Observing The Imperial Transition British Naval Reports PDF

m a r ı́ a - d o l o r e s e l i z a l d e
Observing the Imperial Transition: British Naval

Reports on the Philippines, 1898-1901*
Between 1898 and 1901, the Philippines ceased being a Spanish colony only to fall
under the imperial control of the U.S. government. Witnessing this process, as
highly partisan observers, were British naval officers aboard a flotilla sent to the
islands for the purpose of protecting the safety and interest of its citizens, observing
carefully the developments on the islands, and preventing any movement that
could damage their interests in the area or threaten security and free trade in the
Pacific. This article will examine the experience of that transition from the pers-
pective of British observers, who represented the foreign power with the most
interests in the islands.
The impact of the Spanish-American War and the American annexation on the
Philippines has been covered extensively in international historiography. Both are
considered key elements in the emergence of a new global imperial order, the birth
of the American empire, and the extension of American influence into Asia and the
Pacific.1 Historians have also analyzed the war between Americans and Filipinos
that began with the establishment of an American colonial government in the
*This paper was prepared as part of the project “Empires, Nations, and Citizens in Asia and the
Pacific” (Ref.: HAR2012-39352-C02-02), financed by the Spanish National Scientific Research
Plan.
1. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands
(Baltimore, MD, 1936); Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American
Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, NY, 1963); Wayne H. Morgan, America’s Road to Empire: The
War with Spain and Overseas Expansion (New York, 1965); Thomas McCormick, The China
Market: America’s Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901 (Chicago, IL, 1967); David Trask, The
War with Spain in 1898 (New York, 1981); John Dobson, Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of
William McKinley (Pittsburgh, PA, 1988); John Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the
United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992); John Dorrance, The United
States and the Pacific Islands (Washington, D.C., 1992); Joseph Smith, The Spanish-American War:
Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895-1902 (New York, 1994); Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde, “De
Nación a Imperio: La expansión de los Estados Unidos por el Pacı́fico durante la guerra hispa-
no-norteamericana de 1898,” Hispania 196 (1997): 551-588.
Diplomatic History, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2016). ! The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University
Press on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
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219
220 : d i p l o m a t i c h i s t o r y
islands.2 This historical moment has been also studied in the context of the revo-
lution of 1896 and the birth of the Philippine nation.3 Likewise, research on
imperial transitions has grown in recent years, and several works that cover the
case of the Philippines have been published.4 There are also a number of studies
devoted to the analysis of British interests in the Philippines.5 And finally, scholars
have made important contributions to the study of the special relationship esta-
blished at that time between the British and the Americans in the development of
the international policies of both countries.6
Building on the ideas raised in these various lines of research, this work takes a
novel approach based on primary archival sources that have not been used before.7
Through this documentation, this paper finds that British observers stationed in
the Philippines saw themselves as advisors to a new U.S. colonial adventure. They
supported the establishment of an American protectorate in the Philippines that
fitted well into Britain’s global and regional strategy. Their initial enthusiasm
waned, however, as British onlookers developed an increasingly critical view of
2. Richard E. Welch, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American
War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979); Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The
American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, CT, 1983); Frank H. Golay, Face
of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison, WI, 1998); H. W. Brands, Bound
to Empire: The Unites States and the Philippines (New York, 1992); Brian McAllister Linn, The
Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS, 2000); Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race,
Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006); Alfred W. McCoy, Policing
America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison,
WI, 2009).
3. Samuel Tan, The Filipino Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Manila, 1977); Bonifacio Salamanca,
The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913 (Quezon City, 1984).
4. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of
Difference (New York, 2010); John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires,
1400-2000 (New York, 2008); Alfred McCoy, Josep M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson, eds.,
Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline (Madison, WI, 2012).
5. Nicholas Loney, A Britisher in the Philippines or The Letters of Nicholas Loney (Manila, 1964);
John Bowring, A Visit to the Philippine Islands (London, 1859); Robert MacMiking, Recollections of
Manilla and the Philippines during 1848, 1849 and 1850 (London, 1851); W. P. Morrell, Britain in the
Pacific Islands (Oxford, 1960); Benito Legarda Jr., After the Galleons: Foreign Trade, Economic Change
and Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines (Quezon City, 1999); John A. Larkin,
Sugar and the Origins of Modern Philippine Society (Berkeley, CA, 1993); Norman Owen, Prosperity
without Progress. Manila Hemp and Material Life in the Colonial Philippines (Berkeley, CA, 1984);
Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde, “Comercio, inversiones y estrategia. Los intereses internacionales en
Filipinas,” in Las relaciones entre España y Filipinas, siglos XVI-XX, ed., Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde
(Madrid, 2003): 221-249; Alastair D. Wilson, “Tides of Capitalism, Culture and Politics in the
South China Sea: The British Merchant Community in Spanish Manila, 1837-1869” (Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Bristol, 2011).
6. A. E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London, 1960); H. C. Allen,
Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952 (London,
1954); R. G. Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1898-1900 (East Lansing, MI,
1966); Marshall Bertram, The Birth of Anglo-American Friendship (New York, 1992).
7. The National Archives of the UK (TNA): ADM 125/143, Records China Station, Vol.
XXVIII, Spanish-American War and Rebellion in Philippines. From the same archive, see also,
British Consuls at Manila, Consular & Commercial Reports and Correspondence, TNA: FO 72.
Observing the Imperial Transition : 221
Figure 1: Parade of troops in the Philippines [Desfile de tropas en Filipinas]. Fotografı́a 120044,
MUSEO DEL EJÉRCITO, Toledo, Spain.
the United States’ fumbling attempts to impose a new administration in the islands
and end the conflict with Emilio Aguinaldo’s Filipino troops.
THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER OF A GLOBAL EMPIRE
In the late nineteenth century, Great Britain remained the great global hegemon.
It had an empire spread around the world. It controlled the seas and its commu-
nication routes. Its economy still allowed Britain to predominate in the import
trade of tropical products and the export trade of manufactured goods. Its diplo-
matic representatives and naval forces were respected on the international stage.8
Britain also occupied a dominant position through control of key ports in Asia and
a network of bases in the Pacific. But Britain was not without competitors. In the
growing rivalry for influence in that region, France, Germany, and Russia conti-
nued their expansion while carefully watching foreign penetration in China to
avoid being excluded from any eventual distribution of mainland ports or terri-
tories.9 Other countries did not participate in that late nineteenth century wave of
expansion, but, rather, labored to retain empires built in earlier times. Such was the
8. Cristopher A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830
(London, 1989) and The Birth of the Modern World: Global Connections and Comparisons,
1780-1914 (Oxford, 2004).
9. Nicholas Tarling, Imperialism in Asia. An Essay (Auckland, 2005).
Figure 2: Parade of troops along the harbor. The Philippines [Desfile de tropas por el puerto.
Filipinas.] Fotografı́a 120036, MUSEO DEL EJÉRCITO, Toledo, Spain.
case of Spain, Portugal, and Holland. Finally, two other countries, the United
States and Japan, emerging as new world powers, began exploring the possibility
of increasing their influence over the Pacific and Asia, as indeed would occur in
later decades. Beginning in the 1890s, Japan joined the colonial race. Through
major wars with China and Russia, Japan seized territory in Korea, southern
Manchuria, the Liao-Tung peninsula as well as the islands of Formosa,
Pescadores, and Sakhalin.
The Japanese penetration in China precipitated a new distribution of spheres of
influence in that country. If Britain had been the major commercial and financial
power in China ever since the Opium Wars had forced the opening of Chinese
ports to international trade, in the late nineteenth century the Germans settled
in Kiaochow, the Russians at Port Arthur and Talien-wan, the French in
Kwangchowan, and the British in Wei Hai Wei. Also, the pace of granting con-
cessions for the construction of railways was intensified throughout China. Russia
and Germany monopolized railroads in Manchuria and Shantung; Britain nego-
tiated to lay track up the Yangtze valley; and in September 1898 a Chinese-German
agreement was signed for the construction of additional railways. Thus, it seemed,
had begun a new expansionist assault on China that threatened traditionally
British-supported policies of protecting the territorial integrity of the Chinese
empire and maintaining an “open door” there to international commerce.
Under the circumstances, the American government realized that it was falling
behind in the scramble for Asia. While American commercial agents had been
Figure 3: Troop Training in the Philippines [Preparación de tropas en Filipinas.] Fotografı́a

