9. People v. Lacson - GR.

149453, 2003

Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

FACTS:

 This is an MR of the SC Resolution remanding the case to the RTC of QC for the determination of
factual issues relative to the application of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RRCP) on the dismissal of the cases against Panfilo Lacson and his co-accused

 In said criminal cases, Lacson and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the
shooting and killing of 11 male persons (including 2 minors, policemen and members of the AFP),
bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
 The SC ruled in the Resolution that the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were with
the express consent of Lacson as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed
his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses.
 The Court also held therein that although Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP could be given retroactive
effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant
 The trial court was directed to resolve WHETHER:
a. The provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused
b. It was directed by the court after notice to the offended party
c. The 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed
d. There is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period
e. Notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of Lacson were dismissed by then
Judge Agnir
f. There after affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the 3 other victims
g. The multiple murder cases against Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.

 The Court further held that the reckoning date of the 2-year bar had to be first determined whether
it shall be from:
o the date of the order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases, OR
o o the dates of receipt by the various offended parties; OR
o date of effectivity of the new rule.
 In support of their MR, the petitioners contend that:
o Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to Criminal Cases because the essential requirements
for its applications were not present when Judge Agnir issues his resolution.
 They contend that Lacson did not give his express consent to the dismissal by
Judge Agnir of the cases.
 Lacson allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the CA and during the hearing
that he did not file any Motion to Dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional
dismissal thereof.
 Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the
dismissal of the said cases
 Lacson et al’s express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the
notices to all the heirs of the victims of the former’s motion and the hearing thereon
are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the 2nd paragraph
of the new rule.
 The time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
 Lacson argues that he himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, citing the
resolution of Judge Agnir stating that Lacson and the other accused filed separate but identical
motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrests against them.
o He also asserted that proper notice was given to the other parties.

ISSUES/HELD:
(MAIN) Is Sec. 8, Rule 117 applicable to Criminal Cases? – NO
 Sec. 8, Rule 117:
o (1) A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party.
o (2) A provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than 6 years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2
years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

 Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the CA, Lacson is
burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph:
o The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuico) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case
o The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case
o The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally
o The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal
 The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application the time-bar in the 2nd
paragraph of the new rule.
 The raison d’etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional
dismissal of a case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily
included therein
 Although the 2nd paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision
should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent 1 year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived.
o The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served
with a copy of the order of dismissal.
 Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing.
o It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no interference or implication to supply
its meaning.
o Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the
case no objection or with my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional
dismissal does not amount to express consent.
 A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal.
 If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may
be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule.

 On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the
accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply.
o The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right
of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival
or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
 The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or
by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein.
 There would be not need of a new preliminary investigation
 However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses
of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may
no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary
investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
 o A new PI is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if
under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that
as an accessory to that as a principal.

Was Lacson able to prove all the requisites? – NO

 Lacson has failed to prove that the 1st and 2nd requisites of the 1st paragraph of the new rule were
present when Judge Agnir dismissed the cases.
 The prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
 For his part, Lacson merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the Constitution and
the decision of the Court in Allado v. Diokno, among others, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Lacson and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its examination.

 Lacson contended in his motion that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the
presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against Lacson and if one had
already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed that:
o (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
be conducted by the court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing scheduled
therefor; and
o (2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the incident.
 Lacson DID NOT PRAY FOR THE DISMISSAL, provisional or otherwise, of the criminal cases.
 Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
 During the hearing in the Court of Appeals, Lacson, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally,
and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree
to a provisional dismissal thereof.
 (Case then included transcript of the hearing between Justice Salonga and Atty. Fortun, wherein
Att. Fortun categorically stated that they didn’t ask for a provisional dismissal.)
 Furthermore, in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the CA, Lacson declared in
no uncertain terms that he did not move for the dismissal of the Informations.
 The admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the CA are binding and conclusive on
him.
 To apply the new rule in this case would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which
are not expressly or impliedly included therein.
 There was also no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon
served on the heirs of the victims at least 3 days before said hearing.
o Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to
seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including:
 Collusion between the prosecution and the accused, thereby depriving the State
of its right to due process
 Attempts to make witnesses unavailable
 Provisional dismissal with the consequent release of the accused would enable
him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses, or
flee from PH jurisdiction
 Even if Lacson’s motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may
be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal, all the heirs of the victims
were not notified thereof prior to the hearing although the prosecutor was served with a copy of the
motion.
  Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge
Agnir issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the 2nd paragraph
of Sec. 8, Rule 117.

Should the time-bar be applied retroactively? – NO

 The time-bar under Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not a statute of limitations but is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given
right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right
of the State to prosecute the accused.
 The time-bar does not reduce the periods under Art. 90 of the RPC, a substantive law
 It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the
information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused.
 Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have
abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.
o The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent.
 He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included
therein.
 The State may revive a criminal case beyond the 1-year or 2-year periods provided that there is a
justifiable necessity for the delay.
 By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the RPC are not thereby
diminished.
 But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the
lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the effect is basically the same.
 Procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
 As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished.
 But a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would
involve intricate problems of due process of impair the independence of the court.
 Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively
or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose
and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct
sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.
 IN THIS CASE, the time-bar of 2 years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively
against the State.
 The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Art. 90
of the RPC.
 However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and
the accused.
o The time-bar must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short of
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.
 Petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
 The time-bar was fixed by the SC to exercise the malaise that plagued the administration for the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.

 To apply the time-bar retroactively so that the 2-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999
when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir dismissing the
criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule.
o Instead of giving the State 2 years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than 2 years to do so.
  Judge Agnir dismissed the cases on March 29, 1999.
 The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.
 If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only 1 year and 3 months
or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.
o The period is short of the 2-year period fixed under the new rule.
 On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have 2 years from
December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.

Should the period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 be included in the computation for the
time-bar? – NO

 The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation
of the 2-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the
State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.
o It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the cases against Lacson
or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the 2-year period under the new rule.
 To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the
new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule
before it took effect.
10.
11. People v. Lara y Orbista, G.R. No. 199877, (2012)

FACTS:
 Arturo Lara was charged with robbery with homicide before the RTC.
 The prosecution presented three witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Cruz and PO3
Calix
 Sumulong testified that he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services. That on May
31, 2011 and at around 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employes of San Sebastian. He placed the amount
withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank.
 At around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared that the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him statin, “Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”
 Bautista, who was seated at the back shouted “Wag mo bigay yung bag men!”
 Heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction. After getting hold of the bag,
Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him and fired at Bautista.
 Sumulong left the pick-up and called up the San Sebastian office to relay the incident. When he
went back to the pick-up, we saw blood on the ground. He was informed by one of the bystanders
that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him.
 On June 7, 2001, Sumulong saw Lara walking along Pilapil Street, Bgy. San Miguel, Pasig City.
He alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested.
 At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong
and his companions. After being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently
detained.
 Lara’s interposed the defense of alibi -- that he was a plumber and that he was at his house working
from morning to afternoon on the supposed day of the incident. On June 7, 2001, at around 7:00
PM, he was at the house of one of his cousins when police officers arrived and asked him if he was
Arturo Lara.
 Both the RTC and the CA both found Lara guilty of Robbery with Homicide.
 On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction.
o First, he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a
warrantless arrest.
o Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be
identified by the witnesses.
o Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the
prosecution failed to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts.
Sumulong merely presumed that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag
of money from him.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether the identification made by Sumulong in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without assistance of counsel? NO, IT IS ADMISSIBLE.
 Contrary to Lara's claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police
line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-
up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins
and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
 Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.
  The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police line up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

2. Was there enough evidence to convict Lara? YES.

 Lara argues that only direct and not circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption
innocence.
 However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
o Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.
 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence
sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
 As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the
prosecution strongly indicate Lara's guilt:
o (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side
thereof armed with a gun;
o (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara
demanded that Sumulong give him the bag containing the money;
o (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to Bautista who was seated at the
back of the pick- up;
o (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran towards the back of the pick-up;
o (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista's direction;
o (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and
o (g) Bautista's blood was on the crime scene and empty shells were recovered therefrom.

 In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara's alibi
outright. It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak
defense. Such is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.

 Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that
he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi
must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
2. Salvanera v. People, G.R. No. 143093, May 21, 2007

FACTS:
 An Information dated November 30, 1996 was filed charging petitioner Rimberto Salvanera,
together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, with the murder of Ruben
Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with
treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE
Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
 Theory of the Prosecution:
o Petitioner was the alleged mastermind;
o Lungcay, the hired hitman;
o Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime;
o while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter.
 All the accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained
at-large.
 Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
 On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail.
 The prosecution, on March 4, 1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin
and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
 The trial court granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion
for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.
 The prosecution filed an MR but was denied.
 The prosecution then appealed to CA contending that:
o The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses.
o The testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane.
o It was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s application for
bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the hearing for the
discharge of the two accused.
 The CA sustained the prosecution discharging accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix
from the Information to become state witnesses, and cancelling the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera.
 Petitioner Salvanera filed an MR which was denied.
 Petitioner then filed his Motion for Clarification with Leave of Court which was also denied.
 Hence, this appeal.
 Petitioner argues that the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state
witness must be substantially corroborated (Substantial Corroboration Requirement), not by a
co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the
accused in the same criminal case.
o The theory is allegedly based on the general principles of justice and sound logic.
o He contends that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is
likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal
responsibility.
o Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally
seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of their co-
accused.
 o Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused,
do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy.
Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that
petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. [MAIN ISSUE] Was the CA correct in sustaining the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix
as state witnesses? YES
 The SC agrees with the CA and dismissed the arguments of petitioner.
 In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely:
o (1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
o (2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
o (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
o (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
o (5) The trial court is satisfied that:
 a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
 b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
 c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
 d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
 e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

 In Chua v. Court of Appeals, the SC ruled that the trial court has to rely on the information offered
by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness. The prosecutor knows the
evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case.
 In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan:
o The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution
process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for
government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the
State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification
lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate
power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant,
are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to
prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary
right to decide whom not to prosecute.
o In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction
of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an
impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to
prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies,
but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the
blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at
equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive
to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.

2. Can witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, testify to corroborate the statement of
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind? YES
 To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and
Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no
 other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of the state witness."
 The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses.
 The SC has already previously ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a
fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are
corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory
testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth
in other respects."
 It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or
evidence.
 In the case at bar, the SC was satisfied from a reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin
and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the
circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such
extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."
 As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators.
 Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because
only they have knowledge of the crime.
 The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No
one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and
proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the
crime.

3. Was the cancellation of petitioner’s bail bond proper? YES.

 The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state
witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining
whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
3. People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010

FACTS:

 FELICITA, who turned state witness,5 gave the following version:6

 Felicita, appellant and a certain Conrada were house helpers of one Jose Chan (Chan). When
Chan and family departed in December 1997 for a vacation abroad, Chan’s brother-in-law Lam
Tiong Uy (Uy), on Chan’s request, stayed with the Chans’ two-storey house at Tanggale Street,
Barangay San Jose, Quezon City.

 At around 8:00 p.m. of December 31, 1997, appellant instructed Felicita and Conrada to repair to
their room while he sat beside Uy who was watching television. After about an hour, Conrada went
to the dining room and saw appellant holding a knife. As Felicita followed, she saw the dead body
of Uy lying on the floor covered with a mat, and as she noticed a bloodstained knife on the table,
she exclaimed, "you killed Kuya Tony!," which appellant admitted.

 Appellant at once instructed Felicita and Conrada to leave the house, otherwise they would be
suspected of killing Uy. Appellant then hailed a taxi which the three of them boarded after he had
gone back to the house to set it on fire. They headed for a pier in Tondo, Manila and boarded a
boat that brought them to Masbate where they stayed in appellant’s house for a week.

 On Felicita’s request, appellant brought her to her province, Butuan. Felicita told her mother of the
incidents in which she had no participation. She was soon brought to Bombo Radio where she
surrendered.

 Prosecution witness CHAN declared that when he and his family left for Singapore on December
30, 1997, the only persons in their house were appellant, Felicita, Conrada and his brother-in-law
Uy; and that they returned to the country on January 1, 1998 after learning that their house got
burned the previous night.7 Gemma Chan (Gemma), daughter of Chan, gave essentially the same
testimony.8

 ROSITA UY (Rosita), Uy’s widow, testified on, among other things, the damages she suffered as
a result of her husband’s death including moral damages of over ?3,000,000 and funeral expenses
of ?200,000.9

 By the account of another prosecution witness, SPO1 CARLOS VILLARIN (Villarin) of the Central
Police District (CPD) in La Loma, Quezon City,10 when he arrived at about 10:40 p.m. of December
31, 1997 at the house of Chan to conduct an investigation, the second floor of the house and an
adjacent warehouse were totally burned and he found the lifeless body of Uy at the living room,
lying face down with multiple stab wounds. He and CPD officers SPO2 Eduardo Taveso (Taveso)
and SPO4 Juanito Legaspi (Legaspi) later went to Butuan City, where they picked up appellant and
Felicita and brought them to the CPD in La Loma, Quezon City.11

 At the police station, Rosita identified the Tag Heuer wrist watch then worn by appellant as
belonging to her late husband Uy,12 while Gemma identified the ring and bracelet then worn by
Felicita as among her missing pieces of jewelry.13

 SFO1 SAMUEL TADEO (Tadeo), who conducted an investigation of the incident, declared that he
found out that the fire was ignited by a rice cooker left plugged inside a room on the second floor,
right wing of the house, which suffered the most extensive damage; that 60% to 70% of the house
was damaged; and that 90% of the adjoining warehouse was likewise destroyed.14

 NAZARIO FERNANDEZ, JR. of the Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory attested that he and his team also went to the house of
Chan on December 31, 1997; that, led by Tadeo, they found the dead body of Uy at the living room
with multiple stab wounds and an incised wound on the neck; and that at the back of the house,
they recovered a knife which tested positive for human blood.15

 MA. CRISTINA FREYRA, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory who conducted an
autopsy on the body of Uy, found that the cause of the death of Uy, who sustained 16 stab wounds,
four incised wounds and one contusion, was hemorrhage.16

 ROGELIO DAGOC, family driver of the Chans, attested that the knife recovered by the SOCO team
was familiar to him as appellant used it every day for cutting chicken.17

 For the appellant's version: At about 8:00 p.m. of December 31, 1997, while appellant was inside
his room, Conrada entered it crying. When he asked her why, she answered "We have to leave."
When he further asked why, she just said "Si Kuya kasi." He, Conrada and Felicita thus left via taxi
and headed for Lucena City, where they boarded a boat bound for, and arrived at, Masbate. They
thereafter proceeded to Butuan, where he was arrested and detained until Quezon City policemen
brought him and Felicita to the CPD. Conrada was able to flee.

 Respecting the Tag Heuer watch which was found in his possession, appellant claimed that he
bought it from Gemma.

 The RTC convicted appellant as charged – robbery with homicide and destructive arson sentencing
him to Reclusion Perpetua, to wit:The death of Lam Tiong Uy caused by stab and incise wounds
in vital parts of his body proves beyond dispute that violence was applied upon his person. The
subsequent recovery of his wrist watch in the possession of accused Anabe indicates that said
accused obtained possession of said jewelry through violence. The claim of Anabe that he
purchased the watch from Gemma Chua is not only unbelievable, but also ridiculous. x x x

 The death weapon used against the victim was probably the kitchen knife (Exhibit "T") used by
Anabe in cutting chicken and meat as helper in the Chan residence. x x x The position of the blood
stains located about 10 centimeters from the pointed tip of the knife coincides with the depths of
most of the wounds sustained by the victim strongly indicating that the knife was the lethal weapon.

 The testimony of [Felicita] that Anabe admitted to her and Conrada Salces that he killed Lam Tiong
Uy convinces the Court beyond doubt that Anabe killed Lam Tiong Uy. x x x Escape of the accused
from the scene of the crime indicates strong consciousness of guilt.

 The destruction of the Chan residence after the robbery with homicide was committed is clearly
arson and the perpetrator was Anabe. [Felicita] testified that Anabe admitted to her that he plugged-
in the rice cooker inside the room of Gemma Chan. Arson investigators theorized that the rice
cooker was loaded with clothing which overheated and started the fire. The Court finds the theory
believable. x x x

 The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It found the following circumstances sufficient to sustain
appellant’s conviction: appellant ordered Felicita and Conrada to go inside their room while he kept
Uy company in the living room; when Felicita (sic) and Conrada next saw appellant, he was already
holding a bloodstained knife32 and Uy was already dead; appellant told them that they had to go
with him or else they would be suspected of killing Uy; the blood in the kitchen knife was found to
be human blood; and during the confrontation at the CPD, appellant was wearing Uy’s Tag Heuer
watch.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the RTC correctly gave credence to the testimony of Felicita Generalao
who turned state witness

 The Court dismisses the appeal, but modifies the crime committed by appellant, and deletes the
monetary awards and damages.

