Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's 'Politics'

University of Utah
Western Political Science Association
Superlative Virtue: The Problem of Monarchy in Aristotle's 'Politics'

Author(s): W. R. Newell
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 159-178
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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SUPERLATIVE VIRTUE: THE PROBLEM OF
MONARCHY IN ARISTOTLE'S 'POLITICS'
W. R. NEWELL
ofNebraska-Lincoln
University
ECENT interpreters
of Aristotle'swritingshope to findin them a
communitarian alternative to contemporary liberalism. Although
these interpretations vary considerably, they share the hope that
the recovery of Aristotelian policial philosophy could mitigate the a priori
individualism of the liberal tradition without detracting from its broader
democratic impulse. Notable among them is the recent study by Ronald
Beiner (1983), who follows the work of H.-G. Gadamer (1975, 1976, 1983)
in looking to Aristotle for a philosophy that recognizes communal "dis-
course" rather than "technical expertise" as constituting our political es-
sence. Both believe that a recovery of Aristotle's emphasis on the "context
of mutual agreement" immanent in a healthy society can help to offsetthe
alienating tendencies of the modern technological state.1
Although these are serious and thought-provoking studies, what is ab-
sent from them is a consideration of Aristotle's reflectionon the good and
bad potentialitiesof monarchical rule as he analyses the prospects forachiev-
ing and sustaining political community. Beiner's analysis of Aristotelian
prudence, forexample, rightlysuggests that prudent judgments can be un-
derstood by non-expertcitizens. But while Beiner hopes to make Aristotelian
prudence the basis forwider and more meaningful participation, Aristotle
himselfnever attributesthe capacity formaking prudentjudgments to more
than a few leaders in any given time or place. Beiner concedes this diffi-
culty in a footnote, but he does not explore the implications it would have
forhis main argument thatwe need to combine the universalism(both logical
and political) of Kant with the "heteronomy" - the richness of experience
and responsiveness to circumstance - of Aristotle (Beiner 1983: 177-78,
48, 63, 68, 103). For ifAristotledoes not believe that even a sizable minority,
let alone a majority of people in a community are capable of exercising
prudent political judgment, what grounds are there for drawing upon his
conception of prudence to justifywider and more meaningful political par-
Received: September24, 1985

First Revision Received: February24, 1986
Accepted forPublication: February 27, 1986
NOTE: I am gratefulto the National Humanities Center, where I was a Humanities Fel-
low duringthe 1985-86 academic year, and to the Research Council of the University
of Nebraska-Lincolnfortheirsupportduring the writingof this article. Thanks also
to theanonymousreviewers,and to KerryH. Whitesideforhis commentson an earlier
versionpresentedat the annual meetingof the NortheasternPolitical Science Associa-
tion, November 15, 1985, in Philadelphia.
See especiallyBeiner(1983: xiv-xv,72-101); Gadamer(1975, 1976, 1983: 73-81,92, 116-21,
131-36). For otherattemptsto adapt Aristotelianismto a broadened conceptionof con-
temporarycommunity,see Galstone (1980) and MacIntyre (1981). Yack (1985) pro-
vides a thoughtfulcritiqueof the latter.
160 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
ticipation?Gadamer, in discussingAristotle'stransitionfromethicsto pol-

itics,rightlyobservesAristotle'sbeliefthatcustomand traditionhelp pro-
vide thecontextfora harmonioussocialexistence.But he makesno mention
ofAristotle'sfurther argumentthatcustomand traditionare not sufficient
forhabituatingmost people to become virtuousand cooperativecitizens:
coercionand punishmentby a prudentrulerwillalso be needed (Gadamer
1983: 47, 81, 92, 131-36).
As a consequence of ignoringAristotle'scommendationof the uses of
monarchicalrule, Beiner and Gadamer offera ratherone-sidedinterpre-
tationfromwhichAristotleemergesas too sanguine about the prospects
forcommunitarianharmonyand participation.This has theeffectofmis-
statingthegroundson whichAristotleactuallydoes commendwhathe calls
the "politicalcommunity."To be sure,Aristotle'spoliticalphilosophyem-
phasizesthedesirabilityofcommunitiesgoverningthemselves.Most ofhis
argumentsand illustrations pointin thisdirection.But Aristotlemakesthis
recommendation in lightofthepossibilitywhichhe also raisesthatthebest
formof governmentis not a politicalcommunityat all, but a monarchy
run witha rationalefficiency thatleaves littleor no scope forcitizenpar-
ticipation.Beiner and Gadamer tend to treat the expert,constructivist
dimensionofpoliticsas the alienatingalternativeto thecontextof mutual
agreement.They see political"discourse" as somethingthatflowersnatu-
rallywhen it is released fromthe constraintsplaced on it by the technical
reasoningwhichbuttressesthemodernstate.But in Aristotle'sview, good
governmentnot onlydraws on the everydayexperienceof the non-expert
majority, buton a certainkindoftechnicalreasoning(techne) and construction
(poiesis)at thedisposal ofexpertrulers. The prospects foradapting Aristo-
tle's politicalthoughtto the search fora new communitarianphilosophy
depend, not on omittingthistechnicaland inegalitarianside of it, but on
understandinghow Aristotleis able to arriveat a preferenceforpolitical
communityin fullawarenessofwhathe takesto be themonarchicalclaim.
In what follows,I willdemonstratetheimportanceofthe monarchical
dimensionofAristotle'spoliticalthoughtforunderstandingthe character
and limitsofhis preference forpoliticalcommunityby examiningtheprob-
lem of what Aristotlecalls "superlativevirtue" in the Politics.2In Aristo-
2
AlthoughI have employedthe familiartranslationof the Greek word areteas "virtue,"
it is helpfulto note at the outsetthatthe Greek word has a broader range of meanings
than its Englishcounterpart.Literally,it means "excellence." Thus, it can make per-
fectsensein Greekto speakofthe"virtue" ofa carpenter,doctor,rhetoricianor general,
meaning theirtalentforwhat theydo. This can strikemodern readers as unusual be-
cause we generallytake "virtue" to mean somethingcompletelydisinterested,the ca-
pacity to rise above one's own desires, ambitionsand preferencesfor the sake of the
general good. We would be inclinedto thinkthata general's talentto conquer people
or a rhetorician'sabilityto persuade themto see an argumentas being strongerthan
it reallyis are too prone to belligerence,deceit, and self-aggrandizement
to be consid-
ered properlyvirtuous.The Greekaretecertainlycan have theconnotationofself-denial
and preference forthecommongood above one's own, and itoftendoes have thismeaning
in theworksof Plato and Aristotle.But its meaning is not restrictedto this,and virtue
is nevercategoricallydefinedin thisway so as to exclude all othermeanings. Plato and
Aristotleoftenuse thewordin itsmorecolloquial sense as a talentwhichmay well result
Virtue 161
Superlative
thepublicclaimsofthe"best man" to rulemonarchically

tie's presentation,
constitutean especiallyrevealingtestcase forthe politicalcommunity's
claims to be able to governitself.For here the community'saims are at
loggerheadsnot merelywithselfishdesires- whichAristotlehas no diffi-
cultyrepudiating- but withthehighestdegreeofvirtue.As I will argue,
Aristotlehas a way of resolvingthisproblemin favorof what he takes to
be therequirements of"politics" and thepoliticalcommunity.But although
the cumulativemessage of the Politicsis Aristotle'sendorsementof politi-
cal community,the claim of superlativevirtueto monarchicalauthority
undulatesthroughoutit, leaving thisendorsementa nuanced and condi-
tional one.
THE PROBLEM: WHOSE RULE IS "BEST"?