120035, MUSEO DEL EJÉRCITO, Toledo, Spain.
active for decades in the China trade, they had not enjoyed official support for their
dealings. In the nineties, a new internal debate emerged in the United States in
which political, economic, and military circles stressed the desirability of develop-
ing a global policy more in line with their actual capabilities. The annexation of a
string of islands across the Pacific, the acquisition of the Philippines after the war
with Spain in 1898, and a new defense of their interests in China marked the
beginning of official American involvement in Asia and the Pacific.
THE SEARCH FOR AN ANGLO-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING AND

ITS REPERCUSSION IN THE PACIFIC
In this uncertain context, it was essential for Britain to shore up its position, safe-
guard its communications with the territories under its jurisdiction, and protect its
economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Britain had a dominant position in
the Chinese market. British carriers controlled some 80 percent of exports, domi-
nated trade on China’s rivers, and enjoyed the safe haven of important ports such as
Hong Kong and Singapore. Similarly, British interests were heavily invested in the
potential gains to be made in the opening of China’s immense internal market,
including for work building its transportation and communications infrastructure.
Given this favorable status quo, Britain feared that, contrary to British interests, the
Figure 4: Collective Portrait in a train. The Philippines [Retrato Colectivo en un tren. Filipinas.]
Fotografı́a 120068, MUSEO DEL EJÉRCITO, Toledo, Spain.
other powers would push for a partition of China into spheres of influence.
Motivated, therefore, by these as well as other interests at stake in other parts of
the globe, the British government weighed the possibility of seeking some ally who
could shore up their increasingly precarious dominance.
In the face of this pressure, as Robert G. Neale has pointed out, British policy in
China was based upon two principles:
The first was that the existing and potential China trade and investments were
insufficient to justify the use of armed force against Europeans rivals, who
threatened them or stood in the way of their extension. The second was that
Great Britain was no longer capable by herself of ensuring the political and
territorial stability of the Far East . . . This second principle governed Britain’s
search for allies, following upon the demonstration of the dangers of isolation
provided by Europe’s reaction to the Boer War . . . It caused the approach to
America . . . It was this definition that governed Britain’s attitude towards the
disposition of the Philippines.10
10. Neale, Great Britain and United States, 107-108.