 Robbery with homicide has the following elements:

1. the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

2. the property taken belongs to another;

3. the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animo lucrandi; and

4. by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide is committed.27

 That appellant took the Tag Heuer watch of Uy without his consent and with intent to gain should
pose no doubt.

 The Court finds, however, that the prosecution evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion
that appellant also committed violence against Uy in order to effect the felonious taking.

 There being no eyewitness to the crimes charged, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court on
circumstantial evidence applies:

 SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

 In amplifying the above-listed conditions, this Court has held that circumstantial evidence suffices
to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilt. As a corollary to the constitutional precept of presumption of innocence, a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence.

 To be sure, however, that appellant committed the felonious taking does not mean that he also
committed the violence, even assuming that both occurred on the same occasion. No legal
presumption obtains here.

 The allegation that appellant committed violence on Uy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 Notatu dignum is the fact that at least two persons other than appellant were proven to be with Uy
in Chan’s house on December 31, 1997. While conspiracy was alleged in the Informations, it was
not established during the trial.

 Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty.

 In the present case, there is want of evidence to show the concerted acts of appellant, Conrada
and Felicita (albeit already discharged) in pursuing a common design — to rob Uy. The prosecution
in fact appears to have abandoned the theory of conspiracy altogether, no evidence thereof having
been presented. Absent proof of conspiracy, appellant may only be held accountable for acts that
are imputable to him with moral certainty.

 The claim of Felicita that appellant confessed to the killing of Uy must be corroborated to be given
credence. It must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony
and strong circumstances, and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes
manifest.

 Was Felicita’s testimony regarding appellant’s confession corroborated by the prosecution’s other
evidence?

 After scouring the records, the Court finds in the negative. The only other evidence purportedly
linking appellant to the commission of violence on Uy is the bloodstained kitchen knife (allegedly
seen by Conrada being held by appellant; seen by Felicita on the kitchen table; and recovered by
the police at the back of the house). The measure of the extent of blood stains in the knife may
have coincided with the depths of most of the wounds sustained by Uy. The Court fails to see,
however, how it warrants the conclusion that appellant inflicted those wounds.

 Turning an accused into a state witness is not a magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in the
prosecution’s evidence. The state witness cannot simply allege everything left unproved and
automatically produce a conviction of the crime charged against the remaining accused.
Corroboration of the account of the state witness is key.

 It is in fact a requirement for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court that the testimony to be given can be substantially corroborated in
its material points.

 The Court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the
uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is shown to be sincere in
itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by
their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.36 This exception, however,
applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness.

 Section 17 of Rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged
as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he or she is an eyewitness) in that it
requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the testimony of the said accused.

 Where, as here, the state witness is not an eyewitness, the testimony partakes of the nature of
circumstantial evidence. The rule on circumstantial evidence thus applies. If the testimony is
uncorroborated, it does not suffice.

 The uncorroborated testimony of Felicita does not suffice to establish that appellant committed
violence on Uy. Neither does appellant’s flight. The fact remains that the three persons present at
 around the time the crime was committed all fled thereafter. Appellant’s involvement in every
element of the crime charged must still be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

 The prosecution has not come forward with any evidence completely discounting the possibility
that some person other than appellant could have stabbed Uy to death. It bears reiteration that at
least three persons were present at the crime scene. Even with Felicita’s discharge, the prosecution
still needed to exclude the possibility that Conrada was the one who used the recovered kitchen
knife to stab Uy to death. It failed to do so, however. Such failure is fatal to its case given that its
evidence had already missed that indispensable nexus between appellant’s presence at the crime
scene and his participation in the stabbing of Uy in order to hold him liable therefor as well.
 The Court finds that of the previously enumerated elements of robbery with homicide, the first and
fourth elements – (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide is committed –
were not established against appellant, the prosecution having merely banked on the strength of a
legal presumption that he took the Tag Heuer watch without the consent of Uy and with intent to
gain. The trial and appellate courts thus erred in convicting appellant of robbery with homicide.

 The crime committed by appellant is qualified theft.

 As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against,
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without
the latter's consent.39 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.

 Appellant could not have committed the crime had he not been employed as a house helper of
Chan and family. His employers, as well as their relatives who stay at the Chan residence, reposed
their trust and confidence in him while he was living thereat. He was allowed an almost unlimited
access throughout the house and was even provided his own room. It was this trust and confidence
that he exploited to enrich himself. Committed with grave abuse of confidence, the theft cannot but
be qualified.

 Appellant is, however, guilty of qualified theft only with respect to Uy’s Tag Heuer watch, there
being no competent evidence of his complicity in the asportation of the other items declared in the
Information, including Gemma’s ring and bracelet which were in state witness Felicita’s possession
after she was arrested.

 Appellant being only guilty of qualified theft for stealing the Tag Heuer watch of Uy, the "burning"
of the house of Chan and family for the purpose of concealing or destroying the evidence could not
be unceremoniously imputed to him. The Court even fails to appreciate what evidence of qualified
theft was left to conceal or destroy after appellant ran away with the Tag Heuer watch.

 The claim of Felicita that appellant, before boarding the getaway taxi, returned to the house to set
it on fire is likewise uncorroborated. The findings of police investigators on the damage to the house
and adjacent warehouse do not serve to corroborate Felicita’s claim as they only attest to the
commission of the crime, not its authorship. Again, at least three persons were at the crime scene
and they all left at the same time. Being uncorroborated, Felicita’s account on appellant’s
authorship of destructive arson does not suffice to convict him.

 While denial is generally a weak defense looked upon with disfavor, the weakness of the defense
cannot be the basis of a conviction. The primary burden still lies with the prosecution whose
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight. Under this rule, the defense of denial finds its special
place and assumes primacy when the case for the prosecution is at the margin of sufficiency in
establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt,42 as in this case.
 In fine, appellant cannot be convicted of destructive arson.

 Finally, for the proper penalty for the single crime of qualified theft, osita declared that she could
not remember the purchase price of the Tag Heuer watch but gave an estimate of more than
?2,000.43 This is insufficient to prove the value of the stolen article.

 Merida v. People instructs that to prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the penalty
imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must
present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate". In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309
or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. The Court
finds that the proper penalty is an indeterminate sentence of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum.

 Respecting the trial court’s awards of money and damages, affirmed by the appellate court, they
cease to have any basis in light of the return of the Tag Heuer watch. They are thus deleted.
4. People vs. Dominguez y Santos, G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018

FACTS:
 Jan 13, 2011: Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao, QC by a group of
men (respondents)
o Evangelista's charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija
 Mendiola and Parulan voluntarily surrendered to PNP and executed extrajudicial confessions
o Identified Roger and Raymond (Dominquez brothers) as masterminds
 Led to the filing of an Information before QC RTC against Mendiola and respondents
o Crime: Carnapping with Homicide under Sec. 14 of Anti-Carnapping Act
o Jan 13: accused took and carried away 1 charcoal gray Toyota Land Cruiser model 2009
(P3.4M) driven by Venson and sold to Arsenio Evangelista
o Attacked and assaulted Evangelista
 Shot him on head, mutilated his body and set same on fire
 Talban and Jacinto remained at large, only Dominguez brothers and Miranda were
apprehended and pleaded not guilty
 (IMPT) June 27, 2011: hearing was conducted on prosecution's motion that Mendiola be
discharged as an accused to become a state witness
o Mendiola gave testimony and was cross-examined
 Defense manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to incident of
discharge and that their party reserved the right to more lengthy cross-
examination during prosecution's presentation of evidence in chief
o RTC: granted motion
 (IMPT) May 6, 2012: Mendiola was found dead
o RTC required parties to submit position papers on w/n Mendiola's testimony should be
admitted as part of prosecution's evidence in chief despite failure to testify during trial
proper prior to his death
 RTC: Testimony of Mendiola be stricken off the records
o Offered only for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a
state witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief
o Sec 18, Rule 119: there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular
witness during trial proper to secure his acquittal; non-compliance with this amounted to
deprivation of accused right to due process and right to confront witnesses against them
 CA: no GADALEJ on the part of RTC (also dismissed MR)
 Petitioner's Position:
o Right afforded to an accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him is not an absolute right
 Respondents forfeited their right last June 27, 2011
 Defense's Position
o State witness to be presented again during trial proper
o Testimony of Mendiola was limited to his discharge and defense reserved their right to
propound further questions
o Talban and Jacinto were not yet arrested so to allow testimony to remain on record would
be a denial of their right to cross-examine witness against them

