholdings in Zenith.
Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint against Oscar. The
complaint stated that it is a derivative suit initiated and filed by
the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes to obtain an accounting of
the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION which are now or formerly in the control,
custody, and/or possession of respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar] and to determine the shares of stock of deceased
spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and
fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar] for himself [and] which
were not collated and taken into account in the partition,
distribution, and/or settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouses, for which he should be ordered to account for all the
income from the time he took these shares of stock, and should
now deliver to his brothers and sisters their just and respective
shares.
Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or
Harassment Suit. He claimed that the complaint is a mere
nuisance or harassment suit and that it is not a bona
fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for
the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia that is
outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is not a bona
fide derivative suit but is in fact in the nature of a petition for
settlement of estate; hence, it is outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC acting as a special commercial court.
HELD: Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing his rights as
a co-heir and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks
to remedy is one suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his
successional rights) and not by the corporation nor by Rodrigo
as a shareholder on record.
More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo
clearly aims to accomplish through his allegations of illegal
acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacias
shareholdings without a prior settlement of her estate an
objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be
done. The RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court,
has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute the estate of
a deceased. A relevant provision Section 2 of Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court that contemplates properties of the
decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. It is
clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot
resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That
question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general
rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are
all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, the
probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
The present controversy is not one which may be classified as
an intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
special commercial court to resolve.
8. QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA v. LCN CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
G.R No. 174873, August 26, 2008
PETITIONER:QuashaAncheta Peña and Nolasco Law Office
for its own behalf and representing the heirs of Raymond
Triviere
RESPONDENT: LCN Construction Corporation
SUMMARY: Atty. Syquia and Quasha were appointed
administrators of the estate of the deceased Raymond Triviere.
They dutifuly discharged their obligations but have not been
paid for services they rendered for over a decade. They filed a
Motion for Payment in the trial court which the latter granted.
LCN, as the only remaning claimant of the estate, opposed the
same and on appeal to the appellate court, the former’s petition
was given partial merit in that the awards given to the heirs and
administrators were deleted. The SC held that the award in favor
of the heirs is already a distribution of the estate. However, it
awarded attorney’s fees to petitioner to be sourced from the
shares of the Triviere children upon final distribution of the
estate.
DOCTRINE:Section 2, Rule 82 provides in clear and
unequivocal terms the modes for replacing an administrator of
an estate upon the death of an administrator: Court may
remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.
Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal.x xx. When
an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act
with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person.
FACTS:
1. Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December
1987. On January 1988, proceedings for the
settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his
widow, Amy Triviere, before the Makati RTC. Atty.
Enrique Syquia and Atty. William Quasha of the
Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and
children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively
were appointed administrators of the estate of the
deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real
estate taxes, security services, and the preservation
and administration of the estate, as well as litigation
expenses.
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 26
2. In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed
before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their litigation
expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting
of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration, the RTC denied the Motion for
Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha. In 1996,
Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata
(Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as
the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to
help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6
September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed
another Motion for Payment,for their own behalf and
for their respective clients presenting certain
allegations1 the most important of which is that there
has been no payment of money from the estate for
more than 10 years already. As a consequence, they
moved that the amount of P1M be taken from the
estate funds to be divided among the parties (P450k
as share of the children, P200k as attorney’s fees,
P150k as share of the widow, and P200k for the
administrator).
3. LCN opposed the motion stating that the RTC had
already resolved the issue of payment of litigation
expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment
filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for
4. The appellate court modified the Order of the RTC by
deleting the awards of P450k and P150k in favor of the
children and widow of the deceased respectively. The
appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the
claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was
yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90, barred the
distribution of the residue of the estate. Petitioners,
though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner
children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not
a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus,
rendering Section 1, Rule 90 inapplicable.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the CA erred in ruling that the award in favor of
the heirs is already a distribution of the residue of the
estate — NO
2. WoN the CA erred in nullifying the award of attorney’s
fees in favor of the co-administrators – YES
RULING:Petition PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO:
1. Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether
or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate,
its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by
the following: [1] only part of the estate that is not
affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be
the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule
109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of
outstanding obligations of the estate (second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90). There is no showing
that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and
widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement
of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely
silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award
in a single sentence which stated that petitioner
children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years.
Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly
amounted to P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the
P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the
RTC should have been more prudent in approving the
advance distribution of the same.
2. Petitioners earlier invoked Dael v. Intermediate
Appellate Courtwhere the Court sustained an Order
granting partial distribution of an estate. However,
Daelis not even on all fours with the case at bar. No
similar determination on sufficiency of assets or
absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of
the late Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this
case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against
the estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value
of the entire estate. Furthermore, in Dael, the Court
actually cautioned that partial distribution of the
decedent's estate pending final termination of the
testate or intestate proceeding should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in
extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance
should not be countenanced. The reason for this rule
is that courts should guard with utmost zeal and
jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the
creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the
rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the
inheritance.
3. Petitioner Quasha Law Office asserts that it is not
within the purview of Section 7, Rule 85 since it is not
an appointed administrator of the estate.When Atty.
Quasha passed away in 1996, Atty. Syquia was left as
the sole administrator of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere. The person of Atty. Quasha was
distinct from that of petitioner Quasha Law Office; and
the appointment of Atty. Quasha as administrator of
the estate did not extend to his law office. Neither could
petitioner Quasha Law Office be deemed to have
substituted Atty. Quasha as administrator upon the
latter's death for the same would be in violation of the
rules on the appointment and substitution of estate
administrators, particularly, Section 2, Rule 82. Hence,
when Atty. Quasha died, petitioner Quasha Law Office
merely helped in the settlement of the estate as
counsel for the petitioner children of the late Raymond
Triviere.
4. The Court notes with disfavor the sudden change in
the theory by petitioner Quasha Law Office. Consistent
with discussions in the preceding paragraphs, Quasha
Law Office initially asserted itself as co-administrator
of the estate before the courts. The records do not
belie this fact. Petitioner Quasha Law Office later on
denied it was substituted in the place of Atty. Quasha
as administrator of the estate only upon filing a Motion
for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, and
then again before this Court. As a general rule, a party
cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. This rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions.In the interest of justice and within the
sound discretion of the appellate court, a party may
change his legal theory on appeal, only when the
factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory.
5. On the foregoing considerations, this Court finds it
necessary to exercise leniency on the rule against
changing of theory on appeal, consistent with the rules
of fair play and in the interest of justice. Petitioner
Quasha Law Office presented conflicting arguments
with respect to whether or not it was co-administrator
of the estate. Nothing in the records, however, reveals
that any one of the lawyers of Quasha Law Office was
indeed a substitute administrator for Atty. Quasha
upon his death.
6. The court has jurisdiction to appoint an administrator
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 27
of an estate by granting letters of administration to a
person not otherwise disqualified or incompetent to
serve as such, following the procedure laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78. Corollary thereto, Section 2, Rule
82 provides in clear and unequivocal terms the modes
for replacing an administrator of an estate upon the
death of an administrator. The records of the case are
wanting in evidence that Quasha Law Office or any of
its lawyers substituted Atty. Quasha as co-
administrator of the estate. None of the documents
attached pertain to the issuance of letters of
administration to petitioner Quasha Law Office or any
of its lawyers at any time after the demise of Atty.
Quasha in 1996. This Court is thus inclined to give
credence to petitioner's contention that while it
rendered legal services for the settlement of the estate
of Raymond Triviere since the time of Atty. Quasha's
death in 1996, it did not serve as co-administrator
thereof, granting that it was never even issued letters
of administration. However, while petitioner Quasha
Law Office, serving as counsel of the Triviere children
from the time of death of Atty. Quasha in 1996, is
entitled to attorney's fees and litigation expenses of
P100,000.00 as prayed for in the Motion for Payment
dated 3 September 2002, and as awarded by the RTC
in its 12 June 2003 Order, the same may be collected
from the shares of the Triviere children, upon final
distribution of the estate, in consideration of the fact
that the Quasha Law Office, indeed, served as counsel
(not anymore as co-administrator), representing and
performing legal services for the Triviere children in
the settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
9. RICARDO C. SILVERIO v. RICARDO S. SILVERIO, GR
Nos. 208828-29, 2014-08-13
FACTS:
The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will on
October 7, 1987. She was survived by her legal heirs,
namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S.
Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio,
Jr. (son), Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio
(daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP
PROC. NO.M-2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed
by SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different
petitions and appeal challenging several orders of the intestate
court that went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-G.R.
SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S. SILVERIO
JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order of the intestate court
dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO SILVERIO SR.
("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the... estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO
SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation
dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D.
SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by
EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court... and in his
stead, SILVERIO SR. was appointed as the new administrator.
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and
appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR.
and SILVERIO JR.
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and
LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO, JR.
based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the written
consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE GUANLAO,...
JR. to continue hearing the case considering that he appeared
once as counsel in the intestate proceedings; (2) JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in favor of
SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue several motions
and even issued a TRO in violation of the... rules against
forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYA's Petition for Support and
Release of Funds for Medical Support has not been resolved;
and (4) It is in the best interest of all the heirs that the
proceedings be presided and decided by the cold neutrality of
an impartial... judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order
denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October
2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate.
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16 October
2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property located at No.
3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. CITRINE became the
registered owner thereof on 06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of
Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for
the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-
2011000050 was issued to Monica P. Ocampo. The... latter
subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
(ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11
February 2011 under its name.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
DucesTecum) praying among others, that a
TRO be issued restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR.,
MONICA OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To reinstate
the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2236121 in the name of Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. and the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio.
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 28
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order
granting a Temporary Restraining Order
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA
questioned the following issuances of the intestate court: CA-
G.R. SP No. 121172 Order dated June 16, 2011 reinstating
Silverio, Sr. as
Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No. 121173 (1) Order dated
March 23, 2011 granting Silverio, Sr.'s application for
preliminary injunction enjoining Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting
on their behalf from committing any act that would affect the
titles to the subject... properties and enjoining the Register of
Deeds of Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any way giving due course to
whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents involving
the Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March
23, 2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.'s motion or disqualification
and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated
June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary
injunction); and in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated August 18, 2011
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative
titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and
void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the fallo of
which reads:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172 is DENIED for lack
of merit.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173 is partly DENIED
for lack of merit insofar as it questions the 23 March 2011
Order denying RICARDO SILVERIO, JR's Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao,
Jr.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024 is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order declaring
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all
derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null
and void is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Issues:
the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of
the Intsia and Cambridge properties upon the ground that the
intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited
jurisdiction only and which does not include resolving... issues
of ownership. It is asserted that the CA should not have
stopped there and looked into the nature of the properties sold,
which formed part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. and Beatriz S. Silverio.
Ruling:
the probate court having jurisdiction over properties under
administration has the authority not only to approve any
disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an unauthorized
sale by the prospective heirs or administrator.
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by
respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the intestate
court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31,
2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the
said court on motion by... petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court's order annulling the sale of the
subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is anchored
on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 was still... in effect. It then concluded that
the eventual decision in the latter case making the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the
appointment of petitioner as administrator and not to the grant
of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was...
executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction were in effect.
The CA's ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is:
Whether the authority to sell the properties in question granted
under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was nullified by
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97196. A look at the... dispositive portion of the decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to reasonably conclude
that the grant of authority to sell is still good and valid.
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court
in so far as it authorizes the sale of the three properties in
question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division as null and void.
the injunction order which was made permanent by the Court
of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only
to the portion of the Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of
letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the... removal
of SILVERIO, SR. as administrator and nothing else.
when the... preliminary injunction was issued on 23 March
2011 new titles over the disputed properties were already
issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES
INC.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as
Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by NeliaSilverio-
Dee), we agree with the CA that the permanent injunction
issued under the said decision,... as explicitly stated in its fallo,
pertained only to the portions of the October 31, 2006
Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration
to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent
Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set...
aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing
the sale of the subject properties. Moreover, the CA Decision
attained finality only on February 11, 2011 when this Court
denied with finality respondent Silverio, Jr.'s motion for
reconsideration of the
February 11, 2009 Resolution denying his petition for review
(G.R. No. 185619).
