RULE 45
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
UNION BANK V. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. Hence, it may be
assailed via Rule 45 petition. (Jurisdiction is a question of law)
FACTS: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against
Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two
(2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was
filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47,
Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of
deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in
the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did
not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, citing two grounds. First, she argued that the
venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati
City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has
jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations
in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Likewise, MeTC
denied the MR.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul
and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not
commit grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash.
A petition for review under Rule 45 was filed before the SC. The petition seeks
to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioners. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than the ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy
Chim. They argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the false statements was the essential ingredient
that consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were
made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the
ISSUE: W/N the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should
be Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized,
or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
RULING: MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take
cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines
not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the
court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule
is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in
the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an
accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.
The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where
the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense
was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
The crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is committed at the time the
affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that
all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed; When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
As such, where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case
on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the
crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of
the MeTC-Makati City. The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution
of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and
fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under
oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to
have been made in Makati City: That on or about the 13th day of March 2000
in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which
the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certifi-
cation/Affidavit
Hence, the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be
Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized
REPUBLIC V. ORTIGAS
DOCTRINE: Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising
purely questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on
a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by
notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises
questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
FACTS: Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner
of a parcel of land known as Lot 5-B-2 with an area of 70,278 square meters
in Pasig City.
Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways,
respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property into five lots and
reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated
Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter portion of its property, for the road widening
of Ortigas Avenue.3 Respondent Ortigas also caused the annotation of the
term "road widening" on its title. The title was then inscribed with an
encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to Section 50 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396
square meters of the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the project.
Consequently, respondent Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into two lots:
Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually used for road widening, and Lot
5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized portion of Lot 5-B-2-A.
On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1.
Respondent Ortigas alleged that the Department of Public Works and
Highways requested the conveyance of the property for road widening
purposes.
Finding merit in respondent Ortigas' petition, the Regional Trial Court issued
an order on June 11, 2001, authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to petitioner
Republic of the Philippines. Likewise, MR was denied.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.
Republic then elevated the case to the CA via Rule 41. Petitioner Republic of
the Philippines pointed out that its reference in the notice of appeal to the
October 3, 2001 order denying the motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
decision is not in accordance with law and evidence. It argued that the
Regional Trial Court erred in granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell
its property to the government because the lot can only be conveyed by
donation to the government. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that an
order or judgment denying a MR is unappealable.
MR was filed. But the same was denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals noted that even if the order denying the motion for
reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was still dismissible for lack of
jurisdiction because petitioner Republic of the Philippines raised only a
question of law.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to nullify and
set aside the Court of Appeals' resolution. The Court of Appeals' resolution
dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines' appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court granting private respondent Ortigas' petition for
authority to sell. This petition also seeks to nullify the Court of Appeals’
resolution which denied petitioner Republic of the Philippines' motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N the appeal taken from the RTC raising pure question of law are
not reviewable by the CA.
RULING: YES. Appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 41 must raise both questions of fact and law
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from
the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of
law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall
not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed
outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely
questions of law must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. An appeal by notice of
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises
questions of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
 Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road
shall be applied on a given set of facts.39 Questions of law do "not involve an purposes.
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented." Its resolution
rests solely on the application of a law given the circumstances. There is a
question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or falsity of the
facts presented. A question of fact "invites a review of the evidence."

Here, the sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court
of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it
only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No.
1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision.
It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the
facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue
raised before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law.
The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45.

Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.

ADD’L: Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1,

paragraph (a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[n]o appeal may be
taken from [a]n order denying a x x x motion for reconsideration," is based on
the implied premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not
completely dispose of the case. Orders denying motions for reconsideration
are not always interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be
considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a
particular matter," leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the
decision.