Despite Prime Minister Lord Salisbury’s initial skepticism, then Colonial

Secretary Joseph Chamberlain undertook in the spring of 1898 a search for
allies in Asia to block a possible partition of China.11 He tried to negotiate separa-
tely with Russia, Germany, and the United States, without obtaining any guaran-
tees. None of the parties were interested in bearing the cost of backing the interests
or protecting the borders of their rivals on the other side of the world. Despite this,
the British continued efforts along these lines. In March 1898, shortly before the
United States began its war against Spain and at Secretary Chamberlain’s request,
the Foreign Office issued instructions to its ambassador at Washington, Sir Julian
Pauncefote, to find out if Her Majesty’s government could count on American
cooperation in opposing any action by foreign powers that would tend to restrict
the opening of China to trade with all nations: “Can you ascertain confidentially
whether the Unites States would be prepared to join us?”12
Pauncefote’s reply was disheartening for the Foreign Office. The United States
preferred to maintain its traditional policy of not forming European alliances,
especially at a time of high concern for the problems in Cuba.13 However, the
official position did not deter the British, whose leaders followed speeches in favor
of an understanding between the “Anglo-Saxon” countries and acting so that
nothing should harm Anglo-American friendship. Such behavior was rewarded
when two months later, once the Spanish-American War had begun, Pauncefote
was able to report that there had been a noticeable change in the American attitude
toward Great Britain, and signs favorable to a possible Anglo-American alliance
were beginning to emerge.14 These impressions would have an immediate impact
on the conflict that was then being settled in the Pacific.
At a time when communications did not have the immediacy of our present day,
and in which the declaration of British neutrality in the Spanish-American conflict
seemed to limit the range of action available to the British government, there arose
a curious situation. British diplomats in Hong Kong and Singapore took on an
active role that London did not hinder. Far from Europe, British officials in Asia
revealed their favorable disposition towards the aims of the United States in the
Philippines by supporting American war efforts. They received no such instruc-
tions from either the Foreign Office or the Colonial Secretary. They acted first,
and only subsequently reported to London. Before the war, Chamberlain had
informed the British authorities in the region that he wanted to maintain friendly
11. J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century
(London, 1964); J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1932-34).
12. TNA: FO5/2364, Foreign Office to Pauncefote, Telegram 18, 7 March 1898, and
Telegram 21, 15 March 1898. R. B. Mowat, Life of Lord Pauncefote. First Ambassador to the
United States (London, 1929).
13. TNA: FO5/2361, Pauncefote to Foreign Office, Telegram 13, 18 March 1898, and
Dispatch 70, 17 March 1898.
14. TNA: FO5/2362, Memorandum of the British Embassy at Washington, 27 May 1898.
relations with the United States, and that statement guided the conduct of British
officials stationed in Asia.15
Chamberlain was aware of ongoing diplomatic initiatives–among them, the
British role in brokering meetings between Philippine independence leaders and
Admiral George Dewey to coordinate joint actions against the Spaniards. In the
face of Spanish complaints, Chamberlain proposed that the Foreign Office
“acknowledge receipt of, but express no opinion on the actions of the colonial
government.”16 At a time when there were as yet no contrary orders issuing from
Salisbury, British colonial officials in Asia continued favoring American interests,
believing that this would, in turn, protect British interests. As late as August 1898
Salisbury sent specific instructions asking British officials to act with more care
toward the spirit of neutrality, and only then were British representatives in Asia
careful to follow that course of action.17
Despite this rhetoric of neutrality, Salisbury himself had been at center stage of
an important related episode. In June 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the
British Prime Minister reached an agreement with the Chinese government for
a 99-year lease of Hong Kong and Mirs Bay, the latter then so useful to the
American Navy, given that they were at that time repairing their ships in those
waters. Precisely for this reason, Salisbury decided to delay the signing of the
Anglo-Chinese agreement, so that American ships could continue using Mirs
Bay, still formally under Chinese sovereignty, without violating neutrality were
the British to have dominion over that harbor: “If we get an engagement formally,
we might find an excuse for postponing the date of the lease.”18
Such behavior shows that Salisbury acted in this matter in order to avoid any
situation that might impair friendly relations between Britain and the United
States in an area where his government believed it needed allies.19 More generally,
Neale has described this tacit favoritism in British comportment such that British
action, whether by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, or by local colonial
officers, tended to express a benevolent neutrality in favor of the United States.
The different attitudes adopted reflected the intention of the cabinet to make
Anglo-American friendship a base of Britain’s foreign policy.20
15. Rosario de la Torre, Inglaterra y España en 1898 (Madrid, 1988), 167. Neale, Great Britain
and United States, 45-49.
16. TNA: FO72/2096, Minute from Colonial Office attached to Dispatch 151,
Major-General Wilson Black, Administrator of Hong Kong, to Chamberlain, 20 May 1898.
17. TNA: FO72/2096, Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under Secretary of the State for
Foreign Affairs, to Salisbury, 2 August 1898. TNA: FO72/2097, Salisbury to Pauncefote, 9
August 1898. TNA: FO72/2097, J. A. Swettenham, Governor of the Straits Settlements, to
Foreign Office, 10 October 1898.
18. TNA: FO17/1341, Salisbury in minute on the back of the telegram of Sir Claude
MacDonald, United Kingdom’s Ambassador in China, to Foreign Office, No. 198, 9 June
1898. TNA: FO72/2097, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 18 August 1898. Neale, Great
Britain and United States, 55-58.
19. Torre, Inglaterra, 184.
20. Neale, Great Britain and United States, 81.
BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Within the circumstances outlined above, the posture of Great Britain during the
Spanish-American War in the Philippines was important for several reasons. First,
Britain was the foreign power with the greatest economic interests in the archi-
pelago. Second, it had a dominant position to protect in the Asian region as
a whole. And third, Britain was seeking to garner American support for its
policy objectives in China. Given these interests, Great Britain was therefore will-
ing to look favorably upon any posture that the United States should assume
relative to the future of the Philippines.
Britain’s presence in the Philippines grew steadily beginning in the mid-eight-
eenth century.21 By the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the largest
importer and exporter of goods into and out of the Philippines, even surpassing
Spain itself for many years. This expansion continued up until 1891 when protec-
tionist tariffs reversed the trend.22 British companies were involved in the produc-
tion and trade of sugar, Manila hemp, tobacco, coffee, and indigo. They also
focused on importing products that the islands needed and introducing British
goods into the Philippines. Lastly, the British invested in other areas related to the
creation of infrastructure, such as the creation of the Philippines’ only railway line,
The Manila Railway Co., constructing roads, or laying the telegraph cable that
connected Manila and Hong Kong. Trade became significant enough to justify the
opening of branches of British banks in the islands, which included The Hong-
Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and The Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China.23
Consequently, the position adopted by the British government when faced
with the possibility of imperial transition in the islands in 1898 had an unavoidable
impact on the course of events. The Spanish-American War broke out in that year.
It was a conflict between Spain and the United States over Cuba, but it had direct
repercussions in the Philippines. As soon as hostilities broke out, McKinley’s go-
vernment decided to attack Manila as the first act of war. The action against the
Philippines was justified by the strategic necessity of destroying the Spanish fleet in
the Pacific in order to prevent it from attacking the west coast of the United States,
which threatened to force the opening of a second front in the war between
21. TNA: FO 72/1666, Sovereignty of Spain over the Caroline and Pelew Islands.
22. TNA: FO 72/2081, Consul at Manila, 1898, Consular & Commercial, Report on trade in
the Philippine Islands. Consular Reports, UK., No.1932, Report on Trade and Commerce of the
Philippine Islands for the year 1896. Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries
during the year 1898. Issue from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Department of State
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899, vol. I): 140-141. Report of the Philippine
Commission, paper no. XVI, Commerce, vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1901), 65-66.
23. Legarda, After the Galleons; Larkin, Sugar; Owen, Prosperity; Elizalde, Comercio; Wilson,
Tides.
the two countries.24 Another underlying reason that was mentioned was that it
gave the United States another element for negotiation when a peace treaty was
eventually signed. Underlying these official reasons was a clear interest in taking
advantage of the war with Spain to establish a naval base in a region that was
becoming a strategic priority for the United States. An outpost in the
Philippines would supplement the network of possessions that the Americans
were in the process of occupying throughout the Pacific and would facilitate
entry into Asian markets at a time of maximum colonial rivalry in the area,
when the break up of China into spheres of influence appeared imminent.
The American intervention in the Philippines sparked rumors and international
calculations. Since nobody knew the scope of this intervention or the extent of the
territorial ambitions of the United States, the islands were seen as a territory that
could potentially be divided up in an early round of colonial redistribution. The
countries with direct interests in this matter sent ships to Manila to keep a close eye
on the progress of the events; foreign affairs offices initiated secret negotiations
regarding what would happen in the islands, and different lobbies attempted to
sway the positions taken by their own governments in regard to the Philippines and
Micronesia. The matter appeared to be open to international negotiation.25 Given
the predominant position that Britain occupied in all colonial matters that affected
this area, the British stance was therefore a determining factor when considering
any issue to be addressed in that region.
Salisbury’s government made it clear that it did not want to interfere in the
government of the archipelago: “Territorial expansion by itself and for itself in the
far East is an unmixed evil . . . and . . . unless acquisition of territory was required for
military or naval base, was, if possible, to be avoided.”26 His government’s objecti-
ves were limited to ensuring that existing trade agreements continued to be res-
pected in the islands; securing favorable conditions for British traders and
investors; and providing for the safety of their nationals, ensuring their freedom
of residence and movement, as well as protecting the inviolability of their busi-
nesses and properties. Britain also wanted to avoid the installation of any rival
nation in the Philippines that could threaten either the balance of power in the
24. Plan by William W. Kimball, LT, U.S. Navy, Staff Intelligence Officer, “War with Spain,
1896. General Considerations of the War, the results desired and the consequent kind of opera-
tions to be undertake,n” Naval Operating Forces, North Atlantic Station, June 1, 1898, Navy
Department, entry 43, box 11, Record Group 313 (hereafter RG 313), National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). “Memorandum,” June 1, 1896, General Records of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Record Group 38 (hereafter RG 38), NARA. Taylor, Wainwright and
McAdoo, “Memorandum regarding Naval Attachés Abroad”, April 15, 1897, entry 124,
Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Record Group 80 (hereafter RG 80), NARA.
25. Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde, “El 98 en el Pacı́fico. El debate internacional en torno al futuro de
las islas españolas durante la guerra hispano-norteamericana,” in Presencia española en el Pacı́fico, ed.
Antonio Garcı́a-Abásolo (Córdoba, 1996), 253-262; Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde, “1898: El fin de la
relación entre España y Filipinas”, in Las relaciones entre España y Filipinas, siglos XVI-XX, ed.
Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde (Madrid, 2003), 273-301.
26. Neale, Great Britain and United States, 108.
region or the open door policy in China. Given these goals, Salisbury made it clear
that Britain would not object to the continuation of Spanish sovereignty, but
should a change in power occur, the option most favorable to their interests
would be an American administration in the Philippines. Therefore London did
not fear the rise of an American empire in this region, but rather, expected to
obtain a potential ally to help strengthen Britain’s regional posture in Asia and the
Pacific.
British traders in the Philippines, who communicated their views to the Foreign
Office via the Consul in Manila, showed themselves to be very much in accord with
the official line of thinking: “Vitally important secure American or British adminis-
tration entire archipelago with uniform tariffs under one central government,
deprecate any partition islands under separate governments as destructive
British interests centered in Manila.”27
This preference for stability under an American or British flag grew out of a
shared worry that their interests were tied to the free trade status quo that could be
threatened by the exclusionary trading preferences of rival European powers in the
region such as Germany, France, or Russia.28
Such a posture was perceptible from an early date. Already in a July 1898
interview between Salisbury and John Hay, when the latter was still the
American ambassador in London, the British Prime Minister informed Hay of
his government’s preference that the Americans retain the Philippines and made it
clear that Britain would be disappointed to see the United States abandon the
Philippines thereby giving Germany an opening to advance its project of seeking
new bases in the Pacific. In such a case, Salisbury warned, England would intervene
in the matter, even though it meant further complications among the European
powers.29 Britain thus left no doubt that it favored an American presence in the
Philippines, and that, for geostrategic reasons, Britain was not prepared to allow a
German settlement in an archipelago lying so close upon their ports in China and
Asia. For Britain, American retention of the Philippine archipelago seemed by far
the superior option because it promised to secure American cooperation in
defending British policies in the entire region for the foreseeable future.30 At
that time, Spain was still fighting to maintain its sovereignty over the
Philippines. Only when Manila fell in August 1898 did the Spanish government
27. TNA: FO 72/2081, Consul at Manila to FO, 20 August 1898.

