ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES DE BULGARIE

INSTITUT D’ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES

ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES, 2007, No 1

BISSER PETROV (Institute of Balkan Studies)

COMRADESHIP ON TRIAL: BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY –

COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE RELATIONS DURING THE
GREEK CIVIL WAR

For a long time the true attitude that Bulgaria had towards the Greek Civil War
has been concealed, muted or distorted. However, a range of publications have been
brought to light lately, based on newly declassified documents and directly looking
into Bulgaria’s policy towards Greece with regard to the bilateral government rela-
tions in the aftermath of WWII as well as in strict party terms, namely concerning
the relations between the Greek and the Bulgarian Communist Parties (the latter was
called Bulgarian Labour Party till 1948).
By the early autumn of 1944, Bulgaria had found itself in the camp of the
losers, facing a new Peace Treaty drawn up by the victorious countries. In the frame-
work of the whole process of post-war peace settlement in Europe, the country turned
out to be rather a dependent subject than a real player on the international stage and
had no option but wait again for the Allies’ decision1.
The two communist parties established close contacts in Eastern Macedonia
and Western Thrace, occupied by Bulgaria in April 1941, and unified in an adminis-
trative unit called Aegean District. A radical change of the situation in the region
occurred with the Red Army invasion and the establishment of the Fatherland Front
government on 9th September 1944 in Bulgaria. From 7th to 13th September, the Fa-
therland Front’s rule was established within the district itself. ELAS’ (Greek Na-
tional Liberation Army) guerrillas were let in the inhabited localities of the area,
while representatives of the CPG (Communist Party of Greece) and EAM (National
Liberation Front), together with those of other nationalities were involved in the

1

. , . 
,
  

       

,
 , 2003, 73-74.

41
local Fatherland Front committees. Antonis Fosteridis’ (Anton Tsaous) nationalist
bands also took advantage of the situation and settled to the north of the Drama –
Stavroupolis railroad2.
In order to implement the new Bulgarian policy, on 13th September two gov-
ernment representatives, Dobri Terpeshev and Dimitar Neykov, arrived in the dis-
trict assigned with the task of proclaiming the local Greek population’s rights and
freedoms and contributing to the rapprochement of Greeks and Bulgarians. They
concluded an agreement with the EAM/ ELAS representatives to hand over the civil
authority of Thrace and Macedonia in the hands of the local Greek population in the
person of the EAM3.
The following step in the process of handing over the administrative power by
the Bulgarian authorities was the signature of a Protocol on 6th October 1944, by the
Bulgarian government delegate Sava Ganovski and the EAM representative Elefterios
Matsoukas envisaging to set up a joint Greek-Bulgarian commission. By the begin-
ning of October, a large part of the Bulgarian administration had left the district
while its activities had been taken by the Greek administrative authorities4.
The decision about the Bulgarian troops’ withdrawal was taken at the talks
between Churchill and Stalin from 9th to 11th October 1944 in Moscow when they
agreed upon the notorious division of the Balkans into spheres of influence (the so
called Balkan Deal by virtue of which Bulgaria fell under the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence while Greece under the Western one).
On 11th October, the Bulgarian government was notified about the Great Pow-
ers’ decision: the pulling out within 15 days of the occupied Yugoslav and Greek
territories was set as a prerequisite to start negotiations for armistice. From 21st to 25th
October, the Second Bulgarian Corps withdrew within the old Bulgarian borders5.
However, at the same time the new Bulgarian government did not stay neutral
to the internal conflict in Greece and took openly the EAM/ELAS side. At end–
September, the BCP Central Committee sent a cipher cable to the Bulgarian Com-
munists’ leader Georgi Dimitrov, staying in Moscow at that time, former Secretary
General of the Communist International who at the same time was in charge of the
International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (which until
1952 was called All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Bulgarian Commu-
nists in Sofia informed their leader on the situation in Eastern Macedonia and West-
ern Thrace as well as about the help they rendered to the Greek communists. Even
the possibility of sending 200 Bulgarian Partisans was considered in order to support

2
. , 

   

 
   



,  , 1966, 111-114.
3
. , “
  ! "!  ## $ %  & '
(15  1943 – 25  1944)”,  
  

    ,
36, 1983, c. 50.
4
. , op. cit., 116-122.
5
  

   
 ! 
,
.  "

"

,
. I, 1944-1962,  , 1970, 13-14.

