19-02-23 Qualcomm Position Statement

Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 884-2 Filed 02/23/19 PageID.
99517 Page 1 of 15
Exhibit B
Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 884-2 Filed 02/23/19 PageID.99518 Page 2 of 15
1 Evan R. Chesler (N.Y. Bar No. 1475722) (pro hac vice)

echesler@cravath.com
2 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
825 Eighth Avenue
3 New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (212) 474-1000
4 Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
5 David A. Nelson (Ill. Bar No. 6209623) (pro hac vice)
davenelson@quinnemanuel.com
6 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
500 West Madison St., Suite 2450
7 Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 705-7400
8 Facsimile: (312) 705-7401
9 Karen P. Hewitt (SBN 145309)
kphewitt@jonesday.com
10 JONES DAY
4655 Executive Drive, Suite 1500
11 San Diego, California 92121
Telephone: (858) 314-1200
12 Facsimile: (858) 345-3178
13 [Additional counsel identified on signature page]
14 Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim-Plaintiff
QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
15
16 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
17 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
18
IN RE: QUALCOMM LITIGATION No. 3:17-CV-0108-GPC-MDD
19
20 EXHIBIT B: QUALCOMM
INCORPORATED’S POSITION
21 REGARDING THE PARTIES’
PROPOSED JURY
22 INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT
FORMS
23
Judge: Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
24 Courtroom: 2D
Date: March 28, 2019
25
Time: 1:30 p.m.
26
27
28
EXHIBIT B: QUALCOMM’S POSITION CASE NO. 3:17-CV-0108-GPC-MDD

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c) and Local

2 Rule 51.1(c), Qualcomm Inc. (“Qualcomm”) respectfully submits its position
3 regarding Apple Inc. and the Contract Manufacturers’ (collectively, “Apple”)
4 Proposed Jury Instructions and Verdict Form.
5 Jury instructions and verdict forms should “direct and assist the jury
6 toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues”. United
7 States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wright, J., concurring)
8 (quotation marks omitted). They should not make this complex case any more
9 complex than necessary. Qualcomm has attempted to achieve these goals by
10 drafting proposals that provide a clear, fair and accurate reflection of the law as
11 provided in the various model instructions, concern only those issues that the
12 jury actually needs to resolve, and provide simple context where necessary.
13 By contrast, a number of Apple’s proposals are confusing, argumentative
14 and incorrect or misleading about the law. Apple’s proposals also are far too
15 long to be helpful to the jury. It simply does not require more than 200 pages 1
16 properly to instruct the jury in this case.
17 The most significant defects with Apple’s proposals are summarized
18 below. Exhibits F and H detail Qualcomm’s specific objections to disputed
19 instructions and verdict form questions, respectively. Exhibits G and I are
20 Qualcomm’s proposed instructions and verdict form questions, respectively.
21 Qualcomm respectfully requests that the Court adopt its proposed jury
22 instructions and verdict form in their entirety.
23 I. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT QUALCOMM’S PROPOSED
24 JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
25 Qualcomm’s proposed instructions are clear, fair and tailored to the
26 issues that the jury actually needs to resolve. Qualcomm’s proposed
27
1
Not including certain Qualcomm claims and defenses that Apple improperly
28 omitted from its proposed instructions (and excluding Qualcomm’s interposed
objections).
EXHIBIT B: QUALCOMM’S POSITION -1- CASE NO. 3:17-CV-0108-GPC-MDD
1 instructions are based largely on the Judicial Council of California Instructions