28. Neale , Great Britain and United States, 99.
29. Hay to Day, 28 July 1898, cited in Neale, Great Britain and United States, 91. Hay to
McKinley, 2 August 1898, cited in Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley, 2 vols. (New
York, 1916), II:135.
30. “There was only one policy open to cabinet, and that was to favor the retention of the
Philippines by the Unites States. This would ensure the commercial policy desired in the area by
Britain; it would prevent the disposition of the islands from becoming an occasion for European
rivalry for concessions and counter-concessions; it would write finish to German ambitions in the
area; and above all it would involve the United States territorially and thus permanently, in an area
close to that in which Britain had in the past sought her diplomatic cooperation,” Neale, Great
Britain and United States, 110.
realize it would have to give up all the Spanish possessions in the Pacific. It then
began to officially negotiate with the United States the terms of peace.
Simultaneously it established secret negotiations with Germany to sell the
Spanish islands of Micronesia. In these circumstances, in the fall of 1898, it was
discussed what part of the Philippines and what part of Micronesia would remain
for each country, an issue that for several months was not clear at all.
DEPLOYMENT OF A BRITISH NAVAL SQUADRON TO THE

PHILIPPINES
In this context, when the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, the British
government sent a naval squadron from its Hong Kong base to protect the lives
and property of its subjects, and to report on everything that was taking place in the
islands. This was a normal practice among the world powers: Germany, France,
Japan, and Austria-Hungary also sent warships to Manila in 1898.31 The British
squadron was initially commanded by Edward Chichester, Senior Naval Officer at
the Philippines Islands aboard the H.M.S. Immortalité, but due to the unexpected
extension of the ship’s stay in Manila, he was replaced by other officers and other
ships.32
The officials of this squadron became privileged front-line observers of the
imperial transition from the Spaniards to the Americans. On the one hand, they
enjoyed very good reporting on what was happening in the islands. The British
consulate in Manila, established in 1844, had a long tradition of producing quality
reports owing primarily to the training of its officials who were, in the main,
competent experts on colonial matters.33 These officers were also supported by
a network of vice-consular officials spread throughout the archipelago, many of
whom were traders with a long residence in the country. On the other hand, the
British business community was well established and quite integrated into the so-
ciety of the islands. They were in constant contact with a network of local
producers and exporters, they worked through native-born Filipino agents, and
they maintained generally good relations with the colonial authorities, with re-
presentatives of other countries, as well as with the indigenous population of the
islands. As a consequence of this integration, during the war British officers were
able to maintain direct lines of communication simultaneously with officers from
31. Thomas A. Bailey, “Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay,” The American Historical
Review 45, no. 1 (October 1939): 59-81; Vı́ctor Concas y Palau, Causa instruida por la destrucción
de la Escuadra de Filipinas y entrega del Arsenal de Cavite (Madrid, 1899); Patricio Montojo, “El
Desastre de Cavite, sus causas y efectos,” La España Moderna (1909); Otto von Diederichs, “A
Statement of Events in Manila Bay, May-October 1898,” Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution (November 1914); George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy
(Annapolis, MD, 1987); Aime Ernest Motsch, The Diary of a French Officer on the War in the
Philippines, 1898 (Manila, 1994).
32. TNA: ADM 125/143, Records China Station, Vol. XXVIII, Spanish-American War and
Rebellion in Philippines.
33. Desmond C. M. Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825 (London, 1971).
Dewey’s American squadron and with troops from Emilio Aguinaldo’s Filipino
lines.
From this vantage point, the officials of the squadron prepared interesting
reports as first-hand observers of the situation in the islands, since they moved
freely throughout the archipelago and had the opportunity to observe the different
nuances of the process. What is more, their opinions took on significance since,
holding no diplomatic rank, they felt less obliged to exercise caution and neutrality,
and, unlike merchants or residents of the archipelago, they were external observers
with no immediate interests in the islands. They also possessed a good understand-
ing of the international situation and a range of different colonial experiences in
Asia.
The observer fleet’s reports betrayed a marked bias in favor of American success
in the Philippines when set against any other possible future outcome. Similarly,
when their reports tended to emphasize the strength of the Philippine cause or
point out errors that Americans were committing in the islands, they did not do so
to favor the cause of an independent Filipino government. Instead, they clearly
intended to contribute to the realization of an American protectorate, which they
considered more favorable to British regional interests. The reports sent by these
officers to London through their chain of command by way of the ranking naval
officer in Hong Kong were read in London at the Foreign Office and the Colonial
Office in just this same spirit. In short, both officers on the scene in Asia and
officials in the metropolitan government held a common view of the matter,
which was anchored in the shared purpose of finding a way to primarily benefit
British interests.
The squadron was sent merely to observe the battle with Spain, but the out-
break of war between the Americans and Filipinos, which caught these officers
unaware, meant that they remained on the islands for many more months, until the
capture of Aguinaldo in 1901. This allowed the captains in command of the squad-
ron, and the officers who served under them on the warships, to continue the tale of
what was occurring in the Philippines, and thanks to that circumstance, today we
have unique first-hand testimony that reflects in detail British impressions of the
imperial transition in the Philippines.34
UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS
In the early months of the Spanish-American War, members of the British squa-
dron, privileged front-line observers of everything that was taking place, showed
their uncertainty in regard to the future of the islands. When war broke out, they
34. TNA: ADM 125/143, Records China Station, Vol. XXVIII, Spanish-American War and
Rebellion in Philippines, Vice-Admiral Edward Seymour, GCB, Commander in Chief China
Station.
still reported that relations between the British and the Spaniards were friendly.35
At first, on the ground, they were unable to gauge the scope of the American
presence and its effect on the entire archipelago. Would the Philippines remain
under Spanish sovereignty? Would it be occupied partially or entirely by the
Americans? All were unknowns, and consequently they acted cautiously, watching
and waiting. This was so despite the fact that relations with the American fleet were
good from the outset, allowing the British to observe its operations in Cavite, the
condition of the fleets after the battle, and the arrival of American troops. After
that, they maintained a system of regular visits to Dewey and other American
authorities, through which they remained reasonably well informed of the
situation of the Americans in the islands, although not of the decisions by the
American government in regard to the ultimate destiny of the islands.36
In August 1898, when the Americans had already taken control of Manila, the
British were still wondering whether the islands would return to Spanish rule, and
their merchants, anxious to resume their activities, wrote to London inquiring
along those lines. At that time, all they knew was that there was an upcoming
conference in Paris where the answer to this crucial matter would be determined,
and for them, these questions remained open: “The English Merchants here are in
a great state of mind lest the place should revert to Spanish Rules.”37
At this point, when it appeared that there would be a change in the adminis-
tration of the islands, although they still did not know to what extent, there was a
change in the discourse about their relations with the Spaniards. British consular
correspondence prior to that time reflected that relations between the British and
the Spanish authorities in the Philippines had been correct, and at times even
cordial, intimate, and relaxed. Negotiations between them had revolved around
freedom of trade, protection of the activities of British merchants, and the fight
against taxes or excessive regulation by the colonial authorities.
However, over the course of the war against the Americans, there was a radical
change in the discourse such that, by October 1898, we can see how a commander
of the British squadron was already speaking of the “savage cruelty [of the
Spaniards] to the natives,” the “impossib[ility] for the United States to hand
back Luzon to the bloody barbarities of Spain,” and the fear regarding the
future of captive priests, due to potential repayment of “the debaucheries, rob-
beries and cruelties which they and so many of their predecessors have for many
35. “The relationship between the English Community and that of the Spaniards to be most amic-
able . . . ” TNA: ADM 125/143, H. Hardinge, Lieut. Comm. H.M.S. Rattler to Edward Chichester,
Senior Naval Officer Philippine Islands, Iloilo, 10 July 1898.
36. TNA: ADM 125/143, Lieut. Comm. H. Hardinge to Vice-Admiral Sir Edward H.
Seymour, Report of the Visit of H.M.S. Rattler to the Philippines during the preparations for
and the occupation of Manila by the United States, 1 September 1898.
37. TNA: ADM 125/143, Edward Chichester to Commodore Swinton C. Holland,
Commander in Chief, Hong-Kong, 26 August 1898.
generations perpetrated on the peaceful villagers.”38 This discourse aligned clearly