42
ELAS in its fights against Anton Tsaous’ andartes. At the Bulgarian Army retreat,
the Greek Communists addressed a request for military and material aid. It was dis-
cussed at a special meeting of the BCP Politburo held on 20 October. It was agreed
that such an aid could not be given for two reasons. The first of them was that it
would meant to enter into a conflict with the British and deteriorate even further
Bulgaria’s international position while the second was the lack of arms and ammu-
nition (at that time the Bulgarian Army had already been engaged the Germans in
Yugoslavia)6.
Bulgaria was bound by the “Armistice Agreement” signed on 28th October
1944 in Moscow to withdraw out of the Aegean District not only its armed forces
and administration, which had already been done by that time, but also to take back
those Bulgarian nationals who by 1st January had had Bulgarian citizenship; to re-
peal all the legal acts, which concerned the Greek territories annexed to Bulgaria; to
give back to the Greek citizens and State their possessions in entirety and also to pay
out reparations for war damages. That was the way how as far back as the date of the
Armistice Agreement the conditions were predefined for the future Peace Treaty
between Bulgaria and the victorious countries7.
At that stage Bulgaria’s prospects seemed bleak – not only had it been com-
pelled to cede the Greek territories acquired through German assistance but also it
had to endure the punishment of its actions. A slight hope of getting round the repeti-
tion of the cruel provisions of the Neuilly Treaty was seen in the discord emerging
between the states of the anti-Nazi Coalition, which in the event would bring about
the split of Europe and the world into two hostile camps for a long period of time.
The Bulgarian withdrawal within a fortnight made it possible for conclusion
of armistice between the Allies and Bulgaria on 28th October. It was stipulated under
item 2 of the document body text that Bulgaria had to pull out its armed forces and
administration and repeal all legal and administrative acts, having regard to the an-
nexation. Nevertheless, the Greek government did not feel happy with the signature
of the armistice. It objected that there was not a Greek representative included within
the composition of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria despite of the reiter-
ated insistence of Georgios Papandreou’s government before the British. Moreover,
it made claims for territorial changes in Greek favour. The relations between the two
countries deteriorated and became extremely tense. Beside the fact that they fell into
different spheres of influence, they welcomed the end of the war with opposite in-
tentions. While Bulgaria was trying to get away with the mildest implications, Greece,
on the other hand, being in the camp of the victor nations struggled to obtain the
maximum acquisitions from Bulgaria both in terms of territory and reparations8.

6
*. , “+  +
 /
  0  (1944-1949 +
)”, 

-
 

, 1992, 7 2-3, 93-94.
7
  

a, 15-20.
8
. 
, “+ 8
 +
0  
 +  +  (: 1944 –
 1947)”, , 1982, 7 5, . 46.

43
 By the beginning of November 1944, in all probability thanks to Miltiadis
Porphyrogennis, Minister of Labour in the Greek coalition government at that time,
the two Communist Parties established closer relations of higher level. On 13th No-
vember Sergios Anastasiadis, a member of CPG Politburo arrived in Sofia to meet
the BCP Secretary Traicho Kostov, who in fact was the first leader to substitute
Dimitrov in his absence, with the purpose to seek to Soviet diplomatic support and to
establish a direct radio link with Moscow and Dimitrov. Kostov agreed on that point,
but made a recommendation that the relations between Moscow and the Greek Com-
munists are established through the BCP Central Committee mediation9.
When the fights between EAM/ELAS on the one hand and the government
forces and the British on the other broke out on 7th December in Athens, the member
of the CPG Politburo Petros Rousos arrived in Sofia. He tried to get in touch directly
with Dimitrov and through him with the Soviet leadership. The aim of his mission
was to figure out the Soviet attitude to the events in Greece as well as to find out if
the Greek Communists could probably rely on Soviet support. On the very day of
his arrival, he sent a telegram to Dimitrov ìn that sense, and among others raised also
the issue about the procurement of arms and ammunitions, food supplies, a radio for
keeping in touch, paper for the EAM publications and so on to be looked at by the
Bulgarian Communist leaders. Dimitrov made the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov
familiar with the contents of the telegram and on 9th October informed Sofia on the
Soviet point of view. The latter said that “given the present circumstances the Greek
friends cannot rely on the active intervention and help on the part of the USSR”.
Taking into consideration the international political environment, Dimitrov recom-
mended that the BCP “should not be immediately committed in any way in the de-
velopment of the internal clashes in Greece”10.
It was obvious that the initial EAM/ELAS success in the battle of Athens
varied the Soviet attitude since it was said in a Dimitrov’s telegram dated 14th De-
cember that “the Greek Politburo (Siantos) is in direct touch with me. Although they
have to continue their struggle, for the time being they should not rely on any sup-
port from outside.” In all probability, the Soviet government counted on some fuel-
ing of the conflict though without being directly involved. On the following day
Kostov communicated Dimitrov’s recommendation through a radiogram to the at-
tention of the CPG. “The Old men (Dimitrov) recommends that the struggle go on.
We are doing our best.”11
Yet, a few days later on 19th December, Kostov transmitted to the GPC leader-
ship Dimitrov’s opinion according to which any armed support to EAM/ELAS was
out of question. Any aid coming from Yugoslavia or Bulgaria not only would hardly
be effective but also would probably oppose the two countries to Great Britain. In

9
. , #    
  $%  &
, 1936-1946: '

 



,  , 1999, 655-656.
10
Ibid., 659-660.
11
Ibid., p. 661.