The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to
sell its property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it
completely disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause
delay in the administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the
former used the wrong mode of appeal.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE: Owners whose properties were taken for public use
are entitled to just compensation. Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of an expropriation
proceeding. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ reliance on Section 50 of
the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. Section 50 contemplates roads
and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private
property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public
thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street.
RULE 38
AGAN V. HEIRS OF ANDRES NUEVA
DOCTRINE: The erroneous opinion of a party concerning the incorrectness of
the judicial decision of the court cannot constitute a ground for a petition for
relief. This, while it constitutes a mistake of the party, is not such a mistake as
confers the right to the relief. This is so because in no wise has the private
respondent been prevented from interposing an appeal. If a party complains
of a decision as being void, then the proper remedy is to appeal said judgment.
Mistake, to constitute a ground for petition for relief via Rule 38, refers to a
mistake of fact, not of law. The Court finds occasion to reiterate this basic
principle in this case.
FACTS: On April 13, 1988, Diosdada Nueva, with marital consent, sold under
a pacto de retro, a parcel of land with an area of 2,033 square meters situated
in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, to Philadelphia Agan for P21,000.00.
The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 25370 and
registered in the name of Spouses Andres and Diosdada Nueva.
The agreement is evidenced by a public instrument entitled Deed of Sale under
a Pacto de Retro executed and duly signed by the late Diosdada Nueva with
the marital consent of her husband, Andres Nueva, and Philadelphia Agan.
The parties agreed that the Nuevas are granted the right to repurchase the
property sold, within six (6) months from and after the date of the document
for the same consideration of P21,000.00.
Petitioners failed to repurchase the property within the stipulated six-month
period.
On July 5, 1991, upon the death of Diosdada Nueva, the property was
extrajudicially partitioned where Andres sold his interest in the land in question
to his daughter Ann and son Lou. Since the title to the property was allegedly
lost during the fire that razed the property on March 19, 1990 where Diosdada
died, title was reconstituted and subsequently transferred and registered in the
name of Ann and Lou Nueva under TCT No. 63403.
On June 19, 1992, Philadelphia Agan filed a petition for consolidation of
ownership against Spouses Andres and Diosdada Nueva with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The petition was granted. However, the vendors can still
exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil
Code.
Because of the refusal of Agan to accept the amount of P52,080.00 as
redemption price, the Nuevas were constrained to consign the amount with the
court.
On September 12, 2000, Philadelphia Agan filed a petition for relief under Rule
38 from the August 3, 2000 decision. She argued that she did not find it
necessary to file an appeal from the said decision considering that the grant of
the third-day period to redeem the property is a mere surplusage and hence,
unenforceable and illegal in view of the courts order consolidating ownership
of the property in her favor. Respondent Agan prayed for the court to delete
the said portion of the decision.
The trial court rendered the questioned Order which amended its first decision
by deleting the paragraph which provides “However, the vendors can still
exercise the right to repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this decision pursuant to Article 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil
Code.”
Later, MR was filed but the same was denied. Respondent heirs filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, contending that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in granting the petition for relief. CA reversed the Order
of the RTC and rendered judgment in favor of respondent heirs.
Petitioner reiterates her argument that a mistake prevented her from filing an
appeal. She believes that an appeal was unnecessary because the inclusion
of the second paragraph in the RTC Order of October 9, 2000 was mere
surplusage. Petitioner further submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that respondents had thirty (30) days within which to redeem the property
under the third paragraph of Article 1606 of the Civil Code
ISSUE: W/N the petition for relief is proper
RULING: NO. The remedy of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the Rules of Civil Procedure is a remedy provided by law to any person
against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. Relief is not however available when a party
had another adequate remedy available to him which was either a motion for
new trial or appeal from the adverse decision and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or
taking an appeal. The relief provided for under Rule 38 of the Rules is of
equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no
other available or adequate remedy. The rule is that relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the
right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel.
Here, the ground relied upon by the private respondent in her petition for relief
below the court a quo is her honest belief that the pertinent portion of the
decision granting the seller a retro thirty (30) days to redeem the property is a
surplusage and hence unenforceable and illegal. She relied on the assumption
that since the grant of the period of redemption is an erroneous application by
the lower court of Articles 1606 and 1607 of the Civil Code, the same cannot
be enforced. As the trial court upheld the validity of the sale under a pacto de
retro and granted her petition for consolidation of ownership over the disputed
property, she did not find it necessary to appeal the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion.
The Court also notes that the RTC erred in allowing petitioners the right to
repurchase said property within thirty (30) days from receipt of the RTC
Decision. By express provision, Article 1606 grants the vendor a retro thirty
(30) days from the time final judgment was rendered, not from the defendants
receipt of the judgment. The Court has construed final judgment to mean one
that has become final and executory.
This observation, of course, is moot, as it is not disputed that respondents
offered to pay petitioner the redemption price within the period fixed by the trial
court and, subsequently, consigned the amount in court. The Court makes the
observation only for the enlightenment of the RTC. PETITION DENIED.

