Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The Etim, China, and The Uyghurs

Paragon House
COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG: THE ETIM, CHINA, AND THE UYGHURS

Author(s): Christopher P. Cunningham
Source: International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 29, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2012), pp. 7-50
Published by: Paragon House
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN
XINJIANG: THE ETIM, CHINA, AND
THE UYGHURS
Christopher
Christopher P. Cunningham* Department
P. Cunningham* of Political
Department ofScience
Political Science
Northeastern
Northeastern University
University
360
360Huntington
HuntingtonAvenueAvenue
Boston,
Boston, Massachusetts,
Massachusetts,
02115 02115
USA
Christopher Cunningham is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Sci

at Northeastern University. His main academic focus is ethnic conflict studies and con
analysis. Chris is a graduate of the Queen's University of Belfast in Northern Ireland w
he earned an MA in Comparative Ethnic Conflict, and the University of Louisville w
he received his bachelor's degree in Political Science. He is a previous recipient of th
State Department Critical Languages Scholarship, the US Fulbright Research Grant,
the Rotary Foundation Ambassadorial Scholarship.
This article analyzes the issue of INTRODUCTION

Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang and
the Chinese government's response. This article analyzes the issue o
Since the September 11 terrorist Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang and
attacks, Beijing has focused public
Chinese government's response fo
attention on the Uyghur terrorist
group ETIM, accusing it of having ing the September 11 terrorist attac
direct connections to Osama
More explicitly, this article investig
bin Laden and al Qaeda. This
the relative threat posed by the Uyg
article argues that the government
exaggerated the relative threat terrorist group ETIM, which Beij
posed by ETIM as part of a broader has singled out as the most viciou
move to safeguard certain economic Uyghur separatist organizations. W
and strategic interests. The article
joins other scholarly assessments in the goal of bringing greater clarity
arguing that alienation in Xinjiang what is known about the ETIM and
is partly due to China's treatmentwhat
what type
type ofofthreat
threatititmight
mightpose
posetoto
of the Uyghurs. Notwithstanding
China,
China, this
this article
articleattempts
attemptstotobring
bring
critiques about China's record, it
closes with a discussion of what together
together aa generous
generouscross-section
cross-sectionofof
what
what has
conditions might increase the threat has been
beenwritten,
written,analyzed,
analyzed,evi
evi
posed by Uyghur separatist groups,denced,
denced, debated,
debated,andandconcluded
concludedabout
about
assessing the likelihood of each
condition.
the ETIM.
Since 9/11, Beijing has trained

most of its focus on the ETIM, accusing
accusing
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXIX NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2012 7
COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG
it of having a direct relationship with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Several
experts and specialists argue that the Chinese government has overstated
or embellished the case against the ETIM, perhaps as part of its effort to
win support from the international community in the post-September 11
environment. Nonetheless, it is also possible that China feels legitimately
threatened by instability and unrest in Xinjiang. Therefore, this article
also discusses China's strategic and material interests in Xinjiang that the
government has aimed to protect.
Notwithstanding the fact that instability in Xinjiang legitimately could
threaten (and at times has threatened) these interests, it is argued here that
Beijing has overstated the relative specific threat for terrorism posed by the
ETIM. (Although definitions of the word "terrorism" abound, here it will
be defined as "the deliberate creation
Alienation in Xinjiang hasand exploitation of fear through violence

been caused in part by or the threat of violence in the pursuit
China's treatment of the of political change.")1 Furthermore,
this article suggests that alienation in
Uyghurs.
Xinjiang has been caused in part by
China's treatment of the Uyghurs.
The organization of this article is as follows: first, in order to provide a
fuller context for understanding Uyghur identity, this article briefly examines
the background and history of the region. The next section explores the
nature of Uyghur unrest during Chinese Communist rule, examines China's
response to separatist groups fighting for an "East Turkestan," and describes
how the ETIM came to be identified as a significant terrorist threat. It also
analyzes the perspective and interests at stake for the Chinese government
and Uyghur community. Next, the article examines the case made by the
government against ETIM, and weighs the government's charges against
counter-arguments from various scholars and experts. Finally, it contem
plates some of the possible and/or hypothetical conditions allowing Uyghur
separatism to endure, irrespective of a specific terrorist organization. It will
consider the likelihood of each scenario.
THE UYGHURS AND XINJIANG
It is important to start this analysis by providing some background on the

population in question. The Uyghurs are a Muslim, Turkic-speaking ethnic

8 VOL. XXIX NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2012
group found throughout Central Asia. The vast majority (8 million) live in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China, where they
represent the largest ethnic group but live alongside Kazakh, Kirghiz, and
Han Chinese inhabitants.2 Another half million Uyghurs live in the "western
Turkestan" states in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. In addition, there are roughly 150 thousand Uyghurs living
outside Xinjiang and western Turkestan, including Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Europe and the United States.3 In Xinjiang, Uyghurs
comprise about half the total population, followed by the Han Chinese
at 37 percent.4 While Han Chinese constitute the majority in most cities,
Uyghurs are predominant in the countryside; for those Uyghurs that do
live in cities, they tend to live in crowded, dense communities, reinforcing
their separate identity.5 ■■■■■
The presence of Islam in Xinjiang The Uyg
can be traced back to the 8th century. Muslim
The Uyghur Empire of that time lasted ethnjc
from 744 to 840 ad and was not based in throu
present-day Xinjiang, but in what is now ^ ^
the Republic of Mongolia.6 During this ..
time, subsequent khagans consolidated '
their power over the various Uyghur
clans, extending the Yaghlakar clan's domination ove
tribes. Over the next two centuries, the Uyghur Em
major regional influence. In fact, it was able essentia
to subsequent rulers of the T'ang dynasty, at a time
depended on Uyghur military support.7
However, this was not the period in which the
we see today emerged as a distinct ethnic group
fact, there is some scholarly debate about whethe
today as the Uyghurs is ancestrally directly descend
peoples described above.8 In the 11th century, for in
the east invaded central Asia and defeated the Tur
Turkish-speaking Chinese today actually descend f
Turkish tribes.9
By 1759, the Qing conquest of what was to becom
Manchu hegemony in the region, placing the Uyg

control. Although the Manchus ethnically were not Han, their expansion
into inner Asia had a long-term historical effect—it initiated the spread of
Han Chinese influence, culture, and population into the region.10 A century
later, in 1884, Xinjiang was officially incorporated as a Chinese province,
which also was when the Qing dynasty began calling the region Xinjiang,
meaning "new frontier." It was also around this time that British officials
in India coined the term "East Turkestan" to distinguish the region from
the lands ofWest Turkestan—i.e. the territories of current states Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, all of which had fallen under
Russian influence at the time.11 Inadvertently, the label later assisted a
growing movement for independence by China's Sunni Muslim, Turkic
speaking population.12
The Uyghurs' first assertion for
in 1884, Xinjiang was independence came in 1865 when Yaqub
Beg, a military official in the employ of
officially incorporated as
the Khanate of Koqand, established a
a Chinese province, which
Muslim state in Kashgaria that lasted
also was when the Qing
from 1864 to 1877. Although the state
dynasty began calling the
ended with Yaqub Beg's death and the
region Xinjiang, meaningChinese re-conquest of the region in
"new frontier."
1877, his campaign set a precedent for
future Uyghur separatist movements to
appeal to religion and ethnicity.13 (These events also played out in the con
text of the "Great Game" between Britain, Russia and China.14) According
to one source, Muslims in Xinjiang at the time, who had suffered from
alien domination since the fall of the Moghul khanate in the 1860s, quite
naturally felt proud of what they had accomplished in briefly establishing a
Muslim state. They considered Yaqub Beg "a hero who brought their holy
war to its completion by creating an independent and regionally unified
Islamic kingdom."15
During the first half of the twentieth century, Uyghur separatists would
attempt several times to establish an independent homeland separate from
China. An "East Turkestan Islamic State," founded in Kashgar in 1933,
collapsed within three months.16 In 1945, the Uyghurs—this time with
the help of the Soviets—again attempted to assert their independence,
establishing the short-lived East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in Yining.17

However, when the Communists took Beijing in 1949, its leaders agreed
that the ETR would be incorporated back into Xinjiang, which as a whole
would be absorbed into the People's Republic of China.18
SEPARATISM UNDER COMMUNIST RULE AND

EMERGENCE OF ETIM
This section examines the stability of the region under Communist

the absorption of Xinjiang, the national government has dealt wit
episodes of ethnically-motivated and violent opposition.19 During
era (1949-76), for instance, Xinjiang was subjected to intense p
unrest that correlated with the fluctuating national policies of the
Forward and Cultural Revolution. During this time, the governme
tuted strict assimilation laws that severely
curtailed the practice and teaching of Provincial leaders
Islam, and enacted policies that promoted that granting incr
Han migration to Xinjiang.20 During the economic/social
Cultural Revolution, "Religion was espe- ethnic minoritie
dally oppressed, but so was [sic] ethnic generate demand
language, cultural cuisine, and garb. The po(jtica| autonom
Uyghur in Xinjiang, like other Muslim
minorities throughout China, saw their
religious texts and mosques destroyed, their religious leaders p
and individual adherents punished."21
After Mao, the government lifted several of these restrictions a
its efforts to enact liberalization and reform policies. However, th
provincial leadership, comprised primarily of Han Chinese ra
Uyghurs, did not see eye-to-eye with the national authorities on
policies. In particular, provincial leaders feared that granting
economic/social rights to ethnic minorities would generate de
political autonomy.22 Additionally, world events at the time—s
Iranian revolution, or the Soviets' continuing incursion in Afg
were demonstrating the increasing power of political Islam, and li
local authorities second thoughts about relaxing their policies.2
Even as Xinjiang gained its reputation over the next few d
China's "Wild West," China only occasionally reported ethnic ri