The problemof superlativevirtuein the Politicscomes clearlyto light
in Aristotle'sequivocal definitionof thebest claim to rule.3In the sixfold
classificationofconstitutionspresentedin Book 3, the "correct" constitu-
tions are monarchy,aristocracy,and polity,while the "deviations" are
tyranny,oligarchy,and democracy.Aristocracymeans, literally,"rule of
thebest" withrespectto virtue(1279a-b; 1278a15-20),makingitthe "best
constitution"(1284b20-30; 1293b1-10). But Aristotlealso argues in Book
3 thattheruleofthebestcould be monarchical.In fact,ifthe "best man,"
a man of "superlative virtue" (aretehuperbole), were to appear, even an
aristocracy - indeed, especially aristocracy- should give him com-
an
pleteauthority,sincevirtueis itsprincipleofjustice(1284a-b; 1286a5-10).
Strictlyspeaking,then,it appears thatthe rule of the best - aristocracy
- is monarchy,ratherthantheself-governing communitywhichbears this
name in thesixfoldclassification(Newman 1950, 3:xxix). Some commen-
tatorsregardthisaspectofBook 3 as a ratherpuzzlingrelapseintoPlatonism,
as if Aristotlehad suddenly conceded the possibilityof the Platonic
philosopher-king (Saunders 1981: 210, 220; Ross 1960: 255). It is all the
more puzzlingbecause whenAristotleturns,in Books 7 and 8, to the full
analysisofthe "best constitution,"he proceedsto describean aristocratic
in advantage, honor and reputationto its possessor. This makes it difficultto state at
the outseta generaldefinitionof Aristotle'sview of virtue,fromwhich all specificin-
stances of it could be rigorouslyderived. The plasticityof the Greek word gives "vir-
tue" a shiftingmeaning. For instance,"superlative virtue," the themeof this paper,
could also be translatedas "too muchvirtue," "excessive virtue." To our moralreason-
ing,thissoundsalmostlikea contradiction in terms,like"harmfulbenefit."For Aristotle,
however,as we will see, it is quite conceivable that a ruler could have an excessive,
overbearingamount of "excellence" fromthe viewpointof those under his rule. Psy-
chologically,Aristotleobserves, the "best man" may well be prey to anger and pas-
sion; only laws are capable of being purelydisinterested.Thus, one has to followthe
differentmeaningsofvirtuethroughout Aristotle'stexts,notingthewaysin whichAristotle
acknowledgesthe various "excellences" whichpeople contributeto theircommunities
and contrastingthis plural meaning with the "superlative virtue" which the rare in-
dividual of prudence will occasionallycome along to demonstrate.
3 I use the Newman edition of the Politics
(1950).
162 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
community - as if he had never admitted that, strictlyspeaking, the most

virtuous form of rule was monarchical (1325b30-40; 1326b9).
We can make sense of this apparent inconsistency by relating it to some
broader issues in the Politics.The case of the individual possessing "super-
lative virtue" is part of an extended discussion of the meaning of justice
in Book 3. The core of this argument is the section on ostracism, where
Aristotle says that to exclude the man of superlative virtue frommonarchi-
cal authority bespeaks "a certain political justice" (1284bl7), but would
not conform to the "absolutely just" (1284b25). However, in order to un-
derstand the fullbearing of Aristotle's distinction between "absolute" jus-
tice and "political" justice, we should firstconsider what he means by
"political." I will begin, therefore,by examining Aristotle's way of distin-
guishing between political and other kinds of authority. As we will see, this
turns out to be a distinction between a political community whose mem-
bers possess enough virtue to be able to govern themselves and a prudent
monarch whose virtue is so outstanding that he deserves to rule the city
with the same kind of authority that a master exercises over a household.
However, the claim of superlative virtue to exercise this kind of authority
leads to the destruction of the city understood as a community of diverse
contributions and interests. Having shown the tension between political
community and monarchy, I then turn to Aristotle's consideration of what
happens when the claim to possess superlative virtue rears its head in the
midst of the political community itself.
POLITICAL AND MONARCHICAL AUTHORITY
The association which aims at the supreme good, according to Book

1 of the Politics,is the political community (koinoniapolitike).4The member
of this community is a citizen who holds office in alternation with other
citizens. A political community, in other words, is one where, by natural
endowment and condition of life, people are equal - or, at least, no one
is sufficientlysuperior to the othersto be entitledto hold officepermanently.
The other kinds of rule, although they are associations, are thus not politi-
cal associations, but varieties of monarchical rule: the king or royal ruler,
household manager, and master. Aristotle is at pains to point this out be-
cause some hold the view that these forms of rule do not differin kind,
but only in number. If this were so, Aristotle argues, it would mean that
statesmanship,kingship, masteryand household management could be con-
flated. However, the three types of one-man rule do have more in com-
mon with each other than they do, taken together, with the political
community. As we soon learn, household management and the mastery
4 The "political community"(koinonia politike)is Aristotle'smost general termfora com-

munityof shared rule in contrastwithmonarchy.The "constitution" (politeia)is the
more specificorderingof, and distributionof officesand authoritywithin,the cityin
accordance witha corrector deviant interpretation ofjustice. "Constitution" is also
thename ofoneof the six "constitutions." I translateit in the familiarway as "polity"
to avoid confusion.The meaningsofthesetermsare discussedmore fullyas theyemerge
fromthe text.
Virtue 163
Superlative
of slaves are both requiredby the household(oikos)in orderto secure the