The erroneous opinion of a party concerning the incorrectness of the judicial

decision of the court cannot constitute a ground for a petition for relief. This,
while it constitutes a mistake of the party, is not such a mistake as confers the
right to the relief. This is so because in no wise has the private respondent
been prevented from interposing an appeal. If a party complains of a decision
as being void, then the proper remedy is to appeal said judgment. Mistake, to
constitute a ground for petition for relief, refers to a mistake of fact, not of
law. The Court finds occasion to reiterate this basic principle in this case.

Moreover, the Court is not convinced that petitioner sincerely believed in her
theory that the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the RTC decision
was surplusage. Had it been so, she would have moved to rectify the alleged
error immediately, not after respondents had offered to repurchase the
property in question. Her failure to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal
before the lapse of the reglementary period constitutes an acceptance of the
trial courts judgment, and her rationalization now appears to have been made
only on hindsight.

Petitioner submits that the RTC had no jurisdiction to allow the respondents to
repurchase the property, such judgment purportedly being contrary to
prevailing jurisprudence. This contention has no merit. If there were any error
at all in the Decision of the RTC, the same would be a mere error in judgment,
not one of jurisdiction.

At any rate, the grant of the right to repurchase to respondents is in accordance

with the third paragraph of Article 1606, a provision not found in the old Civil
Code. The legislative intent behind this Article, along with Articles 1602-1605
and 1607 of the same Code, is to accord the vendor a retro the maximum
safeguards for the protection of his legal rights under the true agreement of
the parties. Experience has demonstrated too often that many sales with right
to repurchase have been devised only to circumvent or ignore our usury laws
and for this reason, the law looks upon then with disfavor.
RULE 47
REXLON REALTY V. CA
DOCTRINE: In consonance with the Straight Times case, respondent David’s
act of misrepresentation, though not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an
evidence of absence of jurisdiction. In the Straight Times case and in
Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in
this case, we held that if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired
jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. In the case
at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the owners duplicate of TCT Nos.
T-52537 and T-52538 in the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute
Deed of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support
actual loss of the said owners duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement
thereof are void.
FACTS: Respondent Alex L. David is the registered owner of two (2) parcels
of land located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-72537 and T-72538, with areas of 7,801 and 42,253 square
meters, respectively. On August 17, 1989, petitioner Rexlon Realty Group, Inc.
(Rexlon, for brevity) entered into an agreement with respondent David for the
purchase of the said two (2) parcels of land as evidenced by a document
denominated as Absolute Deed of Sale.
On February 18, 1994, David filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City,
Branch 16, a petition for the issuance of owners duplicate copies of TCT Nos.
T-72537 and T-72538 to replace the owners duplicate copies which were
allegedly lost. David alleged that he entrusted his owners duplicate copies of
the said TCTs to a friend and member of his staff for the purpose of showing
them to a prospective developer who was interested in developing the subject
parcels of land for commercial and/or industrial use; that the said owners
duplicate copies of said titles were misplaced and could not be found despite
diligent efforts to locate the same; and that said owners duplicate copies have
not been delivered to any person or entity to secure payment or performance
of any obligation.
Consequently, a notice of hearing was issued by the RTC ordering its branch
Deputy Sheriff to post copies of the same at the Provincial Capitol Building,
the public market, and the Barangay Hall of the locality where the properties
are located. The said Deputy Sheriff then issued his Certificate of Posting
stating that he has duly posted the Notice of Hearing at the said three (3) public
places. The initial hearing proceeded ex-parte inasmuch as nobody appeared
to oppose the same. Then, RTC granted the petition.
Petitioner Rexlon then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment
of the said Decision of the trial court on the ground that respondent David
allegedly employed fraud and deception in securing the replacement owners
duplicate copies of the subject TCTs; that there was absence of due process;
and, that the decision of the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petition was later amended,
with leave of court, to include as respondent Paramount Development
Corporation of the Philippines (Paramount, for brevity) upon discovering that
respondent David had executed on September 20, 1994, a deed of sale of the
subject parcels of land in favor of Paramount. As a result of that sale, new
certificates of title designated as TCT Nos. T-525664 and T-525665 were
issued in the name of respondent Paramount in lieu of TCT Nos. T-72537 and
T-72538 in the name of Alex L. David.
CA denied the petition. In ruling in favor of respondents David and Paramount,
