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PIMS 3.

5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS


3.3.3
Final Assessment of the In-Line Inspection Data
for Metal Loss Features On the
BP Canada Windsor to Dow Section of the
323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline
System

Report for:
BP Canada Energy Company
Calgary, Alberta

Project number: 90651801


.
Executive Summary
The 134.4 km long Windsor to Dow pipeline section of the 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) diameter
Cochin East Pipeline System, owned and operated by the BP Canada Energy Company Natural
Gas Liquids Business Unit (NGL BU), transports ethylene products from Windsor Terminal,
Ontario, to the Dow site, Ontario.
This pipeline section has a predominant (82.8%) nominal wall thickness of 6.22 mm (111 km),
while the remainder of the pipeline contains several variations in wall thickness ranging from
5.97 to 14.30 mm. The entire pipeline is comprised of Grade 359 MPa pipe and the majority of
the pipeline is coated with polyethylene tape. The maximum allowable operating pressure
(MOP) of this pipeline is 9930 kPa, which corresponds to a maximum operating stress level of
72% of the Pipe‟s Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) (based 6.22 mm wall thickness
pipe).
A program to verify the integrity of this system was initiated by the NGL BU in July 2005 utilizing
Magpie Systems Inc. Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) in-line inspection technology, to detect and
characterize metal loss features.
The MFL high-resolution in-line inspection tool detected 255 features including 105 individual
external and 47 internal metal loss features, 6 ID anomalies (dents), 71 “gain” features), 19 mill
anomalies and 7 weld anomalies (lack of metal). The deepest reported metal loss feature was
41.3% of the pipe wall thickness. This internal metal loss feature had a predicted burst
pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,199 kPa (88.5% SMYS, 123% MAOP (based on 6.22 mm wall
thickness pipe)), which was the only reported metal loss feature with a predicted burst
pressureRStreng 0.85dL of less than 100% SMYS and the lowest predicted burst pressure of all the
reported metal loss features. The deepest external metal loss feature was 39.6% of the pipe
wall thickness, with a predicted burst pressure of 23,185 kPa (117% SMYS, 233% MAOP (based
on 8.97 mm wall thickness pipe)).
Once the stipulated Level 1 (i.e. for “cluster”) and Level 2 (i.e. for “groups”) interaction criteria
were applied to the individual metal loss features, the list of detected features included
105 external features and 47 external features (the interaction criteria were applied by Magpie
Systems Inc.) These 152 metal loss features were identified and used as the basis for the
analysis outlined in this report.
The NGL BU completed twelve (12) excavations in 2006 to investigate/remediate 32 individual
external and internal metal loss features identified by the in-line inspection tool during the
excavation program, 21 of these features were identified in the field, 11 were not identified, and
an additional 32 “features not reported by the in-line inspection tool (un-graded) were found.
Two (2) additional features identified by the tool and found in the field, were not used in the field-
tool correlation for this assessment due to the limited tool information available.
The deepest metal loss feature verified in the field was 55.1% of the pipe wall thickness. This
internal feature also had the lowest predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of the features observed
in the field, which was 10,530 kPa (76.4% SMYS, 106% MAOP (based on 6.22 mm wall
thickness pipe)). This feature corresponds to the deepest internal metal loss feature reported by
the in-line inspection tool at 41.3% and was repaired during the 2006 excavation program.
The deepest external metal loss feature verified in the field was 37.4% of the pipe wall thickness,
with a corresponding tool reported depth of 18.1% of the pipe wall thickness. This feature had a
predicted burst pressure of 18401 kPa (92.6% SMYS, 185% MAOP (based on 8.97 mm wall
thickness pipe)).
A Final Assessment of the July 2005 MFL Inspection and April 2006 excavation data was
undertaken by CC Technologies Ltd. at the request of the NGL BU. The purpose of this
assessment was to evaluate the near term maintenance program completed by the company in
accordance with the BP Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) Procedure 3.5 “Pipeline
Field Excavation, Assessment and Repair Program”. In addition, the assessment of the long
term acceptability of the corrosion caused metal loss features was undertaken in accordance
with PIMS 3.3.3 “In-line Inspection Data”, to develop a long term maintenance program for the
entire Windsor to Dow pipeline section.
The PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment of the near term maintenance program for the Windsor
to Dow pipeline system indicated that one (1) metal loss feature fell within the PIMS 3.5
Remediation Criteria. This feature was identified with a predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of
≥125% and <150% of the MAOP, corresponding to a 180-day remediation schedule and was
excavated during the 2006 excavation program. There were no geometry features failing the
PIMS 3.5 Remediation Criteria.
The assessment of the in-line inspection excavation/validation program was performed to
analyze the in-line inspection tool performance in conjunction with the statistical testing of the
field-tool data to ensure that the excavation/validation program provided representative, reliable,
and conclusive results for the In-Line Inspection Final Assessment. The field-tool data statistical
testing indicated that the Probability of Exceedance (POE)-related coefficients (i.e., linear
regression equation and prediction error) could be used for modeling purposes in the Final
Assessment.
Based on the acceptability criteria for depth and burst pressure for metal loss features identified
within the In-Line Inspection Final Assessment conducted by CC Technologies, the most cost
effective Excavation/Re-inspection Program for the entire Windsor to Dow pipeline section is
attained by undertaking one (1) additional Probability of Exceedance excavation in addition to
those excavations completed in 2006 and re-inspecting this system in 2013 (8.4 years after the
July 2005 MFL in-line inspection) at a Net Present Value of CND (2005) $ 119,219. At the time of
the 2013 re-inspection, the worst predicted depth of a metal loss feature would be 66.2 % of the
pipe wall thickness, while the lowest predicted burst pressure would be 117.7% MAOP.
The NGL BU may elect to identify and undertake additional excavations to address other issues
(i.e. manufacturing defects, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) related issues, etc.). Confirmatory
digs are recommended to be scheduled within the re-inspection interval to verify/validate the
corrosion growth rates used in this assessment.
DISCLAIMER

This report documents the work performed by CC Technologies, Ltd. (CC Technologies) for
BP Canada Energy Company Natural Gas Liquids Business Unit (NGL BU).

(1) The recommendations and/or findings documented in this report are based on data
provided by NGL BU. This report reflects the data and conditions as of the report
date.

(2) Neither CC Technologies, nor any person acting on behalf of CC Technologies,


makes any warranty nor may representations that the use of any information,
method, or process disclosed in this report not infringe on privately owned rights.
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1

2 IN-LINE INSPECTION ASSESSMENT .......................................... 1


2.1 Assessment Criteria and Methodology ......................................................... 2
2.1.1 PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment Criteria for Near Term Maintenance Program ...... 2

2.1.1.1 Acceptance Criteria - Metal Loss Features ............................................ 2

2.1.1.2 Acceptance Criteria - Deformation Features.......................................... 3

2.2 Description of Probabilistic and Deterministic Methodologies .................. 4


2.3 Phases and Procedures ................................................................................. 5
2.3.1 Assessment of the In-Line Inspection Excavation/Validation Program ........................ 8
2.3.2 In-Line Inspection Final Assessment ......................................................................... 10
2.4 Analysis and Results .................................................................................... 15
2.4.1 Summary of In-Line Inspection Data ......................................................................... 15
2.4.2 PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment ......................................................................... 20
2.4.3 Assessment of the In-Line Inspection Excavation/Validation Program ...................... 22
2.4.4 In-Line Inspection Final Assessment ......................................................................... 36

2.4.4.1 Deterministic Corrosion Growth Model ................................................ 36

2.4.4.2 Probability of Exceedance (POE) Based Corrosion Growth Model ... 39

2.4.4.2.1 Probability of Exceedance Depth Based Model ................................... 39

2.4.5 Re-Inspection Interval and Cost/Benefit Scenarios Based on the Final Assessment . 50

3 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................... 56
3.1 Summary of In-Line Inspection Data ........................................................... 56
3.2 Assessment of In-Line Inspection Validation Program ............................. 56
3.3 PIMS 3.3.3 Assessment Long Term Maintenance Program ...................... 57

4 RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................ 57
4.1 PIMS 3.3.3 Assessment: Long Term Maintenance Program ..................... 57

5 REFERENCES ............................................................................ 59
Appendices
APPENDIX A INTERACTION CRITERIA
APPENDIX B EXCAVATION SCENARIOS
List of Tables

Table 1: Estimated Corrosion Growth Rates .....................................................................11

Table 2: Corrosion Growth Rate Comparison....................................................................12

Table 3: Distribution of External and Internal Metal Loss Features with Respect to
their Depth .............................................................................................................17

Table 4: Summary of the PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment ...........................................21

Table 5: External and Internal Corrosion Metal Loss Feature Distribution Detected by
MFL In-Line Inspection Tool versus Verified in the Field ...................................23

Table 6 (a): MFL Data versus Field-Measured Data for the NGL BU 323.9 mm (12.75 inch)
diameter Windsor to Dow Pipeline Section (Features used in the field tool
correlation) ............................................................................................................24

Table 7: Summary of Findings in the Field ........................................................................26

Table 8: Summary of Field versus Tool Reported Depth Differences ..............................27

Table 9: Summary of Field versus Tool Reported Burst Pressure Differences...............30

Table 10: Minimum Statistical Sample Size Calculation .....................................................36

Table 11: Probability of Exceedance Depth Scenarios .......................................................44

Table 12: Probability of Exceedance Burst Pressure Scenarios ........................................49

Table 13: Excavation and Re-Inspection Interval Program Scenarios: Technical and
Economic Factors Based on the Final Assessment for the Windsor to Dow
Section of the Cochin East Pipeline System .......................................................52
List of Figures

Figure 1: Probability of Exceedance for Depth and Burst Pressure Based Criteria ..............5

Figure 2a: Corrosion In-line Inspection Data and Fitness-for-Service


Assessment.................................................................................................................6

Figure 3: Illustration of a Re-Inspection Interval Based on Probability of


Exceedance ...............................................................................................................14

Figure 4: Summary of MFL In-Line Inspection Data for the 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) Diameter
Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section .......................................................16

Figure 5: Distribution of External and Internal Metal Loss Features ....................................17

Figure 6: In-Line Inspection External and Internal Metal Loss Features versus Distance
from Launch ..............................................................................................................18

Figure 7: Orientation of External and Internal Metal Loss Features versus Absolute
Odometer Distance ...................................................................................................19

Figure 8: Pipe Joint Length and Pipe Wall Thickness versus Absolute Odometer Distance
...................................................................................................................................20

Figure 9: Distribution of Metal Loss Features ........................................................................22

Figure 10: Cumulative Natural Distribution of the Percentage of Metal Loss Features
Verified in the Field ...................................................................................................26

Figure 11: T-Standardized Distribution of the Difference between Field Measured Depth and
In-Line Inspection Predicted Depth .........................................................................28

Figure 12: Field-Tool Normalized Depth Difference of +/- 10% of the Pipe Wall Thickness ..28

Figure 13: Distribution of Field-Tool Normalized Depth Differences for 80% of the Features
Validated in the Field ................................................................................................29

Figure 14: Natural Frequency Distribution of the Difference between Field Predicted Burst
Pressure and Tool Predicted Burst pressure .........................................................30

Figure 15: T-Standard Distribution of the Difference between the Field Predicted Burst
Pressure and In-Line Inspection Predicted Burst Pressure ..................................31

Figure 16: Distribution for a Normalized Difference of +/- 10% MAOP between the Field
Predicted Burst Pressure and Tool Predicted Burst Pressure ..............................32

Figure 17: Distribution of Field-Tool Normalized Predicted Burst Pressure Differences for
80% of the Features Validated in the Field ..............................................................32

Figure 18: Field Measured Depth versus In-Line Inspection Predicted Depth .......................34
Figure 19: Field Measured Failure Pressure versus In-Line Inspection Predicted Pressure 35

Figure 20: Features Exceeding Depth Based Criteria (≥80% of Pipe Wall Thickness) ...........37

Figure 21: Features Exceeding Burst Pressure Based Criteria (≤100% MAOP) .....................38

Figure 22: Worst Predicted Depth from Depth Based Probability of Exceedance
Value ..........................................................................................................................41

Figure 23: Probability of Exceedance - Depth Based Criteria Scenarios: 70% Worst
Predicted Depth ........................................................................................................41

Figure 24: Probability of Exceedance - Depth Based Criteria Scenarios: 80% Worst
Predicted Depth ........................................................................................................42

Figure 25: Lowest Predicted Safety Factor (MAOP) from Burst Pressure Based Probability of
Exceedance ...............................................................................................................46

Figure 26: Probability of Exceedance-Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios: 110% MAOP
Lowest Predicted Burst Pressure ............................................................................46

Figure 27: Probability of Exceedance- Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios: 100% MAOP
Lowest Predicted Burst Pressure ............................................................................47

Figure 28: Cumulative Probability of Exceedance Depth Based Level for Excavation/Repair
and Re-Inspection Scenarios ...................................................................................53

Figure 29: Worst Predicted Depth Based on Cumulative Probability of Exceedance Depth
Value per Excavation Scenario ................................................................................54

Figure 30: Cumulative Probability of Exceedance Burst Pressure Based Level for
Excavation/Repair and Re-Inspection Scenarios ...................................................54

Figure 31: Lowest Predicted Safety Factor (%MAOP) Based on Cumulative Probability of
Exceedance Burst Pressure Based Value per Excavation Scenario .....................55
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

1 Introduction
The 134.4 km long Windsor to Dow pipeline section of the 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) diameter
Cochin East Pipeline System, owned and operated by the BP Canada Energy Company Natural
Gas Liquids Business Unit (NGL BU), transports ethylene products from Windsor Terminal,
Ontario, to the Dow site, Ontario.
This section of pipeline has a predominant (82.8%) nominal wall thickness of 6.22 mm (111 km),
while the remainder of the pipeline contains several variations in wall thickness ranging from
5.97 to 14.30 mm. The entire pipeline is comprised of Grade 359 MPa pipe and the majority of
the pipeline is coated with polyethylene tape. The maximum allowable operating pressure
(MOP) of this pipeline is 9930 kPa, which corresponds to a maximum operating stress level of
72% of the Pipe‟s Specified Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) (based 6.22 mm wall thickness
pipe).
A program to verify the integrity of this system was initiated by the NGL BU in July 2005 utilizing
Magpie Systems Inc. Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) in-line inspection technology, to detect and
characterize metal loss features.
The MFL high-resolution in-line inspection tool detected 255 features including 105 individual
external and 47 internal metal loss features, 6 ID anomalies (dents), 71 “gain” features), 19 mill
anomalies and 7 weld anomalies (lack of metal). The deepest reported metal loss feature was
41.3% of the pipe wall thickness. This internal metal loss feature had a predicted burst
pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,199 kPa (88.5% SMYS, 123% MAOP (based on 6.22 mm wall
thickness pipe)), which was the only reported metal loss feature with a predicted burst
pressureRStreng 0.85dL of less than 100% SMYS and the lowest predicted burst pressure of all the
reported metal loss features. The deepest external metal loss feature was 39.6% of the pipe
wall thickness, with a predicted burst pressure of 23,185 kPa (117% SMYS, 233% MAOP (based
on 8.97 mm wall thickness pipe)).
A detailed Final Assessment of the 2005 MFL in-line inspection and excavation data was
performed to develop a long-term maintenance program, for the Windsor to Dow Pipeline
Section. This assessment included the following tasks:

 Assessment of the in-line inspection excavation/validation program;

 Corrosion growth modeling using both deterministic and probabilistic


approaches;

 Determination of integrity factors (i.e. worst predicted depth and lowest predicted
factor of safety) per each excavation/re-inspection scenario; and

 Cost benefits analysis per each excavation/re-inspection scenario.

2 In-Line Inspection Assessment


The purpose of this task is to assess both the short and long-term acceptability of metal loss
features detected in the Windsor to Dow pipeline section by the Magpie Systems Inc. Magnetic
Flux Leakage (MFL) in-line inspection tool. This inspection was performed in July 2005 and the
field excavations were performed in April 2006.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

The MFL tool accuracy was determined by comparing the metal loss data obtained from the MFL
in-line inspection tool to the metal loss data obtained during the field excavations completed in
2006.
The MFL in-line inspection data was subsequently analyzed using both deterministic and
probabilistic methodologies to determine the criticality of each metal loss feature with respect to
both depth-based and burst pressure-based criteria, for a twenty year period following the
inspection. The outputs from these detailed analyses were then used to develop the most
appropriate scope and schedule for future maintenance activities (i.e. excavation/repair and/or
re-inspection), with respect to metal loss, along this pipeline section.

2.1 Assessment Criteria and Methodology


2.1.1 PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment Criteria for Near Term Maintenance Program
The criteria used to assess the 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) diameter Windsor to Dow Pipeline
Section, with respect to metal loss features, are based on NGL BU‟s PIMS 3.5 Procedure and
are outlined below by feature type.
The following definitions shall be used in this document and are based on the PIMS 3.5
Procedure:
Discovery of Condition - occurs when adequate information exists about the condition to
determine that the condition presents a potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline;
Repairs - the range of actions that a pipeline operator could take to address an integrity
problem; and
Remediation - mitigative measures as well as repairs that an operator can take to resolve a
potential integrity concern.
2.1.1.1 Acceptance Criteria - Metal Loss Features
For metal loss features, the criteria are divided into an Immediate Action schedule and an
180-Day remediation schedule as summarized below:
a) Immediate Action Schedule:

 Metal loss features with a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% of MAOP, calculated using
RStreng0.85dL;

 Metal loss features having a depth ≥80% of the pipe nominal wall thickness; and

 An anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the operator to evaluate the
assessment results requires immediate action.
b) 180-Day Remediation Schedule:

 Metal loss features with a predicted burst pressure <125% of MAOP for Class 1 and non-
High Consequence Area (HCA) locations;

 Metal loss features with a predicted burst pressure <139% of MAOP in HCA segments or
<150% of MAOP for Class 2, 3 and 4 locations calculated using RStreng0.85dL;

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

 Metal loss features with a depth >50% of the pipe nominal wall thickness for the following
conditions:

 Located at foreign pipeline crossing;

 Metal loss features that could affect a girth or seam weld;

 Areas of general corrosion; and

 Widespread circumferential corrosion.

