24 Ute Frevert
..
over lower (physical) and higher (mental) emotions that was not setcled even in the
twencieth cencmy. In the l 950s and 1960s1 encyclopedias still distinguished becween
emotions that were 'more' or 'less' physical in a dearly evaluative manner. The
former were supposed to be emocions 'that were primarily reactive, siruationally and
contextually determined'; che larter, by contrast, induding emotions that were 'soul­
ful and mental', 'aesthetic and ethical', were inherencly 'highly complex, stronger
and more habitual'. They hence marked the character and 'basic life mood' of a
person much more strongly and decisively as merely reactive emotions, or, to use
the concepts of Max Scheler and Hubert Rohrbacher, emotions chat are dos; to
sensations and drives (such as pain or fear).69
On the whole, however, differentiation of this kind retreated in che second half
of che twentieth century, as reference works sought decidedly to absrain from value
judgements and prescriptions for moral behaviour. Enrries became more objective,
concise and scientistic, in an effort to orienc themselves as closely as possible to the
newly authoritative sciences (psychology and che neurosciences). At the same rime
they became detached from che variety of real life, since che phenomena to which
they referred were removed from che social conrexts, isolared and universalized,
mimicking r.he practice of the experimental sciences. lnstead of dealing with 'peo­
ple' and their shifting feelings, sensations, and passions, as was che practice of
encyclopedias from the eighteenth to che early twentieth centuries, today che focus
is on 'the person', his or her brain, body, consciousness, and emotion(s).
6. CONTEXTS OF EMOTION: NATIONS, SOCIAL
CLASSES, GENDER
Recenc reference works have chereby more or less given up seeking to provide any
normative orientation that might lend cheir readers a salid self-consciousness and
iniciare chem into a particular way of conducting rheir lives. Not least, chis is related
to a growing heterogeneity of readers and users who resise reduction to chis or that
way of thinking, unlike che relatively manageable bourgeois readership of che eighc­
eenth and nineceenth centuries. At che same time, much of che context conveyed in
earlier encyclopedias is left out here, omitting precísely che material that makes it
possible for today's historians to gain access to che emotions ofearlier generacions.
Pare of this contextual knowledge was that emotions, however natural they
might be, were to a great extent formed culturally and socially. Who felt what, and
how rhey expressed it, depended upon che given circumstances of cheir lives, cheir
level ofeducation, and their age and gender, bue ic also depended u pon che general
development of a society and its leve! of political maturity. These last two fu.ctors in
particular played an important pare in encyclopedia entries.
Incerest in che framework that a society gave to emotions was especially strong
in Great Britain. From the eighteenth century up to che 1840s, discussion was
6 72 'Mancherlei Gedanken über die Kunst zu gefullen', Ernst:md Scherz, 27 (1 October 1803), 107.
� 'Gefühl', in Brockham, 16th edn, iv (1954), 435-6; 'Gefühl, Emotion', in Brockhaus, 17th edn,
vii (1969), 1.7.
Defining Emotions 25
gffiinated by a moralphil.osophy that had a high regard for social emotions. There
a unanimous belief that society funccioned only if its members fostered public
-ectíom, treating each other with sympachy, friendliness, and benevolence. Grati­
údC, concern for reputation, and love of country were also important, as were
·,:-_?nescy, loyalty, and trust. There was a conviction that such feelings flourished to
,, _
'iji�_ir grearest extent in states whose governments respected the freedom and equal­
ify:of their citizens. If they were able to send representatives to parliament, their
feélings and intereses found representation. Such a representative constitution not
,
\ily ensured that cítizens could enjoy che fullest advancement of privare and social
)notions, bue also attracted their love and their deference. Alongside civilizing
" iogress, it chus embodied social harmony and stability.7°
iÜn che ocher side of che English Channel, such chings could only be dreamt of.
,' ivic activism in the service of che common good was not widespread in the Ger­
., <an territorial states, and was not encouraged by absolucist authorities. lt was for
;ic reason that che question of che origin and development of emotions that pre­
'Cupied Scottish moral philosophers found litde resonance in Germany. Instead,
S"��re che focus was upon the limited circles of bourgeois sociability: che family,
''rivate friendship, and, above ali, che development of emotion in individual men
{and women.
1
: ,,,,, Much time and effort were devoted to argufo.g about che readability of genuine'
,
"'atld che pretep.ce of 'false' emotions. This reflected a need in bourgeois circles to
''áeate space for sociability in which people could set aside their social masks and
with each other politely, bue also candidly. Emotions here played a central
for, as che Encycl.opedia Britannica emphasized in 1797, they represented a
language' and promoted social communication. 'Society among indi­
is greacly prometed by that universal language. Looks and ges c ures give
access to che heart; and lead us ro select, with tolerable accuracy, che persons
are wonhy of our confidence.' Even when people sought to hide their emo­
'nature' was thought to set strict limits to such deception through visual
Germany, where authoritarian structures set greater limits on che freedom of
sociability, there was a greater element of doubt. Were there really unambigu­
proofs of che authenticity and candidness of emotions? Were word, gesture,
facial expression to be trusted? (There are people', one popular newspaper
in 1803, 'who never miss an opportunity to unleash sensitive tirades, even
into tears', bue who are nonetheless 'hard-hearted' and selfish. Words were
enough to satisfy che contemporary demand for 'deep emotion, even enthusi­
asm'. 'A facial expression, a glance, even che way that they listen, how they observe,
says much, much more than can the most eloquent speech-but only to those who
, , themselves possess emotion. '72
70 'Moral philosophy' in EB, lst edn, iii (1771), 270-309, largely unchanged in the 7th edn, xv
(1842), 456-89.
71
'Passion' in EB, 3rd edn, xiv (1797), 7-8.
This article is cited in 'Trieb', in Krünitz, clxxxv {1846), 7.