2 (“CACI”), Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions (“Ninth Circuit
3 Instructions”), the American Bar Association Model Jury Instructions in Civil
4 Antitrust Cases (“ABA Instructions”) and precedents from this Court. In many
5 instances, Qualcomm modified the model instructions only to replace terms like
6 “Plaintiff” and “Defendant” with the names of the parties. Qualcomm’s limited
7 other modifications are warranted by the specific claims and facts of the case
8 and are amply supported by the case law, which Qualcomm cites with each
9 proposed instruction. Exhibit E provides a comparison of Qualcomm’s
10 proposed jury instructions with the Model Jury Instructions referenced above
11 (where a model instruction was used).
12 Apple’s proposed instructions are fundamentally flawed for numerous
13 reasons, as detailed in Exhibit F. The most pervasive defects with Apple’s
14 proposal are summarized below.
15 First, Apple’s proposed instructions address issues that the parties agree
16 are ultimately for the Court to decide. Apple proposes 20 instructions that
17 would be used only if the Court empanels an advisory jury. 2 For example,
18 Apple proposes instructions regarding whether certain contracts are
19 unenforceable as against public policy and whether the BCPA contains an
20 unlawful liquidated damages provision under Cal. Civ. Code § 1671(b).
21 (See Ex. F, Apple’s Proposed Instructions Nos. 93-96, 98.) Those issues
22 indisputably are for the Court to decide, and submission of such purely legal
23 issues to the jury (even in an advisory capacity) would be inappropriate in this
24 already complex case. See Erhart v. BofI Holding, Inc., No. 15-cv-02287-BAS-
25 NLS, 2017 WL 588390, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (court decides whether
26
2
27 As set forth in Exhibit F, Qualcomm objects to Apple Proposed Instructions
Nos. 38, 48, 49, 50, 51, 64, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 109, 111, 112, 113, 115, 119,
28 120 and 123 on this basis.
1 contract unenforceable as against public policy); Morris v. Redwood Empire

2 Bancorp, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (whether provision
3 constitutes unlawful penalty under § 1671 is for the court)).3
4 As Qualcomm will explain in connection with Apple’s forthcoming
5 Rule 39 motion, Apple’s proposed advisory instructions underscore why an
6 advisory jury would be unwise here. The jury already faces a substantial task in
7 resolving the dozens of claims and defenses that undisputedly require jury
8 resolution. The jury should not be further burdened by being asked to consider
9 numerous additional claims and defenses, which the Court will ultimately need
10 to decide anyway. See Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 267 F.R.D.
11 338, 339 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (refusing to empanel advisory jury where it would
12 add “unnecessary expense, time and complexity to [the] case”); (see also
13 Nov. 30, 2018 Pretrial Conference Hr’g Tr. at 7:2-4 (ECF No. 742) (noting that
14 “jurors sacrifice their time and their effort” and parties should avoid “wasting
15 their time”); Nov. 27, 2018 Final Pretrial Conference Order (“PTO”) at 1
16 (Apple recognizing that Court “must ultimately decide” any claims or defenses
17 submitted to an advisory jury)). 4
18 Second, Apple proposes wholly improper instructions. For example,
19 Apple proposes instructions regarding issues such as expert methodology and
20 royalty stacking. 5 Exhibit F explains why these and many of Apple’s other
21 proposed instructions are improper or inapplicable here and should not be
22 given. See Nationwide Transport Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys. Inc., 523 F.3d 1051,
23 3
The parties also dispute whether certain claims or defenses are triable as of
24 right
4
by the jury.
Qualcomm proposed that the parties agree not to submit “advisory jury”
25 instructions unless and until Apple files a motion for an advisory jury and the
Court rules on it. Apple refused. If Apple files its motion and the Court
26 decides to empanel an advisory jury, then Qualcomm respectfully requests an
opportunity
5
to submit proposed instructions on these issues at that time.
27 In addition, several of Apple’s proposed instructions relate to purported
defenses or remedies that Apple waived by not pleading and/or not asserting
28 them in the PTO. (See infra pp. 9-10.)
1 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2008) (Although the “instructions . . . may have been correct
2 statements of the law”, the “legal theory was erroneous, [so] the proposed jury
3 instructions were irrelevant”); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d
4 1201, 1234-35 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[I]n all cases, a district court must instruct the
5 jury only on factors that are relevant to the specific case at issue.”).
6 Third, Apple cherry picks instructions on certain critical issues. For
7 example, although Apple recognizes that the CMs must prove the alleged tying
8 arrangement “foreclosed a ‘substantial volume of commerce’”, it includes only
9 part of the model instruction explaining what this element requires, omitting the
10 portion of the model instruction that explains that the CMs must prove a
11 substantial adverse effect on competition in the market for the alleged tied
12 product. See, e.g., Blough v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th
13 Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the inquiry is ‘whether a total amount of business,
14 substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis,
15 is foreclosed to competitors by the tie’.” (quoting Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S.
16 Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969) (emphasis added)); Spindler v. Johnson
17 & Johnson Corp., No. C 10-01414 JSW, 2011 WL 13278876, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
18 Jan. 21, 2011) (effect on “substantial volume of commerce” element requires
19 showing of “pernicious effect on competition”); (Ex. F, Objections to Apple’s
20 Proposed Instructions No. 23; Ex. D, Objections to Apple’s Proposed
21 Instructions (Redline) No. 23).
22 Fourth, Apple’s proposed instructions contain argumentative and
23 inflammatory language. For example, Apple’s proposed instruction for the
24 elements of a breach of FRAND claim repeats the CMs’ argument that
25 “Qualcomm breached their FRAND commitment by refusing to negotiate
26 material terms of the SULAs with the CMs”. (See Ex. F, Apple’s Proposed
27 Instructions No. 62.) Elsewhere, Apple’s proposed instructions argue that
28
1 “Qualcomm declined Apple’s request to license Qualcomm’s SEPs” and