with the image that the Americans were spreading at that time to justify not only
their intervention, but their permanent presence in the Philippines, but broke with
the tone expressed by the British up to that point in regard to the Spanish
administration.39
PHILIPPINE SELF-GOVERNMENT?
The British at first did not appear to consider the possibility of free self-govern-
ment for the Philippines but rather saw the events taking place in the islands as
a handoff between colonial administrations. This was in spite of the fact that they
had directly observed how the Filipino rebels, which is what they called them, had
managed to reorganize life in the archipelago, restore order, and obtain the sup-
port of the citizens during the brief interregnum between one colonial regime and
the other. In this sense, the British observers repeatedly noted that in all areas
where the Spaniards had already withdrawn but where the Americans had not yet
arrived, the Filipinos had resumed life with absolute normality. This situation was
noted first in Manila:
Trade is being carried on Manila and several ships were in the Bay loading and
unloading. In the country, the native life appears to be going its usual course,
the inhabitants have settled down peaceably under a Government of their own
people, to whom they willing pay customs, duties and other taxes.40
A similar report was made later in regard to Cebu, where British observers found
“absolute Law and Order was being maintained by [the rebels], so much so that
there was no panic or mistrust whatsoever among the European Community.
Peace and quietness prevailing generally.”41 And another example in the same
sense referred to Iloilo: “[Everything] has been most orderly and quiet at this
port. The British merchants, who evidently at that time were suffering from
slight nervous debility and left their homes in consequence, have now all returned
and business is now practically proceeding quite in the ordinary course of events as
before.”42
38. TNA: ADM 125/143. H. Lampton, Captain H.M.S. Powerful to E. H. Seymour, 19

October 1898.
39. Mark D. Van Ells, “Assuming the White Man’s Burden: The Seizure of the Philippines,
1899-1902,” Philippine Studies 43, no. 4 (1995): 607-622; Marı́a-Dolores Elizalde, “Imperial
Transition in the Philippines: The Making of a Colonial Discourse about the Spanish Rule,” in
Endless Empire: Spain’s Retreat, Europe’s Eclipse, America’s Decline, eds. Alfred McCoy, Josep M.
Fradera, and Stephen Jacobsen (Madison, WI, 2012), 148-160.
40. TNA: ADM 125/143, Vice Admiral C. H. Seymour, H.M.S. Centurion at Hong Kong to
Admiralty, 11 February 1899.
41. TNA: ADM 125/143, A. Hardinge, Captain H.M.S. Rattler to Robert A. J. Montgomerie,
C.B., Senior Office, Philippine Islands, Captain H.M.S. Bonaventure, Cebu, 11 January 1899.
42. TNA: ADM 125/143. H. Hardinge, Captain H.M.S. Rattler to Robert A. J. Montgomerie,
C.B., Senior Office, Philippine Islands, Captain H.M.S. Bonaventure, Iloilo, 19 January 1899.
However, the ease and naturalness that the Filipinos had shown in assuming
the government of their own people and the resolution of the affairs of the islands
did not lead the British to consider the advantages of that system or the possibility
of full independence for the Philippines. On the contrary, after the Spanish-
American War, the British were clearly leaning towards the option of an
American protectorate in the Philippines.43
In those early days, probably as a consequence of the strategic needs of the
moment, and also as a product of imperial ideology, the maximum degree of
independence for the Filipinos that the British considered was the Philippines as
part of an American protectorate. They thought that if the United States first
recognized the independent state recently declared by Aguinaldo, left internal
matters in the hands of the Filipinos, and emphasized the temporary nature of
the situation, there would be no significant resistance in the Philippines to the pro-
tectorate. They even expected that the Filipinos would agree to discuss the terms of
an American protectorate, provided that the United States first recognize them as
an independent state.44
This political formula, they believed, would probably not be universally
accepted, and the rebels would probably resist, but the solution proposed by the
Americans would ultimately be imposed without significant altercations. The
Filipinos would accept a protectorate by the United States, along the sea coasts,
or of the islands generally, including the occupation of Manila and various other
ports, provided they left the islands to govern themselves internally with the under-
standing that this protectorate was for a term of years, to be renewed or terminated
according to circumstances.45
In this initial phase, the British showed their failure to understand the serious-
ness and commitment of the fight undertaken by the Filipinos for their own in-
dependence, and in some cases showed a lack of respect towards Filipino
aspirations.46 At that time, the British believed that the Filipinos would be
unable to take Manila, a walled city that was perfectly prepared for self-defense.
At the same time, they also considered that the Americans would not give up the
positions that they had occupied in the islands. In that situation, the British
43. The confidence in the upcoming imposition of U.S. government of the islands reached the
point that they did not want to leave a British ship in the port of Cebu so that when the Americans
arrived to take possession of the island, which they were sure would happen, they would not find a
British flag waving there, which could be uncomfortable for all those involved. TNA: ADM 125/
143, A. Hardinge, Captain H.M.S. Rattler to Robert A. J. Montgomerie, C.B., Senior Office,
Philippine Islands, Captain H.M.S. Bonaventure, Cebu, 11 January 1899.
44. TNA: ADM 125/143, Report of R. A. J. Montgomerie, captain of the H.M.S. Bonaventure
to E. H. Seymour, 14 January 1899.
46. “Probably the simplest solution will be for the Americans to raise native regiments offer
them a smart uniform and a band. Filipinos are extremely musical. And Aguinaldo’s troops will
melt away to serve the Stars and Stripes,” TNA: ADM 125/143, H. Lampton, Captain H.M.S.
Powerful to E. H. Seymour, 19 October 1898.
expected that the imposition of an American protectorate would be a quick pro-