 Metal loss features on or along a longitudinal seam weld; and

 Any condition identified by an integrity assessment or information analysis that could


impair the integrity of the pipeline.
2.1.1.2 Acceptance Criteria - Deformation Features
For deformation features, the criteria are divided into an Immediate Action schedule, a 60-Day
Remediation Schedule and a 180-Day Remediation Schedule. A topside dent is defined as
being located above the 8 and 4 o‟clock positions. A bottom side dent is defined as being
located below the 4 and 8 o‟clock positions.
a) Immediate Action schedule:

 Topside dents with any indication of metal loss, cracking or stress riser;

 Topside dents with a depth of >6% of the pipeline diameter; and

 An anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the operator to evaluate the
assessment results requires immediate action.
b) 60-Day Remediation Schedule:

 Bottom side dents with any indication of metal loss, cracking or stress riser; and

 Topside dents with a depth >3% of the pipeline diameter (>0.250 inches/6 mm in depth
for a pipeline diameter < NPS 12).
c) 180-Day Remediation Schedule:

 Bottom side dent with a depth >6% of the pipeline diameter;

 Dent with a depth >2% of the pipeline diameter (>0.250 inches/6 mm in depth for a
pipeline diameter < NPS 12) at a girth weld or a longitudinal seam weld;

 Topside dent with a depth >2% of the pipeline diameter (>0.250 inches/6 mm in depth for
a pipeline diameter < NPS 12);

 Ripple or buckle with a height (measured from peak to valley) of >150% of the pipe
nominal wall thickness or a wavelength to height ratio <12;

 Ovality of the pipeline >6% of the pipeline diameter; and

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

 Any condition identified by an integrity assessment or information analysis that could


impair the integrity of the pipeline.
Some considerations and assumptions were made during the analysis of the metal loss features
identified by the MFL in-line inspection tool. A distance of +/- 5 cm from either side of the
longseam was used for those features that were detected along a longseam weld; similarly a
distance of +/- 30 cm from either side of the girth weld was used for those features that were
detected near a girth weld. In most cases, the location of the longseam was not reported in the
MFL data, and as such, this assessment could not be performed for those cases. The criteria
used to determine the locations of general corrosion is defined by “Specifications and
Requirements for Intelligent Pig Inspection of Pipelines”, Pipeline Operator Forum, Version 2.1,
November 6, 1998, which identifies general corrosion as an area with an axial length greater
than 3 times the pipe wall thickness [A], and a circumferential width greater than three times the
pipe wall thickness “[W ≥ 3A] and [L ≥ 3A]”.

2.2 Description of Probabilistic and Deterministic Methodologies


The methodology, based on Probability of Exceedance (POE) analysis, was developed to
assess the current and future integrity status of pipeline systems affected by corrosion[1, 2]. This
methodology takes into consideration such factors as: the inherent tolerances associated with an
in-line inspection tool and the subsequent growth of the corrosion features identified by the in-
line inspection tool. The Probability of Exceedance analysis determines the cumulative
probability that a corrosion feature exists in a given section of pipeline with a predicted depth
which exceeds the depth based criteria (≥80% of the pipe wall thickness), and also the
cumulative probability that a corrosion feature exists in a given section of pipeline with a
predicted burst pressure which fails the burst pressure based criteria (i.e. ≤100% of MAOP).
The cumulative probability is calculated on an annual basis for a period of twenty years following
the in-line inspection.
The deterministic methodology, which is actually incorporated within the Probability of
Exceedance analysis, also takes into consideration the inherent tolerances associated with an
in-line inspection tool and the subsequent growth of the corrosion features identified by the in-
line inspection tool. In this approach, as is the case with the Probability of Exceedance analysis,
the dimensions of the metal loss features are “adjusted” based upon the results of the
verification excavations. The “adjusted” metal loss features were subsequently grown into the
future, for a period of twenty years following the excavations/repairs in order to establish the
earliest year in which they are predicted to fail either the depth based or burst pressure based
criteria.
The primary difference between the two approaches is that the deterministic methodology
assumes that the dimensions of the “adjusted” metal loss features are in fact correct; whereas
the Probability of Exceedance analysis assumes that there is a certain probability (refer to Figure
1) that the actual dimensions of the metal loss feature may be more or less severe than those of
the “adjusted” metal loss feature. The number of metal loss features predicted to fail annually,
using the deterministic approach, is used in the Probability of Exceedance analysis in order to
establish various scenarios regarding future excavation/repair and re-inspection programs. The
Probability of Exceedance analysis subsequently determines the cumulative probability for each
scenario and transforms that probability into pipeline integrity indicators, such as the worst
predicted depth or the lowest predicted factor of safety at any given time in the future.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

100 1.10
Probability of Exceedance
RPR = 1 is equal to 100% SMYS
`
1.00
Actual Depth, % Wall Loss

90 20% x 250 mm

RPR Field Measurement


50% x 250 mm
75% x 250 mm
0.90
80

0.80
70
0.70 `
80% Pig Call

60
70% Pig Call 0.60

60% Pig Call


Probability of Exceedance
50 0.50
50 60 70 80 90 100 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Pig Call Depth, % Wall Loss RPR Pig Call

Figure 1: Probability of Exceedance for Depth and Burst Pressure Based Criteria

2.3 Phases and Procedures


Figures 2a and 2b, on the following pages, illustrate the three-phased approach for the
assessment of in-line inspection data and development of excavation/validation and re-
inspection programs, respectively.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

IN-LINE INSPECTION DATA AND FITNESS-FOR-SERVICE ASSESSMENT FOR METAL LOSS FEATURES

2. Excavation/Repair and ILI


1. ILI Preliminary Assessment 3. ILI Final Assessment
Validation Program

ILI RUN Assessment of ILI


Validation Program
ILI Vendor’s Pipeline Field
Preliminary Report Excavation/Inspection,
Assessment
and Repair Program Actual Tool Accuracy

Pressure
YES
Critical Reduction
Depth and Predicted
Features &
Burst Pressure
Leak Detection
Excavation / Adjustments
NO Inspection
YES Corrosion Growth Model
ILI Vendor’s Depth and Pressure
FINAL Critical [Deterministic Approach]
REPORT Features
Field Assessment
POE Modeling
[Method, Repair
ILI Data Quality Depth and Burst Pressure
Criteria]
Control and Based Criteria
Assurance [Probabilistic Approach]

Data Integration (i.e. Metal Loss,


Geometry, High Consequence Areas) Development of
Excavation/Re-
Repair [Methodology] Inspection Scenarios
PIMS 3.5: Immediate, 60-day and 180-
day Repair and Remediation Program

Tool Expected Accuracy [Monte Carlo] Cost Benefit Analysis

Excavation / Repair
Corrosion Growth Model Documentation
[Deterministic and Probabilistic] Best Technical/Economic
Re-Inspection Interval
Excavation and Validation Program

Figure 2a: Corrosion In-line Inspection Data and Fitness-for-Service Assessment

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

IN-LINE INSPECTION VALIDATION PROCESS

1. Program Development 2. Program Execution 3. Program Qualification/Assessment

Metal Loss In-Line Inspection


A Report
In-Line Inspection Tool Accuracy
[Probability of Sizing and Identification]
Re-grade CONSISTENCY
APPROACH WITH
IN-LINE Verification
In-line Inspection Data
INSPECTION
Quality Control
Depth and Burst Pressure Unity
Graphs
[Field versus Predicted Tool Data]
VALIDATION Interaction Rules
CRITICALITY APPROACH [i.e. Clustering,
APPROACH Minimum Statistical Grouping]
Data Integration Sample Size for
Criticality Assessment Depth and Pressure Linear Regression Analysis
Outlier Identification [Segmentation, Breaking Points]

Assessment
Methodology [i.e.
Verification B31G, Rstreng]
Number Of
Data Normal Distribution and
SubCritical < Validation
NO YES Identification of Outliers
Features?

Criticality-based Add Features in Feature Sizing and Testing


Prioritization Areas of ILI Tool Identification
Criteria Run Issues
Field-Tool Data Testing

Is the Testing
ADD OR
FIELD VERSUS TOOL
Excavation Program Is
REPLACE NO DATA
Representative of A NO Validation Program
FEATURES DOCUMENTATION
Inspection? Acceptable?
Adjustment Adjustment
YES YES
A
Acceptable Excavation Program Excavation Program is CONCLUSIVE

Figure 2b: In-line Inspection Validation Process

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2.3.1 Assessment of the In-Line Inspection Excavation/Validation Program


The assessment of the in-line inspection excavation/validation program was performed to
analyze the in-line inspection tool performance in conjunction with the statistical testing of the
field-tool data to ensure that the excavation/validation program provided representative, reliable,
and conclusive results for deterministic and probabilistic modeling [3].
Magpie Systems Inc. used the Rstreng0.85dL methodology to predict the failure pressure of the
external features and “groups” reported by their tool. In the field, each metal loss feature was
mapped with respect to their maximum depth and total length. The predicted burst pressure of
the features detected in the field was subsequently calculated using RStreng 0.85dL
methodology.
2.3.1.1. Procedure Followed to Complete the Assessment of the In-Line Inspection
Excavation/Validation Program
1. The individual metal loss features identified in the field during the 2006 excavations
were matched with, and verified against, the MFL in-line inspection data.
2. An analysis of the tool performance was performed based on the comparison of the
predicted depths and burst pressures of the metal loss features reported by the
Magpie System Inc. MFL in-line inspection tool versus the depths and predicted burst
pressures of the same features as measured in the field.
The natural distribution of the in-line inspection data was assessed to identify whether
the data will follow a normal distribution pattern. Any metal loss features, which are
identified as outliers or data points that do not fit a normal distribution, are removed
from the deterministic trending analysis.
3. Unity graphs were prepared, from the MFL tool data and the field data, for depth and
predicted burst pressure.
Linear regression trends providing slope, intercept, prediction error, correlation and
significance coefficients were prepared on unity graphs and subsequently analyzed.
If multiple trends were observed in any of the unity graphs, breaking points in the
plots were established for modeling.
The breaking point, or point at which a significant variance in accuracy or confidence
level is identified, will vary depending on the technology of the MFL tool. If a breaking
point is identified in a linear regression analysis, the prediction errors would be
calculated for each trend line. Prediction errors are used for the probabilistic model.
For verification purposes, both the tool versus field depth and burst pressure data
were statistically examined to determine the level of significance (i.e. "F” value)
associated with the respective linear regressions. The statistical acceptance criterion
of the “F” value is expected to be ≤5%, which translates into a ≥95% confidence level
for the linear regression.
4. An analysis was undertaken to identify the actual probability of identification,
detection, and sizing of the MFL in-line inspection.
The actual probability of identification was compared to the industry standard (i.e.,
≥90%).

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PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

The in-line inspection performance, with respect to sizing, was determined from the
unity graphs based on depth and burst pressure, and compared to vendor‟s
specifications.
5. An analysis was undertaken to determine the minimum number of metal loss features
detected by the MFL in-line inspection which needed to be excavated and assessed
in order to provide a minimum statistical sample size with a 95% level of confidence
or a maximum 5% significance. For this analysis, the following sampling size
procedure and formulas were used:
To ensure that a representative sample of the in-line inspection data is used in the
validation protocol, a stratified sampling approach is used. Doing so ensures (with a
confidence level of 95%) that an adequate number of pits are examined for all three
depth categories detailed below.
The sample size (n) for each bin of metal loss features is calculated using the
following formulae:
 N s2 
n   
2 
 (N - 1)D  s 

B2
Where: D
4
Abbreviation Description of the Variables
Number of Metal Loss features reported by in-line inspection in the
N
selected range of reported depths
Variance of Metal Loss Features reported by in-line inspection in the
s2
selected range of reported depths
Mean of Metal Loss Features (% wall thickness) in the selected range of
x reported depths
B Bound on the Error of Estimation

The variance (s2) is calculated, as follows:


N 2
 (x i  x)
i1
s2 
N
Where xi is each reported metal loss depth
The mean ( x ) is calculated, as follows:

N
x i
i1
x
N

The Bound on the Error of Estimation, B, in the equation above, is selected so that, with
95% confidence, the confidence interval bounding the sample size will be within ± B. The
smaller B is, the larger the necessary sample size which results in a tighter confidence

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

interval. B is computed as the smaller of 0.04 or 0.675 times the standard deviation
(square root of variance) of the selected range of reported depths.
Experience with the prior un-stratified approach found a B value of 0.04 to be reasonable
for the full sample. A B value of 0.04 implied that the sample size selected would with
95% confidence be able to bound the resulting confidence interval to within + 0.04 which
was felt to be sufficiently tight. However with the improved stratified sampling procedure,
the 0.04 was felt to sometimes be too loose (wide) for the smaller ranges of depths found
in each individual stratum, e.g. less than or equal to 20%.
The new algorithm computes the standard deviation of each stratum. The constant 0.675
times the standard deviation comes from the fact that + 0.675 standard deviations covers
50% of the stratum population if it is normally distributed. If the standard deviation is
small within a stratum, a B value of 0.04 may not be tight enough. Thus, allowing B to be
the minimum of either 0.04 or 0.675 multiplied by the (stratum standard deviation) will
ensure that a sufficiently large sample size is chosen for all strata.
The validation program should include the numbers of features (sample sizes) that were
calculated for each range of feature depth: less than or equal to 20% wall thickness;
between 20% and 40% wall thickness and greater than 40% wall thickness. This will
ensure that a distribution of features from each range reported by the in-line inspection is
selected and that the subsequent analysis will be as accurate as possible; thereby,
leading to the development of future maintenance programs which will be prudent and
effective.
2.3.2 In-Line Inspection Final Assessment
The dimensions of each individual or “groups” of external and internal metal loss feature(s)
reported by Magpie Systems Inc. were “adjusted” based on the linear regression analysis from
the field-tool correlation. These “adjusted” values were subsequently used by both the
probabilistic and deterministic methodologies to determine the acceptability of each individual
external metal loss feature detected by the Magpie Systems Inc. for a twenty year period
following the July 2005 in-line inspection run.
The predicted depth and burst pressure, of each “adjusted” metal loss feature and “groups” were
calculated on an annual basis for the twenty year period. The analysis also included the
determination of the earliest year in which each metal loss feature and “group” was predicted to
reach the depth based and burst pressure based criteria. Cumulative probability of exceedance
curves were created, using the probabilistic analysis and data obtained from the deterministic
methodology and the prediction error, to evaluate various potential excavation/repair and/or re-
inspection scenarios. These curves were subsequently used to assess the associated “integrity
indicators” (i.e. the deepest predicted depth and lowest expected factor of safety) for each of the
respective scenarios at any given time in the future.
The various excavation/repair and re-inspection scenarios, including their respective integrity
indicators and Net Present Values (NPV), are presented in Section 2.4.5. For scenario design
purposes, three minimum conditions must be satisfied:

 None of the remaining features or “groups” will be expected to reach a predicted depth
>70% of the pipe wall thickness or a predicted burst pressure <110% MAOP before the
year in which the excavation/repair program is planned to take place;

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PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

 None of the remaining features or “groups” will be expected to reach a predicted depth
>70% of the pipe wall or a predicted burst pressure <110% MAOP within one year of the
planned re-inspection program; and

 None of the remaining features or “groups” will be expected to reach a predicted depth
>80% of the pipe wall thickness or a predicted burst <100% MAOP within two years of
the planned re-inspection program.
2.3.2.1 Procedure Followed to Complete the In-Line Inspection Final Assessment
1. The predicted “adjusted” depth and predicted burst pressure for each metal loss feature
were calculated for the inspection year based on the linear regression analysis.
2. The “adjusted” dimensions for each metal loss feature were grown into the future at the
specified growth rates, using the deterministic methodology (refer to Table 1 for the
applicable growth rates used in this analysis). The expected depth and burst pressure for
each individual metal loss feature, “cluster”, and “group” were calculated on an annual basis
for a twenty year period following the inspection.
Table 1: Estimated Corrosion Growth Rates

External Corrosion Internal Corrosion


Depth Range
Growth Rates Growth Rates
% Through Wall
mm/yr mm/yr

<20% 0.10 0.10

>20% to <40% 0.20 0.15

>40% 0.30 0.25

The external corrosion growth rates outlined above were based on industry recommended
practices. The industry sources used were the National Association of Corrosion Engineers
(NACE RP-0502-2002), Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI), and
CC Technologies (i.e. 2002 default external corrosion growth rates).
The internal corrosion growth rates were established based on an agreement with the NGL
BU.
To assess the conservatism in the assumed corrosion growth rates an analysis was
undertaken based on the maximum depth of the individual metal loss features, “clusters” and
“groups” identified by the in-line inspection tool within each of the three ranges listed above
for the estimated period of corrosion. The corrosion period was calculated for the following
three scenarios:
A. Number of years in service since construction year;
B. Number of years in service minus 2 years for coating deterioration; and
C. Number of years in service minus 5 years for coating deterioration.