necessitiesof life. As forkingship,some have evidentlythoughtthat the
cityitselfcouldbe ruledlikea household- a viewwhichin Book 2, Aristotle
attributesto Plato's Republic(1261a10-22). From theveryoutsetofthePol-
itics,then,and withPlato in mind,Aristotleis disputingtheargumentthat
all human associations,public and private,could be organizedby a single
royal"science" (epistme)of governing(1252a. cf. Newman 1950, 2: 101;
Plato Statesman 259; Xenophon Memorabilia 3.4.12; 3.6.14). A cityruled
likea householdin whichthemonarch'ssubjectsdo not participatein rule
butpassivelycarryoutthetasksassignedthemis thealternative whichAristo-
tle is concernedto preventfromoverwhelming self-government by citizens
in a politicalcommunity.5
The distinctionbetweenpoliticaland monarchicalrule sheds lighton
thelongdiscussionofthehouseholdwhichcompletesBook 1 (1253b-1260b).
Beinerand Gadamer sharetheviewadvancedby Hannah Arendtand Juer-
gen Habermas thattheaim ofthisdiscussionis to establishthesuperiority
of public,communalexistenceover theprivatehousehold's concernswith
materialnecessitiesand comforts(Arendt 1958: 22-37; Habermas 1974:
42, 48). This is one ofitsaims. But focusingon thisaim alone misseswhat
forAristotleis the more problematicand extendedpart of the investiga-
tion: can the household's formsof rule be applied not only to managing
one's privateaffairs,but to entirecities?When Aristotleposes the ques-
tion of whetherthe art of householdmanagementis identicalwiththe ac-
quisitionofwealth,he is notonlyconcernedwithprivatehouseholds.This
questionis one ofhis waysofexploringmorefullythepossibilitythatthere
is a "science" of masterywhichwould swallowup not only the manage-
mentof privatehouseholdsbut statesmanshipand kingshipas well - an
error,he pointsout, "which we raised at the beginning" (1253b15-20).
The discussionof the householdand its place vis-a-visthe citythus dou-
bles back to thatalluringprospectofa singlemonarchicalscienceofgovern-
ing(cf. Newman 1950, 1: 145). Moreover,whereasAristotleis certainthat
the lifeof citizenshipis betterfora human being than absorptionin pri-
vate money-makingand acquisition,he is not nearlyso categoricalin as-
sertingthe superiorityof the "political community"to a certainversion
of the household as a patternforgovernment.
The analysisofthehouseholdbeginswiththeruleofa masteroverslaves.
Accordingto Aristotle,thetools,includingslaves, thatthemasteremploys
are eitherforproduction(poiesis)or action(praxis).The epitomeofproduc-
tivityis the "architectonic" rule of a master-craftsman over
(architekton)
a rankeddivisionoflabor, his slavesbeing "tool[s] servingtools." Ideally,
Aristotlesuggests,toolswoulddirectthemselvesautomaticallyto fulfill their
part of the master-craftsman'splan. The fancifulcomparison of such tools
to the legendaryself-movingstatuesof Daedalus impliesthat,just as the
mostproductivetoolswould be animate,themostproductiveslaves would
be inanimate,or as close to automatonsas human beings could become.
5 See Newell (1983) fora discussion of Xenophon's conceptionof universal monarchyin

contrastwith the Aristotelianconceptionof political community.
164 Western
PoliticalQuarterly
Perfectproductivity, in otherwords,would abstractfromall action. But

considered,an instrument
a slave is, rightly foractionratherthanproduc-
tion (1254al-10). It is like a bed, whichprovidesnothingbeyond its use,
ratherthanlikea shuttlewhichproducesa commodity.A slaveis thussome-
one who by naturebelongsto a masteras an instrumentof action. In this
way, Aristotletriesto preventtheidentification of masterywiththeopen-
ended acquisition of wealth.
As to whetherthe authorityof masterover slave can be justifiedquite
apartfromthequestionofitseconomicconsequences,Aristotlearguesthat
thisis a matterofdistinguishing naturalslaveryfrommerelyconventional
or legal slavery.Despite the attentionthis particularpassage has under-
standably received fromcommentators,6we should bear in mind that
Aristotleis not onlyor even mainlyconcernedwiththe frequentinjustice
ofconventionalslavery(whichhe admits),but to distinguishpoliticalrule
overnaturallyequal citizensfromtheruleofa masteroverslaveseven when
the latterwould be just. Though some details of the argumentjustifying
naturalslaveryare drawnfromprivatelife,in itsconclusionwe are reminded
thatitsmain targetis thaterrordiscussedduringtheinitialdistinctionbe-
tweenpoliticaland otherkinds of authority:"all [formsof] rule are not
[the same], althoughsome say theyare" (1255b15-20).
The firstconclusionAristotledraws, then,about the art of household
managementis thatit shouldnotbe identifiedwithproductivity. Were this
identification to be made, the inflateddesiressuch productiveartswould
servein privatelifecould, Aristotleobserves,fuelan ambitionforpower
and statusin publiclife.Someone who is unable to fulfill his desiresin pri-
vate lifewill seek to do so "by othermeans" like "courage" or "general-
ship" (1258a5-15) - that is, by political and martial daring. Aristotle
underscoresthe danger by depictinga tyrantin this contextas someone
who disposes of an entirecityas his privatepropertyand business enter-
prise(1 259a23-37). The productivity oftheprivatehouseholdmustthere-
forebe circumscribed by therequirements ofthecommongood. The proper
use of wealthis to enable theheads of householdsto pursue public affairs
and philosophy.
Althoughthismightseem to dispose of the claim of the household as
a model forgood government,it is, however,far fromthe whole story.
For the question remainsas to whethersome formof one-man authority
besidestheexploitive,tyrannicalkindmightbe morebeneficialforthecity
than the "political community."This leads to the more complexlevel of
Aristotle'sinvestigationwhichBeinerand Gadamer omit. If thereare not
enough people in any givencitywho are naturallytalentedenough to be
able to pool theirabilitiesand governtheirown affairs,a monarchwho
organizedthemintotheirrespectivefunctionsmightbe a superioralterna-
tiveto a self-governing community.Anticipatingthisobjection,Aristotle
6 The degree to whichAristotlebelieved thatconventionalslaverycoincided with natural
slavery- or whetherhe believedsuch a coincidenceever occurred- is a much argued
question. See, e.g., Ross (1960: 241-42), Strauss (1977: 22-23), Nichols (1983), Mul-
gan (1977: 42-45), Smith (1983), Fortenbraugh(1977).
Virtue 165
Superlative
arguesthat"nature" willprovide"human beings" fitforcitizenshipjust

as she can be expectedto providebothhouseholdmanagersand statesmen
withthe materialnecessities.Statesmanship,therefore,does not need to
"make" or produce(poiein)human beingsfitto live in a city,just as weav-
ing does not produce wool but "uses" wool already provided for it
(1258a20-30). At most,statesmanshipmustbe able to distinguishbetween
the good and bad people already present.The derogationof "making"
in favorof"using" whathas alreadybeen providedrecallsAristotle'searlier
criticismof the householddevotedwhollyto productivity,epitomizedby
the rule of a master-craftsman over a rankeddivisionoflabor. Justas the
householddoes notneed to be givenover to the "architectonic"organiza-
tion of the arts, Aristotleimplies,neitherdoes the city.
In lightof what has preceded,Aristotlegoes on to make the startling
remarkthat"the rulermusthave completemoralvirtue,forthework[he
does] is, taken absolutely,that of a master-craftsman, and reason (logos)
is a master-craftsman" (1260al0-20). Until now we have receivedthe im-
pressionthatAristotlepreferssharedruleto monarchicalrule and thatthe
monarch's skillin "producing" people fitto live in a cityneed not over-
ride the community'sclaim to be able to governitself.Has Aristotlenow
reversedhimselfto endorsethe "architectonic"patternof rule? In order
to clarifythetermsofthisremarkableassertion,we mustturnto some refer-
ences outside of Book 1 and to the Nicomachean Ethics.
In Book 3 ofthePolitics,we learnthatwhilerulersand ruledmay share
certainvirtues,one virtueis peculiar to rulersalone. This is prudenceor
practicalwisdom(phronesis). Prudencetherefore demonstrateswhythevir-
tue of a good citizenrarelycoincideswiththatof a good man, since pru-
dence cannot be exercisedby citizenswho do not themselvesrule. Only
in an aristocracy,wherethecitizensare also rulers,can thevirtueofa good
citizen and a good man coincide. Prudence is at all events uncommon,
characteristically exercisedby "one" or "one withothers." Aristotleem-
phasizes its rarenesswithtwo illustrations:(1) The ruleddo not need pru-
denceforunderstanding butcan getbywith"trueopinion."
politicalaffairs,
This presumablyenablesthemto understandtheprudentjudgmentsoftheir
rulerswithoutsharingthecapacityto make them.Aristotlelikensthisrela-
tionshipbetweenrulerand ruledto thatbetweena pipe playerand hispipes.
(2) Aristotle'sexample of the prudentrulerhere is Jason, who could not
bear to retirefromtyrannyinto privatelifebecause he had such a "hun-
ger" to rule. All in all, a large gulfseparatesthe virtueof the rulerfrom
the virtueof the citizen (1277a15-25; 1277b25-32).
The virtueof the "best man," Aristotleobserveslater in Book 3, is
"superlative" specificallywithrespectto "political capacity" (1284al0).
Prudence is similarly characterized in Book 6 of the Ethics
(1180b25-1181a10), and thediscussionthereclarifiesa numberoftheterms
we have encountered.Prudence is both the chiefintellectualvirtueapart
fromwisdomand theconditionforthepossessionof all the moral virtues.
The rare individualwho possessesit will therefore possess such virtuesas
liberality,moderationand courage, while people possessingone or more
of theselesser virtueswill not necessarilyachieve prudence. Prudence is
166 Western
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notan art(techne) because it does not "make" or "produce" (poiein)things.