the appellate court held as insignificant the contention of petitioner Rexlon that
David had misled the trial court in alleging that his owners duplicate copies of
the said TCT Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 were lost. Besides, a judgment can
be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has been obtained by
fraud ( Santos v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 673). For fraud to serve as a
basis for the annulment of a judgment, it must be extrinsic or collateral in
character, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations (Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 224 SCRA 673). Unfortunately, these grounds do not obtain in the
instant case.
A petition for review of the Decision dated November 19, 1996 and Resolution
dated February 7, 1997 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
annulment of the Decision dated March 1, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cavite, Branch 16, which granted the petition of respondent Alex L.
David in L.R.C. Rec. No. 8843 for the issuance of new owners duplicate copies
of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-72537 and T-72538 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cavite. The petitioner alleges that the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to annul the decision of the trial court on the ground of
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud, according to the petitioner, attended the
proceedings and eventual issuance of the new owners duplicate copies of the
subject certificates of title; and that respondent David misled the trial court in
alleging in his petition before the RTC that his owners duplicate of TCT Nos.
T-52537 and T-52538 were lost when in fact he had delivered the said owners
duplicate of those certificates of title to the petitioner pursuant to a contract of
sale executed between them.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in failing to annul the RTC decision on the ground
of fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: YES. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside
of the trial of the case, the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial,
a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner
in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the
controversy. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the
Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1) is
deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that
the lots are not contested when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains
adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows
has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts and
connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey
plan the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement
that there are no other claims; (5) induces another not to oppose an
application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or (7)
misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to
withdraw his opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the
jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud
becomes subject to annulment.
As held in Straight Times case, it is well-settled that the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud,
because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the
proceedings. While a perjured testimony may prevent a fair and just
determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or
opposing the use of such evidence. Furthermore, it should be stressed that
extrinsic fraud pertains to an act committed outside of the trial. The alleged
fraud in this case was perpetrated during the trial.
Here, in consonance with the Straight Times case, respondent David’s act of
misrepresentation, though not constituting extrinsic fraud, is still an evidence
of absence of jurisdiction. In the Straight Times case and in Demetriou v. Court
of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that
if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in
fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the
court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the
decision may be attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and
genuineness of the owners duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the
possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have
not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said
owners duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.
Petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
ESCAREAL V. PAL
DOCTRINE: When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined
by a valid judgment, that determination is conclusive in a subsequent action to
the parties thereto. What petitioners should have done was to appeal the
adverse decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099, failing which, petitioners must
contend and content themselves with the finality of judicial pronouncements.
FACTS: Petitioners were among those assigned to serve as cabin crew
members of Flight PR501 for Manila to Singapore, scheduled to depart from
Manila on 03 April 1997 at 3:00 p.m. and to return to Manila at 8:00 a.m. the
next day.
During a pre-flight briefing conducted on the afternoon of departure, PAL Flight
Purser, Jaime Gayoso, in the presence of senior PAL officials, announced to
the members of the cabin crew a change in the departure time from 3:00 to
5:30 p.m. because the aircraft intended for PR501 would arrive late. Without
giving the cabin crew members a chance to voice out their sentiments or
objections, Flight Purser Gayoso announced that those taking the flight and its
return leg would receive a per diem of Thirty-three US Dollars (US$33.00) due
