REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by The Armed Forces of The Philippines Finance Center

Civil Procedure - CASE DIGESTS
Victor Kenner S. Galang – 3D
I.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC), petitioner, vs. DAISY R. YAHON, respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201043. June 16, 2014.]
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
FACTS:
Daisy R. Yahon filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of R.A. No.
9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) against her husband S/Sgt. Charles Yahon
(an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006). Daisy and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on
June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but Daisy Yahon has a daughter with her previous live-in partner. The
RTC issued a TPO. It then allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) because of the failure of Sgt. Yahon to appear. The RTC then rendered a decision
issuing a PPO directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of P4,000.00 per month and
fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC) filed its Manifestation and Motion to Lift
Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP. The AFPFC demurred from complying with the directive saying that
the government pension or gratuity is exempt from execution under Section 13 (l) of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. The RTC denied for having been filed out of time. It noted that the TPO and decision granting PPO had long
become final and executory. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. AFPFC then filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of the orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as
spousal support. The CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injuction to enjoin the AFPFC to release the remaining pension
due to Sgt. Charles Yahon. Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic
deduction of 50% from S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as
it contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military personnel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the
retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's lawful wife as spousal support
in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
HELD:
I. Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an
exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 13 The protection orders issued by the court may
be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order
that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to witH
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent's
employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or
withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without
justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, 15 which states: Section 31.
The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed
to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the
active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer
or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such
accountabilities.
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads: SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien.
— .The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution,
levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including
his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his
official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when
his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that a court order directing the Philippine National
Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such
monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter's conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates Section
26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those
properties which are exempt from execution: SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government;
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if
several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is
the latest expression of the legislative will.
We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down
an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
II. Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8 (g) applies to all employers, whether private or
government.
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon's
retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of Pacific
Products v. Ong. 20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment of the
amount of P10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of the Bureau
of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on the previous
rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion 21 and Avendano v. Alikpala, et al. 22
wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries of government employees.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products: A rule, which has never been
seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason
is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain
in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of
the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.
Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8 (g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8 (g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act 24 allow garnishment
of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support.
As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the
law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue
valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession." 25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN are
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
II.
ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, petitioners, vs. PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA
CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO
FERDINAND BELL III, and PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL IV, respondents.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186322. July 8, 2015.]
SERENO, C.J p:
FACTS:
The Bell siblings filed a Complaint for the annulment of the contract of sale executed by their parents over
their 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by virtue of the Deed
against petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios) before the RTC of Batangas City. The RTC
(Civil Case No. 4581) ruled infavor of the Bell siblings but declared Spouses Bell to be liable to Eulogios in the
amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum. The trial court nullified the Deed of Sale over the family home
for lack of a written consent from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the Family Code, the court still
recognized the validity of the transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in
the amount of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum. Both of the parties appealed to the CA, but the trial court's
Decision was affirmed en toto. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners
in the amount of P1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed their Petition for failure to show any reversible
error committed by the CA. Thereafter, the decision became final and executory.
The RTC then issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which Spouses’ Bell property was levied on
execution. The trial court then ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground that the property was a family
home. Eulogio then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution because the current market
value of the family home exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area,
and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million. The RTC then set the case for hearing to determine
the present value of the family home of respondents. Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives
and asked the RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-shopping. They argued that petitioners' bid to
determine the present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue that had long been settled
with finality. The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of respondents and directed the commissioners
to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot. Subsequently, the RTC dispensed with the valuation report of
the commissioners and directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
Spouses bell then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA. It enjoined the execution sale.
The CA granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata had already set in. The
RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared respondents' house and lot as a family
home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid
Decision, there was as yet no res judicata. Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its present value exceeded the statutory
limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the appellate court, is its actual value
at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was contrary to law.
The CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not a hearing to determine the value of Spouses Bell’s family home for purposes of execution
under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata; and whether or not respondents'
family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
HELD:
I. The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit. Petitioners are not guilty of forum- shopping.
Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum shopping.
Simply, the execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the
life of the law. It is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant Petition as
a continuation of the execution proceedings does not constitute forum shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause
of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground
for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers, or
by splitting of causes of action (where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through
means other than by appeal or certiorari. Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise from an
initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate
courts or authorities. This is so because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ from those
in the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a continuation of the original case and treated as only
one case.
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that property in dispute
was a family home, had long attained finality. Petitioners' bid to re-litigate the present value of the property
in the course of the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that petitioners should be cited
for contempt of court because of forum-shopping. Recall that although the trial court had nullified the
Deed of Sale over respondents' family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a written consent from its
beneficiaries as required under Article 158 of the Family Code, 23 the court still recognized the validity of
the transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount
of P1 million plus 12% interest per annum.
Petitioners' bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum shopping. Simply, the
execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is not
separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of the instant Petition as a continuation of the execution
proceedings does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment or order by
appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and provided for
by the rules. Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings in Civil
Case No. 4581 and the consequent execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that
the danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, which the judicial policy
against forum shopping seeks to prevent, does not exist in this case.
II. Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents' family home is barred by res judicata.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that precludes parties
from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. Under the 1997
Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res judicata, namely: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness
of judgment.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which the judgment has been
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. The judgment or decree on the merits of the court of competent jurisdiction concludes the
litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal.
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars Eulogio’s move to have the property
in dispute levied on execution. There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581
and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the same parties and subject matter. For these
reasons, Spouses Bell argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under Article 160 of the
Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has already determined that the value of the
property fell within the statutory limit. The CA held that the trial court's Decision, which is indisputably
final, only settled the issue of whether the property in dispute was a family home. The CA ruled that the
decision of the trial court which has become final and executory, only declares the subject property as a
family home. But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution sale
was not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution was issued and
hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before this Court is whether or not the [f]amily
[h]ome of petitioners under the facts and circumstances of the case could be the subject of a writ of
execution and sold at public auction. The Court disagrees with the CA.
III. "Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It may be
argued that the cause of action in the main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute,
while in the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise,
a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief
sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity of the facts essential to the maintenance
of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot,
by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same
parties or their privies. Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single
or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first
and the second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate
the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No. 4581 — including the
bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to them by the trial court — is founded on a
common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence submitted by petitioners during the
execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main proceedings.
Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had
bought the property from Spouses Bell for P1 million — was utilized to substantiate the claim that the
current value of respondents' family home was actually P1 million. In fact, the trial court's order for
respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based on the price stated in the nullified
Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property. Moreover, the
same contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents'
family home have already been used to support their arguments in the main proceedings. Any lingering
doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to rest by the trial court's discussion of
the nature and alienability of the property in dispute, to wit: The second issue is about the allegation of
the plaintiffs that the family home which has been constituted on the house and lot in question is exempt
from alienation and that its value does not exceed P300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey
house was built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in 1976 from his parents
and has been living there with his family. In 1976, when an extra-judicial settlement was made of the
estate of his parents, the fair market value of the house was P70,000. City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas
testified and presented Tax Declaration and others, (Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047) beginning
1985 showing that the subject lot with an area of 329 sq. m. had a fair market value of P76,000.00 and
the residential house located thereon of P50,000.00, for a total value of P126,000.00. She testified that
during the prior years the assessed values were lower. This shows that the limit of the value of
P300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been exceeded. The testimonies of
the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell show that they had
lived in that house together with their said parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is
a family home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without the
written consent of the majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family Code. 38 [Underscoring supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute exceeded the
statutory limit of P300,000 has already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution. Assuming for the sake of argument that
causes of action in the main proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different, the parties are
still barred from litigating the issue of whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution sale
under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
IV. Respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of
the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon
the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted
with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered. 41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are determined
by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles
prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit:
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a
judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds
that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of
its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results
from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family
home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds
shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment
and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the
amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas,
or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable
for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose
annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural
areas.
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article 160 are enlightening, to wit:
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In reply, Judge Diy opined that the above
Article is intended to cover a situation where the family home is already worth P500,000 or P1M. Justice
Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home, originally valued at P300,000, later appreciated to
almost P1M because of improvements made, like roads and plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a
distinction between voluntary and involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value of the family
home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one establishing the
family home, the Article will apply; but if it is through an involuntary improvement, like the conversion into
a residential area or the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home
should not be punished by making his home liable to creditors. He suggested that the matter be clarified
in the provision.
Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the family home is worth
more than the maximum amount at the time it was constituted, they will avoid the suit because the creditor
will be given proper warning. Justice Puno opined that this is a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added
that, under the second sentence, there will be a preliminary determination as to whether the family home
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law.
Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:
If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to subsequent voluntary improvements
by the person or persons constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the
same rules and procedure shall apply.
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the owner for improving
the family home. On the other hand, Justice Puno opined that the provision covers only the excess in
actual value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added that the owner may improve the family home up
to P300,000. Justice Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can borrow money, put it all
on improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of a family home and, thereby,
exempt it from levy on the part of the creditor. He added that anyway, if one voluntarily improves his
family home out of his money, nobody can complain because there are no creditors.
Justice Puno posed the question: What is "due to the subsequent improvement?" Is it the "excess" or is
it the "increase", or is it the "increase", which constitutes the "excess"? In reply, Justice Reyes opined
that it is the "increase" which constituted the "excess". Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
modified the last sentence as follows: If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in
Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and procedure shall
apply. Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include the original
value. Justice Puno suggested that they just say "increased actual value", which the Committee
approved. 44 [Underscoring supplied]
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by
law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of
currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any
of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160. Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the
family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the
property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. 45
Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit
is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from
levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors. Petitioners
maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family home from execution or
forced sale. They claim that the actual value of respondents' family home exceeds the P300,000 limit in
urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to
sell the property for P1 million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly ordered the execution
sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case No.
4581. 47
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family
home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents
have timely claimed the exemption of the property from execution. 48 On the other hand, there is no
question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.
Notwithstanding petitioners' right to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot obtain
its satisfaction at the expense of respondents' rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those
asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms
of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its enforcement. 49
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any
of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners.
The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality
that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when
petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the
actual value of the property in dispute. The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute under
Article 160. The trial court had already determined with finality that the property was a family home, and
there was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements
by respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion
when one acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment,
as in this case in which the assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal justification. 50
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of
the family home of respondents, is AFFIRMED. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED.
III.
LUCITA TIOROSIO-ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-

