China and The New Geopolitics of Central Asia

China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia
Author(s): J. Richard Walsh

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Mar., 1993), pp. 272-284
Published by: University of California Press
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CHINA AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS
OF CENTRAL ASIA
J. Richard Walsh
The implosion of the Soviet Union into its constituent

republics was viewed initially with alarm by China. In and of itself, the
collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Mos-
cow's central control heightened the ideological isolation of China; in ad-
dition, a new set of nations with transnational ethnic ties now bordered
China's northwestern autonomous regions and provinces, which are areas
of continual ethnic unrest. Depending on the direction of political devel-
opments in each of the Central Asian republics, China could be faced with
the challenges of Islamic resurgence and/or pan-Turkic nationalism. Both
could appeal to the forces of ethnic separatism that exist within the Turkic
and Muslim populations in northwestern China, and by extension to the
independence-minded Tibetans. It was no coincidence that Vice-President
Wang Zhen, after the aborted Moscow coup in August 1991, chose a tour
of Xinjiang Autonomous Region as the appropriate setting from which to
exhort China to "form a steel wall to safeguard socialism and the unifica-
tion of the motherland."
Following the independence of the Central Asian republics, the Chinese
are taking a more sanguine view of the potential challenges emerging from
the region. Drawing on the views of numerous experts and scholars, a
document entitled, "The Realities to be Faced in China in the Wake of
Dramatic Changes in the USSR and Strategic Choices," does not dismiss
the fact that events in the former USSR will have an impact on China's
stability. The paper argues, however, that there is no need for "excessive
reaction" since large scale domestic disorders will not occur. 1 This assess-
J. Richard Walsh is Associate Professor of Asian Pacific Studies,

Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The views expressed herein do not
necessarily represent those of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other U.S.
Government Agency.
? 1993 by The Regents of the University of California
1. "Unpublished Document on Impact of USSR Collapse," Foreign Broadcast Informa-

tion Service, Daily Report, China (hereafter FBIS, DR/CHI), 13 March 1992, p. 2.
272
J. RICHARD WALSH 273
ment reflects China's confidence in its ability to maintain a "great wall" to

safeguard socialism and its belief in the ability of Central Asian political
elites to maintain stability in their republics.
Is China's confidence misplaced, given the fluidity of the political situa-
tion and the pressures of economic development in the Central Asian re-
publics? Does the potential demonstration effect challenge China's control
of its western regions, undermining the basis for sovereign relations among
the republics and China? My purpose is to address these questions by as-
sessing China's perception of the emerging geopolitics in Central Asia and
the strategic choices being made by the Chinese leadership. In this article,
I will examine factors that condition China's perception of Central Asian
geopolitics, then explore Beijing's policies toward the Central Asian repub-
lics. Building on effective domestic control, China's concerns about trans-
national ethnic and religious ties are muted in order to encourage
economic opportunities. Finally, conclusions are drawn about China's
role in Central Asian geopolitics that merge the legacies of imperialism
with new realities.
China's Perceptions of Central Asia

The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced a principal security threat to
China, but in doing so also reduced China's strategic importance.2 Opti-
mistic assessments of China's role in a more multipolar world gave way to
greater concern in Beijing about the emergence of U.S.-dominated unipo-
larity. Though able to recoup some status as a global actor during the
1991 Gulf War, China was alarmed by the swiftness of the allied victory
and critical of any U.S.-proclaimed "new world order." Beijing was
pressed to find a new role in regional affairs that would make the best use
of its political, economic, and military capabilities. The emergence of the
Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbeki-
stan, and Turkmenistan-gives China the opportunity to reassert tradi-
tional regional interests.
From China's perspective, the disintegration of the Soviet Union accel-
erated the process of delinking local and regional conflicts from super-
power rivalry. Beijing sees opportunities in the competing interests of
contiguous (Iran, Pakistan, India, and Russia) and noncontiguous (Turkey
and Saudi Arabia) actors. Their competition reaffirms China's preference
2. This section is based in part on discussions with researchers at the Beijing Institute for
International Strategic Studies (BIISS) and the China Institute of Contemporary Interna-
tional Relations (CICIR), August 1992, Beijing. Researchers at BMISS admitted that they
were just beginning to study the strategic issues attached to the emergence of the Central
Asian republics.
274 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIII, NO. 3, MARCH 1993
for a multipolar world in which U.S. power declines relative to that of