to the resultant reduction in the cabin crews rest period. It appears that
petitioners received per diem without incident.
Upon the conclusion of the pre-flight briefing, at around 3:45 p.m., the cabin
crew members were transported via shuttle to the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA). When they arrived at the NAIA at 4:00 p.m., the crew found out
that the aircraft to be used for Flight PR501 was not yet available, a situation
which would result in further delay.
Petitioners decided to inform PALs Line Administrator, Ms. Jesulita de Leon,
as well as the union to which all petitioners belong, the Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), through a Mr. Ricardo L.
Montecillo, their intention to back out from servicing Flight PR 501. Petitioners
cited as basis for such intention the consequent decrease in their rest period,
which infringed on the minimum rest period granted to them under the 1995
PAL-FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Without further incident, Flight PR501 left Manila with a complete set of
replacement cabin attendants at 6:00 p.m. (half an hour later than the adjusted
departure time of 5:30 p.m.) and arrived in Singapore at 9:30 p.m.
Petitioners thought that in having caused no interruption in the flight
scheduling, they had heard the end of the matter. However, through a Letter
of Inquiry dated 04 April 1997, petitioners were required by PAL to comment
on their failure to take Flight PR501. Petitioner Velasco submitted his reply on
even date while Petitioners Escareal and Versoza submitted their joint reply
on 11 April 1997.
Despite the explanation that they were asserting a right provided them under
the CBA, PAL found probable cause to administratively charge the petitioners.
Petitioners each received a Notice of Administrative Charge dated 22 April
1997 for Conspiracy or Concerted Action, Loitering or Abandonment of Post,
Refusal to Take Assignment, and Withholding Cooperation.
On 20 August 1997, petitioners submitted a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss and/or for a Bill of Particulars praying, inter alia, that
respondents witnesses be required to submit their respective statements
under oath, in the same manner that herein petitioners were required to file
their written answers and counter-affidavits under oath, to ascertain who
among them were resorting to falsehood.
Without acting on the Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, PAL rendered a
decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and imposing upon them a
penalty of a one-year suspension without pay.
On 31 March 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practices
before the NLRC and raffled to the sala of Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday.
LA: ruled in favor of the petitioners.
On appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision, reiterating the factual findings of
the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, it found that the manner by which petitioners
asserted their right to a full twelve (12) hours of rest merited the imposition of
a one(1)-month suspension. Both parties filed MR, and both were denied.
PAL filed an action for certiorari before the CA on the ground that NLRC
committed GADALEJ.
Despite their earlier submission of the Consolidated Comment/Opposition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 54099, petitioners filed on 10 September 1999 their own
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. In their petition, which is the
precursor to the instant case, petitioners sought the annulment and setting
aside of the NLRCs Decision and the reinstatement of the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter and submitted a request for consolidation.
Later, the both petitions were denied by the CA. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied. A Petition for Review assails a Court of
Appeals Decision declaring that where both contending parties, dissatisfied as
they were with the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), separately elevate said judgment by their respective petitions
for certiorari, the first decision by the appellate court in one petition once it
assumes finality, constitutes res judicata on the other petition. Petitioners now
insist that the principle of res judicata is applicable only to the portion of 1 st
petition which declared illegal eleven of the twelve- months suspension meted
on them, but is inapplicable to the declaration by the NLRC that the remaining
one-month suspension is valid. The conclusion is based on their allegation that
the one-month suspension is the issue, subject matter, and cause of action in
2nd petition but which was not determined in 1st petition, the latter having been
rendered on a different issue, subject matter and cause of action.
ISSUE: W/N annulment of judgment is the proper remedy
RULING: NO. Res judicata applies when there exists in two cases identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Thus, the judgment in the first
case is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, between the parties and
those privy with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, the following requisites
must obtain:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after
a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same parties.
On core examination, the first three elements of res judicata are present. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099 is final and
executory. It was rendered on the merits and the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the case,[28] as even plaintiffs sought the same by filing their
own Petition for Certiorari with said Court.