cess. They thought that the transitional nature of the situation needed to be quickly
resolved because the divisions between the civil and the military sectors of the
Filipino rebels threatened to become a troubling destabilizing factor.
They were also afraid that another power would take advantage of the uncer-
tainty and the periods of impasse to intervene at some point in the islands far from
Manila, an eventuality they considered to be totally against their interests and one
that Great Britain should avoid. On this point, the British government and its
representatives in the islands were both in agreement: “Some of the islands, in part
at least, would probably fall into the hands of other powers which it is I think most
important for British interest to avoid.”47
THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN RULE
From those positions, they showed their desire to see the American protectorate
established as soon as possible, so that order could be restored and they could
return to business. In the midst of the transfer of sovereignty that took place on the
cusp between those two centuries, what the British wanted in the islands was peace,
order, trade, profit, and a guarantee of their lives, possessions, and activities. They
thought that all of that would be easier to achieve under a tutelary American
government overseeing the development of the Philippines for an unspecified
number of years.
However, over time, the actions of the Americans led the British to express
increasingly critical opinions in regard to the future of the islands, and the way in
which the transfer of powers and the handover in the administration was being
carried out. In their opinion, the Americans should have acted quickly and firmly in
the summer of 1898, leaving no room for vacillation or uncertainty. They warned
that the longer they waited to act and impose the desired form of government, the
more anti-American sentiment would spread in the Philippines. They worried that
the Americans were opening the door to a generalized uprising by the Filipinos,
which, in their opinion, should not be permitted. And they observed that if the
Americans wanted to govern the archipelago, they should not allow themselves to
get into a war against the Filipinos: “The longer the delay, the less willing will the
Filipinos be to acknowledge the United States claim even at Manila, as they regard
the delay as a sign of weakness.”48
In the opinion of the British, what the Americans had to do was convince the
Filipinos that they had come to the islands to free the inhabitants from the yoke of
the Spaniards, and present themselves as liberators who were going to establish a
temporary protectorate, while they prepared the Filipinos for self-government.
They should emphasize, furthermore, a plan to integrate the Philippines into an
American Commonwealth, which would be highly beneficial to their interests. But