Corrosion growth rate [per depth range] = Maximum reported feature depth [per range]
Corrosion period [A, B, C]

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 2: Corrosion Growth Rate Comparison

First Year of Operation/Construction Jan 1974


Year of Inspection Jul 2005
Years in Operation 31.5

Deepest Identified Feature Growth Rate (mm/yr) Conservative


Wall Maximum CCTC Factor
Tool Depth Thickness Metal Loss Recommended (Recommended/
Depth Range (%) (mm) (mm) Years - 0 Years - 2 Years - 5 (1) Years - 2)
External
0 - 20 % 20.0% 6.22 1.2440 0.0395 0.0422 0.0470 0.1000 2.37
>20 - =<40 % 40.0% 8.97 3.5880 0.1139 0.1216 0.1354 0.2000 1.64
>40 % 0.0% 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3000 N/A
Internal
0 - 20 % 20.0% 6.22 1.2440 0.0395 0.0422 0.0470 0.1000 2.37
>20 - =<40 % 35.0% 8.97 3.1395 0.0997 0.1064 0.1185 0.1500 1.41
>40 % 1.0% 6.22 0.0622 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023 0.2500 118.55
(1) NACE, PRCI, CCT

As shown in Table 2, the external corrosion growth rates applied in the assessment of the
MFL data for the Windsor to Dow Pipeline Section were a minimum of 1.64 times more
conservative then those calculated based on Scenario B (Years – 2).
The internal corrosion growth rates applied in the assessment of the MFL data for the
Windsor to Dow Pipeline Section were a minimum of 1.41 times more conservative then
those calculated based on Scenario B (Years – 2).
3. The output from the deterministic model were used to rank the individual external and
internal metal loss features, “clusters” and “groups” based on the year in which they were
predicted to reach the depth based criteria (i.e. ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness) and the
burst pressure based criteria (i.e. ≤100% MAOP).
4. Based on the aforementioned deterministic ranking process, various excavation/repair
scenarios were identified as input for the probabilistic model.
5. Cumulative probability of exceedance curves, based on the depth based and burst pressure
based criteria, were generated using the Probability of Exceedance analysis for all the metal
loss features, “clusters” and “groups” reported. The Probability of Exceedance of each
metal loss feature and “groups” was cumulated on an annual basis using the following input
variables:
 The predicted “adjusted” depth and burst pressure of each metal loss feature
and “groups”;
 The prediction error calculated from the linear regression analyses; and
 The acceptable limits or criteria for depth (≥80% of the pipe wall thickness)
and burst pressure (≤100% MAOP).

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

6. The cumulative Probability of Exceedance value for the pipeline section was calculated, on
an annual basis for a twenty year period, from both a depth based and burst pressure based
perspective, using the following formula:
n
Probability of Exceedance cumulative = 1 -  (1- Pi)
i= 1

Where Pi = Probability of Exceedance (depth or burst pressure) per feature


 = Factorization of selected Probability of Exceedance values (1-Pi) for analysis
n = Total number of analyzed metal loss features and “groups”

7. The various excavation/repair scenarios derived from the deterministic approach were
evaluated using the Probability of Exceedance analysis to assess their potential impact on
the depth based and burst pressure based cumulative probability of exceedance curves.
8. The impact of the various excavation/repair scenarios on the depth based and burst
pressure based cumulative probability of exceedance curves were analyzed. If there was a
beneficial impact of a given excavation/repair scenario, the depth based and burst pressure
based cumulative probability of exceedance curves were generated for the respective
scenario by removing those metal loss features specifically targeted for excavation/repair.
9. The re-inspection interval scenarios were based on the results obtained from the Probability
of Exceedance (POE) depth based and burst pressure based analysis and by consolidating
the failing features by chainage to provide the most cost-effective and operationally efficient
program. If one or more failing metal loss features were located in the same pipe joint or
within 18 m (excavation coverage) of one another, depending on the concentration of
features, it was assumed that they would be addressed in the same excavation.
10. As illustrated in Figure 3, the re-inspection year was determined by identifying the earliest
year in which one of two Probability of Exceedance (POE) criteria was met. A cost/benefit
analysis was undertaken for the resultant excavation/repair and re-inspection scenarios to
determine their associated Net Present Values (NPV) at the time of the inspection.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Initial Recommended Earliest Year


Inspection Re-Inspection Depth >80% WT
Year Year or PBP <100% MAOP

2 years min
Remedial Actions Based on Initial Inspection
1 year min

TIME Earliest Year


Depth >70% WT
or PBP <110% MAOP

(a) Year In-line Inspection = Year [The earliest year between POE ≥70% of the pipe wall thickness and POE ≤110% MAOP] – 1 year
(b) Year In-line Inspection = Year [The earliest year between POE ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness and POE ≤100% MAOP] – 2 years

Figure 3: Illustration of a Re-Inspection Interval Based on Probability of Exceedance


11. The rationale for subtracting one year from the predicted failure year in equation (a) is to
provide the NGL BU a reasonable time frame (i.e. one year) for receiving and assessing the
MFL inspection results, before the metal loss features “clusters” or “groups” reach a depth of
≥70% of the pipe wall thickness or a safety factor of ≤110% MAOP. Equation (b) also
assures that none of the individual metal loss features would reach a depth of ≥80% of the
pipe wall thickness or a safety factor of ≤100% MAOP, by providing two years after the
in-line inspection to assess or verify any potential sub-critical features.
12. For pipeline operational and budgetary purposes, the cost/benefit analysis was conducted
assuming that any necessary excavations and repairs would be undertaken in the last
allowable year to safely excavate/repair the suspect features “clusters” or “groups”, prior to
any of them reaching a depth of ≥70% of the pipe wall thickness or a burst pressure of
≤110% MAOP, as determined from the Probability of Exceedance analysis. This approach
enables the NGL BU to schedule repair(s) within a reasonable period while still ensuring the
integrity and safety of the pipeline system.
13. The Net Present Value (NPV) approach was utilized as an indicator to determine the
financial worth at the time of the in-line inspection run (i.e. July 2005) of time-allocated costs
for a twenty year period by applying an annual investment return rate of 7% and an annual
inflation rate of 2.5%. The components of the cash flow utilized the MFL in-line inspection
run cost (CDN $150,000) and the cost of the excavations/repairs (CDN $15,000 per site) at
the time of the in-line inspection run in July 2005).
The current market value of the cash flow components were projected to the task execution-
year using the inflation rate, and financially returned to the present value by applying the
investment return rate.
14. After the re-inspection year is selected for each scenario, the worst predicted depth and
lowest expected factor of safety were determined as the integrity factors for that particular
scenario. The re-inspection frequencies determined for each excavation/repair and re-
inspection scenario are superimposed onto the appropriate cumulative Probability of
Exceedance curve from the depth based criteria assessment. The Probability of

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Exceedance value for an equivalent corrosion caused metal loss feature and “groups” was
then obtained for each excavation/repair and re-inspection scenario. The Probability of
Exceedance value for each scenario was then used to identify the worst predicted depth of
corrosion caused metal loss feature at the time of re-inspection for that particular scenario.
A similar process is also followed to determine the lowest expected factor of safety for each
excavation/repair and re-inspection scenario.
15. Four (4) scenarios were technically and economically assessed as follows:

 After the completion of the in-line inspection run and prior to the completion of the
initial excavation program;

 After the completion of the initial excavation program;

 Assuming a fixed five year re-inspection frequency (typical industry practice); and

 After the completion of the initial excavation program and a number (N) of additional
digs based on the criticality of the features.

2.4 Analysis and Results


2.4.1 Summary of In-Line Inspection Data
The MFL in-line inspection of the 324 mm Cochin East Windsor to Dow pipeline section was
performed by Magpie Systems Inc. in July 2005.
A total of 255 individual features were reported by the Magpie Systems Inc. MFL in-line
inspection tool, of which 152 were reported as metal loss features. Figure 4 illustrates that:

 42% (105 features) were classified as external general corrosion features

 18% (47 features) were classified as internal general corrosion features

 28% (71 features) were classified as gain features

 7% (19 features ) were classified as mill anomalies

 3% (7 features) were classified as weld anomalies (lack of metal)

 2% (6 features) were classified as ID anomalies (dents)

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Features Before Clustering

Metal Loss - Internal , ID Anomaly Dent , 6,


47, 18% 2%

Gain Features, 71, 28%

Metal Loss - External , Mill Anomaly , 19, 7%


105, 42%

Weld Anomaly- Lack of


Metal, 7, 3%

Figure 4: Summary of MFL In-Line Inspection Data for the 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) Diameter
Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section

Of the 152 internal and external metal loss features reported by the MFL inspection tool, the
deepest internal feature had a reported depth of 41.3% of the pipe wall thickness. This feature,
had a predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,199 kPa (88.5% SMYS, 123% MAOP (based on
6.22 mm wall thickness)), and is the only metal loss feature with a predicted burst pressureRStreng
0.85dL of less than 100% SMYS. This feature was excavated and repaired during the 2006
excavation program, and as this feature was the only feature reported by the in-line inspection
tool with a predicted burst pressure <125% MAOP. The deepest external metal loss features
was 39.6% of the pipe wall thickness, with a predicted burst pressure of 23,185 kPa (117%
SMYS, 233% MAOP (based on 8.97 mm wall thickness pipe)).
Table 3 and Figure 5 illustrate the distribution of metal loss features reported by the MFL
inspection, with respect to their depth. The majority (81.0%) of the identified external metal loss
features had a predicted depth between 0 and 20% of the pipe wall thickness. The majority
(87.2%) of the internal metal loss features had a predicted depth between 0 and 30% of the pipe
wall thickness.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 3: Distribution of External and Internal Metal Loss Features with Respect to their
Depth
Groups

Wall Number of Number of Percentage of Percentage of


Thickness Reported Reported External Metal Internal Metal
Range External Metal Internal Metal Loss Features Loss Features
(% wall Loss Features Loss Features Reported by the Reported by the
thickness) Total: 105 Total: 47 Tool (%) Tool (%)

0-10% 28 8 26.7% 17.0%


11-20% 57 14 54.3% 29.8%
21-30% 18 19 17.1% 40.4%
31-40% 2 5 1.9% 10.6%
41-50% 0 1 0.0% 2.1%
51-60% 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
61-70% 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
71-80% 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
81-90% 0 0 0.0% 0.0%
91-100% 0 0 0.0% 0.0%

NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section


Depth Distribution of Metal Loss Features Identified by the MFL In-line Inspection Tool

80 100%

90%
70 Metal Loss Data Set
Excavation Sites: 10
External Metal Loss Features Reported by the Tool: = 105
Number of Metal Loss Features

80%
Internal Metal Loss Features Reported by the Tool: = 47
60
Total POE Features Scheduled for Field Investigation (32) = 1.2%
Total POE Features Detected by MFL Tool (26) 70%

Percentage of Metal Loss Features


50
60%

40 50%

40%
30

30%

20

20%

10
10%

0 0%
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100%
Number of Reported External Metal Loss Features 28 57 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total: 105
Number of Reported Internal Metal Loss Features 8 14 19 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total: 47
Percentage of External Metal Loss Features Scheduled in the 7.1% 26.3% 22.2% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Field Within Wall Thickness Range (%)
Percentage of Internal Metal Loss Features Scheduled in the 0.0% 14.3% 26.3% 40.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Field Within Wall Thickness Range (%)

Wall thickness range (% of pipe wall thickness)

Figure 5: Distribution of External and Internal Metal Loss Features

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Figure 6 illustrates the number of external and internal metal loss features per 10,000 m of
inspected section of pipe. The highest concentration of external metal loss features detected by
the MFL tool was 24 features, located from approximately 10,000 m to 20,000 m on the
in-line inspection tool absolute odometer. The highest concentration of internal metal loss features
detected by the MFL in-line inspection tool was 9 features, located from approximately 60,000 m
to 70,000 m.
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
External and Internal Metal Loss Features versus Distance from In-line Inspection Launch Site

30
External
Internal
25
Number of Metal Loss Features

20

15

10

0
0
00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00
00

00

00

00

00
00
00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00
00

10

20

30

40
00
-2

-3

-4

-5

-6

-7

-8

-9
-1

-1

-1

-1

-1
-1
0

0
0

00

00

00

00
0
00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00

00
10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

10

11

12

13
Absolute Odometer (m)

Figure 6: In-Line Inspection External and Internal Metal Loss Features versus Distance
from Launch

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

As shown in Figure 7, 49.5% (52 features) of the 105 reported individual external metal loss
features were located between 4 and 8 o‟clock (bottomside) and 53.2% (25 features) of the
47 reported individual internal metal loss features were located between 4 and 8 o‟clock
(bottomside).

NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section


Orientation (O‟clock) of External Metal Loss Features versus Absolute Odometer Distance

Percentage of Total Features between 4:00-8:00 = 50.7% (77 features out of the total 152 features)
External 49.52% (52) of External Metal Loss Features between 4:00 and 8:00
Internal 53.19% (25)of Internal Metal Loss Features between 4:00 and 8:00

12:00

11:00

10:00

9:00

8:00
Clock Position (O'Clock)

7:00

6:00

5:00

4:00

3:00

2:00

1:00

0:00
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 100000 110000 120000 130000 140000
Absolute Odometer (m)

Figure 7: Orientation of External and Internal Metal Loss Features versus Absolute
Odometer Distance

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

The wall thickness and pipe joint length for the Windsor to Dow Pipeline Section are shown in
Figure 8. While the majority of the pipeline section is comprised of 6.22 mm wall thickness,
Figure 8 illustrates that there are other sections of heavier pipe wall thicknesses (7.47, 8.97,
12.79 and 14.3 mm). The typical individual pipe spool length, as shown in Figure 8, is between
18-20 meters .
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Pipe Joint Length and Pipe Wall Thickness versus Absolute Odometer Distance

25 15
Pipe Joint Length
14
Wall Thickness
13

20 12

11

10

Wall Thickness (mm)


Pipe Joint Length (m)

15 9

10 6

5 3

0 0
0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

100000

110000

120000

130000

140000
Absolute Odometer (m)

Figure 8: Pipe Joint Length and Pipe Wall Thickness versus Absolute Odometer Distance

2.4.2 PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment


Table 4 shows the results of the PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment for the Windsor to Dow
pipeline section. One (1) metal loss feature fell within the 180 day Remediation schedule criteria
with a predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of ≥125% and <150% of the MAOP. This metal loss
feature is located in a class 1 location and was excavated in 2006. The assessment indicated that
there were no other features reported by the MFL in-line inspection tool that met the Immediate
Action or 180-Day remediation schedule criteria.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 4: Summary of the PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment


PIMS 3.5 Pipeline Field Excavation, Assessment and Repair Program Criteria
Pipeline System: Cochin East
Pipeline Section: NPS 12 Windsor to Dow MFL
Date of ILI Run: 15-Jul-05
Date final report received: 17-Feb-06 Total Number of Metal Loss Assessed (all features): 152
60 day Remediation Schedule: 19-Apr-06 Total Number of Dents from MFL Tool: 6 Possible Dent
180 day Remediation Schedule: 17-Aug-06 Total Number of Ovalities Assessed from Geo Tool: 0
Total Number of Dents Assessed from Geo Tool: 0
Immediate Action Schedule 60 Day remediation schedule 180 Day remediation 365 Day remediation schedule Total Number
Criteria Action Taken
(1) (2) schedule (3) (4) of Features
Description # Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 Class 1 Class 2 1
Metal Loss Depth >70% WT 1 0 0 0 None Required
Crack-like feature(s) with a predicted depth ≥ 50% of the pipe nominal wall
2 N/A N/A N/A None Required
thickness regardless of length
5
Predicted Burst Pressure <110% of MAOP 3 0 0 0 None Required
1
Topside dent from 8 to 4 o'clock, with any indication of metal loss,
4 0 0 0 None Required
cracking or stress riser
1
Crack-like feature(s) located in a top-side dent (above the 4 and 8 o‟clock
5 N/A N/A N/A None Required
positions);
Topside dent from 8 to 4 o'clock, with depth >6% of nominal pipeline
6 0 0 0 None Required
diameter
An anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the BP
7 0 0 0 None Required
Dome to evaluate the assessment results requires immediate action.
1
Bottom side dent from 4 to 8 o'clock, with any indication of metal loss,
8 0 0 0 None Required
cracking or stress riser
1
Crack-like feature(s) located in a bottom-side dent (below the 4 and 8
9 N/A N/A N/A None Required
o‟clock positions)
Topside dent from 8 to 4 o'clock, with depth >3% of nominal pipeline
10 0 0 0 None Required
diameter
5
Predicted Burst Pressure ≤ 125% of MAOP for pipe in Class 1 locations, 1 metal loss feature from MFL log (41.3%).
11 1 0 1
≤ 150% of MAOP for pipe in Class 2 locations Feature was excavated in 2006 program.
Metal loss Depth >50% WT at foreign pipeline crossings 12 0 0 0 None Required
4
Metal loss Depth >50% WT for features affecting girth welds or long
13 0 0 0 None Required
seam welds
Metal loss Depth >50% WT at areas of general corrosion 14 0 0 0 None Required
Metal loss Depth >50% WT for widespread circumferential corrosion 15 0 0 0 None Required
Crack-like feature(s) with a predicted depth > 40% of the pipe nominal wall
16 N/A N/A N/A None Required
thickness regardless of length;
Gouge or groove ≥ 12.5% of pipe nominal wall thickness; 17 0 0 0 None Required
4, 6
Corrosion of or along the long seam weld 18 0 0 0 None Required
Bottomside dent from 4 to 8 o'clock, with depth >6% of nominal pipeline
19 0 0 0 None Required
diameter
2, 6
Dent with depth >2% of pipeline diameter that affects pipe curvature at
20 0 0 0 None Required
a girth weld or longseam weld
Topside dent from 8 to 4 o'clock, with depth >2% of nominal pipeline
21 0 0 0 None Required
diameter
4, 6
Laminations associated with blistering or which run into either the
22 0 0 0 None Required
longitudinal weld seam or girth weld;
Ripple or buckle that has a height of >150% of nominal wall thickness or a
23 0 0 0 None Required
wave length-to-height ratio ≤ 12
Ovality of the pipeline >6% of nominal pipeline diameter 24 0 0 0 None Required
Any condition identified by an integrity assessment or information analysis
25 0 0 0 None Required
that could impair the integrity of the pipeline.
Any anomaly that in the judgment of the person designated by the BP
26 0 0 0 None Required
Dome to evaluate the assessment results requires excavation.