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18, 2011
Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the subject
properties grounded solely on the injunction issued in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2
should not be prejudiced by the... flip-flopping appointment of
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 29
Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith
that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31,
2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it...
allowed the aforesaid sale.
10. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ vs. DIANA
JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L.
TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
Doctrine:
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of
pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the
law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease
in the pages.
Facts:
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B.
Lopez (Lopez), and their four legitimate children, namely,
petitioner Richard, Diana, Marybeth and Victoria as compulsory
heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and
Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.
Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will
and Testament before the RTC with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition
contending that the purported last will and testament was not
executed and attested as required by law, and that it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of Richard. Victoria also adopted the said opposition.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional
requirements, Richard presented the attesting witnesses,
namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria
Lourdes Manalo (Manalo); and the notary public who notarized
the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The instrumental
witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed
the will on each and every page, they also read and signed the
same in the latter's presence and of one another. Photographs
of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo
further testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts
and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was
made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client
for more than 20 years. The latter consulted him in the
preparation of the subject will and furnished him the list of his
properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the
will in accordance with Enrique's instruction and that before the
latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence of
one another, he translated the will, which was written in English
to Filipino and added that Enrique was in good health and of
sound mind at that time.
RTC: disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with
Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the
attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the
will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code
requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in
Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages
is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde
or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment
portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page
on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the
RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not
having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
CA: found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the
RTC that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in
the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of
the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the
formal requirements set forth in Article 805 thereof, there was a
total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages
including the acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the
presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision to disallow
the probate of will.
Held:
The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly,
Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil Code provide:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence,
and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the
left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the
will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of Article 805.
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 30
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in
the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this
respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial
compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by
mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation
of evidence aliunde.
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures
appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.
11. SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA,
DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA, ROSARIO DIVINAGRACIA and
JUANITA DIVINAGRACIA
vs.
HON. JUDGE VALERIO V. ROVIRA
G.R. No. L-42615 August 10, 1976
FACTS: Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1,
1964. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their four
daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. The
notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and in
the Manila times. Two days after his death, a petition was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his
estate The order setting the petition for hearing was published.
Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22, 1964.
She administered the estate for seven years. She paid the
estate and inheritance taxes. In April, 1971 she submitted to the
court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer for
the closure of the proceeding. Judge Castrense C. Veloso in his
order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and project
of partition and declared the proceeding "closed and terminated,
subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the
outstanding obligations of the estate". The partition was duly
registered.
On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate
proceeding had become final,CamiloDivinagracia filed a motion
to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged that
he was an illegitimate child of the decedent; that he was born
on November 9, 1930, and that he came to know of the intestate
proceeding only when he was transferred as a government
employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. He
prayed for the determination of his share in the decedent's
estate.
The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended
that the proceeding could no longer be reopened; that its
expediente had already been archived; that there is no
allegation in the motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged
by the decedent. The motion remained unresolved for more
than four years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired
in the early part of 1975. The case was re-raffled to respondent
Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned order dated
October 18, 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding.
The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it
assumed that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and
SaludBretaña that there was no declaration of heirs, and that an
interested party, who was left out in the partition, should be
allowed to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the
proper motion within the reglementary period.
ISSUE: W/N an intestate proceeding, which had already been
closed, can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to
present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the
decedent's estate.
RULING: The probate court erred in reopening the intestate
proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which CamiloDivinagracia is
deemed to have had constructive notice. The order closing it
was already final and executory. The motion to reopen it was
not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted from
the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix.
The closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover,
the order for the reopening of the intestate proceeding was
predicated on the false assumption that there had been no
liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of
heirs. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution,
with final accounting, which was submitted by the administratrix
and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership and a statement as to who were the
decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary
shares.
The probate court further erred in entertaining
CamiloDivinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate proceeding.
It erred because that motion involved the determination of his
status as the decedent's spurious child. That question falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. The rule prohibiting the
splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) is
not violated by the holding that the action to establish plaintiff's
filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the action of
the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary
share in his putative father's estate, which is cognizable by the
Court of First Instance.
