Validity of employee waivers and quitclaims upheld

Quitclaims; validity.
Respondents were terminated from employment due to

retrenchment implemented by petitioner. Upon their dismissal, the respondents
signed individual “Release Waiver and Quitclaim.” The Court ruled that a waiver or
quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties, provided that it
constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement, and that the one accomplishing it
has done so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. In this case, the
respondents were sufficiently apprised of their rights under the waivers and
quitclaims that they signed. Each document contained the signatures of the union
president and its counsel, which proved that respondents were duly assisted when
they signed the waivers and quitclaims. Hence, the Court upheld the validity of the
waivers and quitclaims signed by the respondents in this case. Plastimer Industrial
Corporation and Teo Kee Bin v. Natalia C. Gopo, et al., G.R. No. 183390, February 16,
2011.
Money claims; burden of proof. Respondents alleged that petitioner-

corporation failed to pay them their full compensation. The Labor
Arbiter granted their monetary claims but the NLRC reversed the
award considering that the petitioner-corporation submitted copies
of payrolls, which it annexed to its memorandum on appeal, showing
full payment. The general rule is that the burden rests on the
employer to prove payment, rather than on the employee to prove
non-payment. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel
files, payrolls, records, remittances, and other similar documents —
which will show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave,
and other claims of the worker have been paid — are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of
the employer. In this case, the submission by petitioner-corporation
of the time records and payrolls only when the case was on appeal
before the NLRC is contrary to the elementary precepts of justice
and fair play. Respondents were not given the opportunity to check
the authenticity and correctness of the evidence submitted on
appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the monetary claims of
respondents should be granted. It is a time-honored principle that if
doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and
the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
latter. It is the rule in controversies between a laborer and his
master that doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the
interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the
former’s favor. E.G. & I. Construction Corporation and Edsel Galeos
v. Ananias P. Sato, et al., G.R. No. 182070 ,February 16, 2011.
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, __________________, Filipino, of legal age, a resident of

__________________, and formerly employed with __________________, do by these
presents acknowledge receipt of the sum of __________________, Philippine Currency,
from _____________________ in full payment and final settlement of the (financial
assistance or separation pay, overtime pay, salary or salaries, wage or wages,
commutable sick and vacation leaves, gratutities or any kind of compensation or
emoluments) due to me or which may be due to me from ____________________ under
the law or under any existing agreement with respect thereto, as well as any and all
claims of whatever kind and nature which I have or may have against
________________, arising from my employment with (and the termination of my
employment with ______________________.
In consideration of said payment, I do hereby quitclaim, release, discharge and

waive any and all actions of whatever nature, expected, real or apparent, which I may
have against _______________, its directors, officers, employees, agents and clients by
reason of or arising from my employment with the company. I will institute no action,
whether civil, criminal, labor or administrative against _________________, its directors,
officers, employees, agents and clients. Any and all actions which I may have
commenced either solely in my name or jointly with others before any office, board,
bureau, court, or tribunal against _________________, its directors, officers, employees,
agents and clients are hereby deemed and considered voluntary withdrawn by me
and I will no longer testify or continue to prosecute said action(s).
I declare that I have read this document and have fully understood its
contents. I further declare that I voluntarily and willingly executed this Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim with full knowledge of my rights under the law.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at _____________, this ___

day of _______________, 2000.
_______________________
Affiant
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF
_______________________ ______________________
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188002 : February 1, 2010
GOODRICH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION & MR. NILO CHUA GOY, Petitioners, vs. EMERLINA
ATIVO, LOVITO SEBUANO, MICHAEL FERNANDEZ, JUNIFER* CASAS, ROLANDO ISLA, ELISEO DEL
ROSARIO, MARK JON MARTIN, EDISON GAMIDO, WARRY BALINTON, ROBERT RAGO and
ROBERTO MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1cralaw dated November 28, 2008 and
Resolution2cralaw dated May 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103078. The appellate
court set aside the February 21, 2007 Decision3cralaw and January 29, 2008 Resolution4cralaw of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and reinstated the November 22, 2005 Decision 5cralaw of
the Labor Arbiter.
The facts follow.
Respondents are former employees of petitioner Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation (Goodrich)

assigned as machine or maintenance operators for the different sections of the company. Sometime in
the latter part of 2004, on account of lingering financial constraints, Goodrich gave all its employees the
option to voluntarily resign from the company. Several employees, including respondents, decided to
avail of the voluntary resignation option. On December 29, 2004, respondents were paid their separation
pay.6cralaw On January 3, 2005, respondents executed their respective waivers and quitclaims. 7cralaw
The following day, January 4, 2005, some of Goodrich's former employees, including herein respondents,
filed complaints against Goodrich for illegal dismissal with prayer for payment of their full monetary
benefits before the NLRC. Despite several conferences, no amicable settlement was reached by the
parties.
On November 22, 2005, Labor Arbiter Florentino R. Darlucio rendered a Decision declaring that there was
no illegal dismissal but held that petitioners were still liable to the respondents for their unpaid
emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), 13th month pay, and service incentive leave (SIL) pay. The
Labor Arbiter likewise found the separation pay paid by Goodrich to be insufficient. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Goodrich

Manufacturing Corp. to pay the complainants the following:
Names SEP. PAY 13th Mo. SILP ECOLA SUBTOTAL Waiver & TOTAL AWARD
Pay Quitclai
m
[Emerlina 26,000.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 65,478.44 20,489.58 44,988.86

] Ativo
1,732.16
Warry 6,500.00 10,075.00 1,937.50 9,434.10 27,946.60 10,625.00
Balinton (sic)
Jennifer 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 20,043.13 38,935.31

Casas
Michael 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 29,012.76 29,965.68

Fernande
z
Rolando 13,000.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 18,225.92 40,752.52

Isla
Mark Jon 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 1,937.50 16,312.40 27,946.60 20,533.9 7,412.6
Martin 6 4
Lovito 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 20,342.62 38,635.82

Sebuano
Eliseo del 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 23,810.00 35,168.44

Rosario
Edison 16,250.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 55,728.44 13,125.00 42,603.44