separatist activity, or the arrests of Uyghur activists from the early 1980s
until 1997. However, in April 1990, an armed uprising in Baren signaled
an uptick of ethnically-motivated violence inside Xinjiang. This transformed
the state's perceptions of the cause of violence in the region, and shaped
the approach that China would take regarding Xinjiang affairs for the next
two decades.24 Other incidents of ethnic unrest between 1990 and 1997
also alienated the national government, which now reconsidered the effects
of its "reform and opening" policies vis-à-vis Xinjiang, a province located
far away from Beijing but nearby other Central Asian republics.25 Then,
in 1997, a wave of separatist bombings in Beijing and Urumqi took place
on the anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's death, killing 12. The bombings,
subsequently blamed on Uyghur separat
After the September ists, signaled a new level of organization to
11 terrorist attacks in the separatist threat, assuming the charges
were true.26
the United States, the
China responded to the growing
Chinese government
unrest in a number of ways. In 1996,
seized the opportunity
the government enacted "Strike Hard"
to reframe its dispute
campaigns, or government operations
with the Uyghurs as a designed to fight crime and any threats
dimension of the global to stability by accelerating arrests, tri
war against terrorism. als, and sentencing of criminals. These
campaigns were aimed at all manner of
apparent wrongdoers throughout China;
in Xinjiang, they were directed at Uyghur separatists.27 Also in the mid
1990s, China was pushing for the transformation of the "Shanghai Five"
regional conference into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
eventually established in 2000. It has been argued that China's growing
concerns about separatist and militant activity led Beijing to urge the
SCO to reorient its focus from confidence-building measures and "border
demarcation" to trans-border threats such as radicalism, Islamic extremism,
and drug trafficking.28 Then, after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the
United States, the Chinese government seized the opportunity to reframe
its dispute with the Uyghurs as a dimension of the global war against ter
rorism.29 This action corresponded with the government's felt need "to
protect its porous borders from an influx of more violent forms of Islam

from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan."30 In

the aftermath of 9/11, the Chinese government intensified its rhetoric and
its actions against Uyghur militancy.
It also sought the approval of the United States. Although the Bush
administration initially was reluctant to equate its fight against terrorism
with domestic crackdowns on Uyghur separatists,31 the State Department
in 2002 added to its "terrorist watch list" the previously unknown East
Turkestan Islamic Movement, or ETIM. The US brought about this action
ostensibly because the ETIM had been planning to attack a US embassy in
Kyrgyzstan.32 The State Department accused the ETIM of being respon
sible for "'numerous acts of terrorism' in China, including assassinations,
arson attacks, and bombing of buses, cinemas, department stores, markets
and hotels."33
Observers and scholars of Xinjiang greeted the announcement with
genuine surprise; "At the time, very few people, including activists deeply
engaged in working for an independent East Turkistan, had ever heard of the
ETIM group."34 In effect, the State Department's announcement served as
the ETIM's confirmation of existence to the international community. There
was also some reason for skepticism since the news came during a period of
what appeared to be relative tranquility in Xinjiang. While it is notoriously
difficult to ascertain the exact level of unrest in Xinjiang due to the lack of
access to the region, Millward notes that between 1997 and 2008, there
were not any reported incidents of separatist violence—"certainly nothing
most people would call 'terrorism.'" Likewise, Bovingdon concludes in
his recent book that "A careful and critical review of the evidence reveals
that Xinjiang has been far quieter since 2001 than has any part of China
proper."35 It should be noted, however, that a period of stability obviously
does not preclude the emergence of terrorism, as 9/11 demonstrated.
Months earlier, the Chinese government had laid out its own claims
against the ETIM, in a government report depicting the collective threat
posed by Uyghur separatists. The document, entitled "East Turkistan
Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity"36 (hereafter referred
to as the East Turkestan report), alleged that ETIM possessed direct links
with bin Laden, aspired to launch a "holy war," and intended to set up
a theocratic Islamic state in Xinjiang (claims that are later scrutinized in
this article). It also accused ETIM of being a "major component" of al

Qaeda's terrorist network.37 There was, of course, no way to verify any

of these charges, and other governments may have initially passed off the
report as Chinese propaganda. The State Department's announcement,
however, arguably provided instant credibility to China's claims, at least
about ETIM. Ironically, Beijing was at first disappointed that the US had
not listed all Uyghur separatist organizations that China had identified, but
it managed to thrust aside any lingering resentment, and in the months fol
lowing conducted a public and diplomatic campaign to isolate and discredit
Uyghurs affiliated with ETIM.38 Later that year, the US and China asked
the UN to designate the ETIM a terrorist organization, thereby requiring
all member-states to freeze its assets worldwide and prohibit nationals or
persons in their territories from financing or otherwise assisting the group.39
On the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the UN designated the ETIM
a financer of terrorism.40 In 2003, China
The State Department's also produced its own version of a ter
announcement, however, rorist watch list. It listed four groups
arguably provided instant and 11 individuals, all from the Uyghur
credibility to China's community; the ETIM was one of four
claims, at least about groups identified.41

Recently, ETIM-alleged attacks have
ETIM. Ironically, Beijing
declined, even while public awareness
was at first disappointed
of the organization has increased. From
that the US had not listed
2003 to 2006, there were no reports of
all Uyghur separatist
terrorist incidents involving the ETIM.
organizations that China However, in 2008 China blamed the
had identified.
ETIM for a number of attacks staged
in the run-up to the summer Olympics
Games held in Beijing. According to police, 82 people in Xinjiang were
arrested in connection to terrorist plots targeting the Olympics. In the
most prominent of these violent episodes, two attackers drove a truck into
a Kashgar police station and threw two grenades into the station, killing
16 policemen and injuring 16 more.42 Two Uyghurs eventually were sen
tenced to death for the attacks;43 however, some independent eye-witness
accounts challenged parts of the official version of events.44 In July 2011,
following a weekend outbreak of "knife and bomb" attacks in Kashgar that
killed 22, the government alleged that ETIM militants were to blame and

that they had trained in the tribal regions of Pakistan—an unusually spe
cific accusation possibly signaling China's growing impatience.45 Overseas
Uyghur groups disputed the ETIM connection and held the government
responsible for the attacks.
Perspective of Chinese Government

Before analyzing this case further, it is important to consider the perspec
tive of both China and the Uyghurs, so as to better understand possible
motivations and the interests at stake. One reason that China may have
attempted to tie Uyghur separatists to the war against terrorism was that it
hoped to legitimize to the international community the countermeasures it
intended to adopt. Some scholars have suggested that tacit approval from
the US was especially important to the Chinese.46 According to Gunaratna
and Pereire:
Beijing has not missed the opportunity of labeling its fight against Uighur
[sic] separatism as being part of the larger US-led global campaign against
terrorism. While it was unlikely that there is formal Sino-US arrangement
on this issue, it seems clear that there was an informal understanding. China
will support the global struggle against violent extremism, in exchange for
the US recognizing the Uighur's [sic] as part of that struggle 47
Another scholar also argues that the Chinese government was eager to
equate America's fight against Muslim radicals with its own, so as to receive
a "free hand" in dealing with (allegedly) foreign-assisted terrorists.48 No
doubt this connection became easier for China to portray after US forces
captured 25 Uyghur separatists in Afghanistan. However, the Pentagon
later concluded that the detainees, subsequently held at the US's military
prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, presented no threat to the United States
and could be released.49
A more compelling rationale to explain China's behavior involves
acknowledging China's many strategic, economic, and security interests
in the region. Strategically, Xinjiang is crucial because it shares interna
tional borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indian-controlled Kashmir. Xinjiang is also rich
in natural resources. It has large oil and natural gas reserves in the Tarim
and Dzungeria Basins. Eighty percent of China's reserves in gold, jade

and other precious metals are in Xinjiang.50 China is also cooperating with
neighboring states such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan
to implement new gas pipelines or connect to existing pipelines running
through Xinjiang.51 The region produces one third of China's petroleum,
two thirds of its coal, and one third of its cotton, and possesses several
of China's nuclear testing sites. Additionally, the only major passageway
to Central Asian countries passes through Xinjiang.52 This is important
because Central Asia, with a population of 60 million, offers a large market
for Chinese merchandise on its western borders, and trade between China
and the five republics has increased sixteen-fold between 1992 and 2005,
exceeding $8 billion in 2007.53 By acknowledging so many critical interests
in Xinjiang, it is easier to countenance how the state has been eager to con
front and put down a separatist move
Strategically, Xinjiang is ment threatening to sever the territory.
crucial because it shares It is, of course, both logical and widely
international borders accepted that most any country would
likely respond to a separatist or terrorist
with Mongolia, Russia,
threat by trying to defeat it, rather than
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
through negotiations or compromise.
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, China also fears that instability in
Pakistan, and Indian
Xinjiang will threaten economic invest
controlled Kashmir.
ment. Due to Deng Xiaoping's deci
Xinjiang is also rich in sion to develop China's eastern coastal
natural resources. regions before the western regions, the
poverty gap between eastern and west
em China has widened.54 As of2002, 90 percent of those living under t
poverty line in China lived in its western frontier.55 Xinjiang has fared bet
than other western provinces, such as Gansu and Ningxia, but it also host
the largest urban-rural gap in terms of wealth, underscoring the reality th
most of China's poor reside in the countryside.56
It must be said that Beijing sees economic improvements and inves
ment as the very tool that can undermine agitation efforts for indep
dence, and in recent years it has committed vast amounts of resources
economic development via its Great Western Development Strategy. "T
attempt to use economic tools to address ethnic separatism in Xinjia
reflects the Chinese government's longstanding belief that most peop

Uyghurs included, primarily want a good economic life for themselves and
their children."57 With stability in mind (or at least one of the motivating
factors), the government has spent $125 billion building infrastructure in
China's West, including a south-to-north water diversion, a west-to-east
power transmission, the Qinghai-Tibet railway, and twelve new highways
in Xinjiang connecting to Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan.58
These development projects are strategic and deliberate. "The underlying
idea is that if western regions, most notably Xinjiang, have sufficient devel
opment, then the minorities will prosper, be less restive, give less support
for separatist activities, and be more integrated into the fortunes—both
economic and political—of China."59 At the same time, China is mindful
that instability could threaten investment from the outside. "Beijing fears
[the Xinjiang separatists]... because the mere possibility that they may
cause disruption creates an impression of social instability in Xinxiang and
dampens foreign investment."60
However, some scholars have suggested that China's Great Western
Development plan has produced contradictory results. For example,
Clarke argues that in attempting to ensure the "security" of outer regions
such as Xinjiang, these actions in fact are generating "dynamics of insecu
rity" amongst the region's Uyghurs and other non-Han ethnic groups.61
Becquelin similarly argues that "the dynamics of penetration and resistance
between the centre and what still remains an indigenous periphery can
be expected to generate at the same time both increased sinicization and
increased ethno-national unrest."62
The Chinese government is also cognizant that granting the Uyghurs

greater autonomy would embolden dissidents elsewhere, such as in Tibet or
Taiwan.63 The government fears that Xinjiang separatists could gain regional
or international support. In light of these perceived threats, it is prepared
to use force. As summed up by Davis, "The existing international war on
terrorism, the prevailing perception of the linkages between terrorism and
separatism, the general regional reluctance to condone ethnic separatism,
and the global concern that religion is mixing with both terrorism and
separatism contribute to making the use of domestic force possible."64
Of course, the most ambitious of China's methods to protect regional
interests was to try to cultivate in the Uyghurs a sense of Chinese national
identity, thereby reducing the concern about their loyalty. According to one

observer, this long-held strategy has proven a failure. Gardner Bovingdon,

who has performed extensive field work in Xinjiang, puts it this way:
Despite decades of trying, China's government, one of the strongest and

most penetrative states in the world, has not been able to transform all its
citizens into conscious and willing members of the "Chinese nation"...
Many Uyghurs have refused to identify with either the strong and homog
enizing version of the "Chinese nation," which tacitly equates it with the
Han, or the more pluralist conception of a "multi-minzu minzu," in which
each constituent group has an important, but only a partial, role to play.65
In sum, China has aimed to protect several economic and political interests
in Xinjiang using a variety of methods—some coercive, others meant to
foster cooperation amid hope for a more prosperous future. Thes policies
assume that enhanced economic prosperity will placate the Uyghurs, and the
strategic development that has taken place in the region is partly intended
to help achieve this pacification. Finally, China is resistant to increasing
self-determination rights because of the signal it might send to other dis
sident groups. For these reasons—not to mention the broader cultural,
ideological, or political arguments that can be made regarding China's need
to concentrate power—Beijing is unlikely to surrender any real control to
the local population, nor is it likely to accommodate groups or individuals
that it perceives as threats to the state.
The Uyghur Perspective:

It is impossible to state with confidence the exact percentage of Uyghurs
that desire independence, but previous studies have made clearer the extent
to which Uyghurs have sought to retain a collective identity by resisting
Chinese rule as an act of the Uyghur nation.66 Their actions fly in the face
of China's own attempt to incorporate them into the Chinese nation,
and as a consequence China has countered the Uyghurs' resistance with
increasingly repressive policies, which have exacerbated even further the
disconnect between the Uyghur and Beijing.
From the point of view of the Uyghurs, the most critical issue is the
Chinese government's suppression of cultural and religious freedoms.
Ethnic leaders such as Rebiya Kadeer allege that the Chinese government

is attempting to wipe out the Uyghur language and culture, and that it
has detained and executed thousands of Uyghurs in secret. Uyghurs in
the diaspora call for greater independence and self-determination rights
for Xinjiang—although Kadeer has deliberately sidestepped the issue of
independence.67
It is also true that ethnic tensions appear to have worsened throughout
the 2000s, particularly between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This culminated
in the Urumqi riots that broke out in July 2009, killing 197 people (mostly
Han) and injuring 1700. These riots stemmed from Han-Uyghur tensions
generally, but were sparked by an incident of possible "cultural misunder
standing" a few weeks earlier in Guangdong Province in southern China,
when a factory ex-employee alleged that
six Uyghurs had raped two Han workers From the pojnt of vjew
at the factory." of the Uyghurs, the
What to make of all this! According ^ critjca| is8ue is
to Ogden, the threat perceived by the
T — * j , K , j Chinese government s
Uyghurs does not have as much to do T ,
with territory or dreams of independence »«PP™?»»" <>» cu
per se, but rather with the extinction of a religious fr
their culture.69 It has been suggested that
Beijing is suspicious of the Islamic character of the Uyghur id
thus more willing to repress its traditions or allow the cultural u
to erode, in part by facilitating the migration of Han Chinese to
ince.70 Meanwhile, Muslims in Xinjiang perceive the government
as state interference in religious worship and a deliberate campai
Uyghur culture. In Ogden's words:
The policy of forced migration of Han to the minority areas has de

diluted the ethnic base of the national minorities, yet it has sim
ously reinforced the we-they dichotomy in Tibet and Xinjiang—a so
cultural division of labor and of living. Assimilation policies that re
minorities to learn standard Chinese rather than their own lan
and that severely restricted the practice of their religion and any c
practices that were considered superstitious or "anti-socialist" (m
backward) have been perceived by the Tibetans and Uyghurs as t
to cultural survival.71

Uyghur grievances can also be traced to political and economic factors

such as government corruption, incompetence, and exploitation. Uyghurs
widely are dissatisfied with the rampant corruption and incompetence they
perceive in the provincial government. For example, in 2004 hundreds of
Uyghur residents protested government plans to push them off their farm
lands without fair compensation in order to build a dam.72 Tired of seeing
ill-conceived policies implemented, particularly with regard to "Great Han
chauvinism" or policies meant only to benefit Xinjiang's Chinese Hans,
the Uyghurs increasingly have become alienated from the Chinese state.
According to Ogden:
Ethnic conflict with the local Han, ineffective policies for Xinjiang's
development, and incompetent Han cadres in the party and state leader
ship (few of whom ever bother to learn the Uyghur language) are at the
root of Uyghur antagonism toward the Chinese state and the desire for
independence. Uyghurs also resent the fact that the income of the Han
is so much higher than their own, that the Han enjoy advantages denied
to the Uyghurs, that there are so many Han migrants, and that Beijing is
exploiting Xinjiang's considerable mineral wealth to develop the rest of
China without enriching Xinjiang itself.73
In line with this viewpoint, the increasing intensity of the Uyghur problem
can be seen to be self-inflicted. Though deeply speculative, it is a worthy
question to ask whether Uyghur terrorism would even exist if Chinese
policy in Xinjiang had been more sensitive to Uyghur culture.74
POST 9/11: CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE ETIM

After September 11, China had hoped to convince the world that Uyghur
terrorism, in particular the ETIM, posed a real and legitimate domestic
and international threat. It sought to portray Uyghur separatism as another
face of the global terrorism threat that the international community must
confront in the early 2000s, thus pitting "modern" states such as the
United States and China against not-state Islamic foes. Chinese leaders
likened violence in Xinjiang to the Islamic extremism troubling several
neighboring countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central
Asian states.75 It also sought to highlight perceived successes in its fight

against Islamic militancy, including reports from state media sources that
China had destroyed an ETIM training camp in Xinjiang.76 Perhaps the
most dramatic effect of 9/11 was the government's decision to publicize its
confrontation with the Uyghurs. Previously, Beijing had been tight-lipped
about specific terrorist attacks in Xinjiang that had intensified throughout
the 1990s, culminating in the wave of attacks in 1997.77 In contrast to
then, China was now waging a full-scale media campaign against Uyghur
separatism, framing the effort as an important front of the global war against
terror worthy of Western support.
The aforementioned East Turkestan report released by the Chinese
government less than a year after the September 11 attacks was among
the most critical of these public awareness efforts. In this document, the
government alleges that East Turkestan
terrorist forces were responsible for over
Uyghurs widely are
200 acts of terrorism that killed 162 and
dissatisfied with the
injured 440 throughout the 1990s and
rampant corruption
early 2000s.78 The government contends
and incompetence they
that Uyghur separatist groups grew sur
perceive in the provincial
passingly vicious throughout the 1990s.
government.
This following passage is illustrative of
this point:
In the 1990s, under the influence of extremism, separatism and interna

tional terrorism, part of the "East Turkistan" forces inside and outside
Chinese territory turned to splittist and sabotage activities with terrorist
violence as the main means, even brazenly declaring that terrorist violence
is the only way to achieve their aims. The programs of the "East Turkistan
Islamic Party" and of the "East Turkistan Opposition Party" seized by the
police clearly point out that they will "take the road of armed struggle,"
and "conduct various terrorist activities in densely populated regions."
In the booklet What Is the Hope for Our Independence compiled by
them, they openly declare that they will create a terrorist atmosphere at
kindergartens, hospitals and schools at any cost. The "East Turkistan"
terrorists have engineered a series of bloody terrorist incidents, leaving
many blood-soaked chapters in the historical annals.79

The document alleges that Uyghur terrorist forces carried out explosions,
assassinations, attacks on police and government officials, crimes of poison
and arson, and "establishing secret training bases." It details several terror
ist incidents under subheadings for each of these accusations. The name
of a separatist group called the East Turkestan Liberation Organization,
or ETLO, appears frequently. Western scholars on Xinjiang were familiar
with this group, which had been seen previously as the perfunctory front
for Uyghur separatist violence inside Xinjiang.
However, the government also alleged the involvement of a heretofore
unknown separatist organization, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
More startling, the report accused ETIM of having direct terrorist links
to Osama bin Laden:
The "East Turkistan" terrorist organization based in South Asia has the
unstinting support of Osama bin Laden, and is an important part of his
terrorist forces. The "East Turkistan Islamic Movement" [ETIM] headed
by Hasan Mahsum is supported and directed by bin Laden. Since the
formation of the "East Turkistan Islamic Movement," bin Laden has
schemed with the heads of the Central and West Asian terrorist organiza
tions many times to help the "East Turkistan" terrorist forces in Xinjiang
launch a "holy war," with the aim of setting up a theocratic "Islam state"
in Xinjiang.80
The document accused ETIM of having held meetings with al Qaeda and
having received from al Qaeda financial support, arms and ammunition,
and transportation and telecommunications equipment. It also alleged that
al Qaeda had directly trained "East Turkistan personnel" at bin Laden's
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Finally, it asserted that ETIM cells
were operating in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Chechnya, an
accusation China would repeat in a separate report to the United Nations.81
For Xinjiang specialists, the report provided a groundswell of new
allegations and links into the murky world of Uyghur separatism inside
Xinjiang. Among the most controversial accusations was the alleged link
between ETIM and al Qaeda. Further media reports have shed some light
on the relationship between the two groups. In 2004, a Uyghur activist
named Abdullah Kariaji, the alleged vice chairman of ETIM, told the Wall
Street Journal that ETIM members had met bin Laden in 1997, where they

received his permission to open training camps in Afghanistan that would

also shelter up to 500 Uyghur families.82 Kariaji then claimed that the ETIM
sent newly-trained terrorists back to Xinjiang to carry out attacks against
the Chinese government. However, Kariaji reported that bin Laden and
the ETIM leadership were not close. Uyghur leaders later expressed having
felt slighted when bin Laden did not list Xinjiang as an area of the world
where Muslims are oppressed, as bin Laden is said to have instead focused
on Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, and Chechnya.83 On the
allegation of Uyghurs operating in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, it is
also noteworthy that Pakistan reported in October 2003 that its troops had
killed ETIM's leader Hasan Mahsum in South Waziristan.84 Pakistan, which
has significant Uyghur communities in Kashmir and Rawalpindi, has in the
past deported other Uyghur militants that
Beijing said were ETIM leaders.85 The [Chinese] document
Some scholars' findings offer support
accused ETIM of having
for the government's assertions. Wang,
held meetings with
for instance, concludes that throughout
al Qaeda and having
the 1990s, the ETIM was regroup
received from al Qaeda
ing and had gained new momentum in
Central Asia and Xinjiang.86 According
financial support, arms
and ammunition, and
to Wang, five reasons explain its rise: 1)
transportation and
a regional Islamic revival following the
telecommunications
Soviet Union's collapse, 2) formation of
equipment.
the Taliban in Afghanistan, 3) renewal of
a Uyghur sense of religion and identity, 4)
economic failure and corruption in Xinjiang, and 5) the fact that so many
young Uyghurs had joined the mujahedeen.87 Wang also speculates that
ETIM and al Qaeda objectives entered more or less into unison. He states
that "From the early 1990s, the ETIM has shifted its focus from political
and religious independence to building a real Islamic state through vio
lence."88 However, Wang provides very little evidence for these assertions.
Two major proponents of the al Qaeda-ETIM connection are Rohan
Gunaratna and Kenneth George Pereire, terrorism experts at Nanyang
Technological University in Singapore. They allege that ETIM is receiving
material aid, training, and weapons from al Qaeda and the Taliban. They
have also made a host of other accusations; separately, Pereire contends that

