17.

Corpus v Paje

December 23, 1956 in Lubao, Pampanga, the passenger bus driven by Felardo Paje collided with the jeep driven by Clemente Marcia resulting to
Clemente’s death and physical injuries to two other persons. —A case was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga for homicide and double
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. —On November 7, 1960, Paje was found guilty but he appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals (CA). —On November 21, 1961, while Paje’s appeal was pending decision in the CA, Corpus instituted in the CFI of
Rizal a separate civil action (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Paje & Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc. —Corpus was claiming that the defendants be ordered to pay jointly and separately the amounts of damages. —On
November 9, 1962, CA promulgated its decision in the appeal of Paje reversing the appealed judgement and acquitting him after finding that the
reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident. —On December 29, 1962, Paje &
Victory Liner filed in the civil action a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the CA but the motion was
denied.

At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of action based upon a quasi-
delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Article
1144 of the Civil Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The lower court, in its order of May 31, 1966,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed
direct to this Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint

W/N the civil action had prescribed. YES. Assuming, arguendo, that the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia was based
upon a quasi-delict, 3 the trial court's finding that on that basis the action had prescribed is correct. An action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or
from December 23, 1956, and the running of the said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence.
(Paulan vs. Sarabia, G.R. No. L-10542, July 31, 1958.)
18. PNB v. Bondoc

19. Tolentino v. CA

Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law
during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous
years.

Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. After that, Constancia married ArturoTolentino on April 21,
1945 and they had 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.

Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the
surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters).

In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. The CA decision reversed that of the RTC’s.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed

HELD: Yes

In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted
from the day they may be brought.

Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.

The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired
knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.

She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on
November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.
20. William Miailhe v. CA

"On March 23, 1990, [Petitioner] William Alain Miailhe, on his own behalf and on behalf of Victoria Desbarats-Miailhe, Monique Miailhe-
Sichere and Elaine Miailhe-Lencquesaing filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages against [Respondent] Republic
of the Philippines and defendant Development Bank of the Philippines before the [trial] court. It was alleged, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

4. That plaintiffs were the former registered owners of three parcels of land located at J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila with an aggregate area
of 5,574.30 square meters, and a one (1) storey building erected thereon, formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80645 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila;

5. That the above-mentioned properties had been owned by and in the possession of plaintiffs and their family for over one hundred (100) years
until August 1, 1976;

6. That on August 1, 1976, during the height of the martial law regime of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, [Respondent] Republic of the
Philippines, through its armed forces, forcibly and unlawfully took possession of the aforesaid properties from defendants;

7. That [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through its armed forces, continued its lawful and forcible occupation of the premises from
August 1, 1976 to August 19, 1977 without paying rentals, despite plaintiffs’ demands therefor;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

8. That meanwhile, the Office of the President showed interest in the subject properties and directed defendant DBP to acquire for the
government the subject properties from plaintiff;

9. That on or about August 19, 1977, through threats and intimidation employed by defendants, plaintiffs, under duress, were coerced into selling
the subject properties to defendant DBP for the grossly low price of P2,376,805.00 or about P400.00 per square meter;

10. That defendant DBP, in turn, sold the subject properties to [Respondent] Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the President, in
1982;

11. That the only factor which caused plaintiffs to sell their properties to defendant DBP was the threats and intimidation employed upon them by
defendants;

12. That after the late President Marcos left the country on February 24, [sic] 1986 after the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated
extrajudicial demands upon defendants for [the] return and reconveyance of subject properties to them, the last being the demand letters dated 24
October 1989, copies of which are attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes ‘A’ and ‘A-1’;

13. That despite demands, defendants unjustifiably failed and refused, and still unjustifiably fail and refuse, to return and reconvey the subject
properties to plaintiff;

W/N petitioner’s action had prescribed. NO.

The records in this case indubitably show the lapse of the prescriptive period, thus warranting the immediate dismissal of the Complaint.

The suit before the trial court was an action for the annulment of the Contract of Sale on the alleged ground of vitiation of consent by
intimidation. The reconveyance of the three parcels of land, which the petitioner half-heartedly espouses as the real nature of the action, can
prosper only if and when the Contract of Sale covering the subject lots is annulled. Thus, the reckoning period for prescription would be that
pertaining to an action for the annulment of contract; that is, four years from the time the defect in the consent ceases. 7

A perusal of the Complaint shows that the threat and intimidation ceased after then President Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986. In
fact, it was only then that petitioner was allegedly able to muster the courage to make extrajudicial demands on the Republic of the Philippines.
Paragraph 12 of the Complaint states:

"12. That after the late president Marcos left the country on February 24, 1986 after the EDSA revolution, plaintiffs made repeated extrajudicial
demands upon defendants for [the] return and reconveyance of subject properties to them, the last being the demand letters dated 24 October
1989, copies of which are attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes ‘A’ and ‘A-1’;" 8

The foregoing was reiterated in the following statements in petitioner’s Pretrial Brief: 9

". . . During the height of the martial law era, the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, through his armed forces, forcibly and unlawfully took
possession of the property and after a year, directed the defendant Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") to buy the same from the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were forced to sell the property for the measly sum of P2,376,805.00, which [translated] to about P400.00 per square meter.
The property was later sold by defendant DBP to the defendant Republic of the Philippines [ "Republic" ], acting through the Office of the
President. Plaintiffs pray the Honorable Court to declare their sale null and void and to order reconveyance of the property."