1
Dents have no associated length measurements in ILI data. To meet criteria, metal loss, cracking or stress risers must be within +/-1 foot of a dent.
2
Dents have no associated length or depth measurement in ILI data. Dents must be within +/- 1 foot of a girth weld or +/-2 inches of a longseam weld.
3
Dents have no associated depth measurements in ILI data.
4
Affecting girth weld = +/- 1 foot of girth weld. Affecting longseam weld = +/- 2 inches of longseam weld.
5
For crack-like flaw evaluation calculations such as CorLAS™ or KAPA should be used. Note: The length of the crack-like feature(s) to be used in the crack-like flaw evaluation calculations shall be the “maximum interlinked
6
Long seam welds are not reported in MFL/Geometry inspection

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2.4.3 Assessment of the In-Line Inspection Excavation/Validation Program


The purpose of this assessment was to analyze the in-line inspection tool performance and
statistically test the field-tool data to ensure representative, reliable, and conclusive results for
the deterministic and probabilistic modeling. Figure 9 and Table 5 summarize the number of
metal loss features that were reported by the MFL in-line inspection tool and excavated during
the field investigation. As indicated, 85 (81.0%) of the external metal loss features had a
reported depth of less than 20% of the pipe wall thickness. Of the 22 external metal loss features
selected for excavation, 17 (77.2%) of them had a reported depth of less than 20% of the pipe
wall thickness. For internal metal loss features, 33 (70.2%) of the 47 features had a reported
depth between 10 and 30% of the pipe wall thickness and 7 (70%) of those selected for
excavation were within the same depth range.

NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section


Depth Distribution of Metal Loss Features Identified by the
MFL In-line Inspection Tool and Verified in the Field

80 100%

90%
70

Percentage of Total Features Verified in the Field


Number of External Metal Loss Features

80%
60
Metal Loss Data Set 70%
Excavation Sites: 12
External Metal Loss Features Reported by the Tool: = 105
50 Internal Metal Loss Features Reported by the Tool: = 47
60%
External Metal Loss Features Scheduled for Field Investigation:= 24
Internal Metal Loss Features Scheduled for Field Investigation: = 8
40 50%
Total POE Features Scheduled for Field Investigation (32) = 21.1%
Total POE Features Detected by MFL Tool (152)
40%
30

30%
20
20%

10
10%

0 0%
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51-60% 61-70% 71-80% 81-90% 91-100%
Number of Reported External Metal Loss Features 28 57 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total: 105
Number of Reported Internal Metal Loss Features 8 14 19 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total: 47
Number of Reported External Metal Loss Features Scheduled 1 16 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
for Field Investigation
Total: 24
Number of Reported Internal Metal Loss Features Scheduled 0 1 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
for Field Investigation
Total: 8
Percentage of External Metal Loss Features Scheduled in the 3.6% 28.1% 33.3% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Field Within Wall Thickness Range (%)
Percentage of Internal Metal Loss Features Scheduled in the 0.0% 7.1% 21.1% 40.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Field Within Wall Thickness Range (%)

Wall thickness range (% of pipe wall thickness)

Figure 9: Distribution of Metal Loss Features


The NGL BU completed twelve (12) excavation sites in 2006 to investigate and remediate
32 individual external and internal metal loss features identified by the in-line inspection tool
(these features are represented in Figure 10). During the excavation program, 21 of these
features were identified in the field, 11 were not identified, and an additional 32 “un-graded”
features were found. Two (2) features reported by the tool and detected in the field (refer to

Page 22
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

purple highlighted features in Table 6(b)) were not used in the field correlation due to the limited
tool information.
The NGL BU excavated and remediated 2 features with a reported depth of ≤10% of the pipe
wall thickness, 17 features with a reported depth between 10 and 20% of the pipe wall thickness,
9 features with a tool reported depth between 20 and 30% of the pipe wall thickness, 3 features
with a tool reported depth between 30 and 40% of the pipe wall thickness, and 1 feature
between 40 and 50% of the pipe wall thickness (refer to Table 5).
The deepest internal metal loss feature found in the field was 55.1% of the pipe wall thickness.
This feature had a MFL tool reported depth of 41.3% of the pipe wall thickness and a tool-
predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,199 kPa (88.5% SMYS,
123% MAOP (based on 6.22 mm wall thickness pipe)). The predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL
based on field measurements was 10,529 kPa (76.4% SMYS, 106% MAOP (based on 6.22 mm
wall thickness pipe)). This feature was repaired in 2006.
The deepest external metal loss feature verified in the field was 37.4% of the pipe wall thickness,
with a corresponding tool reported depth of 18.1% of the pipe wall thickness. This features had
a predicted burst pressure of 18,401 kPa (92.6% SMYS, 185% MAOP (based on 8.97 mm wall
thickness pipe)).
The deepest “un-graded” feature had a measured depth of 32.8% of the pipe wall thickness
(found as an external corrosion, chainage 359000 m, joint number 72040). This feature had a
predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,443 kPa (90.3% SMYS, 125.6% MAOP) and was the
feature with lowest predicted burst pressure identified for the unreported defects.
Table 5: External and Internal Corrosion Metal Loss Feature Distribution Detected by MFL
In-Line Inspection Tool versus Verified in the Field
Groups

Number of Number of Percentage of Percentage of


Wall Number of Number of Percentage of Percentage of Reported External Reported Internal External Metal Internal Metal
Thickness Reported Reported External Metal Internal Metal Metal Loss Metal Loss Loss Features Loss Features
Range External Metal Internal Metal Loss Features Loss Features Features Features Scheduled in the Scheduled in the
(% wall Loss Features Loss Features Reported by the Reported by the Scheduled for Scheduled for Field Within Wall Field Within Wall
thickness) Total: 105 Total: 47 Tool (%) Tool (%) Field Investigation Field Investigation Thickness Range Thickness Range
Total: 22 Total: 10 (%) (%)
0-10% 28 8 26.7% 17.0% 2 0 7.1% 0.0%
11-20% 57 14 54.3% 29.8% 15 2 26.3% 14.3%
21-30% 18 19 17.1% 40.4% 4 5 22.2% 26.3%
31-40% 2 5 1.9% 10.6% 1 2 50.0% 40.0%
41-50% 0 1 0.0% 2.1% 0 1 N/A 100.0%
51-60% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 N/A N/A
61-70% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 N/A N/A
71-80% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 N/A N/A
81-90% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 N/A N/A
91-100% 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 N/A N/A

The depth of the metal loss features expressed as a percentage of the pipe nominal wall
thickness and their corresponding predicted burst pressure were utilized for comparing field
versus tool results and determining the actual tool accuracy (refer to Table 6 (a) and 6 (b). the
correlated features are found in Table 6(a). These features were used for the assessment of the
accuracy of the inspection results and validation of the in-line inspection run performed. The
features found in 6 (b) are those features which were found in the field and not reported by the
tool or detected by the tool and not found in the field.

Page 23
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 6 (a): MFL Data versus Field-Measured Data for the NGL BU 323.9 mm (12.75 inch) diameter Windsor to Dow Pipeline
Section (Features used in the field tool correlation)

MFL Vendor: Magpie Systems Inc. Field : Actual As Found Measurements


RStreng RStreng
RStreng RStreng Burst
0.85dL 0.85dL RStreng RStreng Depth
Distance Wall 0.85dL 0.85dL Distance Wall Depth as Depth as Length as Pressure
Joint Chainage SMYS MAOP External/ Clock Depth Length Width Anomaly Predicted Predicted 0.85dL RPR 0.85dL RPR Difference
from U/S thickness RPR RPR from U/S Thickness Found Found Found Difference Defect Description as Found
Number (m) (kPa) (kPa) Internal Position (% WT) (mm) (mm) Description Burst Burst (100% (100% Field - Tool
weld (m) (mm) (100% (100% weld (m) (mm) (% WT) (mm) (mm) Field - Tool
Pressure Pressure SMYS) MAOP) (% WT)
SMYS) MAOP) (% MAOP)
(kPa) (kPa)

380 210.91 0.03 359000 9930 8.97 Internal 5:45 14.8% 15.0 24.0 Metal Loss 23623.9 1.188 238% 0.02 8.97 26.0% 2.33 7.0 23671.36 1.190 2.384 11.2% 0.5% Internal Mill Flaw
380 211.05 0.16 359000 9930 8.97 Internal 5:30 21.9% 77.8 32.0 Metal Loss 21993.8 1.106 221% 0.20 8.97 15.1% 1.35 15.0 23625.07 1.188 2.379 -6.8% 17.8% Internal Mill Flaw
380 211.19 0.31 359000 9930 8.97 Internal 5:45 35.2% 26.9 72.1 Metal Loss 23014.2 1.157 232% 0.30 8.97 51.0% 4.57 35.0 21857.64 1.099 2.201 15.8% -12.6% Internal Mill Flaw
380 214.72 3.83 359000 9930 8.97 Internal 4:30 24.1% 23.9 24.0 Metal Loss 23362.2 1.175 235% 3.80 8.97 15.6% 1.40 25.0 23486.55 1.151 2.365 -8.5% 1.4% Internal Mill Flaw
1750 2516.38 1.72 359000 9930 8.97 Internal 2:45 34.6% 38.9 120.1 Metal Loss 22471.3 1.130 226% 1.74 8.97 34.4% 3.09 35.0 22671 1.140 2.283 -0.2% 2.2% Internal mill flaw
2200 3245.45 7.04 359000 9930 8.97 External 6:15 18.1% 12.0 16.0 Metal Loss 23637.9 1.189 238% 7.00 8.97 37.4% 3.35 170.0 18401.14 0.925 1.853 19.2% -57.1% No depth on photos
2200 3250.55 12.14 359000 9930 8.97 External 6:15 16.9% 20.9 48.1 Metal Loss 23527.8 1.183 237% 12.15 8.97 15.9% 1.43 82.0 22444.09 1.129 2.260 -1.0% -11.8% External corrosion
2200 3250.74 12.33 359000 9930 8.97 External 5:30 12.7% 38.9 128.1 Metal Loss 23331.9 1.173 235% 12.30 8.97 24.0% 2.15 125.0 20941.07 1.053 2.109 11.3% -26.1% External corrosion
2200 3250.94 12.53 359000 9930 8.97 External 6:00 16.6% 18.0 16.0 Metal Loss 23574.9 1.186 237% 12.50 8.97 22.9% 2.05 65.0 22229.46 1.118 2.239 6.3% -14.7% External corrosion
6130 9535.28 5.72 359000 9930 7.47 Internal 8:15 27.0% 44.9 56.6 Metal Loss 18687.3 1.129 188% 5.70 7.47 30.2% 2.26 100.0 16994.3 1.026 1.711 3.2% -18.5% internal surface lap or lamination
8820 13687.36 9.94 359000 9930 7.47 External 4:00 10.0% 23.9 16.2 Metal Loss 19617.4 1.185 198% 9.90 7.47 13.4% 1.00 190.0 18162.06 1.097 1.829 3.4% -15.9% External corrosion
12390 19365.59 13.34 359000 9930 6.22 External 7:30 12.7% 23.9 48.9 Metal Loss 16281.0 1.181 164% -4.88 6.22 14.4% 0.90 75.0 15581.75 1.13 1.569 1.7% -7.6% External Mill Flaw
15490 24679.74 3.94 359000 9930 6.22 Internal 9:15 28.5% 26.9 81.5 Metal Loss 15943.0 1.156 161% 3.95 6.22 36.6% 2.28 40.0 15187.1 1.101 1.529 8.1% -8.2% Internal Mill Flaw
17320 27744.61 2.47 359000 9930 6.22 External 2:30 31.6% 18.0 195.7 Metal Loss 16159.5 1.172 163% 2.50 6.22 18.8% 1.17 10.0 16391.26 1.189 1.651 -12.8% 2.5% External Gouge (circumferential)
17320 27744.62 2.48 359000 9930 6.22 External 12:30 12.8% 9.0 48.9 Metal Loss 16411.4 1.190 165% 2.50 6.22 18.8% 1.17 10.0 16391.26 1.189 1.651 6.0% -0.2% External Gouge (circumferential)
25490 41116.95 17.77 359000 9930 6.22 Internal 3:45 20.3% 35.9 97.8 Metal Loss 15921.5 1.155 160% -0.24 6.22 34.7% 2.16 46.0 15037.25 1.09 1.514 14.4% -9.6% Internal mill flaw
39900 65023.74 1.53 359000 9930 6.22 External 11:00 28.2% 23.9 89.7 Metal Loss 16038.1 1.163 162% 1.53 6.22 27.8% 1.73 20.0 16153.95 1.171 1.627 -0.4% 1.3% External Metal Loss - grind repair
39900 65023.85 1.64 359000 9930 6.22 Internal 5:00 41.3% 152.6 122.3 Metal Loss 12199.4 0.885 123% 1.64 6.22 55.1% 3.43 150.0 10529.97 0.764 1.060 13.8% -18.2% Internal Mill Flaw
63900 105334 12.81 359000 9930 6.22 External 8:30 14.6% 26.9 106.0 Metal Loss 16214.6 1.176 163% -0.1 6.22 22.0% 1.37 27 16079.57 1.166 1.619 7.4% -1.5% External corrosion
72040 119292.89 5.21 359000 9930 6.22 Internal 2:45 26.2% 15.0 32.6 Metal Loss 16281.5 1.181 164% 5.07 6.22 32.8% 2.04 85 14041.53 1.018 1.414 6.6% -24.4% External corrosion
72040 119296.37 8.69 359000 9930 6.22 External 3:45 10.0% 12.0 24.5 Metal Loss 16403.3 1.190 165% 8.72 6.22 9.1% 0.57 250 15455.25 1.121 1.556 -0.9% -10.3% External corrosion

Page 24
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 6 (b) – MFL Data versus Field-Measured Data for the NGL BU 323.9 mm (12.75 mm) Windsor to Dow Pipeline Section (Features “NOT” in field tool correlation)
MFL Vendor: Magpie Systems Inc. Field : Actual As Found Measurements
RStreng RStreng
RStreng RStreng Burst
0.85dL 0.85dL RStreng RStreng Depth
Distance Wall 0.85dL 0.85dL Distance Wall Depth as Depth as Length as Pressure
Joint Chainage SMYS MAOP External/ Clock Depth Length Width Anomaly Predicted Predicted 0.85dL RPR 0.85dL RPR Difference
from U/S thickness RPR RPR from U/S Thickness Found Found Found Difference Defect Description as Found Comments
Number (m) (kPa) (kPa) Internal Position (% WT) (mm) (mm) Description Burst Burst (100% (100% Field - Tool
weld (m) (mm) (100% (100% weld (m) (mm) (% WT) (mm) (mm) Field - Tool
Pressure Pressure SMYS) MAOP) (% WT)
SMYS) MAOP) (% MAOP)
(kPa) (kPa)