Gamido
178,750.0 195,016.2 37,503.1 165,679.8 576,949.1 213,598.0

05 3 0 8 7
Total 365,351.1
Award 1
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8cralaw
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the NLRC. On February 21, 2007, the NLRC reversed and set aside
the Labor Arbiter's decision. In disposing the issue, the NLRC explained:
Going over the complainants deeds of waiver and quitclaim, We are convinced [that] the considerations
they received are not unreasonable, vis-à-vis the awards granted [to] them in the assailed Decision.
Notably, the awards even include the 13th month pays for 2002 and 2003 which, by respondents proof
(Rollo 219 to 233) appear already paid. We also noted that complainants are not shown to have signed
the deeds of waiver and quitclaim involuntarily, without understanding the implication and
consequences thereof. x x x.
Respondents counterclaim is denied. There is no showing that complainants prosecuted their complaint
in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
complainants monetary claims are hereby dismissed.
Respondents counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9cralaw
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit, 10cralaw prompting
them to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals.11cralaw
On November 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered its decision in favor of the respondents. The
pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The record is devoid of any indication that the petitioners were coerced into resigning from the company.
On the contrary, the record supports the view that the petitioners chose to resign without any element of
coercion attending their option. The quitclaim they executed in favor of the company amounts to a
valid and binding compromise agreement. To allow petitioners to repudiate the same will be to
countenance unjust enrichment on their part. The court will not permit such a situation.
xxxx
However, We defer to the findings of the [L] abor [A] rbiter that petitioners are entitled to their unpaid
thirteenth month pay, ECOLA and service incentive leave pay (SIL) at the amounts computed by the [L]
abor [A] rbiter. These are benefits to which petitioners are entitled by statute, and which private
respondent[s] failed to disprove.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Second Division, dated February 21, 2007 and January 29, 2008, respectively, are
hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of Labor Arbiter Florentino Darlucio, dated November 22, 2005, [is]
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.12cralaw
Petitioners are now before this Court raising the same issues: whether the release, waiver and
quitclaim signed by respondents are valid and binding; and whether respondents may still receive the
deficiency amounts due them.
Petitioners contend that to allow respondents to recover their monetary claims would render nugatory
the legal consequences of a valid quitclaim. They further argue that waivers and quitclaims, by their
very nature, set aside all the other claims which the employee may be entitled to by the stroke of a
pen.13cralaw
Petitioners argument is meritorious.
It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal
responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees.14cralaw In certain cases, however, the Court has
given effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employer is able to prove the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or
deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 15cralaw
Our pronouncement in Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission 16cralaw on this matter cannot be
more explicit:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking.17cralaw
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that respondents executed the quitclaims
absent any coercion from the petitioners following their voluntary resignation from the company. 18cralaw
In their Comment19cralaw dated October 1, 2009, respondents themselves admitted that they were not
coerced to sign the quitclaims.20cralaw They, however, maintain that two (2) reasons moved them to
sign the said documents: first, they believed Goodrich was terminating its business on account of
financial hardship; and second, they thought petitioners will pay them the full amount of their
compensation.21cralaw Respondents insist that they were deceived into signing the quitclaims when they
learned that they were not paid their full monetary benefits and after discovering that the company did
not really close shop, but instead only assumed a different company name. 22cralaw
We are not persuaded.
First, the contents of the quitclaim documents that have been signed by the respondents are simple,
clear and unequivocal.23cralaw The records of the case are bereft of any substantial evidence to show
that respondents did not know that they were relinquishing their right short of what they had expected
to receive and contrary to what they have so declared. Put differently, at the time they were signing
their quitclaims, respondents honestly believed that the amounts received by them were fair and
reasonable settlements of the amounts which they would have received had they refused to voluntarily
resign from the said company.
Second, respondents claim that they were deceived because petitioners did not really terminate their
business since Mr. Chua Goy had set up another company with the same line of business as Goodrich.
Such contention, however, was not proven during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Hence, such claim is based only on respondents surmises and speculations which, unfortunately, can
never be used as a valid and legal ground to repudiate respondents quitclaims.
And third, the considerations received by the respondents from Goodrich do not appear to be grossly
inadequate vis-à-vis what they should receive in full. As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the total
awards computed by the Labor Arbiter will definitely even be lesser after deducting the 13th month pay
for the years 2002 and 2003, which have already been received by the respondents prior to the filing of
their complaints, but which the Labor Arbiter still included in his computation. The difference between
the amounts expected from those that were received may, therefore, be considered as a fair and
reasonable bargain on the part of both parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28,
2008 and Resolution dated May 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 103078 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the NLRC Decision dated February 21, 2007 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Endnotes:
*
Referred to as "Jennifer" in some parts of the rollo .
1
cralaw Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and
Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, concurring; rollo, pp. 25-32.
2
cralaw Rollo, pp. 34-35.
3
cralaw Id. at 100-105.
4
5
6
7
8
9
cralaw Id. at 104.
10
11
12
13
14
cralaw Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Arguilla, G.R. No. 143542, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 183, 200.
15
cralaw Id. at 201.
16
cralaw G.R. No. 91298, June 22, 1990, 186 SCRA 724.
17
18
cralaw Rollo, pp. 85 and 104.
19
20
cralaw Id. at 232.
21
cralaw Id. at 233.
22
cralaw Id. at 234.
23
Save for the names, addresses, amounts, dates and signatures appearing thereon, the
documents entitled Release, Waiver and Quitclaim are similarly worded as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT:
I, ____________________, Filipino, of legal age, single/married, with postal

address at _______________________ having voluntarily served from my
employment with GOODRICH MANUFACTURING CORP., hereinafter referred
to as COMPANY, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of ________________
(Php ___________) Philippine Currency from the said COMPANY, in full
payment and settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever kind and
nature which I have or may have against the said COMPANY, its officers or
employees on account of or incident to my employment therewith and
severance thereof.
In consideration of the above-mentioned payment, I have released and

forever discharged and by these presents do, for myself and my heirs
release and forever discharged (sic) the said COMPANY and its officers and
employees from any and all manner of action, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever which I ever had, have or which I or my heirs
hereafter can, shall or may have against the said COMPANY or its officers
and employees, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing
whatsoever, the intention hereof being to completely, absolutely and finally
release and absolve the said COMPANY, its officers and employees from
any and all liabilities arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from
my employment and subsequent severance with the said COMPANY.
I freely declare that during the entire period of my employment with the
said COMPANY, I received and was paid any and all consideration[,]
including 13th month pay[,] service incentive leave pay[,] and all benefits
and privileges to which I was entitled under by all laws by reason of such
employment[,] and that I hereby renounce and waive my rights to any and
all claims whatsoever, which I have or might have against the said
COMPANY, its officers and employees[;] that I received the above
consideration as full and final settlement of any and all such claims[;] and I
further manifest that the payment of the above[-] mentioned amount shall
not be taken by me, my heirs and successors and assigns as a confession
and/or admission of liability on the part of said COMPANY, its officers and
employees for any matter, cause demand[,] or damages I may have against
them.
I hereby declare that I have read this document before signing it and the
release and quitclaim hereby given is made willingly and voluntarily and
with full knowledge of my rights under the law.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto sign these presents this ___day of

_________ at Manila, Philippines.
___________________________
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
__________________________ __________________________
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of _______ at Manila,

Philippines.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990
CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp.
of the Phils.), respondents.
Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually
allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the
case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in
connection with her work, where the rules are not as fickle.
The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development

Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust
and unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse
during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her
reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to
date of her actual reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by
public respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980. 2
On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the
executive labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to
the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the
judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 Pursuant thereto, the said
amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11,
1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order
dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the
notice of garnishment. 5
In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-
barred, having been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules
of Court and the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not
been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving
her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages
and other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.
Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be

executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715,
viz.
ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-
Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested
party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute
or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...
The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception
snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:
Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been
previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial
difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution
more than five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar,
Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority
to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias.
xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to
have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The
statute of limitation has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do
so, for causes beyond their central.
Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the
execution of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record
shows it was she who dilly-dallied.
The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof
following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence
that she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was
rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with
CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the
sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to
the date of the agreement. 7
Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually
reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period
beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her
reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments
that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor
and bona fides.
After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her
right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured
employment as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked
from October 1982 to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that
business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher
than her salary in the CDCP.
For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the
CDCP and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with
a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33
monthly. 9
On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the
rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because
the waiver she had signed was invalid. 10
On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent
(now Philippine National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to
the petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for
three years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11
On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed
another Quitclaim and Release reading as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87

Annapolis St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS:
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00)
Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me
under the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon
Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full
satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby
manifest that I had voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL
TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am satisfied with my present position as
XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.
Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision
dated 10 May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.
I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from
money and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay,
company, statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection
with the above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or
right of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against
said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November
1988 at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12
The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum
she sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in
part:
Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have
helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of
granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among others ...
As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying

the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly
salary of P2,014.00.
Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company
increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly
salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.
Then the lull. Then the bombshell.
On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this
petition.
It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold,
as if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she
rejected it; then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the
ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full
settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after
accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same
judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.
In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the
earlier payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They
were valid before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed
and cheated by the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new
management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is
denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the second
quitclaim.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is
only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.
The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement
of September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration
of the cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the
decision could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was
still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand
was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The
amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the
exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight
years.
The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless
cases that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal,
during which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed
unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that
she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to
the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was actually
employed during most of that period.
Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the
failure of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the
Solicitor General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an
appeal from the decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision,
as in the case at bar.
As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against
making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that
have only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General,
the Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely
hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however
unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the
pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so

ordered.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Derision dated May 10, 1979, penned by Labor Arbiter Mirasol Corleto.
2 Decision rendered by NLRC, First Division.
3 Rollo, p. 9.
4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 NLRC Decision dated September 11, 1989 penned by Encarnacion, Presiding Commissioner, with Bonto-Perez
and Maglaya, Commissioners, concurring, rollo, pp. 20-32.
6 7 SCRA 42.
7 Rollo, pp. 12, 22 and 64.
8 NLRC Decision dated September 11, 1989, p. 3, rollo, p. 22.
9 Ibid., p. 4; Ibid., p. 23.
10 Id., Id.
11 Id., p. 5; Id., p. 24.
12 Id., p. 6, Id., p. 25.
13 Id., p. 7, Id., p. 26.
14 Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. CIR, 56 SCRA 694; Feati University Faculty Club v. Feati University, 58 SCRA 395;
Mariners Polytechnic School v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 74271, March 31, 1989; Central Azucazera de Tarlac v.
Sampang, G.R. No. 84598, May 29, 1989, Third Division, Minute Resolution.
We now go to the Release and Quitclaim signed by respondent. The document,
which was prepared by Petitioner ABV Rock Group,[13] states:
“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That for and in consideration of the sum of Saudi Riyals SR: TWENTY THREE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (SR23,153) receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged to my full and complete satisfaction, I, MARIANITO C. ESQUILLO do
discharge my employer, ABV ROCK GROUP KB, JEDDAH, & its recruitment agent, the
LAND & HOUSING DEV’P. CORP., from any and all claims, demands, debts, dues, actions,
or causes of action, arising from my employment with aforesaid company/firm/entity.
“I hereby certify that I am of legal age, that I fully understand this instrument and
agree that this is a full and final release and discharge of the parties referred to herein, and
I further agree that this release may be pleaded as absolute and final bar to any suit or
suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me against aforementioned
companies/entities.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HANDS THIS 29 day of