Moreover, courts were functioning after Marcos left the country. There was no hiatus in the judicial system. This is manifest in then Acting Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee’s Circular No. 2, which is reproduced hereunder:

The foregoing clearly shows that the alleged threat and intimidation, which vitiated petitioner’s consent, ceased when Marcos left the country on
February 24, 1986. Since an action for the annulment of contracts must be filed within four years from the time the cause of vitiation ceases, the
suit before the trial court should have been filed anytime on or before February 24, 1990. In this case, petitioner did so only on March 23, 1990.
Clearly, his action had prescribed by then.

Interruption of Prescription

Petitioner asserts that the extrajudicial demands pleaded in paragraph 12 of the Complaint legally interrupted prescription in accordance with
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ARTICLE 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor."cralaw virtua1aw library

In other words, petitioner claims that because he is covered by the term "creditor," the above-quoted provision is applicable to him.

We are not persuaded. Petitioner himself avers that "the use of the terms ‘creditor’ and/or ‘debtor’ in Article 1155 of the Civil Code must relate to
the general definition of obligations." 10 He then asserts that "an obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the creditor) may
demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of a determinate conduct, and in case of breach, may obtain satisfaction from the assets
of the latter." 11 He also defines "credit" as the right to demand the object of the obligation. From his statements, it is clear that for there to be a
creditor and a debtor to speak of, an obligation must first exist.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In the present case, there is as yet no obligation in existence. Respondent has no obligation to reconvey the subject lots because of the existing
Contract of Sale. Although allegedly voidable, it is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 12 Not being a determinate conduct that
can be extrajudicially demanded, it cannot be considered as an obligation either. Since Article 1390 of the Civil Code states that voidable
"contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court," it is clear that the defendants were not obligated to accede to any
extrajudicial demand to annul the Contract of Sale. 13

In the absence of an existing obligation, petitioner cannot be considered a creditor, and Article 1155 of the Civil Code cannot be applied to his
action. Thus, any extrajudicial demand he made did not, or will not, interrupt the prescription of his action for the annulment of the Contract of
Sale.

21. Ledesma v. CA

On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed Civil Case No. 38287 in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which petitioner had
failed to comply with. As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981. On December
2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case No. 88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133, against
petitioner on the same cause of action and subject matter.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent by the court a
quo ordering petitioner to pay private respondent P168,000.00 with interest thereon of 12% per annum from December 2, 1988 until full payment
of the obligation, P16,800.00 as attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. Said judgment was affirmed by respondent Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29406 in
its decision promulgated on January 7, 1992, 1 and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution dated August 6,
1992. 2

Petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was denied in our aforesaid resolution, hence its present motion for
reconsideration, dated May 5, 1993. Contending that the second action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed, petitioner invokes
the rulings in Vda. de Nator, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et. Al. 3 and Fulton Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., Et. Al. 4 and
invites us "to give a second look at the apparently conflicting or divergent jurisprudence."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing
an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances have already been decided by
this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to the first.
The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank
of Manila v. Geraldez, Et. Al. 5 in this wise:

". . . The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would commence anew from the
receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period.

"A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period . . .

"Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the ‘prescription of actions is interrupted’ inter alia, ‘when there is any written acknowledgment of
the debt by the debtor.’ This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment, begins to run
anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered
inefficacious . .
Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription
commences to run anew. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and
continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if we
are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is
interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.

"There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of the cessation of the interruption by an intervening action upon the period of
prescription. There is the view expressed and perhaps, not without reasons, that the full period of prescription should start to run anew, reckoned
from the date of the cessation of the interruption. The contrary view is, that the cessation of the interruption merely tolls the running of the
remaining period of prescription, deducting from the full period thereof the time that has already elapsed prior to the filing of the intervening
action. Nevertheless, all discussion on this point is academic; considered in the light of either view, We find that the second action is not
barred."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the dismissal of the second case alleging that the filing of the first case neither tolled nor
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. This Court ruled that the filing of the first action interrupted the running of the period, and then
declared that at any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of the period remaining. It concluded that the issue of whether the filing
of the action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of the prescriptive period was moot and academic because, in either case, the
second action was still filed within the prescriptive period. Consequently, the Fulton case cannot also sustain the thesis of petitioner.

On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold that the correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in
and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company, not only because they
are later in point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner therein. Petitioner’s submission would result
in a bifurcated interpretation of Article 1155, aside from the irrational conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot produce the same result on the
prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.

22. Cabrera v. Tiano

23. PNB v. Osete