EUROPA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11, 11th
Judicial Region, Davao City, NICOLAS L. SUMAPIG, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City and NECEFERO JOVERO,
respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185746. January 20, 2016.]
JARDELEZA, J p:
FACTS:
Necefero Jovero filed an action for damages against Spouses Espinosa because of the malicious filing of
several cases for theft, estafa and perjury against him for the sole purpose of vexing, harassing, and humiliating him
before the RTC of Davao City. Jovero prayed for compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jovero awarding him the prayed
damages with specific amounts. Jovero moved for execution pending appeal, citing his advanced age and failing
health. Meanwhile, Spouses Espinosa moved for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The motion for execution
pending appeal was granted. The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution pending appeal which covered the
entire amount stated in the decision. Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Spouses Espinosa
filed their notice of appeal of the main RTC decision and a separate motion to stay execution pending appeal and to
approve/fix the supersedeas bond. They contended that execution pending appeal involving awards of moral
and exemplary damages is improper because it is contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court. The RTC
denied the motion to stay execution pending appeal.
Spouses Espinosa filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari
for failure to state the date when the assailed order was received. Spouses Espinosa filed their motion for
reconsideration however, it was denied by the CA. Lucita Tiorosio-Espinosa (Lucita) filed this petition for review on
certiorari to appeal the CA's dismissal of the case. Lucita asserts that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the execution pending appeal of the awards of moral and exemplary damages. Jovero maintains that
the RTC correctly granted the motion for execution pending appeal because of his advanced age and frail health.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, may be the subject of execution
pending appeal.
HELD:
The resolution of this issue is straightforward. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that execution
pending appeal of awards of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees is not allowed. In Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Lantin, we explained why these cannot be the subject of execution
pending appeal: The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the
main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract
and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the
exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually
the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the
petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the
petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some
cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced. 37 (Emphasis supplied.) cSaATC
In Engineering Construction, Inc. v. National Power Corporation, 38 we expanded the RCPI doctrine to
likewise exclude consequential damages and attorney's fees from execution pending appeal. 39 The doctrine has since
been reiterated in Heirs of Santiago C. Divinagracia v. Ruiz, 40 International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court of Appeals,
41 Echauz v. Court of Appeals, 42 and Valencia v. Court of Appeals. 43 Clearly, the RTC committed legal error when
it ordered the premature execution of the awards of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Nonetheless, we recognize that the RTC had the power to order the execution pending appeal of actual or
compensatory damages in accordance with the cited authorities.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolutions dated December 14, 2007 and
November 18, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02061-MIN are SET ASIDE. The orders dated April 12,
2007 and September 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City are MODIFIED to exclude moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in the execution pending appeal. The temporary restraining order
issued on February 9, 2009 is LIFTED.
IV.
TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUIS FAJARDO AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150462. June 15, 2011.]
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
FACTS:
Emilio Gregorio (Gregorio) filed an application for registration of title over Lots (1-4) located at Las Piñas,
Rizal, before the CFI of Rizal (LRC Case No. N-5053). The court then issued an order declaring as abandoned the
reserved oppositions of Jose and Pablo Velasquez. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial. Meanwhile, Jose
Velasquez filed an application for registration of title over six lots (Lots 7, 9 and Lots 1, 7, 9 and 11) situated at Almanza,
Las Piñas, Rizal before the same court. The CFI rendered a decision in LRC Case No. N-5053 declaring Gregorio to
be the absolute owner of the lots. An order was issued by said court for the issuance of the decree of registration
stating that it become final. The same court promulgated a decision in adjudicating the lots to Jose T. Velasquez and
ordered the issuance of a decree of registration in view of the finality of the March 30, 1966 decision.
In the meantime, the LRA called the attention of the Director of Lands regarding the overlapping of Lots 1, 7
and 11 awarded to Velasquez, with Lots 1 to 4 adjudicated to Gregorio, and requested that portions of these lots that
are not in conflict be segregated. The LRA informed the CFI that Lots 1 and 7 had been amended by the Bureau of
Lands to exclude therefrom portions covered by Lot 2 and Lots 1 to 4 of Gregorio. On the basis of the LRA report,
Velasquez petitioned the CFI to set aside the award earlier made in favor of Gregorio on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and to give due course to his application over the said lots in LRC Case No. N-5416. The CFI issued
an Order declaring that the application of Velasquez be given due course insofar as Lots 1 and 7 which are identical
to Lots 1 to 4 and the decision in favor of Gregorio respecting the same lots as null and void. The corresponding
certificates were issued in favor of Velasquez. Gregorio appealed the decision of the CFI to the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the CFI adjudication in favor of Velasquez Lots 1 and 7. As per entry of judgment issued by the CA, the
above decision became final and executory. It appears, however, that a petition for review had been filed by Velasquez
with the Supreme Court which was given due course per resolution of the Second Division. Eventually, this Court
denied the petition. It became final and executory as per entry of judgment issued by the SC.
Prior to this however, Decree No. N-141990 over Lots 1, 3 and 4 were issued by the LRA and the
corresponding OCT No. 9587 in the name of Gregorio, was subsequently issued. Lots 1, 3 and 4, Plan Psu-204785
covered by OCT No. 9587 also became the subject of Civil Case No. 16977 of the CFI of Rizal. Gregorio sought the
annulment of the deed of sale over the said lots in favor of Luciana Parami. The CFI dismissed the complaint of
Gregorio. Gregorio appealed to the CA which reversed the CFI. In its decision, the CA declared the aforesaid deed of
sale null and void, and ordered the cancellation of certificate of title in the name of the Paramis and issuance of an
OCT in favor of Gregorio (Lots 1, 3 and 4). The court in the same case issued an order declaring the children of the
deceased Emilio Gregorio "as his compulsory heirs to substitute the said plaintiff." Pursuant to the said decision, OCT
a new certificate of title was issued in favor of his heirs was issued.
In a Report of the LRA informed the CFI that compliance with the CA decision adjudicating Lots 1, 3 and 4 of
in favor of Gregorio will result in duplication of titles over the said properties. The heirs of Emilio Gregorio filed an
ex-parte motion for execution before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 152 in LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and
N-5416. The RTC of Pasig issued the following Order: considering that the resolution by the Supreme Court denying
the petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals become final and executory in favor of
Emilio Gregorio, and considering further the recommendation contained in the Report of the Acting Commissioner of
Land Registration relative to LRC case wherein Emilio Gregorio is the applicant and wherein Jose T. Velasquez is the
applicant, which report is hereby approved, the Court declares as null and void the decree covering Lots 1-4 in favor
of Velasquez as well as all existing subsequent titles emanating therefrom, and any and all encumbrances constituted
against said Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Psu-204785 and other acts of disposition affecting the same.
The Register of Deeds of Pasay City issued titles in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio. Subsequently,
by virtue of a Partition Agreement with Herminia Galman, the property was subdivided into two lots between the heirs
of Gregorio and Galman. Consequently, a new TCT in the name of the heirs of Gregorio and in the name of Herminia
Galman, were issued by the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. Undeniably, the duplication of titles over Lot 1, Psu-
204785 with the issuance of TCT No. S-91911 (transfer from OCT No. 9587) and TCT No. 107729 and its derivative
title, TCT No. 4635, both in the name of the same owners, gave rise to the present controversy.
The Claim of Luis Fajardo (TCT No. 27380, now TCT No. T-34923)
As earlier mentioned, Gregorio appealed the CFI decision awarding Lots 1 to 4 of Psu-204785 in favor of
Velasquez. Sometime after this, he entered into an agreement with Trinidad and Fajardo entitled "Kasunduan na may
Pambihirang Kapangyarihan." By virtue of this agreement, Fajardo would finance the cost of the litigation and in
return he would be entitled to one-half of the subject property after deducting twenty per cent (20%) of the total land
area as attorney's fees for Trinidad if the appeal is successful. After the CA rendered a favorable ruling on Gregorio's
appeal, Fajardo and Trinidad filed a Civil case before the RTC of Pasig to enforce their agreement with Gregorio. The
RTC rendered judgment in their favor. The heirs of Gregorio appealed the above decision but their appeal was declared
abandoned and dismissed by the CA. By virtue of an Entry of Judgment issued by the CA, Trinidad and Fajardo filed
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. However, the writ issued remained unsatisfied as per the Return filed
by the Sheriff. The court appointed Deputy Estrellado to execute the deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs.
Deputy Sheriff Estrellado executed the Officer's Deed of Conveyance in favor of Trinidad and Fajardo. While
the plaintiffs moved for the approval of the subdivision plan needed for the transfer and issuance of separate titles as
per decision, the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas wrote a letter-reply to the Deputy Sheriff indicating that the deed of
conveyance and Order of the Court entered as Entry No. 6503 and 6504 in their docket book could not be pursued
because the subject property was already sold to other parties. In compliance with the order of the CFI, then Register
of Deeds of Las Piñas Alejandro R. Villanueva submitted an official report 24 stating that TCT No. S-91911, still existing
in their records, should have been cancelled when TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 were issued in compliance
with the Order dated March 21, 1986 of the RTC of Pasig, and that such caused an anomalous situation of having two
separate and distinct certificates of title covering the same parcels of land although in the name of the same registered
owners. Villanueva opined that the issuance of TCT Nos. 107727, 107728 and 107729 covering Lots 1, 3 and 4 of Psu-
204785, "placed TCT No. 591911, as deemed cancelled, inasmuch as the latter certificate of title covers one and the
same parcels of land" and hence TCT No. S-91911 should not anymore be subject of any transactions. The CFI initially
withdrew its Order dated August 14, 1989 but eventually reinstated the same and ordered the Register of Deeds to
annotate the Deed of Conveyance at the back of TCT No. S-91911 within 24 hours upon receipt of the order. Said
directive was reiterated by the CFI on June 7, 1991. On June 26, 1991, the court authorized the subdivision of Lot 1,
Psu-204785 and directed the Register of Deeds to issue separate titles in favor of plaintiffs Trinidad and Fajardo.
Consequently, TCT No. T-27380 25 covering 29,369 sq. ms. portion of Lot 1, Psu-204785 in the name of Luis Fajardo
was issued on December 12, 1991. On April 26, 1993, said TCT No. T-27380 was cancelled per Order 26 of the court
dated March 13, 1992 and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-34923 27 was issued, still in the name of Luis Fajardo and without
any of the encumbrances carried over from TCT No. S-91911. cSaADC
The Claim of Top Management Programs Corporation (TCT No. T-8129)
On September 24, 1991, petitioner Top Management Programs Corporation sought the annulment of the CFI
orders in Civil Case reinstating the August 14, 1989 order and directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the
name of Trinidad and Fajardo, on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Petitioner claimed that by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale which was notarized, the heirs of Gregorio sold to it a parcel of land with an area of 20,000 sq. ms., located at
Las Piñas and identified as Lot 1-A being a portion of Lot 1. The CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for
annulment. It held that there existed no extrinsic fraud which would justify the annulment of the questioned orders.
Petitioner sought the reversal of the CA ruling before this Court via a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the CA judgment. On the issue raised by petitioner as to whether the CA erred in
holding that petitioner's claim of title to Lot 1-A should be served as third-party claim on the Deputy Sheriff who executed
the Deed of Conveyance and caused its registration, or to vindicate the claim to the property through a separate
independent action, the Court refrained from discussing the same since its resolution is inconsequential and would not
alter in any way the outcome of the petition.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Makati Civil for Quieting of Title with Damages. Petitioner alleged that the
issuance of TCT in the name of Fajardo — who obtained the same from the court in a case without the knowledge of
petitioner who was not a party therein — despite the existence of TCT in its name constitutes a cloud upon the title of
petitioner. Petitioner claimed that it acquired the same property in good faith and for value from the original owners
thereof. Fajardo asserted that it is the title of petitioner which originated from a void title because its TCT originated
from TCT which was in effect declared null and void under this from the CA Decision. The CA had nullified the CFI
decision insofar as it adjudicates the subject lots to Velasquez. After petitioner's formal offer of evidence, private
respondent filed a demurrer to evidence, which the trial court granted in its Order. Petitioner appealed to the CA and
said court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The CA held that petitioner cannot invoke the
rule that the title which bears the earlier date should prevail in view of the infirmity in its TCT which on its face shows
that its origin was a title already voided by the appellate court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the CA. Hence, this petition alleging that the CA erred in (a) declaring TCT No. T-8129 as defective based
on a mere clerical error despite acknowledgment of its issuance resulting from a final determination by this Court of
the validity of Emilio Gregorio's claim over the subject property, and (b) affirming the validity of private respondent's
TCT No. T-27380 despite the clear nullity of its mother title (OCT No. 9587) which was issued pending the appeal filed
by Velasquez from the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R to this Court.
Petitioner reiterates that an error was made on the entries in TCT No. 107729. Instead of providing that said
title, as well as TCT Nos. 107727 and 107728 issued in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, emanated from the
application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Rec. No. N-27523 pursuant to the Order
of the RTC in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-5053, the Register of Deeds of Pasay City annotated on the face of said
titles that these were derived from Jose T. Velasquez's OCT No. 5678 under Decree No. N-111862. Petitioner laments
that deplorable situation of the legitimate successor of the winning litigant holding a title wrongly annotated to have
been derived from the voided title of the loser in the case. The winning party was then given a title registered as derived
from the title he fought so hard to set aside. Moreover, there is no logic in the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's title traces its origin to a mother title already voided, when in fact it is undisputed that TCT No. 107729 was
issued pursuant to the March 21, 1986 order of the RTC of Pasig in LRC Case Nos. N-5416 and N-5053 implementing
the final and executory February 8, 1984 decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. L-34239-40 denying Velasquez's appeal.
Petitioner further claims that it is a buyer in good faith who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of his predecessor-
in-interest. It paid the purchase price and acquired its title long before it discovered the right to compensation of private
respondent through the Officer's Deed of Conveyance. Finally, petitioner argues that the issuance of OCT No. 9587