NOV, 1994 at JEDDAH.
SIGNED
MARIANITO C. ESQUILLO.”[14]
Petitioners claim that the foregoing Release and Quitclaim has forever
released them from “any and all claims, demands, dues, actions, or causes of
action” arising from respondent’s employment with them. They also contend
that the validity of the document can no longer be questioned.
Unfortunately for petitioners, jurisprudence does not support their stance.
The fact that employees have signed a release and/or quitclaim does not
necessarily result in the waiver of their claims. The law strictly scrutinizes
agreements in which workers agree to receive less compensation than what they
are legally entitled to. That document does not always bar them from demanding
benefits to which they are legally entitled.[15] The reason for this policy was
explained, inter alia, in Marcos v. National Labor Relations Commission, which
we quote:
“We have heretofore explained that the reason why quitclaims are commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy, and why they are held to be ineffective to bar
claims for the full measure of the workers’ legal rights, is the fact that the employer and the
employee obviously do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee
to the wall. The latter must have to get hold of money. Because, out of a job, he had to
face the harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money
proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is
that petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not [to]
have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
“Along this line, we have more trenchantly declared that quitclaims and/or complete
releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising
from unfair labor practices of the employer. The basic reason for this is that such
quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void.
The acceptance of termination does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his
employer for unfair labor practice acts. While there may be possible exceptions to this
holding, we do not perceive any in the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
“We have pointed out in Veloso, et al. vs. Department of Labor and Employment, et
al., that:
‘While rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to

law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.
‘Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim agreement void

ab initio where the quitclaim obligates the workers concerned to
forego their benefits while at the same time exempting the employer
from any liability that it may choose to reject. This runs counter to Art.
22 of the Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another.’” [16]
In Periquet v. NLRC, this Court set the guidelines and the current doctrinal
policy regarding quitclaims and waivers, as follows:

“Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to
annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.”[17]
Hence, quitclaims in which employees voluntarily accept a reasonable
amount or consideration as settlement are deemed valid. These agreements
cannot be set aside merely because the parties have subsequently changed their
minds.[18] Consistent with this doctrine, a tribunal has the duty of scrutinizing
quitclaims brought to its attention by either party, in order to determine their
validity.
In the present case, petitioners themselves offered the Release and
Quitclaim as a defense. Even though respondent -- in his pleadings before the
labor arbiter -- was silent on the matter, he nonetheless filed this case and
questioned his dismissal immediately, a few days after setting foot in the
Philippines. In asking for payment for the unexpired portion of his employment
Contract, he was eloquently taking issue with the validity of the quitclaim. His
actions spoke loudly enough; words were not necessary.
To determine whether the Release and Quitclaim is valid, one important
factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by respondent;
the amount must constitute a “reasonable settlement.” The NLRC considered the
amount of US$6,716 or SR23,153 reasonable, when compared with (1) $3,900, the
three-month salary that he would have been entitled to recover if RA 8042 were
applied; and (2) US$9,447, his salaries for the unexpired portion of his Contract.
It is relevant to point out, however, that respondent was dismissed prior to the
effectivity of RA 8042. As discussed at the outset, he is entitled to his salaries
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his Contract. This amount is exclusive of
the SR23,153 that he received based on the November 29, 1994 Final Settlement.
The latter amount was comprised of overtime pay, vacation pay, indemnity, contract
reward and notice pay -- items that were due him under his employment Contract.
For these reasons, the consideration stated in the Release and Quitclaim cannot be
deemed a reasonable settlement; hence, that agreement must be set aside.

That respondent is a professional structural engineer did not make him less
susceptible to disadvantageous financial offers, faced as he was with the prospect of
unemployment in a country not his own. “This Court has allowed supervisory
employees to seek payment of benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal
even though, for a consideration, they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their
[19]
employers from liability.”
To stress, “in case of doubt, laws should be interpreted to
favor the working class -- whether in the government or in the
private sector -- in order to give flesh and vigor to the pro-poor
and pro-labor provisions of our Constitution.”[20]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
WE C O N C U R:
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES CANCIO C. GARCIA

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 8-25.
[2]
Id., pp. 26-34. Penned by Justice Teodoro P. Regino and concurred in by
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (Division chair) and Josefina Guevara-Salonga
(member).
[3]
Id., p. 35.
[4]
CA Decision, p. 8; rollo, p. 33.
[5]
Id., pp. 1-3 & 26-28. Citations omitted.
[6]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on August 9, 2004, upon this
Court’s receipt of petitioners’ Memorandum, signed by Attys. Victor Pablo C. Trinidad
and Charlo de la Costa Paredes. Respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Benito
Ching Jr., was filed on July 16, 2004.
[7]
Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 182. Original in uppercase.
[8]
OSG’s Manifestation and Motion dated August 5, 2004, p. 3, rollo, p. 173.
[9]
Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. NLRC, 371 Phil. 745, August 24, 1999;
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food and General
Trade, 396 SCRA 518, January 28, 2003; Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, 398 SCRA
288, February 27, 2003.
[10]
Art. 279 of the Labor Code. Anderson v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 116, 126, January
22, 1996.
[11]
This law was approved on June 7, 1995.
[12]
Anderson v. NLRC, supra, p.126, January 22, 1996, per Mendoza, J. See also
Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 132, August 4, 1992.
[13]
Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 2; rollo, p. 164.
[14]
CA rollo, p. 45.
[15]
Fuentes v. NLRC et al., GR No. 76835, November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 767;
see also Garcia v. NLRC et al., GR No. 67825, September 4, 1987, 153 SCRA 639.
[16]
248 SCRA 146, 152-153, September 8, 1995, per Regalado, J.
[17]
186 SCRA 724, June 22, 1990, per Cruz, J.
[18]
Galicia v. NLRC (Second Division), 276 SCRA 381, 387-388, July 28, 1997.
[19]
Ariola v. Philex, GR No. 147756, August 9, 2005, per Carpio, J. (citing De Leon
v. NLRC, 100 SCRA 691, October 30, 1980).
[20]
PPA Employees Hired After July 1, 1989 v. Commission on Audit, GR No.
160396, September 6, 2005, per Panganiban, then acting CJ.
THIRD DIVISION
LAND AND HOUSING G.R. No. 152012

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and ABV ROCK GROUP, Present:
Petitioners,
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ
Promulgated:
MARIANITO C. ESQUILLO,
Respondent. September 30, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Requisites of valid
“Release and Quitclaim”
A “Release and Quitclaim” even if voluntarily signed by a discharged employee may

not be a legally binding agreement if the compensation granted is less than what the
employee is entitled to received. Nor which such quitclaim prevents him from
demanding benefits to which he is entitled.
Aside from the basic requirement of voluntariness in its execution, the quitclaim must
comply with these requisites: (a) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any
of the parties; (b) that the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable;
(c) that the agreement is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morality or
good customs or prejudicial to third persons with a legal right (G.R. 124927, 5/18/99).
G.R. No. 124927. May 18, 1999]
MORE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., OCEAN BULK MARITIME, and ALPHA INSURANCE &
SURETY CO., INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
SERGIO F. HOMICILLADA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MORE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., Ocean Bulk Maritime, and Alpha Insurance and
Surety Co., Inc., in this petition for certiorari, seek to reverse and set aside the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 21 February
1996i[1] affirming with modification the decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) dated 7 September 1995 which ordered petitioners to
pay private respondent Sergio F. Homicillada disability and medical benefits in the
increased amount of US$7,465.00.ii[2]
On 17 January 1994 private respondent Sergio Homicillada entered into an overseas