ETIM is connected with Iraqi jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq.89

Together, they have argued that the ETIM is able to survive because the
Uyghur diaspora, operating from overseas bases in Europe, the United
States, Canada and Australia, as well as other countries in the region like
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, provides significant financial support.90 They
also accord a great deal of significance to the release of an hour-long pro
paganda video on a Middle Eastern web site. Entided "Jihad in Eastern
Turkestan," the video depicts Uyghur terrorists training with rocket
propelled grenades, AK-47s, and small rockets—much the same way that
al Qaeda propaganda portrays its own militants. The video features a clip
of an airplane crashing into the World Trade Center, which they have taken
to suggest that Uyghur militants are "drawing inspiration" from al Qaeda
attacks.91 Their conclusion is typically chilling, if a bit overstated:
Two things can be ascertained from this video. The first is that the more
radicalized Uighur have begun to adopt the jihadi tactics, if not ideology.
The second is that the Chinese government is running out of time if it
wants to contain the Uighur struggle.92
Gunaratna and Pereire also assert that the ETIM was responsible for numer
ous terrorist attacks, including assassinations and explosions, going back to
1996—more than five years before the Chinese government acknowledged
its existence in the East Turkestan report.93 As recently as 2008 Gunaratna,
who has been widely quoted in newspapers about terrorism in Xinjiang,
reported that the ETIM is based in Pakistan, is under the protection of al
Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, and has adopted the ideology of global
jihad.94
The Argument against Beijing's Account:

Several experts and commentators on Xinjiang and the Uyghurs have
expressed skepticism about the government's version of events. They fiercely
dispute the characterization that Uyghur separatists, part of or allied with
ETIM, are connected in any significant way to global jihad. The Council
on Foreign Relations summarizes their skepticism thusly:
Beijing has a long history of falsifying data, [experts] say, and since
September 11 the Chinese have repeatedly tried to paint their own

campaign against Uighur separatists in Xinjiang as a flank of the U.S.-led

war on terrorism—and to get Washington to drop its long-standing pro
tests over Chinese human rights abuses in its crackdowns in Xinjiang.95
These scholars argue that the government has overstated the relative threat
posed by the ETIM, and that those purporting a connection between the
ETIM and al Qaeda too often have based their arguments on an uncritical
reading of China's claims. Clarke, for example, has scrutinized the specific
incidents of violence provided in the East Turkestan report, and found
that the number of dead and injured is substantially less than the figures
previously reported.96 He also argues that Gunaratna and Pereire exagger
ate ETIM's weapons and resource capabilities, its ties with al Qaeda, and
its terroristic activity to date.97 Millward
is also critical of Gunaratna and Pereire,
noting that they appear to rely primarily SC 0 arS ar9ue
on China's "East Turkestan" report, and that the government has
not independent sources.98 Millward sepa- overstated the relative
rately points out that the East Turkestan threat posed by the
report, through frequent use of generic ETIM, and that those
terminology such as "East Turkestan purporting a connection
forces," seems to suggest that all terroris- between the ETIM and
tic activity in the report was the work "of al Qaeda too often have
a single, unified terrorist organization"; based their arguments
however, a closer reading of the report on an uncritical reading
reveals that this is not the case.99 Finally, of China's claims,
he assesses that the report, and related
government documents, are wholly unreliable, containing "much inaccu
rate, questionable, and contradictory reporting and slanting conclusions
reflecting ulterior agendas."100 Gladney is similarly critical of Wang's case
study; he criticizes that Wang "seemingly takes the earlier reports regarding
ETIM at face value, and does not refer to any historical or political studies
by specialists on Xinjiang or the Uyghur."101
Shichor and Gladney both point out obvious disparities in China's
stated views on Xinjiang before and after September 11, underscoring
the amount of framing that was taking place.102 Just days before 9/11,
Xinjiang's Communist Party secretary stated that the destructive activities

of "national separatists" and "religious extremists" would "never affect

Xinjiang's stability." At the same venue, the Uyghur governor of Xinjiang
pronounced Xinjiang "better than ever in history."103 That next month,
weeks after 9/11, China's People's Daily proclaimed that Xinjiang now faced
the threat of terrorism.104 And less than a year later, the government was
making the case that ETIM was "supported and directed" by al Qaeda.105
In considering China's changing position on Uyghur terrorism, it is
important to recognize the extent to which the national security perspec
tives of all countries changed in the post 9/11 environment: China was not
the only state to crack down on terrorist activities within its own borders.
Nonetheless, this acknowledgment should not cloud the fact that apparent
fallacies and exaggerations have characterized China's subsequent campaign
against Uyghur separatism. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear
that Beijing's comparison between ETIM
Upon closer examination, and al Qaeda, in particular, falls short in
it becomes clear that at least three significant respects. These
Beijing's comparison points will be explored in brief.
between ETIM and al First, the ETIM's organizational
capacity cannot be said to legitimately
Qaeda, in particular, falls
short in at least three threaten the well-being of the state. Several
scholars have noted that the record of
significant respects. violent incidents has decreased since the
1996 to 2000 period.106 In fact, neither

the Chinese government nor Chinese media outlets attributed any violent
incidents to the ETIM or other Uyghur terrorist group between 2003
and 2006.107 Clarke argues that the decline can be attributed to three fac
tors: 1) limited capabilities, 2) lack of sophistication and expertise, and 3)
brutal efficiency on the part of Chinese intelligence and security officials
operating in Xinjiang. Compared to other states, China has overwhelmingly
succeeded at preserving stability and public order and staving off terrorism,
in part due to its ability to implement harsh measures as an authoritarian
state.108 When attacks have come, they have hardly resembled the mettle
and destruction typical of al Qaeda attacks. For example, according to an
article in the Economist, attacks that took place before the Beijing Olympics
involved "only the crudest weapons."109 Most bombing attacks have failed
to cause much damage beyond smashed metal and broken glass.110

Second, the ambitions and objectives of Uyghurs are not consistent with
those of Islamic jihadist groups. In particular, the case can be made that
Uyghur separatists are motivated not by religious fanaticism or ideologi
cal fervor, but by nationalistic and separatist desires. Too often, scholars
have taken for granted that Muslim Uyghurs possess jihadist intentions,
without citing hard evidence of any true Uyghur predisposition to jihad
ist motivations. While many point to the fact that certain Uyghur groups,
including alleged members of the ETIM, trained in Afghanistan and even
met bin Laden during the 1990s, there remain many "unknowns" about
this relationship, including whether the two groups trained together or
operated independently, if their training camps were shared, the type of
training that al Qaeda provided the Uyghurs and, perhaps most impor
tantly, if the lessons imparted were ideological as well as tactical. One such
example is a book chapter written by Christoffersen.111 Christoffersen makes
a number of good points about differing conceptions of Uyghur identity.
Christoffersen might overreach in asserting that Uyghur separatists who
trained in Afghanistan during the 1990s acquired "The darker side of [a
pan-Islamic] vision," which she later defines as the dream that Central
Asia could break away from non-Muslim Russian, Indian, and Chinese
domination and form a Central Asian caliphate.112 It is true that during the
1990s, some Uyghurs trained in Afghanistan and committed violent acts
against China. However, the evidence suggesting that large numbers of
Uyghurs identify with the establishment of a "caliphate" is not made clear.
Christoffersen also suggests that after their training, these Uyghurs returned
home to Xinjiang to "wage jihad in China."113 She does not, however, fully
explain her definition of the term "jihad" (another term, like "terrorism,"
that can be notorious for taking on different meanings), the relevance of
jihad to the so-called "pan-Islamic vision," or the exact connection of any of
this to the Uyghurs.114 So while Christoffersen's overall analysis of Uyghur
identity provides an intriguing commentary on the subject, her specific
references to connections between the Uyghurs and Islamic fundamental
ism might have profited from more specificity. More to the point of this
analysis, attributing the Uyghur presence in Afghanistan as clear evidence
of a jihadist link does not sufficiently explain the Uyghurs' motivation.
The position taken here is that there is little direct evidence to support
the argument that Uyghurs accept the tenets of Islamic fundamentalism, or

that groups like the ETIM are committed to jihadist goals such as defeating
the West or establishing a multi-state Islamic caliphate. More often, scholars
have found that Uyghurs have been stirred to action by their conviction
to establish an East Turkestan independent state for ethnic Uyghurs.115
For example, Chang argues that "The latest wave of Uighur separatism
has been inspired not by Osama bin Laden, but by the unraveling of the
Soviet Union, as militants seek to emulate the independence gained by
some Muslim communities in Central Asia."116 It is true that many Uyghurs
see their Islamism as central to their identity;117 and yet, there is not much
evidence to suggest that Uyghur nationalism crisscrosses or overlaps with
Islamic fundamentalist claims, or that other Chinese Muslims identify with
Uyghur nationalism. Instead, the nature of their campaign has taken on a
decidedly ethnic rather than religious orientation.
This is not to say or suggest that
all Uyghurs feel uniformly about their
Claims of a specific
identity and religion. Nor is this meant to
organizational link
deny that Uyghurs have adopted terror
between al Qaeda
ist tactics to pursue these goals; only that
and the ETIM have
their objectives do not closely resemble
never been sufficientlythose of Islamic fundamentalist groups
demonstrated.
like al Qaeda. As Ogden makes clear, "for
those Uyghurs who have engaged in ter
rorism, they are not motivated by religious fanaticism but, rather, a desire
to achieve a concrete, pragmatic goal: Xinjiang's secession from China."118
It is notable that when the Uyghur detainees held at Guantanamo Bay were
questioned intensively, according to their transcripts, they did not profess
Islamic fundamentalist views, but rather, they admitted to fighting for "East
Turkestan's independence."119 It is also worth noting that in conducting
interviews with hundreds of Uyghurs, Bovingdon found that, prior to 2002,
the "more practical Uyghurs" believed that outside intervention was neces
sary "and that they hoped it would come from the United States"—hardly
the average mindset found in a culture supportive of AI Qaeda.120
Third, it has never been sufficiently demonstrated that a substantive orga
nizational link between al Qaeda and the ETIM exists. From the evidence
available, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusion about relations
between the two organizations. Clarke concludes that most evidence