2 Qualcomm “demanded” a royalty. (Id. at No. 69.) One-sided advocacy has no
3 place in jury instructions. See United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1485 (9th
4 Cir. 1995) (court should deny “unduly argumentative” instructions); Alamo v.
5 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 219 Cal. App. 4th 466, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)
6 (same). Nor should the instructions recite facts that favor either side.
7 See Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 201-02 (8th Cir. 1981) (“An
8 instruction is argumentative if it does not include all the elements of the
9 doctrine, or singles out the testimony of one witness while disregarding other
10 relevant evidence, or unduly highlights certain features of a case.” (citations
11 omitted)).
12 Fifth, Apple’s and the CM’s proposed instructions are structured in a way
13 that is confusing and unfairly prejudicial to Qualcomm. The substantive
14 portion of their proposal begins with an extensive tour of Sections 1 and 2 of
15 the Sherman Act, the Cartwright Act and the California Unfair Competition
16 Act, followed by several incorrect and/or improper instructions concerning
17 FRAND and patent concepts. Only after 119 pages of that material does Apple
18 propose to address the contracts among Qualcomm, Apple and the CMs that are
19 at the center of this case.
20 This sequence is unnecessarily difficult and confusing for the jury. The
21 logical way to consider this case is to examine FRAND, the SULAs and other
22 contractual arrangements first. Those agreements form the backbone of the
23 relationship among Apple, the CMs and Qualcomm. Anyone trying to
24 understand this case should start with the contracts. The parties have various
25 disputes arising from the contracts, each of which is relatively discrete and
26 manageable, and each of them has its place as a constituent part of the
27 overarching competition law claims under the Sherman Act and the Cartwright
28
1 Act. Once the contractual disputes have been addressed, jurors can more
2 readily understand the competition law claims, which in essence seek to
3 challenge Qualcomm’s patent license agreements and other contractual
4 arrangements.
5 The parties’ pleadings confirm that this is the logical way to view the
6 case. The first several counts in Apple’s complaint are for breach of contract
7 and other contract-related issues. The competition law claims do not appear
8 until the very end of the document—Counts LXII and LXIII. The “Factual
9 Allegations” section proceeds in the same fashion, beginning with Apple’s
10 products, followed by FRAND and Qualcomm’s licenses and other contracts
11 before eventually moving on to allegations of foreclosure of competition 150
12 paragraphs later. The CMs’ pleadings are similar. Indeed, they assert
13 competition law violations as defenses to Qualcomm’s breach of contract
14 claims (Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Affirmative Defenses), further
15 confirming that the contract claims logically precede the competition law
16 claims.
17 Moreover, the sequence proposed by Apple and the CMs is unfairly
18 prejudicial to Qualcomm in two distinct ways. First, Qualcomm is a plaintiff in
19 this case just as Apple and the CMs are, with vitally important breach of
20 contract claims. Yet the instructions proposed by Apple and the CMs do not
21 address Qualcomm’s contract claims until two-thirds of the way through the
22 document, slanting the instructions in favor of Apple and the CMs and giving
23 the jury the misleading impression that Apple’s and the CMs’ antitrust claims
24 take primacy over anything else. See Howard v. Cincinnati Sheet Metal &
25 Roofing Co., 234 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1956) (remanding for new trial where
26 “the instructions as a whole unduly emphasized [one party’s] version of the
27 case”).
28
1 Second, aside from their sheer bulk, the structure of Apple’s and the
2 CMs’ proposal has the effect of drowning Qualcomm’s claims in a sea of Apple
3 instructions. Qualcomm’s claims are scattered among Apple’s and the CM’s
4 claims and defenses, out of order, like oh-I-almost-forgot, offhand comments.
5 In fact, Qualcomm’s claims are so submerged that they are hard to find even if
6 one is looking for them. 6 They simply disappear among the claims and
7 defenses of Apple and the CMs. This unfairly slants the instructions in favor of
8 Apple and the CMs and prejudices Qualcomm.
9 What is more, some of Qualcomm’s claims and defenses do not appear at
10 all. Although Apple and the CMs took pains to provide a meticulous
11 accounting of each of their affirmative defenses—including defenses that
12 ultimately are for the Court, not the jury, to decide, and new defenses not in any
13 pleading7—Apple and the CMs failed to do the same for Qualcomm. The vast
14 majority of Qualcomm’s affirmative defenses have simply been omitted, even
15 though the same affirmative defenses have been included in response to the
16 same or similar claims asserted against Apple and the CMs.8 To give just one
17 example, Apple’s defenses to Qualcomm’s claims for breach of the BCPA are
18 set forth in Apple/CM Instruction 88, and include such defenses as laches and
19 estoppel (both of which are for the Court to decide). But the next instruction,
20 Instruction 89, which supposedly sets forth Qualcomm’s defenses to the
