documents conveying the lots to him.

In his Answer[9] Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from

the Sebes in a regular manner.
SECOND DIVISION
While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so his wife and children
substituted him.[10] Parenthetically, with defendant Veronico Sevillas death in 2006, his heirs
substituted him as respondents in this case.[11]
HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE, G.R. No. 174497
AURELIA CENSERO SEBE On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
and LYDIA SEBE, considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and
Petitioners, Present: possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of less than P20,000.00. Under the
Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, law,[12] said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed value of the property
- versus - Carpio Morales, exceeds P20,000.00,[13] otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.[14] The RTC
Nachura,* concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Brion, and of Dipolog City.
Abad, JJ.
HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration.[15] They pointed out that the RTC
TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real property when, in
RESOURCE CENTER, Promulgated: fact, it was a case for the annulment of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since
Respondents. such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the
October 12, 2009 jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and the cases of De Rivera
DECISION v. Halili[16] and Copioso v. Copioso.[17]

ABAD, J.:
This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actions involving real properties
with assessed values of less than P20,000.00.
The Facts and the Case
In this petition for review on certiorari[1] petitioners seek to reverse the Order[2] dated August 8,
2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment
of documents, reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an action where the assessed value of the properties is
less than P20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration[3] but the court denied it.[4]
On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their daughter, Lydia Sebe,
(the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City[5] a complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla
and Technology and Livelihood Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed value of P9,910.00, plus
damages.[6] On November 25, 1999 they amended their complaint[7] to address a deed of
confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevillas Answer [8] to the complaint. The Sebes
claimed that they owned the subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign
The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court there said that, since it
also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts of lease on which the opposing parties
based their rights of possession, the case had been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one
that was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, civil actions, which were incapable of pecuniary estimation, came under the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now the RTC).[18] The Sebes pointed out that, like De
Rivera, the subject of their case was incapable of pecuniary estimation since they asked the court,
not only to resolve the dispute over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the validity of the
affidavits of quitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties. [19]Thus,
the RTC should try the case.
The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the assessed value of which was
allegedly P3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that the case comprehended more than just the title
to, possession of, or any interest in the real property. It sought the annulment of contracts,
reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages. In other words, there had been a
joinder of causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently,
the case properly fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here, petitioners argued that their case
had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those involved in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had
jurisdiction over their case.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebess motion for reconsideration, pointing out that
the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.[20] Before
the Huguete, cancellation of titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions of this
nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC had
jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did not exceed P20,000.00.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the Sebess action involving the two lots valued at less
than P20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The Courts Ruling
Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by
the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law
that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.[21]
The gist of the Sebess complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40 years of two
unregistered lots[22] in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered by Tax Declaration 012-239,
with a total assessed value of P9,910.00.[23] On June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to
sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.[24] Being illiterate, they relied on Sevillas
explanation that what they signed were deeds of real estate mortgage covering a loan that they got
from him.[25] And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership
over the two lots to Sevilla for P10,000.00[26] were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any
notary public.[27] Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant Sevilla applied for [28] and obtained
free patent titles covering the two lots on September 23, 1991.[29] Subsequently, he mortgaged the
lots to defendant Technology and Livelihood Resource Center for P869,555.00.[30]
On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale covering the two
lots.[31] Upon closer examination, however, their signatures had apparently been forged. [32] The
Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making them sign such documents to confirm the sale of
the lots when defendant Sevilla already got titles to them as early as September. [33] At any rate, in
1992, defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his name.[34] Then, using force
and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants [35] and harvested that
planting seasons yield[36] of coconut and palay worth P20,000.00.[37]
Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them to hire a
lawyer[38] and incur expenses of litigation.[39] Further the Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the
years.[40] They were also entitled to moral[41] and exemplary damages.[42] They thus asked the RTC
a) to declare void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b) to
declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to them; and d) to
order defendant Sevilla to pay them P140,000.00 in lost produce from June 3, 1991 to the date of
the filing of the complaint, P30,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in attorneys
fee, P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and such amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might
fix.[43]
Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law that applies to the
action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original text
of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the
nature of the case as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the distinction between
these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the first level courts to include real actions involving property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00.[44]
The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129,[45] as amended,[46] to hear actions
involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it now covers only real
properties with assessed value in excess of P20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power
to hear actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Thus
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.
Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside
Metro Manila involved in the suit is P20,000.00 and below, as in this case, jurisdiction over the
action lies in the first level courts. Thus
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
But was the Sebess action one involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it
or one the subject of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?
The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the documents of
conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and, second, for the reconveyance of
the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded in getting. The subject of their action
is, they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action involving title to real property means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a
claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.[47] Title is the legal link between (1) a person
who owns property and (2) the property itself.[48]
Title is different from a certificate of title which is the document of ownership under
the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of
Deeds.[49] While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the
evidence of such claim.
Another way of looking at it is that, while title gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a
certificate of title, the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the
real property. The issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than
what he actually has in law.[50] Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation or nullification of a
certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendants lack of title to real
property. Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed and
later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to
another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.[51]
Nestled between what distinguishes a title from a certificate of title is the present controversy
between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of them has valid title to the two lots and would
thus be legally entitled to the certificates of title covering them?
The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred ownership of the
same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained with them untouched throughout the years,
excepting only that in 1991 they constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevillas
favor. The Sebes alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them
into signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan
that they got from him.
Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of ownership over the
two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidence of ownership or certificates of title