suggesting "clear and significant links" between the ETIM and al Qaeda
or the Taliban are at best "circumstantial and fragmentary."121 It is true
that some Uyghur terrorist groups at one point may have received some
financing from terrorist organizations in the Islamic world. It is also true
that some Uyghur separatists allegedly were allowed to train in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, where they received limited arms training.122 But there is not
good evidence that ETIM and al Qaeda sustained a formalized relation
ship, beyond Kariachi's claim that Uyghur separatist leaders met with bin
Laden and received permission to open training camps in 1997, four years
before the September 11 attacks.123 Even as it concerns the presence of the
Guantanamo Bay Uyghurs in Afghanistan, Clarke raises the possibility that
they were forced to live there as a result of China's crackdown on separatist
activists, or that they were simply in transit to other Central Asian states at
the time of their detainment. Clarke notes that some of the Uyghur detain
ees that were released have told journalists that they fled to Afghanistan
nearly a decade ago because Afghanistan was the only neighboring country
at the time that wasn't returning Uyghurs back to China.124
Clarke's arguments are interesting if also speculative; however, critics
of the ETIM-al Qaeda connection theory can perhaps find firmer ground
when comparing al Qaeda and ETIM tactics. For the most part (at least
according to what is known), attributed ETIM attacks have not tactically
resembled or imitated attacks by al Qaeda or other well-known jihadist
groups. There have been no reliable reports of suicide bombings.125 In the
case of ETIM-alleged attacks, civilian casualties, so much a trademark of
al Qaeda attacks, have not been high in number; in fact it has been argued
that the timing and location of ETIM attacks suggest that the attackers
intentionally were aiming to limit the number of civilian casualties.126 Given
these tactical dissimilarities, it is problematic to suggest that ETIM members
received extensive training at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
A possible exception to this argument was the occurrence of bus explosions
in Kunming and Shanghai in July 2008. Responsibility for this attack was
claimed by a group called the Turkestan Islamic Party, a possible successor
group to the ETIM. For its part, the Chinese government actually denied
that those explosions were related to terroristic activity.127

Understanding China's Actions, and the Uyghur Reaction:

When looked at holistically, the balance of what is known and can be proven
about the ETIM appears to favor the counterview that the Chinese govern
ment has overstated the threat it poses. If the government has intention
ally exaggerated ETIM's links to al Qaeda, it is worth contemplating how
and why it arrived at this decision. To do this, one again must seek deeper
understanding of what motivates the government. On this point, Mackerras
is instructive. He argues that in the face of a threat (real or perceived),
Chinese authorities have acted with "ultra-caution":
Caution means that a state that thinks it might be threatened by terrorism

will try to play safe by refusing to give anybody the benefit of the doubt who
looks as if he (or she, but more usually he) might be a terrorist. The result
has been that quite a few people who may not have any terrorist inclina
tions have seen themselves branded as terrorists and treated as such. This
kind of state reaction has, in turn, sharpened feelings of Islamic identity.128
To the Chinese state, caution was the appropriate response in the face of
a threat. This is not wholly out of the ordinary. It can be stated plainly
enough that most European states traditionally have thought defensively
about internal threats of terrorism or separatism; for example, Britain's
reaction to the breakout of ethnic violence in Northern Ireland in the
1970s, or Spain's approach to separatists in the Basque region. While the
pervasiveness of acting cautiously does not justify China's treatment of the
Uyghurs or its exaggerated claims about the ETIM, it does add context
that is necessary to understand China's decision-making.
There are also material reasons for the state's cautious approach to
Xinjiang in the form of China's many economic and security interests.
Expanding into Central Asia, China has opened six overland routes since
1991 running directly through Xinjiang and connecting the region with
other Turkestan states. Connections with these states offer new economic
opportunities to China, but these states also possess their own Muslim
populations sympathetic to the Uyghurs. Beijing is wary of sympathetic
groups in other states supporting Uyghur militants from the outside.
China also fears that unrest in Xinjiang would lead to a decline in outside
oil investment, jeopardize infrastructure construction, or decrease other
forms of foreign investment. China's leaders worry that separatism, if not

eliminated, will threaten China's burgeoning tourism industry in West

China, marketed as a link to the Silk Road: tourists obviously are not likely
to flock to Xinjiang if they perceive it as unsafe and unstable.129 For these
security and economic reasons, it was in the Chinese mindset to take "cau
tious" measures. In 2001, this meant encapsulating the Uyghur threat as
an outreach of the global war against terrorism.
However, to the millions of affected Uyghurs, this "caution" serves
only to confirm their deepest suspicions about Chinese injustice and anti
Islamic prejudices. The reality is that the relationship between the Chinese
state and the Uyghur population is strained due to differences over reli
gious and ethnic rights, economic opportunities, and frayed relations with
China's Han majority. Meanwhile, the
Uyghurs' perceived repression intensifies
The reality is that the
the salience of their religious and ethnicrelationship between
group identities.130 Ironically, this condi
the Chinese state and
tion then provides a potential breeding
the Uyghur population
ground for acts of organized terrorism;
is strained due to
at the same time, it may also encourage
differences over religious
violence and mass protest that is decid
and ethnic rights,
edly unorganized and non-terroristic.
economic opportunities,
However, it is difficult to tell apart an
and frayed relations with
international source of terrorism from its
domestic forms, an important distinctionChina's Han majority.
in the context of the global war against
terrorism. Chung underscores this general point:
The problem is that some of the Xinjiang activists do in fact use violence
to achieve their goals. Distinguishing between genuine counterterror
ism and the repression of minority rights can thus be difficult, as can be
determining which acts of terrorism are "international" and which are
purely domestic.131
There is no question that unrest in Xinjiang has provided opportunities for

Uyghur separatists to adopt violent terrorist tactics. It is for these reasons
that one should not rule out the threat of Uyghur terrorism in the broader
sense, even while dispelling unproven and doubtful insinuations such as
the existence of a formal ETIM-al Qaeda connection.

THE THREAT OF UYGHUR UNREST
It thus far has been asserted that China has overstated the relati
posed by the ETIM, as well as its supposed links to al Qaeda. H
the Urumqi riots demonstrated, the potential for social unrest in
is very real, and therefore the threat of terrorism in the gener
originating from individuals, a different organization, or other
cannot be discounted. This is not to suggest that Beijing wi
major challenges to its control in Xinjiang; that is unlikely.132 N
the circumstances under which organized terrorist activity co
are obviously important to the government and to internatio
ers. This article ends by contemplating four conditions that w
violent Uyghur separatist groups to endure or even flourish in X
will assess the likelihood of each condition.
Increased ties with Islamic fundamentalists—One way in which Uyghur

separatist groups conceivably would threaten stability in Xinjiang is if they
achieved stronger operational capacity or organizational strength—in other
words, if a group grew into the vicious al Qaeda-sponsored terror group
that the government claims ETIM to be. One such way that this could
come to pass is if the Islamic world more visibly championed or sympathized
with the Uyghur cause, listing it in the same breath (as bin Laden failed
to do) with perceived repression against Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya
or northern Africa. Increasing ties between Uyghurs and other Muslims is
not without possibility. In recent years, the government has allowed some
Uyghurs to gain greater exposure to the global Islamic community, includ
ing travel and Hajjrights to Mecca.133 Ironically, the mistaken detention of
the Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay has helped tie in Uyghur grievances more
closely to the Islamic world.134 However, there are few signs that Beijing
will loosen its restrictions to the point that Uyghurs and Islamic peoples
in the Middle East will soon intertwine their respective causes. Even while
the government has begun permitting its Muslims to make pilgrimages to
Mecca, they are only allowed to take government-sponsored trips, in part
to stop pilgrims from associating with extremists.135

Uyghur Diaspora—A more realistic threat to Xinjiang's stability perhaps

might originate not from the global network of jihad but from the Uyghur
diaspora, over a million strong and spread out across the globe. Diaspora
organizations like the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), headed by Rebiya
Kadeer, advocate for the rights of Uyghurs and regularly accuse Beijing
of human rights abuses and a campaign to erode Uyghur culture.136 The
Chinese government has accused the WUC of abetting terrorism and
fomenting unrest in Xinjiang—for example, it alleges that Kadeer helped
to instigate or coordinate the 2009 Urumqi riots, a charge that Kadeer
denies and many Western sources dismiss as propaganda. The WUC and
its affiliates say they reject any ties to violence or Islamic extremism, and
are interested only in promoting human rights issues affecting the Uyghur
population.137 Other prominent groups include the Uyghur American
Association, the East Turkestan National Congress, the Eastern Turkestan
National Freedom Center in Washington DC, and the Eastern Turkestan
Union in Europe.
It could be argued that organizations such as these pose the more
immediate and realistic threat to China's security. However, the direct
national security threat they would pose—in other words, their willingness
to finance violent factions such as the ETIM to carry out terroristic actions
against the government—is disputed. Gunaratna and Pereire have accused
ETIM of being "one of the major beneficiaries of covert funding from the
Uyghur diaspora population."138 Additionally, Pereire describes the dangers
of the Uyghur diaspora and other international groups:
Although the Chinese security forces and the intelligence service have been
effective against ETIM and other groups by conducting numerous arrests
and clampdowns, the Uighur militants' presence overseas—from Central
Asia to West Asia and in Europe—is enabling the groups to survive. ETIM
has emulated groups, such as the Chechen terrorists, to exploit Western
human rights and humanitarian concerns.139
Chung also acknowledges that the émigré community supports a number

of separatist political organizations; however, she states that many of these
groups do not advocate or encourage violence. Organizations such as the
Eastern Turkestan National Freedom Center or the Eastern Turkestan
Union, she suggests, are far more likely to organize conferences or lobby

COUNTERTERROR1SM IN XINJIANG
members of Congress than they are to finance an active terrorist movement.

