Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
*From PPT
*From Atty’s discussion
*Atty’s comments on cases
*GC’s personal opinion
I. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1997 – RA 8282
1. JURISDICTION
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. – (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with
respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any
other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission, and any
case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its
members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided
within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the submission of the
evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed
by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
DACION EN PAGO IMPLEMENTATION (SSS v Atlantic Gulf)
Which body has jurisdiction to entertain a controversy arising from the non-
implementation of a dacion en pago agreed upon by the parties as a means of
settlement of private respondents' liabilities?
SC: From the allegations of respondents' complaint, it readily appears that there is
no longer any dispute with respect to respondents' accountability to the SSS.
Respondents had, in fact, admitted their delinquency and offered to settle them by
way of dacion en pago subsequently approved by the SSS in Resolution No. 270-s.
2001
The controversy lies in the non-implementation of the approved and agreed
dacion en pago on the part of the SSS. As such, respondents filed a suit to obtain its
enforcement which is, doubtless, a suit for specific performance and one incapable
of pecuniary estimation beyond the competence of the Commission, as it falls
under the jurisdiction of the Regional trial Court.
Pointers for Finals
2. WEEKLY STIPENDS OR EXCESS IN SERVICE SURPLUS (Republic v. Asiapro)
Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Its
primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop
other livelihood services for its owners-members.
In the discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives, respondent cooperative
entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco — a division of Dole
Philippines, Inc. and a company based in Bukidnon. The owners-members do not
receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they
receive a share in the service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns
from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the
said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their income
from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they
rendered, which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent
cooperative.
In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997, the owners-
members of the respondent cooperative who were assigned to Stanfilco
requested the services of the latter to register them with petitioner SSS as self-
employed and to remit their contributions as such .
SSS sent a letter to Asiapro that based on the Service Contracts it executed with
Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is actually a manpower contractor supplying
employees to Stanfilco and for that reason, it is an employer of its owners-
members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative should register
itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report and
remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law.
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the
following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the
workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter
House Tyrell
assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important element is
the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. All
elements are present in this case.
It is the respondent cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and
means of performing the services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as
well as the means and methods of work. Also, the respondent cooperative is solely
and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other
representatives at Stanfilco.
Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task,
piece or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or to be
rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service
surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-members were in
reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that
prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order
applicable to the area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the
prevailing rates of wages. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares
in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-
members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperatives client,
Stanfilco.
3. “PROJECT EMPLOYEES” (Chua v CA)
Petitioner contends that the respondents are not regular employees and are thus,
not included in the mandatory coverage of the SSS.
Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his construction projects,
although the period of their employment was allegedly co-terminus with their
phase of work. Even without such admission from petitioner, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties can easily be determined by
the application of the "control test." Suffice it to say that regardless of the nature of
their employment, whether it is regular or project, private respondents are subject
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of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law, their employment not falling
under the exceptions provided by the law. This rule is in accord with the Court's
ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS to the effect that all employees, regardless
of tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS, except those
classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act.
When you look at SS Law, there are employments which are covered and therefore
employer must report and employee must be reported. There are also
employments which are not covered under the SS law. These are the exceptions. It
is provided in Section 8 (j). [SEE PAGE 3, NUMBER 7 OF TRANSCRIPT]
So based on this, when you are given a question of whether a person is an
employee under SS Law and therefore that person should be reported for
compulsory coverage, you look at the exceptions. If that person does not fall under
the exceptions then you apply the law in SSS- All employees regardless of the
nature of their employment are covered.
4. FARM WORKERS; EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELTIONSHIP (Gapayao v. Fulo)
Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. We have
consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular
employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to
time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off
season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season
or when their services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of
the nature of their job, and not because of the length of time they have worked.
The rule, however, is not absolute. In Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of
Sugarcane Workers-Food & General Trade, the Court held that seasonal workers
who have worked for one season only may not be considered regular employees.
Similarly, in Mercado, Sr. v. NLRC, it was held that when seasonal employees are
free to contract their services with other farm owners, then the former are not
regular employees.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard used is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual
trade or business of the employer.
5. TAXI DRIVER ENGAGED ON BOUNDARY BASIS
Even-if the driver is getting income through “boundary,” this does not negate the
existence of employee-employer relationship.
6. LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING
Labor-only contracting is prohibited.
Labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor merely
recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for the
principal, and the following elements are present:
1. The contractor does not have substantial capital or investments in the form of
tools, equipment, machines, work premises, among others, and the employees
recruited and placed are performing activities that are usually necessary or
desirable to the operation of the company, or directly related to the main business
of the principal within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether
such job, work or service is to be performed within or outside the premises of the
principal; or 2. The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the
performance of the work of the employee
7. EMPLOYMENT SERVICES NOT COVERED
Employment services excluded – Sec. 8 (j) of RA 1161
 Purely casual employment and not for the purpose of occupation or business
of the employer (Mansal v PP Go-Checo Lumber Co.GR No.L-8017)
 Services performed or in connection with an alien vessel by an employee if
he/she is employed when such vessel is outside the Philippines
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 Services performed in the employ of the Philippine government Service
performed in the employ of a foreign government or international
organization, or their wholly-owned instrumentality unless there is an
agreement with the Philippine Government for the inclusion of such employees
in the SSS
 Such other temporary services performed by temporary employees which may
be excluded by regulation. Employees of bona fide independent contractors
shall not be deemed employees of the employer engaging the service of said
contractors.
Purely Casual – (Mansal v Go-Checo)
“In a sawmill, for example, if a power unit running the mill gets out of order and
a mechanic is contracted to fix the engine, the work of the mechanic would be
considered as purely casual because the preparation of the mill is not the actual
work or business of the same sawmill but the sawing lumber. But the piling up of
lumber is work directly connected with the business of a lumber yard. Lumber
must be sorted and piled up in groups according to sizes to facilitate handling
and sale. The piling up of lumber is, therefore, an ordinary part of work in a
lumber yard.”
8. DUTIES OF AN EMPLOYER
Among others:
• Require presentation of SS number of prospective employee
• Report all employees for SS coverage within 30 days from date of employment
• Deduct from the employees the monthly SS contributions based on schedule of
contributions; pat their share of contributions including Employees’
Compensation and remit these contributions to SSS or accredited banks within
first 10 calendar days following the month when said contributions are due and
applicable
• Submit a summary of all contributions
• Issue official receipts and maintain official records of employment and
deductions
• Remit to SSS all salary, educational, stocks investment or privatization loan
amortization of their employees and submit a form
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
• Submit a summary of all employees’ loan amortization
• Advance SS and EC sickness benefits once approved by SSS
• Advance SS maternity benefits due
• File for reimbursement for all legally advanced sickness and maternity
benefits
• Benefits under social security program
• Covered employees are entitled to a package of benefits under social security
and EC in the event of death, disability, sickness, maternity, and old-age
• Self-employed and voluntary members also get same benefits except those
benefits under the EC program
• Sickness benefit
• A daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member is unable to work
due to sickness or injury. The amount is equivalent to 90% of the member’s
average daily salary credit.
9. DEFINITION OF “EMPLOYER”
Section 8. (c) Employer – any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity
of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as
regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or
controlled by the Government: Provided; that a self-employed person shall be
both employee and employer at the same time.
10. SICKNESS BENEFIT – NUMBER OF DAYS THAT CAN BE PAID
A daily cash allowance paid for the number of days a member is unable to work
due to sickness or injury. The amount is equivalent to 90% of the member’s
average daily salary credit.
Requirements:
 He is unable to work due to sickness or injury and confined either in a hospital
or at home for at least 4 days;
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Sickness or injury may not be related to the work unlike EC which requires
that it must be because of the work.
 He has paid at least 3 months of contributions within the 12-month period
immediately before the semester of sickness/injury;
 He has used up all company sick leaves with pay;
 He has notified the employer or SSS, if separated, voluntary or self-employed.
Notify employer within 5 calendar days after start of sickness/injury and
employer must notify SSS within 5 days after receipt of notification. Notice is
not required it member’s confinement is in hospital or member got sick while
working or within company premises.
In computing, exclude the semester of sickness. A semester refers to two
consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of sickness. A quarter refers to three
consecutive months ending March, June, September, or December.
For example: SSS member gets sick in October 2006 for 20 days. a. The semester of
sickness would be from July 2006 to December 2006. b. The 12-month period
would be from July 2005 to June 2006 (where the six highest monthly salary
credits will be chosen)
In no case shall the daily sickness benefit be paid longer than one hundred twenty
(120) days in one (1) calendar year, nor shall any unused portion of the one
hundred twenty (120) days of sickness benefit granted under this section be
carried forward and added to the total number of compensable days allowable in
the subsequent year.
11. MATERNITY LEAVE BENEFIT
It is a daily cash allowance granted to female member who was unable to work
due to childbirth or miscarriage. It is not necessary that female is legally married.
It is equivalent to 100% of member’s average daily salary credit multiplied by:
60 days for normal delivery or miscarriage
78 days for caesarian section delivery.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
Qualifications for entitlement
 She has paid at least three monthly contributions within the 12-month period
immediately preceding the semester of her childbirth or miscarriage
 She has given the required notification of her pregnancy through her employer
if employed, or to SSS if separated, voluntary or self-employed.
For example: SSS member gives birth in December 2006.
a. The semester of contingency would be from July 2006 to December 2006.
b. The 12-month period before the semester of contingency would be from July
2005 to June 2006.
Deliveries covered: Only for the first four deliveries or miscarriages.
Notice required: As soon as pregnancy is confirmed, member must notify
immediately his employer or SSS, as the case may be, and probable date of
childbirth at least 60 days from the date of conception. Employer must in turn
notify SSS after receipt of notification. Failure to observe this rule may result in
denial.
Can a member apply for sickness benefit if she has been paid maternity benefit?
No. No member can be entitled to two benefits for the same period.
12. WHO DETERMINES E-E?
The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the
purpose of determining the coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly
excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the
SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling disputes arising under the
Social Security Law of 1997. (Asiapro case)
The coverage of the SS Law is based on the existence on such relationship.
Meaning, if there is no relationship, there is no compulsory coverage. That is the
rule.
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13. EFFECT OF FINAL JUDGMENT AT NLRC ON E-E
Final judgment on relationship = conclusiveness of judgment
Co vs. People
Petitioner was charged criminally by claimed employees for violation of SS Law
for non-remittance of contributions. Prior to the criminal case, a final decision of
NLRC held that the claimed employees were independent contractors and not
employees. Petitioner filed a motion to quash.
Ruling: Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of RA 1161 as
amended, is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. A
final and executory NLRC decision (to the effect that respondent spouses were
not the employees of petitioner) was binding on the criminal case for
violation of RA 1161, as amended. Accordingly, the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to grant petitioner's motion to quash the
Information. Simply said, any conviction for violation of the SSS law based on the
erroneous premise of the existence of an employer-employee relationship would
be a transgression of petitioner's constitutional rights.
14. CONTINGENCIES COVERED; BENEFITS WHERE EMPLOYER ADVANCES
Contingency — The retirement, death, disability, injury or sickness, and maternity
of the member.
The benefits which the employer advances are sickness benefit and maternity
leave benefit.
Other benefits:
A. Retirement – It is a cash benefit either in monthly pension or lump sum paid to
a member who can no longer work due to old age.
Who may qualify?
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
 A member who is 60 years old, separated from employment or ceased to be Some partial permanent disabilities:
self-employed, and has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the One thumb One big toe
semester of retirement One index finger One hand
 A member who is 65 years old whether employed or not and has paid at least One middle finger One arm
120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement. One ring finger One foot
One little finger One leg
When may underground mineworkers qualify for retirement benefit? Hearing of one ear One ear
 Has reached the age of 55 years old and is an underground mineworker for at Hearing of both ears Both ears
least 5 years (either continuous or accumulated) prior to the semester of Sight of one eye
retirement but whose actual date of retirement is not earlier than March 13,
1998; separated from employment or in the case of self-employed, has ceased Prescriptive period in filing a disability claim: 10 years from the date of
self-employment, and has paid at least 120 monthly contributions prior to the occurrence of disability
semester of retirement
 Has reached the age of 60 years old whether employed or not and has paid at 15. CLAIMS UNDER LABOR CODE VIS-À-VIS SSS
least 120 monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement
Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social Security Law
B. Disability – for benefits are not the same as to their nature and purpose.
Disability – any restriction or lack (lack from impairment) of ability to perform an On the one hand, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code govern
activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being. compensability of work-related disabilities or when there is loss of income due to
work-connected or work-aggravated injury or illness.
Impairment – any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or
anatomical structure or function. On the other hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law are intended to
provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks of disability, sickness,
Who is qualified? A member who suffers partial or total permanent disability with old age or death, inter alia, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the
at least one month contribution paid to the SSS prior to the semester of course of the employment.
contingency.
And unlike under the Social Security Law, a disability is total and permanent
Some total permanent disabilities: under the Labor Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is
 Complete loss of sight of both eyes unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120
 Loss of two limbs at or above the ankles or wrists days REGARDLESS of whether he loses the use of any of his body parts.
 Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs
 Brain injury resulting to incurable imbecility or insanity Types of disability benefits:
 Such cases as determined and approved by SSS  Monthly pension – cash benefit paid to a disabled member who has paid at
least 36 monthly contributions to the SSS prior to the semester of disability.