380 N/A 3.36 359000 9930 8.97 N/A 4:00 N/A N/A N/A Mill Anomaly N/A N/A N/A 3.4 8.97 35.1% 3.15 35 22642.31 1.139 2.280 N/A N/A Internal Mill Flaw No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
55850 N/A 0.00 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Weld Anomaly N/A N/A N/A 0 6.22 0.0% 0.00 n/a 0 0 0.000 N/A N/A Girth weld without protruding cap No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 8.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 0.26 8.97 16.7% 1.50 65.0 22672.98 1.140 2.283 N/A N/A Internal Mill Flaw No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 8.97 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 1.30 8.97 8.2% 0.74 190.0 22596.07 1.136 2.276 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 12.30 8.97 24.0% 2.15 1500.0 19017.2 0.956 1.915 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 4.26 8.97 6.4% 0.57 15.0 23674.83 1.190 2.384 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -2.70 0.00 14.7% 0.00 35.0 23338.22 1.174 2.350 N/A N/A Gouge No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -1.40 0.00 7.2% 0.00 40.0 23495.84 1.181 2.366 N/A N/A Gouge No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 1.17 0.00 11.2% 0.00 8.0 23689.51 1.191 2.386 N/A N/A Mill Flaw - surface lap No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 0.08 0.00 15.5% 0.00 10.0 23668.45 1.190 2.384 N/A N/A remnants of weld from alignment kleat No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -2.95 0.00 4.3% 0.00 35.0 23608.58 1.187 2.378 N/A N/A Mill Flaw - surface lap No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 2.76 0.00 7.2% 0.00 215.0 22696.4 1.141 2.286 N/A N/A Mill Flaw - sliver No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 0.15 0.00 5.0% 0.00 115.0 23208.97 1.167 2.337 N/A N/A Mill Flaw - sliver No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 6.50 7.47 7.5% 0.56 38.0 19547.08 1.180 1.968 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 9.89 7.47 8.1% 0.61 1.5 19741.87 1.192 1.988 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 10.05 7.47 3.6% 0.27 34.0 19666.17 1.187 1.980 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 12.15 7.47 9.7% 0.72 3.0 19740.23 1.192 1.988 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 12.85 7.47 7.3% 0.55 25.0 19648.35 1.185 1.979 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 14.90 7.47 9.4% 0.70 15.0 19694.5 1.189 1.983 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 16.56 7.47 4.1% 0.31 12.0 19729.36 1.191 1.987 N/A N/A localized penetrator on ERW upset No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 7.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 11.70 7.47 12.1% 0.90 55.0 19193.01 1.159 1.933 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 7.47 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 10.90 7.47 19.7% 1.47 15.0 19632 1.185 1.977 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 1.80 6.22 10.7% 0.67 8.0 16422.57 1.191 1.654 N/A N/A External Gouge (circumferential) No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 2.45 6.22 5.0% 0.31 9.0 16429.67 1.191 1.655 N/A N/A External Gouge (circumferential) No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 2.10 6.22 2.1% 0.13 1550.0 16152.22 1.171 1.627 N/A N/A Superficial Corrosion (External) No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 2.43 6.22 3.6% 0.22 9.0 16432.28 1.192 1.655 N/A N/A External Gouge (circumferential) No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -9.94 6.22 6.9% 0.43 250 15696.41 1.138 1.581 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -0.5 6.22 3.4% 0.21 22 16405.63 1.19 1.652 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A -0.4 6.22 6.8% 0.42 45 16223.61 1.176 1.634 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 4.97 6.22 32.8% 2.04 405 12443.01 0.902 1.253 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 4.36 6.22 17.7% 1.10 460 14288.2 1.036 1.439 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 8.49 6.22 18.0% 1.12 68 15441.44 1.12 1.555 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 8.61 6.22 6.6% 0.41 73 16071.78 1.165 1.619 N/A N/A External corrosion No Data reported by MFL inspection tool
Ungraded N/A N/A 359000 9930 6.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A N/A 8.98 6.22 4.7% 0.29 50 16270.04 1.18 1.638 N/A N/A Mill Flaw - sliver No Data reported by MFL inspection tool

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 7: Summary of Findings in the Field

Tool
Tool Tool Not
Reported
Reported Reported
Type of Feature and Not
Found in the Found in
Found in
Field Field
Field
External Metal Loss Features 11 13 11
Internal Metal Loss Features 10 0 0
Internal Mill Flaw Ungraded 0 1 0
Gouge Ungrade 0 5 0
Localized penetrator on ERW Upset 0 9 0
MillFlaw ungraded 0 6 0
TOTAL 21 34 11

The information contained within Figures 10 through 17 is intended to provide NGL BU with the
data necessary to assess the accuracy of the inspection results and validate the MFL
in-line inspection tool run performed by Magpie System Inc. The depth accuracy for this
in-line inspection tool is ±15% of the pipe wall thickness for 80% of the features if the defect area
is ≥2WT x 2WT and ±20% of the pipe wall thickness for 80% of the features if the defect area is
≥1WT x 1WT. In this case, the former spec would apply to 15 features and the latter spec would
apply to 6 features.
Natural Frequency Distribution of the Difference between Field Measured Depth and Tool Predicted Depth for the
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program
20 19
LEGEND
18 Frequency Polygon
Total Number of Features= 21
Mean= 4.654% wt Frequency Histogram
16 Standard Deviation = 8.254% wt
Field Measured Depth (% wall thickness)
Median= 6.0% wt (Divider at 50% of Sample)
> Tool Predicted Depth(% wall thickness)
14
Field Measured Depth (% wall thickness)
Number of features

< Tool Predicted Depth (% wall thickness)


12

Conservative Inspection
10
Non-Conservative Inspection
8
90.5% of the sample within
+/-15% of the pipe wall
6
thickness

4
2
2
0 0 0
0
-15 to 0%

0 to 15%

15 to 30%

30 to 45%

45 to 60%

60 to 75%
-60 to -75%

-45 to -60%

-30 to -45%

-30 to -15%

Field Measured Depth Minus In-Line Inspection Tool Predicted Depth (% wall thickness)

Figure 10: Cumulative Natural Distribution of the Percentage of Metal Loss Features
Verified in the Field

Page 26
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Figure 10 shows the natural frequency distribution of the differences between the field measured
depth and the reported depth of the metal loss features excavated and assessed. The
frequency histogram (blue bars), depicted in Figure 10 are in increments of 15% of the pipe wall
thickness.
Of the 19 features with a defect area ≥2WT x 2WT, 18 (94.7%) of them were within the accuracy
specification. For the two features with a defect area ≥1WT x 1WT, both of them were within the
accuracy specification. Table 7 shows a summary of the depth differences that were within and
outside of the stated criteria. The results show that the tool performed within the stated criteria.
The results also show a tendency for the tool to under-predict the depths, a slightly non-
conservative bias.

Table 8: Summary of Field versus Tool Reported Depth Differences

Total Number Number Number Number Number Number


Number of Within -15 to Within 0 to Within -20 Within 0 to (Percentage) (Percentage)
Features 0% 15% to 0% 20% Within ± 15% Within ± 20%
19 (>2t x 2t) 11 7 12 7 18 (94.7%) 19 (100%)
2 (>1t x 1t) 1 0 2 0 1 (50%) 2 (100%)

The frequency polygon graph (line) is drawn by connecting the frequency value for each range of
difference in depth. The area under the frequency polygon was subsequently generated and
hereafter is referred to as the Natural Distribution Curve. As illustrated in Figure 10, the
mean (M), standard deviation (S) and median (Mn), are 4.654%, 8.254%, and 6.0%,
respectively.
The cumulative natural distribution graph (refer to Figure 10) illustrates that 90.5% of the in-line
inspection validated features had a field-tool difference from –15% to +15% of the pipe wall
thickness.
For engineering purposes, the natural distribution has been modeled into a t-distribution (refer to
Figures 11, 12 and 13). Outliers, if any, caused either by the in-line inspection run and/or
statistical issues are not included in the distribution curves, but noted.
Figure 11 shows the t-standardized differences between the field measured depth and tool
predicted depth within one and two standard deviations from the mean value of 4.654%. Within
one standard deviation of the mean is approximately 67% of the metal loss features detected by
the tool and actually located and verified in the field depicting differences in depth from -3.6% to
12.9% of the pipe wall thickness for this sample of features. Approximately 94% of the metal
loss features detected by the tool and located and verified in the field are allocated within two
standard deviations of the mean, which depicts differences in depth from -11.9% to +21.2% of
the pipe wall thickness for this sample of features.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Distribution of the Standardized Differences (t) Between Field Measured Depth and Tool Predicted Depth for the Interval
(M +/- S) TO (M +/- 2S) for the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

LEGEND t-distribution
Total Number of Features= 21 Mean = 4.654% wt
Mean= 4.654% wt
Standard Deviation = 8.254% wt
Median= 6.0% wt (Divider at 50% of Sample)
Degrees of Freedom v = 20

M-S M+S

67%

M - 2S M + 2S
94%

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= - 11.9%) (M-S= - 3.6%) (M= 4.654%) (M+S= + 12.9%) (M+2S= + 21.2%)

t-Standardized Difference t = (X-M)/S

Figure 11: T-Standardized Distribution of the Difference between Field Measured Depth
and In-Line Inspection Predicted Depth

Distribution for a Field-Tool Normalized Depth Difference of +/-10% for the


NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program
Based on the 2005 Excavation Program
t-distribution

LEGEND CALCULATIONS
Mean = 4.654% wt For +/- 15% Tool Accuracy
Total Number of Features= 21
Mean= 4.654% wt t[+15%]= 1.3 [38.8%-area under the graph]
Standard Deviation = 8.254% wt t[-15%]= - 2.4 [48.6%-area under the graph]
Median= 6.0% wt (Divider at 50% of Sample) Probability [+/-15% wt] = 87.4%
Degrees of Freedom v = 20

t= - 2.4 x= - 15% to + 15% t= +1.3


x= - 15% x= + 15%

87.4% of Sample

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= - 11.9%) (M-S= - 3.6%) (M= 4.654%) (M+S= + 12.9%) (M+2S= + 21.2%)

Figure 12: Field-Tool Normalized Depth Difference of +/- 10% of the Pipe Wall Thickness
Distribution for a Field-Tool Normalized Depth Difference for 80% for the
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

t-distribution
LEGEND Mean= 4.654% wt
Total Number of Features= 21 CALCULATIONS
Mean= 4.654% wt For 80% of the Sample
Standard Deviation = 8.254% wt t[T= +90%-area under the graph]= 1.32
Median= 6.0% wt (Divider at 50% of Sample) t[T= -10%-area under the graph]= - 1.33
Degrees of Freedom v = 20 x= t s + mu = x[1.32]= 15.5%
x= t s + mu = x[-1.325]= -6.3%

t= - 1.33 t= + 1.32
(x= - 6.3%) (x= +15.5%)

80%

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= - 11.9%) (M-S= - 3.6%) (M= 4.654%) (M+S= + 12.9%) (M+2S= + 21.2%)

Figure 13: Distribution of Field-Tool Normalized Depth Differences for 80% of the Features
Validated in the Field
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the t-standardized differences between the field measured
and reported depths for a t-distributed difference of +/-15% of the pipe wall thickness. A
t-distributed difference of +/- 15% (from t = -2.4% to + 1.3% of the pipe wall thickness was
achieved for 87.4% of the 21 validated features, which meets the expected tool accuracy criteria
of depth sizing (within ±15% of the field measured depth 80% of the time).
Figure 13 shows the distribution of the t-standardized differences between the field measured
and tool predicted depths for 80% of the validated data from the t-distributed mean of 4.654% of
the pipe wall thickness. As indicated, 80% of the t-distributed sample ranges from -6.3% to
+15.5% of the pipe wall thickness. This indicates that the depths for most of the validated
features detected in the field are larger than to those predicted by the Magpie Systems Inc. MFL
in-line inspection tool.
Figure 14 shows the frequency distribution in increments of 10% MAOP of the differences
(expressed in percentage of MAOP) between the predicted burst pressure of the metal loss
features based on field measurements and those reported by the tool for those metal loss
features excavated and assessed.
As indicated in Figure 14, eleven (11) of the 21 (52.4%) validated features had field predicted
differences in predicted burst pressure between -10% and +10% as compared with the tool
predicted burst pressures.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Natural Frequency Distribution of the Difference between Field Predicted Burst Pressure and
Tool Predicted Burst Pressure for the
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

7
LEGEND
Total Number of Features= 21
6 6
6 Mean= -9.286% MAOP
Standard Deviation = 13.871% MAOP
Median= -8.9% MAOP (Divider at 50% of Sample)
Degrees of freedom = 20
5
5
Number of features

Frequency Polygon
Frequency Histogram
4
Field Calculated Burst Field Calculated Burst
Pressure (% MAOP) Pressure (% MAOP)
3 < Tool Predicted Burst > Tool Predicted Burst
Pressure (% MAOP) Pressure (% MAOP)

2
2

1 1
1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
-10 to 0%

0 to 10%

90 to 100%
10 to 20%

20 to 30%

30 to 40%

40 to 50%

50 to 60%

60 to 70%

70 to 80%

80 to 90%
-60 to -50%

-50 to -40%

-40 to -30%

-30 to -20%

-20 to -10%

Field Predicted Burst Pressure Minus In-Line Inspection Tool Predicted Burst Pressure (% MAOP)

Figure 14: Natural Frequency Distribution of the Difference between Field Predicted Burst
Pressure and Tool Predicted Burst pressure

Table 9 shows a summary of the burst pressure differences that were within and outside of
±10% MAOP. Since 52.4% of the validated features are within ±10% MAOP, this illustrates a
moderately accurate tool run with respect to the predicted burst pressure.

Table 9: Summary of Field versus Tool Reported Burst Pressure Differences


Total Number Number Number Number Percentage
Number of Within -10 to Within 0 to Below - Above Number Within ±
Features 0% 10% 10% +10% Within ± 10% 10%
21 6 5 9 1 11 52.4%

Difference calculated as: [(Field Burst pressure Calculated minus Tool Burst Pressure Calculated)/ MAOP]*100%

Page 30
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

The frequency polygon graph (line) is drawn by connecting the frequency value per range of
difference in predicted burst pressure (% MAOP). The area under the frequency polygon was
subsequently generated and hereafter is referred to as the Natural Distribution Curve. As
illustrated in Figure 14, the mean (M), standard deviation (S), and median (Mn), expressed as a
percentage difference of the maximum allowable operating pressure are -9.286%, 13.871%, and
-8.9% MAOP, respectively.
Figure 15 shows the t-standardized differences between the predicted burst pressures of the
field measured external and internal metal loss features and the predicted burst pressures of the
tool reported external and internal metal loss features within one and two standard deviations
from the mean value of -9.286% MAOP. One standard deviation area represents approximately
67% of the metal loss features detected by the tool and verified in the field, depicting differences
from -23.2% to +4.6% of MAOP for this sample of features. Approximately 94% of the metal
loss features detected by the tool and verified in the field are allocated within two standard
deviations of the mean, which depicts differences in predicted burst pressure from -37.0% to
+18.5% of MAOP for this sample of features; thereby, illustrating the tool run tended to be on the
conservative end of the accuracy spectrum.

Distribution of the Standardized Differences (t) Between Field Predicted Burst Pressure and Tool Predicted Burst Pressure
for the Interval (M +/- S) TO (M +/- 2S) for the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

(Canadian and US Sections Combined) Based on the 2005 Excavation Program


LEGEND t-distribution
Total Number of Features= 21
Mean= -9.286% MAOP Mean = -9.286% MAOP
Standard Deviation = 13.871% MAOP
Median= -8.9% MAOP (Divider at 50% of Sample)
Degrees of Freedom v = 20

M-S M+S

67%

M - 2S M + 2S
94%

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= -37.0% (M-S= -23.2% (M= -9.286% (M+S= 4.6% (M+2S= 18.5%
MAOP) MAOP) MAOP) MAOP) MAOP)
Standardized Difference t = (X-M)/S

Figure 15: T-Standard Distribution of the Difference between the Field Predicted Burst
Pressure and In-Line Inspection Predicted Burst Pressure

Page 31
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Distribution for a Field-Tool Normalized Burst Pressure Difference (% MAOP) for the
NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

t-distribution
LEGEND Mean = -9.286%
Total Number of Features= 21
Mean= -9.286% MAOP CALCULATIONS
Standard Deviation = 13.871% MAOP For +/- 10% Tool Accuracy
Median= -8.9% MOP (Divider at 50% of Sample) t[+10%]= +1.39 [41%-area under the graph]
Degrees of Freedom v = 20 t[-10%]= - 0.05 [2.0%-area under the graph]
Probability [+/-10%] = 43.0%

x=- 10% to + 10%

t= - 0.1 t= + 1.4
x= - 10% x= + 10%

43.0% of Sample

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= - (M-S= -23.2% (M= - (M+S= 4.6% (M+2S= 18.5%
37.0% MAOP) 9.286% MAOP) MAOP)
MAOP)

Figure 16: Distribution for a Normalized Difference of +/- 10% MAOP between the Field
Predicted Burst Pressure and Tool Predicted Burst Pressure

Distribution of the Field-Tool Normalized Burst Pressure Difference for 80% of the Features
Validated in the Field for the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Based on the 2006 Excavation Program

LEGEND
Total Number of Features= 21 t-distribution
Mean= -9.286% MAOP
Mean= -9.286% MAOP
Standard Deviation = 13.871% MAOP
CALCULATIONS
Median= -8.9% MAOP (Divider at 50% of
Sample)
For +/- 80% of the Sample
Degrees of Freedom v = 20 t[T=+90%-area under the graph]= 1.32
t[T=-10%-area under the graph]= -1.33
x= t s + mu = x[1.32]= 9.0%
x= t s + mu = x[-1.325]= -27.7%

t= - 1.33 t= + 1.32
(x= -27.7% MAOP) (x= +9.0% MAOP)

80%

t= - 2 t= - 1 t=0 t= + 1 t= + 2
(M-2S= -37.0% (M-S= -23.2% (M= -9.286% (M+S= 4.6% (M+2S= 18.5%
MAOP) MAOP) MAOP) MAOP) MAOP)

Figure 17: Distribution of Field-Tool Normalized Predicted Burst Pressure Differences for
80% of t he Features Validated in the Field

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Figure 16 shows the distribution of the t-standardized differences between the field predicted
burst pressure and tool predicted burst pressure for a t-distributed difference of ±10% MAOP. A
t-distributed difference of +/- 10% (from t -0.1 to +1.4) of MAOP was achieved for 43% of the 21
validated features.
Figure 17 shows the distribution of the t-standardized differences between the field predicted
burst pressures (MAOP) and tool predicted burst pressures for 80% of the validated data from
the t-distributed mean of -9.286% of MAOP. As indicated, 80% of the t-distributed samples
range from -27.7% to +9.0% of MAOP; thereby illustrating a tool run with a tendency to be on the
conservative side of the spectrum.
The cumulative natural distribution graph (refer to Figure 14) illustrates that 52.3% of the
in-line inspection validated features had a field-tool difference from –10% to +10% of the MAOP.
In comparison, the mean-centered (mean = -9.286% MAOP) t-distribution (refer to Figure 15)
illustrates that 43% of the in-line inspection validated features had the same field-tool depth
difference from +10% to –10%.
2.4.3.1 Depth and Burst Pressure Unity Graphs and Regression Analysis
The depth of the metal loss features, as detected by the Magpie Systems Inc. MFL tool and
measured in the field, was statistically analyzed and trended using linear regression analysis to
better represent the correlation between the tool data and the actual field data.
Figure 18 shows the comparison between the reported depth of the metal loss feature and the
depth of the same feature as measured in the field. It can be seen that comparative data shows
the depth defects range from ≥10% to ≤ 42% of the pipe wall thickness, and that the linear
regression line relating field depth to reported depth is slightly above the intercept line.
The following first degree equation, represented as Y, was used to calculate the “adjusted”
predicted depth of the individual and “groups” of metal loss features reported by Magpie.
“Adjusted” tool predicted depth
Y=0.985x + 4.981%
Correlation coefficient: 0.735
Prediction error: 8.054% WT
where “x” is the tool predicted depth.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section