regional powers. China's ability to play in the new geopolitical game in
Central Asia is based on "comprehensive national strength" (political, eco-
nomic, and cultural) as well as traditional interests. Geography also favors
its role in Central Asia since three of the five republics border on Xinjiang.
China quickly established relations with all five of the Central Asian
republics in accordance with its "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
that reflect a Chinese world view premised on immutable sovereignty and
the expectation of reciprocal noninterference in internal affairs. By re-
specting the sovereignty of the nascent republics, Beijing hopes both to
practice good neighbor diplomacy and extend its open door policy to Cen-
tral Asia. Economic cooperation could aid the development of Xinjiang
and adjacent provinces that have been low priorities in China's economic
planning. In a reversal of early nineteenth century imperial policy,
China's open door to the West is becoming the basis for the opening of its
northwestern frontier.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, is a mixed blessing for
China. On the one hand, it hastened trends toward multipolarity, effec-
tively eliminated China's security threat to the north, and opened up new
political/economic opportunities in Central Asia. But commercial ties
with the flow of goods, services, and ideas across boundaries does subject
China to the effects of ethno-nationalism in Central Asia, and the Soviet
Union's divide and rule policy did not obliterate pan-Turkic and Islamic
awareness. The Chinese leadership's worst fear is that ethno-nationalism
alone or in combination with resurgent Islam could destabilize China's
northwestern provinces (Gansu and Qinghai) and autonomous regions
(Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet). In recent years, northwest China has been
the site of ethnic unrest by groups chafing under Han Chinese rule. These
provinces and regions are also of considerable strategic importance as they
include China's principal nuclear testing and missile launching sites and
much of its "gulag archipelago."
On the other hand, the conjunction of dissidents in and around north-
west China need scarcely concern the Chinese government. Their num-
bers are relatively small (only 6.5% of a total population of 1.1 billion) and
Beijing has successfully controlled them with a combination of sanctions
and rewards. Unlike its relations with the West, or with the rest of East
Asia for that matter, China is in a relatively better position vis-A-vis the
land-locked Central Asian republics. As one Chinese researcher in Beijing
asserted, for either historical or contemporary reasons, China's presence as
a continental power is essential to the stability of the Central Asian region.
Historically, Central Asia was an object of Chinese diplomacy to "use the
barbarians to control the barbarians"; in the contemporary period, with
the decline of Russia and the threat of unipolarity, China must intervene
to maintain a favorable balance of power.
China's involvement in Central Asia is based on classical geopolitical
concepts-i.e., divide and rule and revival of the Silk Road. Security poli-
cies build on the divide and rule tactics that have existed on both sides of
the border. As recent events demonstrate, Beijing will not hesitate to use
military force to suppress ethnic separatism at home. The use of force is
clearly more problematic across the border where ethnic conflict is brew-
ing; containment of such conflict depends more on the management of re-
lations with other nations who are competing for influence in the region.
As one of the root causes of ethnic unrest and Muslim resurgence is the
endemic poverty in the region, the second element in Beijing's strategy
toward Central Asia is the establishment of economic ties. China can
build on an advantage that the Central Asian republics enjoyed during the
Soviet period, i.e., their distance from Moscow. As a consequence, the
republics were able to retain parts of their historical market economy. Us-
ing its open door policy as a starting point, China hopes to build on the
remnants of that market economy and revive the classical geopolitical role
of Central Asia and its Silk Road. What follows is a discussion of both
aspects of China's strategy toward Central Asia.
Divide and Rule