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Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
In addition to monthly pension, supplemental allowance of P500 is paid to the
total or partial disability pensioner.
 Lump sum amount – granted to those who have not paid the required 36
monthly contributions.
The member who suffers from permanent partial disability shall receive his
monthly pension for the duration of a certain number of months assessed based
on the degree of his disability.
Prescriptive period in filing a disability claim: 10 years from the date of
occurrence of disability.
16. COMPULSORY COVERAGE
Coverage of employees
a. A private employee who is not over 60 years old
b. A household-helper earning at least P1,000 a month is covered starting Sept. 1,
1993.
A household-helper is any person who renders domestic or household services
exclusively to a household employer such driver, gardener, cook, governess,
and other similar occupations.
c. A Filipino seafarer upon the signing of the standard contract or employment
between the seafarer and the manning agency which, together with the foreign
ship owner, act as employers.
d. An employee of a foreign government, international organization or their
wholly-owned instrumentality based in the Philippines, which entered into an
administrative agreement with the SSS for the coverage of its Filipino workers
In Chua vs. CA, the question of whether these laborers assigned in the construction
projects are compulsorily covered by SS Law. SC ruled that they do not fall under
the exceptions; they are covered regardless of the nature of their employment
thus the SC found that they performed work which was usually necessary and
desirable. Pursuant to Chua, if you don’t fall under the exception thus you apply
the rule that ALL EMPLOYEES, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF EMPLOYEMENT
IS COVERED
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Coverage of employers
a. An employer, or any person who uses the services of another person in
business, trade, industry or any undertaking.
- A social, civil, professional, charitable and other non-profit organization
which hire the services of employees are considered “employers”.
b. A foreign government, international organization or its wholly-owned
instrumentality such as embassy in the Philippines, may enter into an
administrative agreement with the SSS for the coverage of its Filipino
employees.
Coverage of self-employed persons
A self-employed person, regardless of trade, business or occupation, with an
income of at least P1,000 a month and not over 60 years old, should register with
the SSS. Included but not limited to are the following self-employed persons: self-
employed professionals; business partners, single proprietors and board
directors; actors, actresses, directors, scriptwriters and news correspondents who
do not fall with the term “employee”; professional athletes, coaches, trainers and
jockeys; farmers and fisherfolks; and workers in the informal sector such cigarette
vendors, watch-your-car-boys, hospitality girls, among others.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE.
Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of his
operation and that of the employee on the day of his employment: Provided, That
the compulsory coverage of the self-employed person shall take effect upon his
registration with the SSS.
For an employee – on the first day of employment
For an employer – on the first day the employer hires employee/s
a. Employer is given 30 days from date of employment to report the
employee for coverage to SSS.
For self-employed – upon payment of first valid contribution, in case of initial
coverage.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
What if the employer did not report the employee on the first day? Does it mean
that the coverage will start on the day the employer report the employee for the
coverage? NO, it will start in the 1st day of employment.
If the employer did not pay the in the SSS, what SSS would do is file a case against
the employer.
17. APPEAL FROM SSC
 Appeal to Courts. — Any decision of the Commission, in the absence of an
appeal therefrom as herein provided, shall become final and executory fifteen
(15) days after the date of notification, and judicial review thereof shall be
permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted
his remedies before the Commission. The Commission shall be deemed to be a
party to any judicial action involving any such decision and may be
represented by an attorney employed by the Commission, or when requested
by the Commission, by the Solicitor General or any public prosecutor.
 Court Review. — The decision of the Commission upon any disputed matter
may be reviewed both upon the law and the facts by the Court of Appeals. For
the purpose of such review the procedure concerning appeals from the
Regional Trial Court shall be followed as far as practicable and consistent with
the purposes of this Act. Appeal from a decision of the Commission must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notification of such decision. If the decision
of the Commission involves only questions of law, the same shall be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. No appeal bond shall be required. The case shall be
heard in a summary manner, and shall take precedence over all cases, except
that in the Supreme Court, criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death
has been imposed by the trial court shall take precedence. No appeal shall act
as a supersedeas or a stay of the order of the Commission unless the
Commission itself, or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, shall so order.
To the Court of Appeals – Rule 43 (by petition for review)
To the Supreme Court – Rule 45 (pure question of law)
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Ordinary Appeal vs. Petition for Review
Ordinary appeal – governs only in the courts of law (by notice of appeal under
Rule 41)
Petition for review – you have to make a pleading. You state the parties, facts,
arguments etc. and file it with the Court of Appeals. It is an original petition. So
kung naa kay mga kuwang sa petitions ei imohang ptr karaan pa, daghan ang
causes na madismiss ang imong petition.
When there is a claim filed in the SSS, nobody is allowed to get attorney’s fees. It
was prohibited. It is only allowed if there is a hearing at the SSC. So kung adto ka
sa branch or region, you are not allowed. In fact you will be penalized for exacting
attorney’s fees. It is allowed in SSC only up to 10% and only if there is an award.
Dili pwede i-advance.
18. BENEFICIARIES
Beneficiaries — The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be
the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the
absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the
member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred
percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall
be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the
foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary
beneficiary.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
Primary: (1) Legitimate dependent spouse until the person remarries; (2)
dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and illegitimate children who
are not yet 21 years old.
Secondary: In the absence of primary, dependent parents. In their absence, any
other person designated by member in record.
SSC v. Azote
The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different
women as his spouse is already an indication that only one of them can be the
legal spouse. As can be gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO, there is
no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered
as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the existence
of a previously contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of Edna's claim
by the SSC was correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC determined Edna's
eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on their
database as expressly permitted by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.
If deceased member is survived by legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and
illegitimate children, how is monthly pension to be divided?
If survived by less than five, the illegitimate minor children will be entitled to 50%
of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted and 100% of the
dependents’ pension (equivalent to 10% of the member’s monthly pension or
P250 whichever is higher). Only five minor children, beginning from the youngest,
are entitled to dependents’ pension. When there are more than 5, the legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted shall be preferred.
For how long will the dependent child receive the pension?
When the child reaches 21 years old, gets married, gets employed or dies.
However, the dependents’ pension is granted for life to children who are over 21
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years old, provided they are incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to
physical or mental disability which is congenital and acquired during minority.
19. EXTENT OF THE REQUIRED “DEPENDENCY”
Section 8 (e). Dependents — The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of
age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
Although a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, whether one is
actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact
of marriage alone.
Signey v. Aguas
The one who died here had three wives who claimed his death benefits. The SSC
determined that it was Gina’s (second common law wife) illegitimate children
who was entitled to the benefits.
SSC found (affirmed by CA and SC) based on the SSS field investigation report
that even if Editha was the legal wife, she was not qualified to the death benefits
since she herself admitted that she was not dependent on her deceased husband
for support inasmuch as she was cohabiting with a certain Aquilino Castillo.
Ruling: Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since petitioner is
disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased has no legitimate child,
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall be
entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that
for a minor child to qualify as a "dependent,” the only requirements are that
he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born on
13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the
deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law,
Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50%
of the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased
predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary
beneficiaries of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.
SSC v. Delos Santos
After Gloria (respondent) left Antonio twice, he amended his SSS entries from
Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila de los Santos, the second wife; from Gloria
de los Santos to May-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to
Armine de los Santos. Thus, upon the death of Antonio, Cirilia applied and began
receiving his SSS pension benefit. On the same month, Gloria filed a claim for
Antonio's death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied
because she was not a qualified beneficiary of Antonio. In the letter, the SSS said
that she was not qualified due to the fact that she had obtained a divorce against
the member and she had already remarried. But contrary to findings of the SSC,
the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive
support from her husband.
The Court reminded us of the case of Dycaico vs. SSS which declared as
unconstitutional the proviso “as of the date of his retirement” to qualify the term
of “primary beneficiaries.” Thus, the reckoning point in determining the
beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be at the time of his death.
Although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased (because the divorce
obtained by respondents was not valid), we find that she is still disqualified to be
his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of
10 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio. AN ESTRANGED wife who was
not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to be his
beneficiary.
SSS v. Favila
Teresa averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension
benefits under the SSS were given to their only minor child at that time, Florante
II, but only until his emancipation at age 21. Believing that as the surviving legal
wife she is likewise entitled to receive Florante's pension benefits, Teresa
subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. The SSS, however,
denied the claim.
According to the SS Law, it is plain that for a spouse to qualify as a primary
beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof, he/she must not only be a legitimate
spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e), that is, one who is
dependent upon the member for support. Here, there is no question that Teresa
was Florante's legal wife. What is at point, however, is whether Teresa is
dependent upon Florante for support in order for her to fall under the term
"dependent spouse" under Section 8 (k) of RA 1161. Aside from Teresa's bare
allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for support and her
misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and
then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented sufficient
evidence to discharge her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her
husband for support at the time of his death.
"Dependent" - "one who derives his or her main support from another [or]
relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain
oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power or aid of someone else."
20. SECTION 22
Right to Institute - “The right to institute the necessary action against the
employer may be commenced within twenty (20) years from the time the
delinquency is known or the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the
benefit accrues, as the case may be.”
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
Lo v. CA
Private respondent’s application was denied because the SSS records showed
that he became a member only in 1983, and contributions in his favor were
remitted only from October 1983 to September 1984. As private respondent
knew that SSS contributions were deducted from his salary since compulsory
SSS coverage took effect in 1957, he filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission against Jose Lo and his son Rafael Lo, who took over the
management of the company. The Commission upheld private respondent's
claim and ordered petitioner and Jose Lo to remit to the SSS the unpaid
contribution in favor of private respondent, including penalties and charges.
SC: The provision of Section 22 (b)(2), of Republic Act No. 1161 is clear that the
period of prescription commences to run only upon the discovery of the
violation, which took place in 1985. When the complaint was filed on August 14,
1985, less than one year had passed since private respondent discovered the
delinquency. Therefore, the claim was timely instituted.
21. CONSENT OF SSS ON FILING OF CRIMINAL ACTION
Sec. 28 (i) – Criminal action arising from a violation of the provisions of this Act
may be commenced by the SSS or the employee concerned either under this Act or
in appropriate cases under the RPC: Provided, That such criminal action may be
filed by the SSS in the city or municipality where the SSS office is located, if the
violation was committed within its territorial jurisdiction or on Metro Manila at
the option of the SSS.
Is the consent of SSS required before any criminal case may be filed?
No, because Section 28 (i) states that a “criminal action arising from a violation of
the provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or the employee
concerned either under this Act or in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal
Code.”
11 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
22. LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT AND GOOD FAITH AS DEFENSES
Tan v. Ballena
In an answer to criminal complaint for violation of SS law, petitioners interposed
the defenses of lack of criminal intent and good faith as their failure to remit was
brought about by alleged economic difficulties, and they have already agreed to
settle their obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay
in installments.
SC: As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of
criminal intent for the petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the
respondents' contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations charged
in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a
class of offenses known as mala prohibita.
Only inquiry is, has the law been violated? Thus, the petitioners’ admission in the
instant cases of their violations of the provisions of the SSS Law is more than
enough to establish the existence of probable cause to prosecute them for the
same.
23. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be
commenced within twenty (20) years from the time the delinquency is known or
the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the benefit accrues, as the
case may be.
CAVEAT: DI KO SURE ANI KUNG UNSAY PASABOT NI SIR SORRY NA PO
24. IS A DIRECTOR LIABLE? (GARCIA V. SSC)
Section 28 (f) – If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an
association, partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head,
directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the
offense.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
SSC found Garcia, the sole surviving director of Impact Corporation, petitioner
herein, liable for unremitted SSS contributions. The issue is whether or not
petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact Corporation, can be made
solely liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to
unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties therefore.
Court said yes. Section 28(f) is clear and unambiguous. The said provision does
not qualify that the director or partner should likewise be a "managing director"
or "managing partner.“
Although a corporation once formed is conferred a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the persons comprising it, it is but a legal fiction introduced for
purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. The concept cannot
be extended to a point beyond its reasons and policy, and when invoked in
support of an end subversive of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts.
25. MANAGING HEAD (MENDOZA V. PEOPLE)
The Information against petitioner reads:
That sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra Industries,
Inc., duly registered employer with the Social Security System (SSS), did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the
SSS premium contributions in favor of its employees amounting to
P421,151.09 to the prejudice of his employees.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28
of Republic Act No. 8282, as amended
The term "managing head" in Section 28 (f) is used, in its broadest connotation,
not to any specific organizational or managerial nomenclature. To heed
petitioner's reasoning would allow unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently
escape liability by the creative adoption of managerial titles.
12 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
MR: RA No. 9903 (Social Security Condonation Law) creates two classifications of
employers delinquent in remitting the SSS contributions of their employees: (1)
those delinquent employers who pay within The six (6)-month period (the former
group), and (2) those delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment
period (the latter group). Waiver of accrued penalties: derived from the last
proviso of Section 4 of RA No. 9903.
The dispositive portion provides: The Court AFFIRMS the petitioner's conviction
for violation of Section 22(a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No.
8282, and the petitioner is thus sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
9903, the petitioner's liability for accrued penalties is considered WAIVED.
Considering the circumstances of the case, the Court transmits the case to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant
of executive clemency to the petitioner.
26. NOVATION (SSS V. DOJ)
Facts: The Martels were charged by the Prosecutor’s Office with nonremittance of
SSS contributions. At first, they offered a parcel of land. However, later on, they
offered computer-related services.
The Court held that novation was inapplicable in this case. This Court first
recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to criminal cases in
People v. Nery, involving a case for Estafa. In that case, the Court observed that
although novation is not one of the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code
to extinguish criminal liability, it may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to
cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction," provided the
novation takes place before the filing of the Information with the trial court.
Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an
underlying contract initially defined the relation of the parties such as the contract
in sale on commission in Estafa cases or the contract in sale of goods in cases of
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
violation of the Trust Receipts Law. Further, the party invoking novation must  Who have not reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
prove that the new contract did indeed take effect.
ARE JUDGES COVERED?
Only covered for purpose of life insurance

II. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ACT OF 1997 - R.A. Who are not covered
8291  Employees who have separate retirement schemes under special laws and are
therefore covered by their respective retirement laws, such as the members of
1. JURISDICTION the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and other similarly situated
government officials;
SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes – The GSIS shall have original and exclusive (Judges and Justices are only covered for purposes of life insurance but beyond
jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising under this Act and any other laws that they are not covered)
administered by the GSIS.  Uniformed members of AFP & PNP including BJMP
 Those who are not receiving basic pay or salary (for example Barangay
GSIS has original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising under RA Officials)
8291 with respect to:  Contractuals who have no employer and employee relationship with the
 Coverage agencies they serve
 Entitlement to benefits  Services as a consultant (compensation is in the form of honoraria, their
 Collection and payment of contributions payment is not fixed)
 Any other matter related to any or all of the foregoing which is necessary for
their determination 3. CREDITABLE SERVICE

Which body of GSIS is vested with Quasi-Judicial Functions? Valdez v. GSIS

Board of Trustees. Petitioner would want SC to reverse CA ruling rejecting his assertion that his
services rendered in the MECO, MMSU, PHIVIDEC and as OIC Vice-Governor of
2. WHO ARE COVERED? Ilocos Norte should be credited in the computation of his retirement benefits.