to do this, it was essential to avoid a war with the Filipinos, because, as the British
quite bluntly expressed it, killing them was not the best way to gain their
acceptance.49
FILIPINO RESISTANCE
The outbreak and later development of that unwanted war between the Americans
and Filipinos changed opinions.50 By February and March 1899, the British
acknowledged that they had underestimated the Filipinos and overestimated
American finesse:
The English in Manila have not diagnosed the feeling and power of resistance
of the Filipinos correctly, the Americans, by their dilatoriness and I must
confess lack of statesmanship and failure to satisfy the hopes held to them by
some of the United States Consuls, have made the Filipinos thoroughly distrust
them and they have no faith in their word which is the most difficult problem
the Americans have to overcome.51
The British noted that as time went on and the string of battles grew longer, strong
anti-American sentiment had spread throughout the islands. They also thought
that the Filipinos had lost respect for the Americans due to the lack of clarity and
firmness of the actions of the Americans, which could perhaps be justified due to
political reasons, out of fear of being presented as cruel governors, when upon
arriving in the islands they had come as liberators of the people. The spread of the
uprisings had turned the entire population against the Americans: “Practically the
whole population against the Americans. Those friendly to them cannot be many
in number now and are, by the fear of having their throats cut, obliged to range
themselves against the Americans.”52
As the months passed without a solution to the conflict, the British began to
see increasing difficulties facing the attempt to Americanize the islands. On one
hand, they warned that in spite of the battles won, the United States had only two
49. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus to Commander in Chief H.
M. Ships in China, Manila, 15 February 1899.
50. U.S. War Department, Office of Adjutant General, Correspondence Relating the War with
Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the Same. Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the
China Relief Expedition, between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders in the
United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China and the Philippines, from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902
(Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1902, 2 vols.); U.S. Congress. Senate.
Communications between the Executive Department of the Government and Aguinaldo or Other
Persons Undertaking to Represent the People in Arms against the United States in the Philippine
Islands, Together with Other Official Documents Relating to the Philippine Islands, 56th Cong., 1st
Sess., Senate doc. 208 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1900).
51. TNA: ADM 125/143, Captain King Hall to Commander Chief in China, 18 March 1899.
M. Ships in China, Manila, 9 February 1899. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S.
Narcissus to Commander in Chief H. M. Ships in China, Manila, 23 February 1899.
strong points, Manila and Cavite, but the rest of the territory was controlled by the
Filipino forces.53 On the other, they noted that American soldiers were averse to
the fighting that had broken out in the Philippines; they thought that they had been
sent to the islands to free the natives from Spanish rule, not to fight against them.
Reluctance to engage in an imperial war of conquest was also widespread in the
United States, complicating American actions in the Philippines: “Before taking
any active measures, this feeling, which also exists in the United States, would have
to be considered and it may account for the apparent vacillation on the part of the
United States authorities.”54
If the Americans ultimately decided to take up the burden of establishing a
colony in the Philippines, British observers expected they would face a prolonged
and determined guerrilla resistance. Ultimately, it was thought, both nationalities
would reach an agreement, especially when food became scarce.55
On that long road to pacification, the British made a distinction between the
different situations in the various regions of the archipelago. They indicated
that Luzon was the most conflicted territory. Despite being the area where the
Americans had become strongest, it was, at the same time, the main stage of
the Filipino resistance, where the bloodiest battles were being fought. The
Visayas were a world apart. The British had witnessed the reorganization of the
Filipinos following Spain’s withdrawal, and how things, in the absence of any
foreign occupation, were developing with complete normality. As they were well
acquainted with the Visayan world due to their long-standing presence in the
islands, and the establishment of profitable commercial houses there, some of
which had been in operation for almost fifty years, they expected no resistance
to the arrival of the Americans. They were therefore surprised that a state of war
had broken out between the Americans and Visayans. They were, furthermore,
uneasy about the shelling of Iloilo by the Americans, and were taken unaware by
the fierce resistance by the islanders:
The Visayas Islands of Negros, Cebu and Panay will submit at any rate to a
more or less extent very shortly especially as the influence of the sugar planters,
etc, is on the side of the Americans for the sake of peace and profit . . . Iloilo was
bombarded on the morning of the 11th instants, 24 hours before the time
notified on account of which Lieutenant and Commander Cooper and the
German Consul sent in a protest of which I have approved though I am of
M. Ships in China, Manila, 9 February 1899.
opinion that under the circumstances the conduct of the Americans was quite
justifiable and in the end conduced to less loss of property ...56
Believing the Americans did not understand the character of the Visayans,
British observers criticized the Americans for failing to recognize racial differ-
ences. Americans were treating them as if they were natives from Luzon, when
the two races, the Tagalogs and Visayans, were entirely different in terms of
language, characteristics, and temperament. In their opinion, the Visayans were
innocent, docile, and inoffensive people, who would be tractable if handled
nicely.57
They also emphasized that Mindanao and Zamboanga were very different
worlds that posed an especially difficult situation for the Americans, which
meant that the area might possibly be partitioned off from the rest of the archi-
pelago, as it always had been, in essence: “The other Islands, Mindanao, etc. will be
left severely alone for the present. The Spaniard had very little hold over them in
any way and are still garrisoning Zamboanga and other places there they remain
until the Treaty is signed.”58
BRITISH INTERCESSION
In the face of the military impasse in the islands, the British decided to intercede
with the Filipinos, mediating in favor of the Americans and depicting them as
liberators, guarantors of order, and conductors towards progress and political
maturity, which, in the long term, would lead the Filipinos to self-government.59
The Filipinos listened out of respect, and perhaps even due to the sympathy that
56. Both quotes, respectively, in TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S.
Narcissus, to Commander in Chief H. M. Ships in China, Manila, 8 March 1899; TNA: ADM
125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus to Commander in Chief H. M. Ships in China,
Manila, 15 February 1899.
57. TNA: ADM 125/143, Lieut.Com. Cowper, Captain H.M.S. Glover, to Vice Admiral
Seymour, Iloilo, 8 March 1899.
58. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to Commander in Chief
H. M. Ships in China, Manila, 8 March 1899.
59. “Both Rear Admiral Dewey and Mayor General Otis have been most courteous and
friendly in every way and are aware that if I can be of any service as between the Americans and
Filipinos I am at their disposal.” TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to
Commander in Chief H. M. Ships in China, Manila, 9 February 1899. “I have considered at my
duty in the cause of humanity for the sake of the pacification of the Islands and the safeguards of
British interests to cause the ships under my orders to visit many of these places and inform the
Filipino authorities on the authority of Admiral Dewey that as long as they take no hostile action
his ships will not do so and that he is anxious for their welfare.” TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King
Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to Commander in Chief H. M. Ships in China, Manila, 8 March
1899.
they professed towards the British, but always aware that they supported the
American cause and not their own:60
The Filipinos suspected them [the British residents] of being in sympathy with
the Americans . . . The Malolos Government still has a wholesome respect for
the British Government but say they know if any European complications break
out with reference to the Islands, Great Britain will side with the United States.61
As they travelled through the islands amidst the battles between the Filipinos and
the Americans, the British became privileged observers of the situation. They were
probably the only ones that at that time had open access to all roads, admission
to the heart of the American decisions and strategies, as well as a direct line to the
Filipino authorities. In addition to a powerful naval squadron capable of recon-
noitering all of the islands and making repeated inspection trips, they had the best
informants, thanks to the agents of the British companies who had been living in
the islands for twenty or thirty years and had an in-depth understanding of the land
and its inhabitants. With all doors open to them, they took advantage of the
opportunity to meet with the Filipino authorities on different islands, to meet
with military leaders, to maintain correspondence with Aguinaldo, and to visit
the most remote towns and see how the different social strata were handling the
situation. This led them to reconsider and prepare a new analysis of the situation.62
Their renewed understanding of the local situation caused them to reevaluate
the position of the Filipinos, recognize their commitment to the fight for inde-
pendence, their unwavering political aspirations, and the importance of the sup-
port that they enjoyed throughout the country. This in turn led them to prepare
new forecasts for the future and new recommendations for the Americans. They
still believed a supreme American government was the best option, but they had
realized that the Filipinos would have to occupy a central role at the heart of the
internal government of the islands within that administration. For this reason they
suggested that the Americans take a series of measures into account. First, after
60. “The Englishmen, I think, are quite safe at these ports as the [Filipino] authorities recog-
nize the disadvantage of trouble with Great Britain and always found them quite courteous and
anxious to treat Englishmen with a proper consideration.” TNA: ADM 125/143, Report on the
Hemp Ports of the Philippine Islands, Lieutenant Commander J. G. Amslirng?, Captain H.M.S.
Peacock, to G. A. Callaham, Senior Officer, Manila, 26 August 1899. Forwarded to the Commander
in Chief China.
61. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to Commander Chief
H. M. Ships China, 18 March 1899.
62. For example, in March 1899, the British decided to send a ship to the Port of Sual in order
to protect British citizens and to take on any who wished to leave. They wrote to Aguinaldo in the
most official manner, addressing him as his Excellency general, and asking him to order his officers
to provide them with all necessary assistance. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S.
Narcissus, to his Excellency General Aguinaldo, 18 March 1899. Other examples: “I wrote an
official and also a private letter to General Aguinaldo” and “He (Mr. Higgins, manager of the
Manila Railway) was ready and desirous to go to Malolos and hear the Filipino side of the ques-
tion ...” Both in TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to Commander
Chief HM Ships China, 18 March 1899.
their first military success, the Americans should immediately open negotiations
with the Filipinos in order to end the war. Second, the power and resources of the
Filipinos were significantly greater than what the Americans had estimated. Third,
the population of the islands could only be reconciled to an American presence
through a Filipino government. Fourth, while there was dissention among the
Filipinos, they were united against the Americans. Fifth, for all of these reasons,
it was considered essential to keep the central government established by the
Filipinos intact. Sixth, it was also important that they take into account that
although Aguinaldo was all-powerful among the people, Mabini was the inspira-
tional force behind the Filipino independence movement. And seventh, only if the
Americans took these aspects into account could they attempt to build a peaceful
government that was accepted by the people.63
Along these same lines, the British felt that it would be essential to keep the
Malolos government in place to maintain order in the islands, because without that
strong central power, they feared that anarchy could spread: “The Narcissus was sent