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other
than natural children, commonly known as bastards include
adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married
woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married woman cohabiting with a woman other than his wife.
They are entitled to support and successional rights (Art. 287,
Civil Code). But their filiation must be duly proven (Ibid, Art. 887).
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 31
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the
spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of
the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition. In the
instant case, CamiloDivinagracia did not disclose whether he
has any evidence of voluntary recognition of his filiation. There
is no allegation in his motion that would sustain his claim for
compulsory acknowledgment of his filiation.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the probate court's order
of October 18, 1975, reopening the intestate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Feliciano Divinagracia, is set aside.
12. JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs. JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO
LOPEZ
FACTS:
Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y
Siongco. They had no children.llOn April 28, 1936, Jacinta
executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir
and executor. On October 26, 1953, herein petitioner Juanita
Lopez, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was
declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses
Jacinta and Alejandro. After adopting legally herein petitioner
Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute
another will or codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of
her heirs. In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate
Proceedings No. 1426, the will was admitted to probate and the
surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed
executor without bond by the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. Neverthless, both Alejandro and Juanita executed
a project partition, approved by the lower court on April 23, 1960
and directed that the records of the case be sent to the archives,
upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes
On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a
separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of
partition, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and
pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a
statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately
to Juanita the lots allocated to her. Meanwhile, in the Testate
Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying
that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual
possession of said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed
the separate petition alleging the testate proceedings had
already been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as
a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the
deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and
negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4
years after such closure of the estate. The parties have agreed
to suspend action or resolution upon the said petition for the
delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has
been finally settled and decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on
the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend
resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after
the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been
finally settled and decided. Hence this petition for certiorari and
mandamus.
ISSUE:
WON the project partition approved by the TC “ ordering it
closed and terminated” terminated the Probate proceeding.
RULING:
No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by
itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long
as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong vs. Tecson, ); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent
the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period has not elapsed. The better practice, for the
heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate
on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule
90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as, which secures for
the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession", re-states the
doctrines. In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for
the delivery of her share was filed on July 20, 1964, which is just
more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended
project of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23,
1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly,
her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project
of partition had not yet expired. The position of Juanita should
be sustained and the writs prayed for granted.
13. Heirs of Late Jesus Fran vs. Hon. Bernardo Salas GR
NO. L-53546
Case Doctrine:
The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a
jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Sec 1 Rule 76
which allows the filing of a petition for probate by persons
named therein, regardless of whether or not he is in possession
of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed.
FACTS:
Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor
ascendants. She left real and personal properties wherein she
bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario
Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Jesus
Fran filed a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and
testament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not
physically well. The court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as
special administrator.
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 32
Private respondents, filed a manifestation alleging that they
needed time to study the petition. However, private respondents
did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein
they expressly manifested that they have no objection to the will.
The petition thus became uncontested.
During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the
requisite evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts. The
probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will
of the testatrix and appointing petitioner Fran as executor.
Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions
made in the will and signed by all the devisees and legatees
was submitted, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C.
Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina. Said legatees
and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt
of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of
hearing. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court
ordered the administrator to deliver to the said parties their
respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed.
Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge,
was transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII.
(so napalitan yung judge na humahawak ng case then yung
private respondents biglang naisipang kontrahin yung unang
decision ng court—oppose to the allowance of the will)
Private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment and asked
the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their
opposition to the allowance of the will.
Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge
issued an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Omnibus and to Reconsider the 26 February 1980 Order
setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, but the respondent Judge
denied it for lack of merit
Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to
restrain respondent Judge from reopening the case.
Respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the
testamentary dispositions of the will void, and converting the
same into an intestate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that the original copy of the will
be presented for the court to acquire jurisdiction for the
allowance of the will.
CLAIM/S OF PETITIONER:
(a) private respondents are in estoppel to question the will
because they filed their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The
Allowance of Will which states that they have no objection
to its allowance;
(b) private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the
Project of Partition and private respondent Concepcion M.
Espina submitted a certification stating therein that she
received the notice of hearing therefor and has no
objection to its approval;
(c) the probate judgment and the order approving the Project
of Partition had long become final and had in fact been
executed. Private respondents had long lost their right to
appeal.