during the pendency of Velasquez's appeal to this Court renders said title null and void ab initio, citing the ruling in
Director of Lands v. Reyes. 35 Since OCT No. 9587 is a nullity, it follows that its derivative title, private respondent's
TCT No. T-27380, is likewise a nullity. Private respondent counters that petitioner's assertion of the existence of clerical
errors in the annotations of the entries in TCT No. 8129 is, at the very least, an admission that said title is indeed
defective. Obviously, petitioner may not file a petition to quiet its title and at the same time seek, in the same proceeding,
the corrections of the entries therein. As to the issue of premature issuance of OCT No. 9587, private respondent points
out that the decision in LRC Case No. N-5053 dated January 31, 1966 as a consequence of which Decree of
Registration No. 141990 was issued, has already attained finality even before Velasquez sought the annulment of the
award in favor of Emilio Gregorio utilizing the Report of the Commissioner of Land Registration dated September 16,
1966, to the effect, among others, that a portion of the land awarded in his favor overlapped with that adjudicated to
Gregorio. Hence, the prohibition mentioned in the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra) has no application to the
case at bar, and therefore could not serve as basis to nullify OCT No. 9587, the mother title of TCT No. T-27380 in the
name of private respondent.
We deny the petition.
I. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. In an action for quieting of title, the plaintiffs must show not only
that there is a cloud or contrary interest over the subject real property, but that they have a valid
title to it.
The court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not
only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right
will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the
improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.
Petitioner anchors its claim over the disputed lot on TCT No. T-8129 which is a transfer from TCT No.
107729 in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio, from whom it bought the property in January 1989.
On the other hand, private respondent acquired the same land by virtue of the Officer's Deed of
Conveyance executed in their favor pursuant to the final judgment in Civil Case No. 35305 of the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 164 and was issued TCT No. T-27380 in his name.
If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach
is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. Citing our earlier
ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals we declared: where two transfer certificates of title have been issued
on different dates, to two different persons, for the same parcel of land even if both are presumed to be
title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail.
On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual issuance of
subject transfer certificates of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which
the certificates of title in dispute were derived. Should there be only one common original
certificate of title, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail,
absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration. 40
From the recitals in the transfer certificates of title respectively held by petitioner and private respondent,
as well as the records of the LRA, there appears not just one but two different original certificates.
TCT No. T-8129 on its face shows that the land covered was originally registered as OCT No. 5678 under
Decree No. N-111862 (Velasquez), while TCT No. T-27380 indicates the original registration as OCT No.
9587 under Decree No. N-141990 (Gregorio). Both the LRC and CA found TCT No. 107729 and its
derivative titles TCT Nos. 4635 and T-8129 as void and inexistent since OCT No. 5678 in the name of
Velasquez had been nullified under the order for execution of the final judgment in LRC Case Nos. N-
5053 and N-5416 in which Gregorio prevailed. Consequently, the lower courts upheld the title of private
respondent which alone can be traced to the original certificate in the name of Emilio Gregorio (OCT No.
9578). Petitioner, however, asserts that the entries in his TCT contain errors and insists that TCT Nos.
107729, 4635 and T-8129 actually emanated from the application for registration of Emilio Gregorio in
LRC Case No. N-5053, LRC Record No. N-27523 pursuant to the Order of the Regional Trial Court in
LRC Case Nos. N-5053 and N-5416, as in fact TCT No. 107729 were issued along with TCT Nos. 107727
and 107728 covering two other lots also in the name of the Heirs of Emilio Gregorio by way of
implementing the final judgment of said court in the case between Gregorio and Velasquez, as affirmed
by the CA and this Court. We disagree.
TCT No. 107729 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio issued on April 29, 1986, on its face showed
badges of irregularity in its issuance. First, the technical description stated that it covers a portion of Lot
1, plan Psu-204785, LRC Case No. N-5416 instead of N-5053. Second, the decree number and date of
issuance, as well as OCT number clearly indicate that the original decree pertained to Velasquez and not
Gregorio. Third, the name of the registered owner in the original certificate is not Velasquez or Gregorio
but "Delta Motor Corp." And fourth, the certificate from which TCT No. 107729 was supposedly a transfer
should have been the OCT (of Gregorio) and not those unfamiliar TCT numbers indicated therein. The
annotations regarding the supposed original registration of TCT No. 107729 read as follows: IT IS
FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 12th day of December in the year
nineteen hundred and sixty-six in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal
Volume A-69 page 78 as Original Certificate of Title No. 5678 pursuant to Decree No. N-111862 issued
in L.R.C. ___________ Record No. N-28735 Case No. N-5416 in the name of Delta Motor Corp. This
certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27737/A/T-145-A S-8722/T-41 which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned. 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing errors are not mere typographical as petitioner claims, but serious discrepancies in the
registration process. In fact, it is not far-fetched that the erroneous entries could have been intended to
create the impression that TCT No. 107729 was a separate and distinct title from the previously issued
TCT No. S-91911 even if they pertain to one and the same lot adjudicated to Emilio Gregorio. Such
conclusion is reinforced by the unexplained inaction or failure of the heirs of Gregorio to rectify the alleged
errors in their title before selling the property to petitioner. The heirs of Gregorio knew that their TCT No.
S-91911 bore encumbrances in favor of third parties, notably the notice of pending litigation (Lis Pendens)
involving the property covered by said title before the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 35305,
which Trinidad caused to be annotated thereon. The issuance of a new certificate with exactly identical
entries as that of TCT No. S-91911 (as to its original registration) would mean that the aforesaid
annotations had to be carried over to such new certificate. Strangely, it is TCT No. 107729 which RD
Alejandro R. Villanueva upheld in his February 5, 1989 Report notwithstanding its later issuance and the
glaring errors in the entries of its original registration. It must be stressed that OCT No. 5677, 5678, 5679
and 5680 and its derivative titles were ordered cancelled precisely because they were issued pursuant
to Decree Nos. N-111862 to N-111865 issued in LRC Case No. N-5416 in the name of Velasquez, who
lost in the final judgment rendered in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R, and whose claim to the lots covered
thereby were declared null and void. Logically, therefore, any new certificate of title to be issued to the
heirs of Gregorio by virtue of the aforesaid final judgment adjudicating the land to Emilio Gregorio, could
not possibly be a transfer or replacement of the aforesaid void OCTs in the name of Velasquez.
But even granting that the subject entries in TCT No. 107729 were mere clerical errors and assuming
arguendo that said certificate was issued to implement the final judgment in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R,
such execution is tainted with infirmity. The March 21, 1986 order issued by the RTC of Pasig did not
only cancel OCT No. 5678 (and other titles in the name of Velasquez covering the same lots adjudicated
to Gregorio), it also ordered the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the heirs of Emilio
Gregorio despite having been informed by the LRA and the Register of Deeds that there was already
issued OCT No. 9587 over the same lot in the name of Emilio Gregorio, which was replaced with TCT
No. S-91911 in the name of the heirs of Emilio Gregorio following the decision rendered by the appellate
court (CA-G.R. No. 56015-R) in another case filed by Gregorio against spouses Parami (Civil Case No.
16977).
At this point, it serves well to emphasize that upon finality of judgment in land registration cases, the
winning party does not file a motion for execution as in ordinary civil actions. Instead, he files a petition
with the land registration court for the issuance of an order directing the Land Registration Authority to
issue a decree of registration, a copy of which is then sent to the Register of Deeds for inscription in the
registration book, and issuance of the original certificate of title. The LRC upon the finality of the judgment
adjudicating the land to an applicant shall, following the prescribed procedure, merely issues an order for
the issuance of a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in the name of such
applicant.
In this case, the RTC of Pasig, cognizant of a previous decree of registration instead ordered the Register
of Deeds to issue new certificates in favor of the heirs of Gregorio, erroneously declaring that such
certificates are in lieu of OCT Nos. 5677, 5678, 5679 and 5680. Said court exceeded its authority when
it ordered the issuance of transfer certificates in the name of the heirs of Gregorio despite the existence
of TCT No. S-91911 already issued to them covering the sae parcel of land. This caused the duplication
of titles held by the heirs of Gregorio over Lot 1. Thus, while there was only one decree and original
certificate issued to the common predecessor-in-interest of petitioner and private respondent, Emilio
Gregorio, the latter's heirs were able to secure two transfer certificates covering the same land. Indeed it
could not order the issuance of another OCT as it would result to duplication of titles or "double titling."
44 A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the
name of another in an earlier land registration case. 45 Issuance of another decree covering the same
land is therefore null and void.
In the light of the LRA Report dated September 12, 1984 stating that compliance with the July 30, 1971
final judgment rendered by the CA which reversed the LRC decision and adjudicated Lots 1, 3 and 4 in
favor of Emilio Gregorio, would result in duplication of titles, it was grave error for the RTC of Pasig to
grant the motion for execution filed by the heirs of Emilio Gregorio who sought, — in the guise of
implementing the July 30, 1971 CA decision — the issuance of new titles in their name notwithstanding
the existence of OCT No. 9587 and TCT No. S-91911. Given such vital information, there exists a
compelling need for the land registration court to ascertain the facts and "address the likelihood of
duplication of titles . . ., an eventuality that will undermine the Torrens system of land registration." 47
Petitioner nonetheless assails OCT No. 9587 as null and void, having been issued when the adverse
decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was elevated by it to this Court. Following the
doctrine in Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra), it is asserted that OCT No. 9587 should not have been
issued because the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40739-40-R was not yet final at the time, pending resolution
by this Court of the appeal by Velasquez (G.R. No. L-34239-40). In Director of Lands v. Reyes (supra),
this Court laid down the rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration
proceeding and the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. In that case, the assignee of the
original applicant applied for a motion for issuance of a decree of registration before the lower court
pending the approval of the Record on Appeal. The motion was opposed by the Government which
appealed the lower court's decision adjudicating the land to the said assignee. We thus ruled: Under the
circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the
counsel for the adjudicatee Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was
served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on Appeal in both of which the Notice
of Appeal is embodied. Hence, such failure cannot impair the right of appeal. What is more, the appeal
taken by the Government was from the entire decision, which is not severable. Thus, the appeal affects
the whole decision.
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It
is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. A Torrens title issued on the
basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title
becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned
issues the corresponding certificate of title. Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely
taken from the entire decision a quo.
OCT No. 9587 on its face showed that its basis was Decree No. N-141990 issued on October 31, 1972
pursuant to the January 31, 1966 decision of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5053 and CA decision
dated July 30, 1971. Per records of this Court, however, Velasquez had filed a petition for review of the
CA decision. Be that as it may, the premature issuance of the decree in favor of Emilio Gregorio and the
corresponding original certificate of title in his name did not affect his acquisition of title over the subject
land considering that Velasquez's petition was eventually dismissed. Neither can petitioner, by reason
alone of defective issuance of OCT No. 9587, claim a right over the subject land superior to that acquired
by the private respondent. A reading of the annotations of encumbrances at the back of TCT No. T-27380
which were carried over from TCT No. S-91911 in the name of the Heirs of Gregorio, would show that
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 35305 filed before the CFI of Rizal by private respondent and
Trinidad, the latter caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens involving the same properties of the
defendants therein, the heirs of Emilio Gregorio. The notice of lis pendens was registered as Entry No.
21398 49 on TCT No. S-91911. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction,
power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the
action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to
keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent
the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the
whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over
said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of
the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the
final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject
of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. 51 Once a notice
of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would
have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation.
Petitioner being a mere transferee at the time the decision of the RTC of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35305
had become final and executory on December 6, 1988, it is bound by the said judgment which ordered
the heirs of Emilio Gregorio to convey Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4, Psu-204875 in favor of private respondent and
Trinidad. As such buyer of one of the lots to be conveyed to private respondent pursuant to the court's
decree with notice that said properties are in litigation, petitioner merely stepped into the shoes of its
vendors who lost in the case. Such vested right acquired by the private respondent under the final
judgment in his favor may not be defeated by the subsequent issuance of another certificate of title to the
heirs of Gregorio respecting the same parcel of land. For it is well-settled that being an involuntary
transaction, entry of the notice of lis pendens in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds is
sufficient to constitute registration and such entry is notice to all persons of such claim. 53 cHESAD
"It is to be noted that the notation of the lis pendens on the back of the owner's duplicate is not mentioned
for the purpose of constituting a constructive notice because usually such owner's duplicate certificate is
presented for the purpose of the annotation later, and sometimes not at all until [it is] ordered by the
court." 54 Strictly speaking, the lis pendens annotation is not to be referred to "as a part of the doctrine
of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow
litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice
the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice." 55 Thus we have held that one who
buys land where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in good
faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in interest. 56
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in affirming the trial court's order dismissing
petitioner's complaint for quieting of title and ordering the cancellation of its TCT No. T-8129.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 30, 2001 and Resolution dated October
23, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60712 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
V.
SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-fact MARILOU