It is not a science(episteme)because it does not deal withpermanentcondi-
tions, but withvariable ones (1140a25-1140b10). However, prudence is
somethingconsiderablymorepreciseand skillfulthaninstinct,improvisa-
tionor evendebateamonginformedcitizens.For prudencemustbe guided
by an "architectonic"facultyfor"statesmanship," applyingthisfaculty
accordingto "correctreason" (1141b10-30; 1144b10-25). Aristotle'sex-
ample of prudentstatesmanshiphere is Pericles(1140b7-10), whose pre-
dominance over the Athenian democracy Thucydides compares to a
monarchyin all but name (Thucydides 1951: 121).
The characterizationof prudentstatesmanshipas an "architectonic"
facultyguided by correctreason suggeststhat the gap betweentechnical
and scientificreasoningon theone hand and prudenceon the otheris not
as wide as itmightappear. As we observedin Book 1 ofthePolitics,Aristo-
tleregardsthearchitectonicorganizationof theartsas theoptimalone for
technicallyskilledproduction(poiesis).Moreover,although"intelligence"
(nous) is initiallycharacterizedin the Ethicsas the source fromwhich
"science" intuitsthefirstprinciplesofdeductiveproofs,Aristotlelatersug-
geststhat "intelligence" also furnishesprudencewithan intuitionof the
particularswithwhichit mustdeal (1143bl-10). In Book 10 of the Ethics,
whenAristotlediscussesthetransitionfromethicsto government,thedis-
tinctionbetweenartand scienceon theone hand and prudenceon theother
is furtherrelaxed. This appears to parallel Aristotle'scontentionthatwe
mustturnfromethicsto governmentbecause persuasionis not enough to
make mosthuman beings prefervirtueto vice: formost people, "force"
and law are also required.The prudentruleris now said to have to know
"statesmanship" with the same acuity as scientistsknow science and
artisans know art, so as to be able to "make (poiein) people better"
(1179b-1180alO; 1180b20-1181a10). In otherwords, the transitionfrom
questionsof ethicsto questionsof governmentand rule leads to less em-
phasis on persuasionand the voluntaryaspect of citizens' habituationto
virtueand to more emphasison the need to supplementpersuasion with
regulationand punishment.As thistransitionoccurs,prudencemovescor-
respondinglycloserto (thoughit nevercoincideswith)poiesisand episteme.
These modulationsin the meaning of prudentstatesmanshiptake us
back to the underlyingdebate betweenAristotleand Plato. Aristotlewill
not abandon the distinctionbetweenprudence as a kind of skilledjudg-
mentofexperienceand thepureexpertiseofscientific and technicalknowl-
edge. In contrast with Plato, Aristotle willnot allow the sphereofpractical
statesmanshipto be assimilatedentirelyto a monarchicalscience of rule.
This parallelshis unwillingnessto see the sphereof public lifeobliterated
by themonarchicalscienceofhouseholdmanagement.His examplesofpru-
dent statesmen,thoughindividualsof rare ability,are fleshand blood ac-
tual rulerslikeJason and Periclesratherthan thetotallydisinterestedand
ideal prototype ofPlatonicmonarchy.On theotherhand,however,Aristotle
is willingto modifythedistinction betweenprudentstatesmanship and tech-
nical reasoningas he moves fromthe formationof a gentlemanlycharac-
Virtue 167
Superlative
terin the Ethicsto the frequentneed in wider politicalpracticeformore

directand coercivemodes of habituation.
Let us returnto the passage fromthe Politicswithwhichthisexcursus
began(1260al0-20): iftherulerin the"absolute" sense,who rulesaccording
to "reason" and "complete moral virtue," is to patternhis rule on that
of the master-craftsman, thenit would seem thatpoliticsoughtindeed to
be organizedaccordingto therankeddivisionoflabor. For thisis themaster-
craftsman'sway of organizingthehousehold. In Book 2 of the Politics,we
learn thatAristotleinterpretsPlato's Republic- the city,as the Platonic
Socrates put it, "according to reason" (Republic369a) - as functioning
accordingtojust such a divisionoflabor. In thiscontext,Aristotleobserves
thatjust as it is more productiveforshoemakersalways to do the same
job ratherthan rotatingtheirjobs forothers,so would it be "better" if
the rulers of the political communitywere "always . . . the same"
(1261a30-1261b10). When consultingthe criterionof the good, in other
words,Aristotleseems to be at one withPlato on the best formof rule.7
Wherethatis notpossiblebecause "all are naturallyequal," he continues,
the membersof the communityshould rule and be ruled in turn.
But even iftherankeddivisionoflabor betweenrulingand ruledwere
possible,it is difficultto reconcileAristotle'sapproval of it in the context
just citedwith the main driftofhis argumentsin favorofsharedparticipa-
tion in ruling.The way to make sense of this,however,is to keep before
us thefundamental he makesbetweenpoliticaland non-political
distinction
associations.The Republic, Aristotleargues, is so unifiedowingto itshier-
archyoflabor thatit is like a singlehouseholdratherthan a city. For the
natureofthecityis differentiation. Diverse contributions,selfishinterests
and conflicting viewsofjusticecompriseitsfragileunity.Returningto Book
1, we finda variationon this argument.Althoughhe has just spoken of
moralvirtuein its"completion,"Aristotle now criticizesSocratesforhaving
held virtueto be the same in everysoul, differing only in the amount of
iteach soulpossesses(cf.PlatoMeno71-73;Nicomachean Ethics1144b-1145a).
Instead,different kindsofvirtueare distributedin varyingdegreesamong
men, women and children,dependingon whichvirtue,and how much of
it, is needed fortheirtasksas slaves, servants,familymembersor citizens
- tasksthatwill varyfurther withthe particularkind of constitutionun-
der which theylive (1260a-b).
Summing up the resultsof this analysisof Aristotle'sdistinctionbe-
tweenpoliticaland monarchicalrule: Aristotleargues thatalthoughthere
is such a thingas a good formofhouseholdrule, it is not a city,and that
althoughthereis such a thingas "absolute" rule employing"complete
moralvirtue," it need notassimilatethelesserand diversevarietiesofvir-
tue whichmake the citygo. Thus, whilethe reasonablerulermay indeed
be the rulerin the "absolute" sense, reason need not assertits claim to
rule wherenaturehas suppliedpeople of sufficient, diversevirtuesto gov-
ernthemselves.Wherehumannatureis notdeficient,the "architectonic"
rule of reason would be unnecessarilyand unjustlycoercive. Even where
7 Beltion(better)being the comparativeof agathos(good).
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human naturewere so deficientas to requirethiskind of rule, however,

itwould stillbe unpolitical
rule,destructive
ofthecityand citizenship.With
these argumentsin mind, we can now considerhow Aristotletreatsthe
claim of superlativevirtueto monarchicalauthoritywhenit presentsitself
among the otherclaimsto authoritywhichcontendin actual politicallife.
What happens,in otherwords,whentheman of "superlativevirtue" rears
his head in the midst of the communityof shared rule?
EQUALITY, INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL JUSTICE