Depth Correlation from the Initial Excavation Program
Comparison of Field Simulated Depth vs. In-line Inspection Predicted Depth (% Wall Thickness)

100%
Field Measured Depth (% of the Pipe's Wall Thickness) Trendline f(WT)
90%
Y = 0.985x +4.981% WT
Correlation Coefficient: 0.735 + 20% Difference

80% Prediction Error: 8.054% WT


Significance: 1.474E-02% + 10% Difference
Number of Features: 21
70%
- 10% Difference

60%
- 20% Difference

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Tool Reported Depth (% of the Pipe's Wall Thickness)

Figure 18: Field Measured Depth versus In-Line Inspection Predicted Depth

The predicted burst pressure of the metal loss features, based on both MFL tool and in-field
measurements, were also statistically analyzed and trended using linear regression, to further
compare the tool data with the actual field verification data.
Figure 19 shows the comparison between the predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of the metal
loss features using the dimensions reported by Magpie Systems Inc. in their final report, and the
predicted burst pressure of the same features, based on the measurements taken in the field.
The following first-degree equation, represented as Y, was used to calculate the “adjusted”
predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of each metal loss feature detected by the Magpie Systems
Inc. MFL in-line inspection tool.
“Adjusted” tool predicted burst pressure
Y = 1.027x + -1227.257 kPa
Correlation coefficient: 0.9679
Prediction error: 954.145 kPa (9.6% MAOP)
where x is tool predicted burst pressure.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section


Burst Pressure Correlation from the Initial Excavation Program
Comparison of Field Based Predicted Failure Pressure vs. In-line Inspection Predicted Pressure
Predicted Burst Pressure Based on Field Measurements (kPa) 24000
Trendline f(PBP)

Y = 1.027x -1.221.257 kPa + 20% Difference


22000 Correlation Coefficient: 0.9679
Prediction Error: 954.145 kPa (9.6% MAOP)
+ 10% Difference
Significance: 3.045E-10%
Number of Features: 20
20000
- 10% Difference

- 20% Difference
18000

16000

14000

12000

10000
10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000 22000 24000

Tool Predicted Burst Pressure (kPa)

Figure 19: Field Measured Failure Pressure versus In-Line Inspection Predicted Pressure
The levels of confidence in the linear regression equations obtained for both depth and burst
pressure were assessed by evaluating their associated “F” factor (i.e. level of statistical
significance in the analysis). An acceptable “F” value for prediction purposes is 5%, which
translates into a 95% confidence level in the analysis.
The “F” value for depth based prediction was 0.015%. Therefore, the confidence level for the
depth based prediction is greater than 95% and considered acceptable. The “F” value for burst
pressure based prediction was 3.05 x 10-10%. Therefore, the confidence level for burst pressure
based predictions is greater than 95% and considered acceptable.
The RPRRStreng 0.85dL, based upon 100% SMYS, was calculated for both the tool and the field data
as follows:
Predicted burst pressure 0.85dL
RPR 0.85 dL[SMYS] 
100% SMYS burst pressure

For reporting and pipe class location analysis purposes, the RPRMAOP was calculated for each
metal loss feature based on their “adjusted” Predicted Burst PressureRStreng 0.85dL and the
Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of the Windsor to Dow pipeline section.

Predicted Burst PressureRStreng0.85dL


RPR[MAOP] 
Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure(MAOP)

Page 35
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2.4.3.2 Assessment of the Field-Tool Data (Sample Size Verification)


As illustrated in Table 10, for modeling and field validation purposes, a total of 16 metal loss
features would need to be excavated in order to provide a 95% sampling confidence for the
given distribution of in-line inspection data. A total of 32 features reported by the in-line
inspection tool were excavated, however only 21 features were correlated and used for the
depth field-tool correlation and 20 features were used for the burst pressure correlation.

Table 10: Minimum Statistical Sample Size Calculation

Sample Size Calculation for feature Less than or equal to 20% Finite population formula
Mean = 13% Category n = (Ns^2)/( (N-1)*D + s^2)
Count (N) = 107 Less than equal to 20% D= B^2/4
Variance (s^2) = 0.087832% 0.02963649 Equation 4.11, page 89
Bound on Error (B) = 0.0200 Elementary Survey Sampling, 6th ed., 2006
D = B^2/4 = 0.0001 Richard L. Scheaffer, William Mendenhall III, R. Lyman Ott
Required (rounded) sample size (n) = 8 Less than equal to 20% Duxbury Advanced Series, Thomson Brooks/Cole

Sample Size Calculation for features Between 20 & 40%


Mean = 25% Category
Count (N) = 44 Between 20 & 40%
Variance (s^2) = 0.213424% 0.04619785
Bound on Error (B) = 0.0312
D = B^2/4 = 0.0002
Required (rounded) sample size (n) = 7 Between 20 & 40%

Sample Size Calculation for features Greater than 40%


Mean = 41% Category
Count (N) = 1 Greater than 40%
Variance (s^2) = 0.000000% 0
Bound on Error (B) = 0.0000
D = B^2/4 = 0.0000
Required (rounded) sample size (n) = 1 Greater than 40%

2.4.4 In-Line Inspection Final Assessment


2.4.4.1 Deterministic Corrosion Growth Model
Figure 20 shows the cumulative number of metal loss features detected by the MFL in-line
inspection tool that would be predicted to exceed ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness (i.e., depth
based criterion) on an annual basis for a twenty year period following the date of the in-line
inspection program. This model assumes that the feature continues to grow at the
CC Technologies recommended corrosion growth rates provided in Table 1. The orange bars
depicted in the graph represent the cumulative number of as-reported external metal loss
features, i.e., prior to performing the initial excavations, which would be predicted to exceed the
depth based criterion over the next 20 years. The yellow bars represent the cumulative number
of external metal loss features, following the initial excavation program, which would be expected
to reach the depth criterion over the same 20-year period. The corresponding internal features
are represented by the blue and green bars, respectively.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Features Reaching a Depth of ≥80% of the Pipe Wall Thickness
Adjusted by Tool Accuracy; Growing Depth

16

14

Number of External and Internal Metal Loss Features


12

10
Failing Depth Based Criterion

0
Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Ext Depth ≥ 80% of the Pipe Wall Thickness Prior to the Initial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 10 12 13 14
Excavation Program
Int Depth ≥ 80% of the Pipe Wall Thickness Prior to the Initial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 6
Excavation Program
Ext Depth ≥ 80% of the Pipe Wall Thickness Remaining After 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 8 10 11 12
the Initial Excavation Program
Int Depth ≥ 80% of the Pipe Wall Thickness Remaining After 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 6
the Initial Excavation Program

Year

Figure 20: Features Exceeding Depth Based Criteria (≥80% of Pipe Wall Thickness)
As illustrated in Figure 20, no metal loss features (after the initial excavation program) are
predicted to reach a depth ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness until July 2014, and in that year one
internal feature is expected to reach such a depth. The first external metal loss feature is
predicted to reach a depth ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness (after the initial excavation program)
in July 2020. According to the deterministic model, 12 external and 6 internal metal loss features
are predicted to reach a depth ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness during the next 20 years. It is
apparent from Figure 20 that the initial excavation program successfully addressed two external
metal loss features that were predicted by this model to reach a depth of ≥80% of the pipe wall
thickness over the next 20 years. The initial excavation program, however, did not address any
of the internal metal loss features, as shown in Figure 20.
Figure 21 shows the cumulative number of metal loss features detected by the MFL in-line
inspection tool that would be predicted to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP on an annual
basis for a twenty year period following the in-line inspection program. The orange bars depicted
in the graph represent the cumulative number of as-reported external metal loss features, i.e.,
prior to performing the initial excavations, which would be predicted to exceed the depth based
criterion over the next 20 years. The yellow bars represent the cumulative number of external
metal loss features, following the initial excavation program, which would be expected to reach
the depth criterion over the same 20-year period. The corresponding internal features are
represented by the blue and green bars, respectively.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
Features Reaching a Predicted Burst Pressure ≤100% MAOP
Adjusted by Tool Accuracy; Growing Length and Depth

16

14
Number of External and Internal Metal Loss Features

12
Failing Burst Pressure Based Criterion

10

0
Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Ext Burst Pressure ≤ 100% MAOP Prior to the Initial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5 8 10 11
Excavation Program
Int Burst Pressure ≤ 100% MAOP Prior to the Initial Excavation 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 6
Program
Ext Burst Pressure ≤ 100% MAOP Remaining After the Initial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 5 6 8 9
Excavation Program
Int Burst Pressure ≤ 100% MAOP Remaining After the Initial 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 6
Excavation Program

Year

Figure 21: Features Exceeding Burst Pressure Based Criteria (≤100% MAOP)
As illustrated in Figure 21, no metal loss features (after the initial excavation program) are
predicted to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP until July 2008, and in that year one internal
feature is expected to reach such a pressure. The first external metal loss feature predicted to
reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP (after the initial excavation program) is in July 2020.
According to the deterministic model, nine external and six internal metal loss features are
predicted to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP during the next 20 years. It is apparent from
Figure 21 that the initial excavation program successfully addressed two external metal loss
features that were predicted by this model to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP over the next
20 years. The initial excavation program, however, did not address any of the internal metal loss
features, as shown in Figure 21.
The internal feature predicted to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP in 2008 was previously
excavated in conjunction with adjacent external feature. As a repair for the external features, a
Clock Spring® composite sleeve was installed at this location and included the internal feature
within the sleeve length. Although the Clock Spring® was installed at the location of the internal
feature, the Clock Spring® is not considered a permanent repair for internal metal loss, as the
internal corrosion processes can continue despite the installation of the Clock Spring® on the
outside of the pipe and any leak or rupture would likely not be contained by the Clock Spring®.
Consequently, CC Technologies performed deterministic calculations to determine when this
feature would be predicted to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP if the MAOP was reduced to
6205 kPa and 2068 kPa. The results showed that the feature would not be expected to have a
burst pressure ≤100% MAOP within the next 40 years regardless of whether the MAOP was
6205 kPa or 2068 kPa. At the time of the in-line inspection, the corresponding factor of safety for
this feature was 1.70 and 5.09 for pressures of 6205 kPa and 2068 kPa, respectively.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2.4.4.2 Probability of Exceedance (POE) Based Corrosion Growth Model


The Probability of Exceedance values, calculated on an annual basis for each metal loss feature,
“cluster” and “group”, were used to generate cumulative Probability of Exceedance value versus
time curves from both a depth and burst pressure based perspective.
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance versus time curves were generated for the following
cases:

 All metal loss features, “clusters” and “groups” identified in the July 2005 in-line
inspection data;

 All metal loss features, “clusters” and “groups” identified in the July 2005 in-line
inspection data except for those metal loss features and “groups” verified during the initial
excavation program; and

 All metal loss features, “clusters” and “groups” identified in the July 2005 in-line
inspection data except for those metal loss features, “clusters” and “groups”
excavated/repaired during the initial excavation program and the selected metal loss
features identified as critical during the next 20 years, based upon the Deterministic
Assessment discussed in Section 2.4.4.1.
Note: Individual curves were generated for each of the different scenarios identified by the
Deterministic Assessment. These individual curves were generated by removing, at the
beginning of the 20-year period, those specific metal loss features predicted to reach the
depth based or burst pressure based criteria. Each of these different scenarios represents
potential future excavation and repair scenarios.
The Probability of Exceedance values associated with the depth based and burst pressure
based acceptance criteria (i.e. depths ≥70%/≥80% of the pipe wall thickness and burst pressures
≤110%/≤100% MAOP) were superimposed onto the depth and burst pressure based Cumulative
Probability of Exceedance value versus time curves to identify the year in which each of the
various excavation and repair scenarios would be expected to reach the acceptance criteria.
2.4.4.2.1 Probability of Exceedance Depth Based Model
The probability of each metal loss feature or “groups” reaching a depth ≥80% of the pipe wall
thickness is calculated by taking into account the field-tool correlation as determined in the in-
line inspection validation program.
The depth based cumulative probability for the Windsor to Dow pipeline section was calculated
on an annual basis for a period of twenty years from the MFL inspection run. The cumulative
depth based probability versus time curve was plotted and compared to the equivalent
probability of “at least one” feature exceeding the depth based criterion (i.e. >70%/≥80% of the
pipe wall thickness). The year at which this condition is reached is subsequently identified.
Conversely, the worst predicted depth at any given year, within a twenty year period, can be
determined from the depth based cumulative probability for that year.
For example, in Figure 22, a probability of exceedance depth value of 5.0 x 10-01 equates to a
worst predicted depth of 80% of the pipe wall thickness; while a probability of exceedance depth
value of 1.1 x 10-01 equates to a worst predicted depth of 70% of the pipe wall thickness.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Provided in Figures 23 and 24 are the cumulative probability of exceedance for depth versus
time. These curves were generated for the following seven scenarios:
A. All metal loss features identified in the July 2005 in-line inspection data (i.e. prior to
the initial excavation program).
B. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features).
C. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the one (1) metal loss feature predicted to reach the depth based
criteria in July 2014 by the Deterministic Assessment, which will be addressed in this
excavation program.
D. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the two (2) metal loss features predicted to reach the depth based
criteria in July 2014 and July 2020 by the Deterministic Assessment, which will be
addressed in this excavation program.
E. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the five (5) metal loss features predicted to reach the depth based
criteria in July 2014, July 2020 and July 2021 by the Deterministic Assessment, which
will be addressed in this excavation program.
F. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the nine (9) metal loss features predicted to reach the depth based
criteria in July 2014, July 2020, July 2021 and July 2022 by the Deterministic
Assessment, which will be addressed in this excavation program.
G. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the twelve (12) metal loss features predicted to reach the depth based
criteria in July 2014, July 2020, July 2021, July 2022 and July 2023 by the
Deterministic Assessment, which will be addressed in this excavation program.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Depth Based Levels vs. Worst Predicted External Metal Loss Feature Depth

1.1E-01 5.0E-01 Worst Predicted Depth (% Wall Thickness)


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1E+00
1E-01
1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
Probability of Exceedance

1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
1E-12
1E-13
1E-14
1E-15
1E-16

Figure 22: Worst Predicted Depth from Depth Based Probability of Exceedance Value

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Depth Based Criteria Scenarios
Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment
A. After in-line inspection
B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst external metal loss feature and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 4 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
F. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
G. After initial excavation program without the 10 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features

POE 70% WT
1E+00
1E-01
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
Jul 2011 Jul 2011

1E-12
1E-13
Dec 2014
Mar 2015
Aug 2015

Feb 2017
Jun 2016

1E-14
1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025

Year

Figure 23: Probability of Exceedance - Depth Based Criteria Scenarios: 70% Worst
Predicted Depth

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Depth Based Criteria Scenarios
Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment

A. After in-line inspection


B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst external metal loss feature and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 4 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
F. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
G. After initial excavation program without the 10 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features

POE 80% WT
1E+00
1E-01
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09
1E-10
1E-11

Dec 2013 Dec 2013


1E-12
1E-13

Jun 2017

Sep 2019
Jan 2018

Nov 2018
Mar 2017
1E-14
1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025
Year

Figure 24: Probability of Exceedance - Depth Based Criteria Scenarios: 80% Worst
Predicted Depth
As illustrated in Figure 23:
A. Based on the feature population as reported by the MFL inspection tool, the probability of
a feature growing to a depth of ≥70% of the pipe wall thickness becomes “unacceptable”,
(i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in July 2011.
B. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada the
probability of a feature growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the
Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in July 2011.
C. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of one (1) additional metal loss feature, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in December 2014.
D. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of two (2) additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in March 2015.
E. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of five (5) additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in August 2015.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

F. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of nine (9) additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in June 2016.
G. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of twelve (12) additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥70% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 1.1 X 10-1) in February 2017.
As illustrated in Figure 24:
A. Based on the feature population as reported by the MFL inspection tool, the probability of
a feature growing to a depth of ≥80% of the pipe wall thickness becomes “unacceptable”,
(i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in December 2013.
B. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada the
probability of a feature growing to a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the
Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in December 2013.
C. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of one additional metal loss feature, the probability of a feature growing to
a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds
5.0 X 10-1) in March 2017.
D. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of two additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature growing
to a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in June 2017.
E. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of five additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature growing
to a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in January 2018.
F. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of nine additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature growing
to a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in November 2018.
G. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada and
the excavation of twelve additional metal loss features, the probability of a feature
growing to a depth of ≥80% WT becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability
exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in September 2019.
Consequently, based upon the above Probability of Exceedance analysis it is apparent that, in
the absence of any additional excavations performed, there are no metal loss features or
“groups” predicted to reach a depth of ≥70% of the pipe wall thickness until the year 2011 and
similarly no metal loss features or “groups” are predicted to reach a depth of ≥80% of the pipe
wall thickness until the year 2013. It is important to note that this Probability of Exceedance
analysis predicts that a feature or “cluster” will exceed the depth based criteria of ≥80% of the
pipe wall thickness approximately 1 year earlier (i.e. 2013 versus 2014), than was indicated by
the Deterministic Assessment discussed in Section 2.4.4.1. The reason for the discrepancy
between the predictions made by the Deterministic and Probability of Exceedance Assessments

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

is that the Probability of Exceedance assessment takes into account the regression analysis
prediction errors used to arrive at the “adjusted” dimensions of each metal loss feature whereas
the Deterministic Assessment does not.
Table 11 summarizes the probability of exceedance depth based scenarios and the individual
features that progressively reach the >70 or >80% criterion for this pipeline section.

Table 11: Probability of Exceedance Depth Scenarios

Year
Absolute Failing
Distance Depth
POE # Scenario (m) INT/EXT Criterion
125 C 108435 EXT 2020
103 D 74208.17 EXT 2021
124 D 107659.2 EXT 2021
149 D 128415.6 EXT 2021
53 E 18771.47 EXT 2022
63 E 35190.22 EXT 2022
119 E 100236 EXT 2022
143 E 122244.6 EXT 2022
74 F 49087.64 EXT 2023
93 F 65436.79 EXT 2023
99 F 68161.39 INT 2023
32 G 10484.04 EXT 2024
57 G 25934.73 INT 2024
98 G 67920.98 INT 2024

2.4.4.2.2 Probability of Exceedance Burst Pressure Based Model


The probability of each metal loss feature or “group” reaching a predicted burst pressure ≤100%
of the maximum allowable operating pressure is calculated by taking into account the field-tool
correlation as determined in the validation program.
The burst pressure based cumulative probability of exceedance was calculated on an annual
basis for a period of twenty years following the MFL inspection run. The burst pressure based
cumulative probability versus time curve was plotted and compared to the equivalent probability
of “at least one” feature exceeding the burst pressure based criterion (i.e. ≤100%/ ≤110% of the
maximum allowable operating pressure). The year at which this critical condition is reached is
subsequently identified. Conversely, the lowest predicted burst pressure and minimum factor of
safety in any given year within the twenty year period can be determined from the burst pressure
based cumulative probability for that year.
For example, in Figure 25, a Probability of Exceedance value of 1.5 x 10-01 equates to a lowest
expected factor of safety of 1.10 (equivalent to a burst pressure of 110% MAOP) while a

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Probability of Exceedance value of 5.0 x 10-01 equates to a lowest expected factor of safety of
1.00 (equivalent to a burst pressure of 100% MAOP).
Provided in Figures 26 and 27 are the cumulative Probability of Exceedance burst pressure
based value versus time curves. These curves were generated for the following
seven (7) scenarios:
A. All metal loss features identified in the July 2005 in-line inspection data (i.e. prior to
the initial excavation program).
B. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features).
C. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the one (1) metal loss features predicted to reach the burst pressure
based criteria in July 2008 by the Deterministic Assessment, which will be addressed
in this excavation program.
D. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the four (4) metal loss features predicted to reach the burst pressure
based criteria in July 2008 and July 2020 by the Deterministic Assessment, which will
be addressed in this excavation program.
E. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the seven (7) metal loss features predicted to reach the burst pressure
based criteria in July 2008, July 2020 and July 2021 by the Deterministic
Assessment, which will be addressed in this excavation program.
F. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the ten (10) metal loss features predicted to reach the burst pressure
based criteria in July 2008, July 2020, July 2021 and July 2023 by the Deterministic
Assessment, which will be addressed in this excavation program.
G. All metal loss features identified by the MFL inspection, except for those individual
features verified during the initial 2006 excavation program (22 external metal loss
features) and the thirteen (13) metal loss features predicted to reach the burst
pressure based criteria in July 2008, July 2020, July 2021, July 2023 and July 2024
by the Deterministic Assessment, which will be addressed in this excavation program.

Page 45
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Burst Pressure Based Level vs. Lowest Predicted Factor of Safety

1.5E-01 5.0E-01 Lowest Predicted RPR (% MAOP)


0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00
1E+00

1E-01

1E-02

1E-03
Probability of Exceedance

1E-04

1E-05

1E-06

1E-07

1E-08

1E-09

1E-10

1E-11

1E-12

1E-13

Figure 25: Lowest Predicted Safety Factor (MAOP) from Burst Pressure Based Probability
of Exceedance
Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios
Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment
A. After in-line inspection
B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 3 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 5 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features
F. After initial excavation program without the 6 worst external metal loss features and 4 worst internal metal loss features
G. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 5 worst internal metal loss features

POE 110% MAOP


1E+00
1E-01
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
Apr 2006 Apr 2006

1E-12
1E-13
Sep 2015

Aug 2019
Dec 2017

Jan 2021

1E-14
Jul 2016

1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025

Year

Figure 26: Probability of Exceedance-Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios: 110%


MAOP Lowest Predicted Burst Pressure

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios
Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment
A. After in-line inspection
B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 3 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 5 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features
F. After initial excavation program without the 6 worst external metal loss features and 4 worst internal metal loss features
G. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 5 worst internal metal loss features

POE 100% MAOP


1E+00
1E-01
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
Mar 2008 Mar 2008

1E-12
1E-13

Jul 2018
Jun 2017

Jan 2023
Feb 2020
1E-14

Jul 2021
1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025
Year

Figure 27: Probability of Exceedance- Burst Pressure Based Criteria Scenarios: 100%
MAOP Lowest Predicted Burst Pressure
As illustrated in Figure 26:
A. Based on the feature population as reported by the MFL inspection tool, the
probability of a feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP
becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in April
2006.
B. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
the probability of a feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP
becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in April
2006.
C. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of one (1) additional metal loss feature, the probability of a feature
reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e.
the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in September 2015.
D. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of four (4) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in July 2016.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

E. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of seven (7) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in December
2017.
F. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of ten (10) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in August 2019.
G. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of thirteen (13) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 1.5 X 10-1) in January 2021.
As illustrated in Figure 27:
A. Based on the feature population as reported by the MFL inspection tool, the
probability of a feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP
becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in
March 2008.
B. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
the probability of a feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP
becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in
March 2008.
C. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of one (1) additional metal loss feature, the probability of a feature
reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP becomes “unacceptable”, (i.e.
the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in June 2017.
D. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of four (4) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in July 2018.
E. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of seven (7) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in February 2020.
F. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of ten (10) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in July 2021.
G. Based on the feature population after the remedial work conducted by BP Canada
and the excavation of thirteen (13) additional metal loss features, the probability of a
feature reaching a predicted burst pressure of ≤100% MAOP becomes
“unacceptable”, (i.e. the Cumulative Probability exceeds 5.0 X 10-1) in January 2023.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Consequently, based upon the above Probability of Exceedance analysis it is apparent that, in
the absence of any additional excavations performed, there are no metal loss features or
“groups” predicted to reach a predicted burst pressure of ≤110% MAOP until the year 2015 and
similarly no metal loss features or “groups” are predicted to reach a predicted burst pressure of
≤100% MAOP until the year 2017. It is important to note that this Probability of Exceedance
analysis predicts that a feature or “cluster” will exceed the burst pressure based criteria of
≤100% MAOP approximately 4 months earlier (i.e. March versus July 2008), than was indicated
by the Deterministic Assessment discussed in Section 2.4.4.1. The reason for the discrepancy
between the predictions made by the Deterministic and Probability of Exceedance Assessments
is that the Probability of Exceedance assessment takes into account the regression analysis
prediction errors used to arrive at the “adjusted” dimensions of each metal loss feature whereas
the Deterministic Assessment does not.
Table 12 summarizes the probability of exceedance burst pressure based scenarios and the
individual features that progressively fail the 110% or 100% criterion for the pipeline section.

Table 12: Probability of Exceedance Burst Pressure Scenarios

Year Failing
Absolute Pressure
distance Criterion
POE # Scenario (m) INT/EXT (MAOP)
74 C 49087.64 EXT 2020
125 C 108435 EXT 2020
149 C 128415.6 EXT 2020
57 D 25934.73 INT 2021
119 D 100236 EXT 2021
143 D 122244.6 EXT 2021
88 E 64566.66 INT 2023
93 E 65436.79 EXT 2023
148 E 128334.9 INT 2023
53 F 18771.47 EXT 2024
98 F 67920.98 INT 2024
124 F 107659.2 EXT 2024
103 G 74208.17 EXT 2025
130 G 115239.8 INT 2025

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2.4.5 Re-Inspection Interval and Cost/Benefit Scenarios Based on the Final


Assessment
The following cost/benefit scenarios were selected by combining a Depth Based Scenario
(Scenarios A thru G) with a Burst Pressure Based Scenario (Scenarios A thru G). The
combinations of scenarios are selected based on the year a particular scenario reaches the
failure criteria for depth and the failure criteria for burst pressure. For example, if Depth
Scenario D reaches the depth failure criteria in 2010 and Burst Pressure Scenario B reaches the
burst pressure failure criteria in a relatively close year, i.e. 2011, then Depth Scenario E and
Burst Pressure Scenario B can be combined and selected as a single excavation scenario. In a
few cases a Depth Scenario may reach the failure criteria within a few months of another Depth
Scenario. For example, in Figure 24, it is apparent that Depth Scenarios C and D reach the
failure criteria within a few months of one another. Similarly, a Burst Pressure Scenario may also
occur in a year relatively near these Depth Scenarios. In such a case, these scenarios may be
grouped together, i.e. Depth Scenario D may be grouped with Depth Scenario E and together
combined with a Burst Pressure Scenario reaching the burst pressure criteria in the same year,
as a single excavation scenario.
For the entire Windsor to Dow Cochin East pipeline section, Table 13 summarizes the following
six specific scenarios that were assessed:
1. After the initial excavation program with no additional excavation sites,
fixed five year re-inspection frequency; The pipeline will contain all the metal
loss features detected by the MFL inspection tool except for those
excavated/repaired during the initial excavation program. Recommended re-
inspection determined to be in July 2010 (five years from the July 2005 MFL
inspection).
2. After the initial excavation program; The pipeline will contain of all the metal
loss features detected by the MFL inspection tool except for those
excavated/repaired during the initial excavation program. Re-inspection
determined to be in April 2005.
3. After the initial excavation program with one additional excavation site; The
pipeline will contain all the metal loss features detected by the MFL inspection
tool except for those features excavated/repaired during the initial excavation
program and the one (1) feature reaching the depth and burst pressure based
criteria, that could be addressed by the excavation program. Re-inspection
determined to be in December 2013 (8.4 years from the initial inspection of July
2005). The latest time to repair the one feature reaching the depth and burst
pressure based criteria will be in April 2006.
4. After the initial excavation program with five additional excavation sites;
The pipeline will contain all the metal loss features detected by the MFL
inspection tool except for those features excavated/repaired during the initial
inspection program, the two (2) depth features reaching the depth based criteria,
and the three (3) features reaching the depth and burst pressure based criteria
that could be addressed by the excavation program. Re-inspection determined to
be in August 2014 (9.1 years from the initial inspection of July 2005). The latest
time to repair the five features reaching the depth and burst pressure based
criteria will be in April 2006 (1 site from Scenario 3) and December 2012
(remaining 4 sites).

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

5. After the initial excavation program with ten additional excavation sites; The
pipeline will contain all the metal loss features detected by the MFL inspection
tool except for those features excavated/repaired during the initial excavation
program, the five (5) features reaching the depth and burst pressure criteria, four
(4) depth features reaching the depth criteria, and one (1) feature reaching the
burst pressure criteria that could be addressed by the excavation program. Re-
inspection determined to be in June 2015 (9.9 years from the initial inspection of
July 2005). The latest time to repair the ten features reaching the depth and
burst pressure based criteria will be in April 2006 (1 site from Scenario 3),
December 2012 (4 sites from Scenario 4), and August 2013 (remaining 5 sites).
6. After the initial excavation program with 13 additional excavation sites; The
pipeline will contain all the metal loss features detected by the MFL inspection
tool except for those features excavated/repaired during the initial excavation
program, six (6) features reaching the depth and burst pressure criteria, five (5)
features reaching the depth criteria, and two (2) features reaching burst pressure
criteria that could be addressed by the excavation program. Re-inspection
determined to be in July 2015 (maximum 10 year recommended). The latest time
to repair the 13 features reaching the depth and burst pressure based criteria will
be in April 2006 (1 site from Scenario 3), December 2012 (4 sites from Scenario
4), August 2013 (5 sites from Scenario 5), and June 2014 (remaining 3 sites).

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Table 13: Excavation and Re-Inspection Interval Program Scenarios: Technical and Economic Factors Based on the Final
Assessment for the Windsor to Dow Section of the Cochin East Pipeline System

Year Failing Year Failing


Re-Inspection Year [2] Year for Number Worst Predicted Depth & Factor
Depth/ Burst Scenario (Based on Number of 80% Wall 70% Wall Net Present
[2]=[1a] - 2 yr or Repairs or Repair and of Safety (MOP) [After Repairs] at
Pressure Remediation Sites) AND Thickness Thickness Value (NPV) in
[2]=[1b] - 1 yr Validation Validation Re-Inspection Year
Scenario Used Predominant Failure Mode and/or 100% and/or 110% Jul 2005
The Earliest Year Digs Sites MAOP = 9930 kPa
MAOP [1a] MAOP [1b]
65.9% Wall Thickness/
1: 0 Additional Excavation Sites
B/B Mar 2008 Apr 2006 Jul 2010 N/A 0 86.8% MAOP $121,162
Fixed 5 Year Re-inspection Interval
NOT SAFE
Apr 2005 A scenario with no additional
B/B 2: 0 Additional Excavation Sites Mar 2008 Apr 2006 -0.3 Year Re-Inspection N/A 0 excavation sites is not safe or N/A
Interval operationally feasible
Dec 2013
3: 1 Probability of Exceedance Site [1 66.2% Wall Thickness/
C/C Mar 2017 Dec 2014 8.4 Year Re-Inspection Apr 2006 (1) 1 $119,219
Depth/Pressure Feature] 117.7% MAOP
Interval
4: 5 Probability of Exceedance Sites Aug 2014
Apr 2006 (1) 66.6% Wall Thickness/
E/C [3 Depth/Pressure Features + 2 Jun 2017 Aug 2015 9.1 Year Re-Inspection 5 $159,987
Dec 2012 (4) 115% MAOP
Depth Features] Interval
5: 10 Probability of Exceedance Sites
Jun 2015 Apr 2006 (1)
[5 Depth/Pressure Features + 4 66.3% Wall Thickness/
F/D Jul 2018 Jun 2016 9.9 Year Re-Inspection Dec 2012 (4) 10 $209,529
Depth Features + 1 Pressure 114.7% MAOP
Interval Aug 2013 (5)
Feature]
Jul 2015
6: 13 Probability of Exceedance Sites 10 Year* (Maximum Apr 2006 (1)
[6 Depth/Pressure Features + 5 Recommended) Re- Dec 2012 (4) 64.5% Wall Thickness/
G/E Sep 2019 Feb 2017 13 $239,931
Depth Features + 2 Pressure Inspection Interval Aug 2013 (5) 118.7% MAOP
Features] (Re-Inspection Year Jun 2014 (3)
Calculated to be: Feb 2016)

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

The year of re-inspection for each of the scenarios from Table 13 was superimposed onto the
depth and burst pressure based Probability of Exceedance graphs to obtain the
corresponding Probability of Exceedance depth based/burst pressure levels (refer to Figures
28 and 30). Based on the Probability of Exceedance depth/burst pressure levels (Figures 29
and 31) the corresponding worst predicted depth and lowest expected factor of safety were
determined.