In the areas of northwest China that are contiguous to Central Asia, the
Chinese have generally followed a divide and rule policy not unlike that of
the former Soviet Union. When the People's Republic of China was
founded in October 1949, the regime followed a "united front" policy of
pluralism in order to consolidate political control. Within newly formed
autonomous regions for minority nationalities, prominent local elites were
included in the formal political structure. Talk of class struggle was muted
and local customs and habits were tolerated. A modern communications
and transportation infrastructure was built to link the autonomous regions
to adjacent Han Chinese centers. Beginning with the Great Leap Forward
(1957), the policy shifted toward more radical assimilation, but this
sparked widespread violent clashes in Tibet and Xinjiang and, conse-
quently, was relaxed until the mid-1960s when the Cultural Revolution
brought the return of more radical policies. Beginning in 1969, however,
the Sino-Soviet border conflicts made the Chinese leadership realize the
necessity of ethnic minorities' support for national security.3
3. Lucian W. Pye, "China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security," Current Scene,
14:12 (December 1976), pp. 7-10; a discussion of policy changes toward ethnic minorities is
Following the Cultural Revolution, minority customs were encouraged

as expressions of ethnic diversity. Representation of ethnic groups in party
and government organs increased, and the 1982 Constitution contains de-
tailed provisions for self-government in the autonomous regions. Re-
sources have been devoted to the restoration of important religious sites
and channeled to individual minority groups. It is common to find in Xin-
jiang, for example, separate Kirghiz and Uighur mosques in the same
town. The Chinese government is also promoting the use of ethnic lan-
guages in local schools and in local and regional television and radio.4
As China demonstrated in April 1990 and again in early 1992, should
the various ethnic groups, individually or in coalition, rebel against the
Han Chinese authorities, Beijing will respond with decisive military force.
Western journalists have been prohibited from visiting Xinjiang Province
since August 1991, and it is difficult to determine the extent to which sepa-
ratists are able to conduct their activities. Some alleged incidents, like a
series of bombings in Urumqi in February 1992, have been attributed by
the Uighur independence movement to Chinese provocateurs.5 In a rare
moment of candor, Xinjiang leaders admitted in March 1992 that the situ-
ation in the province was unstable. Tomur Dawamat, chairman of the
Xinjiang regional government, emphasized the need to crack down on the
activities by "an extremely small number" of separatists.6 His concerns
have been echoed by other Xinjiang leaders and in commentaries on the
need for ethnic unity as a prerequisite for socialist modernization.
Chinese authorities are well aware that the northwestern borders are
porous and that strong ethno-religious ties transcend political boundaries.
Stories of Tibetan resistance filter through to other minority areas; Ui-
ghurs in Xinjiang are aware of unrest among Mongols in Inner Mongolia
who desire greater independence from Beijing and ties with the Mongolian
Republic; some minority groups have heard of the Joint Committee for the
Manchu, Mongol, East Turkmen, and Tibetan Peoples and are anxious to
obtain its publication, One Voice. Former separatists continue to live in
exile in Kazakhstan, and there are reported links between Uighurs and the
Turkestan Liberation Movement and between Kirghiz in Xinjiang and
in June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1976).
4. William Peters, "Central Asia and the Minority Question," Asian Affairs, vol. 22, part
II (June 1991), pp. 154-55; "Xinjiang Promotes Use of Ethnic Languages, in FBIS, DR/CHI,
27 July 1992, p. 53.
5. Henri d'Antoine, "The Uighurs' Watches Still on Beijing Time," Asia-Pacific Defense
Reporter, June-July 1992, p. 37.
6. "Tomur Dawamat Urges Crackdown on Separatism," in FBIS, DR/CHI, 18 March
1992, p. 59.
tribesmen across the border who may have provided arms during the April
1990 riots. In July 1992 a Russian newspaper reported that a political
party met in Bishkek, capital of Kirghizstan, to advocate the formation of
an independent Uighur state in territory occupied by Xinjiang.7
As long as the Soviet Union existed, these ethnic ties did not seem to
constitute a major threat. The independence of the Central Asian repub-
lics, however, presents new political possibilities, and China faces the same
challenges that the Soviet leadership faced in the 1920s, religious and lin-
guistic ties that transcend borders. Moscow wished to reduce both ele-
ments in the consciousness of the Central Asian peoples and tried to
exploit ethnic differences in the establishment of the Central Asian repub-
lics. In the wake of independence, it is clear that resurgent Islam and pan-
Turkism are forces that present security challenges for China.
In order to control "hostile foreign forces" emanating from Central
Asia, China is pursuing a number of diplomatic efforts directed at the
emerging alignments in the region. As evident in the recent efforts to bro-
ker a peace agreement among the mujahidin in Afghanistan, China cannot
overlook the fundamental competition between Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi
Arabia for influence. China pays closest attention to Pakistan and Iran,
which have longstanding cultural and expanding economic ties to the Cen-
tral Asian republics. The basis of China's relations with Iran and Pakistan
is its role as a supplier of conventional arms, missiles, and nuclear technol-
ogy. China's willingness to supply the arms and technology is driven as
much by support for these nations' strategic interests in areas outside of
Central Asia as by any profit. To underscore the point of shared strategic
interests, China sent President Yang Shangkun on a high profile trip
through Pakistan and Iran in October 1991. A common theme of Yang's
meetings with Pakistani and Iranian leaders was concern over a U.S.-dom-
inated world order.8
Based on the success of policies at home and abroad, China appears to
be more sanguine about the effects of rising Islamic influence in Central
Asia. Despite the presence of over 20,000 nuclear weapons in Central Asia
and the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of Persian Gulf states and
Pakistan (which China aids through technology transfer), Beijing has ex-
pressed little concern about the reality of an "Islamic bomb." Indeed, one
recent commentary stressed the point that the resurgence of Islam arouses
more nervousness in the West, and has led the United States to counter
7. Peters, "Central Asia," p. 156; "Party Aims for 'State of Uygurstan' in Xinjiang," in
FBIS, Daily Report, Central Eurasia, 30 July 1992, p. 49.
8. Tai Ming Cheung and Salamat Ali, "Strategic Triangle," Far Eastern Economic Review
(FEER), 14 November 1991, p. 1 1.
Iranian influence in Central Asia.9 Beijing sees "Great Power chauvin-