CLAIM/S OF RESPONDENT:
(a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will;
(b) they were not notified of any resolution or order closing the
proceedings;
(c) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will
as petitioner Jesus Fran did not attach it to the petition; what
was attached was only the English translation of the will.
RULING:
Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the conversion of the
testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the
petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate
(sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state that they have no
objection to the allowance of the will.
In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project
of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and
is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings.
private respondents claim that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the petition because only the English translation
of the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the
petition;
the Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original
of the will be attached to the petition. "The original of said
document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons
given to justify the nonpresentation of said original and the
acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof."
The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a
jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76
of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for
probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or
not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or
destroyed.
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is
lost or destroyed.
private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief
from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 33
reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months
and twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and
six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court
issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they
voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective
certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.
private respondents' contention that the order approving the
Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void
because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of
hearing and that they were not notified of the hearing thereon.
In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5 September 1973,
private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she
"received a copy of the Project of Partition and the Notice of
Hearing in the above-entitled proceeding, and that she has no
objection to the approval of the said Project of Partition."
the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED.
14. Solivio versus Court of Appeals
182 SCRA 119
February 12, 1990
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. He died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are his two aunts namely; Petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the sister of his mother Salustia Solivio and
Private respondent Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father. Salustia Solivio brought to her marriage
paraphernal properties which she had inherited from her mother
but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived
marriage to Esteban Sr. On October 11, 1959, Salustia died,
leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had expressed to his
aunt Celedonia his plan to place his estate in a foundation in
honor of his mother. Unfortunately, he died sooner without
having set up the foundation. Two weeks after his funeral,
Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom
his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take
care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation. Celedonia then filed a special proceeding for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Thereafter,
she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. Four months later after the court’s pronouncement,
Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision because she too was an heir of
the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by
the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial,
Concordia filed for partition, recovery of possession, ownership
and damages. The trial court ruled in favour of Concordia and
ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the
estate. Celedonia filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the trial court. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the decedent's properties were
subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side
from whom he had inherited them
2.) Whether or not private respondent may recover her
share of the estate after she had agreed to place the
same in the foundation
Ruling:
1.) Article 891 of the NCC provides for the reserva troncal
provision which reads that:
“The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came.”
No. Based from the foregoing provision, the reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from
a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by
a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the
situation covered by Article 891. In the case at bar, the
property of the deceased is not a reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of
his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his
inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt,
Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree
on his mother's side. Since the deceased, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, Articles 1003 and 1009 of the NCC
should apply in the distribution of his estate.
2.) No. Private Respondent Concordia had agreed to deliver
the estate of the deceased to the foundation, an agreement
which she ratified and confirmed during the court
proceedings. She is thereby bound by that agreement. It is
true that by virtue of the agreement, she did not waive her
inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to
place all of Esteban's estate in the foundation which
Esteban, Jr. This was taken by the Court as an admission.
Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence
need be presented to prove the agreement. Having agreed
to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
 R U L E 8 8 t o R U L E 9 0 – C A S E D I G E S T | 34

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
15. NUÑAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 94005
6, 1993
her In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
872 has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the
trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any
April modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion
of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.

FACTS: The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit

Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then against the parties in Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial court) rendered its her share in the subject property, in order that all the parties in
judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the interest can prove their respective claims.
partition of the property of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary
Ekstrom Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in July 1982 then remanded to the lower court
and two years later, a writ of execution was issued by the latter.

On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank
C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed
a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary
injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to
the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and
participation over the land should not be affected by a judgment
in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable
insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is
concerned, said share not having been brought within the
Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She further invokes Section 12,
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order

directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a
share in the partition of the property

The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the

decision of the lower court whether or not the trial court may
order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir entitled to
participate in the partition of the property considering that she
was neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case
No. 872 for partition and accounting of the aforesaid property
and that the decision rendered in said case has long become
final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an
excluded heir to a final and executory judgment of partition is a
motion to quash said judgment?

HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court said that when a final
judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The
only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors
or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is
void."

Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially

affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose."