Cole V Cobb County

Case 1:17-cv-01378-WMR Document 68 Filed 03/19/19 Page 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION
v. ) FILE NO. 1:17-cv-01378-WMR
)
COBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,)
)
Defendant. )
)
)
ORDER
This case came before the Court on March 15, 2019 for oral argument on
Defendant Cobb County School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 54].
Having considered the Motion, arguments of counsel, and all appropriate matters of
record, the Court rules that the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 54] is
DENIED for the reasons and authority stated in Plaintiff’s responsive brief [Doc.
55].
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of March, 2019.
______________________________
WILLIAM M. RAY, II
United States District Judge
Northern District of Georgia
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
)
COBB COUNTY SCHOOL ) 1:17-cv-1378-WMR
DISTRICT and CHRIS RAGSDALE, )
Individually and in his capacity as ) JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
Superintendent of COBB COUNTY )
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
Plaintiff Bonnie Cole was and is a much-beloved elementary school
administrator in the Cobb County School District. Until 2016, she was the
Assistant Principal at Bullard Elementary School where, in 2015, several teachers
and Ms. Cole began to use “brain-based mindfulness” techniques to help students
manage the many stresses of modern schooling. These techniques had an
immediate and measureable effect on students’ performance, including a drastic
decrease in disruptive behaviors. However, in the Spring semester of 2016, a
religious “rancor” occurred when certain parents and teachers began to voice
religious objections to the mindfulness activities, and demanded that Ms. Cole
1
either “resign or be terminated” for implementing them. Rather than remaining
neutral and explaining to these objectors the secular purpose of the mindfulness
activities, Defendant instead immediately transferred Ms. Cole without
explanation, sending her to a different school many miles away. By doing so,
Defendant sent a clear message of endorsement of the religious objections against
and religious disapproval of Ms. Cole. She has suffered professionally and
personally as a result.
On summary judgment, Defendant now makes three attempts to avoid being
held responsible for its unconstitutional acts: (1) that Ms. Cole does not have
standing to sue, despite the fact that she clearly suffered as a result of Defendant’s
actions; (2) that Ms. Cole cannot show a basis to hold Defendant liable under
Monell v. Department of Human Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), even though the
record is clear that Defendant’s final policymaking authority (the Cobb County
Board of Education) explicitly decided to transfer Ms. Cole because of the
“disruption” cause by the religious outcry; and (3) that Ms. Cole cannot establish
an Establishment Clause violation, despite the ample record evidence that
Defendant’s actions had the effect of promoting a particular religious viewpoint at
the expense of Ms. Cole. As set forth below, Defendant’s arguments are without
merit, and Ms. Cole’s claim should be allowed to proceed to a jury.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff incorporates, in their entirety as if set forth fully herein, each of her
statements of material fact and responses to the statements of material fact filed by
Defendant in connection with the motion for summary judgment. 1
ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering the motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendant, “the judge’s function is not … to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The court
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and may not weigh
evidence or make credibility determinations, which are jury functions, not those of
a judge.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013).
1
These include: (1) Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts
as to Which There is no Genuine Issue to be Tried, submitted in support of
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 55-1);
and (2) Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts as to Which there is No Genuine Issue to be Tried (Doc. 55-2).
3
Ms. Cole filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, asserting a claim of
economic, emotional, and professional damages caused by Defendant’s violation
of her constitutional rights of freedom from establishment of religion. Defendant
ignored its constitutional obligations to remain neutral in a religious controversy
and instead unlawfully transferred her to another school at the religiously-
motivated request of one side in that dispute. Defendant claims that Ms. Cole (1)
does not have standing to sue, (2) cannot establish a basis to hold Defendant liable
for its actions, and (3) cannot establish a violation of the Constitution. Each of
these arguments disintegrates upon close inspection, leaving Defendant unable to
demonstrate that it is entitled to Summary Judgment. Given its own admissions
and the presence of genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury, summary
judgment must therefore be denied to Defendant, and Ms. Cole’s claim allowed to
proceed to trial.
II. Bonnie Cole Suffered an “Injury in Fact” and has Standing to Bring her
Claims against Defendant.
Bonnie Cole has standing to assert her claim because CCSD’s promotion of
the religious viewpoint of a group of parents violated her fundamental rights and
caused her actual harm. To establish standing, a plaintiff seeking to invoke this
Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the alleged misconduct; and (3) a
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. L.M.P. on

4
behalf of E.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 879 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir.
2018). Defendant argues only that Ms. Cole cannot show an “injury in fact,” and
does not address the issues of causation or redressability. Doc. 54-2, pp. 4-7. As
discussed below, Defendant’s assertion is without merit, as Ms. Cole can show that
she personally suffered the direct effects of CCSD’s unconstitutional conduct.
It is true that, in order to have standing, a Plaintiff must claim more than a
generalized Constitutional violation by a government. Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485
(1982). In other words, a generalized interest in a government that does not
establish a religion is not sufficient; “a plaintiff must demonstrate that [s]he
personally has been subjected to an actual or threatened injury.” Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d
1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (citations and internal punctuation
omitted).
On the other hand, a plaintiff has standing to bring suit if she is personally
“directly affected by the laws and practices against whom their complaints are
directed,” is “forced to assume special burdens” because of the unconstitutional
action, or comes “into direct contact with the offensive conduct.” Saladin v. City of
Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1987); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, fn. 9 (1963) (where a party is “directly affected by
5
the laws and practices against which their complaints are directed,” such interests
“surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain”). It is not necessary to
show “proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed” in order to establish
standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause. Id. If the
Plaintiff herself personally experienced the constitutional violation—a violation of
her fundamental right to be free from such establishment—she can assert a claim,
even if only for nominal damages. See Bats v. Cobb Cty., GA, 495 F. Supp. 2d
1311, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“a plaintiff who vindicates a right under
the Establishment Clause, but does not demonstrate actual injury, is entitled to an
award of nominal damages); Selman v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:02-CV-2325-
CC, 2005 WL 8157364, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2005) (ordering an award of
nominal damages based on a violation of the Establishment Clause by the Cobb
County Board of Education).
Certainly, then, a Plaintiff who has suffered economic injuries caused by
unconstitutional government action can establish that she was personally affected
by that action. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (“[s]he who is likely to be financially injured may be a
reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest”)
(internal punctuation and citations omitted). However, the Supreme Court also
“has repeatedly emphasized that a showing of noneconomic injury is sufficient to
6
confer standing.” A.C.L.U. of GA v. Rabun Cty. C.O.C., 698 F.2d at 1104 (citing
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 (“standing may be predicated on noneconomic
injury”); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973) (standing “not confined to those who could
show economic harm”); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 73 (U.S. 1978) (finding “environmental and aesthetic consequences” to
satisfy injury-in-fact requirement)).
Noneconomic injuries caused by a constitutional violation can include
emotional distress. Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345
(11th Cir. 2005) (describing emotional distress damages in the context of
constitutional claims). Such damages can also include damage to reputation. Berry
v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 18-CV-60722, 2018 WL 3126218, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June
26, 2018) (“Plaintiffs allege that they sustained damage to their reputation—
another particularized and concrete injury in fact”)(internal punctuation omitted).
A “plaintiff's testimony, standing alone, can support an award of compensatory
damages for emotional distress based on a constitutional violation [where that
testimony establishes] that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional
distress…” Akouri, 408 F.3d at 1345.
Finally, this Circuit has recognized that a public employee who is transferred
for an unconstitutional purpose has a cognizable claim, even where the transfer
7
does not include a salary decrease. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1564
(11th Cir. 1994) (finding a cognizable claim where an employee was transferred
even though her salary did not decrease), citing Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 73 (1990) (observing that “[e]mployees who find themselves
in dead-end positions due to their political backgrounds are adversely affected,” as
are “employees denied transfers” for unconstitutional purposes). In this way, the
Eleventh Circuit is consistent with numerous other Courts recognizing “that an
employee who is subjected to an involuntary lateral transfer on unconstitutional
grounds has a cognizable claim.” Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 709 F. Supp. 2d
628, 641 (S.D. Ohio 2010), citing Boger v. Wayne Cty., 950 F.2d 316, 321–22,
324–26 (6th Cir.1991); Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292,
316 (4th Cir. 2006) (“With regard to the retaliation claim, a public employer
contravenes a public employee's First Amendment rights when it discharges or
refuses to rehire the employee, or when it makes decisions relating to promotion,
transfer, recall, and hiring based on the exercise of” that employee's
[constitutional] rights”)(emphasis added). Such an individual may suffer numerous
non-economic damages as a result of the transfer, as the Sixth Circuit explained in
Boger:
Plaintiff need not have suffered loss of salary, promotional

opportunities, seniority or other monetary deprivations to have a
cognizable interest protected by the First Amendment or the equal
protection clause. In both counts, the plaintiff alleged injuries
8
consisting of extreme embarrassment, humiliation, extreme mental

anguish, and loss of professional esteem…
950 F.2d at 321. 2 Thus “an employer possessing [complete discretion to transfer an
employee from one position to another position within the same class] may not
transfer an employee for reasons that infringe upon rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution.” Id. at 324.
Bonnie Cole was personally and directly affected by CCSD’s
unconstitutional decision to transfer her in order to assuage the religious concerns
of some parents in her school. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d at 692;
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. First of all, CCSD
2
These rulings are consistent with the numerous rulings in this Circuit that
an involuntary transfer, even without economic damages, may constitute an
adverse employment action in the context of Title VII or similar claims. See, e.g.,
Peterson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 5:14CV265-MW/CJK, 2015 WL 5698501, at
*5 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2015) (noting in a Title VII retaliation case, that the
plaintiff's transfer “to the undesirable night shift, standing alone, could dissuade a
reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity and thus constitute an
adverse employment action”); Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 1254, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“a significant change in employment can
occur regardless of whether the individual retains the same salary and benefits”).
However, in the constitutional context, “adverse employment actions” are more
broadly defined than in the Title VII context, including any action that is “likely to
chill” the exercise of a fundamental right. McCabe, 12 F.3d at 1563; Goffer v.
Marbury, 956 F.2d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1992).
9
cannot dispute that Ms. Cole was transferred, and an unconstitutional transfer itself
may be the basis of a cognizable claim. McCabe 12 F.3d at 1564; Rutan, 497 U.S.
at 73; Boger v. Wayne Cty., 950 F.2d at 321–22, 324–26 Ridpath v. Bd. of
Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d at 316. Consequently, even if she were unable
to establish actual damages, she could still seek an award of nominal damages for
the County’s transferring her for an unconstitutional reason. Bats v. Cobb Cty., GA,
495 F. Supp. 2d at 1319; Selman v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 8157364, at *1;
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 304-307. She thus has standing to sue. Id.; Saladin, 812
F.2d at 692; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
Ms. Cole has also established that she suffered actual harm in the form of
economic damages. Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154. Her
commute was extended to “two and a half to three times” the distance she
previously traveled, adding two hours of time to her daily commute. (Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts (“SAMF”), ¶65.) Her work hours are also
extended an “additional two to three hours” due to additional work that must be
performed at her new school. (SAMF ¶66.) This additional commute and work
time has deprived Ms. Cole of her professional opportunities, as she had to shutter
a growing Reiki practice at Breath of Life due to the additional restrictions on her
time. (SAMF ¶67.)
10
Ms. Cole has also established through her testimony that she suffered
emotional distress, mental anguish, and loss of professional reputation. A.C.L.U. of
GA v. Rabun Cty. C.O.C., 698 F.2d at 1104; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486. Akouri
v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 408 F.3d at 1345. The fact that CCSD not only
refused to support her in the face of baseless religious complaints, but in fact sided
with those making the complaints to her detriment, critically damaged her
reputation and was viewed as a tacit confirmation that she had done something
inappropriate—which she had not. (SAMF ¶60.) The emotional damages Ms. Cole
experienced as a consequence were severe. She stated that when she found out
about her transfer “an hour before the board meeting,” she was “in a state of
shock” and emotional turmoil,” and suffered from a “broken heart.” (SAMF ¶61.)
She suffered panic attacks and mood swings, “[cried] all day,” and “would flip out
at random moments.” (SAMF ¶62.) She began to see a counselor, and began taking
Klonopin and Xanax for her mental distress. (SAMF ¶63.) Eventually, her doctor
suggested that she take FMLA leave for the remainder of the school year in order
to deal with the stress of the situation, which she did. (SAMF ¶64.)
Thus, Ms. Cole has established not only that she was transferred—which
itself provides standing to sue—but that her transfer resulted in both economic and
noneconomic damages which are redressable by this Court, in addition to the
nominal damages she is due as one who suffered a deprivation of a Constitutional
11
right. She has thus established (1) that she suffered an injury in fact (her transfer
and the resulting economic, professional, and emotional damages), (2) that the
complained of action (an unconstitutional transfer to assuage religious concerns of
some community members) caused her injury; and (3) that she is therefore entitled
to at least nominal damages for having been personally subjected to
unconstitutional state establishment of religion, but also for her actual economic
and noneconomic damages resulting therefrom. Broward Cty., 879 F.3d at 1281;
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485; Rabun Cty., 698 F.2d at 1104. Defendant’s claim
that she does not have standing to sue is therefore without merit, and this Court
should allow her claims to proceed to a jury.
III. Defendant May Be Held Liable for its Decision to Transfer Bonnie
Cole under Monell.3
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality or other local
government—particularly a school board—may be held liable under §1983, noting
that “Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be
included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (emphasis in original).
Reading the language of §1983 against the legislative history, the Court concluded
that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
3
Plaintiff agrees that, as a matter of state law, the Cobb County School Board is
the final policymaking authority with respect to employment decisions made by the
Cobb County School District. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-211.
12
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on
a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691 (emphasis in original). However, the
Court emphasized that where “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers,” a local governing body
can be sued directly under §1983. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). 4
The Supreme Court has since recognized that “Monell's language makes
clear that it expressly envisioned other officials ‘whose acts or edicts may fairly be
said to represent official policy,’ Monell, supra, 436 U.S., at 694, and whose
decisions therefore may give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.” Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986), In overruling the 6th Circuit’s
determination that a single decision of a policymaker cannot constitute a “policy”
under Monell, The Court stated that a single decision, “tailored to a particular
situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations,” still constitutes
4
In addition, local governing bodies “may be sued for constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels.”
Id. at 690-91. However, despite Defendant’s straw-man argument to the contrary,
Ms. Cole has never argued that her rights were violated due to a “custom” of the
Cobb County School Board, but because of its decision to transfer her to quell
religious unrest in the community. [Doc. 11.] There is no requirement that a
Plaintiff establish existence of a “custom” where she complains of a specific
unlawful decision instead. Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481
(11th Cir. 1991) (“if plaintiff succeeds in proving a city policy of discrimination
based on the actions of a “final policymaker,” he would have no need to prove in
addition a custom or practice”).
13
an act of official policy “[i]f the decision to adopt that particular course of action is
properly made by that government's authorized decisionmakers.” Id. at 469. The
Court later further clarified that such decisions extend to approval of a
subordinate’s decision: “[i]f the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's
decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the
municipality because their decision is final.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 127 (1988).
Importantly, although the issues can be easily conflated, the question of
whether a basis exists to hold a municipality liable for a potential unconstitutional
action under Monell (a legal question for the Court) is separate from the issue of
whether the municipality is ultimately liable (that is, whether the complained-of
action is actually unlawful—a question for the jury). See Monell, 436 U.S. at 713-
714 (ruling only on the question of the potential liability of a municipality and
school board, not on whether the complained-of act was unconstitutional); see also
Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469 (ruling only on the question of “whether, and in what
circumstances, a decision by municipal policymakers on a single occasion” may
subject the municipality to liability, and not discussing the the constitutionality of
the complained-of action); Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (ruling only to “define the
proper legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by municipal
officials or employees may expose the municipality itself to liability under 42
14
U.S.C. § 1983,” not on the constitutionality of the underlying action); Doe v. Sch.
Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that the
Court of Appeals “need not reach” the question of a constitutional violation where
the predicate issue of §1983 liability was already decided); Scala v. City of Winter
Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1403 (11th Cir. 1997) (ruling only on the question of Monell
liability, not on whether the complained-of decision “was improperly motivated”);
Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Only after this determination
is made is the second step of the inquiry relevant: Did the challenged decision or
act of the official cause the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights? The answer to this
question is, of course, for the jury.”).
Thus, in order to establish the possibility of liability under Monell, Ms. Cole
need only show that the act of which she complains was a decision taken by the
Cobb County School Board as final policymaker. Monell, 436 U.S. 658. She may
do so by showing that the Cobb County School Board “approve[d] a subordinate's
decision and the basis for it[.]”Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Having done so, Ms.
Cole will have satisfied Monell and its progeny’s requirements as to potential
liability; she may then establish that liability by showing that the decision and basis
for it were unconstitutional. Id.; see Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d at 793 (stating that
“second step” of inquiry into deprivation of constitutional rights may be made
“only after” a determination of Monell liability).
15
Here, the record is clear that the Cobb County School Board approved both
the decision to transfer Ms. Cole and basis for that decision, both of which were
presented to the Board by Superintendent Ragsdale and Assistant Superintendent
John Adams. As Mr. Adams testified, he and Dr. Rivera “came up with the
recommendation” to transfer Ms. Cole, to which Ragsdale “essentially assented.”
(SAMF ¶43.) Before presenting this decision to the Board, Adams’ office
generated a “personnel report that goes to the Board that lists transfers, people that
go on leave, et cetera. Sometimes that’s 15, even 30 pages.” (SAMF ¶44.) He also
generated a “shorter executive session personnel report” which specifically lists the
names of assistant principals and principals who are being transferred. (SAMF
¶45.) Adams testified that he always “meets with Mr. Ragsdale prior to a board
meeting and go[es] over the personnel report with him. But typically, Mr. Ragsdale
looks at it and then puts it down, and we tend to talk about other things…He is
very hands off on personnel…I can’t recall a time when he has overruled one.”
(SAMF ¶46.) This shorter list of assistant principals and principals was then
presented to the Board in “executive session,” containing a total of 12 individuals.
(SAMF ¶47.) The Board then votes to approve the list of personnel changes
presented to them as a whole. (SAMF ¶48.)
As Ragsdale testified, during the executive session, John Adams “identified
Bonnie Cole in that because the Board had received communication from the
16
community” and that Adams “referenced, you know, the situation going on at the
school.” (SAMF ¶49.) Ragsdale further testified that Adams said something along
the lines of “as the board, you know, is probably aware, many of you have gotten
emails about the situation going on at the school. Ms. Cole is the assistant principal
at that particular school.” (SAMF ¶50.) According to Ragsdale, Adams then
specifically referenced the controversy that had occurred in the community as a
result of parents’ religious complaints about the mindfulness program. (SAMF
¶51.) As Ragsdale admitted, the board then approved the transfer of Ms. Cole
because of the “disruption” caused by parents who were offended by the
mindfulness program for religious reasons. (SAMF ¶52.)
The Board’s vote to approve Adams and Ragsdale’s transfer of Ms. Cole
was a “decision” of a “final policymaker” for the purposes of Monell liability.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (approval of a subordinate's decision “and the basis for
it” constitutes a “decision” for Monell purposes). The Board was presented with
the basis for the decision, which was the “disruption” caused by the religious
complaints of a contingent of parents whose religious sensibilities were offended.
(SAMF ¶53.) The Board therefore also approved the “basis” of the decision.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Clearly, a majority of the Board voted for the action,
as the transfer then occurred. (SAMF ¶54.) This vote constituted a “decision” for
which—if the decision is determined to be unconstitutional—Defendant may be
17
held liable. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 480; Monell, 436 U.S. at
713-714; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d at 793. Ms. Cole has therefore established a
basis for holding Defendant liable for her §1983 claims. Id. 5
IV. By Failing to Remain Neutral with Respect to a Religious Dispute

and Transferring Ms. Cole at the Behest of Individuals Raising
Religious Concerns, CCSD Violated the Constitution.
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....” U.S. Const.
Amend. I. This mandate extends to state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
5
Smith v. Cobb County School District, No. 1:10-CV-848-TWT, 2013 WL
4028856 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013), cited at length by Defendant, has no bearing on
this case. Smith concerned a plaintiff who argued that the Cobb County School
Board had a “custom” of “rubber-stamping” employment decisions made by
subordinate employees, including the superintendent, such that those employees
were in fact the “final policy makers” who could subject the School District to
liability. Id. at *3-4. This Court disagreed, ruling correctly that the School Board
had “final policymaking authority” as to employment decisions under state law,
and concluding that the record showed that the Board had taken steps to ensure that
its decision was not being made on an unlawful retaliatory basis. Id. at *4-5. In
contrast, in this case, the record is clear that the Board voted to transfer Ms. Cole
after being presented with the decision and basis for that decision (to quell
religiously-motivated “disruptions”) by Adams and Ragsdale. See Infra p. 15.
Regardless of how Board members themselves might have testified when deposed,
the record is clear that they were presented with and considered a specific rationale
for the transfer and decided to take action based on that presentation. Id. Thus,
beyond the fact that Ms. Cole does not assert the existence of a “custom,” but
claims a specific decision by the Board violated her constitutional rights, Smith’s
holding does not preclude a finding for Ms. Cole on Monell liability.
18
While the Constitution does not guarantee that a School Board can always
avoid conflict with respect to religious controversies, it does require that the Board
remain neutral in the face of such controversies. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
622, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2116, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971) (“Ordinarily political debate
and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system of government…”); Smith v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The religion clauses
of the first amendment require that states “pursue a course of complete neutrality
toward religion.”) Thus, no State can “pass laws which aid one religion” or that
“prefer one religion over another.” Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S.
1, 16 (1947). In other words, “the clause against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and State.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Consequently, when it comes to religious controversies,
the Government—and in particular a school district—is not to take sides.
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162
L.Ed.2d 729 (2005) (“When the government acts with the ostensible and
predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates the central Establishment
Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the
government's ostensible object is to take sides”).
19
In analyzing whether the wall of separation has been breached by a
particular government action, Courts are to look at three criteria: “[f]irst, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Smith v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612–13). As described by Justice O’Connor, “[t]he purpose
prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or
disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either
question should render the challenged practice invalid.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (J.
O’Connor, Concurring) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “[t]he effects test
of Lemon is violated whenever government action creates an identification of the
state with a religion, or with religion in general, or when the effect of the
governmental action is to endorse one religion over another, or to endorse religion
in general.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585 (1992).
Defendant claims that its decision to transfer Ms. Cole “was based entirely
on the severity of the disruption caused by Plaintiff’s mindfulness program at
20
Bullard Elementary,” and argues that this disruption was not based on any
“religious” grounds. [Doc. 54-2, p. 17.] This assertion ignores the fact that the
individuals causing the disruption were primarily voicing religious complaints.
(SAMF ¶¶25-39.)
In early 2016, Adams learned that certain religious parents at Bullard were
in uproar over the use of mindfulness activities at Bullard, which they claimed
offended their religious beliefs. (SAMF ¶¶25-29, 32.) Adams also learned that
community members were having prayer meetings, including one where a group
converged on Bullard Elementary School and laid their hands on Bonnie Cole’s
office windows. (SAMF ¶32.) Multiple emails sent to both Ragsdale and Adams
expressed, in vehement terms, religious concerns that Ms. Cole was teaching
“Buddhism” or “Hinduism” via the mindfulness program, calling it a “disturbing
activity” and demanding that Ms. Cole “resign or be terminated.” (SAMF ¶¶25-
33.) Soon thereafter, Mr. Adams attended a “Coffee and Conversation” meeting
held by Bullard Principal Dr. Patrice Moore, at which a group of parents
vehemently expressed their religious opposition to the mindfulness program.
(SAMF ¶¶34-39.) Following that meeting, Adams received an email from a parent
in attendance at that meeting, which stated “with the focus now being on how we
as a school community move forward and heal the divisions, I think it is going to
be very difficult for that to happen with parents and staff as she is still an
21
administrator at the school." (SAMF ¶39.) Adams then responded to this parent,
praising his “reasonable, balanced perspective” and stating that “we are indeed
continuing to closely monitor, review, and discuss the matter at the executive
cabinet level and will take any additional action as may be needed." (SAMF ¶40.)
Adams testified that “[g]iven what I saw at the coffee meeting, town hall, given
that the level of rancor and disruption that occurred… her continued presence at
that school would be -- continue to be disruptive.” (SAMF ¶41.) He then
recommended her transfer to Ragsdale. (SAMF ¶42.) Later, Adams submitted the
decision and his rationale for it to the Board of Education, which approved it.
(SAMF ¶43-54.)
Only those parents making religious complaints to the school—which were a
minority of even those who attended the “Coffee and Conversation” meeting—
demanded that Ms. Cole “resign or be terminated” or expressed concerns that her
continued presence at the school would inhibit healing. (SAMF ¶56.) Many parents
and staff loved Ms. Cole and wanted her to stay. (SAMF ¶57.) In fact, Bullard’s
Principal, Dr. Patrice Moore, testified that she believed the transfer to be
counterproductive in moving the community towards healing, and believed that the
transfer to Mableton was unnecessary. (SAMF ¶58.)
If Defendant had merely clarified that no religious activities were taking
place as part of Bullard’s mindfulness program and remained neutral in the
22
community dispute, it would not have violated Ms. Cole’s constitutional rights.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 622; Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d at
689. Instead, Defendant chose to assent to the demands made of it by one side in a
religious community dispute, thereby conveying a “a message of endorsement” of
the religious group’s cause and agreement with that groups “disapproval” of Ms.
Cole. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56. In other words, Defendant failed to
remain neutral, and instead chose a side—thereby violating the Constitutional
prohibition against establishment of religion. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. at 860.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied because (1) Ms.
Cole has demonstrated that she has standing to sue because she was personally
affected by the complained-of unconstitutional act of transferring her employment;
(2) she has established a basis to hold Defendant liable under Monell; and (3)
because the evidence reflects that the effect of Defendant’s transfer of Ms. Cole at
the behest of religiously-motivated complaints was to endorse that viewpoint.
Summary judgment must therefore be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 2019,
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP
By: /s/ T. Brian Green

Edward D. Buckley
23
Georgia Bar No. 092750

edbuckley@buckleybeal.com
T. Brian Green
bgreen@buckleybeal.com
Promenade, Suite 900

1230 Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
Counsel for Claimant
24
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing has been prepared in the Times New
Roman 14 font as approved by the Court in LR 5.1B.
/s/ Edward D. Buckley

Edward D. Buckley
25

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of February, 2019, I electronically
filed the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
system which will automatically send email notification of such filing to the
following attorneys of record:
Charles Bachman (cbachman@gregorydoylefirm.com)

Thomas Owen Farist (ofarist@gregorydoylefirm.com)
(signature on next page)
26
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP
By: /s/ Edward D. Buckley

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

1230 Peachtree Street NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
27
Case 1:17-cv-01378-WMR Document 55-1 Filed 02/12/19 Page 1 of 21

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FACTS

PRESENTING GENUINE ISSUES FOR TRIAL
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and LR 56, NDGa, Plaintiff Bonnie Cole
(“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Cole”) ”) submits this Statement of Additional Material Facts
Presenting Genuine Issues for Trial 1 in support of her Response in Opposition to
the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Cobb County School
District (“Defendant” or “CCSD”).
1
All depositions, affidavits, and exhibits cited herein are filed in their entirety in
support of Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
1
Bonnie Cole was and Is a Well-Respected School Administrator

in the Cobb County School District
1.
Bonnie Cole was well respected by her Principal, Dr. Patrice Moore, who
stated that she was a “good assistant principal,” “was very relational,” and that Dr.
Moore had no complaints about Ms. Cole’s performance. (Deposition of Dr.
Patrice Moore (“Moore Dep.”) 12:8-21.)
2.
Dr. Moore also stated that prior to 2015-2016, she had received no
complaints at all from other parents of Bullard students, and in fact had received
positive comments about her. (Moore Dep. 12:22-13:3.)
3.
John Adams, Deputy Superintendent of Human Resources and Operations
for Defendant (hereinafter, “Adams”), testified that “Bonnie is a good AP. She was
a good AP,” and also state that “Bonnie has always been not only competent but a
very good AP.” (Deposition of John Adams (“Adams Dep.”) 94:11-12, 139:9-11.)
The Brain-Based Mindfulness Activities at Bullard were Secular, Scientific,

and Successful
4.
As described by Dr. Moore, “mindfulness activities” involves “a practice in
teaching adults or students how to be in the moment, to be able to calm themselves,
[take] deep breaths, positive [sic], being positive, and learning how to reduce
2
anxiety.” (Moore Dep. 13:12-16.)
5.
Dr. Moore further testified that “Brain based mindfulness” refers to “[b]rain
compatible in that you -- before starting the next activity, for example, in an
elementary school, you would do a brain activity to be able to refocus, recenter
students to move into academic work.” (Moore Dep. 13: 17-23.)
6.
As used by Dr. Moore and Ms. Cole, the term “recenter” simply means “[t]o
refocus.” As Dr. Moore stated, these techniques are useful in an academic setting
because “[s]tudents have a hard time attending to a task, especially at the
elementary level,” and de-stressing activities lets students “get the wiggles, jitters,
all those things, out so they can refocus themselves on whatever task, instructional
task, we have for them.” (Moore Dep. 14:1-8.)
7.
In 2014-2015, Ms. Cole and Dr. Moore began offering activities after school
that gave teachers and staff “an opportunity for them to voluntarily come after
school and do some work with us on techniques to de-stress themselves.” (Moore
Dep. 14:15-21.)
8.
That same year, Dr. Moore turned an empty classroom into “Australia,” a
3
room “where teachers could go throughout the day and relax and rejuvenate
themselves.” (Moore Dep. 14:22-15:4.)
9.
The “Australia” room (whose moniker referred to a children’s book)
contained a refrigerator, “a Keurig, bean bags, soft lighting, music, coloring books,
sand, I mean, anything they could use to relax.” (Moore Dep. 14:22-15:8.)
10.
Other activities offered to teachers included yoga, talking about journaling,
some meditation, and coloring. (Moore Dep. 13-18.)
11.
Although Ms. Cole often led these activities, other teachers also led
activities. (Moore Dep. 15:19-16:12.)
12.
Dr. Moore estimated that approximately three-fourths of the staff
participated in mindfulness activities in some way. (Moore Dep. 29:19-30:1.)
13.
Later, in 2015-2016, teachers at Bullard began asking to implement
mindfulness activities in the classroom with students; at those teachers’ request,
Ms. Cole or another teacher would demonstrate the particular mindfulness activity
requested by the teacher. (Moore Dep. 22:1-24:24).
4
14.
As used with students, these activities primarily included quick, five-minute
sessions where students would “breath like frogs,” play with fidgets, or color, and
used both resources approved by the Cobb County School District P.E. program,
including “GoNoodle” videos. (Moore Dep. 20:15-18, 22:18-24:15.)
15.
The “GoNoodle” videos contained a monkey that did yoga, and who would
say “Namaste” at the end of the video. (Moore Dep. 20:21-25.)
16.
Dr. Moore testified that as these activities became implemented, teachers
reported seeing positive results, including “a significant decrease in our discipline
history from like -- I took data from November to March of that year. Had a 33
percent decrease in the number of discipline referrals that teachers were submitting
for students. I had a fifth-grade math -- a teacher in fifth grade who reported that
her math increased, her students were able to function higher in math because she
would purposely practice de-stressing activities, mindful activities, prior to quizzes
and tests, and she saw a significant increase in her students' ability to perform as a
result. Teachers reported that they felt less stress. They were able to release some
of the anxiety that they were experiencing that year, so testing was a big stressor
5
for the teachers, the amount of testing we were doing with students. And so they
expressed that they felt calmer. We even had parents report that their own personal
children seemed to be able to handle stress better as a result.” (Moore Dep. 26:4-
27:2.)
The Implementation of Brain-Based Mindfulness Activities at Bullard

Violated no Cobb County Rules or Procedures and Successfully Reduced
Stress and Disruptive Behaviors in Students
17.
Dr. Moore and Ms. Cole testified that the brain-based activities used at
Bullard were not religious in any way. (Moore Dep. 19:8-20:12; Cole Dep. 40:5-
9).
18.
Ms. Cole testified that it was “always forefront in [her] mind” to make sure
that the mindfulness activities used with students were not about religion. (Cole
Dep. 127:16-17.)
19.
No one, including Ms. Cole, promoted any business related to “Reiki,” yoga,
or mindfulness to any students at Bullard. (Moore Dep. 31:8-32:18.)
20.
Dr. Grant Rivera, Assistant Superintendent for Leadership and Learning
(“Rivera”), never told School Superintendent Chris Ragsdale (“Ragsdale”) that he
6
had concluded that Bullard or Ms. Cole were engaging in any religious practice at
the school. (Ragsdale Dep. 100:12-18.)
21.
In fact, Rivera testified repeatedly that he conducted no investigation into
the allegations against Ms. Cole and had “no verification” that she was doing
anything improper; in fact, he stated that he “strongly discouraged” an
investigation, “because there was nothing to investigate.” (Rivera Dep. 60:12-17,
73:2-74:19.)
22.
Rivera testified that “this was not this is not a situation where I'm
interviewing families, interviewing children…interviewing teachers. No, no, no,”
and repeatedly stated in an email “we have no evidence this occurred” with
reference to Ms. Cole’s alleged unapproved activities. (Rivera Dep. 58:17-20;
Rivera Dep. Exh. 2.)
23.
Adams did not conduct any investigation into the mindfulness activities of
Ms. Cole, or whether any of the allegations against her were true. (Adams Dep.
43:22-24; 47:3-16; 58:1-6; 85:21-86:14; 92:8-9; 94:16-17; 105:20-22.)
24.
According to both Adams and Rivera, Ms. Cole “didn't do anything that warranted
7
any kind of HR investigation in the formal sense.” (Adams Dep. 67:6-9.)
The Spring 2016 Complaints against Mindfulness Were Religious Objections
25.
In the Spring of 2016, several parents began to send emails to Cobb County
Board Member Randy Scamihorn, Superintendent Ragsdale, and others at Cobb
County School District voicing religious complaints about the mindfulness
activities used at Bullard. (Ragsdale Dep. 77:9-82:1, 93:1-12, 104:22-25; 135:27-
22, 141:8-17; Ragsdale Dep. Exhs. 3, 10, 11, 14, 23; Adams Dep. 55:7-24, 56:13-
22.)
26.
These complaints included allegations that Ms. Cole was teaching
“Buddhism” or “Hinduism” via the mindfulness program. (Adams Dep. Exhs. 1, 3,
10, 11, 16; Ragsdale Dep. Exhs. 21, 23.)
27.
One email stated that Ms. Cole was using “crystals/stones” and teaching
children “how to breath like a dragon,” and stated that “there are cult like practices
being practiced at this school.” (Adams Dep. Exh. 1.)
28.
Another stated that “we have a very strong Christian Faith, and we pray. My
8
child does not need a crystal or stone to protect her from negative energy. She has
the blood of Jesus” and alleging that the mindfulness activities at Bullard have
“strong connections to Buddhism” before claiming to have joined “the revolution.”
(Adams Dep. Exh. 3.)
29.
Another email stated that mindfulness was a “very disturbing activity” with
origins in “Buddhism and Hinduism,” tracing the “ultimate source” of the
“religious practice” to “Vice Principal, Bonnie Cole.” (Adams Dep. Ex. 10.)
30.
No investigation was ever conducted into the truth of these allegations.
(Adams Dep. 43:22-24; 47:3-16; 58:1-6; 85:21-86:14; 92:8-9; 94:16-17; 105:20-
22.)
31.
Initially, Rivera attempted to address the complaints by meeting with Ms.
Cole, Dr. Moore, and Area Superintendent Dr. Barbara Swinney to place limits
around the school’s mindfulness activities, including ordering Ms. Cole not to lead
classroom lessons on yoga or breathing. (Rivera Dep. 56:14-21; Rivera Dep. Ex. 2;
Moore Dep. 64:20-22.)
32.
However, the religious “uproar” over mindfulness activities continued; some
9
community members, including a group called “Moms with Swords,” even had
prayer meetings at the school with the intent to “rid the school of Buddhism.” At
one point a group converged on Bullard Elementary School and laid their hands on
Bonnie Cole’s office windows. [Adams Dep. 58:15-25, 59:8-60:4; Cole Dep.
100:1-101:4.)
33.
Some of the religious objectors began demanding that Ms. Cole “resign or
be terminated.” (Adams Dep. Exhs. 10 (fifth page containing the “resign or be
terminated” reference).)
34.
As the religious “rancor” continued to escalate, Dr. Moore held a “Coffee
and Conversation” meeting for the purpose of explaining the mindfulness activities
and how they would be limited to parents, which Adams attended. (Adams Dep.
71:18-72:24; Moore Dep. 70:3-71:12.)
35.
Dr. Moore presented a PowerPoint presentation at that meeting, which
discussed definitions of mindfulness, the activities being used at Bullard (including
“GoNoodle,” the fact that the activities did not have any religious purpose or
connotations, and what the school would be doing moving forward. (Moore Dep.
81:2-86:16; Moore Dep. Exh. 52.)
10
36.
After Dr. Moore concluded her presentation, some of the parents who had
previously made email complaints stood up and accused Dr. Moore of “not being
truthful” about the practices, calling out Ms. Cole by name and falsely accusing her
of “laying crystals” on children in the Australia room. (Moore Dep. 86:21-89:12;
Adams Dep. 71:18-72:24; Declaration of Katie Greene, ¶¶6-8.)
37.
The proportion of attendees at the meeting expressing these religious
complaints about mindfulness were a minority of “five, six, no more than 10”
parents (out of about 100). (Moore Dep. 77:19-20, 89:19-91:24.)
38.
On the other hand, approximately 20-30 parents pushed back in
disagreement with the parents who expressed religious complaints, and at points
would “stand…almost like a shield…because [the religious complaining parent]
was spewing a lot of hate.” (Moore Dep. 91:19-92:12.)
39.
Following that meeting, Adams received an email from another parent in
attendance at that meeting, which stated “with the focus now being on how we as a
school community move forward and heal the divisions, I think it is going to be
very difficult for that to happen with parents and staff as she is still an
11
administrator at the school." [Adams Dep. 125:22-126:6; Adams Dep. Exh. 11.]
40.
Adams then responded to this parent, praising his “reasonable, balanced
perspective” and stating that “we are indeed continuing to closely monitor, review,
and discuss the matter at the executive cabinet level and will take any additional
action as may be needed." [Adams Dep. 126:17-20; Adams Dep. Exh. 13.]
41.
Adams testified that “[g]iven what I saw at the coffee meeting, town hall,
given that the level of rancor and disruption that occurred… her continued presence
at that school would be -- continue to be disruptive.” [Adams Dep. 69:21-70:9.]
42.
Adams then forwarded that email to Rivera and Ragsdale, stating that “we
will need to reassign the AP for next year in order for the school to get past this.”
(Adams Dep. Exh. 14.)
Defendant Took the Action Demanded by the Religious Objectors without

Informing Ms. Cole
43.
As Mr. Adams testified, he and Dr. Rivera “came up with the
recommendation” to transfer Ms. Cole, to which Ragsdale “essentially assented.”
[Adams Dep. 128:16-25.]
12
44.
Before presenting this decision to the Board, Adams’ office generated a
“personnel report that goes to the Board that lists transfers, people that go on leave,
et cetera. Sometimes that’s 15, even 30 pages.” [Adams Dep. 129:1-5.]
45.
He also generated a “shorter executive session personnel report” which
specifically lists the names of assistant principals and principals who are being
transferred. [Adams Dep. 129:6-18.]
46.
Adams testified that he always “meet[s] with Mr. Ragsdale prior to a board
meeting and go[es] over the personnel report with him. But typically, Mr. Ragsdale
looks at it and then puts it down, and we tend to talk about other things…He is
very hands off on personnel…I can’t recall a time when he has overruled one.”
[Adams Dep. 130:16-25.]
47.
This shorter list of assistant principals and principals was then presented to
the Board in “executive session,” containing a total of 12 individuals. (Adams Dep.
131:23-132:17; Adams Dep. Ex. 46.)
48.
The Board then voted to approve the list of personnel changes presented to
13
them as a whole. (Ragsdale Dep. 40:5-41:10.)
49.
As Ragsdale testified, during the executive session, John Adams “would
have identified Bonnie Cole in that because the Board had received communication
from the community” and that Adams “would have referenced, you know, the
situation going on at the school.” (Ragsdale Dep. 45:6-9, 46:4-5.)
50.
Ragsdale further testified that Adams said something along the lines of “as
the board, you know, is probably aware, many of you have gotten emails about the
situation going on at the school. Ms. Cole is the assistant principal at that particular
school.” (Ragsdale Dep. 47:6-10.)
51.
According to Ragsdale, Adams then specifically referenced the controversy
that had occurred in the community as a result of parents’ religious complaints
about the mindfulness program. (Ragsdale Dep. 47:11-18.)
52.
As Ragsdale admitted, the board then approved the transfer of Ms. Cole
because of the “disruption” caused by parents who were offended by the
mindfulness program for religious reasons. (Ragsdale Dep. 141:8-18.)
14
53.
The Board was presented with the basis for the decision, which was the
“disruption” caused by the religious complaints of a contingent of parents whose
religious sensibilities were offended. (Ragsdale Dep. 45:6-9, 47:11-18.)
54.
A majority of the Board voted for the action, as the transfer then occurred.
(Ragsdale Dep. 141:8-17.)
55.
Rivera and Adams told Ms. Cole that she “would not be moved” and that she
had “done nothing wrong”; however, Ms. Cole then received a phone call stating
that she was being moved, without any further explanation. (Cole Dep. 86:13-
87:11, 90:2-91:12.)
56.
Only those parents making religious complaints to the school—which were a
minority of even those who attended the “Coffee and Conversation” meeting—
demanded that Ms. Cole “resign or be terminated” or expressed concerns that her
continued presence at the school would inhibit healing. (Moore Dep. 89:1-91:20;
Adams Dep. Exh. 10, 11.)
57.
Many parents and staff loved Ms. Cole and expressed that they wanted her
15
to stay. (Moore Dep. 101:4-16; Moore Dep. Exh. 48 (composite exhibit of positive
emails referring to Ms. Cole.)
58.
In fact, Bullard’s Principal, Dr. Patrice Moore, testified that she believed the
transfer to be counterproductive in moving the community towards healing, and
believed that the transfer to Mableton was unnecessary. (Moore Dep. 102:5-103:2.)
Bonnie Cole Suffered the Consequences of Defendant’s Choosing Sides
59.
Having been abruptly transferred away from the school that she loved, Ms.
Cole became despondent, and unable to go to work. (Cole Dep. 97:1-98:2.)
60.
The fact that CCSD not only refused to support her in the face of baseless
religious complaints, but in fact sided with those making the complaints to her
detriment, critically damaged her reputation and tacitly confirmed that she had
done something wrong—which she had not. (Pl. Dep. 85:23-86:7).
61.
She stated that when she found out about her transfer “an hour before the
board meeting,” she was “in a state of shock” and emotional turmoil,” and suffered
from a “broken heart.” (Pl. Dep. 94:14-17, 97:2-3).
62.
16
She suffered panic attacks and mood swings, “[cried] all day,” and “would
flip out at random moments.” (Pl. Dep. 102:2-11).
63.
She began to see a counselor, and began to take Klonopin and Xanax for her
mental distress. (Pl. Dep. 103:22-106:6).
64.
Eventually, her doctor suggested that she take FMLA leave for the
remainder of the school year in order to deal with the stress of the situation, which
she did. Id.
65.
Ms. Cole also suffered economic losses, as her commute was extended to
“two and a half to three times” the distance she previously traveled, adding two
hours of time to her daily commute. (Pl. Dep. 107:21-108:10).
66.
Her work hours are also extended an “additional two to three hours” due to
additional work that must be performed at her new school. (Pl. Dep. 108:13-25).
67.
This additional commute and work time has deprived Ms. Cole of her
professional opportunities, as she had to shutter her practice at Breath of Life due
to the additional restrictions on her time. (Pl. Dep. 121:22-122:21).
17
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of February, 2019.
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
18
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 5.1
Pursuant to Local Rule 5.1, the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that
the foregoing pleading was prepared with one of the font and point selections
approved by the Court.
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
19

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
filed the PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT
OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such filing
to the following attorneys of record:

BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP
20

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
21

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT

OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and LR 56, NDGa, Plaintiff Bonnie Cole
(“Ms. Cole” or “Plaintiff”) responds to Defendant Cobb County School
District’s (“CCSD” or the “District”) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
1. Plaintiff began working for Defendant Cobb County School District
in 1998 as a teacher at Vaughan Elementary in Cobb County. (Pl. Dep. 6:15-17).
REPONSE: Admitted.
2. In 2006, Plaintiff became Assistant Principal of Bullard
1
Elementary School (“Bullard”) and stayed in that position until the end of
the 2016 school year. (Pl. Dep. 9:23-10:5).
REPONSE: Admitted.
3. Plaintiff identifies as a Christian. (Pl. Dep. 32:9-12).
REPONSE: Admitted.
4. In July 2015, Plaintiff became a licensed practitioner of Reiki,
a Japanese-based stress reduction technique, and opened an outside business
offering Reiki services to the public under the umbrella of a business called
“The Breath of Life Healing Center.” (Pl. Dep. 36:24 – 37:20).
REPONSE: Admitted.
5. On the Breath of Life website, Plaintiff referred to herself as
“moonlighting as an assistant principal.” (Pl. Dep. 66:1-7).
REPONSE: Admitted.
6. During this time frame, Plaintiff had reached a level three (out
of four) certification in the practice of Reiki. (Pl. Dep. 38:8-13).
REPONSE: Admitted.
7. Plaintiff does not consider the practice of Reiki to have any
religious overtones. (Pl. Dep. 40:2-4).
REPONSE: Admitted.
2
8. In the Fall of 2015 Plaintiff also began to taking training from
www.mindfulschool.org. (Pl. Dep. 34:13-16).
REPONSE: Admitted.
Plaintiff’s Yoga and Mindfulness Programs at Bullard
9. Sometime in 2015, Plaintiff began to implement a “brain-based
mindfulness” program at Bullard. (Pl. Dep. 15:1-11).
REPONSE: Admitted.
10. Plaintiff does not consider the brain-based mindfulness program
she implemented at Bullard to have any religious implications. (Pl. Dep. 40:5-9).
REPONSE: Admitted.
11. As the 2015-2016 school year progressed Plaintiff began to
implement additional mindfulness programs at Bullard, including setting up
classroom space where teachers could go to “collect themselves.” (Pl. Dep.
26:20-27:18).
REPONSE: Admitted.
12. During the 2015-2016 school year Plaintiff also started
“Wellness Thoughtful Thursday” meetings with staff to help “teachers feel
more confident” in the mindfulness techniques at Bullard. (Pl. Dep. 29:11-20).
REPONSE: Admitted.
3
13. Sometime after Wellness Thoughtful Thursdays began, Plaintiff
began sending out a related e-mail newsletter. (Pl. Dep. 30:19-31:6).
REPONSE: Admitted that Ms. Cole testified that she
occasionally sent out an email related to Thoughtful Thursdays;
denied as to Defendant’s characterization of this email as a
“newsletter,” a word Ms. Cole did not use.
14. CCSD has approved mindfulness curriculum and training which
had been adopted and implemented by other schools within the District. (Rivera
Dep. 59:11-21, 116:1-6).
REPONSE: Admitted.
15. During the 2015-2016 school year parents began to complain to
CCSD personnel and CCSD Board Members about Plaintiff’s mindfulness
practices at Bullard. (Pl. Dep. 41:12-15, 51:3-23, 116: 6-23; Rivera Dep. 38:17-
23, 57:11-15; Adams Dep. 56:3-57:6).
REPONSE: Admitted.
16. Plaintiff first became aware of these parent concerns on February
29, 2016. (Pl. Dep. 41:12-15).
REPONSE: Admitted.
17. A number of the parents became increasingly hostile and
4
aggressive creating a widespread disruption among the parents and staff,
inundating CCSD personnel with emails, and leading to Plaintiff feel “very
ostracized” at Bullard. (Pl. Dep. 72:10-21, 81:11-24, Adams Dep. 94:23-24,
125:18-126:1).
REPONSE: Admitted.
18. The controversy attracted national and international media
attention, including on talk shows like “The View.” (Pl. Dep. 81:17-24; Dess
Dec. ¶7).
REPONSE: Admitted.
John Adams Investigation
19. After being made aware of these complaints, CCSD’s Chief
Human Resources Officer, John Adams, and his team began gathering
information about the situation, including having conversations with Plaintiff.
(Adams Dep. 41:23 – 42:21).
REPONSE: Disputed that Adams had “conversations” with Ms.
Cole; Adams testified only that he “was in a meeting once with
Bonnie.” (Adams Dep. 42:6.) Denied further that any investigation
into the truth of the complaints occurred; Adams testified that there
was no investigation conducted by human resources, and that he “did
5
not personally investigate” the allegations of the religious parents—in
fact, he took them with a “very large grain of salt.” (Adams Dep.
41:14-22, 43:22-24, 85:18-25.)
20. Mr. Adams was concerned about staff morale, school climate,
and to what extent there was division amongst Bullard’s staff. (Adams Dep.
77:13- 19).
REPONSE: Admitted that Adams so stated.
21. Jeff Dess, a CCSD counselor and licensed psychologist who runs
the CCSD Prevention Intervention Center, was tasked with getting a
“reading…on the level of fracture among the staff”, to see if the fracture was
reconcilable, and to give recommendations on how the school community
might be able to move forward. (Adams Dep. 78:18-20; Dess Dec. ¶6).
REPONSE: Admitted.
22. Over the course of several weeks Mr. Dess met with Bullard’s
faculty and staff at the school. (Dess Dec. ¶8).
REPONSE: Admitted.
23. Mr. Dess found a systemic loss of trust within the School as
faculty and staff as a result of the issues surrounding the implantation of the
mindfulness programs and a profound split on the staff’s view of Plaintiff’s
6
mindfulness program. With respect to Assistant Principal Cole, the faculty
and staff had chosen sides and were deeply entrenched in their positions. Due
to these issues, there was a core group of staff members who no longer felt safe.
(Dess Dec. ¶9).
REPONSE: Admitted that Dess so stated.
24. Mr. Dess found the situation at Bullard to be one of the most
difficult challenges of his 29-year career at the Prevention Intervention
Center. (Dess Dec. ¶12).
REPONSE: Admitted.
25. Mr. Dess reported his findings to John Adams and Grant
Rivera. (Dess Dec. ¶13).
REPONSE: Admitted.
26. After Mr. Dess’s investigation, Mr. Adams understood that the
staff members at Bullard were generally split “50-50” and that the split likely
could not be rectified. (Adams Dep. 79:1 – 81:11).
REPONSE: Disputed; Dess did not state in his declaration what
he felt the split to be, and Adams’ testimony is that he proposed the 50-
50 split. (Adams Dep. 79:12-15.) Others testified that a minority of
teachers and parents within the Bullard community expressed
7
religious complaints about the mindfulness activities. (Moore Dep.
89:19-91:24.)
Rivera Investigation
27. Likewise, CCSD’s Chief of Leadership and Learning, Dr.
Grant Rivera, and his team also began looking into the allegations made by
parents and staff primarily to ensure that Plaintiff was in compliance with
CCSD’s approved mindfulness curriculum and because of the media exposure.
(Rivera Dep. 59:9- 25, 76:1-17).
REPONSE: Disputed. Rivera does not testify that he “began
looking into allegations made by parents and staff” in the above-cited
deposition. He only testified that he required “brain break” materials
to be provided through Mark Anderson, coordinator of the District for
PE. (Rivera Dep.75:16-25). Rivera testified repeatedly that he
conducted no investigation into the allegations against Ms. Cole and
had “no verification” that she was doing anything improper; in fact,
he stated that he “strongly discouraged” an investigation, “because
there was nothing to investigate.” (Rivera Dep. 60:12-17, 73:2-74:19.)
28. Dr. Rivera told Plaintiff that he believed her intentions to be
“very noble,” however CCSD’s concern was that Plaintiff was not following
8
the approved curriculum which needed to be adhered to for consistency
throughout the District. (Rivera Dep. 84:8-16, 87:13 – 88:8).
REPONSE: Admitted that Rivera was concerned, in part, that
approved materials be used; disputed that he actually concluded that
any unapproved materials were being used, because Rivera testified
that he had an “accusation” with no “verification”, and stated in an
email “although we have no evidence this occurred” with reference to
Ms. Cole’s alleged unapproved activities. (Rivera Dep. 74:17-25;
Rivera Dep. Exh. 2.)
29. Dr. Rivera also felt that certain elements of the mindfulness
programs implemented by Cole - - such as using the word “namaste,”
putting your hands in the prayer position, and coloring mandalas - - were, at
least by some, identified with activities and symbols of certain religions such
that she should avoid those elements to avoid any perception that there was a