However, Chung does suggest that other groups based abroad, such as
the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the Revolutionary Front of Eastern
Turkestan, and the Organization for the Liberation of Uyghurstan, have
external connections that are suspicious: according to Chung, each of
these groups has links to guerilla cells operating in Xinjiang's Taklamakan
Desert.140
Other scholars are more skeptical of the threat posed by the diaspora.
Gladney notes that most groups have foresworn violence since 9/11
and are only "pressing for a peaceful resolution of ongoing conflicts in
the region."141 Regarding Gunaratna and Pereire's argument, it is again
unclear on what substance they base their claims. More often, it has only
been proven that these separatist organizations and diaspora groups pro
vide significant financial support to Uyghur political organizations, not
to groups advocating violence and terrorism. It is therefore quite difficult
and problematic to cast suspicion on the diaspora as a whole, although
intelligence agencies should doubtlessly remain vigilant to the activity of
the most menacing of these groups. For its part, China has achieved close
cooperation with its neighbors, both bilaterally and multilaterally through
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to monitor Uyghur advocate
groups and organizations in Central Asia.142
Perceived repression by the state—A third flashpoint for escalation of violence

is the effect of the Chinese government's own policies. The government has,
in the past, instituted "hard" policies toward religious practice, character
ized in the Uyghur case by campaigns against construction of unlicensed
mosques, against religious education that is not sponsored by the govern
ment, and the "reeducation" and "reform" of religious leaders identified
as threats to the state.143 However, these actions, designed as they are to
quell threats to the state, could have the reverse effect: "If 'strike hard'
campaigns are seen to discriminate against nonviolent Uyghurs and if the
perception that economic development in Xinjiang aids Han Chinese at the
expense of Uyghurs, the separatist movements will be fueled."144
Some theoretical framework can be used to better understand this issue.
Human Security theory, which Clarke uses to analyze Xinjiang, postulates
that terrorism will most likely occur when a population's human rights
and security are violated by the state. One way in which a group comes

to feel that its security is threatened is when its "we" identity is perceived
to be in danger, whether this is objectively the case or not. It is therefore
possible that a wide range of state actions, "from restrictions on the use of
language or dress, control or closure of places of education and worship,
to the deportation or killing of members of the community," could foster
new violence and radicalize the Uyghurs.145 Elsewhere, Ogden identifies
general conditions that allow terrorism to thrive. In perusing through this
list, at least three stand out as applicable to the way that Uyghurs perceive
the way they are treated: 1 ) an ethnic, national, or religious group perceives
a regime is treating it unjustly or exploitatively, 2) a victim group feels
oppressed by a majority group and that it has lost land, its language, and/
or its right to religious and ethnic practices, and 3) the regime does not
allow group members to speak freely and often jails or executes its members.
Nevertheless, the list is expansive and includes several other conditions not
applicable. Ogden only introduces it as a starting point to her own discus
sion; its significance should not be overplayed.146
Human Security theory as applied by Clarke, and to a lesser extent
the conditions under which terrorism thrives, provide a more credible
lens through which to view China's treatment of the Uyghurs. The strike
hard campaigns implemented by the government in the 1990s, followed
by multiple crackdowns and arrests rounding up suspected terrorist sub
jects, have poisoned the relationship between Uyghurs and the Chinese
state. Amnesty International has reported that these roundups have led to
hurried trials and summary executions of large numbers of Uyghurs. One
estimate suggests Xinjiang has the highest number of executions in all of
China, most of them Uyghurs, averaging 1.8 per week.147 The following
description of a scene in Xinjiang, in the run-up to the Beijing Olympic
Games, offers a glimpse of the extent to which the government conducts
itself in Xinjiang as a "heavy" presence:
In the build-up to the games and particularly since these latest incidents
[i.e. the pre-Olympic attacks attributed to the ETIM], residents of Kashgar
and Kuqa say many suspected of militancy have been arrested. Helmeted
police cruise the streets of Kuqa at night in open-topped jeeps. A driver
in Kashgar erupts with a tirade against China's leaders—as "fascists" who
do nothing but "bully" Uyghurs.148

This passage from Davis is also illustrative:
Several levels of police conspicuously patrolled the Uyghur sections of

Urumqi daily in 2007; Han Chinese police officers patrolled the streets
in a six-man formation wearing black uniforms and black flack jackets,
armed with batons and side arms.149
Such tactics are emblematic of the heavy-handedness that has contributed to

the Uyghur's discontent and made Xinjiang less stable. One need not buy
into the interpretation that China is explicitly and intentionally attempting
to "eradicate" Uyghur culture; Mackerras, for one, does not.150 But the
Chinese government must understand the effect of the perception that it is
trying to wipe out Uyghur ethnicity, and act accordingly. Chung urges that
instead of "trying to stamp out the problem through force and repression
alone," Beijing should concentrate on improving conditions that anger the
Uyghurs and empowers separatists in the first place.151
Competition with Han Chinese—As a result of Xinjiang's regional economic

strategy focus on infrastructure, resources and energy development, Xinjiang
has received an influx of Han Chinese drawn to the region's economic
opportunities. While its economy has seen job growth and new labor
opportunities in recent years, it has also placed new pressures on Uyghurs
to compete for these jobs with growing numbers of Han Chinese. From
1990 to 2000, Han Chinese in Xinjiang increased from 5.7 million and
37.6 percent of the provincial population to 7.5 million and 40 percent,
respectively.152 There also exists a "floating" population of mostly Han "sea
sonal migrants," estimated by one count to be 700,000, although others
have asserted that the number of migrants is higher.153 This has led China
to find itself in what Kerr and Swinton describe as a paradox:
[The Chinese government] cannot ignore the minzu areas since disparities
of income and social opportunity will breed resentment against the Han
majority and increase pressures for self-government. Alternatively by imple
menting a development strategy that requires a large influx of majority
population, many of whom will have higher levels of education and better
economic connections than the minzu populations, they will create a dual
economic and social structure with strongly ethnicized characteristics.154

Further complicating the Uyghur-Han relationship is the predisposition

among many Han Chinese to feel superiority over China's national minori
ties, whom they have insulted in the past as being "backward," "barbarian,"
and at one time, "dogs."155 According to one source, "There is a tendency
to view Uyghurs with suspicion—they are frequently unemployed and thus
seen as thieves, troublemakers, or harboring discontent toward their host
governments."156 Another notes that there is a widely held stereotype,
even by China's well-educated and urban Han classes, "That Uyghurs are
ungrateful, lazy, violent, knife-carrying, pocket-picking criminals, in addi
tion to being potential terrorists."157
The foremost reason for ethnic tension, Yee argues, is the incompetence
of Han cadres, who do not know or care enough about the Uyghurs and
never learn their language.158 Further, it
Further complicating
has been reported that the government
practices favoritism toward the Han
the Uyghur-Han
Chinese, including discriminatory hiring
relationship is the
practices. According to Yee, thousands
predisposition among
of college-educated Uyghur youths have
many Han Chinese to feel
difficulty finding employment, while
superiority over China's
Han graduates secure jobs in the gov
national minorities.
ernment sector with comparative ease.159
If Uyghurs see that job opportunities
are unfairly skewed toward their Han co-habitants, who in turn mistreat
and look down on the Uyghurs, this will create the conditions for further
social unrest, discontent with the state, and the lingering suspicion among
Uyghurs that China is trying to "wipe out" its culture. It is not a stretch
to suggest that this will provide fertile breeding ground for organized ter
rorist movements, although the relative success of a terrorist organization
in carrying out operations would depend on other factors. At the least,
these conditions could lead to rioting and chaos, as they have in the past.
However, if economic and social conditions improve, then Xinjiang will
reduce the appeal of extremism.160

CONCLUSION
Following several months in which little ETIM activity

recent events have injected the organization back into th
29,2012, China's state-run press service Xinhua reported
separatists had attempted to hijack a flight from Hotan to U
of the event remained sketchy at the time of this writing,
police the militants attempted to take control of the airplan
after takeoff, before being subdued by passengers and fligh
few weeks before the attempted hijack, the Chinese foreign
a visit urged Pakistan's President to expel ETIM militants liv
areas. And in April, the Chinese government for the firs
the pictures and profiles of six Uyghurs that it has alleg
of the ETIM living in South Asia.161 It is important not t
the significance of any of these incidents. Yet, for the
analysis, these events are illustrative for at least two reason
as a reminder that China has not dropped its public camp
ETIM, even while the global appeal of such efforts has
some since the Obama administration took office, not to me
death of Osama bin Laden, and 2) based on the limited in
China is willing to share with the rest of the world, it rem
establish in precise terms the overall strength or resourcefu
such as the ETIM.
Helpfully, the conclusions of this analysis are more limited in scope.

This article concludes that the Chinese government has overstated the
specific threat of ETIM to China, in particular its links to al Qaeda or other
jihadist groups. Those that do purport a connection between the ETIM
and al Qaeda often have based their arguments on an uncritical reading of
China's claims. That China was able to perpetuate this supposed connection
internationally testifies to the wide effects of America's "War on Terror,"
which allowed most countries to adopt harder-line policy approaches against
terrorism-associated groups.
The purpose of this article has not been to discount the possibility
that organized, terroristic violence of an Islamic fundamentalist nature
has taken place in some regard in Xinjiang, or that the potential for that
to happen does not exist. Rather, the intent has been narrower—to clarify
to the extent possible the capabilities of a specific organization that the

Chinese government has labeled the most threatening separatist group in

the region. However, it would be unwise to discount the threat posed by
instability in Xinjiang in a more general sense—and not least because it
could allow terrorist activity to fester in the near future.
The primary reason that some Uyghurs have radicalized is because of
perceived repression by the Chinese state. This article has identified some of
those critical issues separating the central government and the Uyghurs—
differences over religious and ethnic rights, economic opportunities, and
frayed relations with China's Han majority. As a general point, China can
discourage further violence and terrorism from coming to pass by strength
ening its relationship with, and understanding of, the Uyghur populace at
large, and specifically, understanding the effect of its policies in Xinjiang.
Notes
* I thank Suzanne Ogden, David Schmitt, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful
comments. This article was first researched and written in fall 2009 and spring 2010, and has
since been updated.
1. Bruce Hoffman, "Defining Terrorism," in Russell D. Howard, Reil

L. Sawyer, and Natasha E. Bajema, eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism:
Understanding the New Security Environment, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill,
2008): p. 33. See this chapter for discussion of the full evolution of the term
"terrorism."
2. John Gee, "China's Xinjiang Problem," Washington Report on Middle

East Affairs, 27, no. 8 (2008): pp. 42-43.
3. John Z. Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement: A Case Study of a
New Terrorist Organization in China," International Journal of Offender Therapy
and Comparative Criminology, 47, no. 5 (2003): p. 574.
4. Suzanne Ogden, "Inoculation Against Terrorism in China: What's in the
Dosage?" In William Crotty, ed., Democratic Development and Political Terrorism
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2004).
5. Ibid.
6. For a broader discussion of the Uyghur Empire from 744

Colin Mackerras, "The Uighurs," in Denis Sinor (ed.), The Camb
Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199

7. Mackerras, "The Uighurs," pp. 317-8. As part of this arrangement, emperor

appointments of Uyghurs as virtually independent "governors" provided them with almost
total local control. See John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 571.
8. See Dru C. Gladney, "The Ethno-genesis of the Uighur," Central Asian

Studies, 9, no. 1 (1990): p. 3; Gladney, "Islam in China: Accommodation or Separatism?"
China Quarterly, 174 (2003): p. 455. In the latter, Gladney notes that "while a collec
tion of nomadic steppe peoples known as the 'Uyghur' has existed since before the
eighth century, this identity was lost from the 15th to the 20th centuries." See also Sean
R. Roberts, "Imagining Uyghurstan: Re-evaluating the Birth of the Modern Uyghur
Nation," Central Asian Survey, 28,4 (2009), pp. 361 -81 ; and James A. Millward, Beyond
the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press 1998).
9. Gladney, "Islam in China." Gladney, "Ethno-genesis of the Uighur."