The "best man's" claim to authorityis takenup in the midstof a dis-
cussionofthemeaningofjustice in politicalargument.Accordingto Book
justice is equalityforequals and inequalityforunequals.
3 of the Politics,
But while thereis agreementon the comparativequalityof things,there
is disagreementover who reallydeserveswhichthings.Our own interests
are inextricablyinvolvedwhenwe argue about whatconstitutes just treat-
ment.Hence, forexample,thepartisansofoligarchymistaketheirsuperi-
orityin wealthforsuperiority in all contributions
to thepoliticalcommunity.
The partisansofdemocracymistaketheirequalityin freebirthfortheequal-
ityofhuman beingsin everyrespect.Thus, Aristotlesays, "all adhere to
a kindofjustice,but theyonlyproceedso far,and do notdiscussthewhole
ofjustice .. ." (1280a5-15). The decision about the meaning ofjustice,
commonlya blendofthearguers'self-interest and a "part" ofjustice,gener-
ates the distinctionsamong constitutions.
In Book 3, however,Aristotleraisesdoubts about the adequacy of his
own six-foldclassificationof constitutions.In effect,he asks: is not even
thisvarietyofpossibledecisionsabout how to constitutethepoliticalcom-
munitytoo limitingof the possible meaningsof equality and inequality,
each one too exclusiveand narrowly-based withinitself?For thereare other
qualities(forinstance,ancestryand familybackground)whichcontribute
to the city's survivaland pursuitof the good lifebesides those contained
in thesix principles.8How, then,can we judge preciselya person's equal-
ityor inequalityin comparisonwithotherpeople so as to knowwho is en-
titledto "offices?"Distinguishingequalityfrominequalityin a politically
relevantway, it transpires,is a problemforwhichwe need "political phi-
losophy" (1282b).
Aristotleoffersthisillustration oftheproblem(1282b20-1283a30).Some
would argue that,ifpeople are equal in otherrespects,any remainingsu-
perioritywill sufficetojustifythe unequal distributionof offices.To this,
he respondsthatnotall formsofsuperiority justifysuperiorpoliticalauthority.
Using an analogy,Aristotlearguesthata superiorpipe playerwill always
deserve the best pipes. This will be the case even where anotherperson
8 In Book 4, where the most inclusiveconstitution,polity,is discussed in detail, Aristotle

observes that not only are theremany claims to virtue,but theymay co-existin the
same people, makingit even moredifficult to decide preciselywho is equal and unequal
in a politicallyrelevantway: "the same people [may be] soldiers,farmersand artisans,
as well as councillorsand judges, and indeed everyonethinkstheyare capable of hold-
ing most of the offices"(1291bl-10).
SuperlativeVirtue 169
is superiorto thepipe playerin birthor good looks in a greaterproportion

than the pipe playeris superiorto thatotherperson in pipe playing,and
even supposinglooks and birthto be greatergoods than pipe playing. In
otherwords, the diversecontributionswhichpeople make to the cityare
notcommensurable.They cannotbe super-addedso as to arriveat a ranked
hierarchyof who deserveswhat. This is in keepingwithAristotle'scriti-
cism, earliernoted,oftheSocraticargumentfortheunityofvirtue- the
notionthatvirtuewas thesame forall people, varyingonlyby the amount
each person possessed. If thiswere the case, it would be possible to con-
clude thatthesecondman was moreentitledto thebestpipes thanthebest
pipe player,because his superiorbirthand looks added up to more "su-
periority"than the pipe player's musical talent.
Of course, in anothersense the analogy does point toward the unity
ofvirtueand monarchicalrule.For eventhoughthecontributions ofdifferent
typesof people cannotbe added up into one overridingclaim to rule, ap-
parentlyoneperson could possess enough virtueto make this claim from
the outset. For the best pipe playerdoes unambiguouslydeserve the best
pipes. Earlier in Book 3, as we observed,Aristotlemakes thispoint more
explicitlyby comparingthe relationshipbetweenan outstandinglyvirtu-
ous ruler and his subjects to that between a pipe player and his pipes
(1277b25-30). Here, though,thedriftoftheargumentis towardinclusive-
ness. Hence, returningfromtheanalogyto theproblemofjustlydistribut-
ing politicalauthority,Aristotleconcludesthatneitherthe well-born,the
free,thewealthy,theeducated,northevirtuous- takentogether,in com-
binationsof two or more, or separately- can claim all politicalhonors
and influence,althoughtheyare certainlyentitledto a share of them.
The specificmentionof "education and virtue," the concommitants
of aristocracy(cf. 1283a35-1288b),makes it clear thatAristotleis notjust
speakingofvirtuein the relativesense of the manytalentswhichkeep the
citygoing.While allowingthateducationand virtuehave the "most just"
(1283a20-25) claim to politicalauthority,he maintainsthateven thesedo
not deserve"inequality in all." It thereforetranspiresthat"all such con-
stitutions,"includingaristocracy,are "deviant" because in each case the
rulingpart mistakessuperiorityin one quality forsuperiorityin all. We
are not surprisedto learn thisabout the regimespreviouslydescribedas
deviant because theydo not rule forthe common good but only forthe
rulingpart's advantage. But it is surprisingto learn thatvirtueitselfcan
push its claim to authoritytoo far.9
But thisis just what Aristotlemeans, and his reason forit is "politi-
cal" in the sense discussedabove. Here we should bear in mind that the
mostinclusiveofthecorrectconstitutions - mostconvenientlytranslated
as "polity" - is bothspecifically distinguishedfromruleaccordingto vir-
tue (aristocracy)and givenas its own particularname the name common
9 As Newman notes
(1950, 3: xxii-xxiii),the problem cannot be solved by assuming that
"all such constitutions"refersonly to tyranny,oligarchyand democracyor to ones in
whichauthorityis claimed on thebasis of somethingotherthanvirtue.See also thedis-
cussion in Mulgan (1974).
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to all six principlesof rule(politeia- "constitution" 1279a35-1279b). Al-