21 Apple’s BCPA claims, makes no mention of laches or estoppel, even though
22
6
23 7
They are in Instructions 67, 69, 83, 100 and 103.
(See, e.g., Ex. F, Apple’s Proposed Instructions No. 121 (“Violation of SSO
24 IPR8
Policy”.)
Apple’s and the CMs’ proposal includes 9 instructions listing 61 affirmative
25 defenses Apple and the CMs have purportedly asserted in response to
Qualcomm’s claims. Those are Instructions 68, 70, 88, 90, 91, 92, 102, 104 and
26 105. By contrast, Apple’s and the CMs’ proposal includes 2 instructions
identifying just 4 affirmative defenses asserted by Qualcomm—Instruction 47,
27 which describes the defense of antitrust mitigation, and Instruction 89, which
lists three of Qualcomm’s affirmative defenses to Apple’s claim for breach of
28 the BCPA.
Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 884-2 Filed 02/23/19 PageID.99526 Page 10 of
15
1 Qualcomm also asserted both defenses.9 And Qualcomm Counts III and IX
2 against Apple, as well as Qualcomm Count IX against the CMs, also do not
3 appear anywhere in Apple’s and the CMs’ proposal. As a result of these
4 omissions, Apple’s and the CMs’ proposal is not only improper, it actually
5 understates the length of the approach they have taken. The Court should reject
6 Apple’s and the CMs’ one-sided approach and adopt Qualcomm’s proposed
7 instructions.
8 II. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT QUALCOMM’S PROPOSED
9 VERDICT FORM.
10 Like Qualcomm’s proposed jury instructions, Qualcomm’s 24-question
11 proposed verdict form is limited to issues that the jury must decide, avoids
12 unnecessary repetition and confusion, correctly reflects the law, and does not
13 engage in improper advocacy. Apple’s prolix proposed verdict form (62
14 questions), by contrast, repeats many of the same defects that pervade Apple’s
15 proposed instructions. Qualcomm’s specific objections to each disputed verdict
16 form question are set forth in Exhibit H. The most serious defects with Apple’s
17 proposed form are summarized below.
18 First, Apple proposes 33 questions (over one-half of Apple’s total
19 proposed questions) that are not for the jury and would be used only if the Court
20 empanels an advisory jury. 10 (See, e.g., Ex. H, Apple’s Proposed Question
21 No. 48 (whether BCPA contains unlawful liquidated damages provision
22 pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1671(b)); Morris, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 1314
23 (whether provision constitutes unlawful penalty under § 1671 is for court).) 11
24 9
Although Qualcomm agrees that such defenses should not be submitted to
25 the jury at all, Qualcomm objects, of course, to any approach that would submit
Apple’s defenses to the jury but not Qualcomm’s.
10
26 As set forth in Exhibit H, Qualcomm objects to Apple Proposed Question
Nos. 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34,
27 35,
11
37, 40, 43, 46, 48, 49, 51, 54, 57, 61 and 62 on this basis.
Apple does not dispute that these issues would be relevant only if an advisory
28 jury is empaneled.
15
1 The Court should disregard these questions unless and until it decides to use an
2 advisory jury (which, as explained above, it should not do).12
3 Second, Apple proposes 21 questions about affirmative defenses (with
4 most questions addressing numerous separate defenses).13 These questions are
5 unnecessary and further contribute to Apple’s bloated proposal. Qualcomm’s
6 proposed verdict form does not explicitly ask about any affirmative defenses—
7 Apple’s or Qualcomm’s. Instead, Qualcomm’s proposed instructions tell the
8 jury which affirmative defenses apply to each claim and instruct the jury to
9 consider the applicable affirmative defenses before finding for the claimant.
10 The Court should utilize Qualcomm’s streamlined approach, which is sufficient
11 for the jury to render a verdict on all claims and defenses. See Mateyko v. Felix,
12 924 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The trial court has complete discretion
13 whether a general or special verdict is to be returned, and this discretion extends
14 to determining the form of the special verdict, provided the questions asked are
15 adequate to obtain a jury determination of the factual issues essential to
16 judgment.”).
17 Third, Apple improperly attempts to pursue affirmative defenses or
18 remedies that it waived, either by never pleading them in the first place or by
19 failing to assert them in the PTO. 14 See Jorst v. D’Ambrosio Bros. Inv. Co.,
20 No. C 00 03646 CRB, 2001 WL 969039, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2001) (“A
21 defendant waives an affirmative defense where the defendant fails to plead that
22 defense in its answer.”); Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal.
23 App. 4th 758, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“A party who fails to plead affirmative
24 12
If the Court decides to empanel and advisory jury for these issues but to use
25 Qualcomm’s proposed verdict form, Qualcomm respectfully requests an
opportunity to submit proposed general questions for these issues.
13
26 As set forth in Exhibit H, Qualcomm objects to Apple Proposed Question
Nos. 2, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 30, 34, 37, 40, 43, 46, 51, 54, 57 and
27 62
14
on this basis.
As set forth in Exhibit H, Qualcomm objects to Apple Proposed Question
28 Nos. 26 and 28 on this basis.
15
1 defenses waives them.”); In re Transact, Inc., No. SACV 13-1312-MWF, 2014