employment contract with petitioner More Maritime Agencies, Inc., (MORE MARITIME),
then acting as local agent of its principal, its herein co-petitioner Ocean Bulk Maritime
(OCEAN BULK), a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Greece. The
contract stipulated that Homicillada was to be employed as oiler on board the vessel
MV Rhine with a basic monthly salary of US$287.00 plus allowance of US$76.00 per
month, open overtime and vacation pay for a period of nine (9) months. iii[3] On 5
February 1994, pursuant to their employment contract, Homicillada boarded the
vessel MV Rhine at Port Sete, France.
On 18 March 1994, while the MV Rhine was anchored at a port in Brazil, respondent
Homicillada was directed to open and clean the main engine as well as the first and
second cylinders of the air trunk.iv[4] To accomplish this, Homicillada had to enter a
manhole, an entrance that was accessible only in a crouching position, and had to
carry a weighty 20-liter canister in order to collect the carbon, mud and oil deposited
inside the cylinders and bring them out for proper disposal.
After working for four (4) consecutive days, Homicillada started experiencing pain on
his left leg transcending upward to his waist and lower back. His left foot swelled.
Due to the excruciating pain, he decided to inform his Chief Engineer who insisted
however that he continue with his work. He was given only a “salonpas” plaster to
relieve his pain.
On 29 March 1994 Homicillada’s condition worsened. He finally told his ship Captain
who forthwith had him examined by their ship doctor. In his medical report the doctor
certified that Homicillada was not fit for work for five (5) days. But that
notwithstanding, the ship Captain still required him to work. He was never given any
rest from work. After the vessel sailed out of Brazil, the pain intensified and became
unbearable.
Upon his return to France Homicillada had himself medically examined again. On 27
April 1994 he was repatriated to the Philippines where he underwent a series of
physical examinations at the Physician’s Diagnostic Service Center, the same clinic
that cleared him for work prior to his deployment to the MV Rhine.
Initial examination indicated that Homicillada’s manifestations of limping and lower

back pain were probably due to a slipped-disc.v[5] This diagnosis was later confirmed
in a Medical Evaluation Certificate dated 4 May 1994 prepared by the same clinic. vi[6]
ACT-scan image of the lower back of Homicillada revealed a “Degeneration Osteo
Arthropathy, lumbar spine, with Disc Bulge,” or simply a slipped-disc.vii[7] The
diagnostic center recommended laminectomy and dissection on Homicillada’s lower
back to alleviate his pain.viii[8] However, upon learning that the surgery would cost
approximately P40,000.00 petitioner MORE MARITIME disregarded the
recommendation and proposed instead a pelvic traction treatment which was a less
costly procedure. But this did not improve the condition of private respondent.
Thus on 6 December 1994 Homicillada filed a complaint with the POEA against
petitioners for disability and medical benefits as well as for payment of his two (2)
months basic salary which petitioners had withheld. ix[9] In their answer petitioners
countered that Homicillada was not entitled to the benefits he was demanding
because “his illness was pre-existing, concealed from respondents, unrelated to his
employment, or is otherwise baseless.”x[10]
The POEA sustained Homicillada and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay
the former US$1,642.30 or 14.93% of US$11,000.00 pursuant to Appendix I-A of the
Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels at the exchange rate prevailing during actual payment.
The POEA also held Alpha Insurance Company liable as surety of MORE MARITIME.
From this ruling both parties appealed to the NLRC with Homicillada insisting that he
was entitled to more than the amount decreed by the POEA. For their part,
petitioners asserted that Homicillada was not entitled to disability benefits, reiterating
that his sickness was not work-connected and was in fact already in existence prior to
his deployment abroad. Petitioners further made reference to the quitclaim which
was allegedly made by Homicillada in consideration of the post-repatriation medical
treatment extended to him at the expense of the maritime agency and that, as a
consequence, he was deemed to have released and absolved petitioners from any
liability which would have been adjudged against them.
In its challenged decision of 21 February 1996 the NLRC modified the appealed
judgment by increasing the disability award to US$7,465.00 based on POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 5, which took effect 20 March 1994, upgrading the basis for
disability allowance to US$50,000.00. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which
the NLRC denied in its resolution of 19 April 1996.
In this recourse, petitioners allege that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it completely ignored a “Receipt and Release” dated 16 August 1994
purportedly signed by Homicillada in favor of More Maritime Agencies while the case
was pending in POEA, and affirming the finding of the POEA that the illness of
Homicillada was work-connected.
In that “Receipt and Release” Homicillada supposedly acknowledged receipt of the

amount of P15,750.00 “in complete and final settlement of (his) wages, bonuses,
overtime pay, leave pay, allotments and all other entitlements as well as sickness
wages, reimbursement of medical expenses, medicines and other benefits due (him) x
x x accruing from (his) services and employment on the vessel MV Bulk Rhine x x x x”
and that “(he) hereby declare(s) and confirm(s) that (he) (has) no other claims
against said vessel, Master, Owners, Operators and Agents and (he) hereby
discharge(s) and release(s) them from any other liability whatsoever x x x
x"xi[11]Contrary to the finding of the NLRC, petitioners maintain that they attached this
quitclaim to their position paper with motion to dismiss which was received by the
POEA on 10 April 1995.xii[12]
Whether the quitclaim was actually filed and formed part of the records which the
POEA and the NLRC decided to ignore, as petitioners would want to impress on us, is
largely a question of fact which we choose not to dwell on in this special civil action
for certiorari. Besides, as aptly observed by the NLRC:
“Further, granting the existence of the said quitclaim, it cannot effectively free the
respondents from liability as the fact remains that complainant was not afforded the
proper medical treatment per physician’s advice, it appearing from the records that
the respondents only approved the procedure for a pelvic traction on the complaint
which was not however the recommended recourse, the Medical Evaluation Certificate
dated May 4, 1994 showing that the complainant was advised to undergo
laminectomy and dissection of his disc herniation. This is further buttressed by the
fact that, even after the complainant was administered with a pelvic traction, the
medical certificate dated June 23, 1994 indicated no improvement in the herniation
and that the complainant will just the same suffer from a partial permanent disability
in the absence of the previously advised surgery. If at all, the only visible help
extended by the respondents was diagnostic in nature which answers to the cost of
CT-Scan of complainant’s lumbo-sacral area in the amount of Three Thousand Eight
Hundered Pesos (P3,800.00). Certainly this is not an amount to justify a waiver of the
claim to which the complainant’s entitlement has been upheld.”xiii[13]
Indeed, it is appalling that Homicillada would settle for a measly consideration of

P15,570.00, which is grossly inadequate, that it could not have given rise to a valid
waiver on the part of the disadvantaged employee. In American Home Assurance Co.
v. NLRCxiv[14] this Court held:
“The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than
what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to
which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full
measure of the worker’s legal rights, considering the economic disadvantage of the
employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity.”
Thus it is never enough to assert that the parties have voluntarily entered into such a
quitclaim. There are other requisites, to wit: (a) That there was no fraud or deceit on
the part of any of the parties; (b) That the consideration of the quitclaim is credible
and reasonable; and, (c) That the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law.xv[15] Although some of the requisites mentioned were satisfied, it cannot be
said that the quitclaim executed by Homicillada was a fairly reasonable settlement of
his claims. He was shortchanged by a not so insignificant amount. The financial
terms were so unconscionable that we have no hesitance to strike down the “Receipt
and Release” dated 16 August 1994 as a complete nullity.xvi[16]
Petitioners likewise aver that Homicillada’s illness was diagnosed as “chronic low back
pain” in the medical report of Dr. Mario Ver of the St. Luke’s Orthopedic Institute. xvii[17]
Citing Black’s Law dictionary which defines “chronic” as “(w)ith reference to diseases,
of long duration, or characterized by slow progressive symptoms; deep seated and
obstinate, or threatening a long continuance; -distinguished from acute,” xviii[18]
petitioners submit that the use of the word “chronic” as characterizing Homicillada’s
malady supports their position that the same was not work-related but already pre-
existing long before his overseas employment with petitioners.
Petitioner’s reliance on Black’s Law Dictionary is misplaced. Its definition of “chronic”

does not state a definite span of time to qualify the duration of the existence of the
illness as “chronic.” As aptly observed by the NLRC, the definition does not discount
the fact that a period of more than five (5) months from the time Homicillada started
to work for petitioners until such finding of “chronic low back pain” on 15 July 1994
may be considered long enough to describe his ailment as “chronic” since it could
have traced its inception to the date of his actual employment.
But even assuming that the ailment of Homicillada was contracted prior to his
employment with the MV Rhine, this fact would not exculpate petitioners from liability.
Compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease was
pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-
related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to pressume that, at the very
least, the arduous nature of Homicillada’s employment had contributed to the
aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was pre-existing at the time of his employment.
Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in
order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect
condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that he be free from disease.
Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities, and while the
employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds
them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some
injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury
is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the
previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had
for injury independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease.
In the instant case, the Court is more inclined to believe the findings of the POEA,
which are supported by substantial evidence:
“The contention of respondent (herein petitioners) that the sickness of the