TOPACIO-NARCISO, petitioners, vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157644. November 17, 2010.]
BRION, J p:
FACTS:
Spouses Topacio obtained a loan amounting to P400,000.00 from the Banco Filipino Savings (BFS) secured
by a real estate mortgage. Topacio failed to pay the loan, prompting BFS to file a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of Mortgage. To satisfy the obligation, the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan sold the mortgaged property at public auction
where the BFS emerged as the highest bidder. Accordingly, a Certification of Sale was issued in its favor and registered
with the RD. After the expiration of the redemption period, BFS then filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Possession pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135 over the mortgaged property before the RTC of Valenzuela
City. Upon posting of the required bond, the RTC issued a writ of possession, commanding the sheriff to place BFS
in possession of the property. The writ of possession was not implemented because Spouses Topacio filed with the
RTC, a petition to set aside the auction sale and the writ of possession (with application for a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction).
Nearly six (6) years later, BFS filed a Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. The RTC
made a clarification that the Order of Dismissal refers to the dismissal of the "main case for issuance of a writ of
possession” and also denied the respondent's motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession. After filing a
motion for reconsideration, the RTC (Judge Leachon) granted the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Spouses
Topacio moved for a reconsideration. The RTC then denied the Topacio’s motion for reconsideration and reiterated its
order for the issuance of an alias writ of possession in favor of the BFS. The petitioners elevated the case before the
CA, where they argue that it was error for the RTC to have issued an alias writ of execution upon a mere motion for
reconsideration and not by an independent action pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition and held that an independent action for the revival of the writ of possession need not be
filed in order to enforce the writ of possession issued on December 12, 1983 since Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court applies only to civil actions and not to special proceedings. Spouses Topacio now contends that pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the writ of possession may no longer be enforced by a mere motion
but by a separate action, considering that more than five years had elapsed from its issuance. The petitioners
also argue that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies to the present case since a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession is neither a special proceeding nor a land registration case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after the lapse of more
than five (5) years from the time of its issuance.
HELD:
I. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings. In a later case Sta. Ana v. Menla, the Court also ruled that the provision in the Rules of
Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after five years but
within ten years by an action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as land registration cases. We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land
registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the
Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years
but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6. Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and
is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a
civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land
is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
Subsequently, the Court, in Republic v. Nillas, affirmed the dictum in Sta. Ana and clarified that "Rule 39
applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality," viz.: Rule 39, as invoked
by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not
expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such
as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent
with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact.
Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to
effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court
to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
II. In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition
for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action 54 governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by Section 7 of Act
No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
The provision states: Section 7. Possession during redemption period. — In any sale made under the
provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] where the property or any part
thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion
in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the
case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the
Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the
office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court
shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred
and fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession
issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said
order immediately.
The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the Court, and finally to the
execution of the order by the sheriff of the province in which the property is located. Based on the text of
the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession
is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond. In fact, the issuance and the immediate implementation of
the writ are declared ministerial and mandatory under the law.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil, 56 we emphatically ruled that "once the writ of possession has
been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay." The issuance of a
writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as

