Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Nacar v Nistal
Anderson v Perkins
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of
his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property
which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael
Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners
herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
Suarez v CA
Facts: Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died.
His estate has not been liquidated or partitioned. Petitioners
widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in a case
for rescission of contract and for damages and were ordered
to pay damages. 5 parcels of land were then levied and sold
with private respondent as highest bidder and were issued
certificates of sale
Held: No. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law
applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." Article 888
further provides: "The legitime of the legitimate children
and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may
freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights
of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as
hereinafter provided." The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became coowners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners
are not barred in any way from instituting the action to
annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
Constantino v CA
Facts: Josefa Torres died intestate. Her heirs are Roque,
Luna and Austria. The heirs of Josefa as vendors and
petitioner Constantino as vendee entered into a contract to
sell a parcel of land. Constantino was to prepare the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of estate with sale. Such deed has
several spaces left blank including the specifications of the
metes and bounds of the land. The heirs signed the
document with the understanding that Roque, one of the
heirs, would be present during the survey of the land.
However, without participation of any of the heirs, the
property was surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT
T-292265 and T-292266. The heirs learned that the area
sold was much bigger than that agreed upon. The heirs filed
with the RTC of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed
and cancellation of the certificate of titles with damages. The
heirs claimed that they signed the document before the land
was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no
definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at
the time of the signing. Also, they were not notified about the
survey and the subdivision of the lot and therefore they could
not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner.
Constantino claims that the heirs signed the deed after the
survey of the land was completed and before a notary public
in Manila. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the heirs.
Issue: Whether or not the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate with sale is valid
Held: NO, the deed is not valid. The court held that petitioner
Constantino violated their agreement that Roque should be
present when the lot is to be surveyed by the Bureau of
Lands. Petitioner deceived the heirs by filling the blank
spaces in the deed and having the lot surveyed and
subdivided on his own and without the knowledge and
consent of the heirs. Also, the claim of petitioner that the
heirs signed the deed after the survey was contradicted by
petitioner’s own witness who positively asserted in court that
the survey was conducted six days after the signing. The
court also doubts the procedural regularity in the execution
and signing of the deed. It is not easy to believe that
petitioner and the heirs would travel to Manila to have their
document notarized considering they live in Bulacan where
notaries public are easy to find. Another compelling reason
for the annulment of the document is that the second page
thereof clearly manifests that the number of the subdivision
plan and the respective areas of said lots were merely
handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were
typewritten, which leads the court to the conclusion that
handwritten figures thereon were not available at the time
the document was formalized.
HELD: NO. The Court ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. The determination of who are legal heirs of t he
deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy which a party seeks to establish a
right, or particular fact. The Court held that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners in the case at bar are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
7.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
v
ELLA GAGARANI, ISAGANI,
ADRIAN, NATHANIEL, NIEVA,
JONATHAN, DIONESIO,
FLORENCE and JEREMIAS,
all surnamed ASOK,
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not respondents are the legal heirs of the
decedent
(2) Whether or not the action for repurchase has prescribed
RULING: (1) YES. In line with the rationale behind Sec. 119,
the Court rejected a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is
used in a broad sense and the law makes no distinctions.
Paz v Abena
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of
decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent
was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929. On April
27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending
nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and
siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first
cousins including petitioner. Before her death, Margarita
executed a Last Will and Testament3 on February 2, 1987
where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a
real property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of
209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo,
and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion
each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided
share of a real property located at San Antonio Village,
Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by
TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and
Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each.
Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent
whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of
Makati while on On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a
petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of
Makati. On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated
and respondent as the executor of the will. Petitioner
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the
Court of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000,
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
Petitioner argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with
the formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code
because the will was not signed by the testator in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence
of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the
testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or
similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same
day. She further argues that the will was procured through
undue influence and pressure because at the time of
execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and
entirely dependent upon respondent and her nephews for
support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her
freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner
likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have
declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita
since they are her only living collateral relatives in
accordance with Articles 10099 and 101010 of the Civil Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum11 that
the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and
as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the
Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring
the will invalid for failure to comply with the formalities
required by law,
Held:
No, RTC correctly held with [regard] to the contention of the
oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator
[Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a
will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without
merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance
of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption
that the testator was of sound mind. Anent the contestants’
submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that
its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three
(3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2)
pages only because the attestation is not a part of the
notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion
that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will.