Now, is the fourth requisite present that of uniformity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action? We hold in the affirmative. Obviously the parties involved
are the same; the subject matter and cause of action in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099
and CA-G.R. SP No. 54850 are the same despite an expected difference in
the manner by which the opposing parties presented their grounds for
certiorari.
Implicit in petitioners prayer is a request for this Court to annul or set aside the
final and executory Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099,
since they seek a modification of the NLRC Decision which that court affirmed.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two remedies for aggrieved
parties to annul a final and executory judgment. The first is by filing a verified
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence within sixty days after the petitioner learns
of the judgment to be set aside, and not more than six months after such
judgment was entered. The other remedy is for a party to file a verified petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, within four years from its discovery. However, in addition to
these, jurisprudence has likewise recognized an additional relief through a
direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against a judgment that is
void on its face.
allegations but also to substantiate their own bid to obtain the reinstatement of
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Special Eleventh Division of the Court
of Appeals rendered its decision only after a review of the submissions of
petitioners.
Had there been a due process violation, it may have been possible for this
Court to set aside even a final and executory judgment. However, we do not
see any overriding reason not to abide by the well-entrenched doctrine of res
judicata. Indeed it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule
of law, more even than an important principle of public policy, and that it is a
fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society, for not only
does it ward off endless litigation, it ensures the stability of judgment, and
guards against inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts. It also takes
into consideration the ideal that a party should not be vexed twice regarding
the same cause.
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
judgment, that determination is conclusive in a subsequent action to the parties
thereto. What petitioners should have done was to appeal the adverse decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099, failing which, petitioners must contend and content
themselves with the finality of judicial pronouncements.