44
his comment on Dimitrov’s message, Kostov emphasized once again that it is not
feasible to get external support and the CPG leaders should take into account that
fact in their further decisions. On the same day Siantos acknowledged receipt of the
said cipher telegram and Kostov duly informed Dimitrov on the matter saying the
following: “Siantos has appreciated your advice. They communicate that the nation-
wide struggle for freedom and national independence will continue.”12
The receipt of that telegram of 19th December was of high importance for the
CPG position since long time after the events that had taken place some leading
Party leaders claimed a later date of its receipt or argued that because of technical
problems they did not manage to decipher it earlier than 15th January 1945, when the
fights for Athens had eventually ended. After many years had elapsed, the former
CPG Secretary Mitsos Partsalidis would justify his signing the Varkiza Agreement
of 12th February 1945 exactly on the basis of the same telegram. In addition to that,
he claimed that in a conversation Stalin had with him in 1946 he allegedly pointed
out that Dimitrov’s advice did not fall in line with the CPSU’ point of view. To what
an extent did the Soviet dictator backdate the events is quite another question (in all
probability the meeting took place in the wake of Churchill’s speech of 5th March in
Fulton, which marked the beginning of the Cold War), yet there is no doubt that
Dimitrov interpreted correctly the Soviet position and it was brought to the CPG
leaders knowledge in a timely manner. However, there is a possibility that the tele-
gram had been taken for another dated 12th January 1945 in which Dimitrov argued
that given the impossibility to provide external armed support, the CPG should there-
fore preserve their forces and launch a campaign for explaining their goals to the
world democratic community13. Still, most probably the CPG leaders concealed on
purpose the receipt of the telegram of 19th December 1944 in order to excuse both the
continuation of the fights in Athens in December and their capitulation in Varkiza
after having been defeated.
As far as the Soviet position is concerned, at that time Stalin had still been
sticking rigidly to the Balkan Deal of October 1944 and was not willing to strain the
relations with his Western allies in the very decisive moment before the defeat of
Germany and in the perspective of the overall peace adjustment of the post-war
Europe. In January 1945 he confided to Dimitrov the following: “I recommended
them not to engage in Greece. ELAS’ people should not have come out of
Papandreou’s government. They obviously believed that the Red Army would come
down to the Aegean Sea… We cannot send our troops in Greece. The Greeks have
been foolish.”14
The Bulgarian standpoint, having in mind the subordinate position the coun-
try had to Moscow could not have differed much from the Soviet one, albeit the
genuine liking Bulgaria had for the Greek Communists’ cause. At the end-Decem-

12
Ibid., 662-663.
13
*. , “+  +
 /
”, 99-101.
14
Ibid., p. 98.

45
ber 1944, the CPG Politburo member Ioannis Zevgos arrived in Sofia. In the course
of his meeting with Kostov he let him know in detail about the adverse develop-
ments that the CPG was facing and addressed a pressing request for support. How-
ever, the BCP Secretary refused under the pretext that Bulgaria could not give sup-
port to EAM/ELAS openly in order to stay in good terms with the British and be-
cause of the Allied Control Commission which at that time was in Bulgaria. He
recommended him to go and ask Yugoslavia for help15.
After Varkiza, the CPG resorted to political and parliamentary means to pur-
sue the struggle, relying at the same time on the Balkan Communist Parties’ solidar-
ity and support. Its leadership came out with the idea of summoning a conference of
the Secretaries of the Balkan Communist Parties. That was the meaning of the re-
quest, which the Politburo member Ioannis Ioannidis addressed to the Bulgarian
Central Committee at the beginning of May. But Dimitrov did not approve the idea,
considering it as a premature one and reckoned that if steps should be taken in order
to make it real, the initiative should come from the Yugoslav Communist Party.
Moreover, the CPG made some financial claims for its apparatus and cadres. On 16th
May, Dimitrov answered that the Greeks could hardly count on any materiel aid
from the USSR and delivered instructions to grant a sum amounting to a few million
dollars from the BCP currency reserves. By 25th November 1945, thanks to his me-
diation and intercession Moscow had granted $100,000 more. The Bulgarian offi-
cial authorities also provided support to the CPG and EAM. For instance, the CPG
cells in the Evros region received some material aid from the Bulgarian Ministry of
Interior and the Border guard16.
Meanwhile, in the heat of the white terror and the nationalist hysteria in Greece
the CPG stayed indifferent to the anti-Bulgarian swing and the territorial claims
against Bulgaria that the Athens government put forward. On 22nd June Dimitrov
cabled to Kostov that the CPG should make it clear to the Greek people that its well-
being did not depend on the “borders’ rectification”, but rather on the democratiza-
tion of Greece and its good relations with the neighbours. Obviously, Dimitrov’s
standpoint had been transmitted to the CPG leadership since one month later Kostov
let him know about a correction of the Party’s line17.
With regard to Greek claims concerning the borders shift to the North them-
selves, the three Great Powers did not welcome and did not approve of it, either. The
Soviet Union was fully against, the United States opted for preservation of the pre-
war borders while Great Britain, the main Greek ally and intercessor reckoned that
the so claimed rectification would probably be tactically significant but strategically
meaningless for the Greeks in terms of precautions against a potential conflict with

15
. , #    
, p. 664.
16
. , ! 