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Depth Based Scenarios Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment

A. After in-line inspection


B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst external metal loss feature and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst external metal loss feature and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
F. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
G. After initial excavation program without the 10 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features

Excav Scen 4
4.8846E-02 1E+00
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

Excav Scen 5
1E-01
4.4895E-02 1E-02
1E-03
Excav Scen 3 1E-04
4.2869E-02
1E-05
Excav Scen 1 1E-06
3.9773E-02 1E-07
Excav Scen 6 1E-08
2.7334E-02 1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
1E-12
1E-13
1E-14
1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025
Year
Excav Scen 1 Excav Scen 3 Excav Scen 4 Excav Scen 5 Excav Scen 6
Jul 2010 Dec 2013 Aug 2014 Jun 2015 Jul 2015

Figure 28: Cumulative Probability of Exceedance Depth Based Level for


Excavation/Repair and Re-Inspection Scenarios

Page 53
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Section
POE Depth Based Levels for Excavation/Repair and Re-inspection Scenarios

Excav Scen 6 Excav Scen 1 Excav Scen 3 Excav Scen 5 Excav Scen 4
64.5% 65.9% 66.2% 66.3% 66.6%

Worst Predicted Depth (% of Pipe's Wall Thickness)


0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1E+00

1E-01

1E-02
Probability of Exceedance

1E-03

1E-04

1E-05

1E-06

1E-07

1E-08

1E-09

1E-10

1E-11

Figure 29: Worst Predicted Depth Based on Cumulative Probability of Exceedance


Depth Value per Excavation Scenario

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Burst Pressure Based Scenarios Corrosion Growth Modeling and Actual Tool Accuracy Adjustment

A. After in-line inspection


B. After initial excavation program (22 features excavated)
C. After initial excavation program without the 1 worst internal metal loss feature
D. After initial excavation program without the 3 worst external metal loss features and 1 worst internal metal loss feature
E. After initial excavation program without the 5 worst external metal loss features and 2 worst internal metal loss features
F. After initial excavation program without the 6 worst external metal loss features and 4 worst internal metal loss features
G. After initial excavation program without the 8 worst external metal loss features and 5 worst internal metal loss features

Excav Scen 1
9.1548E-01 1E+00
Cumulative Probability of Exceedance

1E-01
Excav Scen 5
6.3684E-02
1E-02
1E-03
Excav Scen 4 1E-04
5.9698E-02
1E-05
Excav Scen 3 1E-06
3.2515E-02 1E-07
Excav Scen 6
1E-08
2.5652E-02 1E-09
1E-10
1E-11
1E-12
1E-13
1E-14
1E-15
1E-16
Jul 2005

Jul 2006

Jul 2007

Jul 2008

Jul 2009

Jul 2010

Jul 2011

Jul 2012

Jul 2013

Jul 2014

Jul 2015

Jul 2016

Jul 2017

Jul 2018

Jul 2019

Jul 2020

Jul 2021

Jul 2022

Jul 2023

Jul 2024

Jul 2025

Year Excav Scen 5 Excav Scen 6


Excav Scen 1 Excav Scen 3 Excav Scen 4
Jul 2010 Dec 2013 Aug 2014 Jun 2015 Jul 2015

Figure 30: Cumulative Probability of Exceedance Burst Pressure Based Level for
Excavation/Repair and Re-Inspection Scenarios

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

Entire Section of the NGL BU 323.9 mm Windsor to Dow Cochin East Pipeline Section
POE Burst Pressure Based Risk Levels for Excavation/Repair and Re-Inspection Scenarios

Excav Scen 1 Excav Scen 5 Excav Scen 4 Excav Scen 3 Excav Scen 6
86.8% 114.7% 115.0% 117.7% 118.7%

Lowest Predicted Factor of Safety (MAOP)


0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.00
1E+00

1E-01

1E-02
Probability of Exceedance

1E-03

1E-04

1E-05

1E-06

1E-07

1E-08

1E-09

1E-10

Figure 31: Lowest Predicted Safety Factor (%MAOP) Based on Cumulative Probability
of Exceedance Burst Pressure Based Value per Excavation Scenario
The Net Present Value (NPV) approach was utilized as an indicator to determine the financial
worth at the time of the initial in-line inspection run (July 2005) of time-allocated costs for a
twenty year period by applying an annual investment return rate of 7% and an annual
inflation rate of 2.5%. The components of the cash flow utilized the cost of the in-line
inspection (CDN$150,000) and the excavations/repairs (CDN$15,000 per site) at the time of
the in-line inspection run in July 2005. The current market value of the cash flow
components was projected to the task execution-year using the inflation rate, and financially
returned to the present value after applying the investment return rate.
Scenario 3 (i.e. one (1) additional excavation and re-inspection in December 2013) is the
best scenario from both the technical and economical perspective at CDN 2005 $119,219.
Under this scenario, the worst predicted depth and lowest predicted factor of safety of a
metal loss feature prior to the 2013 re-inspection would be, respectively, 66.2% of the pipe
wall thickness and 1.17 (equivalent to a burst pressure of 117.7% MAOP).
NGL BU may elect to identify and undertake additional excavations to address other issues
(i.e. manufacturing defects, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) related issues, etc.).
Confirmatory digs are recommended to be scheduled within the re-inspection interval to
verify/validate the corrosion growth rates used in this assessment.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

3 Conclusions
3.1 Summary of In-Line Inspection Data
 The total number of features detected by the MFL tool was 255 (152 metal loss, 7 ID
anomalies, 71 “gain” features, 19 mill anomalies, and 7 weld anomalies. The
152 metal loss features were assessed by the deterministic and probabilistic
corrosion growth models.
 The deepest metal loss feature detected by the Magpie MFL in-line inspection tool
had a reported depth of 41.3% of the pipe wall thickness. This feature, with a
predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of 12,199 kPa (88.5% SMYS, 123% MAOP
(based on 6.22 mm wall thickness)), is the only metal loss feature with a predicted
burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of <100% SMYS. This feature was excavated and repaired
in 2006, and as a result there were no remaining features reported by the tool with a
predicted burst pressureRStreng 0.85dL of <125% MAOP.
 The PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment for this section of pipeline indicated that
one (1) of the metal loss features fell within the 180-day PIMS 3.5 Remediation
Criteria. This feature was excavated in 2006.
 The pipeline parameters listed in the questionnaire are listed correctly in the tool
data, with the following wall thickness exceptions: 5.9, 7.97 and 14.3 mm. These
wall thicknesses were reported by the MFL tool but were not reported in the pipeline
questionnaire. CC Technologies‟ review of the tool data indicates that none of the
metal loss features occur in pipe with these wall thicknesses and therefore, this
finding does not affect the results of the POE assessment.

3.2 Assessment of In-Line Inspection Validation Program


 The field excavation program in 2006 verified 32 external and internal metal loss
features detected by the Magpie MFL in-line inspection tool. Of these, 21 features
were identified and matched for the field tool correlation. Eleven (11) of the reported
features were not identified and 32 additional “un-graded” features were found. In
addition, two (2) additional features reported by the tool with limited information
were also verified in the field, but were not used in the field-tool correlation. The
features found in the field were all recoated and repaired.
 Of those features observed in the field, including those not reported by the MFL in-
line inspection tool, the deepest feature was found to be 55.1% of the pipe wall
thickness, which was also correlated to the deepest feature reported by the MFL in-
line inspection tool (41.3% of the pipe wall thickness). The lowest predicted burst
pressure of this feature observed was 10,530 kPa (76.4% SMYS, 106% MAOP) and
had the lowest predicted burst pressure of the all the features found during the 2006
excavations.
 Ninety (90%) percent of the field validated features had tool-reported depths within
±15% of the pipe wall thickness of the actual measured depth. Fifty-two (52%)
percent of the field validated features were within ±10% of the tool predicted burst
pressure.

 The Magpie System Inc. MFL in-line inspection tool achieved a t-distribution of
differences between field measured and tool predicted depth from -6.3% to 15.5% of
the pipe wall thickness for 80% of the reported features. The tool also achieved a

Page 56
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

t-distribution of differences between field predicted and tool predicted burst pressure
from -27.7% to +9.0% of MAOP for 80% of the reported features.

 The statistical significance in the field/tool correlations indicated a level of


confidence for both depth and burst pressure exceeding 99.9%. These linear
regression significance factors (F) indicated that the linear regression equations
were expected to predict with a minimum of 95% confidence level.

 For modeling and field validation purposes, the 21 features used for the depth field-
tool correlation and 20 features used for the burst pressure correlation were more
than the 16 metal loss features required to provide a 95% sampling confidence for
the given data distribution of in-line inspection data.

3.3 PIMS 3.3.3 Assessment Long Term Maintenance Program


 All of the metal loss features were grown into the future using the deterministic
methodology. There are 18 metal loss features after the initial excavation program
that would be expected to reach the depth based criteria (i.e. ≥80% of the pipe wall
thickness) within the next twenty years, with the first feature expected to reach 80%
pipe wall thickness in July 2014.

 From the burst pressure based criterion standpoint, there are 15 metal loss features
after the initial excavation program that would be expected to reach the burst
pressure based criteria (i.e. ≤100% MAOP) within the next twenty years, with the
first feature expected to reach a burst pressure ≤100% MAOP in July 2008.

 Based on the estimated corrosion growth rates (i.e. Table 2), all the metal loss
features and were grown into the future using the Probability of Exceedance (POE)
methodology. In the absence of any additional excavations, this assessment
predicts that a metal loss feature will reach the depth based criteria (i.e. ≥80% of the
pipe wall thickness) in December 2013 and the burst pressure based criteria (i.e.
≤100% MAOP) in March 2008.

4 Recommendations
4.1 PIMS 3.3.3 Assessment: Long Term Maintenance Program
Based on the acceptability criteria for depth and burst pressure for metal loss features,
identified within the In-Line Inspection Final Assessment, conducted by CC Technologies, the
most beneficial and economical alternative for an excavation/repair and re-inspection
program is attained at a Net Present Value of CDN2005 $119,219 with one (1) additional
excavation/repair site required in addition to the excavations completed in 2006, and a re-
inspection in December 2013 (maximum recommended re-inspection interval). At the time of
the December 2013 re-inspection, the worst predicted depth will be 66.2% of the pipe wall
thickness and the lowest expected factor of safety (MAOP) will be 1.17 (equivalent to a burst
pressure of 117.7% MAOP).
The one (1) additional recommended feature was found during the 2006 field excavation
program and the external feature in the vicinity of this feature was repaired/recoated.
However, the Clock Spring® that was installed to repair the external features is not a PIMS
acceptable permanent repair for the internal feature. Therefore, we recommend excavation
and repair of this feature (see Appendix B, scenario 3), which is predicted to have a burst
pressure below 100% MAOP by July 2008.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

One (1) metal loss feature reported by the tool located at 3245.45m (joint 2200) has a
calculated burst pressure that appears to highly influence the field tool correlation and was
not included in the field tool correlation for burst pressure.
It should be noted that the recommended number of excavations is the minimum number
required to ensure that no metal loss features will reach a depth ≥70% of the pipe wall
thickness or a predicted burst pressure ≤110% MAOP one year prior to the recommended
re-inspection date.
The NGL BU may elect to identify and undertake additional excavations to address other
issues (i.e. manufacturing defects, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) related issues, etc.).
Confirmatory digs are recommended to be scheduled within the re-inspection interval to
verify/validate the corrosion growth rates used in this assessment.

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Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

5 References
[1] Vieth, P. H., Rust, S. W., and Ashworth, B. P., “Use of In-line Inspection Data
for Integrity Management”, NACE International, Proceedings of Corrosion 99
Conference.
[2] Mora R.G., Parker C., Vieth P., Delanty B., “Probability of Exceedance (POE)
Methodology for Developing Integrity Programs Based on Pipeline Operator-
Specific Technical and Economic Factors”, ASME, 2002 Internal Pipeline
Conference (IPC), IPC2002-27224, October, 2002.
[3] Mora R.G., Powell D.A., Harper W.V., “Methodology for Statistically Designing
and Assessing Metal Loss In-line Inspection Validation Programs”, NACE
International, Proceedings of Corrosion 2004 Conference.

Page 59
APPENDIX A

INTERACTION CRITERIA
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

1. Level 1 Interaction Criteria („cluster‟)


Individual metal loss features shall be considered to interact, to form „clusters‟, if they are
spaced at an axial or circumferential distance of less than or equal to six times the pipe wall
thickness (6t). As illustrated in Figure A1, to determine the spacing, the dimensions of the
individual metal loss features shall be expanded in both axial directions and circumferential
directions by 3t. If two or more expanded metal loss features touch or overlap, they shall be
deemed to interact to form a „cluster‟. Each individual metal loss feature shall be handled
individually and compared to all other metal loss features within close proximity. The final
„cluster‟ dimensions shall be based upon the actual dimensions of the individual metal loss
features that interacted to form that particular „cluster‟ and shall not include the 3t expansion
in both the axial and circumferential directions (refer to Figure A1).

3t3T
or 12.5 mm
(whichever is
greater)

Individual C
3t or Feature
3T mm
12.5
(whichever
is greater)
WC
A

3t or 12.5 mm WC
3T
(whichever is
greater)

Individual D
3t or Feature
3T mm
12.5
(whichever
is greater)
B

LC

Cluster Dimension
L= the lesser of LC or (A+B)
W= the lesser of WC or (C+D)

Figure A1: Individual Features Forming a “Cluster”

Page A1

LC
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

2. Level 2 Interaction Criteria („Groups‟)


Individual „groups‟ shall be considered to interact, to form „groups‟, if they are spaced at an
axial distance of less than or equal to 300 mm (12 in) and spaced at a circumferential
distance of less than or equal to 6t. As illustrated in Figure A2, to determine the spacing, the
individual „groups‟ shall be expanded in both axial directions by 150 mm (6 in) and in both
circumferential directions by 3t. If two or more expanded „groups‟ touch or overlap, this
interaction shall be deemed as a „groups‟. Each „cluster‟ shall be analyzed individually and
compared to all other „groups‟ within close proximity. The final „groups‟ dimensions shall be
based upon the actual dimensions of the individual „groups‟ that have interacted to form that
particular „groups‟ and shall not include the 300 mm (12 in) expansion in both axial directions
nor the 3t expansion in both circumferential directions (Refer to Figure A2).
The purpose of the Level 2 interaction criteria is to identify any locations in which a number of
individual “groups” are aligned and in close proximity to one another. These locations are
then to be reviewed in greater detail to ascertain whether the interaction of the individuals
‟groups‟ into the „groups‟ results in the „groups‟ having a lower predicted burst pressure than
any of the individual „groups'.

LG B(1)

Defect D(1)

A(1)
<6t

C(1) Defect
Cluster 1

<6t WG
B(2)

< 300 mm
(12”)
D(2) Defect

<6t

Group Dimensions
C(2) Defect Cluster 2
L = ((A(1) + B(1)) + (A(2) + B(2))) and
W = ((C(1) + D(1)) + (C(2) + D(2)))
A(2)

Group Dimensions

L=the lesser of LG or ((A(1)+B(1))+(A(2) +B(2)))


W=the lesser of WG or ((C(1)+D(1))+(C(2)+D(2)))

Figure A2: Level 2 Interaction – Individual Features or “Clusters” Forming a Group

Page A2
APPENDIX B

EXCAVATION SCENARIOS
Windsor to Dow Section of the 323.9 mm Diameter Cochin East Pipeline System
PIMS 3.5 Compliance Assessment and PIMS 3.3.3 Final In-Line Inspection Assessment

APPENDIX B – Excavation Scenarios


Predicted
Cluster
Calculate Calculated Burst Year Predicted Year Failing Earliest Year
Absolute Wall Calculated d RPR Calculated Cluster RPR Pressure Predicte Failing Burst Pressure Failing Depth &
Weld Relative Distance Clock Thickness SMYS MAOP Peak Total PBP 085dl 085dl RPR 085dl ASME B31G ASME B31G d Depth Depth Pressure Criterion Pressure
D/P Scenario Number Distance (m) INT/EXT Position (mm) (Kpa) (Kpa) Depth Length (SMYS) (SMYS) (MAOP) (SMYS) (SMYS) 085dL Criterion 085dL (MAOP) Criterion
C/C Scenario 3
Scenario 3 Dig 1 Pressure/Depth (1) 39900 1.6 65023.85 INT 5:00 6.22 359000 9930 41.3 152.61 0.88 1.229 12201.139 0.872 12026.97 0.46 2014 11309.31 2008 2008
E/C Scenario 4
Scenario 4 Dig 1 Depth 45290 17.3 74208.17 EXT 11:45 6.22 359000 9930 25.19 11.97 16342.57 1.185 1.646 1.094 15086.13 0.30 2021 15562.57 2025 2021
Scenario 4 Dig 2 Depth 65240 0.3 107659.19 EXT 9:30 6.22 359000 9930 24.23 17.95 16242.13 1.178 1.636 1.088 15000.38 0.29 2021 15459.41 2024 2021
Scenario 4 Dig 3 Depth/Pressure 65760 18.0 108434.97 EXT 1:45 6.22 359000 9930 29.17 38.9 15541.66 1.127 1.565 1.047 14438.40 0.34 2020 14740.03 2020 2020
Scenario 4 Dig 4 Depth/Pressure 77340 10.1 128415.64 EXT 8:45 6.22 359000 9930 26.44 44.89 15472.64 1.122 1.558 1.043 14385.19 0.31 2021 14669.14 2020 2020
F/D Scenario 5
Scenario 5 Dig 1 Depth 12030 2.4 18771.47 EXT 8:30 6.22 359000 9930 21.7 20.95 16211.38 1.176 1.633 1.086 14973.72 0.26 2022 15427.83 2024 2022
Scenario 5 Dig 2 Depth 22010 1.7 35190.22 EXT 6:00 8.97 359000 9930 39.64 20.95 23185.32 1.166 2.335 1.079 21448.65 0.44 2022 22590.07 >2025 2022
Scenario 5 Dig 3 Pressure 30220 0.0 49087.64 EXT 8:45 6.22 359000 9930 20.59 47.88 15657.36 1.135 1.577 1.054 14529.98 0.25 2023 14858.85 2020 2020
Scenario 5 Dig 4 Depth/Pressure 60940 1.5 100235.99 EXT 8:45 6.22 359000 9930 20.97 44.89 15705.00 1.139 1.582 1.056 14566.26 0.26 2022 14907.77 2021 2021
Scenario 5 Dig 5 Depth/Pressure 73730 7.4 122244.59 EXT 8:15 6.22 359000 9930 20.81 38.9 15842.67 1.149 1.595 1.064 14673.65 0.25 2022 15049.16 2021 2021
G/E Scenario 6
Scenario 6 Dig 1 Depth/Pressure 40130 18.6 65436.79 EXT 8:15 6.22 359000 9930 20.51 29.92 16047.36 1.164 1.616 1.076 14837.64 0.25 2023 15259.38 2023 2023
Scenario 6 Dig 2 Depth 41740 17.5 68161.39 INT 9:00 6.22 359000 9930 34.3 23.94 15922.69 1.155 1.603 1.069 14743.28 0.39 2023 15131.35 >2025 2023
Scenario 6 Dig 3 Pressure 16220 10.4 25934.73 INT 4:00 6.22 359000 9930 31.1 53.86 14965.77 1.085 1.507 1.015 14003.24 0.36 2024 14148.59 2021 2021

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