thoughitis theleastvirtuousofthecorrectconstitutions, polityis evidently
closestto whatAristotletakesto be the practicalaim of "constitutional"
government as such:theinclusionwithinthepoliticalcommunity ofas many
diverseand conflicting interestsand abilitiesas possible.10For a citythat
excludes too many people fromrule will be "full of enemies," and hence
unstable, makingboth mere life and the good life impossibleto sustain
(1281b25-35). The derogationin thiscontextofthe politicsofvirtuein fa-
vorofthe"constitutional" politicsofinclusivenesshelpsto explainAristotle's
remarkthatwe have to considerwhat will happen when all six claims to
rule "are presentin one city" (1283b1-5). This appears to mean thatthe
six-foldschema, thoughusefulas a heuristicdevice, is too abstract;that
therewillseldomifeverbe a precisefitbetweenreal citiesand thesix prin-
ciples of rule (cf. 1292b10-25). Cities as we observethemin practiceare
morelikelyto be a kindof politicalcauldronwhereall the claims are con-
tendingforpower at once. Even in citiesthatdo fitcloselyto one of the
classifications,otherclaims are seethingbeneath the surface,waitingfor
theiropportunity.Far frombeing able to stabilize the politicalcommu-
nity,therefore,each of the constitutions(with the probable exceptionof
polity)is likelyto be feltas a despoticimpositionby thosewhomit excludes.
Aristotleunderscoresthisdeficiency by arguingthat,pushedto itsextreme,
each principleof rule, as it were, self-destructs, ruiningthe self-interest
and authorityof itsveryclaimants,and necessitatinga more inclusiveap-
proach to power sharing.Thus, the oligarchsmust,in orderto live up to
theirown principle,give way to the one or fewrichestin theirmidst,or
to thecommonpeopleiftheyare collectively richerthantheoligarchy.Those
claimingto be equal by freebirthwill have to yield to the freest-born by
backgroundand ancestry.Those who claimto rulethroughvirtuewillhave
to yield to the one or fewmost virtuousin theirmidst (1283b5-1284a).
Up to thispoint,Aristotle'sargumentseems stronglyto favora broad
definition ofcontributions to thecityand a broad claimto publicauthority.
In a ratherabruptshift,however,he goes on to argue thattheremay be
4"one" whose virtueis so outstandingly superiorto all othervirtuesas to
make him like a "god" among "human beings," and who cannot even
be considered"a part of the city" (1284al-15). This is in keeping with
the preceding,whichmightappear to deny any such claim, if one bears
in mind that Aristotle'sdenial of supremacyto any one virtue,and the
overall derogationof virtuein favorof "constitutional" rule, was made
squarelywithina "political" contextas thattermwas discussed earlier.
The pointhere,bycontrast, is thattheman of"superlativevirtue"is literally
notpolitical;not "a partofthecity."" Here, then,we are gettingtheother
10Polityis themostinclusive
and stableofconstitutions
becauseitblendstheprinciples
of
democracy and oligarchy
which,betweenthem,includethemostpeopleand are the
sourceofthemostexplosiveandprevalent ofconflicts:
richversus
poor.ConsiderClark
1975: 104-05;Randall 1968: 263-64.
The languagerecallsBook1, wheresomeonewhois self-sufficientenoughnotto be "a
partofthecity"is said to be eithera beastor god (1253a25-30).
Virtue 171
Superlative
conclusionfromthepipe playeranalogywhichAristotledid notdraw when

stressingthelimitedclaimsofvariouskindsofvirtueto politicalauthority.
Althoughthediversecontributions in any givenpoliticalcommunitycan-
notbe rankedso as to establishan entitlement to exclusiveauthority,some
rare individualspossess a degreeof virtueso overwhelmingthatit cannot
be includedwithinthisbalancingand blendingofclaims in thefirstplace.
This is the "best man" withthat rare kind of prudence which sets him
apart fromthe rest.
AlthoughAristotlerecognizestheforceofthisclaim to rule,we should
note thathe does not presentsuperlativevirtueas an exclusivelyor self-
evidentlybeneficentqualityfromthe perspectiveof the politicalcommu-
nity.Superlativevirtuecertainlycan be takento mean rule in the "abso-
lute" sense, ruleaccordingto reasonbyone who possessescompletemoral
virtue.buteven a reasonableor prudentruler,Aristotleimplieshere,could
be partlymotivatedby an ambitionforhonor and perhaps even desire,
appearingto his subjectslike a predatorylion among thehares. We recall
that the examples of prudenceofferedin Book 1 and in the Nicomachean
EthicswereJason and Pericles- men scarcelydevoid of ambitionand ac-
customedto having thingsdone theirway. Whetherpurelybenevolent,
or willingto rule benevolentlyin exchange forcertainadvantages, such
a rulerwillin any case be hardforthe"equals" makingup a politicalcom-
munityto bear, just as theArgonautsfoundHercules too heavy fortheir
ship to stay afloat(1284al5-25).
The questionabledesirabilityofsuperlativevirtuefromtheperspective
ofthepoliticalcommunity- thequestionofwhethersuch a ruler'stalents
and beneficence couldeveroutweightheoverbearingqualityofhis authority
- is emphasizedby Aristotle'sinitialdiscussionof it in the contextof os-
tracism.In Aristotle'spresentation, ostracismis a typically
democraticprac-
tice because the claim of superlativevirtueto absolute authorityexistsin
a starkercontradictionwithdemocracy,whose principleis absoluteequal-
ity,thanwithany otherregime.But thequestionofhow to accommodate
such a claim is a problemforall regimes,accordingto Aristotle,the cor-
rectas well as the deviant. Ostracismis in factanalogous to the practice
oftyrants in "loppingoff,"likethetallestbladesofgrass,theleadingcitizens
who mightrivalthem.Despite his usuallystrongcondemnationoftyranny,
in thisconnectionAristotledoes not considerthe criticsof tyrannyto be
"absolutelycorrect"(1284a25-40). For theotherregimes- "even thecor-
rectones" - mustlikewiselop offtheoutstandingly virtuous.In thissense,
he seems to imply,all regimescontainan elementof tyranny,an uncom-
promisingsuppressionof the best titleto rule, and" in thistheyare adher-
ing to "a certainpoliticaljustice," althoughnotto absolutejustice." The
communityas politicalcommunity,as a differentiated unity,cannottoler-
ate the unifiedauthorityof the "best man" exceptat the price of its own
being - any more thana paintercan allow one part ofhis paintingto be
disproportionately large, or a chorus-master can allow a performer whose
voice is "nobler and more powerful" than all the rest(1284bl-30).
But when the constitution'sown principleof rule is "the best," there
appearsto be an insurmountable problemin principle.For neitherthedevi-
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ant constitutions (whichare nakedlybased on the rulers'self-interest) nor