such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion
in the issuance thereof; it must grant the issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set
forth by law, and the provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately. Clearly,
the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the moment of the issuance of the writ of
possession, leaves no room for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be applicable only to civil actions. From
another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by
action within the purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In sum, based on these considerations, we
find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of possession in favor
of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The August 26, 2002 Decision and the March 17, 2003 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32389 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

VI.
JUANARIO G. CAMPIT, petitioner, vs. ISIDRA B. GRIPA, PEDRO BARDIAGA, and SEVERINO
BARDIAGA, represented by his son ROLANDO BARDIAGA, respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 195443. September 17, 2014.]
BRION, J p:
FACTS:
The Court previously cancelled the titles of the Campit and his father Jose because they were obtained
through the misrepresentation of the petitioner's grandfather, Isidro Campit. The respondents further contended that
they have long desired to divide the subject property among themselves, but the petitioner adamantly refused to
surrender his title to the property to them, or to the Register of Deeds, despite their formal demand. Respondents Isidra
B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga, filed an action for
annulment and cancellation of title with the RTC against Campit for their refusal to surrender the title pursuant to their
desire to divide the subject property among themselves. The petitioner opposed the action and argued that the decision
which declared his title null and void could no longer be enforced because its execution was already barred by the
Statute of Limitations, as the said decision was never executed within 10 years from July 19, 1979 — the date of finality
of the judgment. Noting that the action filed by the respondents was not one for revival of judgment, the RTC proceeded
to hear the case and, in a decision dated August 13, 2008, ruled in the respondents' favor. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC because not being the true owner of the subject property, the subsequent issuance of a certificate of title to
the defendant-appellant does not vest him ownership over the subject land. Registration of real property under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Campit then moved to
reconsider, but the CA denied his motion in a resolution. Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. Campit now argues that his title to the subject property must prevail not only because the August 8,
1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357 which became final and executory on July 19, 1979 and which declared his title
null and void, was never executed, but also because, under the Torrens system of registration, a certificate of title is
an indefeasible and incontrovertible proof of ownership of the person, in whose favor it was issued, over the land
described therein. He now contends that he had acquired the property in good faith and for valuable consideration and,
thus, entitled to own and possess the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gripa et. al can still enforce the decision declaring the title to Campit as null and void nothwithstanding
its failure to execute the decision within ten (10) years from July 19, 1979
HELD:
I. The validity of petitioner's title, having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357, could no
longer be reviewed in the present case because of Res Judicata
The issue on the validity of Campit’s title to the subject property has long been settled in Civil Case No.
15357, where the court, in its decision dated August 8, 1978, which became final and executory on July
19, 1979, had found and declared Campit’s title null and void by reason of fraud and misrepresentation.
A matter adjudged with finality by a competent court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter already constitutes res judicata in another action involving the same cause of action, parties
and subject matter. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and
constitutes as an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action. Thus, the validity of petitioner's title, having been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 15357,
could no longer be reviewed in the present case.
The August 8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, however, was not executed or enforced within the
time allowed under the law. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final and executory judgment
may be executed by the prevailing party as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the
entry of judgment, failing which the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action which must be enforced
by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment. 13
II. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be compelled
under the law to reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner under the principle that
the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose
name it is registered.
It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever filed by the respondents — the prevailing
party in Civil Case No. 15357, to execute and enforce the August 8, 1978 decision. The title to the subject
property, therefore, remained registered under the petitioner's name. As the petitioner argued, his title
had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system of land registration provides for the
indefeasibility of the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the expiration of one (1)
year from the date of entry of the registration decree.
We cannot, however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit from the fruit of his and his
predecessors' fraudulent acts at the expense of the respondents who are the rightful owners of the subject
property. The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor
can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense
of others. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner 16 under the principle
that the property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name
it is registered. 17 The party seeking to recover title to property wrongfully registered in another person's
name must file an action for reconveyance within the allowed period of time. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such action does
not prescribe, i.e., when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject property, the action, being in effect
that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.
In the present case, the respondents, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 18421 (the action for
annulment and cancellation of title filed in 2013), have always been in possession of the subject property.
Worth noting are the CA's findings on this respect: of course, Campit has a certificate of title in his favor.
But it cannot be denied that he has never been in possession of the subject property. Neither did he
exercise acts of ownership over the said land since the time he allegedly purchased it from his father in
1977. Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to show that his predecessor-in-interest, Jose
Campit, claimed ownership or was ever in possession of the said land. The defendant-appellant has
admitted that he has paid realty tax covering the subject land only once when he applied for the issuance
of title in his favor. On the other hand, the continuous possession of the subject premises by the plaintiffs-
appellees has not been denied or disputed by the defendants-appellants (sic). The possession in the
concept of an owner by the plaintiffs-appellees has also been confirmed by witness Charlie Martin.
Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the respondents is substantially
in the nature of an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the
fact that the respondents have always been in possession of the subject property, we shall treat Civil
Case No. 18421 as an action to quiet title, the filing of which does not prescribe. Thus, we find the
respondents' filing of Civil Case No. 18421 to be proper and not barred by the time limitations set forth
under the Rules of Court in enforcing or executing a final and executory judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and consequently
AFFIRM the decision dated May 13, 2010 and resolution dated January 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 92356.
VII.
LEONCIO S. SOLIDUM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION) AND INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD., respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161647. June 22, 2006.]
PUNO, J p:
FACTS:
A complaint for collection for a sum of money was filed by Solidum against Unified Capital Management
Corporation (UNICAP) before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner obtained favorable judgment but was not able to get full
payment from UNICAP. Thus, he went after UNICAP's debtors. It appears that one of the debtors, Susan Yee Soon,
executed two (2) Deeds of Relative Assignment to UNICAP which assigned to UNICAP "all moneys that may be
payable to Yee Soon and her beneficiary/ies from the basic proceeds of life insurance policies issued by Insular. Sheriff
Cruz served upon Insular the first Notice of Garnishment which ordered Insular not to dispose of "all sums of money,
credits, shares, interest, accounts receivables and collectibles" arising from the aforementioned policies. A second
Notice of Garnishment reiterated the first Notice. Atty. de Jesus from the Legal Affairs of Insular gave the assurance
that it "shall hold the release of any sums (sic) of money, credits, shares, interest, account receivables and collectibles
of the subject policies." The sheriff wrote Insular requesting for the release of the garnished credits but this time, Insular
refused. Insular averred that the "basic policy proceeds" may only be paid upon the occurrence of the risk subject of
the insurance — i.e., the death of Susan Yee Soon, and further, depending on any lien, charge or indebtedness that
Insular may have on the policies.
Solidum then filed a Motion to direct Insular to comply with the Notices of Garnishment. The trial court ordered
Insular to release to Solidum "the annual dividend due and payable on 17 September 1999 and the subsequent
dividends payable every anniversary date of the policy and such all money, credits, shares, interest, account
receivables and collectibles of Susan Yee Soon under [the policies]." Insular again hedged in complying with the Order.
It argued that what was assigned in the Deeds of Relative Assignment was limited to the total face value of the policies.
It did not include dividends arising from the policies. Insular refused to release the garnished amounts. Solidum moved
for the issuance of an Order directing the sheriff to collect the proceeds of the policies. Insular opposed. Acting on the
motion, the court issued its questioned Order directing the sheriff to collect from the garnishee Insular the proceeds in
the total sum of PhP1,616,900.64." Again, Insular filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed.
The trial court conducted a summary hearing to resolve the motion for reconsideration. Insular presented the
sole testimony of its Customer Servicing Department Head, Mr. Jose A. Padilla. He testified that Susan Yee Soon
obtained a P550,000.00 loan from each of the subject policies from UNICAP. As security for the loans, she assigned
to UNICAP her policies taken from Insular. Insular formally offered its evidence and all the documentary evidence was
admitted by the trial court. However, upon Partial Motion for Reconsideration of Solidum that the Policy Loan
Agreement was inadmissible for lack of proof of due execution and authenticity, the court excluded the questioned
document. The RTC then denied Insular's Motion for Reconsideration, viz.: on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
issues raised therein are mere rehash of the arguments previously considered and resolved by the Court. Moreover,
the exclusion of Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F" leaves the movant with no evidence of the loan agreement between the
policyholder Susan Yee Soon and the movant. There being no such evidence, the movant has no basis to withhold the
proceeds of the policy. Thus, the Court hereby orders the reiteration of the Order dated 07 August 2001. 23
Insular filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It alleged that the judge gravely abused
his discretion when he issued the questioned Order despite its adverse claim on the garnished amounts. The Court of
Appeals gave due course to the petition. It then annulled and set aside the orders of the trial court. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the lone issue:
ISSUE:
I. Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to