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether or not the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken off the records of Criminal Case?
NO, the death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony
during the discharge proceeding inadmissible.
 Sec. 17, Rule 119 is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will
only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
witness
o In this case, hearing is concluded and motion for discharged approved
  Whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of
the records and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule
 Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete as pointed out by Miranda
o His lengthy narration was more than sufficient to establish his possession of all the
necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness
o Miranda did not contest RTC granting Mendiola’s motion to be a state witness
 RTC and CA incorrectly interpreted Sec. 18, Rule 119
o Rule does not speak of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible
o It would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal
o Testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be
admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to
testify in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge,
militating against the claim of inadmissibility

Sub-issue: To qualify as a state witness, the respondent must testify on the details of the commission of
the crime
 Testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him as a state witness does
not automatically render his statements as to the specifics on the commission of the offense
inadmissible
 Sec. 17, Rule 119 requires to establish that respondent does not appear to be the most-guilty
among him and his cohorts
o To establish this, it is understandable that, during the discharge proceeding, Mendiola
narrated in graphic detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the extent of the
participation of each of the accused
 Mendiola’s narration
o Essential in establishing that he is not the main perpetrator of the murder of Venson
Evangelista, rendering him eligible as a state witness under Sec. 17 of Rule 119
o Incumbent upon respondents to have timely objected against the line of questioning for
irrelevance (Sec. 36, Rule 132)
 Respondents failed to do so

Sub-issue: Respondents had the opportunity to cross-examine Mendiola

 One of the most basic rights of an accused person under our justice system is the right to confront
the witnesses against him face to face. Subsumed under this right of confrontation is the right to
cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution
o In Seneris, the right, though fundamental, may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the same:
 Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine an opposing witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and
the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record
 Respondents have to realize that their option to not ask for a continuance and reserve the right to
continue with their line of questioning for trial proper instead carried inherent risks, just like their
current predicament
o The assumption of the risk amounted to a waiver of any objection as to the admissibility of
Mendiola's testimony during the discharge hearing
 In Seneris, it elucidates that the testimony of the deceased prosecution witness shall not be
expunged from the records if the defense was able to conduct a rigorous and extensive cross-
examination prior to the witness' demise
 In this case, Mendiola was cross-examined at length for his testimony by the counsels of Miranda
and the Dominguez brothers
o Even covered the details of the commission of the offense
 Respondents' reservation for trial proper of the right to further cross-examine Mendiola did not
diminish the sufficiency of the opportunity that they were given to confront the adverse witnesses
o Mendiola's testimonies and admissions as regards the particulars of the crime
already formed part of the records of the case when the RTC granted his motion to
be declared a state witness
5. People v. Caoili, GR 196342, Aug 8, 2017

FACTS:
 Information filed against Caoili, charging him with f rape through sexual intercourse in violation of
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and R.A.
No. 7610. 6
 The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
 Caoili pleaded not guilty

VICTIM’S TESTIMONY: AAA, testified

 On October 23, 2005, at 7:00 p.m., her father, Caoili, sexually molested her at their house in
Barangay JJJ, Municipality of KKK, in the Province of LLL.
 Caoili kissed her lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left hand
into her vagina, and made a push and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for 30
minutes. AAA felt excruciating pain during and after the ordeal. Against her father's harsh warning
not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located 20 meters away
from their house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and dragged her home. He beat and
hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the stomach. 12
 AAA disclosed to Emelia the guidance counselor at AAA's school, the sexual molestation and
physical violence committed against her by her own father. Loayon accompanied AAA to the police
station to report the sexual and physical abuse.
 medical examination conducted by (Dr. Hipe) at the [KKK] Medicare Community Hospital.
 Dr. Hipe referred AAA to a Medical Specialist, Dr. Lucila Clerino (Dr. Clerino), for further Medico-
Legal examination and vaginal smear. Dr. Clerino issued a Supplementary Medical Certificate
dated October 28, 2005, indicating that AAA's hymenal area had lacerations complete at 6 o'clock
and 9 o'clock superficial laceration at 12 o'clock. 17

For his defense, Caoili denied molesting AAA. alleged that

 on October 23, 2005, at about 7:00 p.m., he saw AAA with her boyfriend at the cassava plantation.
He recognized AAA by the fragrance of her perfume and by the outline of her ponytail. He even
greeted them "good evening" but they did not respond. He then went home. When AAA arrived at
their house, he confronted her and the latter admitted that she was with her boyfriend "Dodong"
earlier that evening. He was so angry so he struck AAA's right thigh with a piece of wood and
pushed the same piece of wood on her forehead. When AAA cried out in pain, he became
remorseful and asked for forgiveness, but AAA kept mum. After they had supper, Caoili and his
son slept in one room; while AAA and her siblings slept in another room. 19

RTC: guilty of rape by sexual assault. (NOTE THE ONE FILED IS RAPE BY SEXUAL INTERCOURSE)

CA: (IMPT)SET ASIDE RTC decision. REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings The CA
held that although Caoili is clearly guilty of rape by sexual assault, what the trial court should have
done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper offense and
after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information.

1. Issue/held: WON The prosecution has established rape by sexual assault. YES

R.A. No. 8353 amended Article 335 reclassifying rape as a crime against persons and introducing rape by
"sexual assault," as differentiated from rape through "carnal knowledge" or rape through "sexual
intercourse." Incorporated into the RPC by R.A. No. 8353, Article 266-A reads:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed —

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; By means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority; [and]
c. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present[.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

rape under the RPC, as amended, can be committed in two ways:

1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to rape through sexual intercourse. The central element in rape
through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object rape,"
or "gender-free rape." It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. 33

 Through AAA's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that Caoili molested his own daughter
when he inserted his finger into her vagina and thereafter made a push and pull movement with
such finger for 30 minutes, thus, clearly establishing rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC.

(2) Issue/HELD WON Rape by sexual assault is subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse. NO

The variance doctrine, which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from
but necessarily included in the crime charged, is embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120
of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved. (Emphasis ours)

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

JURISPRUDENCE: accused charged with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by
sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial
distinctions between these two modes of rape.

ELEMENTS OF RAPE BY ELEMENTS OF RAPE BY SEXUAL ASSAULT

SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

1. that the offender is a man 1. that the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
2. that the offender had 2. that the act of sexual assault is committed by inserting his
carnal knowledge of a penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice or by
woman inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal
3. that such act is orifice of another person;
accomplished by using 3. act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or
force or intimidation. intimidation, among others.
 1. the offender is always a 1. the offender may be a man or a woman;
man; 2. offended party may be a man or a woman
2. the offended party is 3. rape is committed by inserting the penis into another
always a woman; person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
3. rape is committed into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
through penile 4. the penalty is prision mayor.
penetration of the vagina;
4. the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

People v. Abulon: In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal
Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual
assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

(3) Issue/Held: WON Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610. (YES)

At the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was fourteen (14) years, one (1) month and ten
(10) days old. This calls for the application of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 66 which provides:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period. (Emphasis ours.)

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 67 (Emphasis ours)

The prosecution's evidence has sufficiently established the elements of lascivious conduct under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

 Caoili's acts are clearly covered by the definitions of "sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct"
under Section 2 of the rules and regulations 70 of R.A. No. 7610:
 It has been settled that Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require a prior or contemporaneous
abuse that is different from what is complained of, or that a third person should act in concert with
the accused. 71
 AAA was a child below 18 years old at the time the lascivious conduct was committed against her.
Her minority was both sufficiently alleged in the Information and proved.
  "Influence" is the improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another's objective. On the other hand, "coercion" is the improper use of power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.
 In People v. Leonardo: Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being
abused for profit, but also one in which a child is coerced to engage in lascivious conduct. To
repeat, intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion
equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. T
 AAA, who is only a little over 14 years old at the time the offense was committed, was vulnerable
and would have been easily intimidated by an attacker who is not only a grown man but is also
someone exercising parental authority over her. Even absent such coercion or intimidation, Caoili
can still be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 as he
evidently used his moral influence and ascendancy as a father in perpetrating his lascivious
acts against AAA. It is doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.
 consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. 76 The mere act
of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense because it is a malum prohibitum,
an evil that is proscribed.
 all the essential elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 have been
proved, making Caoili liable for said offense.