Compulsory for all employees: (ALL ELEMENTS MUST CONCUR) SC: Aside from having been rendered part-time in said agencies, the said
 Appointive or elective positions were without compensation as defined in Section 2 (i) of R.A. No.
 Whether temporary, casual, permanent or contractual w/ e-e relationship (so 8291.
those under job orders are not covered)
 Who are receiving basic pay or salary but not per diems, honoraria or
allowances; and

13 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
4. WHO IS A DEPENDENT LEGITIMATE CHILD • Allocation of at least 40% of the Social Insurance Fund (SIF) to member Loans

Any legitimate, legitimated and/or legally adopted child, including any illegitimate NEW BENEFITS
child, who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, who has not attained the age of  Unemployment benefit
 Separation benefit
majority, or being at the age of majority but incapacitated and incapable of self-
support due to a mental or physical defect acquired prior to age of majority. a. Unemployment Benefit

5. NEW BENEFITS; PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES IN CASE OF SUVIVORSHIP The benefit is paid when a permanent employee is involuntarily separated from
the service as a result of the abolition of his office or position usually resulting
Contingencies compensable from reorganization.
• Retirement
• Separation Who is eligible?
• Unemployment Permanent employee who has paid 12 monthly contributions.
• Disability  Duration of benefit – depends on length of service ranges from 2 mos. to a
• Survivorship maximum of 6 mos
• Death (Life Insurance and Funeral)  Equivalent of benefit – 50% of the average monthly compensation
 Options – Those who have more than 15 years service may either avail of
There is no life insurance in SSS but there is life insurance in GSIS. There is a new retirement or separation benefits as the case may be.
law for the National Prosecution Service so Fiscals now are covered by Separate
Retirement law so they are not covered by GSIS but they are covered in so far as b. Separation Benefit
for life insurance.
Separation benefit and Unemployment benefit is not in the SSS. There is no A cash payment of 18 times the Basic Monthly Pension at time of separation and a
maternity benefit in GSIS. life pension to start at the age of 60 will be given to those who separate from the
service with at least 15 years of service and are below 60 years of age.
Improvement of existing benefits
Under PD 1146, separated member will have to wait until he is 60 years of age to
• Increase in Average Monthly Compensation (AMC) Limit: from AMC limit of receive any separation benefit.
P3,000 to P10,000
• Increase in the Revalued Average Monthly Compensation (RAMC): from P140 to Who are eligible?
P700 Types:
• Full enjoyment of 5-year lump sum benefit (no more discounted per PD 1146 1. rendered at least 3 years but less than 15 years
where retiree receives only 52.17 months while it is full 60 months at present) - (cash payment equivalent to 100% of Average Monthly Compensation for
• Liberalization of eligibility requirements (liberal construction in favor of the every year of service payable upon reaching 60 or upon separation
retiree)