( 
:  
  " "

, 1944-1964,  , 2004,
133-134.
17
*. , “+  +
 /
”, 104-105.

46
the Bulgarians in the future. Foreign Office advised that the territorial claims against
Bulgaria were groundless and void of practical meaning and such a line of conduct
would make it difficult for Great Britain to defend the Greek interests in the event of
eventual Bulgarian counter-claims. Instead of speaking out clearly to the Greek gov-
ernment of all of the above reasons, they persuaded it not to make its pretensions
official but abide its time. Well, as such was considered the drafting and signature of
the Peace Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allies18.
In the meantime, on the eve of the signature of the Varkiza Agreement, the
CPG informed Dimitrov and the Kremlin on the ongoing events and asked them for
advice on the position it should take. On 5th February, Dimitrov delivered to Molotov
a message from the CPG Central Committee which read that under these circum-
stances the Party had to choose between two possible lines of conduct – a nation-
wide resistance and armed uprising which would need some outside support or pur-
suit of the class struggle through participation in the planned parliamentary elec-
tions, in spite of the falsification they expected. Dimitrov commented on the mes-
sage that the CPG should go for the second one, since no outside support is possible
in the given case, and without it the Greek democracy would be doomed to defeat
while its cadres would face physical annihilation. In his reply of 8th February, the
Soviet Foreign Minister wrote to Dimitrov to communicate to the Greeks that Mos-
cow also advised them to take the second line of conduct – namely the one of non-
armed struggle and expansion of mass struggle for democracy combined with mass
self-defense19.
All in all, the hard-core line in the CPG, represented by its Secretary General
Nikos Zachariadis, for boycott of the March elections gained the upper hand. After
the armed clashes on the election day of 31st March, Greece engaged in a new stage
of the civil conflict which became popular under the name of the Third Round of the
Civil War. Without Moscow’s formal approval, Zachariadis started looking for the
other Communist Parties’ support. At the end of March and the beginning of April
1946, he was on a visit in Czechoslovakia. On his way back, he called in Belgrade
and Sofia. Unlike Tito’s full support, he was promised only “co-operation in the
future” at the meeting held with Dimitrov. Among others, Zachariadis put forward a
specific request in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania with regard to establish train-
ing centers for 8,000 officers and fighters20.
On the grounds of the available archives and materials one draws the implicit
conclusion that the CPG launched consultations with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and USSR
only after the re-establishment of guerrilla bands in Aegean Macedonia and Thessaly
back in August 194621. It is then that the CPG activated its contacts with the regimes
of its northern neighbours. Ioannis Ioannidis was appointed as a special envoy for

18
. 
, op. cit., 48-49.
19
*. , “+  +
 /
”, 105-106.
20
. , ! 

( 
, 135-136.
21
*. , “+  +
 /
”, c. 108.

47
contact. On 27th August he came to Sofia to solicit a meeting with Dimitrov, who
unluckily for him was at that time in Moscow again. And another CPG Politburo
member, Petros Rousos turned up here. Both of them insisted on setting off to Mos-
cow in order to report and talk to Dimitrov. In spite of their insistence and Zachariadis’
intercession, their trip to Moscow failed. On 12th September 1946, Ioannidis arrived
in Sofia once again. That time the talk with Dimitrov took place. He handed him
over a “CPG Memorandum to the fraternal Communist Parties’ attention”. The
Memorandum read that the guerrilla army needed a growth from 4,000 to 15-20,000
in order to deal with the government troops. To that end, the CPG made a request for
aid in terms of foodstuffs, garments, arms and ammunitions. It was brought to light
that after Varkiza there were hidden weapons available to equip 12,000 men only
which called for support to equip 8,000 more fighters22.
After the hostilities had expanded, the Greek Communists’ requests for out-
side help became more frequent to the point of permanence. At end-September 1946,
Ioannidis sent again a letter to Dimitrov in Moscow in the same meaning. After
having emphasized on the upcoming signature of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and
the problems stemming out of the recognition of the Bulgarian government by the
Western Powers, the Bulgarian Party Chief advised the Greeks to turn for help to
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union23.
At the same time, however, Bulgaria provided assistance to the CPG cadres,
trained in Bulkes, Yugoslavia, to be clandestinely transferred to Greece. On 11th
September, the first group of six organizers of the guerrilla movement transgressed
the border in the region of Ivailovgrad. On 10th October 1946, the CPG solicited the
Bulgarian assistance with the transfer of 100 more people from Bulkes to Western
Thrace as well as that of some amount of weapons. Dimitrov reckoned that it could
be done not earlier than the intricate parliamentary elections of 27th October 1946.
As a result of the complications that occurred, the BCP Secretary Valko Chervenkov
insisted in a cable as dated 20th November to Ioannidis, staying at that time in Belgrade,
for stalling the process. On 10th November 1946, Dimitrov received Ioannidis, who
was in Sofia again and made him familiar with his own view as well as Moscow
standpoint on the events in Greece. He pointed out that the international environ-
ment on the one hand and the winter season which was coming closer on the other
were adverse to any large-scale guerrilla activities and also recommended that the
efforts should be focused on mass political struggle within the law limits in order to
preserve the CPG cadres. In his reply Ioannidis shared the thought that Dimitrov’s
point of view fell in line with CPG’s line of conduct. Also, the Greek high-ranking
Communist functionary made a direct appeal to Moscow for financial aid, his en-
treaty being backed up by Dimitrov’s favourable intercession24.