complainant (herein private respondent) was pre-existing and was concealed from the
respondent is untenable. The fact is before the complainant was made to sign the
contract, he was required to undergo medical examination and declared fit to work
otherwise the respondent would not have accomodated him. The respondent cannot
avoid liability by saying that complainant’s sickness was concealed from it. Being an
employer, respondent had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen and choose their
applicants and whether they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit. The
moment it has chosen an applicant it is deemed to have subjected its applicant to the
required pre-qualification standard. Thus, the respondent cannot now claim that
complainant’s sickness was pre-existing and concealed from it. Further, the defense
of the respondent that the disease of the complainant is not connected or related to
his work does not deserve merit. The nature of the job of the complainant, as an
oiler, is to clean the engine. Complainant was assigned to get in through the manhole
to clean the engine taking with him containers in which the mud and waste oil shall
be placed and carrying them out of the manhole for disposal. This is the regular job
of the complainant resulting in “Disc Herniation” as diagnosed by the physician.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that the sickness is not work
related, still the complainant is entitled to disability benefits provided the disease
occurred during the effectivity of the contract because the Standard Contract for
seamen approved by the POEA does not qualify whether the sickness is work related
or not.”xix[19]
In sum, the instant petition fails to show that the NLRC has committed grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the reversal of its decision of 21 February 1996 and its resolution
of 19 April 1996. The injury sustained by Homicillada is compensable the same
having resulted from the rigors of carrying heavy canisters in a crouching position
which logically strained his lower back that lead to his slipped-disc.
Migrant workers are the modern-day heroes of our time. Quite often they find
themselves laboring in the scorching heat and the freezing cold in foreign lands.
Their woes often remain unheard, their tears unnoticed. It is time that the arms of
justice reach out to them workers and cradle them gently in her bosom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision and resolution of

public respondent National Labor Relations Commissions dated 21 February 1996 and
19 April 1996, respectively, ordering petitioners More Maritime Agencies, Inc., Ocean
Bulk Maritime and Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. jointly and severally to pay
private respondent Sergio F. Homicillada the sum of US$7,465.00 at the exchange
rate in Philippine Peso prevailing at the time of actual payment are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on leave.
Estoppel or waiver cannot validate acts

contrary to law or public policy
Respondent bank offered two retirement programs to its Employees: (a) the Ordinary
Retirement Program (ORP) which will pay 85% of the employee’s basic monthly salary
times number years of service; and (b) the Special Retirement Program (SRP) which
will pay 250% of the gross monthly salary of the employee times number years of his
service. Since petitioner employee is only 45 years old, he was not qualified for
retirement under ORP. Hence, he applied to retire under SRP for which he received the
net amount of P963,619.28. Subsequently, he signed an undated “Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim” acknowledging receipt of the net proceeds of his retirement benefits,
and agreeing as well that the bank may bring any action for damages resulting from
his breach of the Release and Quitclaim and that such award would include the return
of the retirement pay he received under the SRP. The petitioner was likewise required
to sign an Undertaking as a supplement to the Release and Quitclaim in which he
promised that “he will not seek employment with a competitor bank or
financial institution within one (1) year xxx” from his retirement date.
On May 11, 1995—or 3 months from his retirement—petitioner was

employed by another bank for the same position he held in respondent
bank. When petitioner refused to return the retirement pay granted to him,
respondent bank filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
In his Answer, petitioner alleged among others that the Undertaking not to “seek
employment with any competitor bank xxx within one (1) year from February 28,
1995” was void for being contrary to the constitution, the law and public policy, and
as being unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive.
The trial court ruled in favor of the bank, ordering petitioner to restitute the
amount paid to him as retirement pay plus 12% interest.The court declared that
the prohibition in the Undertaking was not unreasonable.
On appeal by the petitioner, the CA declared that having executed the

Release and Quitclaim, including the undertaking not to seek employment
within the proscribed one-year period, and thereafter receiving the benefits
under the SRP, he is deemed to waive the right to assail the same, and
hence, is estopped from retaining the amount granted under the SRP.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and CA rulings. The post-
employment competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no
geographical limits. Petitioner is not proscribed, by waiver or estoppel, from assailing
the post-retirement competitive employment ban. Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code “contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent or void from the
beginnig.” Estoppel cannot validate an act that is prohibited by law or is against
public policy.
However, since the terms of the undertaking state that any breach by the
petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to a cause of action in the courts of
law, restitution of the SRP benefits is not automatic. Respondent bank must still
prove its entitlement to the restitution of aforesaid benefits. Hence, the Court
remanded the case to the RTC where respondent will have to prove its entitlement to
the amount paid petitioner under the SRP (G.R. 16329, 4/19/06).
Estoppel or waiver cannot validate acts
contrary to law or public policy
Respondent bank offered two retirement programs to its Employees: (a) the Ordinary
Retirement Program (ORP) which will pay 85% of the employee’s basic monthly salary
times number years of service; and (b) the Special Retirement Program (SRP) which
will pay 250% of the gross monthly salary of the employee times number years of his
service. Since petitioner employee is only 45 years old, he was not qualified for
retirement under ORP. Hence, he applied to retire under SRP for which he received the
net amount of P963,619.28. Subsequently, he signed an undated “Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim” acknowledging receipt of the net proceeds of his retirement benefits,
and agreeing as well that the bank may bring any action for damages resulting from
his breach of the Release and Quitclaim and that such award would include the return
of the retirement pay he received under the SRP. The petitioner was likewise required
to sign an Undertaking as a supplement to the Release and Quitclaim in which he
promised that “he will not seek employment with a competitor bank or
financial institution within one (1) year xxx” from his retirement date.
On May 11, 1995—or 3 months from his retirement—petitioner was

employed by another bank for the same position he held in respondent
bank. When petitioner refused to return the retirement pay granted to him,
respondent bank filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
In his Answer, petitioner alleged among others that the Undertaking not to “seek
employment with any competitor bank xxx within one (1) year from February 28,
1995” was void for being contrary to the constitution, the law and public policy, and
as being unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive.
The trial court ruled in favor of the bank, ordering petitioner to restitute the
amount paid to him as retirement pay plus 12% interest.The court declared that
the prohibition in the Undertaking was not unreasonable.
On appeal by the petitioner, the CA declared that having executed the

Release and Quitclaim, including the undertaking not to seek employment
within the proscribed one-year period, and thereafter receiving the benefits
under the SRP, he is deemed to waive the right to assail the same, and
hence, is estopped from retaining the amount granted under the SRP.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and CA rulings. The post-
employment competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no
geographical limits. Petitioner is not proscribed, by waiver or estoppel, from assailing
the post-retirement competitive employment ban. Under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code “contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent or void from the
beginnig.” Estoppel cannot validate an act that is prohibited by law or is against
public policy.
However, since the terms of the undertaking state that any breach by the
petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to a cause of action in the courts of
law, restitution of the SRP benefits is not automatic. Respondent bank must still
prove its entitlement to the restitution of aforesaid benefits. Hence, the Court
remanded the case to the RTC where respondent will have to prove its entitlement to
the amount paid petitioner under the SRP (G.R. 16329, 4/19/06).
What determines whether

contract is reasonable or not?
To determine whether a contract is reasonable or not, these factors should be

considered: (a) whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest of the
employer; (b) whether the covenant creates an undue burden on the employee; (c)
whether the covenant is injurious to the public welfare; (d) whether the time and
territorial limitations in the covenant are reasonable; and (e) whether the restraint is
reasonable from the standpoint of public policy (G.R. 163269, 4/19/06).
---o---
Moral damages for breach of contract
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if

the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair amount of

damages. The yardstick should that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive
(G.R. 146918, 5/2/06).
Briefly Noted
Moral damages
In culpa contractual or breach of contract moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations (G.R.
146918, 5/2/06).
---o---
Due process: hearing before conviction
Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process demands the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence in support of one’s defense. “To be
heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court --- one may also be heard
through pleadings (G.R. 168498, 6/16/06, citing Batongbakal v. Zafra).
---o---
Error of judgment or error of jurisdiction?
An error of judgment is one which a court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction and which error is reviewable only by an appeal [under Rule 45].
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction [correctible only under
Rule 65]. The SC stressed that the remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive (G.R. 165910, 4/10/06).
---o---
Contract of adhesion is as binding

as ordinary contracts
The Pre-Need Agreement between the petitioner and respondent is in fact a contract
of adhesion since the stipulations therein were unilaterally prepared and imposed by
the private respondent on a take-it- or leave-it basis. Petitioner is, however, bound by
the terms of the contract nor can she unilaterally change it to suit her whim. A
contract of adhesion, said the Court, is “as binding as ordinary contracts, the
reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it
entirely.” Moreover, the Court will not interpret the terms and conditions of the pre-
need plan since its language is explicit and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
parties. As held by the Court in Insular Life v. Court of Appeals:
A court, even the Supreme Court, has no right to, make new contract for the parties
or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid seeming hardships. Neither
abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a contract
for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party
to a contract of an obligation not assumed (G.R. 147748, 4/9/06).
---o---
Cases need resolution on the merits rather than on technicality
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather that promote substantial
justice must be avoided.
In the Cusi-Hernandez case, the Court held:
“We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity
to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality
or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better
served. Moreover, the Court has held:
“Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, sense, for they are adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims,” (cited in
G.R. 148852, 9/27/06).