polity(which aims at a blend ofdiverse interestsand espouse
contributions)
virtueas theirexclusiveand undilutedclaim to authority.But how can
an aristocracyconsistently rejecttherule ofone "surpassinglyvirtuous?"
For it to do this,Aristotleargues, would be like "claiming to rule over
Zeus." In an importantqualificationofhis claim in Book 1 thatstatesmen
need not "make" humanbeingsbecause naturewillprovidesufficient num-
bersof themcapable of governingthemselves,Aristotlenow adds thatsu-
perlativevirtueand itsclaimto authority also flowfromnature(1284b20-35).
In thecase ofthisone constitution (thatis, aristocracy),one-manruleover-
rides "political" rule strictly
in keepingwitha correctprincipleof "politi-
cal" ruleitself.In otherwords,thearistocrats'claim to authorityover the
politicalcommunitylaysbare, in an especiallyrevealingway, theinability
of "politicaljustice" altogetherto live up to therequirementsof "absolute
justice." Thus, whileallowingthatotherconstitutionsmay need to ostra-
cize individualsofsuperlativevirtue,Aristotle depictstheclaimsofthe"best
man" as being particularlyembarrassingforaristocracy.Withinthe six-
foldclassification,aristocracyis a peculiar sortof half-wayhouse between
thedeservingnessof superlativevirtueand the necessityforinclusiveness.
On theone hand, aristocracyis likelyto exclude too many people in com-
parisonwithpolity.On theotherhand, since aristocracyrecognizesvirtue
as theonlyclaim to rule,itsfailureto embodythehighestdegreeofvirtue
is more glaringlyunjustthanin thecase ofconstitutions whichjudge peo-
ple's contributions and interestsless rigorouslyand witha greaterview to
stability.Thus, Aristotleconcludesin whatsounds almostlikea quotation
fromPlato's Republic,"it remainsforall to obey such a man gladly, so
thatmen ofthissortare kingsin thecitiesforever"(cf. Plato Republic 473d).
SUPERLATIVEVIRTUE ANDJUSTICE
The discussion of monarchy which completes Book 3 is a recapitula-
tion oftheproblemof how to reconcilecompetingclaims forauthority-
how to judge betweentheequal and the unequal - in lightof the admit-
ted possibilityof superlativevirtue. Aristotle'spresentationof virtuous
monarchyrecallshis discussionin Book 1 of rule in the "absolute" sense,
the 'architectonic'rule of reason. For thismonarchyof the "best man"
is a formofhouseholdmanagement(1285b20-1286a). Moreover, alone of
the correctconstitutions, monarchyis in principlelawless, since its ruler
"acts in all thingsaccordingto his own will" (1287a1-10; 1287a30-40. Cf.
Newman 1950, 3: 28; Plato Statesman 292b-303c). It is an emphatically'un-
political' formof rule, thatis, incompatiblewithany notionof civic com-
munity.Since the view ofjustice it embodies - the outstandingmeritof
one person- can in no way be sharedor participatedin by the members
of a local community, it is also universalistic in principle, and so capable
of swallowingup whole cities and "nations."
Aristotleraisessome possibleobjectionsto virtuousmonarchyfromthe
"constitutional"perspectiveon the cityas an association "composed of
many (people)" (1286a25-35). Thus, he suggeststhat the "multitude,"
Virtue 173
Superlative
by pooling itsjudgments,may frequentlybe a betterjudge of public af-

fairsthantheexpert,in thesense thata banquet providedby manyhands
willbe superiorto one providedby a singleindividual.Whereas one man
- even, apparently,a virtuousruler- can be corruptedby "anger" or
some "other such passion," it is more difficultforeveryonein a crowd
to be led astrayat once. If the "majority" - relativeto the monarch-
are actuallyof "sound soul," thatis to say, an aristocracy,thentheywill
resistthe tendencyof a "multitude" to splitinto factions,and will there-
forebe altogetherpreferableto the rule of one (1286a35-1286b10).
Some would argue, moreover,thatit is simply"against nature" that
one man shouldrule because thecityis composedof equals (1287a10-15).
Thus, a communitywherelaw rules and officesare rotatedis preferable
to monarchy.For althoughman is a political animal possessingreason
(1253al-10), he is an animalnonetheless,and to alloweventhe"best man"
absolute power unconstrainedby law may offertoo much temptationto
the "wild beast" (therion) withinhim of desire and spiritedness(thumos -
1287a25-40). Thus, we are remindedagain that- at least fromthe per-
spectiveofthepoliticalcommunity- the"best man" maymixhisbenevo-
lent expertisewiththeleonine qualities of a lord and master.The rule of
law, by contrast,is like intelligencedivestedof such passions. Moreover,
althoughexpertsadmittedly mustsometimesoverridethelaw (just as a doc-
tor must sometimesdepart fromprescribedtreatment),expertisecan be
used forunjust ends (just as a doctorknows best how to kill a patient).
Thus, the rule of law is on the whole preferableto the rule of an expert,
a "mean" between(apparently)absolutemonarchyand the spontaneous
impulsesof the multitude(1287a40-1287b).
Still,it is importantto note thattheseare not so much Aristotle'sown
argumentsas hypotheticalobjectionspresentedforour consideration.He
concludesby statingthat,wheremen are equal, monarchyis neitherjust
nor advantageous,even ifthemonarchis (relatively)"superior in virtue"
- exceptin a certaincase." This is thecase, as at theoutset,of theman
of "superlative" virtuewho should not rule "in alternation"like citizens
but "absolutely." For, havingrehearsedtheobjections,Aristotledoes not
findthemsufficient. Whilean absolutemonarchshouldnotruleoverequals,
wherehe is "outstandingly"unequal, theyare plainlyno longer(even rela-
tively)equal (1288al-30).
Aristotlebringsus fullcircleto the problemof distinguishing equality
frominequalityand argues,somewhatstartlingly, thatthisproblemis solved
by theclaimofsuperlative virtueto monarchicalauthority. We are reminded
that all the other constitutions,including aristocracy,make claims to
authoritybased on different kindsof inequality.However, while theyall
urge thejustice of theseclaims,onlymonarchymeetsthe requirementsof
"the whole ofjustice," ofjustice in the "absolute" sense. Whereas the
partialityand exclusivenessoftheotherclaimsled Aristotleearlierto back
away fromthesix-foldclassification and to stresstheneed to blendas many
competing claims as possible, in the case of superlativevirtuehe appears
to regardthe equal and unequal as reconcilable.This claim is commen-
surable withall the othersif only in the negativesense that all the other
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claims are incommensurablewithit. But thiskindof monarchy,based on

theprincipleofhouseholdmanagement,is, in accordancewiththedistinc-
tionsbetweenkindsof rulemade at the beginningof thePolitics,unpoliti-
thatmeetstherequirementsofjustice is not itself
cal. The one constitution
a politicalcommunity.Thus, althoughwe are remindedin conclusionthat
to ostracizesuch a man would neverbe in accordancewith"absolute jus-
tice," we rememberthatit is in a sense "politicallyjust" to do exactlythat.
CONCLUSION
AlthoughAristotlecontinuesto include monarchicalrule among the

possible meaningsof aristocracy- the "rule of the best" - thoughout
therestofthePoliticsaristocracyhas mainlythemeaningofa politicalcom-
munityofthevirtuous(1289a26-38; 1293a35-1293b7;1294a9-29).In Books
7 and 8, wherethe "best constitution"is prescribedin detail,ithas exclu-
sivelythismeaning. On the basis of the precedinganalysis, several rea-
sons can be suggestedforthis ambiguity.First of all, aristocracyin the
lattersense, while extremelyrare, is in Aristotle'sview relativelycloser
to practicalpossibilities,and thus more easily emulated,than the rule of
a "god-like" monarch. Oligarchies,forinstance,can sometimesqualify
as 'loose' aristocracies,a blend of wealthand virtue(1249a9-29). Polity,
the correctregimewhichAristotlebelieves has the best chance of setting
a standardforactual practice,can encourage the awardingof officeson
the basis of virtue, the aristocratic principle of distribution
(1294a35-1294b14).
The otherreason forAristotle'sequivocal definitionof aristocracyis,
in myview, thedangerwhichhe believesis posed to public lifeby the ad-
vancementofa merelypresumptiveclaim to superlativevirtue.As we saw
in Book 1, Aristotlecautionsagainstperverting theproperuse ofthehouse-
hold or monarchicalformofrule intoa tyrannicalexploitationofthe city.
In real life,Aristotlelaterremarks,mostpeople are not even aware ofthe
distinction betweenmonarchyand tyranny,buttendto identify all govern-
ment with "mastery" - the exploitationof the ruled by the ruler
(1324b22-1324b41.Cf. Lord 1982: 190-91). Thus, theclaim to possess su-
perlativevirtuecould be used as a powerfulrhetoricalcamouflageby those
who aim at tyranny.12 Even someone who reallydoes possess the knowl-
12In thislight,we can see Hobbes as arguing thatAristotledid not