2 WL 3888230, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2014) (“Failure to raise a defense in a
3 pretrial order . . . constitutes waiver.”); cf. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 16.1(f)(6)(c)(2).
4 For example, Apple never pleaded the purported defense of “Violation of SSO
5 IPR Policy” in its answer to Qualcomm’s counterclaims (Exhibit H, Apple’s
6 Proposed Question Nos. 26, 28, 37 and 40); instead, Apple first raised this
7 defense in the PTO. Apple should not be permitted to submit a waived defense
8 to the jury.
9 Fourth, Apple’s proposed verdict form invites the jury to misapply
10 damages law. Apple’s proposal would allow the jury to award multiple
11 damages for the same alleged harm. See, e.g., Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News
12 Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The general rule of
13 compensatory damages bars double recovery for the same wrong.”). For
14 example, Apple’s proposed form provides five separate opportunities for the
15 jury to award damages to the CMs for claims related to alleged violations of the
16 antitrust laws or FRAND (Ex. H, Apple’s Proposed Question Nos. 5, 8, 11, 17,
17 24), even though the report of the CMs’ putative expert Dr. Jeffrey Leitzinger
18 makes clear that the CMs seek the same damages for all of these claims. (See
19 June 29, 2018 Expert Report of Jeffrey Leitzinger, Ph.D., at 4-8 (ECF Nos. 807,
20 808-3).) The CMs cannot recover more than once for the same alleged loss.
21 See Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 954 (9th Cir. 2016) (“This doctrine
22 [of double recovery] dictates that in the absence of punitive damages a plaintiff
23 can recover no more than the loss actually suffered. The animating principle is
24 simple: when a plaintiff seeks compensation for wrongs committed against him,
25 he should be made whole for his injuries, not enriched.” (quotations omitted)).
26 Qualcomm’s form eliminates this risk by presenting one opportunity for
27 FRAND and antitrust-related damages to be awarded and asking the jury to
28
15
1 identify which damages are attributable to the CMs’ antitrust claims.