22
. , ! 

( 
, 136-137.
23
Ibid., p. 137.
24
Ibid., p. 138.

48
 By the end of 1946, Bulgaria was not committed to providing systematic or-
ganized support to the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG). It was hard to obtain and
happened in a rather accidental way. For instance, the latest cable in a row with a
request for help from Ioannidis in Belgrade was endorsed by Dimitrov in the follow-
ing way: “At present no armed support should be expected.” However, Ioannidis did
not despair, yet he managed to work out some financial aid for the DAG. Besides, the
CPG representatives in Bulgaria were given the opportunity to carry out some orga-
nizational activities. The assistance with transferring the underground revolutionary
cadres from Bulkes also continued. By February 1947, 330 men altogether were led
through the border. All of them were equipped by the Bulgarian authorities with
arms of foreign origin. The Greek insurgents were also given medical aid, the in-
jured received treatment in Bulgarian hospitals. There is some evidence available
that by the beginning of April 1947 there was an operational training course on
Bulgarian soil for DAG fighters meant to be sent to Greece25.
At the same time, relations between the two neighbour countries were still at
dead-end with no bright perspectives of improvement. The signature of the Peace
Treaty between Bulgaria and the victorious countries on 10th February 1947 in Paris
laid the formal legal basis for adjustment of the relations. Eventually, that did not
happen. Since Greece’s territorial claims were unsatisfied, its government made a
strong protest against the Paris Conference and the Council of the Foreign Ministers’
refusal to change the Greek-Bulgarian border. It was also deeply discontented with
the reparations stipulated by the Peace Treaty, which amounted to $45 million, and
which it considered was not enough. The Greek discontent found a kind of expres-
sion in the delay of the deposition of the Treaty ratification, which happened two
month later after USA, USSR and Great Britain. That is how for Greece the Treaty
entered into force not as of 15th September 1947 but since 14th November 1947 on,
which is eventually the date of deposition of the ratification26.
The incidents on the Northern Greek border exercised some additional pres-
sure on the bilateral relations. The Athens government made accusations against
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania for providing support to the guerrillas and med-
dling with the Greek civil conflict. On 19th November 1946, the UN Security Coun-
cil voted for the establishment of Commission of Investigation, which was tasked to
examine the border situation and report on the results of its work.
The Commission became operational at the end-January 1947 and completed
its work by the end-May with the submission of its report to the Security Council on
27th June. Eight out of its 11 members endorsed the conclusion that: “Yugoslavia and
to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria had supported the guerrilla warfare in
Greece.”27 Despite of the emergency measures taken by the government in Sofia

25
Ibid., 139-140.
26
>. ?, “'


  :   
&
  +  0 
  
 /
”,  
 
, 1992, 7 2, . 61.
27
The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, Washington, D.C, 1947, . 24.

49
with the purpose to conceal its interference with the Civil War, the findings of the
Commission showed that the Bulgarian authorities helped the Greek guerrillas in
and out of the country’s territory and provided hospitalization and political indoctri-
nation in a special camp in Berkovitsa (North-West Bulgaria)28.
The border clashes that reached the point of paroxysm because of the crossing
of the Greek-Bulgarian border by the guerrillas after fights with the government
troops raised anxiety in Moscow. In accordance with the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria,
the Soviet troops residing in Bulgaria were meant to leave the country, and hence the
Bulgarian armed and security forces had to take over the country’s defense. At the
end-July 1947 the Soviet Military Headquarters in Sofia submitted the government a
document with recommendation addressed to the Bulgarian Chief of the General
Staff and the Chief of the Border Troops to take measures in view to ensure cover of
the Southern border aiming at beating back or capturing the Greek guerrilla bands
making incursions into the Bulgarian territory29.
Yet, the CPG representatives ignored the tricky situation Bulgaria was in. Fol-
lowing Zacharidis’ meeting with Stalin in May 1947 when he was promised diplo-
matic and material support, CPG’s requests towards Bulgaria and the other socialist
countries multiplied. With connection to the plans of activation of the DAG forces in
the mid-August 1947, the CPG leaders took steps before Belgrade, Sofia, Tirana,
Bucharest and Moscow with the purpose to obtain more substantial military support.
On 15th August 1947, the CPG representative in Bulgaria Kostas Saperas made a
request for a large amount of weapons including guns, mortars, submachine guns,
explosives and so on. In a letter to the BCP leadership, he stated that: “Your support
is considerable but is not enough.” Following consultations with Kremlin, Dimitrov
replied: “The support we provide to our neighbours should reach the greatest extent
possible. Still, it is necessary to strengthen and improve the precautionary measures
against failures.”30
The appeals for materiel aid became ever more pressing in the wake of the 3rd
Plenum of the CPG held in September 1947 in Belgrade when the plan “Limnes”
was adopted with the purpose of conquering free territories in Northern Greece with
Thessaloniki as center and tripling the DAG personnel up to 50,000-60,000 strong.
The Bulgarian Party and State leadership was not able to satisfy the DAG grown
needs, and still they allowed free transit through the country’s territory for the mili-
tary equipment and materiel sent by the other socialist countries. It was obvious that
at that time the leading role in the procurement of the guerrillas pertained to Yugo-
slavia and to the lesser extent to Bulgaria. A fact that infuriated Saperas who, in
November, made accusations against the Bulgarian authorities of breaking the prom-
ises they had made31.