religious overtone to the mindfulness activities. (Rivera Dep. 77-87.)
REPONSE: Admitted only that Rivera expressed a belief that
some individuals were offended by mindfulness activities; disputed
that Rivera concluded that the religious complaints were true, since he
conducted no investigation to verify their truth. (Rivera Dep. 73-74.)
9
30. Dr. Rivera felt that Cole “was giving people enough - - there
was enough meat on the bone, there was just enough sliver there that people
could say, well, that rock is religious, that mandala is religious, that namaste and
prayer position is religious.” (Rivera Dep. 84:11-16).
REPONSE: Admitted that Rivera so testified.
31. No member of the CCSD Board of Education ever told Dr.
Rivera to “stop mindfulness”, especially since CCSD had approved
mindfulness curriculum in place. (Rivera Dep. 115:14-116:9).
REPONSE: Admitted.
32. The expectation was never to eradicate mindfulness from
CCSD. Instead, it was to make sure that all mindfulness programs were
implemented through the District-approved curriculum and training. (Rivera Dep.
116:7-9).
REPONSE: Admitted only that Rivera stated his expectation as
to himself, disputed as to others who did not so testify.
Coffee and Conversations Town Hall Meeting
33. In an effort to address the growing unrest by parents and
staff, Bullard Principal Patrice Moore held a “town hall” meeting at the school
10
called “Coffee and Conversations” on March 18, 2016. (Pl. Dep. 60:22-25;
Dess Dec. ¶10).
REPONSE: Admitted.
34. The Coffee and Conversations town hall was “standing room
only” and “surprisingly rancorous” despite the principal’s attempt to “explain
and to a lesser extent defend” Plaintiff’s secular yoga and mindfulness
programs. (Adams Dep. 70:11-19, 74:18-21; Pl. Dep. 61:18-20).
REPONSE: Admitted that a minority of parents in attendance
voiced “rancorous” religious opposition to the mindfulness practices
at Bullard; a larger proportion of attendees voiced support for Ms.
Cole and the mindfulness activities. (Moore Dep. 89:25-92:24.)
35. The level of “rancor and disruption” witnessed at the Coffee
and Conversations town hall was concerning to CCSD. (Adams Dep. 69:24-
70:10).
REPONSE: Admitted that Adams stated that he was concerned
about the “rancor and disruption,” which was coming from parents
making religious complaints. (Adams 69:24-70:1, 72:8-24; Moore Dep.
89:25-92:24.)
11
36. Parent objections to Plaintiff’s mindfulness programs were on
religious grounds, including both complaints that the District was
implementing any religious based activity at school and complaints that the
mindfulness violated the parent’s own religious beliefs, and secular grounds
based on parents complaining that the mindfulness activities reflected the school
“taking your eyes off the academic ball”. (Dess Dec. ¶11; Adams Dep. 71:2-22).
REPONSE: Admitted that some parents objected to the
mindfulness program on religious grounds. Disputed that any parent
stated that teachers or administrators at Bullard were “taking [their]
eyes off the academic ball”; those words are Adams’. The primary
objection of complaining parents was religious; the only evidence that
other concerns came into play was a single email that also referenced
religious complaints (for instance, that Ms. Cole was teaching children
about “chakras,” which did not occur). (Adams Dep. Ex. 11.)
37. Following the Coffee and Conversations, it was evident to
Plaintiff that she did not need to be seen by parents in the halls of the school.
(Pl. Dep. 64:23-25).
REPONSE: Admitted that Ms. Cole was concerned about the
anger of some parents who were making religious complaints. (Pl.
12
Dep. 72:16-21.)
38. Several parents made clear that they felt it would be very
difficult for the Bullard community to heal and move forward if Plaintiff
remained an administrator at Bullard. (Adams Dep. 125:18-126:6).
REPONSE: Admitted.
39. After the Coffee and Conversations meeting the administration
at Bullard as well as CCSD continued to receive complaints. (Pl. Dep. 80:9-12).
REPONSE: Admitted.
40. The Coffee and Conversations town hall made clear to Mr.
Adams that Plaintiff had lost the ability to function at Bullard and that her
continued presence at the school would be disruptive and not in Plaintiff’s
best interest. (Adams Dep. 70:1-10).
REPONSE: Disputed as to Defendant’s attempt to characterize
Ms. Cole as being at fault for the “rancor and disruption” of certain
parents making religious objections to the mindfulness program. None
of the religious allegations about Ms. Cole’s activities were
substantiated by Adams, Rivera, Dess, or Ragsdale, and in fact, the
evidence that was obtained confirmed that Ms. Cole was simply
“trying to help kids [and staff] relax.” (Adams Dep. 43:25-44:16, 58:1-
13
14, 94:16-22, ; Ragsdale Dep. 82:2-84:17). Rivera even stated that, as
far as he was concerned, “I would have strongly discouraged them
from having to go out and do this exhaustive investigation because
there was nothing to investigate.” (Rivera Dep. 60:12-17.)
41. Superintendent Chris Ragsdale recommended to the Board of
Education that Plaintiff be transferred to another school in the District. (Ragsdale
Dep. 125: 2-3, 133:8-134:23, 141:8-17).
REPONSE: Admitted.
42. Superintendent Ragsdale’s recommendation to the Board was
based on Dr. Rivera’s and Mr. Adams’ recommendation to Superintendent
Ragsdale that Plaintiff be transferred because the severity of the disruption
at Bullard Elementary rendered Plaintiff unable to effectively lead her staff and
her students moving forward. (Adams. Dep. 69:17-70:22, 118:1-119:4, 133:23-
25).
REPONSE: Admitted that there was “disruption” at Bullard.
Denied that Plaintiff caused it. The disruption was caused by the
minority of parents making religious complaints about Ms. Cole, not
by Ms. Cole herself. (Adams Dep. 67:18-68:2, 87:12-19.)
43. Plaintiff’s transfer was not a disciplinary action. (Rivera Dep.
14
59:7- 61:19).
REPONSE: Disputed. The transfer was an adverse employment
decision that sent Plaintiff to a school of lesser status and damaged her
reputation in the community. The transfer gave credence to the
religious complaints against Plaintiff and appeared to punish her for
activity viewed as anti-Christian. (Pl. Dep. 85:23-86:7).
44. Plaintiff believes that the disruption at Bullard would have
continued as long as either her (sic) or her principal Dr. Patrice Moore were
at the school. (Pl. Dep. 136:8-13).
REPONSE: Disputed. Ms. Cole’s testimony in the cited passage is
that “my guess is if – if I wasn’t gone, then it – it would have to have
been Dr. Moore. Not us together.” This testimony does not indicate
whether she believes that the disruption would have continued as long
as either she or Dr. Moore remained at the school, only that the
parents religious complaints might have continued to demand that
someone be removed in order to placate them. In fact, Dr. Moore did
continue to work at the school, and works there today, apparently
without disruption. (Moore Dep. 11:1-5.) This mischaracterization of
Plaintiff’s testimony seeks to shift the blame for others’ disruptive
15
behaviors to her. In fact, the cause of the disruption would not have
been her continued presence—it would have been the unreasonable,
religious demands of the parents calling for her “to resign or be
terminated.” (Adams Dep. Exh. 10.)
45. Plaintiff does not think that she could have returned to Bullard for
the following year, i.e., the 2016/2017 school year. (Pl. Dep. 107:11-15).
REPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph mischaracterizes
Plaintiff’s testimony. Ms. Cole testified that she could not have
returned to Bullard not because of the “disruption” caused by the
religious objections of some parents, but because she felt she “lost
trust in the leadership of the county,” who did not support her there.
(Pl. Dep. 107:11-15).
46. On March 24, 2016, the CCSD Board voted to transfer
Plaintiff from Bullard to Mableton Elementary for the 2016/2017 school
year. (Adams Dep. 135:24-136:12).
REPONSE: Admitted.
47. After learning she was transferred, Plaintiff returned to the School
until Spring Break, but then went on FMLA leave for the rest of the school year
because she “knew [she] was unable to do [her] job effectively.” (Pl. Dep. 97-
16
98.)
REPONSE: Admitted.
48. Plaintiff was afraid to go in the hallway because she did not know
which teachers “had been a part of it.” (Pl. Dep. 97.)
REPONSE: Admitted.
49. When Plaintiff was transferred to Mableton she retained the same
job title, salary, and all other benefits. (Pl. Dep. 107:16-20).
REPONSE: Admitted.
Respectfully submitted this ____ day of February, 2019.
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 5.1
Pursuant to Local Rule 5.1, the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that
the foregoing pleading was prepared with one of the font and point selections
approved by the Court.
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
18