14 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
whichever comes later if not receiving monthly pension from permanent total
disability)
2. rendered at least 15 years & who is below 60 at time of resignation/separation
- (cash payment equivalent to 15 times the basic Monthly Pension payable
upon separation plus monthly pension starting 60)
The 2010 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation is silent on the cause for
separation.
PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES IN CASE OF SURVIVORSHIP
Survivorship – Those granted to surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the
deceased member or pensioner to cushion them against the adverse economic,
psychological and emotional loss resulting from the death of a wage earner or
pensioner.
Who are eligible?
• If at time of death, a member was in the service and has rendered at least 3 years
of service (primary beneficiaries to receive survivorship pension plus cash
payment; secondary beneficiaries or legal heirs entitled to cash payment)
• If at time of death, a member was in the service with less than 3 years of service
or was separated from the service with at least 3 years of service and has paid 36
monthly contributions within the 5-year period immediately preceding his death
or has paid a total of at least 180 monthly contributions prior to death (primary
beneficiaries to receive survivorship pension plus cash payment; secondary
beneficiaries or legal heirs entitled to cash payment)
Primary - The legitimate spouse, until he/she remarries, and the dependent
children. In the IRR, it includes Cohabitation or common law relationship.
6. DISABILITY
Any loss or impairment of the normal functions of the physical or mental faculties
of a member, which reduces or eliminates his capacity to continue with his current
gainful occupation or engage in any other gainful occupation (IRR, Sec. 1.18)
15 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
 Evaluation of disability as a contingency is vested solely in GSIS ( IRR, Sec. 9.3.1)
 General condition for entitlement is that the disability was not due to
misconduct, notorious negligence, habitual intoxication or willful intention to
kill himself or another (IRR, Sec. 9.3.2)
Permanent Total Disability
• A member who becomes permanently and totally disabled when he/she is in the
service and has paid at least 180 monthly contributions (monthly income benefit
for life equivalent to basic monthly pension plus cash payment equivalent to 18
times his basic monthly pension effective on date of disability)
• A member who becomes permanently and totally disabled are eligible when (a)
he is in the service at time of disability or (b) separated from the service and has
paid at least 36 monthly contributions within the last 5 years immediately
preceding the disability or has paid a total of at least 180 monthly contributions
(monthly income benefit for life equivalent to the basic monthly pension)
• A member who becomes permanently and totally disabled when he is separated
from service with at least 3 years of service but has not paid 36 monthly
contributions within the last 5 years is still eligible (cash payment equivalent to
100% of the AMC) for every year of service but not less than P12,000)
Disabilities considered permanent total
• Complete loss of sight in both eyes
• Loss of two limbs at or above ankle or wrist
• Permanent complete paralysis of 2 limbs
• Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility or insanity
• Other cases as may be determined by GSIS
Permanent Partial Disability
• A member who becomes permanently and partially disabled when he is in the
service at time of disability or separated from service and has paid 36 monthly
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
contributions within the last 5 years immediately preceding the disability or has
paid a total of at least 180 monthly contributions.
Temporary Total Disability
Accrues or arises when there is complete but temporary incapacity to continue
with a member's present employment or engage in any gainful occupation due to
the loss or impairment of the normal function of the physical and/or mental
faculties of the member. In effect, this loss or impairment can be reversed to the
point where the member can continue with his previous employment or engage in
another gainful occupation.
A member who suffers temporary total disability for reasons not due to grave
misconduct, notorious negligence, habitual intoxication or willful intention to kill
himself or another may be entitled if:
- he is in service at time of disability and has exhausted sick leave credits; or
- if separated, has rendered at least 3 years of service and has paid at least 6
monthly contributions in the twelve month period immediately preceding his
disability.
A written notice of sickness or injury shall be given by a member or anybody in
his/her behalf within five (5) working days from the date of the occurrence of the
contingency.
An application for disability benefits must be filed with the GSIS within Four (4)
years from the date of the occurrence of the contingency, fully supported by
required papers and documents.
FORFEITURE OF DISABILITY BENEFITS IF MEMBER REFUSES OR
DELIBERATELY FAILS TO:
(a) have himself/herself medically treated by a physician when required by the
GSIS; or
16 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
(b) take the prescribed medication; or
(c) have himself/herself confined in a hospital without justifiable reason, when
such confinement is required by the GSIS; or
(d) avail himself/herself of such rehabilitation facilities as may be duly
recommended by the GSIS and made available for him/her; or
(e) observe such precautionary and/or preventive measures as prescribed by a
physician or expressly required of him/her to prevent the aggravation or
continuance of his/her disability.
(f) report on his/her re-employment.
7. ENTITLEMENT TO PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS (Lledo v. Lledo)
SC dismissed for the service Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, former branch clerk of court of
the RTC of QC, Brach 94. Cesar’s wife, Carmeleta, had filed and administrative case
against him, charging the latter with immorality, abandonment and conduct
unbecoming a public official. During the investigation, it was established that
Cesar had left his family to live with another woman with whom he begot children.
He failed to provide support for his family.
May a government employee, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to
recover the personal contributions he paid to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS)?
Sec. 11 (d) of CA 186, as amended, continues to govern case of employees
dismissed for cause and their claims for the return of their personal contributions.
The said law provides:
II- Retirement Insurance benefit
“(d) Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled
only to his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of 3%
per annum, compounded monthly.”
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
Neither P.D. No. 1146 nor R.A. No. 8291 contains any provision specifically dealing
with employees dismissed for cause and the status of their personal contributions.
Thus, there is no inconsistency between Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended, and Section 4 of P.D. No. 1146, and, subsequently, R.A. No. 8291.
The inevitable conclusion then is that Section 11 (d) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, as amended, continues to govern cases of employees dismissed for cause and
their claims for the return of their personal contributions.
Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social
legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. The
money subject of the instant request consists of personal contributions made by
the employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement.
The occurrence of a contingency, i.e., his dismissal from the service prior to
reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him
from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the
GSIS would condone undue enrichment.
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, Cesar is entitled to the return of his
premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, with interest of three per centum per
annum, compounded monthly.
8. COA DISALLOWANCES
GSIS vs. COA
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.- The funds and/or the
properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-
judicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his
pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or
performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in
connection with his position or work except when his monetary iability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
17 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
It is clear from the above provision that COA disallowances cannot be deducted
from benefits under RA 8291, as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from
such deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA disallowances
in view of the clear mandate of the foregoing provision.
Accordingly, the GSIS interpretation of Section 39 that COA disallowances have
become monetary liabilities of respondents to the GSIS and therefore fall under
the exception stated in the law is wrong. No interpretation of the said provision is
necessary given the clear language of the statute. A meaning that does not appear
nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed
therein by construction.
Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS interpretation, then it would be
unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as among those from which benefits
under RA 8291 are exempt. In such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in
the enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since the GSIS could
simply consider COA disallowances as monetary liabilities in its favor. Such a
construction would empower the GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption
expressly granted by law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied
to his indebtedness to the government has been settled in several cases. In this
case, the Court had to distinguish between the COA disallowances that were
allowed from those that were not. Since the disallowance only accrued when the
respondents were already retired, it gave rise to a case of solution indebiti.
Nonetheless, it may be recovered not by deducting on the retirement pay, but on
the other assets of the respondents.
9. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
4 years from date of contingency except life and retirement which do not prescribe.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
10. SECTION 39; (GSIS v. NLRC) - Security Guards’ Money Claims
The case revolves around the decision of the NLRC holding GSIS solidarily liable
for the judgment rendered in favor of the security guards who were considered
their employees because the contractor was declared a labor-only contractor.
GSIS argues that the enforcement of the decision is impossible because its charter
unequivocally exempts it from execution. The Court rejected this argument and
held that GSIS’s charter should not be used to evade its liabilities to its employees,
even to its indirect employees, as mandated under the Labor Code.
III. PORTABILITY LAW – R.A. 7699
1. WHEN APPLICABLE (Gamogamo v. PNOC)
Petitioner worked with DOH and served for 14 years of service. After that, he
worked in PNOC and then after working for several years, PNOC was privatized.
According to petitioner, there is a mandate under RA 7699, that his period of years
in DOH shall be tacked in or shall be added with the number of years with PNOC.
SC: The totalization of service credits was resorted to only when the retiree did
not qualify for benefits in either or both the Social Security System of GSIS. In this
case, petitioner’s 14 years of service with the DOH may not remain
uncompensated because it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to Section 12
of the Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as may be determined by the
GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits from the GSIS, he cannot
avail of the benefits under RA 7699.
He worked with DOH for about 14 years before as a dentist. Afterwards, he
transferred to PNOC which was privatized. He wanted to retire under the private
18 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
sector but he cannot qualify. So according to Gamogamo, he has 14 years of service
with GSIS so he can add those years to the present in service so he can retire under
SSS. But court said “do you qualify under gsis law/retirement? No, because you