28
Ibid., p. 21.
29
*. , “
&
 ' '  
 
 /
  0  (1947-1949)”,
 
  

    , 62, 1998, . 108.
30
Ibid., 110-110.
31
. , ! 

( 
, 141-142.

50
 On 21st October 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 7109/II
with regard to the Greek issue setting forth a recommendation to Albania, Yugosla-
via and Bulgaria on the one hand and to Greece on the other that they should normal-
ize their diplomatic relations. The regulation provided for foundation of a Special
Committee on the Balkans, which would supervise and support the four countries’
governments in their efforts to bring their relations back to normal. Referring to the
said resolution, the Greek government is the first one to undertake diplomatic prob-
ing in view of prospective restoration of the diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. The
hidden reasons for that should be seen in the internal situation of the country itself.
The DAG military achievements brought about its widespread control over a consid-
erable part of country’s territory. Should the relations with the northern neighbours
be brought to normal, the Athens government would be enabled to set up a legal
barrier against the support that was providing to the guerrilla fighters. On 23rd De-
cember 1947, DAG’s radio heralded the setting up of Provisional government headed
by General Markos Vathiadis in the territories under its control. The news redoubled
the Athens’ fears that the government of the Left could probably be recognized by
the northern neighbours and thus impair Greece’s international position32.
It was obvious that at that time the Bulgarian Party and State leaders were
cherishing hopes for Greek Communists’ victory over the “monarchic-fascist” gov-
ernment. That was proved out by Dimitrov’s statement (who had already taken up
office of Prime Minister at the end of 1946) in January 1948 in which he said that
Greece would also be involved in the Balkan Federation that was planned at that
time. Although Dimitrov had to retract his statement later on under Stalin’s caustic
criticism, it explicitly showed his confidence in the victory of the Left in Greece.
That fact along with Bulgaria’s open reluctance to enforce effective control on the
common border which would prevent providing support to the DAG clearly evinced
that Sofia was taking its time in restoring the official diplomatic relations with
Athens33.
At the beginning of 1948, the DAG efforts to implement the plan “Limnes”,
which would set the preconditions for recognition of the Provisional government
broke down. Neither Moscow nor the other states of the Soviet block did it. What is
more, at the dramatic meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Party delegations in
February, Stalin openly voices his idea that the uprising in Greece had to beat a
retreat, since the Unites States would never tolerate infringement on their interests
and communications in the Mediterranean34. At that moment Stalin restrained his
actions only to fully impose the Soviet totalitarian model upon the rest of the social-
ist countries and make them fully dependent on Moscow. He was not willing to
provoke exacerbation of the confrontation with the United States that became ac-

32
>. ?, op. cit., 62-63.
33
Ibid., p. 74.
34
@.  , )* 

*", Frankfurt/M., 1970, 172-173.

51
tively involved in the Greek Civil War to the side of the Athens government and in
addition to that still had the monopoly of the nuclear weapons.
The course of the events and the reticence of Moscow made the Bulgarian
government to be very cautious and reserved about the ceaseless Greek appeals for
help. In April 1948, in reply to the last appeal in a row, Chervenkov notified Zachar-
iadis in person that Bulgaria would send only foodstuffs. At the beginning of June,
the arising problems made Dimitrov seek for a private meeting with the Greek Com-
munist leader. It took place on 11th June in Sofia. Zachariadis voiced his confidence
that the outcome of the Civil War would be successful for the CPG an made the one
more request for military aid including anti-tank guns and mortars The Bulgarian
Prime Minister informed Moscow on the matter, asking for further instructions. That
clearly evinces to what an extent the BCP was dependent and subject to Kremlin35.
The Civil War in Greece raised unceasing problems and complications for the
Bulgarian State. The Bulgarian military and border authorities were seriously wor-
ried about the fact that the Greek guerrillas made continuous incursions into the
Bulgarian territory where the fights against the government troops were still going
on, besides while doing so they often took with them captured or kidnapped people.
In addition, a multitude of refugees would flee across the border, seeking asylum in
Bulgaria. The issue about how to receive and accommodate all those people was
discussed on a BCP Politburo meeting on 20th May when some measures were laid
down for giving them relief36.
At mid-August during the fierce fights in Northern Greece, the severe inci-
dents multiplied along the border, which frequently developed into direct clashes.
The Bulgarian government was deeply worried about the situation and apprehended
that the incidents were a prelude to a more serious military conflict. It gave notice to
the CPG leaders and the DAG commanders to take the necessary measures. In cipher
message dated 11th September sent by the Minister of Interior Anton Yugov to Za-
chariadis a case was mentioned when a DAG detachment crossed the Bulgarian bor-
der and the government troops shelled the Bulgarian territory. In reply to that Za-
chariadis promised to take the necessary measures in order to put an end to the in-
fringements37.
By coincidence, Tito and Stalin were on bad terms exactly in the heat of fights
from June to August 1948 that the DAG was compelled to engage in the Grammos
Mountain against the government army that excelled in every way. The event had a
disadvantageous influence on the chances for victory of the Left since the CPG lead-
ers endorsed the resolution of the Cominformburo dated back in June 1948 censur-
ing the Yugoslav Communist Party. It resulted in exacerbation of the relations be-
tween the two Parties and the Yugoslav support to the Greek guerrillas waned.