ism" at work and is particularly critical of the chosen instrument of power,
Turkey.
Despite attempts to stress the differences among the Central Asian eth-
nic groups, Moscow was never able to make the Turkic speakers unintel-
ligible to each other. This transnational linguistic tie is the basis of
Turkey's appeal to Central Asian elites. Turkey has been aggressively
courting the four Turkic republics (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghiz-
stan, and Kazakhstan), and its influence is reflected by the expansion of its
press and attempts to spread the use of the Roman alphabet. The Ankara
government has agreed to receive more than 10,000 university students
from Central Asian republics to study the Turkish language, banking, law,
engineering, and economics. The Turkish Culture Ministry places great
hopes on Project Turksat, a communications satellite designed to broad-
cast Turkish television from the Adriatic to China. Turkey's economic ties
to the West are also valued by Central Asian elites who are more interested
in Western technology and aid than in Muslim resurgence.
On the surface, it would appear that the Turkish model of a secular state
parallels China's modernization efforts. Beijing, however, sees hegemonic
designs behind Turkey's actions. Because of its traditional perception of
Chinese unity in geopolitical and cultural terms, the Chinese leadership is
wary of Turkish influence. China complains that Turkey is attempting to
dominate the Central Asian economy to the exclusion of other interests.
Beijing is also concerned that Turkey's cultural efforts in Central Asia
could promote the "peaceful evolution" in the northwestern provinces of
China that the central authorities are resisting in the more urban coastal
provinces. Since 60% of Xinjiang's 15 million residents are Turkic Mus-
lims, China has reason to be concerned about resurgent pan-Turkic senti-
ment. That concern is amplified by the fact that the 90-year-old leader of
the Turkestan Liberation Movement, Yusuf Isa Alptekin, still resides in
Istanbul. Chinese authorities have reportedly linked the recent activities
of separatist groups in Xinjiang to the presence of large numbers of tour-
ists coming from Turkey and Egypt. 10
Much has been written about the competition between the Turkish and
Iranian models in Central Asia. Any rivalry between Iran and Turkey is
viewed favorably from Beijing because it is largely defensive in character,
with each trying to block the other's advances.11 The Turkish model is
9. Zhang Xiaodong, "Central Asia on the Rise," Beijing Review, August 3-9, 1992, p. 16.
10. "Egypt, Turkey Said Aiding Xinjiang Separatists," FBIS, DR/CHI, 18 March 1992, p.
11.
11. George I. Mirsky, "Central Asia's Emergence," Current History (October 1992), p.
338.
more attractive to the rulers of Central Asia's Turkic republics, and those
republics represent important markets for Turkish goods. China values
these rulers whose continuity is essential to regional stability. The Iranian
model has less resonance among Central Asian elites, with the exception of
Tajikistan. As a Persian Gulf oil state, though, Iran has the capital neces-
sary to transform the infrastructure of the Central Asian economies to
make them viable in the long run. In this competition of geo-economic
interests, China finds room to resume its traditional role of anchoring the
eastern end of the Silk Road.
Reviving the Silk Road