Variance doctrine applied

 Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the
RPC and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime
of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610, which was the offense proved, because it is included in rape, the offense charged.
 the right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation is not transgressed if the information
sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense
established to have been committed by the accused, 81 which, in this case, is lascivious
conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Guidelines: Nomenclature of crime

and penalties for lascivious conduct
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610

Guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in
determining the imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610." Pursuant
to the second proviso in Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
in its medium period.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18)
years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself
or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty isreclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. 89

(4) Issue/Held: (TOPIC UNDER SYLLABUS) WON the CA's erred in remanding the case to TC. YES.
It is procedurally infirm.
  The CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the purpose of filing the proper
Information on the basis of the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 14. Amendment or substitution. — x x x xxx xxx xxx If it appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Sec. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense
and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him.
In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information. (Emphasis ours)
 the rules are applicable only before judgment has been rendered. In this case, the trial has
been concluded. The RTC already returned a guilty verdict, which has been reviewed by the CA
whose decision, in turn, has been elevated to this Court.

(5) Issue/Held: Did the CA’s order amount to an acquittal? NO

 It is true the CA declared that given the substantial distinctions between rape through sexual
intercourse, as charged, and rape by sexual assault, which was proved, "no valid conviction can
be had without running afoul of the accused's Constitutional right to be informed of the charge."
This statement, however, must be read alongside the immediately succeeding directive of the
appellate court, remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Said directive clearly shows that the CA
still had cause to detain Caoili and did not discharge him; in fact, the CA would have Caoili answer
for the proper Information which it directed the prosecution to file.

FINAL VERDICT:guilty of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610.
6. Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, Sept. 28, 2007

FACTS:

 Ssgt. Jose M. Pacoy was charged with homicide for shooting his commanding officer, Lt. Frederick
Esquita.
 After the arraignment, the RTC judge issued an Order, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the information.
 Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide
and instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the information.
The accusatory potion remained exactly the same as that of the original information for homicide,
with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from Escuita to Escueta.
 Pacoy was re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Pacoy objected on the ground that he would be
placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting to the dismissal of his case.
 Pacoy then moved to quash the information against him, which motion was denied. The RTC judge
ruled that Pacoy was never acquitted or convicted of the crime of Homicide, so he was never placed
in double jeopardy by the new information.

ISSUE/ HELD:

(1) Whether the denial by the RTC judge of Pacoy’s motion to quash was proper? YES.

 Pacoy’s insistence that the RTC judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his
express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
 Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Sec. 7, Rule 110 presupposes a definite or
unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the
jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
 The RTC judge's Order was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the information but not to
dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense.
(2) Whether the information amended? YES.

 The information here was amended, not substituted for another information.
 Under Rule 119, Sec. 19:
o SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good
cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the
proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
 There must be a distinction made between Sec. 14, Rule 110 on the amendment of an information
and Sec. 19, Rule 119 on the substitution of the information.
o 1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
o 2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;
o 3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and
o 4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information
or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
 presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include
or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
 [the application of Sec. 14, Rule 110 is also discussed here]
 In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Sec.
14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that
where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that
initially charged, a substitution is in order.
 There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration
of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute
the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
 In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely
a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.
 While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination
of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly
the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all
any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
"Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.
7. People vs. Sayaboc Seguba, G.R. No. 147201, (2004)

FACTS:
 On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon
Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje
o On or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya
o armed with a firearm
o with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence
o upon the person of Joseph Galam y Antonio
o by then and there suddenly firing at the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who has not given
any provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter
 At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje
pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July
1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
 Evidence for the prosecution:
o At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a
vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid
screaming from across the road: "Enough, enough, enough!" In front of her were Marlon
Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a fisticuff.
o By the time Pawid was able to subdue the two men by standing between them and
embracing Galam, Buenviaje's face was already bloodied and Galam's shirt collar torn.
o As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to face Galam and, with his right index finger making
a slicing motion across his throat, shouted: "Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin,
papatayin kita.
o Galam retorted, "Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika." Buenviaje did not respond anymore
and left on a tricycle
o More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at
the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was
located at Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
o According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00
p.m. of that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the
doorbell of the Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked
in. She answered in the negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc asked another
question, "What time does your bosing arrive?" She replied that she did not know. She
then went to the second floor of the establishment
o Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m.
Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information counter with his hands
tucked in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer.
o Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of the
building. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the
latter to fall to the ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith
ran out and disappeared into the darkness.
o Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay
Tanod of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon
Restaurant located along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. After getting his order and while he was getting out of
the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop building.
He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc, walking
briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle
sped off towards the center of the town.
o The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where he was
declared dead on arrival. Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his
 cadaver, found four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were inflicted
from behind and the last two were frontal
o On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death.
o On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command
Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he
arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the
investigation room.
o Half an hour later, the police o􏰂cers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then
conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, "okay," he
continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time.
However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave
to go to the comfort room. That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in
Ilocano dialect.
o At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, counsel for
accused Mike Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that
he be given fifteen days to file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.
 The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order issued on 16 August
1999. Further, it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were granted express
leave of court prior to their filing of the demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes and
Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case for judgment in accordance
with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed
to proceed with the presentation of his defense.
 Evidence for the defense
o Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also
flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to
having been beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating room, who then
coerced him to confess to having killed Galam. Apart from his testimony, he submitted a
handwritten statement dated 20 March 1995 and an affidavit dated 10 April 1995 to support
his claim of police brutality and retraction of his confession.
 RTC:
o found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying
circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances. It then
sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death.
o As for Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the
treachery employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared
them guilty of the crime of homicide only, with the 􏰂rst as principal and the two others as
accomplices.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Can the extrajudicial confession be used against Sayaboc? NO

 Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition
for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional
requirements safeguarding an accused's rights during custodial investigation have been strictly
complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for
this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations.
Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant
did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure to properly inform
a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible.
 In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungao's claim that he conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour
informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only an “advice”
 o The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators
either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused
to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of
a right is missing.
 Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution.
o The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."
 We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police,
still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao
that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
o That Sayaboc was a "garrulous" man who would "do what he wanted to do regardless of
the advice of others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within the rights of a suspect.
 Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the testimony
that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. of
that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam. Settled is the rule
that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed
before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.
 Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide only, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium period.

2. Should the case be remanded to the trial court due to denial to be heard by the trial court? NO
(MAIN)
 We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and
Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied
the right to be heard by the trial court.
 It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior
leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said pleading was filed only the next day. The filing
of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court.
 The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in Section 15,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned
appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
 The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to
present evidence for the accused.
o The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said
evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence
is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings
by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose
behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a
demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right
to present its evidence.
 The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present
evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
8. People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 137707-11, 17, (2004).

FACTS:

 The following are the Amended Information filed against the respondents:
 Criminal Case No. 17282 for robbery: (basta puro criminal information ‘to)

"That on or about the 24th day of November 1990 in the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, RAYMUNDO JARQUE, being then a Brigadier General, ARTHUR
TUPAZ, being then a 1st Lieutenant, AGUEDO VILCHES and BENJAMIN MARCHAN, both being
Majors, all of the Philippine Army and all stationed at the Negros Island Command headed by
accused RAYMUNDO JARQUE as its Commanding General, CAPT. RAMIRO DE JOYA, being
then the Officer-in-Charge of the 601st CIS Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; SGT. LEOPOLDO
MARFIL, being then a Senior Police Officer 2, 331st PC Company, Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.,
Camingawan, Bacolod City; SGT. ALEXIS GONZALES, being then an agent of the PNP-CIS,
Bacolod City, and hence, all public officers, while in the performance of their official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office, with evident bad faith, and conspiring and
confederating with one another and with MAYOR ANTONIO SUATENGCO and with EDUARDO
ABAJA, a civilian agent of the PC-CIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with
intent to gain steal, take and carry away without the consent of the owner Magdaleno M. Pena one
Baume and Mercier wristwatch valued at P65,000.00, one M-16 Colt with Serial No. 900370, one
M-16 Hydramatic with Serial No. 3399912, one 12-gauge Benelli shotgun with Serial No. 201700,
and cash amounting to P85,000.00, by forcibly opening the cabinets inside the residential house of
Soledad O. Montilla, thus causing damage and prejudice to Magdaleno M. Pena in the amount of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 Criminal Case No. 17283 for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:

"That on or about the 24th day of November 1990 in the Municipality of Pulupandan, Province of
Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, Raymundo Jarque, being then a Brigadier General, Arthur Tupaz, being
then a 1st Lieutenant, Aguedo Vilches and Benjamin Marohan, being then both Majors, all of the
Philippine Army and all stationed at the Negros Island Command headed by accused Raymundo
Jarque as the Commanding General, Capt. Ramiro de Joya, being then the Officer-in-Charge of
the 601st CIS Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; Sgt. Eduardo Jison, being then a Senior Police
Officer 2, 601st Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; Sgt. Leopoldo Marfil, being then a Senior
Police Officer 2, 331st PC Company, Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Camingawan, Bacolod City; Sgt.
Alexis Gonzales, being then a Police Corporal, Bacolod Police Station; Sgt. Alexander Tan, being
then an Agent of the PNP-CIS, Bacolod City; Sgt. Rico Bondoc & Sgt. Rosenio Bersal, being both
members of the CIS-PNP, and hence, all public officers, while the performance of their official
functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, with evident bad faith, and conspiring
and confederating with one and another and with Mayor Antonio Suatengco, Eduardo Abaja, as
civilian agent of the PC-CIS, Jesus Clavecilla, Nelson Alvarez, Manuel Malapitan, Sr., Rodolfo
Talabon, Reming Jovenes and Atty. Allan Zamora, all private individuals, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to one Soledad Oppen Montilla and her
attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Pena in the following manner; accused having been restrained by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23469 entitled "Soledad Oppen Montilla v. Hon. Marietta Alino,
et al" from implementing the Orders dated October 22, 1990 and November 20, 1990 of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 62, Bago City in Civil Case No. 394, and/or
despite having prior knowledge of a Temporary Restraining Order to this effect issued by the Court
 of Appeals, insisted in implementing the aforesaid Orders to reinstate Bonifacio Pena in possession
of the residential house belonging to Soledad O. Montilla, in complete disregard of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court of Appeals, and with the use of military vehicles and
armaments, with the assistance of 150 military personnel, and without securing a break-open order
from the court, the accused succeeded in destroying by means of force a portion of the perimeter
fence of the compound where the aforesaid house is situated and thereafter opened the main gate
of the compound, and after gaining entry thereto, took over the premises and the residential house
therein, which act of defiance and unauthorized enforcement caused undue injury to Soledad
Oppen Montilla and Magdaleno Pena.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 Criminal Case No. 17284 for qualified theft:

"That on or about the 3rd day of January 1991 in the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, RAYMUNDO JARQUE, being then a Brigadier General, ARTHUR
TUPAZ, being then a 1st Lieutenant, AGUEDO VILCHES and BENJAMIN MARCHAN, both being
Majors, all of the Philippine Army and all stationed at the Negros Island Command headed by
accused RAYMUNDO JARQUE as its Commanding General, CAPT. RAMIRO DE JOYA, being
then the Officer-in-Charge of the 601st CIS Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; SGT. LEOPOLDO
MARFIL, being then a Senior Police Officer 2, 331st PC Company, Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.,
Camingawan, Bacolod City; SGT. ALEXIS GONZALES, being a Police Corporal in the Bacolod
Police Station, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation
to their office, conspiring and confederating with one another and with MAYOR ANTONIO
SUATENGCO, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, and in the
company of other unidentified military personnel, and after having illegally entered the fishpond of
one Soledad Oppen Montilla situated at Barangay Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to gain harvest, take and carry away on
board a dump truck 2 tons or 2,000 kilos of prawns from the aforesaid fishpond without the consent
of said Soledad Oppen Montilla, thereby causing damage and prejudice to her in the amount of
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency, computed at
the prevailing rate of P130.00 per kilo.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 Criminal Case No. 17285 for qualified theft:

"That on or about the 3rd day of January 1991 in the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, RAYMUNDO JARQUE, being then a Brigadier General, ARTHUR
TUPAZ, being then a 1st Lieutenant, AGUEDO VILCHES and BENJAMIN MARCHAN, both being
Majors, all of the Philippine Army and all stationed at the Negros Island Command headed by
accused RAYMUNDO JARQUE as its Commanding General, CAPT. RAMIRO DE JOYA, being
then the Officer-in-Charge of the 601st CIS Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; SGT. LEOPOLDO
MARFIL, being then a Senior Police Officer 2, 331st PC Company, Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.,
Camingawan, Bacolod City; SGT. ALEXIS GONZALES, being a Police Corporal in the Bacolod
Police Station, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation
to their office, conspiring and confederating with one another and in the company of other
unidentified military personnel, and after having illegally entered the fishpond of one Soledad
Oppen Montilla situated at Barangay Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, did then and there
 willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to gain harvest, take and carry away on board a
dump truck 2.5 tons or 2,500 kilos of prawns from the aforesaid fishpond without the consent of
said Soledad Oppen Montilla, thereby causing damage and prejudice to her in the amount of
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P325,000.00), Philippine Currency,
computed at the prevailing rate of P130.00 per kilo.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 Criminal Case No. 17286 for qualified theft:

"That on or about the 3rd day of January 1991 in the Municipality of Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, RAYMUNDO JARQUE, being then a Brigadier General, ARTHUR
TUPAZ, being then a 1st Lieutenant, AGUEDO VILCHES and BENJAMIN MARCHAN, both being
Majors, all of the Philippine Army and all stationed at the Negros Island Command headed by
accused RAYMUNDO JARQUE as its Commanding General, CAPT. RAMIRO DE JOYA, being
then the Officer-in-Charge of the 601st CIS Provincial Field Office, Bacolod City; SGT. LEOPOLDO
MARFIL, being then a Senior Police Officer 2, 331st PC Company, Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Jr.,
Camingawan, Bacolod City; SGT. ALEXIS GONZALES, being a Police Corporal in the Bacolod
Police Station, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation
to their office, conspiring and confederating with one another and with MAYOR ANTONIO
SUATENGCO, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, and in the
company of other unidentified military personnel, and after having illegally entered the fishpond of
one Soledad Oppen Montilla situated at Barangay Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to gain harvest, take and carry away on
board a dump truck 500 kilos of prawns from the aforesaid fishpond without the consent of said
Soledad Oppen Montilla, thereby causing damage and prejudice to her in the amount of SIXTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00), Philippine Currency, computed at the prevailing rate of
P130.00 per kilo.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

 Respondents pleaded not guilty. Respondents Jesus Clavecilla and Manuel Malapitan, Sr. were
never arraigned. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Soledad Oppen Montilla (now
deceased) was the owner of a residential house and a prawn farm in Barangay Ubay, Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental. She has two grandsons: brothers Magdaleno and Bonifacio Pena.
o Initially, Bonifacio managed Soledad's properties and businesses. He was then in
possession of her residential house.
 On April 3, 1990, Soledad executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing Magdaleno as her
attorney-in-fact and giving him the powers of general supervision, control, and management of her
family properties. Consequently, Bonifacio was ejected from her residential house and Magdaleno
took possession of it.
 Bonifacio then threatened to evict Magdaleno from the residential house. This prompted Magdaleno
to file with the Regional Trial Court of Bago City a petition for injunction with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO).
 The trial court, after hearing the case on the merits, issued an Order denying Magdaleno's petition
and reinstating Bonifacio "to his possession of the residential house."
o Magdaleno filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
 The trial court issued a writ of execution designating the CIS as a special sheriff to implement it.
The Commanding General of the Negros Island Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
was also mandated to give full assistance to the Special Sheriff.
 Meanwhile, Magdaleno filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for a
TRO assailing the trial court's Order.
 o On November 23, 1990, (the day the trial court issued the writ of execution), the Court of
Appeals granted Magdaleno's prayer for a TRO.
 The following day, November 24, 1990, Magdaleno's counsel furnished the Provincial Commander
of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) a copy of the TRO from the
Court of Appeals. In turn, the latter apprised the CIS and the Commanding General of the Negros
Island Command about the same TRO.
 Respondents (military and police officers) nonetheless proceeded to enforce the writ. They forcibly
entered Soledad's residential house. Respondent Brigadier General Raymundo Jarque directed
the operation through a radio. Inside the compound, Magdaleno showed them a copy of the TRO
issued by the Court of Appeals, but they disregarded it. The civilian respondents, Pulupandan
Mayor Antonio Suatengco, Atty. Alan Zamora, Jesus Clavecilla and Manuel Malapitan, Sr., joined
the men in uniform. The respondents then forced open several cabinets and took a Baume &
Mercier watch, two M-16 assault rifles, a Benelli shotgun, and P85,000.00 in cash. Magdaleno then
left the compound.
 Respondents occupied the premises from November 24, 1990 to January 3, 1991. On November
27, 1990, they entered Soledad's fishpond located some two (2) kilometers from the residential
house and harvested 2.5 tons of prawns. Despite the directive of former President Fidel V. Ramos,
then the Secretary of National Defense, to respondents to comply with the TRO, they remained
obstinate and harvested more prawns on December 6, 1990 and January 3, 1991.
 Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in favor of Magdaleno, restraining and
prohibiting Bonifacio from taking possession of the residential house.
 The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan, the Informations (earlier mentioned)
for robbery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and three (3) counts of qualified
theft against herein respondents.
o After the prosecution had rested its cases, the defense filed, without leave of court, a
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
respondents beyond reasonable doubt.
o On January 20, 1999, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision granting respondents'
demurrer to evidence and acquitting all the respondents for insufficiency of evidence.
o In acquitting respondents, the Sandiganbayan held that they were only seeking to
implement a lawful order of the trial court. They came to know of the TRO issued by the
Court of Appeals only after they had implemented the writ of execution.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, in granting the respondents’ demurrer to evidence acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion

 Records show that two of the respondents, Jesus Clavecilla and Manuel Malapitan, Sr., were never
arraigned before the Sandiganbayan. Nor were they ever arrested.
o Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them.
o Basic is the rule that before a court can act upon the case of an accused, it must first
acquire jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the accused is acquired by (a) his
arrest, or (b) his voluntary submission. If the accused is a fugitive from justice, the court
cannot even proceed with a trial in absentia, unless he has been previously arraigned. We
thus hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting both
respondents for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they could not validly file a
demurrer to evidence.
 With respect to the rest of the respondents, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its
discretion in granting their demurrer to evidence. Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure then applicable provides:
o In the instant cases, there is no question that the prosecution had presented its evidence
in support of the charges against the accused.
 o Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is best left to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion. Accordingly, unless the Sandiganbayan acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, its Decision to grant or deny the demurrer
may not be disturbed.
 Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
o None of these was committed by the Sandiganbayan in granting the demurrer to evidence.
 First, petitioner's theory that the Sandiganbayan "totally disregarded" the prosecution's evidence in
granting the demurrer has no basis. Petitioner points out that the assailed Decision did not cite any
transcript of stenographic notes or any of the prosecution's documentary evidence.
o A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. It is sufficient if it
states the facts as found by the court. To test the adequacy of the challenged
Decision, the proper yardstick is Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution which
states in part that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
 The purpose of this provision is to inform the parties of how the court reached its
conclusion after considering the pertinent facts and the applicable laws. The losing
party is entitled to know why he lost and following analysis of the decision, he may
elevate what he considers its errors to a higher tribunal for review.
o The fact that the Sandiganbayan did not cite any transcript of stenographic notes or
documentary proof does not mean that it "totally disregarded" the prosecution's evidence.
In its ratiocination, the court discussed the issues as borne by the evidence and cited the
laws applicable. Simply stated, its conclusion is based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the laws applicable.
 Second, the petitioner submits that inasmuch as Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao did not
participate in the hearing of the cases, he committed grave abuse of discretion when he penned
the assailed Decision. We find nothing whimsical, capricious, or despotic on his part. It is settled
that the decision of the judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous,
especially when the decision has been deliberated upon by a collegiate court, like the
Sandiganbayan. Significantly, the other Justices present during the entire proceedings concurred
in the ponencia. The absence of a dissent is telling.
 The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and
when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the
case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
o Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be
appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being
one of acquittal, the case ends there.
9. People v. Tolentino y Estrella - GR 176385, 2008

FACTS:
 This case is a review of the CA decision affirming the decision of RTC of Labo, Camarines Norte,
B64, finding Emelio E. Tolentino and Jesus M. Trinidad, guilty of the Murder and two counts of
Frustrated Murder.
 On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder
were filed before the RTC against appellants, together with accused Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel
Trinidad.
 That on or about 11:10pm, August 29, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena,
Camarines Norte, shot JOSITA FERNANDEZ-NOVELO in her face.
 The accused also attacked ANTONIO BEA, by poking him with a firearm and tying his hands with
a robe, and stabbing him in different parts of his body.
 Accused also attacked ANTONIO NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the different parts of his
body and then shot him but missed
 Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Accused Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad remained
at large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the merits of the three criminal cases ensued.

According to prosecution

Madaming tao dito so let’s summarize who they are

NAME WHO

Rogelio Husband Took a trip to manila leaving his wife to

Novelo manage the pond

Josita Novelo Wife (dead) – shotgun to the left Victim of murder

cheek

Antonio Bea Caretaker-Victim stabbed 4 times Victim of frustrated murder

and tied via rope

Antonio Beaten (disappeared in fishpond) Victim of Frustrated murder – did not fly
Novelo

Ricardo Victim-neighbor His house was just near the pond

Basila

Jesus Assailant-accused Partner/manager of pond and murderer

Trinidad

Emelio Assailant-accused stabber

Tolentino

Jimmy Assailant-at large Driver of escape vehicle

Arnel Assailant-at large
Trinidad

 In January 1997, Rogelio, the surviving spouse of the deceased-victim Josita Novelo, and Jesus
Trinidad operated and rented a fishpond located in Barangay San Vicente. In April of the same
year, the pond yielded its first harvest. Rogelio and Josita brought the produce to Manila to be sold,
while Trinidad was left to manage the fishpond. Upon the couple’s return, they discovered that all
the fish and crabs had already been harvested and disposed of.Josita demanded from Trinidad the
return of the investment or be allowed to buy Trinidad’s share in the partnership. Appellant chose
the latter and was paid P9,700.00.
 After that, when the replenished fishpond with crab seedlings were ready for harvest, Trinidad
together with Tolentino, Jimmy and Arnel, without permission, harvested the crabs. The couple
confronted them and filed a complaint before the barangay which was set for hearing. A few days
before the hearing, Rogelio Novelo took a trip to Manila, leaving his wife to manage the fishpond.
 On August 29, at around 10:30pm, Antonio Bea, the caretaker of the fishpond, was inside his
house. He heard someone calling his name from outside so he went outside with a flashlight
towards the direction of the fishpond Watergate (“prensa”). Suddenly, he recognized someone as
Emelio Tolentino grab his hand and pulled him out of the house. There he saw Jesus, Jimmy and
Arnel. Jesus kicked Bea and tied his hands behind his back. Tolentino pulled him by the rope
towards the house of a certain Ricardo Basila. Arnel called Basila out and Basila went out of the
house with a flashlight and flashed it on the faces of the 4 perpetrators. They got irritated so they
started kicking Basila and ordered him to get inside the house. This is when Basila noticed that
Emelio was carrying a weapon.
 The assailants, together with Bea, proceeded to the house of the Novelo spouses alongside the
fishpond which was more or less 100m from Basila’s house. There, Jesus called Josita to get out
of the house. She was holding a flashlight when Jesus grabbed her and they went inside together
with Emelio and Antonio Bea. Emelio and Jesus took Bea outside when they saw Antonio Novelo,
the brother of Rogelio, and immediately kicked Antonio Novelo causing him to fall into the fishpond
and disappeared from sight.
 Antonio Bea was tied to the door with Emelio guarding him. Bea saw Josita Novelo being mauled
by Jesus and Arnel. Then, Jesus shot Josita Novelo on the left cheek with a gun. After that, Emelio
entered the house and slashed the face of Josita with a jungle bolo. The three assailants untied
the feet of Bea while leaving his hands tied. They left the house proceeding towards the fishpond
Watergate when Emelio stabbed Bea four times in the stomach with the jungle bolo. Bea fell into
the fishpond.
 The assailants left the victim and boarded a boat operated by Jimmy. Bea was able to untie his
hands and swim across the river and ask for help from the people of Purok 7. He was brought to
the house of the Barangay Captain Wilfredo LLarena. He was brought to the hospital. Then the
barangay captain together with some members of the police, went to the Novelo house and saw
the dead body of Josita.
o The Medico-legal officer of the NBI who conducted the autopsy stated that the shotgun
wound at the left side of the face caused her death
 On 19 October 1999, the prosecution rested its case and made a formal offer of evidence.
o appellants through counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence, without leave of court. RTC
denied the demurrer and submitted the case for decision pursuant to Section 15, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the order denying their Demurrer to
Evidence be recalled and that they be allowed to present evidence. The RTC denied the said
motion.
 Appellants again filed a petition for certiorari before SC. The Court denied the petition, which
became final and executory on 5 February 2003. As a result, the case was submitted for decision
without any evidence proffered by the defense.
 RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the crimes.
o Guilty for the crime of murder of Josita.
 o Guilty for frustrated murder of Antonio Bea.
o Acquitted of frustrated murder committed against Antonio Novelo
 appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that "errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial." Appellants argued
that in the interest of justice and equity, they should be given the opportunity to testify in their favor
considering that they are meted out by the RTC the supreme penalty of death.
 The RTC denied appellants' motion for new trial stating that the error of appellants' counsel during
the trial does not amount to error of law or irregularity which constitutes a valid ground for the
granting of a motion for new trial.
 The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE/HELD:

(IMPORTANT) THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS TO PRESENT DEFENSE EVIDENCE AFTER THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY - NO

 Appellants urge this Court to revisit the issue as to the denial of the Demurrer to Evidence and
preventing them from presenting evidence due to their failure to seek leave of court prior to the
filing of the demurrer to evidence.
 The issue on the validity of the order was already elevated before to the SC via petition for certiorari.
SC dismissed the petition. So this issue was already put to rest having attained finality and therefore
constituting the law of the case. Any attempts to pass upon anew a final ruling constitutes a crass
contravention of the rules on procedure.
 Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically,
it means that whatever is already irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct
on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.
 Besides, under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that when
an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives
his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution, thus:
 SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of
court.
 If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right
to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
 The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the
right to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the accused
moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence,
he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need
for him to present any evidence is negated. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the
dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial
thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence.