35
. , ! 

( 
, 143-144.
36
*. , “
&
 ”, . 116.
37
Ibid., p. 117.

52
 Under the new circumstances the Greek requests for aid from Sofia became
even more insistent, but the Bulgarian leaders on their part sought approval from
Moscow and restrained from action without having a Soviet go-ahead. For instance,
in a cable dated back on 22nd August, Dimitrov notified Stalin about the consecutive
request for 400 tons of flour, a considerable amount of arms and ammunitions, and
other materials and asked him for further instructions38. It was obvious that Sofia
aimed at involving the other socialist countries and thus to get rid of part of the
material burden. On 20th November Kostov wrote to Zachariadis: “Nikos, we’ve
forwarded your request to the Romanian comrades who are in a better position...”39
Since the autumn of 1948 the Bulgarian aid to the DAG went a level up in
terms of organization. On grounds of conspiracy, the staff involved in procurement
and deliveries was replaced by Bulgarian personnel, which on its part gave rise to
Saperas’ discontent. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia’s withdrawal from the conflict in Greece
resulted in a more frequent use of the Bulgarian territory for transportation of the
materiel aid for the guerrillas. Zachariadis addressed a personal request to Sofia for
provision of means of transport for delivery of supplies. Not being in a position to
procure the necessary number of trucks, the BCP forwarded the request to Romania
from where were provided 15 vehicles40.
On 30th December 1948, Zachariadis met Dimitrov, Kostov and Yugov in per-
son in Sofia. In the course of the talks he said he anticipated a favourable outcome of
the struggle and arranged for specific aid which Bulgaria undertook to provide in the
future. The course of the events in Greece was discussed on a special meeting of the
BCP Secretariat held on 19th January 1949. Zahariadis in person familiarized the
audience with the situation and defined the perspectives before the DAG as “not
bad”. During the first quarter of 1949, 400-450 tons of war materiel were prepared
for transfer from Bulgaria with the plan to transport it to the Prespa region but diffi-
culties arouse with the transportation through the Yugoslav territory41.
At the end of 1948, Moscow started to show less and less interest and kept its
distance vis-à-vis the events in Greece. Stalin focused his efforts on stigmatizing and
ousting Tito, while in a wider European perspective the bipolar contest, further exac-
erbated by the Berlin crisis, shifted towards Central Europe. That new Soviet atti-
tude predefined to a great extent the outcome of the Greek Civil War42.
Notwithstanding all of the above said, Bulgaria continued to do its best in
order to ease DAG’s condition. A specialized center meant to the treatment of the
injured and ill fighters was set up in Bankya near Sofia, where penicillin – in short
supply at that time – was delivered. After their recovery, they were taken back to the

38
. , ! 

( 
, 45-146.
39
*. , “+  +
 /
”, . 114.
40
. , ! 

( 
, . 146.
41
Ibid., p. 147.
42
*. , “
&
 ”, . 122.