2 (See Ex. I, Qualcomm’s Proposed Verdict Form at 23, 24.)
3 Put simply, the verdict form should accurately reflect the law, should be
4 devoid of advocacy and should be as simple as reasonably possible in the
5 context of this case. Qualcomm’s proposed form meets those objectives.
6 Apple’s does not.
7 CONCLUSION
8 For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Exhibits F and H,
9 Qualcomm respectfully requests that the Court reject Apple’s proposed jury
10 instructions and verdict form and adopt Qualcomm’s proposed jury instructions
11 and verdict form.
12
13
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15
16
17
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15
1 Dated: February 23, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

2 By /s/ Evan R. Chesler
Evan R. Chesler
3
4 CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
Evan R. Chesler (pro hac vice)
5 (N.Y. Bar No. 1475722)
echesler@cravath.com
6 Keith R. Hummel (pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 2430668)
7 khummel@cravath.com
Richard J. Stark (pro hac vice)
8 (N.Y. Bar No. 2472603)
rstark@cravath.com
9 Antony L. Ryan (pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 2784817)
10 aryan@cravath.com
Gary A. Bornstein (pro hac vice)
11 (N.Y. Bar No. 2916815)
gbornstein@cravath.com
12 J. Wesley Earnhardt (pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 4331609)
13 wearnhardt@cravath.com
Yonatan Even (pro hac vice)
14 (N.Y. Bar No. 4339651)
yeven@cravath.com
15 Vanessa A. Lavely (pro hac vice)
(N.Y. Bar No. 4867412)
16 vlavely@cravath.com
Worldwide Plaza
17 825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
18 Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Facsimile: (212) 474-3700
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
15
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

1 SULLIVAN, LLP
David A. Nelson (pro hac vice)
2 (Ill. Bar No. 6209623)
davenelson@quinnemanuel.com
3 Stephen Swedlow (pro hac vice)
(Ill. Bar No. 6234550)
4 stephenswedlow@quinnemanuel.com
500 West Madison St., Suite 2450
5 Chicago, Illinois 60661
Telephone: (312) 705-7400
6 Facsimile: (312) 705-7401
7
Alexander Rudis (pro hac vice)
8 (N.Y. Bar No. 4232591)
alexanderrudis@quinnemanuel.com
9 51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor
New York, New York 10010
10 Telephone: (212) 849-7000
Facsimile: (212) 849-7100
11
Sean S. Pak (SBN 219032)
12 seanpak@quinnemanuel.com
50 California St., 22nd Floor
13 San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 875-6600
14 Facsimile: (415) 875-6700
15
16 JONES DAY
Karen P. Hewitt (SBN 145309)
17 kphewitt@jonesday.com
Randall E. Kay (SBN 149369)
18 rekay@jonesday.com
4655 Executive Drive, Suite 1500
19 San Diego, California 92121
Telephone: (858) 314-1200
20 Facsimile: (858) 345-3178
21 Attorneys for Defendant and
Counterclaim-Plaintiff
22 QUALCOMM INCORPORATED
23
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19-02-23 Qualcomm Position Statement

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Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 884-2 Filed 02/23/19 PageID.

1 Evan R. Chesler (N.Y. Bar No. 1475722) (pro hac vice)

EXHIBIT B: QUALCOMM’S POSITION CASE NO. 3:17-CV-0108-GPC-MDD

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c) and Local

1 instructions are based largely on the Judicial Council of California Instructions

1 contract unenforceable as against public policy); Morris v. Redwood Empire

1 “Qualcomm declined Apple’s request to license Qualcomm’s SEPs” and

1 defenses waives them.”); In re Transact, Inc., No. SACV 13-1312-MWF, 2014

1 identify which damages are attributable to the CMs’ antitrust claims.

1 Dated: February 23, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

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