go nearlyfar enough
in thisdirection.For Hobbes, admittingeven the possibilityof superlativevirtuepro-
motes politicalinstability.For the presumptiveclaim, once admittedas a possibility,
is always open to recognitionand acceptance, meaning that the "vainglorious" have
a convenientpretextfortheirambition. Hobbes' presentationof the stateof nature is
meant to convince us thatno claim to superiorvirtuecan outweighour fundamental
equalityin vulnerabilityto violentdeath. Paradoxically,thisdemands a Sovereignwith
powersfaroutstrippingany thatAristotlewould have attributedto virtuousmonarchy.
For Hobbes, even fearof death at the whim of the Sovereign,let alone resentmentat
his failureto recognizemeritor rulebeneficently, is preferableto a stateofopen conten-
tion forpowerbased on competingclaims to virtue.If the protectionoflife,ratherthan
the possession of virtue,is the only admissible claim to absolute authority,the result
is a Sovereignwho cannot,in practiceor principle,be distinguished froma tyrant(Hobbes
1979: 226, 240, 700, 722; Laird 1943).
edge to govern- and here Aristotledeparts notablyfromthe Platonic

presentationofmonarchy- may also be vulnerableto a desireforhonor,
excessive anger, and an intolerancefor even a reasonable and well-
intentionedairing of views.
For theveryreasonthatAristotleis willingto mutetheclaim of super-
lativevirtue,however,it mightbe asked whetherwe cannotpush Aristotle
further in thisdirectionby abandoninghis concernwithsuperlativevirtue
whileretaininghis endorsementofpoliticalcommunity.My answeris that
a conceptionofpoliticalcommunity whichexcludedsuperlativevirtuewould
not be an Aristotelianconceptionof politicalcommunity.This is because
Aristotle'sunderstandingofpolitics,whiletryingto giveinclusivenessand
diversitytheirfairweight,is inegalitarian
in principle.Accordingto Aristotle,
man fulfillshis naturein politicallifeby pursuingvirtue.What Aristotle
means by virtueis, as we have seen, on a kind of slidingscale between
monarchyand slavery.Betweentheseextremesofexcellenceand helpless-
ness, the degree of virtueto be expected frompeople will vary with the
circumstances.The "constitutional"politicsofinclusiveness,and even an
aristocraticcommunity, requireonlya degreeofvirtueas closeto themonar-
chical end ofthescale as thedifferentiated unityofthecitycan withstand.
The factthat"constitutional"virtuedoes not measure up to the monar-
chical standard- the factthat citizens,forexample, may only be able
to understandprudentjudgmentswhile not being able to make themfor
themselves- does not rob it of its relativeworthin Aristotle'seyes. But
suchworthas ithas derivesfromitsrankingin comparisonwiththathigher
standard.Thus, althoughAristotleis tolerantofthelooserapproximations
of virtueachieved by mostpoliticalcommunities,he cannot embrace the
notionthatthereis no higherorderofvirtuein principlethanthatofwhich
everyhuman beingis capable. He does notregardprudence,forexample,
as thefacultyofman qua man, but onlyoftherareststatesmen.Aristotle's
endorsementof politicalcommunitycannot be severedfromhis concern
withsuperlativevirtuebecause superlativevirtueis the absolute standard
fromwhich the relativeworthof politicalcommunityis derived.
More fundamentally, Beiner's and Gadamer's visionofpoliticalcom-
munityis incompatiblein principlewithAristotelianpoliticalphilosophy
because theyconceiveof the naturalnessof politicallifeon entirelydiffer-
entgrounds.As we have observed,forAristotleboththepoliticalcommu-
nityand monarchicalrule are sanctionedby nature. That is, both shared
participation in rulingand theexclusiveruleofone are natural.The reason-
ing behindthisunderstandingof the natureof politicallifeis supplied by
Aristotle'sPhysics, wherenatureis understoodboth in termsof spontane-
ous self-movement and as beinganalogousto therationalprecisionby which
an artisanproducesthings.In otherwords,naturalphenomenaare a mix-
tureof the spontaneousand the rationallyconstructed.Nature is charac-
terizednot only by self-movement, but by techneand poieis. 3 Extending
13Aristotlerejectsthe pre-Socraticunderstandingof natureas pure spontaneityor becom-

ing because it cannot account for the formsand purposes of visible beings (Physics
193a5-193b20). But Aristotlealso resiststhe opposite extremeof making nature syn-
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thisunderstandingof natureto politicallife,the natural realm of politics

is accordinglya mixtureof the self-government of politicalcommunities
and theskillsofmonarchicalstatecraft by whichprudentrulers"make people
better." I have suggestedhow Aristotle,in contrastwithPlato, resiststhe
assimilation ofpoliticalcommunity to monarchicalrule.But althoughAristo-
tle's argumentcannotbe drivento a purelymonarchicaloutcome,it can-
not be driven to a purely communitarianoutcome either because his
conceptionof the naturalnessof politicsrequiresa mixtureof the spon-
taneous and the technicaldimensions.
Liberalpoliticalphilosophers suchas Hobbes upsetthisAristotelianbal-
ance by reducingtheunderstanding ofnatureto spontaneousself-movement
alone, and assertingman's capacityto turnagainst nature so conceived
and reconstruct thispurposelessflux.Rousseau reactedagainstthispurely
technicalmode ofstatecraft by evokingthespontaneousfreedomand whole-
ness ofthe naturallife,and thewholenessimmanentin societiesrelatively
closeto nature,in contrastwiththeartificialityand alienationbroughtabout
by the modern bourgeois state.Beiner and Gadamer echo theRousseauan
convictionthat,were man to be released fromthe bonds of the state and
the technicalreasoningwhichupholds it, his happiness would be freeto
flower.The point,however,is thatnot only the Hobbesian emphasis on
techniquecutadriftfromitsnaturalmooring,but theRousseauan emphasis
on spontaneitybereftof rationalconstructionare both distortionsof what
Aristotlemeant by the naturalnessof politicallife.
In Aristotle'sview, althoughman inclinesnaturallytowardvirtueand
cooperation,he does notdo so automatically, or merelythroughtheremoval
ofexternalconstraint.On thecontrary,laws and punishmentsare required
to forcerecalcitrant people away fromthepowerfulinclinationtowardvice.
Virtuousstatecraft is thereforea kindof "making" or constructionwhich
fulfillshuman natureby enablingit to resistitslowerimpulsesand pursue
itshigherend. For Aristotle,then,althoughpoliticscannotbe assimilated
to productionand art, neitherare thelattersimplyalienatingand restric-
tive. Politicsare "natural" in the Aristoteliansense because theyare al-
ways moving,in responseto circumstancesprudentlyassessed, between
the freedomof self-government and the authorityof statesmanship.
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