10. Joseph F. Fletcher, "Ch' ing Inner Asia ca. 1800," in Denis Twitchett and John
K. Fairbank, (eds), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 10, Late Ch 'ing, 1800-1911,
Pt. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): p. 36. For a fuller explanation
of the effects of the Qing Empire in Inner Asia, please see Fletcher's entire chapter, pp.
35-106. In particular, the Qing government's decision to move Han Chinese and Chinese
Muslim families into northern Xinjiang from China proper—a policy it had resisted in
nearby Manchuria and, for a time, Mongolia—proverbially opened the floodgates for
later generations of Han migration to take place (p. 65). My thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for raising this point.
11. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point.
12. John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 573.

13. Chien-Peng Chung, "China's 'War on Terror': September 11 and Uighur
Separatism," Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 4 (2002): p. 9.
14. Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 456.
15. Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese
Central Asia, 1864-1877 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): p. 73. For other
scholarship on the rise and fall of this Muslim state, see Laura J. Newby, The Empire
and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860
(Lieden: Brill, 2005); and Joseph Fletcher "The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China," in
Beatrice Manz (ed.), Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia (Aldershot: Variorum,
1995): 1-46.
16. For more detail on this movement and more generally Xinjiang in the 1920s
and 1930s see Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords & Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A
Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986).

17. Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 456. The ETR was supported from the
beginning by the Soviet Union, which has led some to argue that the episode
represented less a rebellion or revolution than it did an incident engineered by the
Soviets. In this respect see David D. Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: the Tininß
Incident (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999).
18. David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow; John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan
Islamic Movement," p. 573.
19. Michael Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang: Human Security
and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism," Terrorism and Political Violence,
20 (2008): p. 276.
20. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China."
21. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang,
China," Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35, no. 1 (2008): p. 17.
22. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 276. Another scholar
describes the Catch-22 for the Chinese government thusly: "Government religious
reforms were intended to quell Uyghur disaffection with Chinese rule and cause
Uyghurs to develop more harmonious sentiments for the Han Chinese. However,
the Chinese [were] caught in a dilemma: when they allow or encourage it, Uyghurs
become more content with the government but their strengthened Islamic practice
leads them to feel more separate from and apathetic towards Chinese society." See
Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyjjhur Nationalism along China's Silk Road
(New York: Colombia University Press, 1997): pp. 47-8.
23. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 276.
24. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 15.
25. Michael E. Clarke, "Xinjiang in the 'Reform' Era, 1978-91 : The Political
and Economic Dynamics of Dengist Integration, Issues & Studies, 43, 2 (2007):
pp. 39-72. Credit is also due to an anonymous reviewer in strengthening this
particular point.
26. The Chinese government executed eight alleged Uyghur terrorists in

response.
27. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 280; Davis, "Uyghur

Muslim Ethnic Separatism."
28. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 291. However, the

real impetus for the Shanghai 5 and SCO may have been to counter closer defense
relations between the US and Japan, after China was seen as acting belligerently
in the Taiwan Strait in 1995/96. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising
this point.

29. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" pp. 10-11. Chung is careful to note,
however, that Beijing was uncomfortable about the interventionist precedents
set by the United States campaign in Afghanistan, precedents that the Chinese
government has generally opposed. See p. 10.
31. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror,'" p. 11.
32. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism."
33. Christian Tyler, Wild West China (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 2003): pp. 244-245. Some suspect that the Bush administration acquiesced
to China's position on the ETIM because of the need for getting Chinese support
in the looming conflict with Iraq. See also Mackerass 2005, pp. 12-13
34. See Dru C. Gladney, "Xinjiang," in Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey S.
Murer, eds., Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism (New York: Taylor and Francis,
2006): p. 234 and footnote 36.
35. James Millward, "Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence
Mark a Turning Point?" Central Asian Survey, 28, no. 4 (2009): p. 348; Gardner
Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia
University Press): p. 112.
36. The title of this document has been translated elsewhere as "East
Turkistan Terrorist Forces Exposed."
37. Economist, "Chinastan," September 6: p. 54.
38. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, p. 136.
40. Ibid.
41. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China," p. 244. The

groups identified were the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO)
World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), and the Eastern Turkestan Infor
Center (ETIC).
42. Edward Wong and Keith Bradsher, "16 Killed in Attack on West
China Police Station," New Tork Times, August 4, 2008, http://www.ny
com/2008/08/04/sports/olympics/05china.html (March 29, 2010).
43. Edward Wong, "2 Uighurs Sentenced to Death for West China P
Assault," New Tork Times, December 18, 2008: A16.
44. The nature and source of this attack has been widely disputed.
Chinese government has produced little evidence proving that the attac
indeed the work of Uyghur terrorists. Additionally, video of the attack tak
a bystander at the scene, which appears to show two men of Han Chinese

than Uyghur descent at work, casts further doubt on the government's claims.
For more on the disputed nature of this case, see Edward Wong, "Doubt Arises
in Account of an Attack in China," New Tork Times, September 29, 2008: A5.
45. Michael Wines, "Deadly Violence Strikes Chinese City Racked by
Ethnic Tensions," New Tork Times, August 1,2011 : A3; "Chinese Police Kill Two
Suspects in Xinjiang Violence," New Tork Times, August 2, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/08/03/world/asia/03brief-kashgar.html (July 3, 2012);
Marianne Barriaux, "China Blames Unrest on Pakistan-Trained 'Terrorists,'"
Agence France-Presse, July 31,2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/
article/ALeqM5iz6noUEGx2847p7_Jwqnwx7fHLhg (July 3, 2012).
46. See Gladney, "Xinjiang"; Chung, "China's War on Terror"; Christian
Tyler, Wild West China: the Taming of Xinjiang (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2003).
47. Rohan Gunaratna and Kenneth George Pereire, "An AI Qaeda Associate
Group Operating in China?" China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4 no. 2 (2006):
p. 56.
49. Robin Wright, "Chinese Detainees Are Men Without a Country,"
Washington Post, August 24,2005: p. A01. In point of fact, the detainees endured
a complicated legal path toward their release because the US has chosen not to
send them back to China but has refused to allow them to enter the United States
and has had difficulty finding other countries to accept them. Following relocations
of several of the detainees to Sweden, Bermuda and Palau, there are five detainees
who remain incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay at this time.

51. Ibid.
52. John Wang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 574; Gu

and Pereire, "Chinese Detainees."
53. Hasan H. Karrar, The New Silk Road Diplomacy: China's Centr
Foreign Policy since the Cold War (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2009): p. 4.
54. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism."

55. David Kerr and Laura C. Swinton, "China, Xinjiang, and the Transna
Security of Central Asia," Critical Asian Studies, 40, no. 1 (2008): p. 1
56. Ibid., p. 122.
58. Ibid., p. 19.

59. Ibid.

61. Michael E. Clarke, "China's Internal Security Dilemma and the
Western Development': The Dynamics of Integration, Ethnic Nationa
Terrorism in Xinjiang," Asian Studies Review, 31, 3 (2007): pp. 323-342
62. Nicolas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," China Qua
178, 2 (2004): p. 358.
63. Ibid., p. 10; Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism."
64. Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," pp. 18-19.
65. Bovingdon, 'Die Uyghurs, p. 160.
66. Ibid., p. 6; see also Justin Jon Rudelson, 1997, Oasis Identities:
Nationalism Along China's Silk Road. New York: Columbia University
67. Times Topic, "Rebiya Kadeer," The New York Times web site,
July 30, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/time
people/k/rebiya_kadeer/index.html (June 27, 2012); David Montg
"The Mother of the Uighur Movement," Washington Post, July
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009
AR2009070804141.html (June 27, 2012); Asia News, "China: Rebiy
Denounces New Beijing Crackdown on Uyghur," Asia News web site, M
2011, http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Rfibiya-Kadeer-denounces-new
crackdown-on-Uyghur-21109.html (June 27, 2012).
68. Millward, "Introduction," p. 350. Following this allegation, wh
posted to an internet bulletin board, violence broke out at and around the
when Han employees, armed with clubs, iron bars and machetes, storm
factory's Uyghur dormitories. Two Uyghurs were killed, and 118 were
Suspecting that a Chinese cover-up was underway, Uyghers in Xinjiang
a march on July 5 to Urumqi's People's Square to protest how the case
handled. The demonstration was then put down, by some accounts v
sparking the rioting that took place across the city that mostly killed and
Han residents, as well as possible clashes between rioters and police that to
that night. See Millward for his complete account.
69. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China."

70. See Colin Mackerras, "Ethnicity in China: The Case of Xin
Harvard Asia Quarterly, 8, no. 1 (2004): pp. 4-14; Mackerras, "Some Is
Ethnic and Religious Identity among China's Islamic Peoples," Asian Et
6, no. 1 (2005): p. 9. In the latter, Mackerras states that "[The governm
blamed Islam for interfering in administrative affairs, judicial operation,

parenthood and other social affairs, with the aim of carrying out separatist and
sabotage activities."
71. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China," p. 232.
74. Ibid., p. 247.
75. Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54; Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in
Xinjiang," p. 294.
76. See "Police Destroy Islamist Camp, Killing 18," China Daily, January
8, 2007. Cited in Davis, "Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism," p. 21.
77. In fact it was illegal even to mention the term "East Turkestan" prior to
the release of the East Turkestan report. See Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 226.
78. Information Office of the State Council of People's Republic of China.
2002. "East Turkistan" Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.
Government Report. January 21, 2002, http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200201/21/eng20020121_89078.shtml (March 29, 2010).
79. Information Office 2002, section I, para. 8.
80. Information Office 2002, section III, para. 6
82. David S. Cloud and Ian Johnson, "Friend or Foe: In Post-9/11 World.
Chinese Dissidents Pose US Dilemma," Wall Street Journal. Cited in Clarke,
"China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 293.
83. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," pp. 293-294.
84. Ibid., p. 283.
87. In point of fact, Wang provides little evidence for his assertion that a
high number of Uyghurs join the mujahedeen.
88. Ibid., p. 575.