53
Berkovitsa camp where by March 1949 around 2,000 people were staying. From
there and with Bulgarian co-operation, they were sent to Greece. Since March until
mid-April 750 people were transferred43.
In the first months of 1949, the CPG gave its formal assent in support of the
appeal for establishment of Macedonian state launched by the National Liberation
Front of Greek Macedonia (NOF). The available archives reject the assumption that
the position was taken on instructions from either Sofia or Moscow. Chervenkov
addressed a query in a cipher message to the Soviet authorities about their approval
or disapproval of the idea of gathering a NOF congress, pointing out that as far as the
Bulgarian Communists were concerned such an appeal for Macedonian unification
within the framework of a Balkan Federation “was premature and inexpedient”. Stalin
replied on 12th March 1949 making it clear that the Greek Communists had been
advised “to avoid discussing all matters concerning the future of the Macedonian
people within the framework of a Balkan Federation and to stick to the specific task
of calling up or mobilizing the population of Greek Macedonia to fight against the
monarchic-fascist regime in Greece and its inspirers for a free and democratic
Greece”44.
Although measures were taken to conceal Bulgaria’s assistance to the DAG, it
could not be hidden to the international community. In a report to the UN Special
Committee on the Balkans it was pointed out that from October 1948 to July 1949
there was an ample evidence indicating that Bulgaria had supplied the guerrillas
with large quantities of ammunitions and that the deliveries were well organized.
Allegedly, Bulgarian military men brought the supplies up to the border and handed
them over to DAG representatives45.
On 11th April 1949, Zachariadis arrived in Moscow on Soviet leaders’ invita-
tion. He was asked to cease the struggle and advised not to wait for further Soviet
assistance given the fact that since 1st May Bulgaria and Albania would close their
borders. The Soviet stand was a relief for the authorities in Sofia as its international
position and image were seriously marred by the UN accusations of involvement in
the Greek home affairs. On 18th April, the Bulgarian leadership addressed an invita-
tion to Zachariadis for a visit in Sofia in order to discuss with him the new state of
affairs. Instead, Partsalidis answered in written: “Nikos is absent. By termination the
deliveries, you are cutting off our hands.” Three days later, Zachariadis notified
Sofia that he accepted the invitation and launched a desperate appeal for renewal of
the supplies to the DAG in Central and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, where the
situation after cutting off the supplies deteriorated to its worst. He went on sending
dramatic calls for help and even made a suggestion in a radiogram dated back 11th
May that the requested petrol, oil and lubricants should be forwarded by boat to

43
. , ! 

( 
, 147-148.
44
*. , “
&
 ”, . 124.
45
. , ! 

( 
, . 147.

54
Albania. In all probability, after co-ordination with Moscow, the reply that arrived 9
days later was negative. At the same time the Bulgarian leaders were deeply con-
cerned about the fact that the national territory was still used for carrying out DAG’
military operations. They found themselves compelled to resort to disarmament of
the detachments that were crossing the border46.
Also, Sofia took no action following the pressing calls for material aid, which
continued to throughout the summer of 1949. At the end of August, the CPG Central
Committee addressed the one in a row request for arms, ammunitions and foodstuffs
to the rescue of 6th DAG Division in dire straits in Eastern Macedonia and Western
Thrace. Chervenkov forwarded it to Moscow and waited instructions. Meanwhile,
the Greek government forces and the DAG engaged the last bitter fights in the
Grammos Mountain. On 30th August, the last stronghold of resistance held by the
guerrillas caved in and their detachments withdrew in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia. Eventually, the end of the fights marked the end of the Civil War in Greece47.
Even after the DAG’ defeat, the CPG leaders continued to seek for Bulgarian
assistance for the remaining smaller bands in Greece. Saperas remained in Sofia and
at the beginning of December 1949 Dimitrios Vlandas, member of the Politburo also
joined him. He raised the issue about supplying garments and arms to the guerrillas
who numbered 3,000 people and were meant to continue the revolutionary activities
among the population. Chervenkov informed again Moscow on the matter, making
it clear that Bulgaria had put an end to all kind of special aids to the Greeks and
stating that restarting it would not be the right thing to do48.
After the Greek Left had been defeated, the Bulgarian government committed
itself to launch campaigns in defense of political, public and trade-union figures
whose life was in danger and also to provide support to the Greek émigrés who had
settled in the country. In 1949 the number of the latter reached 2,000 although as
time elapsed some more arrived in Bulgaria who, at first, had found political asylum
in other socialist countries. At mid-60s, the number of Greek political emigrants in
the country exceeded 7,500. Additionally, not only did the leaders’ body of the Greek
political emigration in its entirety settled in Sofia but also “ELAS Press”, its publish-
ing house was established there49.
In conclusion, it could be summarized that in spite of the unfavourable exter-
nal factors as well as the immediate risk of complications at international level, the
Bulgarian Communist government rendered substantial assistance to the Greek Left
both in terms of tangible and intangible assets. It was limited within the availability
size and was directly dependent on the Soviet policy towards the events in Greece
that in a number of cases did not meet the ever-increasing requirements of the CPG.

46
Ibid., 149-150.
47
Ibid., 150-151.
48
Ibid., p. 151.
49
*. , “+  +
 /
”, 115.

55
Anyhow, Bulgaria after having been beaten in WWII, running the risk of detrimental
complications at international level and in full disregard of the formal bilateral Greek-
Bulgarian relations violated the international law in the name of the Communist
solidarity. At the beginning of the Cold War and the polarization of the world, the
Bulgarian Communists considered their line of political conduct as the only one
which was necessary and made sense. However, the deep changes that occurred both
in the foreign and home environment were completely detrimental to the Greek Left
and that was the reason why in spite of its co-operation, Bulgaria was not in a posi-
tion either to influence the general drift of affairs to its advantage or to prevent its
defeat in the Civil War.

56