Pacific Banking Corporation vs. CA & Oriental Assurance
Pacific failed to
[GR. No. L-41014 28 November 1988]
Facts: An open Fire Policy issued to Paramount Shirt
Manufacturing for Php61,000 on the following: stocks,
materils, supplies, furniture, fixture, machinery,
equipment contained on the 1st to 3rd floors. Insurance
is for a year starting 21 OCTOBER 1964.
Paramount Shirt is debtor of Pacific Banking amounting
to Php800,000. Goods in policy were held in trust
by Paramount for Pacific under thrust receipts. Fire
broke out on 4 January 1964.
Pacific sent letter of demand to Oriental. Insurance
Adjuster ofOriental notified Pacific to submit proof of
loss pursuant to Policy Condition 11. Pacific did not
accede but asked Insurance Adjuster toverify records
form Bureau of Customs.
Pacific filed for sum of money
against Oriental. Oriental alleged that Pacific
prematurely filed a suit, for neither filing a formal claim
over loss pursuant to policy nor submitting any proof of
loss.
Trial court decided in favor of Pacific. Decision based on
technicality. The defense of lack of proof of loss and
defects were raised for the 1st time. (On presentation of
evidences by Pacific, it was revealed there was violation
of Condition No.3, there were undeclared co-insurances
under same property –Wellington, Empire, Asian. The
only declared co-insurances were Malayan, South Sea,
and Victory)
CA reversed decision. Concealment of other co-
insurances is a misrepresentation and can easily be
fraud.
Issues: (1) Whether or not unrevealed con-insurances is
a violation of Policy Condition No.3
(2) Whether or not there was premature filing of action
Held:
(1) Yes. Policy Condition 3 provides that the insured
must give notice of any insurance already in effect or
subsequently be in effect covering same property being
insured. Failure to do so, the policy shall be forfeited.
Failure to reveal before the loss of the 3 other insurances
is a clear misrepresentation or a false declaration. The
material fact was asked for but was not revealed.
Representations of facts are the foundations of the
contract. Pacific itself provided for the evidences in trial
court that proved existence of misrepresentation.
(2) Yes. Policy Condition 11 is a sine qua non
requirement for maintaining action. It requires that
documents necessary to prove and estimate the loss
should be included with notice of loss.
submit formal claim of loss with supporting documents
but shifted the burden to the insurance company. Failing
to submit claim is failure for insurance company to reject
claim. Thus, a lack ofcause of action to file suit.
Furthermore, the mortgage clause in the policy
specifically provides that the policy is invalidated by
reasons of FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION and
FRAUD. Concealment can easily be fraud or
misrepresentation.
The insured – PARAMOUNT is not entitled to proceeds.
Moreso, Pacific as indorsee of policy is not entitled.
ALFREDO CHING VS. CA G.R. NO. 110844
(2000)
Facts: P was charged before the Makati RTC with Estafa,
in relation to the “Trust Receipts Law.” Thereafter, P
filed before the Manila RTC for declaration of nullity of
documents and for damages. P then filed a petition
before the Makati RTC for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a
civil action.
Issue: Whether there is a prejudicial question
Held: No. The two essential requisites of a prejudicial
question are: (1) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the
case at bar, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil
case for the declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages, does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming
arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the
case adjudicates that the transaction entered into
between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement,
nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be
established and his culpability under penal laws
determined by other evidence.
ROLANDO TING vs..HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely:
FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L.
ABEJO, ALICIAL. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID,
EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE
L. ALCOVER,
Facts:1.Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application
filedby the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for
registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the
CebuCadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
2.The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and
executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen
thereafterissued an order of November 10, 1982
directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the
correspondingdecree of registration and the certificate of
title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
3.On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed
with the RTC of Cebu an application for registration of
titleto the same lot.
4.The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely:
Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia
L.Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the
opportunityto file an opposition to petitioner’s
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed
their Answercalling attention to the December 10, 1976
decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
executory on January 29,1977 and which, they argued,
barred the filing of petitioner’s application on the ground
of res judicata.
5.After hearing the respective sides of the parties,
Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of
respondents,dismissed petitioner’s application on the
ground of res judicata.
6.Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the property is exempt from
execution.Held: Affirmative
Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
reading:SEC. 6.
Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final
and executory judgment or order may beexecuted on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it isbarred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also beenforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry
and thereafter by action before it is barred bythe statute
of limitations.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. enunciates theraison d’etre why
Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land
registrationproceedings.Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that
judgment may be enforced within5 years by motion, and
after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39.)
The provision of theRules refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This isso because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against theadverse party, and his failure to act
to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rulesmakes the decision unenforceable against
the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish
astatus, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of
land issought to be established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
nofurther proceeding to enforce said ownership is
necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
beenin possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.Furthermore, there is no
provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6,
Rule 39, regarding the executionof a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ ofpossession. The decision
in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing
party is in possession, becomesfinal without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting
an appeal.
Cuenco vs. CA G.R. No. L-24742, October 26,
1973
o The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was
survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing
in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that
the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of
Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal
for the probate of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of
prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of
prohibition
o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings

HELD:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing

the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the last will and
testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the

settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is

not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect
the prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also
first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in
order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of
all other courts.