89. Kenneth G. Pereire, "Jihad in China? Rise of the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM)," Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Commentaries, 22
June 2006: p. 2.
90. Gunaratna and Pereire, "An Al-Qaeda Associate Group," p. 57.
91. Pereire, "Jihad in China," p. 1-2.


93. Ibid., p. 59; Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 293.
94. Wong and Bradsher, "16 Killed"; Gunaratna and Pereire, "An Al-Qaeda
Associate Group," p. 58. However, Gunaratna and Pereire are unclear on this
point, as they later state that "In the post 9/11 environment, the Uighur groups
are now significantly influenced by the developments in the global jihad arena"
(p. 59). To what extent they refer to "jihad" to represent tactical or ideological
similarities is never made clear.
95. Holly Fletcher, "The East Turkestan Islamic Movement," Backgrounder,

Council on Foreign Relations web site, 2008: http://www.cfr.org/publica
tion/9179/. (December 7, 2009).
96. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," pp. 282-283. Clarke's tally
from the data supplied in the document is 56 killed and 362 injured, compared
with 162 killed and 440 injured.
97. For example, Clarke criticizes Gunaratna and Pereire's claim that ETIM
was responsible for numerous terrorist incidents from 1996 onward, a conclusion
ostensibly based on the Chinese government's findings in the East Turkestan
report. However, the government actually only identifies ETIM as having estab
lished "training bases" from 1998 onward. See Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror'
in Xinjiang," p. 293.
98. Millward, "Introduction," p. 357-8 (footnote 1); for an additional cri
tique, see also Bovingdon, Uyghurs, p. 220 (footnote 3).
99. James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007): pp. 339-341.
100. James A. Millward, "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical
Assessment," Policy Studies, 6, no. 3 (2004): p. ix.
101. Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 234.
102. Yitzhak Shichor, "Fact and Fiction: A Chinese Documentary on Eastern
Turkestan Terrorism," China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 4, no. 2 (2006): pp.
106-7.
103. Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 225.

104. Ibid.
105. Shichor, "Fact and Fiction," pp. 106-7.

106. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 295; Millward, "Violent
Separatism in Xinjiang."

108. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China." According to Ogden,

it is easier for China to control the flow of migrants, immigrants and foreign
residents than it is for liberal democracies, a reason why terrorists have preferred
to operate in liberal democracies and not authoritarian states. Yet on this point,
Ogden is hesitant to connect the general occurrence of terrorism to a country's
style of government, and instead limits the analogy to China rather than authori
tarian regimes in the abstract.
109. Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54.

110. Ibid.
111. Gaye Christoffersen, "Islam and Ethnic Minorities in Central Aisa: The
Uyghurs," in Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azizian, eds., Islam,Oil, and
Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11 (Lanham: Rowan and littlefield, 2007):
pp. 45-59.
112. Ibid., p. 52.
113. Ibid., p. 54.
114. Ibid. She later references "reliable reports" that Islamists have been
"known to lop off' the heads of Han PLA soldiers and place them on stakes along
roads in Xinjiang, but it is not clear if the reference to brutal methods is meant to
qualify her use of the term "jihad"; she also does not identify the source of these
reports.
115. See Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China"; Gladney,

"Xinjiang?" pp. 231-232; Chung, "China's 'War on Terror'," p. 8.
116. Chung, "China's 'War on Terror'," p. 8.
117. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 8-10.
119. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 294. These transcripts
indicate that when asked about their prior experiences in Afghanistan, one detainee
responded "That is true, I went to Afghanistan... The reason is number one: I am
scared of the torture from my home country. Second: if I go there I will get some
training to fight back against the [deleted] government." Another responded, "We
have nothing to do with the Taliban or the Arabs. We have nothing to do with
the US government or coalition forces. We never thought about fighting with the
Americans... I want you to understand what our goal is: just to fight against the
[deleted] government. If there is nothing happening in the future, we would like
to stay wherever, abroad, to do our business." See Wright, "Chinese Detainees," p.
Al. Some counterterrorism commentators, such as Thomas Joscelyn of the Long
War Journal web site, argue that while the Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay may have
denied al Qaeda sympathies in their testimony, their admitted association with

certain individuals tied to al Qaeda demonstrates that the ETIM and al Qaeda
are affiliated organizationally and ideologically, and that the ETIM poses a direct
threat to American interests.
120. Bovingdon, Uyghurs, p. 92.

122. Mary Kay Magistad, "Stranded in Paradise," Foreign Policy, March
26, 2010: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/26/stranded_in_
paradise?page=0,0 (April 9, 2010).
123. Interestingly, an anonymous reviewer has noted that while field research
ers in the area are generally skeptical of a significant ETIM-al Qaeda connection,
s/he knew of several "State Department people who aver that they were initially
skeptical of the Chinese claim that there were and are links, but were convinced by
sources available to them. I asked if these sources were supplied by the Chinese.
They said no, definitely not." The reviewer agreed that it is hard to draw any
definitive conclusions from the evidence available.

125. In Kuqa, two bombers did blow themselves up, but it is not clear if they
did it on purpose or by accident. See Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54.
126. Ibid. Many of the attacks occurred early in the morning, and few took
place in high traffic areas such as public squares or marketplaces
127. Jim Yardley and Ian Urbina, "China Doubts Bus Blasts are Linked
to Separatists," New Tork Times, July 27, 2008: http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/27/world/asia/27bus.html (March 29, 2010).
128. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," p. 11.
129. Gladney, "Islam in China," p. 459.
130. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 8-10. In
this respect, Clarke points out that the exchange of views between Uyghurs and
the government takes on a cyclical quality. Uyghurs see the government as using
the war against terrorism as a means of "eroding" their culture and religion. The
government, of course, claims its crackdown is not directed at any ethnic group,
religion or culture, but at criminal activity, and that cracking down on this activity
will serve the interests of Xinjiang's different ethnic groups. The Uyghurs then
insist that the root cause of violent activity is the government's harsh and repressive
policies, which the government discounts by contending that any separatist move
ment is considered treason thereby justifying harsh measures, including policies
restricting the activities of Uyghurs or the execution of pro-independence activists.
See Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 279.


132. Shichor, "Fact and Fiction."
133. Kerr and Swinton, "China, Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security,"
p. 125.
135. Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54; Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 231.
136. Millward, "Introduction," p. 350; Asia News, "China: Rebiya Kadeer,"
para. 4.
137. Millward, "Introduction," p. 354; Times Topic, "Rebyia Kadeer," para.
6.
138. Gunaratna and Pereire, "An Al-Qaeda Associate Group," p. 58. Pereire
also accuses diaspora groups of placing members in Europe to study the tactics
and technologies of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in Iraq. See Pereire, "Jihad in
China," p. 2.
139. Pereire, "Jihad in China," p. 3.
141. Gladney "Islam in China," p. 458. On the same page, Gladney also notes
that "the growing influence of'cyber-separatism' and international popularization
of the Uyghur cause concerns Chinese authorities, who hope to convince the world
that the Uyghurs do pose a real domestic and international terrorist threat."
142. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

145. Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 274. For complete
discussion on Human Security Theory, see Rhonda L. Callaway and Julie Harrelson
Stephens, "Towards a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant
of Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 29 (2006): 773-96; Paul Roe,
Ethnic Violence and the Social Security Dilemma, London: Routledge (2005). Both
are cited by Clarke, "China's 'War on Terror' in Xinjiang," p. 273.
146. Ogden, "Inoculation against Terrorism in China," pp. 228-231.

147. Amnesty International, People's Republic of China: Gross Violations of
Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, London, April 21,
1999. Cited in Gladney, "Xinjiang," p. 227.
148. Economist, "Chinastan," p. 54.

150. Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 13-14,
16.

153. Ibid., p. 278. See Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-So-Silent Majority:
Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," Modern China 28, no. 1 (January
2002): pp. 47-52. Cited in Clarke.
154. Kerr and Swinton, "China, Xinjiang, and the Transnational Security,"
p. 123.
157. Millward, "Introduction," p. 349.
158. Herbert S. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uyghur-Han
Relations in Urumqi" Journal of Contemporary China, 12, no. 36 (2003): 431-52;
Cited in Mackerras, "Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity," pp. 15 -16.
159. Yee, "Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang," p. 449.

160. JohnWang, "Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement," p. 580.
161. Sutirtho Patranobis, "Passengers Foil Hijack Attempt in ChinaZia Ur
Rehman, The Hindustan Times, June 29,2012, http://www.hindustantimes.com/
world-news/China/Passengers-foil-hijack-attempt-in-China/Articlel-880967.
aspx (June 29, 2012); "China Concerned about Uyghur Rebels Operating in
Pakistan." The Friday Times (Pakistan), June 8-13, 2012, http://www.thefriday
times.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120608&page=5 (June 29,2012); BBC
News, "China Urges Pakistan to Expel Uighur Islamic Militants." May 31,2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18276864 (June 29, 2012).


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Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The Etim, China, and The Uyghurs

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COUNTERTERRORISM IN XINJIANG: THE ETIM, CHINA, AND THE UYGHURS

Christopher Cunningham is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Sci

This article analyzes the issue of INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11, Beijing has trained

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Alienation in Xinjiang hasand exploitation of fear through violence

THE UYGHURS AND XINJIANG

It is important to start this analysis by providing some background on the

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SEPARATISM UNDER COMMUNIST RULE AND

This section examines the stability of the region under Communist

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from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan."30 In

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Qaeda's terrorist network.37 There was, of course, no way to verify any

claims, at least about groups identified.41

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Perspective of Chinese Government

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The Chinese government is also cognizant that granting the Uyghurs

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observer, this long-held strategy has proven a failure. Gardner Bovingdon,

Despite decades of trying, China's government, one of the strongest and

The Uyghur Perspective:

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The policy of forced migration of Han to the minority areas has de

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Uyghur grievances can also be traced to political and economic factors

POST 9/11: CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE ETIM

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In the 1990s, under the influence of extremism, separatism and interna

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received his permission to open training camps in Afghanistan that would

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ETIM is connected with Iraqi jihadist groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq.89

The Argument against Beijing's Account:

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campaign against Uighur separatists in Xinjiang as a flank of the U.S.-led

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of "national separatists" and "religious extremists" would "never affect

1996 to 2000 period.106 In fact, neither

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Understanding China's Actions, and the Uyghur Reaction:

Caution means that a state that thinks it might be threatened by terrorism

kind of state reaction has, in turn, sharpened feelings of Islamic identity.128

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eliminated, will threaten China's burgeoning tourism industry in West

There is no question that unrest in Xinjiang has provided opportunities for

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THE THREAT OF UYGHUR UNREST

Increased ties with Islamic fundamentalists—One way in which Uyghur

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Uyghur Diaspora—A more realistic threat to Xinjiang's stability perhaps

Chung also acknowledges that the émigré community supports a number