to Dagupan to bring away British subjects, as it was feared that if Malolos, the seat of
the Filipino Government, were taken, they might be in some danger, as a state of
anarchy would then probably prevail for some time in the Island (Luzon) . . . I agree
with Captain King Hall that it is desirable that the Government at Malolos should
not be broken up, inasmuch as it would leave no head to deal with, although the
capture of the place would discourage the natives.”64
It is interesting to observe, at this point, how the British adopted a policy in the
Philippines that was different from the one that they had applied in India. While in
1898 they had recommended that the Americans seek the complicity of the Filipinos
in the exercise of the government, they did want to achieve a social base that was
sufficient to guarantee governability, in 1857, after the Great Mutiny in India, the
British opted to distance themselves from the local population and reaffirm their own
powers, standards, customs, and spaces in relation to the inhabitants of the country.65
AND ULTIMATELY, PEACE AND ORDER ABOVE ALL
As the months passed, the British in the Philippines revealed their concern in
regard to the dissent between the Filipino civilians and the military, and between
63. TNA: ADM 125/143, G. King Hall, Captain H.M.S. Narcissus, to Commander Chief H.
M. Ships in China, 18 March 1899.
64. TNA: ADM 125/143, Report submitted to Admiralty for information, Vice Admiral
Seymour, 23 March 1899.
65. Christopher Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1988);
Christopher Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the
Making of Modern India (New Delhi, 1998); Christopher Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought
in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge, 2011); Teresa Segura, “La configuración d’una
societat colonial. La comunitat angloı́ndia a Smila, 1870-1890” (PhD. diss., Universitat Pompeu
Fabra, 2008); Manu Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres: Princes, Education and Empire in Colonial India.
(New Delhi, 2003); Antoinette Burton, At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter
in Late-Victorian Britain (Berkeley, CA, 1998); Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents
and the Residency System, 1764-1858 (New Delhi, 1998).
the different races in the archipelago. They attributed to the Tagalogs the most
combative role against the Americans, in contrast to the more peaceful character of
the other groups, drew distinctions among the islands and population groups, and
made a clear exception of the islands to the south.66
In this context, British officers thought that the confrontation between different
Filipino factions could be resolved by American intervention. They felt that the
Americans would ensure greater governmental stability, isolating the more
extremist Filipino factions, and also that a foreign regime would therefore better
serve British interests. However, as time went by, their confidence in the abilities
of the Americans waned. After many months of war with no signs of improvement
in the situation, in April 1900 the British assumed that the United States no longer
had much interest in the islands. There were different reasons behind this supposi-
tion: the Americans did not have enough troops to make significant progress;
the political parties in the United States did not support an expanded war with
the Filipinos; and the economic interests of the islands were mostly in British
hands. In that situation, they wondered whether the Americans were really interes-
ted in maintaining the war effort or whether, on the other hand, they had reached
the point at which they considered it more reasonable to withdraw.
British officers still believed Filipinos would be able to manage their own in-
ternal affairs under a paternal American government. Until this ideal was realized,
though, the material prosperity of the islands was being seriously impaired. At the
same time, the Americans lacked sufficient troops to make serious headway. Even if
sufficient troops had been available, there were parties in the United States who
objected to the coercion of the Filipinos. For many Americans it was difficult to see
where the Americans interests came in considering that American forces then held
only a small portion of the islands, and that by far the greatest part of the com-
mercial interests was in the hands of British merchants.
66. “The natives are quiet and wish for peace, but a number of Tagalos have been sent to
several of the places visited with the evident intention of inciting the natives to resist the United
States forces and to do duty as a sort of garrison.” TNA: ADM 125/143, Percy S. St. John, Captain
of H.M.S. Peacock, to Federich W. Ficher, Senior Officer, 20 June 1899.
British officers also explained that “on the S.E. coast of Luzon the civilians are quiet and wish for
peace, but the military, most of whom are Tagallos, are making a lot of money out of the duties on
hemp, and also, in some of the ports, by robbing the civilians, and they wish to carry on the state of
war as long as possible. Although there is a general feeling of hatred for the Americans, the
civilians, for the most part, are willing to submit to them, as they want some superior power to
keep the Tagallos in order. The military, on the contrary, intent to resist the Americans, and if the
sea ports were bombarded would raised to the hills and carry on a guerrilla warfare . . . In Samar
and Leyte does not seem to be the same bad feeling between the military and civilians and the
former say that, though at first they were willing to be governed by a foreign power, now they will
have nothing less than complete independence and they are willing to fight for it, although they
quite recognize the fact that they can do nothing against men of war . . . Things are fairly quiet at
Iloilo but there is constant firing between the Philippine and American lines . . . At Cebu there is no
fighting at all with the exception of an occasional raid from a small band of brigands in the hills.”
TNA: ADM 125/143, Report on the Hemp Ports of the Philippine Islands, Lieutenant
Commander J. G. Amslirng?, Captain H.M.S. “Peacock,” to G. A. Callaham, Senior Officer,
Manila. Forwarded to the Commander in Chief in China, 26 August 1899.
In fact, British officers had seen some severe articles in the American papers
criticizing the non-appearance of American capital in these islands. But that matter
was easily explained. Americans went to war with Spain, the British believed, at the
instigations of the sugar and tobacco trusts, and some military and politic sectors,
for the acquisition of Cuba not the Philippine Islands, and they only took these
islands because they were practically forced into it by German interference, and, of
the very many Americans they had spoken to on the subject, there was not one who
did not regret the step. Besides this, there were powerful parties who would have
yet been glad to give them up. They could not give them to the Spaniards, and
would not give them to the Germans. And thus it was that they were stuck with a
veritable white elephant on their hands. Under these circumstances, it was no
wonder that American capitalists would not invest their money in the
Philippines, where once there was a good and secure government there was
much money to be made, especially in wood, a source of wealth which was, as
yet, practically untapped.67
Although its prospects were clouded, the new colony was not without economic
potential. The commanders of the British Naval forces pointed out that the
economy of the archipelago, once full of promise and vigorous expansion in the
preceding decades, was in a state of abandonment. They also observed the conse-
quences of the blockade imposed on the islands, with food running short, while the
Filipinos continued to receive weapons and supplies.68 In this situation, the British
felt that hunger, disorder, internal squabbling, looting, the pressure of armed
patrols, and the dismantling of the economy, would, in the short term, cause
specific sectors to desire the restoration of peace and order above all. They believed
that the Americans should take advantage of this situation to secure their position
in the islands, if in fact they ultimately intended to remain there. Yet they under-
stood that, at that point, in order to do so, they would unavoidably have to grant
the Filipinos a much more important role in the governing of the island than they
had initially planned, at a time when Americans were still wont to speak of Filipinos
as children in need of education and the throwing of a triumphal parade before
imposing an American protectorate. Much had changed in the intervening
months, yet, in the end, the British believed that for the Philippine people the
revolution and war would not have been in vain.
67. TNA: ADM 125/143, Letter no. 34, State of the Philippine Islands, Captain Senior Office,
Philippine Islands, 26 April 1900.
68. “Rice is getting very scarce around these ports and it is doubtful if it will last for another
month; this only affects, or will affect, the civilian class, who instead of resisting the Americans
would be only too pleased to get any efficient government to look after their interests. When this
rice gives out and the natives begin to feel the pangs of hunger there is no knowing what will be the
results.” TNA: ADM 125/143, Further Report on the conditions of the Hemp Ports of the
Philippine Islands, Lieutenant Commander J. G. Amslirng?, Captain H.M.S. Peacock, to G. A.
Callaham, Senior Officer, Manila, Cebu, 3 October 1899.
CONCLUSIONS
We can therefore conclude after reading these reports that the British saw the
entire period of 1898-1903 as a time of transfer between two colonial administra-
tions, and not as a fight for the liberation of the Filipinos.69 They immediately
forgot their earlier complicity with the Spaniards in the Philippines, and greeted
the American presence with open arms, supporting the idea of a U.S. protectorate.
In the process of the Filipino-American War, there was a reassessment of the fight
of the Filipinos for their independence and their capability to govern their country:
the attitude of the Filipinos during the war with the Americans and the way in
which they governed their communities during the years of fighting changed the
British perception of the Filipinos for the better. However, more than any other
consideration, on the ground Britain’s true concern was the restoration of order;
defense of the interests, activities, and property of its citizens; and the adoption of
new trade and customs regulations that were favorable to their interests. And they
trusted the Americans more than Aguinaldo’s government to accomplish this.
They valued pragmatism above all. With the same pragmatism that had guided
their actions in the islands since 1844, the British were seeking trade, investment,
economic profit, geo-strategic balance, and defense of their interests in Asia and
the Pacific. All matters were at the service of these priority interests. Finally, it is
also important to note the growing respect that they felt for the Filipinos’ struggle
for independence, a fight that won their admiration, even though they considered
it preferable to subject it to a new colonial regime that would lead, after a “reasona-
ble” time, to the country’s ambition for self-government. In the service of this goal
British observers preferred to characterize the Filipinos as immature, in order to
better guarantee their own interests in the area, which, they reasoned, would be
more easily attained under American rule than with an unpredictable independent
government. Britain’s calculations were also influenced by the effect that this
matter could have on the independence movements that were already taking
root in Asia under British rule. It was therefore preferable to quell the nationalist
desires of the colonized peoples and thus gain the support of the United States for
its plans in this area.
69. The last document in the record states: “Excellency, I have the honor to report that the
insurgent General Aguinaldo has this morning been brought a prisoner into Manila.” TNA: ADM
125/143, British Consul to the Admiral Commanding Fleet, Hong Kong, 28 March 1901.
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m a r ı́ a - d o l o r e s e l i z a l d e

Observing the Imperial Transition: British Naval

THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER OF A GLOBAL EMPIRE

Figure 3: Troop Training in the Philippines [Preparación de tropas en Filipinas.] Fotografı́a

THE SEARCH FOR AN ANGLO-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING AND

10. Neale, Great Britain and United States, 107-108.

Despite Prime Minister Lord Salisbury’s initial skepticism, then Colonial

BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

27. TNA: FO 72/2081, Consul at Manila to FO, 20 August 1898.

DEPLOYMENT OF A BRITISH NAVAL SQUADRON TO THE

UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS

generations perpetrated on the peaceful villagers.”38 This discourse aligned clearly

38. TNA: ADM 125/143. H. Lampton, Captain H.M.S. Powerful to E. H. Seymour, 19

expected that the imposition of an American protectorate would be a quick pro-

THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN RULE

American Commonwealth, which would be highly beneficial to their interests. But

AND ULTIMATELY, PEACE AND ORDER ABOVE ALL

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