As noted above, the forging of regional economic ties between northwest
China and the Central Asian republics predates the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Under Gorbachev, Moscow ceded some economic authority to the
republics to placate demands for greater autonomy and boost foreign in-
vestment and trade. There was a dramatic increase in border trade, espe-
cially between northeast China and Siberia; the establishment of various
kinds of joint ventures; the opening or expansion of transportation and
telecommunication links; and the export of Chinese contract workers to
chronically labor-short areas of the USSR.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics have
attempted to forge economic ties that would give them greater freedom
from Moscow. Beijing was quick to recognize the potential and capital-
ized on its established presence in contiguous areas. The transnational
economic ties are elements of a broader regional economic pattern that the
Chinese identify as the Great Islamic Circle, composed of Xinjiang, Cen-
tral Asia, and the Middle East. 12 For the Chinese, the core of the identity
is the Silk Road, the ancient continental bridge between Asia and the
West, with a terminus in Xinjiang. Turkey, Iran, and the Central Asian
republics share that identity. At their May 1992 Ashkhabad summit,
agreements were signed to revive the Silk Road by building a highway
from Turkey to Western China and completing rail links between the Per-
sian Gulf and Xinjiang.
Beijing proceeds with trade and investment in Central Asia from the
assumption of a strong complementarity between the economies of the re-
publics and China. The five republics have steel and mechanical products,
timber, and chemical fertilizers, which Xinjiang in particular lacks. Xin-
12. Gaye Christoffersen, "Xinjiang's Open Door Policy in Sino-Soviet Relations," Pacific
Affairs (in press); Steven I. Levine, "Second Chance in China: Sino-Soviet Relations in the
1990s," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 519 (January
1992), p. 36.
jiang and other Chinese provinces produce the light industrial goods, tex-
tiles, and foodstuffs that are in short supply in the republics.
Interdependence is the result of several years of border and barter trade
that overcomes the hard currency shortages that may hamper other for-
eign traders. The Chinese government has given trading companies ex-
panded barter trade powers, and Xinjiang and other provinces enjoy a
preferential border trade policy that includes a 50% exemption from the
usual customs duties. As a result of these efforts, China has seen a dra-
matic increase in trade in Central Asia. Before 1991, only five trading
companies operated in Xinjiang; by late 1992, there were over 200 compa-
nies whose total two-way trade of $220 million was a three-fold increase
over 1991.13 Moreover, China is moving beyond the traditional patterns
of border trade into new areas of real estate, aircraft leasing, and the estab-
lishment of joint ventures and large department stores in Central Asian
cities.
China has 5,400 km of border adjoining eight countries, including three
of the Central Asian republics. Xinjiang has the longest international bor-
der of any Chinese province or autonomous region, and therefore is the
centerpiece of China's efforts to expand economic ties with Central Asia.
Xinjiang has opened eleven international ports of entry, including three
international highways, rail service and air links between its capital,
Urumqi, and the Kazakhstan capital of Alma-Ata, and the expansion of
air service to other Central Asian republics. The success of Xinjiang's oil
and gas exploration provides another potential link to meet the republics'
energy needs.
A Chinese reporter noted that the opening of Xinjiang to Central Asia
marked an important landmark in rebirth of the old Silk Road, and to
drive the point home, Urumqi hosted an international trade fair in Septem-
ber 1992 that included representatives from all the Central Asian repub-
lics, Pakistan, and Iran. The trade fair coincided with the state visit of
Iranian President Rafsanjani, and the Chinese took the opportunity to take
him to Urumqi where he spoke of the need for expanded commercial and
technological ties. On a visit to the Urumqi Islamic education center, Raf-
sanjani commented on the cultural ties between Iran and Xinjiang and the
importance of Islamic education for modernization.
Both the trade fair and Rafsanjani's presence made the economic point
of the Great Islamic Circle and China's regional perspective. But there is
also an important security element attached to economic ties with Central
Asia. Despite rising ethnic separatism in Xinjiang, the standard of living
13. "Border Trade Develops Rapidly in Xinjiang," FBIS, DR/CHI, 22 December 1992, p.
51.
in most of the autonomous region is much higher than in the neighboring

Central Asian republics. Busloads of Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Kirghiz come
to Urumqi and other cities on visa-free, three-day shopping visits.14 The
major differences between levels of economic development make it less
likely that calls for transnational ethnic unity will lead to major geopoliti-
cal changes in the near future. The imperative is for economic cooperation
among the republics and with China.
Though prospects are good, there are limits to the expansion of eco-
nomic ties. High inflation rates and unstable polities discourage a rapid
expansion of Chinese business operations, and laws and regulations to en-
courage foreign investment may not be sufficient to offset the high degree
of risk. China, like many of the nations competing in Central Asian mar-
kets, cannot meet the capital needs of the republics for infrastructure de-
velopment. As the republics attempt to join organizations like the Asian
Development Bank, their overwhelming investment needs will bring them
into conflict with the needs of China. Finally, China is facing increasing
competition from Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, who are actively
pushing consumer exports.
The problems of transition to more open market economies weigh heav-
ily on Central Asian leaders long accustomed to subsidies from Moscow.
Level of economic development, geography, and ethnicity favor China's
use of its economic resources to assist in the transition. Kazakh, Turk-
men, Uzbek, and Kirghiz leaders have expressed interest in China's experi-
ence in switching from a planned to a market economy, and for those
republics contiguous with Xinjiang, China may be for the short term the
most important foreign economic partner in Central Asia. The long term
will depend on the ability of China to compete with others to meet the
consumer and infrastructural needs of the republics, and the attraction of
those republics to the West, East Asian NICs, and other states for more
purely economic reasons.
Conclusion: Legacies and New Realities

As the Central Asian republics struggle to assert their independence, com-
parisons with the developing world are unavoidable. Central Asia was the
Soviet third world, where traditional values resisted Soviet-style moderni-
zation. In China the republics can find a society that in its own way re-
sisted Soviet-style modernization, underwent some measure of
modernization, yet lags enough to claim a common identity as a develop-
ing nation. An identity of interests may be natural, but China's role in
14. d'Antoine, "The Uighurs' Watches," p. 37.
Central Asia is largely dependent on the legacy of imperialism and the new
realities of Central Asian geopolitics.
From China's perspective, since both communism and traditional social
structures share an authoritarian base, the survival of the native nomen-
klatura as post-independent ruling elites is important to regional stability.
Russian influence continues to be essential,15 and there is no interest in
championing the cause of the Central Asian republics at the risk of offend-
ing Moscow. Russia's military capabilities and economic attraction (far
more than the whole of Central Asia) make competing powers like Iran,
Turkey, and China equally respectful of Moscow's interests. Russia has a
large Muslim population and desires friendly ties with allies in the Middle
East; its interests should make life easier for ethnic Russians living in Cen-
tral Asia as well as garner some Middle East investment for Russia.16
Moscow is also expanding its economic relations with China, including the
transfer of sophisticated military technology. China supports the con-
certed effort by CIS military units to control situations such as that in
Tajikistan and the efforts of Russia and contiguous republics to resolve
jointly long-standing border issues.
As important as good relations with Russia may be for regional stability,
there is a race on to win the hearts, minds, and markets of Central Asia. A
new "great game" is developing with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, China, Russia, and India as the major competitors. Two factors are
important for understanding the new game: conventional and nuclear
weapons proliferation and ethnic conflict.
As economic pressures generate discontent in Central Asia, several re-
publics view conventional arms sales as a means to boost employment and
earn foreign currency to pay for food and consumer goods. Though the
availability of conventional arms may fuel conflicts in Central Asia and
elsewhere, the prospect of nuclear proliferation is more disturbing. A ura-
nium enrichment facility exists in Tajikistan, while mines and factories
also operate in Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is being wooed by countries eager
to obtain nuclear weapons materials, technologies, and assistance to design
and manufacture their own weapons. Leaders in Iran and Pakistan regu-
larly deny that nuclear technology transfers from Central Asia have taken
place. 17
15. Discussions with researchers at BIISS and CICIR revealed disagreement over Russia's
ability to influence events due to its overwhelming domestic economic problems. Researchers
at CICIR tended to emphasize the constraints on Russia, while those at BIISS emphasized
necessary Russian presence in Central Asia to maintain stability.
16. Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Sum-
mer 1992, p. 123.
17. J. Mohan Malik, "The 'Great Game' Begins," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, June-July
Central Asia's conventional arms sales and possible nuclear technology