a judgment debtor which may be found owing to such debtor by a third person.
It cites some stranger to the litigation who is debtor to one of the parties to the action. Such debtor
stranger becomes a forced intervenor, and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over his person by
means of citation, requires him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor,
who is creditor in the main litigation. It is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of
one creditor for another. Garnishment involves at least three (3) persons: the judgment creditor, the
judgment debtor, and the garnishee, or the person cited who in turn is supposed to be indebted to
the judgment creditor.
In case the garnishee asserts his own rights over the garnished property, Section 16 of Rule 39
provides the remedies, viz.: Section 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
— If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy
thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-
party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for
damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third
person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee
from claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a
frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly
representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer
is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General and if
held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer
out of such funds as may be appropriated for the purpose.
In the case at bar, it is plain that Insular, as garnishee, did not avail any of the remedies provided by
the rules. After it was impleaded as garnishee, it wrote letters to the trial court, initially not contesting
petitioner's right to the basic proceeds of Susan Yee Soon's insurance policies. Later on, however,
it changed its stance and resisted payment by filing an Omnibus Motion and Motions for
Reconsideration of the orders of the trial court. It even appealed to respondent court via a petition
for certiorari.
Trite to state, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is filed when a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
II. Neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-
party claim.
We have held that neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial
of a third-party claim. In the case of Northern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia, the petitioner filed, among
others, a third-party claim which was denied by the respondent judge in the disputed resolution.
Northern Motors, Inc. thereafter filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the resolution and order of the
respondent judge. In resolving whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner's third-party claim, the Court held: Pursuant to [Section 17, 31 Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court], a third-party claimant has two remedies, such as, an action for damages
against the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim to the property. In the case at bar, petitioner's and
intervenor's remedy against the bond proved to be unavailing because of the disputed order of the
respondent Judge cancelling the indemnity bond. Such an order as well as the order denying a
motion to reconsider the same in effect discarded or quashed the third-party claims. What then would
the remedy be of the third-party claimants?
In the recent case of Serra vs. Rodriguez, . . . this Court (First Division), thru Mr. Justice Makasiar,
ruled: From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor,
neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. The remedy of petitioner would
be to file a separate and independent action to determine the ownership of the attached
property or to file a complaint for damages chargeable against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the provincial sheriff.
In Lara vs. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955, this Court, thru Mr. Justice Concepcion, later Chief
Justice, in denying the petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the lower court quashing the
third-party claim of a chattel mortgagee, held: Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained therein
shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action." Neither does
the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by
appropriate proceedings. In short, he has another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law," and, hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.
32 (Emphases supplied.)
The Court further held that since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the action, he
could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying its claim, but should file a separate
reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for damages against the bond filed
by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The rights of a third-party claimant should be decided
in a separate action to be instituted by the third person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed,
if the term "appeal" may be properly employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the
execution creditor or complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment
creditor in favor of the sheriff.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72637 dated September 29, 2003 and January 12, 2004, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. AaSIET
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