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
MARILYN VALDECANTOS, G.R. NO. 148852
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and
FERNANDO GOKIOCO, Promulgated:
Respondents. September 27, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Marilyn Valdecantos (petitioner) assailing the Resolutions dated December 7,
20001[1] and June 22, 20012[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed herein
petitioner’s petition for review and denied her motion for reconsideration, respectively,
issued in CA-G.R. CR No. 24645.
Petitioner was charged in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 49, with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
178508. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of February, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously made and issue Check No. 035539
dated February 28, 1997 in the amount of P13,100.00 drawn against UNION BANK, to
apply for value in favor of FERNANDO GOKIOKO, well knowing at the time of issue that
she/he had no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full presentment, which check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of
funds or credit, had not said accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop the
payment of said check, and with intent to defraud, failed and still fails to pay said
FERNANDO GOKIOKO the amount of P13,100.00 despite receipt of notice from the
drawee bank that said check had been dishonored and had not been paid. 3[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
1 [1]
Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Now a Member of this Court) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.;
CA rollo, pp. 45-46.
2[2]
Id. at 135-136.
3[3]
CA rollo, p.57.
On June 30, 1999, the MTC rendered its Decision, 4[4] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful consideration of the foregoing evidence, the Court

finds accused Marilyn Valdecantos y Valmoseña, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of issuing a worthless check defined and penalized in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
hereby sentences the said accused to a penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay
a fine of twenty-six thousand pesos (P26,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify complainant Fernando Gokioko the amount

of thirteen thousand one hundred pesos (P13,100.00) representing the amount of the
dishonored check with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum starting February 28,
1997 until the amount is fully paid, to reimburse to the said complainant the amount of
twenty-thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of this
suit. 5[5]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-58312 and raffled to Branch 126. The RTC affirmed the
MTC in its Decision dated July 24, 2000;6[6] and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in its Order dated October 16, 2000.7[7]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA on November 28, 2000,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 24645. On December 1, 2000, petitioner filed a
4[4]
Id. at 30-37; Penned by Judge Belen B. Ortiz.
5[5]
Id. at 37.
6[6]
Id. at 38-42; Penned by Judge Luisito C. Sardillo.
7[7]
Id. at 43.
“Submission of Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping” 8[8] attaching thereto
the Verification and Certification signed by petitioner on November 27, 2000.
On December 7, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition
on the following grounds:
(a) The Regional Trial Court was not furnished a copy thereof as required by Section 1, Rule
42 of the present Rules of Court;
(b) It is not verified and failed to contain a non-forum shopping certification as mandated by
Section 2, Rule 42, supra, and
( c ) Only the two (2) lower court’s decision and order denying the motion for reconsideration
are attached without the other pleadings and material portion of the records as would support
the allegations of the petition, such as, the information, position papers and appeal
memoranda of the parties filed below, as provided for in Section 2, Rule 42, supra.
Section 3, Rule 42, same, considers the above omissions as sufficient grounds for the
dismissal of the petition.9[9]
Upon receipt of the CA Resolution on December 18, 2000, petitioner filed her Motion
for Reconsideration stating that her counsel’s failure to attach the verification and
certification against forum shopping which she had already signed was due to inadvertence
or oversight of the latter’s secretary who forgot to attach the same to the petition; that three
days after the filing of her petition with the CA, she filed on December 1, 2000 a
“Submission of Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping” where she had
attached her verification and certification thereto. She likewise attached to her motion for
8[8]
Id. at 47-49.
9[9]
Id. at 45-46.
reconsideration copies of the following documents: (a) Information in Criminal Case No.
178508; (b) Memorandum of petitioner’s appeal in the RTC; (c) Memorandum of private
respondent in the RTC; (d) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the RTC; (e)
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration; (f) Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the
testimony of Union Bank representative Ariel Puno taken on May 11, 1999; (g) Union Bank
Check No. 035539 dated February 28, 1997 in the sum of P13,100.00; and the proof of
service of a copy of her petition which she furnished the RTC on December 19, 2000.
In a Resolution dated June 22, 2001, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration in this wise:
xxx
Petitioner seasonably submitted a Motion for Reconsideration claiming inadvertence

and oversight of his secretary in failing to comply with the missing requirements and
altogether attaching the pertinent documents including a verification and certification against
forum-shopping.
It should be stressed, however, that failure to file a certificate of non-forum shopping

is mandatory and failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that
plaintiff is not guilty of forum shopping, and that subsequent compliance with the
certification requirement on non-forum shopping cannot excuse a party’ failure to comply in
the first instance.10[10]
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari anchored on the following
issues:
10[10]
Id. at 135-136.
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition
despite the fact that petitioner has submitted all the required documents, and
instead ignored and disregarded the clear and manifest errors in the decisions of
the MTC and RTC in convicting the petitioner.
2) Whether or not, on the basis of the evidence presented in the MTC, the petitioner
could be convicted of having violated BP 22.11[11]
Petitioner reiterates her contentions raised in her motion for reconsideration filed
before the CA. She also claims that it is the declared policy of the courts to afford every
litigant amplest opportunity for determination of his case freed from constraints of
technicalities. Petitioner likewise contend that although our jurisdiction is confined to
questions of law, it may extend its hand to accord justice to petitioner considering that the
decision of the MTC finding her guilty of BP 22 was not supported and was even contrary
to the evidence on record.
A Comment was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General praying for the dismissal
of the petition. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda as required by the Court.
Preliminarily, we find it necessary to give proper perspective to the instant petition.

Originally filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the same should be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court as there is nothing to review on the merits due to its outright dismissal by the CA, for
11[11]
Rollo, p. 24.
being insufficient in form and substance.12[12] Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved
party from a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. 13[13] Inasmuch as the present petition
principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the
jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.14[14]
The CA dismissed the petition for review due to petitioner’s failure (1) to attach the
required verification and the certification on non-forum shopping, (2) to furnish the RTC
with a copy of the petition, and (3) to attach the pleadings and material portions of the
records of the case pursuant to Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.15[15]
12 [12]
Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, December 21, 2004, 447
SCRA 402, 411 citing Donato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129638, December
8, 2003, 417 SCRA 216, 223.
13[13]
Id.
14[14]
Id.
15 [15]
SECTION 1. How appeal was taken; time of filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, …. and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of
the petition.
SECTION 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate
the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time ; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters
involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies
thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or
proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding
The Court grants the petition.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. 16[16]

Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance
of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. 17[17] Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and
not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith.18[18] The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.19[19]
While the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its
submission after the filing of the petition, and the submission of a certificate against forum
shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 20[20] Not being jurisdictional, the
has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five (5) days therefrom.
SECTION 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of petitioner to comply with any of
the foregoing requisites regarding the payment of the docket and, other lawful fees, the deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
16 [16]
Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 391 Phil. 303, 312 (2000) citing Sy v.
Habacon-Garayblas, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-93-860, December 21, 1993, 228
SCRA 644, 646; Buenaventura v. Halili-Uy, No. L-28156, March 31, 1987, 149
SCRA 22, 26; Quimpo v. Victoria, 150-B Phil. 124, 131 (1972); Valino v. Munoz,
146 Phil. 412, 418 (1970); Republic v. Lee Wai Lam, 139 Phil. 265, 269 (1969).
17[17]
Id. citing Republic v. Lee Wai Lam at 276.
18[18]
Id. citing Buenaventura v. Uy at 26; Republic v. Lee Wai Lam at 269.
19[19]
Id. citing Sy v. Habacon-Garayblas at 646; Republic v. Lee Wai Lam at 269-270.
requirement has been relaxed under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial
compliance.
In Roadway Express v. CA,21[21] the Court considered as substantial compliance the

filing of a certification against forum shopping 14 days before the dismissal of the petition
for review. In the same case, the Court stated that:
x x x If subsequent compliance, citing Sanchez vs. CA, G.R. 111255, February 7,