have only 14 years. But do you qualify for other benefits? Yes. You can qualify for
separation benefits.” 2 types of sepa – at least 3 under 15, at least 15 not reaching
the age of 60. He was qualified under the first type. Since he qualified, he cannot
use RA 7699.
So there is a limitation that if member qualifies in previous system, previous
system credits cannot be added to the present.
Portability – refers to transfer of funds for the benefit and account of a worker
who transfers from one system to the other (RA 7699, Sec. 2 [b]).
There is no actual transfer. They only get certification and present it. So there is no
actual transfer.
2. WHEN IS TOTALIZATION RESORTED TO
A member of GSIS who does not qualify for old age and other benefits by reason of
non-fulfillment of the required period of service may be able to qualify for such
benefits by making use of the period during which he rendered services to a
private employer and for which contributions were paid to SSS. This is allowed
under RA 7699 (approved May 1, 1994)
The Act instituted a limited portability scheme in the GSIS and SSS by totalizing
the workers’ creditable services or contributions in each of the Systems.
You have a situation where a member is presently employed in a public sector but
previously, in the private. It can also be the other way around. First criterion is
there must be service in both systems. If the person only works in one system, it
cannot apply. It’s possible that one works with a system and then after that he
work with another system. Another scenario is it could be simultaneously. For
example, if before he is registered as a self-employed and after that he work in the
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
govt sector but continued his contribution as self-employed. So simultaneously, he
is contributing in SSS and in public sector. That is allowed but there is a limitation.
The limitation is that the overlapping should only happen once. Dili pwede na
overlap karon and then overlap napud sunod. The second overlapping will not be
considered.
Another is does not qualify for old age and other benefits. Normally the scenario is
under retirement. Example, he has only 10 years of service, he lacks 5 years and
assume that he has also worked in the private sector and has 5 years of service.
Then, that can be added so that he can qualify for retirement benefits. Now, we
should however be careful in this example because even if the member cannot
qualify for retirement, the member can qualify for the other benefits.
IV. PD 442, as amended
1. PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY
Workman’s Compensation Act - This Act works upon the presumption of
compensability which means that if the injury or disease “arose out of” and “in the
course of” employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within
the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of
causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not
arise out of or in the course of employment.
2. THEORY OF AGGRAVATION
All that the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires to entitle claimants to its
benefits is a showing that the nature of the deceased's work and duties did
aggravate his illness as in this case. (Belmonte v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission)
19 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
3. DOCTRINE OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
To be compensable, the claimant must be able to show that the sickness and
resulting disability or death that the sickness was the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex “A” of the Rules on Employee’s Compensation.
4. THEORY OF INCREASED RISK
If the sickness was not so listed under Annex “A”, the claimant must be able to
show that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s
working conditions.
I noticed that in the Supreme Court, if there is particular disease, the first thing to
do is to look in Annex “A” if it is listed in the occupational disease. If the cause is
not in Annex A but it is linked then it is compensable. Look at Annex A, if
immediate cause is not one those then proceed with theory no. 2 “Theory of
Increased Risk”
The diseases listed in Annex “A” are presumed to be work-related but not every
death resulting therefrom automatically entitles a claimant to death benefits.
Annex “A” requires that, for the statutory presumption of causal relation to arise,
it must be established beforehand that the listed disease was contracted under
certain working conditions.
The following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The employee’s work must involve the risks described therein
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to the
described risk
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
5. ART. 203, LABOR CODE (PROHIBITION AGAINST DEMAND OR CHARGE
FOR FREE); COMPARE WITH SSS
ARTICLE 203 OF THE LABOR CODE – “No agent, attorney or other person
pursuing or in charge of the preparation or filing of any claim for benefit under
this Title shall demand or charge for his services any fee and any stipulation to the
contrary shall be null and void. The retention or deduction of any amount from
any benefit granted under this Title for the payment of fees for such services is
prohibited. Violation of a provision of this Article shall be punished by a fine of not
less than five hundred pesos not more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment
for not less than six months nor more than one year or both, at the discretion of
the court.”
UNDER SSS – “SECTION 17. Fee of Agents, Attorneys, etc. — No agent, attorney or
other person in charge of the preparation, filing or pursuing any claim for benefit
under this Actshall demand or charge for his services any fee, and any stipulation
to the contrary shall be null and void. The retention or deduction of any amount
from any benefit granted under this Act for the payment of fees for such services is
prohibited: Provided, however, That any member of the Philippine Bar who
appears as counsel in any case heard by the Commission shall be entitled to
attorney's fees not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the benefits awarded by the
Commission, which fees shall not be payable before the actual payment of the
benefits, and any stipulation to the contrary shall be null and void. Any violation of
the provisions of this Section shall be punished by a fine of not less than five
hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or
imprisonment for not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year, or both,
at the discretion of the court.”
Same prohibition on the SSS but allows not more than 10%of benefits awarded for
a lawyer who appears as a counsel in a case heard by SSC.
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6. MEANING OF “ACCIDENT”
Unforseen for which the injured party is not legally responsible
7. ECC BOARD RESOLUTIONS
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 12-03-08
(DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OD DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEEE DUE TO
ASSUALT WHEN THE SAME OCCURRED IN THE COURSE OF THE PERFOMANCE
OF OFFICIAL FUCNTIONS NOTWHITSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE MOTIVE
ISPERSONAL IN NATURE)
To declare the compensability of death of an employee due to assault
notwithstanding the fact the motive us persona in nature if the same occurred in
any of the following situations, in addition to those provided under Item II of
Circular No. 03709 dated 22 July 2009:
1. The Employee was at his assigned/designated workplace, or at a place where
his work requires him to be;
2. The employee was executing an order from employer regardless of the time and
pace of the incident, or in the performance of his official functions; or
3. The employee was “going to or coming from” his workplace, subject to the
existing guidelines of the same.
Even if personal in nature ang assault kay compensable gihapon.
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 14-02-15
(COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES OR DEATH OF THE SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN
WHEN RESPONDING TO A CRIME OF SITUATION WHEN THEY ARE NOT AT
THEIR ASSIGNED POST.)
To declare the compensability of injuries and its resulting disability or death,
sustained by the soldiers and policemen when responding to a crime situations or
when performing their sworn duties as law enforcers while they are not at their
assigned posts.
Considered compensable basta nitabang
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 15-04-15
(DELCARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES SUSTAINED BY EMPLOYEE AT
PLACES OF RECREATION WITHIN THE EMPLOYER’S PREMISES)
To declare the compensability of injuries sustained by employees on the places of
recreation within the premises of the employer, within an allowed period;
Paragraph 6.1 of Board Resolution No. 93-08-0068, dated August 5, 1993, is
hereby modified or amended to read as follows:
“Personal Comfort Doctrine “6.1 Acts performed by an employee
a. Within the time and space limits of his employment to minister to personal
comfort such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger or other demands
b. While on the places of recreation within the employer’s premises, or
c. To protect himself from extreme temperature in a place within the employer’s
premises, Shall be deemed incidental to his employment and injuries which the
employee suffered in the performance of such acts shall be considered
compensable and arising out of and in the course of employment.
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 15-01-20
(ADVISORY ON THE DEFINITION OF MISSING PERSONS UDNER EC BOARD
RESILUTION NO. 14-07-20)
Advisory is issued in relation to the implementation of Board Resolution No. 14-
70-20 (“Guidelines on the Grant of EC benefits due to Calamity or Fatal Event
Amending for this Purpose Paragraph 5 of Board Resolution No. 93-08-0068”):
The following are the series of events which should be considered in the grant of
EC benefits:
1. The word “missing” refers to unknown fate or there is no trace of whereabouts
of a worker, employee and uninformed personnel while he/she is in the
performance of his/her duties during calamities or fatal events.
2. The worker employee or uninformed personnel was not seen or heard from
after the lapse of four years from occurrence of the incident.
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3. The disappearance of the worker, employee or uninformed personnel gives rise
to presumption of death.
4. The death of the worker, employee or uninformed personnel arises out of and in
the course of the employment.
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 10-03-45
(CLARIFYING THE RULES ON PRESCRIPTION)
According to the case of Buena Obra vs SSS and Mesa vs. SSS, when a claimant filed
a claim for disability or death benefits before the Systems either under the SSS
Law or GSIS Law, the claim for same benefits under the Employee’s Compensation
Law should be considered as filed.
The filing of disability or death benefits under either the SSS Law or the GSIS Law
within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued would stop the running of
the prescriptive period under P.D. 636, as amended.
EC claim must be filed within 3 years from:
 In case of sickness-time when the employee was unable to report for work
 Injury-time of the accident
 Death (Date of Death)
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 11-04-10
(SETTING THE RECKONING DATE OF THE THREE-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
IN THE EVALUATION OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION CLAIMS FOR
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY (PTD))
The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from
the time the employee lost his earning capacity.
Defenses against EC claim (employer has no participation, so he can’s invoke these
defenses)
 Not work connected or not occupational
 Limitation (intoxication, etc)
 No notice was giver to employer - Art. 212 of LC
 Prescription
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
ECC BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 12-01-02
(DECLARING THE COMPENSABILITY OF INJURIES AND ITS RESULTING
DISABILITY OR DEATH SUSTAINED BY STAY-IN LOCAL EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE
QUARTERS FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYERS)
"Bunkhouse Rule" - ". . . where the employee is required to stay in the premises or
in quarters furnished by the employer, injuries sustained therein are in the course
of employment regardless of the time the same occurred."