It must be noted that the subject instrument is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient
safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the
honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting
of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in
consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation"
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code. As for the
signatures, testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary.
There is no evidence to show that the first signature was
procured earlier than February 2, 1987. Finally, the court
finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on
the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture
reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling
with the other witnesses while executing the subject will.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned
findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 88715 of the
Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her
properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner
has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.
Petition denied.
Case #9
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the will in the case at bar is valid
Held:
Aluad v Aluad
FACTS: Maria Aluad(mother of petitioners) as well as
their uncle, respondent Zenaido, were raiser by the childless
spouses Matilde and Crispin. Crispin was the owner of six
lots located in Capiz. When he died, Matilde the wife
adjudicated the lots to herself. On 14 November 1981,
Matilde executed a “Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter
vivos” in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria - covering all the
six lots. On 26 August 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to
respondent Zenaido by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
property - and on her will she devised Lot 674 to Zenaido. In
1992, Matilde executed a Last Will devising Lot Nos. 675,
677, 682 and 680 to Maria, and her “remaining properties”
including Lot No. 674 to respondent Zenaido. Matilde died
on 25 January 1994, while Maria died on September 24
same year. On 21 August 1995, Maria’s heirs, herein
petitioners filed before the RTC - a complaint for declaration
and recovery of ownership and possession of lot nos. 674
and 676 and damages against respondent. As a defense,
Zenaido alleged that Lot No. 674 is owned by the defendant
as this lot was adjudicated to him in the last will of Matilde,
while lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde. These two
lots are in his possession as true owners thereof. Petitioners
later filed a Motion for leave to amend complaint already filed
to conform to evidence to which it annexed an Amended
Complaint which cited the donation of the six lots via deed of
donation in favor of their mother Maria. RTC Branch 15
granted the motion and admitted the amended complaint.
FACTS:
Barrera v Tanjoco
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained
in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814.
Bellis v Bellis
Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977,
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate
of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children of
spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes
being not the wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void;
the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate.
Lourdes filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that she
is entitled to some compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although they were not legally
married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The
CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the same
within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but
declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?
HELD:
No. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is
invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own.
In this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of
Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final and executor.
The only instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence
with circumstances do not concur herein.
17. Bellis Vs. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Doctrine:
A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters.
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State
of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who
pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman;
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted
to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to
him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
Lower Court:
Issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Lower court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or no Texas law or Philippines law must apply.
Held:
Texas Law must apply.
Renvoi Doctrine - Said doctrine is usually pertinent where
the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent
was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied
to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Azuela v CA
FACTS:
A petition was filed by petitioner Felix Azuela seeking to
admit to probate the notarial will of the late Eugenia E.
Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is
the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will consisted of 2
pages and was written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three
witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the
attestation clause. The probate petition adverted to only 2
heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely:
petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was
alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the
will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to
the designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who
represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12
legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda claimed that:
The will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its
emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in
several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property,
all centering on petitioner's right to occupy the properties of
the decedent.
She also asserted that contrary to the representations of
petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12
legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then
residing abroad.
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not
executed and attested to in accordance with law. She
pointed out that decedent's signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central
matters to this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the notarial will complied with the requirements of
the law and should be admitted to probate
HELD:
No. Petition was denied. The court laid down additional
defects of the notarial will of the deceased.
1. The attestation clause fails to state the number of pages
of the will. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to
state the number of pages on which the will is written is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of
pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part
of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the
execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. z
Petition denied.
Garcia v La Cuesta
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased.
ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for
respondents.
Facts : CFI approved the attestation clause and allowed the
will of Antero Mercado which was written in Ilocano dialect.
However, the CA reversed the decision of the CFI and ruled
that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was
signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the
end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express
request of the testator in the presence of the testator and
each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after
the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the
former's request said testator has written a cross at the end
of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of
which the will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify
that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages
thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino
Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed
below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino
Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a cross
immediately after his name. Petitioner argued that there is
no need for such recital because the cross written by the
testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the
signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage.
Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as
a thumbmark as decided in some of the cases by the court.
Issue :1. W/N the cross can be admitted as a signature of
the testator
2. W/N the will is void due to the nullity of attestation
clause
Held : 1. No. The court ruled that the cross made by the
testator is not his usual signature or even one of the ways by
which he signed his name. The cross cannot be considered
to be the same of a thumbmark because the cross cannot
and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
2. Yes. The will is void because the attestation clause is
fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name
under his express direction, as required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. What has been said makes it
unnecessary for the court to determine there is a sufficient
recital in the attestation clause as to the signing of the will by
the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the
latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.
FACTS:
Ana Abangan’s will was duly probated and said document
consisted of two sheets, the first page contains all the
dispositions of the testatrix and duly signed at the bottom by
Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the
testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause signed at the bottom by
the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is
signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions,
according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.
HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that the will was duly probated. The
Court held that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of
which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed
also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also
be signed on the left margin by the testator and three
witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 seeks
to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby
changing the testator’s dispositions. In the case at bar, the
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet and signed
by the testator and the three witnesses. Therefore, the
requirement of the marginal signatures would be
purposeless. The signatures at the bottom already
guarantees its authenticity. Another signature on the margin
would be unnecessary.
Taboada v Rosal
Taboada vs Rosal
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of the late
Dorotea Perez and presented as evidence the alleged will
and the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses
thereto. the will consists of two pages. The first page
contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed
at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at
the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses.
The second page which contains the attestation clause and
the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation.
Held:
No.
Under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be
subscribed or signed at
its end by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by another person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
Nera v Rimando
G.R. No. L-5971. February 27, 1911.
Facts:
Narcisa Rimando, question the admission for probate of the
said will. One of the subscribing witnesses, Javellana was
present in the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and deceased, Pedro Rimando, and the
other subscribing witnesses attached their signature. It was
alleged that during that time he was outside, some eight or
ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller
room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which
made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of
attaching their signatures to the instrument.
HELD:YES
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, SC held
that: "The true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they
actually saw each other sign, but whether they might
have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do
so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction when he ruled that the right of a forced heir
to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to
probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.
Held:
No, this contention is without merit. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the
will normally comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue. Although on its face, the will appeared to
have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the
decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania
law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may
be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy
and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply.
Alsua - Betts v CA
Facts:
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña
Florentina Ralla, entered into a duly notarized agreement,
Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial, over the then present
and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Doña
Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doña Tinay
filed before the Court of First Instance of Albay their
respective petitions for the probate of their respective
holographic wills.
Issues:
WON the private respondents, oppositors to the probate of
the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of
testator Don Jesus Alsua.
Held:
FACTS:
Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Respondent Lutgarda
Santiago are both nieces of the testatrix Isabel Gabriel who
died a widow. A will was submitted for probate by the
respondent.
ISSUES:
Whether or not, evidence on record of credibility by the three
instrumental witnesses must be established as evidence on
record.
Whether or not, the term “credible” in the Civil Code should
be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization
Law
HELD:
No, it is not mandatory that the credibility of the
witnesses must be established as evidence on record. It is
enough that the qualifications enumerated under Article 820
are complied with such that there is soundness of mind, 18
years of age, not blind, deaf and able to read and write, and
none of the disqualifications set in Article 821, any person
not domiciled in the Philippines, those who have been
convicted of falsification of a document or perjury. The court
held that the good standing of the witness in the community,
his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness, are attributes presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party.
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
HELD:
No. In the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were
admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way:
after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting
and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three
honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and
the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in
court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and
authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may
have purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the
oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the error,
because the document itself is not at hand. And considering
that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages,
and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the
unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones,
may go undetected. Obviously, when the will itself is not
submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of
authenticity3— the testator's handwriting — has
disappeared.
Rodelas v Aranza
Held: Yes. The SC held that in the Gam case there was
footnote that said “Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or
carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the
photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
Gago v Mamuyac
Francisco Gago vs. Cornelio Mamuyac et.al.,
GR L- 263317
Probate court held that the 1919 will was revoked by a 1920
will.
RTC = petitioner
CA = reversed
Lopez v Gonzaga
Caniza v CA