(NOT IMPT) THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANTS
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED - NO

 Appellants maintain that considering the lateness of the hour when the incident took place, and the
fact that it was dark, witness Antonio Bea could not have seen clearly the faces of his attackers
 and that of the deceased Josita Novelo. Antonio Bea, according to appellants, is incompetent to
testify on matters relating to what was done to the late Josita Novelo because he was tied from the
waist down to the door outside the house, thus, he could not have seen what had happened inside
the house where the deceased was brutally attacked.
 Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate
between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it,
accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be manifestly shown that the
latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in
the case.
 In the instant case, prosecution witness Antonio Bea steadfastly pointed to appellants and their
companions as the malefactors. He has stated that he has known the assailants for 10 years and
he recognized their voices so he couldn’t have been mistaken.
 The foregoing testimony can only be told by a person who had really witnessed the incident and
had been subjected to personal violence from the perpetrators, hence, such testimony is entitled
to full faith and credit. Furthermore, Bea's testimony jibed with the physical (medical) evidence. The
prosecution successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants and their cohorts
killed Josita Novelo.

(NOT IMPT) GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY OF

INFLICTING INJURY ON ANTONIO BEA, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THEM GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED MURDER ALTHOUGH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THAT
BEA'S WOUNDS WERE MORTAL

 appellants argue that in the stabbing of Antonio Bea, they should have been liable only for
attempted murder and not frustrated murder since the prosecution failed to prove, due to its failure
to present the attending physician, that the injury suffered by the victim was fatal.
 A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result
in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission
of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. However, the crime was not consummated by
reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the
offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is
mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
 In the instant case, the prosecution established that Antonio Bea sustained four stab wounds
inflicted by Emelio Tolentino which caused damage to the victim's abdomen resulting in massive
blood loss. The victim was hospitalized for two months because of these injuries. In fact, at the trial,
the victim showed the scars in his abdomen. All these tend to show the seriousness of the wounds
suffered by the victim and which would have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical
intervention.
10.
11. Osorio v. People, G.R. No. 207711, (2018)

FACTS:
 Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.
 The prosecution presented as witness private complainant Josefina Gabriel and, head of Philam
Life’s Business Values and Compliance Department, Alberto Fernandez.
 Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in Dec. 2000, Osorio visited
Gabriel’s store and introduced herself as an agent of Philam Life.
o As proof, Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio
offered insurance coverage to Gabriel. Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later date as
she needed more time to think about the offer.
 When Osorio, returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life’s Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package.
Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from Feb 2001 to Nov. 2001.
 On Nov. 19, 20001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund
Management. The proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme and would
earn 20% annually. Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn
issued Philam Life receipts.
 A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment
of premiums. When Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she
would take responsibility.
 On May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management
(PMIAM) thanking her for investing in the company. Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her
investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher
rate of return. Displeased with had happened, Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment.
 Osorio admitted that aside from being a Philam Life agent, she was also a referral agent of PMIAM.
She received P4,000.00 from the company as commission for Gabriel’s investment. She asserted
that she initially planned to place Gabriel’s investment in Philam Life but decided later that PMIAM
would yield a higher return rate.
 When Osorio informed Gabriel of her decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her consent.
 Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she was allowed to engage in
other lines of work. He stated that Osorio should not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel’s
P200,000 investment. Although the receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should
only be issued for insurance premium payments.
 Both the RTC and CA found Osorio guilty of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a), RPC.
 Petitioner now asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a), RPC were
established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private complainant was proven.
 Art. 315 2(a) states Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
o 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
 (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
 Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life.
During her first meeting with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling
card as proof of her identity and employment. Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values
and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent
as of December 2000.
 In praying for her acquittal, petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code were established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part
of the private complainant was proven. Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in
soliciting private complainant's investment as nothing in the records shows that she used a fictitious
name or that she pretended to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications. Fernandez, one of
the prosecution's witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent.
  Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place private
complainant's investment in PMIAM. She adds that she did not conceal this from private
complainant, who later on agreed to the placement.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Should Osorio be held guilty? YES, BUT UNDER ART. 318 INSTEAD.
 In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private
complainant's money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting
to private complainant that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management
and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums.

 Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise
that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance
policies. She parted with her funds because of the representation that her investment's earnings
would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance premiums. As a result of
petitioner's representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the succeeding
insurance premiums as they fell due. Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life receipts led
private complainant to believe that her money was already as good as invested in the company.
 Indeed, the false representation committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of “other
similar deceits” under Art. 315 (2)(a) as “other similar deceits” cannot be construed in the broadest
sense to include all kinds of deceit under the principle of ejusdem generis.
 Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Art. 318. Art. 318 is
broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not
falling under Arts. 315, 316 and 317.
 All the elements of Art. 318 are present in this case. Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's
money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be
used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is what
induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance
premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the
investment in another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed.

 Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule
proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him or her.
o An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure [check codal].
 Rule 120, sec. 4 of the Revised Rules on Crimpro simply means that if there is a variance between
the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved
if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if
it is necessarily included in the offense proved.
 In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is
necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code. This rule also makes clear that there is no violation of the accused’s
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against her.
 Lastly, the ratification allegedly given by private complainant hardly qualifies as genuine consent.
When private complainant discovered the transaction, her insurance policies had already lapsed.
She was trapped in a difficult situation where she could potentially lose another investment. Thus,
she had no other choice but to agree to the placement. The lack of genuine consent is further
evidenced by private complainant's repeated requests for a refund of her initial investment even
after she received the first tranche of interest income.
12. Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, 13 August 2014
FACTS:
 Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, in an Information.
o Upon arraignment, Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty.
 The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of
Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).
o That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending criminal case against him,
Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal
case against him for assault upon an agent of a person in authority before the MeTC of
Malabon City, Branch 55.
 Based on the same set of facts, an administrative complaint was likewise filed against Sevilla.
o The Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable for dishonesty and
falsification of official document and dismissed him from the service.
o In Sevilla v. Gervacio, the Court affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as
regards Sevilla's administrative liability.
 On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer vis-à-vis the question on whether he has any pending criminal case.
o However, he averred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS.
o He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually
prepared his PDS.
o According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001, since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in
his house.
o At around two o'clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon
before five o'clock that afternoon.
o He then instructed Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he
filed with the personnel office.
o After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just
signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries therein.
o That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending
criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
 The defense likewise presented the testimony of Torres, a former City Councilor.
o Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on
July 2, 2001;
o that when the members of Sevilla's staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would
just use the typewriter inside Torres' office.
o Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having
used the typewriter in his office.
 Sandiganbayan found the accused GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through Reckless
Imprudence
o Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification
of public document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC since he did not act with malicious
intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS.
o However, considering that Sevilla's PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of
public document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC.
 Sevilla's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
o Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for
the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC. -
YES
 At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan's designation of the felony supposedly
committed by Sevilla is inaccurate.
o The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365
of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document.
o However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as "falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence."
o The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a modality of committing it.
o Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a
mere modality in the commission of a crime.
 Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses.
o It is not a question of classification or terminology.
o In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
o Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase
as 'homicide through reckless imprudence', and the like; when the strict technical
sense is, more accurately, 'reckless imprudence resulting in homicide'; or 'simple
imprudence causing damages to property'."
 Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification
of public documents and not falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence.
 The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
 Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted
of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved.
 There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution — the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification
of public document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.

2. Whether reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily

included in the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of the
RPC. -YES
 While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a wilful crime, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for
the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
 Thus, Sevilla's claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable.
 To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is
necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater
offense.
o As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification
of public documents.
 In Sarep v. Sandiganbayan, the petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed
with the CSC.
o An Information was then filed against him for falsification of public document.
o Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did not maliciously
pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person.
 Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise
to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer
from criminal liability.
o It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care and diligence in order that
no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts that are otherwise
offensive.
o What is penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous
recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have
produced several effects or consequences