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
filed the PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT
OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS with the Clerk of Court using the
CM/ECF system which will automatically send email notification of such filing
to the following attorneys of record:

19
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Edward D. Buckley
T. Brian Green
BUCKLEY BEAL, LLP

Atlanta, GA 30309
Telephone: (404) 781-1100
Facsimile: (404) 781-1101
20
DocuSign Envelope ID: 21A87C6A-17D4-4ED1-BCF9-3AF5E7B72915

ATLANTA DIVISION
BONNIE COLE, )
)
Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION
) FILE NO. 1:17-cv-01378-WMR
v. )
) JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
COBB COUNTY SCHOOL )
Individually and in his capacity as )
SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Defendants. )
DECLARATION OF KATIE GREENE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Katie Greene, declare under penalty of
perjury under the laws of the United States that the following is true and correct:
1. All statements contained in this Declaration are true and correct to the
best of my knowledge. I am over 18 years of age, am suffering from no mental
disability, and am competent to testify on matters contained in this Declaration.
2. In 2016, I worked as a special education teacher at Bullard
Elementary School (“Bullard”), located at 3656 Old Stilesboro Road, Kennesaw,
Georgia 30152. Part of my work included working with autistic students.
3. I worked with Plaintiff Bonnie Cole until her transfer to Mableton
Elementary School at the end of the 2015/2016 school year.

1
DocuSign Envelope ID: 21A87C6A-17D4-4ED1-BCF9-3AF5E7B72915
4. On March 18, 2016, I attended a “coffee and conversation” meeting
organized by my principal Dr. Patrice Moore to discuss “mindfulness” activities
that had been used at Bullard, including stretching and breathing techniques.
5. I had used similar techniques in my classroom with autistic students,
and found them to be very useful in helping those students manage their emotions.
6. Also in attendance at the meeting was a large number of parents, as
well as other teachers; John Adams, assistant superintendent; and Dr. Barbara
Swinney, who was the area superintendent at the time.
7. Some of the parents at the meeting raised religious concerns about the
use of mindfulness activities.
8. I witnessed one of those parents, Kate Daniell, speak in an angry and
accusatory tone for several minutes. Ms. Daniell accused Bonnie Cole, who was
Assistant Principal at the time, of “promoting Buddhism”; “using crystals to heal”
students; and engaging in “Reiki” with students on campus.
9. I myself never witnessed Ms. Cole engage in any such activities.
10. I believe the accusations made by Ms. Daniell to be false.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
12/21/2018
Executed on _____________________________ (date)
__________________________________________
Katie Greene

Cole V Cobb County

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Cole V Cobb County

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Case 1:17-cv-01378-WMR Document 68 Filed 03/19/19 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 19th day of March, 2019.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S

Plaintiff Bonnie Cole was and is a much-beloved elementary school

Assistant Principal at Bullard Elementary School where, in 2015, several teachers

manage the many stresses of modern schooling. These techniques had an

immediate and measureable effect on students’ performance, including a drastic

decrease in disruptive behaviors. However, in the Spring semester of 2016, a

either “resign or be terminated” for implementing them. Rather than remaining

activities, Defendant instead immediately transferred Ms. Cole without

Defendant sent a clear message of endorsement of the religious objections against

On summary judgment, Defendant now makes three attempts to avoid being

Board of Education) explicitly decided to transfer Ms. Cole because of the

an Establishment Clause violation, despite the ample record evidence that

Defendant’s actions had the effect of promoting a particular religious viewpoint at

merit, and Ms. Cole’s claim should be allowed to proceed to a jury.

Defendant in connection with the motion for summary judgment. 1

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

economic, emotional, and professional damages caused by Defendant’s violation

of her constitutional rights of freedom from establishment of religion. Defendant

ignored its constitutional obligations to remain neutral in a religious controversy

and instead unlawfully transferred her to another school at the religiously-

these arguments disintegrates upon close inspection, leaving Defendant unable to

demonstrate that it is entitled to Summary Judgment. Given its own admissions

likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. L.M.P. on

she personally suffered the direct effects of CCSD’s unconstitutional conduct.

generalized Constitutional violation by a government. Valley Forge Christian Coll.

(1982). In other words, a generalized interest in a government that does not

establish a religion is not sufficient; “a plaintiff must demonstrate that [s]he

personally has been subjected to an actual or threatened injury.” Am. Civil

directed,” is “forced to assume special burdens” because of the unconstitutional

“surely suffice to give the parties standing to complain”). It is not necessary to

Plaintiff herself personally experienced the constitutional violation—a violation of

nominal damages based on a violation of the Establishment Clause by the Cobb

County Board of Education).

Certainly, then, a Plaintiff who has suffered economic injuries caused by

“has repeatedly emphasized that a showing of noneconomic injury is sufficient to

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 (“standing may be predicated on noneconomic

injury”); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures

U.S. 59, 73 (U.S. 1978) (finding “environmental and aesthetic consequences” to

satisfy injury-in-fact requirement)).

Noneconomic injuries caused by a constitutional violation can include

(11th Cir. 2005) (describing emotional distress damages in the context of

another particularized and concrete injury in fact”)(internal punctuation omitted).

A “plaintiff's testimony, standing alone, can support an award of compensatory

damages for emotional distress based on a constitutional violation [where that

testimony establishes] that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional

distress…” Akouri, 408 F.3d at 1345.

in dead-end positions due to their political backgrounds are adversely affected,” as

Eleventh Circuit is consistent with numerous other Courts recognizing “that an

employee who is subjected to an involuntary lateral transfer on unconstitutional

contravenes a public employee's First Amendment rights when it discharges or

refuses to rehire the employee, or when it makes decisions relating to promotion,

[constitutional] rights”)(emphasis added). Such an individual may suffer numerous

non-economic damages as a result of the transfer, as the Sixth Circuit explained in

Plaintiff need not have suffered loss of salary, promotional

consisting of extreme embarrassment, humiliation, extreme mental

States Constitution.” Id. at 324.

Bonnie Cole was personally and directly affected by CCSD’s

unconstitutional decision to transfer her in order to assuage the religious concerns

F.2d at 692; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.

time. (SAMF ¶67.)