This Commission RESOLVES AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to declare the
compensability of injuries, and its resulting disability or death, sustained by stay-
in local employees in their quarters regardless of the time of its occurrence except
when the disability or death was occasioned by the employee's intoxication, willful
intention to injure or kill himself or another, or notorious negligence as provided
under Article 172 of P.D. No. 626, as amended.
8. COMPENSABILITY
GSIS V. CA
In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant
or private respondents to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of
contracting Osteosarcoma was increased by the working conditions of the late
Abraham. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The records show that
Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that the development of his
ailment was traceable to his working conditions in the Philippine Navy, the now
defunct Philippine Constabulary and the PNP. Further, private respondents'
allegation in their petition for review with the CA that Abraham, as a rifleman in
the Philippine Navy, may have been exposed to elements like a virus which could
have contributed to his ailment does not satisfy the requirement of substantial
evidence. The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and
presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing. The application of the
rules would mean that absent any proof that the risk of contracting the ailment
22 | P a g e - J P D E H 4 0 6
was increased by the working conditions of the late Abraham, private respondents
would not be entitled to compensation.
Considering, however, that it is practically undisputed that under the present state
of science, the proof referred by the law to be presented by the deceased private
respondent claimant was unavailable and impossible to comply with, the
condition must be deemed as not imposed.
Before the amendment, the law simply did not allow compensation for the ailment
of respondent. It is under this set-up that the Raro case was decided. However, as
the ECC decision noted, the law was amended and now "the present law on
compensation allows certain diseases to be compensable if it is sufficiently proven
that the risk of contracting is increased by the working conditions." It, therefore,
now allows compensation subject to requirement of proving by sufficient evidence
that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the working conditions.
As earlier noted, however, in the specific case of respondent, the requirement is
impossible to comply with, given the present state of scientific knowledge. The
obligation to present such as an impossible evidence must, therefore, be deemed
void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with the
social legislation's intended beneficial purpose.
ALANO V ECC
The deceased was waiting for a bus to the school where she works as a principal.
However, while waiting, she was bumped by a mini van that resulted to her death.
The petitioner alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the
course of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its views and
contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from
that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is
"categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the
workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." We rule in
favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her
place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of
the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.
LORENZO V GSIS
The wife of the deceased died due to Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to Terminal
Leukemia. Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees
Compensation death benefits from the GSIS. It was denied on the ground that the
GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department (MEUD) found Rosario's
ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory Arrest Secondary to Terminal
Leukemia, a non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as
amended.
Sickness, as defined under Article 167 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor
Code of the Philippines refers to "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused
by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions.
It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" found in the old Workmen's Compensation Act is expressly
discarded under the present compensation scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro
case, the new principle being applied is a system based on social security
principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased risk." As further declared
therein:
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the
Government Service Insurance Syatem and Social Security System — under the
Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for
workconnected death or disability.
GSIS V CAPACITE
The deceased was a DAR employee who died of lung cancer. The CA justified the
compensability of her disease by saying that Elma had been exposed to
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voluminous dusty records and other harmful substances that aggravated her
respiratory disease.
While item 17, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules of Employee's Compensation
considers lung cancer to be a compensable occupational disease, it likewise
provides that the employee should be employed as a vinyl chloride worker or a
plastic worker. In this case, however, Elma did not work in an environment
involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic, for her lung cancer to be
considered an occupational disease. There was, therefore, no basis for the CA to
simply categorize her illness as an occupational disease without first establishing
the nature of Elma's work. Both the law and the implementing rules clearly state
that the given alternative conditions must be satisfied for a disease to be
compensable.
9. LIMITATION TO COMPENSABILITY; GSIS V ANGEL
Section 1. Limitation – No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his
dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of
the following:
a. His intoxication – person’s condition in being under the influence of liquor or
prohibited drugs to the extent that his acts, words or conduct are impaired visibly
as to prevent him from physically and mentally engaging in the duties of his
employment
b. His willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or
c. His notorious negligence – something more than mere or simple negligence;
deliberate act to disregard own personal safety
10. VALERIANO V ECC
The Court ruled that petitioner's injuries and consequent disability were not
work-connected and thus not compensable. Petitioner was not able to
demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he
had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and
social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of
the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit
of an order of his superior. The Court also ruled that the 24-hour-duty doctrine
cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work
place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But
the more important justification for the Court's stance is that he was not doing an
act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such
nature, at the time he sustained his injuries.
COVERAGE FORMULA:
“ARISING OUT OF” - upon consideration of all circumstances, a causal connection
between the condition under which the work is required to be performed and
resulting injury, refers to the origin or cause of the accident
"IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" – refers to time, place and circumstances
under which the accident takes place.
24-HOUR-DUTY DOCTRINE – The concept of workplace cannot always be
literally to a soldier on active status whom for all intents and purposes, is on a 24
hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law and call of his
superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status; this
doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances but only
those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police
service in character
11. CAN A CLAIM FOR BENEFIT BE DEFEATED BY THE MERE FACT OF
SEPARATION FROM SERVICE?
GSIS V CUANANG
(Teacher – Cardio Pulmonary Arrest with Acute Myocardial Infarction as the
antecedent cause, and Bronchial Asthma and Hypertension as underlying causes)
In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year after her retirement.
Clearly, the period between her retirement and demise was less than one year.
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Indeed, if a death which occurred almost four and one half years after retirement
was held to be within the coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, as in the
Manuzon case, with more reason should a death which occurred within one year
after retirement be considered as covered under the same law. A claim for benefit
for such death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service.
Further, we agree with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that there was
substantial evidence to support respondent's claim. Hence, the degree of proof
required under PD 626 was satisfied, i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Probability and not
ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.
AQUINO V. SSS
(Grocery Man US Navy – congestive heart failure)
Congestive heart failure is not included. Hence, petitioner should have shown
proof that the working conditions in the commissary where her husband worked
aggravated the risk of contracting the ailment. Petitioner should have adduced
evidenced of a reasonable connection between the work of her deceased husband
and he cause of his death, or that the progression of the disease was brought about
largely by the conditions in her husbands job as grocery man at the commissary
store. Failing in this aspect, we are constrained to rule that her husband’s illness
which eventually caused his demise was not compensable.
In addition, granting petitioner’s claim will set a bad precedent considering that
23 years elapsed from the time her husband stopped working at the commissary
store up to the time he died. If we were to grant it, we might unduly burden the
funds of the ECC and jeopardize it with a flood of unsubstantiated claims. Besides,
the court cannot remain oblivious to the possibility that, within that 23-year
period, other factors intervened to cause the death of petitioner’s husband.
Petitioner was thus under an even greater compulsion to proffer evidence to
negate this possibility and establish the casual connection between her husband’s
work and his death. The 23-year gap between his separation from employment in
1977 and his death in 2000 was a gaping hole in petitioner’s claim.
Agrarian Reform and Other Social Legislation
ECC v. SANICO
Prescription not to be reckoned when PTB became known but from time employee
12. “PARENTS” AS BENEFICIARIES (BARTOLOME V SSS) lost his earning capacity (termination from job due to illness)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the
14. DEFENSES AGAINST EC CLAIMS
afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its
general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the
ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, 1. Not work connected or not occupational
whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When 2. Limitations (intoxication, etc..)
3. No notice was given to the employer under Art. 212 of the Labor Code
the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, 4. Prescription
who are in need of support or assistance.

13. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD;

Art. 201: 3 years from the time the cause of action accrued.

When did the cause of action accrue? From the date of the occurrence of the
contingency.

OBRA v. SSS
We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS
should be considered as the Employees Compensation itself. This is but logical and
reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed with the SSS
is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same
agency with which the EC claims are filed. As correctly contended by the
petitioner, when she filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SS
Law, she had already notified the SSS of her EC claim, because the SSS is the same
agency where claims for payment of sickness/death/disability benefits under P.D.
No. 626 are filed.

This case refers to the same nature of benefits.

This ruling will apply (I SUBMIT) only if claims under SSS and EC are the same in
nature

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