VIII.
LIGAYA ESGUERRA, LOWELL ESGUERRA and LIESELL ESGUERRA, petitioners, vs. HOLCIM
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182571. September 2, 2013.]
REYES, J p:
FACTS:
Esguerra filed with the RTC of Bulacan an action to annul the Free Patent in the name of de Guzman. Esguerra
demanded that the portion of his property, which has been encroached upon and included in de Guzman's Free Patent,
be excluded. He later amended his complaint to implead Hi-Cement as a co-defendant since the latter was hauling
marble from the subject land. He also prayed that Hi-Cement be ordered to desist from hauling marble, to account for
the marble already hauled and to pay him.
The RTC dismissed Esguerra's complaint but on appeal, the CA reversed in the Decision. The decision was
affirmed when it was elevated to the Supreme Court. After attaining finality, the case was remanded to the RTC for
execution. Thereafter, the heirs of Esguerra filed an Omnibus Motion with the RTC praying for an examination
under Section 36 and 37, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the order pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37,
Rule 39 of [the] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It directed the sheriff to submit his return of the Writ of Execution and
ordered de Guzman and Hi-Cement (Union Cement Corporation) to appear to be examined on the dispositive portion
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, de Guzman and HOLCIM were not
examined. Rather, Esguerra presented Engineer Balicanta who testified that upon an examination of the topographical
maps covering the land of the deceased Esguerra, the estimated volume of limestone hauled or quarried therefrom
covering the years 1990 to 2003 was 3,535,020.471 cubic meters. Esguerra then filed their Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Esguerra then filed a Supplement to the Motion for Execution and a Motion for Alias Writ of Execution wherein
they claimed that the royalties due them amounted to P10.00 per metric ton. Thus, for the 9,187,257.67 metric tons of
limestone which HOLCIM allegedly acquired, the petitioners should receive a total royalty of P91,872,576.72. The RTC
made a finding that the total volume of limestone which HOLCIM allegedly quarried from the subject land amounted to
P91,872,576.72. It also ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the royalties which were purportedly due
to the petitioners. The RTC subsequently issued an Order clarifying that an alias writ of execution be issued directing
[de Guzman] and/or Hi-Cement Corporation and/or HOLCIM to pay the [petitioners] the amount of Php91,872,576.72
representing their liability for the minerals extracted from the subject property pursuant to the Order of the Court, dated
December 01, 2005. Subsequently, an alias writ of execution and notices of garnishment on several banks, garnishing
all amounts that may have been deposited or owned by HOLCIM, were issued on December 20, 2005 and December
21, 2005 respectively. HOLCIM filed a motion for reconsideration because it did not owe any amount of royalty
to the petitioners for the extracted limestone from the subject land. HOLCIM averred that it had actually entered
into an Agreement dated with the Esguerra governing their respective rights and obligations in relation to the limestone
allegedly extracted from the land in question. HOLCIM further asserted that it had paid advance royalty to the petitioners
from year 1993, in an aggregate sum of P694,184.22, an amount more than the P218,693.10 which the petitioners
were entitled under the Agreement. Petitioners filed its Opposition to [the] Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the
Motion for Reconsideration is barred by the omnibus motion rule because HOLCIM failed to question the petitioners'
motion for execution of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 120004. The petitioners also averred that HOLCIM is barred
by estoppel to question the execution of the decision based on the Agreement, because said Agreement is in
contravention with the trial court's previous orders which required HOLCIM to deposit to the clerk of court the royalties
due the deceased Esguerra. The petitioners also argued that the Agreement is a way to evade the trial court's orders
and has been procured by taking advantage of the petitioners' financial distress after Esguerra died.
HOLCIM filed a Manifestation and Motion (for Ocular Inspection). It asked the court to conduct an ocular
inspection, advancing the argument that HOLCIM did not extract limestone from any portion of the 47,000-sq m
property which Esguerra owned; and that the pictures, which the petitioners presented to prove that HOLCIM has been
extracting limestone from the subject land until year 2005, were actually photographs of areas outside the contested
land. The RTC denied HOLCIM's motion for reconsideration and motion for ocular inspection. It held that the petitioners
proved their entitlement to the royalties totaling to P91,872,576.72. The RTC also blamed HOLCIM for not presenting
its own witnesses and evidence. It further stated that to grant the motions for reconsideration and ocular inspection is
to reopen the case despite the fact that the trial court has no more power to do so since the execution of this Court's
decision in G.R. No. 120004 is now a matter of right on the petitioners' part. HOLCIM filed a Petition for Certiorari (with
Urgent Applications for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA. The CA
promulgated the its decision finding merit in HOLCIM's petition. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in
the CA's Resolution 38 dated April 14, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC may order the payment of debt by Holcim to Esguerra because of the former’s denial of
indebtedness under Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
I. HOLCIM is not estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court to conduct a hearing
and to accept evidence on the exact amount of royalty HOLCIM should pay the petitioners.
Esguerra argue that HOLCIM is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in conducting
a hearing on the exact amount of royalty that HOLCIM must pay the petitioners. They allege that: (a)
HOLCIM expressed willingness to pay the royalty to whoever would be adjudged the rightful owner
of the subject land; (b) HOLCIM and de Guzman did not appear in the hearing nor oppose the
Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004; (c) HOLCIM did not file any opposition or comment on
the petitioners' Formal Offer of Evidence, Supplement to the Motion for Execution and Motion for
Alias Writ of Execution; and (d) HOLCIM is now the new owner of de Guzman's property. As such, it
has acquired the rights, interests and liabilities of de Guzman. The petitioners insist that HOLCIM
must not only account for the royalty it paid de Guzman, but it must also turn over said payments to
the petitioners. 65
HOLCIM counter-argues that when it expressed willingness to pay the royalties to whoever would
be declared the rightful owner of the subject land, it simply manifested its good faith in fulfilling its
obligations. It adds that the petitioners and HOLCIM entered into an Agreement regarding the amount
of royalty it should pay to the landowner; and subsequently, the petitioners voluntarily accepted and
retained the amount of P694,184.22 paid by HOLCIM. In fact, HOLCIM stresses that the said amount
was more than what was stipulated in the Agreement. HOLCIM also asserts that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and not by laches, estoppel or by agreement among the parties and such lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 66 Furthermore, HOLCIM avers that it is
even the DENR panel of arbitrators which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Section 77 of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 67 Lastly, HOLCIM claims that it eventually acquired de Guzman's
property, maintaining that the said property did not overlap with Esguerra's property. Thus, HOLCIM's
ownership and quarrying operations on lands outside the disputed area would have no bearing
whatsoever on the petitioners' claim for royalties on extractions done within the disputed area.
HOLCIM also asseverates that the obligation to turn over any royalty paid to de Guzman is not a real
obligation which attaches to the disputed area or to the land itself or which follows the property to
whoever might subsequently become its owner; rather, HOLCIM argues that the obligation is purely
a personal obligation of de Guzman and thus, not transferable to HOLCIM. IEDaAc
What is clear is that the present case emanates from the petitioners' desire to implement the CA
decision which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Decision. At the execution stage, the only
thing left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory judgment; and the dispositive
portion of the decision controls the execution of judgment. The final judgment of this Court cannot
be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions.
In the instant case, the CA's decision which this Court affirmed in G.R. No. 120004 rendered, among
others, the following judgment:
(a) Insofar as then defendant-appellee de Guzman is concerned, the CA declared OCT No. P-3876
in her possession null and void in relation to the disputed area of 38,641 sq m; the same CA's
decision subsequently ordered de Guzman —
[i] to segregate at her expense the disputed area of 38,641 sq m from OCT No. P-3876;
[ii] to surrender her owner's copy of OCT No. P-3876 to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan;
[iii] to immediately vacate and surrender to then plaintiff-appellant Esguerra possession of the
disputed area;
[iv] to pay and turn over to plaintiff-appellant Esguerra all the amount she received from her co-
defendant Hi-Cement Corporation (now HOLCIM) as compensation or royalty for marbles extracted
or quarried from the disputed area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23, 1990; and
[v] to pay the costs
(b) Insofar as HOLCIM is concerned, the CA's decision ordered HOLCIM —
[i] to immediately cease and desist from quarrying or extracting marble from the disputed area; and
HCaEAT
[ii] to make an accounting of the royalty it paid to de Guzman.
Indeed, the final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a certain
amount to Esguerra and his heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was merely to account
for the payments it made to de Guzman. Apparently, this was not enforced. It may be deduced
from the records that when the petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion dated September 28, 2004, they
asked for the examination of de Guzman and Hi-Cement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and 37 of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This motion was subsequently granted by the trial court.
Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are resorted to only when the judgment remains
unsatisfied, and there is a need for the judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his
property and income for their application to the unsatisfied amount in the judgment. In the instant
case, the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to simply
make an accounting of the royalty paid to de Guzman. Unfortunately, the trial court, instead
of facilitating the accounting of payments made by HOLCIM to de Guzman, proceeded to
adduce evidence on the amount of limestone extracted from the disputed area and imposed
the monetary liability on HOLCIM.
It is rather unfortunate that HOLCIM did not register a whimper upon petitioners' presentation of
evidence. Notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned orders without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Indeed,
when the decision has been rendered unenforceable on account of the undetermined amount to be
awarded, it was incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence from both parties to determine
the exact amount due to the petitioners. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the
petitioners' evidence, considering that the former's Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection
was denied, justice will be better served if the trial court determines first the existence of documents
relative to HOLCIM's payments made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further
evidence, this time, from both parties. It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence to be
adduced here is in relation to the amount of royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM for marbles
extracted from the disputed area of 38,451 sq m beginning March 23, 1990 up to the time HOLCIM
ceased to operate in the subject area. In the event that the petitioners' claim is beyond the subject
area and period, and HOLCIM denies such indebtedness, the governing rule should be Section 43,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 43. Proceedings when indebtedness denied or another
person claims the property. — If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of
the judgment obligor or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him or
denies the debt, the court may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment obligee to
institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid
a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt within one hundred twenty (120) days from
notice of the order, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt. Such order may be
modified or vacated at any time by the court which issued it, or by the court in which the action is
brought, upon such terms as may be just. (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to this Rule, in the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has
the property of such judgment obligor or is indebted to him (Rule 39, Section 37), and such person,
corporation, or juridical entity denies an indebtedness, the court may only authorize the judgment
obligee to institute an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such
interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives the court the authority to order such person or
corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it orders the
person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. In Atilano II v. Asaali, 72 the Court held
that an "[e]xecution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and
not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates
that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties."
Finally, the Court does not agree with petitioners' argument that the person of de Guzman is "now
merged in the person of HOLCIM or that HOLCIM has assumed her personal liability or the judgment
rendered against her." 74 Nothing in the records shows that HOLCIM admitted of assuming all the
liabilities of de Guzman prior to the sale of the subject property. HOLCIM, however, expresses its
willingness to pay royalty only to the rightful owner of the disputed area. Thus, in the event that the
amount paid by HOLCIM to de Guzman has been proven, de Guzman is ordered to turn over the
payment to the petitioners. 75 If the petitioners insist that HOLCIM owed them more than what it paid
to de Guzman, the petitioners cannot invoke the CA's decision which was affirmed by the Court in
G.R. No. 120004 to ask for additional royalty. As earlier discussed, this must be addressed in a
separate action for the purpose. All told, the Court finds no reversible error with the decision
of the CA in nullifying the orders of the RTC for having been issued in excess of its
jurisdiction. TcDIEH
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94838 are hereby AFFIRMED.
IX.
MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015.]
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya?
Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas
ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
xxx xxx xxx
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan pa po ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?"
xxx xxx xxx
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat
ay kinuha na sa kanila.
-"Tata Selo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
FACTS:
Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the RPC because he unlawfully harvested the
1000kg of abaca fibers when he entered into the abaca plantation of Anecita Pacate. Ligtas pleaded not guilty.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant
of the land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial
court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and
without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.
The RTC found Ligtas guilty of theft and that the defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and
substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. According to it, "the burden to prove the existence
of the tenancy relationship" belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy
agreement and that the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the land is irrelevant in the case at
bar". Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Ligtas then filed a Petition assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. This court required People of the Philippines to file its Comment on the
Petition within 10 days from notice.
Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and revenge.
The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant. Telling is the
fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000, while the Information for Theft was
filed on December 8, 2000. Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's
tenant. The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship. The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence. 73 To require petitioner to prove
tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd
and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence. Also, according to petitioner, the
DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did not file an appeal and the finding as to the parties'
tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata. On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals
correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision. The trial court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:
While the DARAB ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy
relationship between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp. Nevertheless, respondent
maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship between him and private
complainant. Private complainant did not consent to the alleged tenancy relationship. Petitioner also failed to provide
evidence as to any sharing of harvest between the parties. According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land. The DARAB's
recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca
hemp from [private complainant's land]." 134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent. As to the existence of
another element of theft — that the taking was done without the consent of the owner — petitioner argues that this,
too, was negated by his status as private complainant's tenant: The purported lack of consent on the part of the private
complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for . . . Anecita Pacate to stop
or prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security
of tenure. This right entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until
his eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by private
complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or
can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
HELD:
I. We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and
binding on courts if supported by substantial evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court
has ruled in a number of cases that: It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing
is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act. Thus, considering
the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed
in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be
the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts
involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and
administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there
exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225
involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a factor
in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.
In its Decision, the DARAB found that all the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy
relationship as required in the above-quoted Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence
submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any evidence submitted by the
respondent. In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is
entitled to a security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the
landowner except for any of the causes provided by law and only after the same has been proved before,
and the dispossession is authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory. Private
complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence. 85 This
court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of evidence."
II. The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.
This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have the same binding effect as
judgments and orders of a regular judicial body." Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include
controversies relating to: tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. In Salazar v. De Leon, this court upheld the Department of
Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between
landowners and tenants. The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by
substantial evidence.
This court ruled that administrative res judicata exists in that case: Significantly, respondent did not
appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in consequently, the same has attained
finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy
of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which
forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that
whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication
may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of
res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as
courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof, and that the more equitable attitude is to
allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr, 94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by
agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings: The CA
was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely
administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations
of the parties. 95 (Citations omitted)
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness
of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al., 96 this
court discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata: Res judicata embraces two concepts:
(1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment, between the same parties or
their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the
first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar
by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but
not identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. 97 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals, 98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in this
case, the DARAB Decision in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.
This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies: Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the
Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial
adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to the
implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof provides that the decision of the DARAB attains
finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no
appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano
as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled
and no longer open to doubt and controversy. We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the
cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution
of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT
and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained
finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary
to understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have
been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew. The instant case is complicated by the failure of
the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant in the case before the adjudication board and
the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the
doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in
a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the
doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same
issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case
and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
binding between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can
no longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not
by the principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment. 102 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
III. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal cases
In Co v. People, et al., 103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies
in criminal cases." 104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System contributions. 105 This court
upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the
absence of an employer-employee relationship and had attained finality. 106 This court held that: The
reasons for establishing the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public policy.
. . . It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious
principle that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises,
the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the
course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot
be again litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled
merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable
time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases. 107 (Citations omitted)
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this court ruled that tenancy
relationship must be duly proven: [A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence
to prove this allegation. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It
is also a legal relationship.
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy
relationship were proven by petitioner. It found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's
claim as tenant of the land. In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of
both petitioner and private complainant. It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which consisted of
sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate
sometime in 1993. Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after harvest.
However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest. Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to
private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land
on June 29, 2000. We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant
failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled hearings. The DARAB even
quoted in its Decision the reason offered by private complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as
counsel: That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her
intention not to participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her; That despite the
advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in the proceedings
of the case; That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he
is now withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled case[.]
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even
records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.
119 In declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Cornes, et al. v.
Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al.
In Cornes, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally
devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate
Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that
when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents, respondents
were aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña. Respondents
offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.However, they failed to comply with their obligations
under the terms of the compensation package. 123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints before
the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator. The Provincial
Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the
parties." 125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not
tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package. On appeal,
the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy
between the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were
entitled to security of tenure. The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the
Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that all the
requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of tenancy relationship, the
compensation package agreement must be upheld. This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.
129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy
relationship: At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears
that there was personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject
landholding, what was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving
testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and
JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are
inadequate; proof must be adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support
them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy,
which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown.
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense. Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of
harvests in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest
and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt
or any other evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments
to the claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of
harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to
have existed on the basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes's claim. It is self-serving and is without
evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced.
If at all, the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. We also sustain the
conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the testimony of Araceli
Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted cannot
overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made
upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court that
the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This
ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as herein shown,
were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of tenancy.
Thus, in Cornes, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional
and, thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the
testimony of the Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted.
Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus,
it is presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality. 131 It is also established that private
complainant participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings. 132 Therefore, the issue of the
existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review the
DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious
doubts as to the guilt of the accused.
IV. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest
the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the
taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.
Tenants have been defined as: persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their
immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under
the leasehold tenancy system. Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or
she cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties.
Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
In Pit-og v. People, 139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the
basis of reasonable doubt. 140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.
141 It failed to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and
consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him." 142 There were doubts as to whether the
plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted
her own plants adjacent to it. 143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property
belonged to private complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas
believing them to be her own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent."
In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it
is with the consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until
proven guilty. 145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person." 146
Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]" 147 Equally
settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt,
and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted."
148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the other errors
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution
dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined
for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
X.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
respondents.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]
BRION, J p:
FACTS:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on.
He then got married to Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines and was surprised that
Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on. The
divorce decree took effect a month later.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's. The RTC denied
Gerbert's petition because Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen and that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." From the RTC's ruling, Gerbert filed the present
petition.
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse — an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility
that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert's position.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
I. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages — void and voidable marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: To
maintain that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse]
and still subject to a wife's obligations cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
II. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of
the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves
as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
III. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
IV. Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his
or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court comes into play.
This Section requires proof, either by

(1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents.
If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms.
This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive
rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
V. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically
requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is
established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (e) divorces;
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission
of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read
in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,
36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 — both of which required a final order
from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in
the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under
the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares
that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry — one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama Jr., JJ., concur.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by The Armed Forces of The Philippines Finance Center

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by The Armed Forces of The Philippines Finance Center

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Civil Procedure - CASE DIGESTS

Victor Kenner S. Galang – 3D

Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:

LUCITA TIOROSIO-ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA HOFILEÑA-

The Claim of Top Management Programs Corporation (TCT No. T-8129)

We deny the petition.

With costs against the petitioner.

SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO, as represented by their attorney-in-fact MARILOU

I. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions

writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as

Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

I. Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.

MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

III. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal cases

This Section states:

IV. Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court

This Section requires proof, either by

V. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama Jr., JJ., concur.

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