Petitioners have not alleged that the judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 54099 was
entered against them through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence; not to mention that the prescriptive period for filing a petition for
relief had lapsed. Petitioners do not allege any extrinsic or collateral fraud
taken against them in the rendition of the decision; nor do they claim the lack
of jurisdiction of the NLRC to make its Decision, or the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to affirm the same. Moreover, the Decision in the 1st
petition is not patently void. In fact, petitioners have recognized the final and
executory nature thereof and even admitted a partial res judicata effect of said
judgment. Consequently, there is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis for
this Court to annul the Decision of the Court of Appeals in 1st petition.

As a last-ditch effort, petitioners ask this Court to disregard the rigid application
of res judicata to avoid the sacrifice of justice to technicality.

In addressing this supplication, this Court must ask itself, were petitioners
denied a fair hearing so as to merit an exception to the finality of judgments?
A review of the proceedings a quo shows that petitioners had been given their
day in court. Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents. They also
elevated the adverse decision of the NLRC in their own Petition for Certiorari
and filed a lengthy Consolidated Comment/Opposition to PALs Petition for
Certiorari, buttressed with factual and legal arguments not only to defeat PALs
RULE 65
SEN. DE LIMA V. HON. GUERRERO
DOCTRINE: SEE RULING
FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several
inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid
Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed affidavits in support of their
testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of 4 complaints with
the Department of Justice against Sen. Leila De Lima.
The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,
wherein the petitioner, through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to
Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for the
Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus
Motion"). In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman
has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against
her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the
petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and
refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.
On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition and Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the
complaints against her. The petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and
CA-G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th
Division of the appellate court. Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of
the preliminary investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated February 14,
2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima.
Accordingly, on February 17, 2017, three Informations were filed against
petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC ofMuntinlupa City.
One of the Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and
raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge.
On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the
following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged against
petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the Information
charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not
allege the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies
of witnesses who are not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and
the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.
On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order
finding probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima
and her co-accused. Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated
February 23, 2017, which contained no recommendation for bail, was issued
against petitioner.
On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the
Warrant of Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued the assailed
February 24, 2017 Order, committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP
Custodial Center.
Hence, for consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order1 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De Lima. In it, petitioner
assails the following orders and warrant issued by respondent judge Hon.
Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch
204, in Criminal Case No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:"
(1) the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrant of arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the Warrant of Arrest against
De Lima also dated February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing the petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and
finally, (4) the supposed omission of the respondent judge to act on petitioner's
Motion to Quash, through which she questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30
claiming that petitioner falsified the jurats appearing in the: (1) Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2) Affidavit of
Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while
the advertedjurats appeared to be notarized by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C.
Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest logbook31 in the PNP
Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does not bear the
name of Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner De
Lima did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date
in Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the
petition should therefore be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by
petitioner De Lima.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES: (MADAMING ISSUES NAG FOCUS NALANG AKO
SA PROCEDURAL ASPECT)
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts considering that the petition should first be filed with the
Court of Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before
the trial court renders the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule
against forum shopping given the pendency of the Motion to Quash the
Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case
No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097, assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by
the DOJ Panel.
D. W/N THE PETITION COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE
65
RULING:
A. PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by
this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine
the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity
of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case" that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of
course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions
could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews
the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in
nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of
the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most
special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or
further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
n a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed
when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of
constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the
case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time
is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a
constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions
that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the
present petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the rules on the
hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international
interest is obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of
courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason
for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on
the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present
administration. A primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political
neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before
it through the warped prisms of political partisanships.
That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special
treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to
every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her
position and status in the government.
B. THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE
Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to
rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.
In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to
dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge
to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner.
Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this
Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of
the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the
absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to Quash
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion for this Court
to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there
is nothing for this Court to declare as having been issued without jurisdiction
or in grave abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law." Thus, the failure to exhaust
all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a premature resort to this
Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.
C. PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
All these requisites are present in this case.
The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an
accused in the criminal case below, while the respondents in this case, all
represented by the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the
complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court.
As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the
Motion to Quash will reveal that the arguments and the reliefs prayed for are
essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the
Information; the purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and,
basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict her.
With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains
in the present case. Should we grant the petition and declare the RTC without
jurisdiction over the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's Motion to
Quash in deference to this Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court
rules on the Motion to Quash in the interim, the instant petition will be rendered
moot and academic.
In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can
restrain a party to a case before the trial court to institute a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, still such petition must be rejected outright
because petitions that cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly
and expeditious processing and adjudication of cases.
On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate
dismissal.
D. NO. PETITION DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQS OF RULE 65.
While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely
reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private document,
which requires /roof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as
evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered controlling in determining
compliance with the requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that the petitions
for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn
certificate of non-forum shopping."
In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a]
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading."
Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues
in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable
by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided x x x."
In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has
likewise failed to properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby
rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping.
Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner
swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It must be noted that
verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice,41 as
what apparently happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the
notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature also negates a
proper attestation that forum shopping has not been committed by the filing of
the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned
pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.
Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the
notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and excuse the
petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties
seeking the ultimate relief of certiorari to observe the rules, since
nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."

Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these

prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is to

dismiss outright the present petition.
PEOPLE v. LATAYADA
DOCTRINE: When an appellant escapes detention pending appeal, the
appeal is normally dismissed, and the lower court’s judgment thus becomes
final and executory. However, this Court has held that this rule does not apply
to death cases, in which an automatic review is mandated by law even if
appellant has absconded.
FACTS: Sometime on October 29, 1995 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening,
Pedro Payla arrived at the house of Vicenta Cordino at Sitio Hanopolan,
Claveria, Misamis Oriental. Pedro Payla allegedly told Vicenta ‘Don’t be afraid,
Nang, I am the son of Lucia Payla, I was stabbed by Elgin Latayada, bring me
to the hospital.’ Vicenta, who was already old, then called her neighbor Joseph
Tion for help and the latter responded. Joseph treated the wounds of Pedro
and asked what happened. Pedro allegedly told Joseph that Elgin asked to be
brought to Hanopolan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. On their way, Elgin told
Pedro to stop because he wanted to answer the call of nature. After Elgin
relieved himself, instead of boarding at the back of the motorcycle, he stabbed
Pedro and escaped on board the motorcycle.
When a passenger jeepney passed by, Pedro was loaded and brought to
Claveria Hospital. When they passed by a police station, the conductor of the
passenger jeep reported the stabbing incident. At Claveria Hospital, Pedro’s
wound was treated and sutured. However, due to inadequate medical facilities
at Claveria Hospital, the doctor thereat advised Gina Payla, wife of Pedro, to
bring Pedro to Cagayan de Oro. On that same night, Pedro Payla was brought
to [the] Medical Center in Cagayan De Oro City. Pedro died on October 30,
1995.
On October 30, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Gina Payla,
Pedro’s wife, was able to converse with him. Again, Pedro pointed to appellant
as his assailant and further narrated the circumstances surrounding his
stabbing.
At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, SPO1 Victorino
Busalla arrived at the hospital and then proceeded to take the antemortem
statement of Pedro. Pedro could not write because of his injuries; hence, he
placed his thumb mark using his own blood in lieu of his signature on the said
statement. The same statement was signed by Gina Payla who was present
when the statement was taken. Pedro died on the same day.
The motorcycle driven by Pedro with Chassis No. 951-50025, color blue, was
originally owned by Rodrigo Estrada. He later sold the same to [Kagawad
Verano] Caabay for P10,000.00. It was [Kagawad] Caabay who had an
arrangement with Pedro regarding the use of the motorcycle to transport
passengers.
The motorcycle was recovered only on November 4, 1995, already
cannibalized, at Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City.
After the prosecution rested its case on June 21, 2002, appellant escaped from
prison which is evidenced by a Notice of Escape submitted to the court a quo.
He has remained at large. The defense averred that the accused had escaped
from jail after the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and therefore
failed to testify.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with
homicide. inding treachery to have qualified the killing, the lower court imposed
on the accused the supreme penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review.
Appellant Latayada claimed that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the
penalty of death upon the accused-appellant when treachery was not alleged
in the Information either as a qualifying or as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
The CIR appealed the CTA decision to the CA but the CA affirmed it.
ISSUES: W/N his escape shall dismiss his appeal
RULING: NO.
GENERAL RULE: When an appellant escapes detention pending appeal,
the appeal is normally dismissed, and the lower court’s judgment thus
becomes final and executory. However, this Court has held in People v.
Esparas, People v. Pradesh, and People v. Raquino that this rule does not
apply to death cases, in which an automatic review is mandated by law even
if appellant has absconded.
HERE, RTC IMPOSED ON THE ACCUSED SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH.
HENCE, the exception to the general rule applies. An automatic review is
mandated by law even if appellant absconded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No.
97-917 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. 1.Appellant is found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day.
2. 2.Appellant is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of the deceased the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P26,199 as actual
damages, P50,000 as moral damages, and P1,589,850 for loss of
earning capacity.