Adriano, Ernesto III B.

Procedure for the application for replevin

ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO and KAREN T. GO

G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009

Facts:

A lease agreement with option to purchase entered into by and between Respondent and
petitioner whereby the latter delivered unto the former six (6) post-dated checks. As the said checks were
dishonored upon presentment, Respondent KarenT. Go filed two complaints for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of
replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. Petitioner maintains that the
complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of
the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.

Issue:

Whether or not prior demand is required for the issuance of writ of replevin.

Ruling:

Demand is not required prior to filing of replevin action. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that
the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which
states: The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows
the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party,
alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief; (c)
That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and (d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as
stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in
the action. Nothing in these provisions requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of
the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition
precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Procedure for the application for replevin

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA

G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008

Facts:

Astorga was employed by respondent Smart Communications as District Sales Manager and
enjoyed various benefits including a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00. In February 1998, SMART
launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. The realignment resulted to
Astorga’s termination on ground of redundancy. Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal.
Meanwhile, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the
Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the
same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus
prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin Astorga moved to dismiss on the ground that the regular
courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising
from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in
regular courts. Astorga’s motion to dismiss the replevin case was denied. Her subsequent MR was denied
as well. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA. Granting the petition and,
consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA held that the case is intertwined with Astorga’s
complaint for illegal dismissal On the other hand, the illegal dismissal case was decided by NLRC in
favor of SMART

Issue:

Whether or not regular courts has jurisdiction to grant an application for replevin over a vehicle
issued to an employee pursuant to an employment car plan benefit.

Ruling:

The answer is in the affirmative. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed
jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss.
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the
car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than
employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Procedure for the application for replevin

WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY, Petitioner vs.ALVIN TOMLIN, Respondent

G.R. No. 205998 April 24, 2017

Facts:

In July, 2011, petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (RTC) a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin5 against Frankie Domanog
Ong (Ong), Chris Centeno (Centeno), John Co Chua (Chua), and herein respondent Alvin Tomlin. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 and assigned to RTC Branch 224.

In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover with Plate
Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from alberto Lopez III (Lopez) on July 22, 2009; that in 2010, he
entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a second-hand car sales showroom
("Motortrend" in Katipunan, Quezon City), after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer
therefor; that Ong failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner
later found out that the vehicle had been transferred to Chua; that in December, 2010, petitioner filed a
complaint before the Quezon City Police District's Anti-Carnapping Section; that Ong, upon learning of
the complaint, met with petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle; that Ong still failed to surrender the
vehicle; that petitioner learned that the vehicle was being transferred to respondent; and that the vehicle
was later impounded and taken into custody by the PNP-Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp Crame,
Quezon City after respondent attempted to process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to
transferring ownership thereof. Petitioner thus prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the return of the
vehicle to him, and that the defendants be ordered to pay him ₱100,000.00 atton1ey's fees and the costs of
suit.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner failed to allege all the material facts in the complaint for replevin and
affidavit of merit under sections 2 & 4, rule 60 of the revised rules of court.

Ruling

Yes, The Petition must be denied."In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly
show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,
and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same."24
"Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of personal property, to apply
for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is 'the owner of the property claimed ... or is entitled to the
possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the
possession of the property and his legal basis therefor." In Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, this Court likewise held that-It is not only the owner who can institute a replevin suit. A person
"entitled to the possession" of the property also can, as provided in the same paragraph cited by the trial
court, which reads:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. - Upon applying for such order the plaintiff must show...

(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled
to the possession thereof;
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Procedure for the application for replevin

KENNETH HAO vs. ABE C. ANDRES

A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008

Facts:

Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin while respondent is the
sheriff who implement the writ of replevin. Complainant Hao filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent and alleged the following: (1) Andres gave undue advantage to the replevin applicant
in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive
manner; (2) the day after the seizure, the seized vehicles were kept in a compound owned by the
applicant; (3) allowed applicant’s lawyer Atty. Macadangdang to get a keymaster to duplicate the
vehicles’ keys in order to take one motor vehicle; and (4) eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were
reported missing.Investigating judge found Andres guilty of serious negligence in the custody of the nine
motor vehicles.

Issue:

Whether or not a property seized pursuant to a writ of replevin may be kept in a place owned by
the applicant for purposes of safekeeping the following day immediately after the implementation of the
writ.

Ruling:

No, Section 6 of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court provides that: If within five (5) days after the
taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of
the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the
applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his
bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property
shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the
sheriff must return it to the adverse party. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited
no less than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the
bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a
counter-bond. This, he failed to do. It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles
merely for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized
should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized
property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately
after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal
justification.
Adriano, Ernesto III B. Procedure for the application for replevin

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK,
INC. G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013

Facts:

Petitioners spouses Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of
Citimotors, Inc. Thereafter the right and interest of Citimotors, Inc. in the Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage was assigned the same to respondent BPI. For failure to pay four successive installments from
May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002 despite repeated demands, respondent filed an action for Replevin and
Damages. A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized. After trial on the
merits, RTC ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount of
Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the
costs of suit. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC and argued that
respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to
the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a writ of replevin and ordering the party against
whom writ was issued to pay the applicant the value of the obligation considering that the writ was never
implemented.

Ruling:

No, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent
despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that
petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued,
commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the
alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.