1994, First Division, Minute Resolution, with Circular 28-91, after a petition was dismissed
for non-compliance was considered by the court as substantial compliance, citing Fajardo,
Jr. vs. CA, G.R. 112558, en banc, Minute Resolution, with more reason should the petition
for review be allowed in this case, in view of the compliance prior to the dismissal of the
petition.22[22]
In Uy v. Landbank,23[23] the Court dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and
certification against non-forum shopping. However, the Court subsequently reinstated the
petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping
certification and justified the reinstatement.
In this case, on December 1, 2000, three days after petitioner filed her petition for
review on November 28, 2000, she immediately rectified her error by filing a “Submission
of Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping” attaching thereto her Verification
20 [20]
Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No.
149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 465 citing Robern Development
Corporation v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 787 (1999).
21[21]
332 Phil. 733 (1996).
22[22]
Id. at 738.
23[23]
Supra note 16.
and Certification. Significantly, such verification and certification was submitted even before
the petition was dismissed by the CA on December 7, 2000.
In addition, the Court notes that petitioner had appended a verification and
certification against forum shopping in her motion for extension of time to file petition for
review with the CA which further lends credence to her claim that indeed it was only due to
inadvertence that she failed to submit the certification in her petition for review.
These circumstances mitigate the oversight. It is in the interest of substantial justice

that the subsequent filing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping be
considered as substantial compliance of the rule.
Petitioner likewise attached the missing pleadings and pertinent documents of the case
when she filed her motion for reconsideration. Jurisprudence dictates that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of a petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.
In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz,24[24] Piglas-Kamao v. National Labor Relations

Commission,25[25] Mendoza v. David,26[26] the Court ruled that the subsequent submission of
the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial
compliance. The reasons behind the failure of the petitioners in these cases to comply with
24[24]
390 Phil. 1245 (2000).
25[25]
G.R. No. 138556, May 9, 2001, 357 SCRA 640.
26[26]
G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 172.
the required attachments were no longer scrutinized.27[27] Noteworthy in each case was the
fact that the petitioners therein substantially complied with the formal requirements when
they filed their motion for reconsideration.28[28]
In Donato v. CA,29[29] the Court reversed the CA’s dismissal of a petition on the
grounds that the (a) certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel and
not by petitioner himself; and (b) only a certified copy of the questioned decision was
annexed to the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration where he attached a
certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by him as well as copies of the material
portions of the records of the lower courts. On petitioner’s failure to attach material portions
of the records, the Court held:
In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph
b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the
outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the
appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be
necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of
the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court deems
necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a
complete record of the case as provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At
any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records
below with his motion for reconsideration x x x. (Emphasis supplied)30[30]
The same leniency should also be extended to petitioner considering that petitioner,
one day after receipt of the CA Resolution dismissing her petition for review, immediately
27[27]
Jaro v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 532, 547 (2002).
28[28]
Id. at 547.
29[29]
Supra note 12.
30[30]
Id. at 225-226.
complied with the rules and submitted the relevant pleadings and documents with her motion
for reconsideration.
The Court also takes note of the fact that petitioner had furnished the RTC with a copy
of the petition the following day after her receipt of the CA Resolution dismissing her
petition.
Thus, petitioner’s substantial compliance with Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court should have prompted the CA to reconsider the dismissal of the petition for review
on technical grounds. In dismissing the petition, the CA clearly put a premium on
technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case 31[31] which should be avoided.
In the Cusi-Hernandez32[32] case, where the formal requirements and substantial

compliance were liberally construed, the Court held:
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to
all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Moreover,
the Court has held:
“Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the

rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very
aims.”
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of
cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would
31[31]
Id. at 226.
32[32]
Supra note 24.
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.33[33]
Petitioner contends that the MTC and RTC erred in finding that Union Bank Check
No. 035539 was not sufficiently funded on the date of its presentment and that the bank
statement presented failed to establish that it was the same account of petitioner against
which the check was to be drawn. Petitioner points out that the evidence showed that there
was sufficient fund to cover the check upon presentment and that Account No. 007-31719-2
which was in petitioner as well as in Felimon and Lydia Valdecantos’s names from which
account the check was supposed to be drawn was only changed with a new account number,
i.e., Account No. 074-000206-5; that these accounts are one and the same which had
sufficient fund to cover the check upon presentment. Petitioner also avers that the burden of
proof lies with the prosecution, thus it should be the prosecution which must prove that
petitioner did not maintain sufficient fund or credit in her account to pay the check within
ninety days from the date of the check which it failed to do.
Furthermore, in her petition for review filed with the CA, petitioner contends that the
trial court erred in finding that the sole ground for her stop payment order was the loss of the
Lancer car and that respondent Gokioko had still demanded for the issuance of five
additional checks in the total amount of P65,500.00 as additional payment for the car.
The Court will not resolve these issues in the present petition for certiorari. The issues
involved are factual issues which require the weighing of evidence that is best addressed to
33[33]
Id. at 1252.
the CA in the petition for review filed before it. Thus, the case should be remanded to the CA
for the just resolution of the substantive issues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 7, 2000

and June 22, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
---o---
NLRC may issue writ of certiorari on “abuse of discretion” by Labor Arbiter
Petitioners were adjudged guilty by the Labor Arbiter of illegal dismissal and non-
payment of money claims filed by its former security personnel. As petitioners failed
to seasonably file an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission, the
Arbiter’s decision became final and executory resulting in the issuance of a writ of
execution upon motion of the respondents.
Petitioners then filed motions to recompute the money claims as awarded as well as
lift the notices of garnishment on petitioner’s receivables. Following the Arbiter’s
denial of these motions, petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC assailing the
denial of their motion to recompute money claims and the Arbiter’s order releasing
the garnished funds to respondents. The NLRC dismissed the appeal as well as a
subsequent petition for injunction against the implementation of the writ of execution
issued by the Arbiter on 25 August 2000.
On 14 May 2003, a 2nd alias writ of execution was issued by Arbiter for the
satisfaction of P2,024,347.00 “representing unpaid accrued backwages x x x including
attorney’s fees plus execution fee.” On 20 May 2003, petitioners filed before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. On 12 June 2003, the Court of Appeals
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the Arbiter’s order
subject of the assailed alias writ of execution. But in its decision on the merits dated
31 July 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and affirmed the order of
the Arbiter for payment of backwages and monetary claims of the respondents.
Moreover, the CA faulted petitioners for immediately filing their petition for
certiorari before the Court without first seeking recourse from the NLRC in
violation not only of the Rules of Procedure of that body but also of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
At the Supreme Court, petitioner contend that the NLRC Rules of Procedure (Rule III,
Sec. 4) do not provide for any remedy or procedure for disputing the order granting a
writ of execution nor the issuance of a writ of certiorari: Hence, petitioners’ recourse
to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court under which an aggrieved party
may file a special action for certiorari to the Court of Appeals under Rule 65. The SC
Court did not agree. The Court pointed out citing Air Services Cooperative v. Court of
Appeals, that under Article 223 of the Labor Code, prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion by the Labor Arbiter - - -
“xxx is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant thereof to the
NLRC indicates the lawmakers’ intention to broaden the meaning of appeal
as that term is used in the Code..”
The Court likewise upheld the observation of the Court of Appeals that “xxx being
the administrative agency especially tasked with the review of labor cases,
the NLRC is in a far better position to determine whether petitioners’
grounds for certiorari are meritorious” (G.R. 160871, 2/6/06).
Laches cannot prevail over justice
LACHES is an equitable doctrine and as such its application is controlled by equitable

considerations. Laches cannot be involved to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud.
Since claimant filed a claim well within the 3-year prescriptive period for filing of
money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code, the doctrine of laches is
inapplicable to her (G.R. 109808, 3/1/95).
G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995

ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H.
ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT
CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR., and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to
protect the poor, their interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In the case at bench,
petitioner, a poor, uncounselled entertainment dancer signed a contract with her
Japanese employer calling for a monthly salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S.
Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign an immoral side agreement reducing her
salary below the minimum standard set by the POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to
collect her salary differentials, but incredibly found public respondent straining the
seams of our law to disfavor her. There is no greater disappointment to the poor like
petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the beautiful rhetoric of laws. We
will not allow this travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), 1 dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of
public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator
Jose N. Sarmiento, dated February 17, 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint for
unpaid salaries amounting to Six Thousand Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard

employment contract for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning
Japan Co., Ltd., 2 through its Philippine representative, private respondent Centrum
Placement & Promotions Corporation. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six
(6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved
the contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with
her Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
Date: Dec. 10, 1988
SUBJECT: Salary Deduction

MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
DATE OF DEPARTURE: _________________
ATTENTION: MR. IWATA

I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have
the honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr.
Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner) 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six
(6) months, until June 10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on
February 21, 1991. She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars
(US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months.
Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and Placement
Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer,
Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February

17, 1992. He ratiocinated, inter alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner herein)

was satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything regarding her
employment in Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant
complaint on February 21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard
Employment Contract on December 1, 1988, she entered into a side agreement with
the Japanese employer thru her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion consenting to
a monthly salary of US$750.00 which she affirmed during the conference of May 21,
1991. Respondent agency had no knowledge nor participation in the said agreement
such that it could not be faulted for violation of the Standard Employment Contract
regarding the stipulated salary. We cannot take cognizance of such violation when
one of the principal party (sic) thereto opted to receive a salary different from what
has been stipulated in their contract, especially so if the contracting party did not
consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant (petitioner) cannot now
demand from respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on) the processed
Employment Contract for she is now considered in bad faith and hence, estopped
from claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and agreeing to receive a salary
not in accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her self-imposed
silence for a long period of time worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed
laches to prevail which barred respondent from doing something at the outset.
Normally, if a person's right (is) violated, she/he would immediately react to protect
her/his rights which is not true in the case at bar.
The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in
due time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of action, thus,
leading another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This
resulted in placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . .
Likewise, the Supreme Court in one case held that not only is inaction within
reasonable time to enforce a right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of
laches but such inaction evinces implied consent or acquiescence to the violation of
the right . . .
Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of
the Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if any,
(it) not being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers for
abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
(Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to the
respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the basis for Us to
arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable for
her claims.
The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between
respondents Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents
Promotion.
There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed. 4
Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition,
alleging that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in finding: that
she is guilty of laches; that she entered into a side contract on December 10, 1988
for the reduction of her basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars
(US$750.00) which superseded, nullified and invalidated the standard employment
contract she entered into on December 1, 1988; and that Planning Japan Co., Ltd.
and private respondents are not solidarily liable to her for Six Thousand US Dollars
(US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. 5
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to

authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars
(US$250.00) from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing
laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard employment
contract of December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA with the following stipulation
appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are
in conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed
by the POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or
changes made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall
be null and void; 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule
I, Book VI of the 1991 Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment,
thus:
Book V, Rule II
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and

review employment standards in accordance with the market development and
welfare objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing market
conditions.
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the
minimum requirements for contracts of employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for
services rendered beyond regular working hours in accordance with
the standards established by the Administration;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Standard Employment Contract. The administration shall undertake

development and/or periodic review of region, country and skills specific employment
contracts for landbased workers and conduct regular review of standard employment
contracts (SEC) for seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum
employment standards herein enumerated under Section 2, of this Rule and shall
recognize the prevailing labor and social legislations at the site of employment and
international conventions. The SEC shall set the minimum terms and conditions of
employment. All employers and principals shall adopt the SEC in connection with the
hiring of workers without prejudice to their adoption of other terms and conditions of
employment over and above the minimum standards of the Administration.
(Emphasis supplied.)
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
Sec. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx xxx xxx
f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents approved and

verified by the Administration from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the period of expiration of the same without the Administration's
approval.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00)
guaranteed to petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in
accordance with the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by
the POEA, Thus, the side agreement which reduced petitioner's basic wage to
Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void for violating the
POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the
POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by
unscrupulous employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled
to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands"' cannot be applied to petitioner.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier, 7 thus giving rise to a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 8 It is not concerned
with mere lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute
laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine,
its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to
defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive
period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. 12 For
this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in
Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 (1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist
the enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate
Appellate Court . . . that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law.
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was
more emphatic upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice outside

legality," this applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present
here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments
based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery
therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of
laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at
law.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd.
— the agency's foreign principal — are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid
wages. This is in accordance with stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard
employment contract which provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement
Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper implementation
of the terms and conditions in this Contract. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule
V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended,
thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. — Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in

favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former . . . . Such
formal appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain the following provisions,
among others:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and
the contracts of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the
poorest sector of our society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile
shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crime. Hardly
literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in our
country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious
employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in
foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human
conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect
them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public officials who should
sympathize with the working class appear to have a different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA

Administrator and NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER),
respectively dated February 17 and December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the
NLRC, dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Through its Second Division, composed of public respondents Presiding

Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez, Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala, ( ponente), and
Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta.
2 Owned and operated by Iwata International Management Co., Ltd.
3 Exh. "C" of Petition; Rollo, p. 17.
4 The Second Division also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a

minute resolution, dated March 23, 1993.
5 See Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 6-7.
6 Exh. "A" of Petition, p. 1; Rollo, p. 10.
7 La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 151 (1993); Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 223
SCRA 656 (1993); Marcelino v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 444 (1992).
8 Bergado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 497 (1989).
9 See Donato v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 196 (1993).
10 Bergado v. Court of Appeals, op cit.
11 Jimenez v. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190 (1990).
12 Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall be forever
barred. . . .
13 Exh. "A" of Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 13.

[1] Decision penned by Presiding Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale, concurred in
i
by Commissioners Vicente S.E. Veloso and Alberto R. Quimpo, NLRC-NCR-CA No.

009825-95.
[2] Decision penned by POEA Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., POEA Case No.
ii
ADJ(M) 94-0702258, 7 September 1995.

iii
[3] Records, p. 77.
iv
[4] Rollo, p. 27.
v
[5] Records, p. 23.
vi
[6] Records, p. 22.
vii
[7] Ibid.
viii
[8] Ibid.
ix
[9] Id., pp. 67-68.
x
[10] Id., pp. 51-52.
xi
[11] Rollo, p. 25.
xii
[12] Id., p. 171.
xiii
[13] Id., pp. 32-34.
xiv
[14] G.R. No. 120043, 24 July 1996, 259 SCRA 280, 293.
xv
[15] See Periquet v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91298, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 724, 730.
xvi
[16] Id.
xvii
[17] Records, p. 124.
xviii
[18] Rollo, p. 168.
xix
[19] Records, pp. 78-80.

Validity of employee waivers and quitclaims upheld

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Validity of employee waivers and quitclaims upheld

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Quitclaims; validity.

Respondents were terminated from employment due to

Money claims; burden of proof. Respondents alleged that petitioner-

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, __________________, Filipino, of legal age, a resident of

In consideration of said payment, I do hereby quitclaim, release, discharge and

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at _____________, this ___

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF

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G.R. No. 188002 : February 1, 2010

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The facts follow.

Respondents are former employees of petitioner Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation (Goodrich)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Goodrich

[Emerlina 26,000.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 65,478.44 20,489.58 44,988.86

Jennifer 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 20,043.13 38,935.31

Michael 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 29,012.76 29,965.68

Rolando 13,000.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 18,225.92 40,752.52

Lovito 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 20,342.62 38,635.82

Eliseo del 19,500.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 58,978.44 23,810.00 35,168.44

Edison 16,250.00 19,429.58 3,736.46 16,312.40 55,728.44 13,125.00 42,603.44

178,750.0 195,016.2 37,503.1 165,679.8 576,949.1 213,598.0

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

Respondents counterclaim is also dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioners argument is meritorious.

We are not persuaded.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT:

I, ____________________, Filipino, of legal age, single/married, with postal

In consideration of the above-mentioned payment, I have released and

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto sign these presents this ___day of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of _______ at Manila,

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be

xxx xxx xxx

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

2 Decision rendered by NLRC, First Division.

7 Rollo, pp. 12, 22 and 64.

8 NLRC Decision dated September 11, 1989, p. 3, rollo, p. 22.

9 Ibid., p. 4; Ibid., p. 23.

11 Id., p. 5; Id., p. 24.

12 Id., p. 6, Id., p. 25.

13 Id., p. 7, Id., p. 26.

which was prepared by Petitioner ABV Rock Group,[13] states:

“KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HANDS THIS 29 day of

that the validity of the document can no longer be questioned.

Unfortunately for petitioners, jurisprudence does not support their stance.

explained, inter alia, in Marcos v. National Labor Relations Commission, which

xxx xxx xxx

‘While rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to

‘Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim agreement void

policy regarding quitclaims and waivers, as follows:

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at ___________, this _

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ day of _____ at Manila,