transfers are a direct challenge to China's commercial interests. In the
long run, these sales and transfers could affect the strategic balance from
the Persian Gulf to South Asia. Given China's ambivalence about nuclear
proliferation and its nuclear technology sales, Beijing does not publicly
discuss the issue, but the prospects of an open and accelerated nuclear
arms race, especially in South Asia, must be disturbing to it. Indeed,
China's diplomacy in and around Central Asia can be viewed as an at-
tempt to address the economic causes of arms sales while forging strategic
interests with actual and potential nuclear powers on the periphery.
The situation in Tajikistan, with conflict between the communist old
guard elites and more fundamentalist Tajiks, underscores the potential for
spreading ethnic conflict. Moscow sees the Tajikistan situation as a threat
to Russia's national security. The risk of spreading conflict is the worst
fear, but the Russians are also concerned about the growing involvement
of Iran and Afghanistan with different Tajik factions. The conflict is spill-
ing over into the Ferghana Valley, which straddles Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Kirghizstan. Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are all supporting
groups in the Ferghana valley. The effect of their support so far seems to
be reinforcement of the existing ethnic nationalism. The appeal to nation-
alism, however, is sparking large-scale migrations of Russians and other
ethnic groups and disrupting economies throughout Central Asia. Such
disruptions further constrain China's ability to rebuild the Silk Road.
The Ferghana Valley is also one of the most active areas for resurgent
Islamic movements. But despite the proximity of the valley to Xinjiang,
the Chinese leadership appears more concerned about pan-Turkic secular-
ism than Islam. Among the Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Central Asia, pan-
Turkic ethnic awareness is much weaker than tribal affiliations.18 It may
be that pan-Turkic appeals resonate strongly among the more urbanized
and readily mobilized Turkic population in Xinjiang. The potential for
future ethnic unrest and reprisals could jeopardize expanding economic
and political ties with the Central Asian republics. Consequently, Chinese
diplomacy emphasizes both the benefits of economic cooperation and the
need for political stability.
For the short-term, several factors leave the Chinese leadership confi-
dent about controlling any demonstration effect: the relatively small size
of China's ethnic population, its lack of effective political organizations,
and the Chinese military presence in the northwest region. For the long-
1992, p. 36; Hamish McDonald, "Secret Shoppers," FEER, 29 October 1992, p. 20; Rajan
Menon and Henri J. Barkey, "The Transformation of Central Asia: Implications for Re-
gional and International Security," Survival, Winter 1992-93, p. 83.
18. Paul B. Henze, "Turkestan Rising," The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 54.
term, the rivalry between opposing pan-Turkic and Islamic forces could be
decisively influenced by the type of regimes that replace the present ruling
elites in the Central Asian republics. Therefore, a fundamental objective
of Chinese policy is maintenance of the status quo through active political
and economic support. The risks of acting are clear, that is, the exposure
of China's ethnic groups to greater separatist influences. Chinese sover-
eignty, however, may depend as much on Beijing's ability to influence
events across its borders as it does on controlling events within.

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China and the New Geopolitics of Central Asia

Author(s): J. Richard Walsh

The implosion of the Soviet Union into its constituent

J. Richard Walsh is Associate Professor of Asian Pacific Studies,

? 1993 by The Regents of the University of California

1. "Unpublished Document on Impact of USSR Collapse," Foreign Broadcast Informa-

ment reflects China's confidence in its ability to maintain a "great wall" to

China's Perceptions of Central Asia

for a multipolar world in which U.S. power declines relative to that of

Divide and Rule

Following the Cultural Revolution, minority customs were encouraged

Iranian influence in Central Asia.9 Beijing sees "Great Power chauvin-

Reviving the Silk Road

in most of the autonomous region is much higher than in the neighboring

Conclusion: Legacies and New Realities

14. d'Antoine, "The Uighurs' Watches," p. 37.

Central Asia's conventional arms sales and possible nuclear technology

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