covering the same and, second, to possess and enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued
to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and their
corresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners.[52]
The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the documents or the
reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two lots. These would merely
follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of which between the contending
parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also entitled to their possession. Based on the
pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their
property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage
to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is
the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of
such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00. Clearly, this amount
does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages
that the Sebes claim are merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the
computation of the jurisdictional amount.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order dated August 8, 2006,
of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208232 March 10, 2014
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, namely: EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA and ZOEY G.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO LINDO and WELHILMINA LINDO; and HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN, namely: MA.
LOURDES DAQUIGAN, IMELDA CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN and CORSINO
DAQUIGAN, REBECCA QUIAMCO and ANDRES QUIAMCO, ROMULO LORICA and DELIA LORICA,
GEORGE CAJES and LAURA CAJES, MELIDA BANEZ and FRANCISCO BANEZ, MELANIE GOFREDO,
GERV ACIO CAJES and ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO SEGOVIA and VERGINIA SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM,
PEDRO M. SAM and LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ and MINA MENDEZ, HELEN M. BURTON and
LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO and BIENVENIDA JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN, LEO MA
TIGA and ALICIA MATIGA, FLORENCIO ACEDO JR., and LYLA VALERIO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the April 25, 2013 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 as well as its Order of July 3, 2013 denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land
located in Poblacion, Lupon, Davao Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
(1572) P-6144. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months later, OCT No.
(1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the
vendees.1
Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental, docketed as Civil Case No. 1798,2
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise
known as the "Public Land Act," which reads:
SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as
defenses.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner
Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).
Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty
square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and
withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the
RTC in its Decision dated January 27, 2011, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, a DECISION is hereby rendered based on the above-quoted Compromise Agreement
and the parties are enjoined to strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the same.
SO ORDERED.3
Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss4 dated February 4, 2013, alleging that the
complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, they asserted
that the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five hundred pesos (PhP
16,500), and the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its assessed
value. Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed
value is more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question
since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional
ceiling.
RTC Ruling5
Acting on the motion, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of
the subject property exceeds 20 thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was
that the total and full refund of the purchase price of the property is PhP 16,500. This omission
was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that in real actions, jurisdictional
amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction
over the case.
With respect to the belated filing of the motion, the RTC, citing Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v.
Kemper Insurance Company,6 held that a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction may be filed at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Repurchase, Consignation, with Preliminary Injunction and
Damages is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.7
Assignment of Errors
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now seek recourse before this
Court with the following assigned errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN ADMITTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED
FEBRUARY 4, 2013, BELATEDLY FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CASE.
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE FOR
REPURCHASE IS A REAL ACTION.8
The Issue
Stated differently, the issue for the Court’s resolution is: whether or not the RTC erred in granting
the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Arguments
Petitioners argue that respondents belatedly filed their Motion to Dismiss and are now estopped
from seeking the dismissal of the case, it having been filed nine (9) years after the filing of the
complaint and after they have actively participated in the proceedings. Additionally, they allege
that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it
being founded on privity of contract between the parties. According to petitioners, what they seek
is the enforcement of their right to repurchase the subject property under Section 119 of CA 141.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that since the land is no longer devoted to agriculture, the
right of repurchase under said law can no longer be availed of, citing Santana v. Mariñas.9
Furthermore, they suggest that petitioners intend to resell the property for a higher profit, thus,
the attempt to repurchase. This, according to respondents, goes against the policy and is not in
keeping with the spirit of CA 141 which is the preservation of the land gratuitously given to
patentees by the State as a reward for their labor in cultivating the property. Also, the Deed of
Absolute Sale presented in evidence by Bautista was unilaterally executed by him and was not
signed by respondents. Lastly, respondents argue that repurchase is a real action capable of
pecuniary estimation.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129,
which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.―Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which
provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases.―Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.
The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of
real property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R.
Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a
free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.10 In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil,11
wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.12
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;13
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.14
The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent.
While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to
repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant
to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of
sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract.15
Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate
contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the
parties.16 Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That is
precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot
subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly
such action, then it is akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his
action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or possession of real property or
any interests therein and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged
with the MTC. They rely on Sec. 33 of BP 129.
Republic Act No. 769117 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (PhP
20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty
thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots
he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the
RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots
by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to and an
offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA
141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right
to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus,
the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of
the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property
conformably to the express provision of CA 141.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein
which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling
price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents
that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because respondents have actually
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their position, and by
virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the
principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
In Heirs of Jose Fernando v. De Belen, it was held that the party raising defenses to the complaint,
actively participating in the proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence, and invoking
its authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court.18
Here, we note that aside from the belated filing of the motion to dismiss––it having been filed nine
(9) years from the filing of the complaint––respondents actively participated in the proceedings
through the following acts:
1. By filing their Answer and Opposition to the Prayer for Injunction19 dated September 29, 1994
whereby they even interposed counterclaims, specifically: PhP 501,000 for unpaid survey
accounts, PhP 100,000 each as litigation expenses, PhP 200,000 and PhP 3,000 per daily
appearance by way of attorney’s fees, PhP 500,000 as moral damages, PhP 100,000 by way of
exemplary damages, and costs of suit;
2. By participating in Pre-trial;
3. By moving for the postponement of their presentation of evidence;20
4. By presenting their witness;21 and
5. By submitting the compromise agreement for approval.22
Having fully participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTC’s authority by asking
for affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court.
Simply put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be,
considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the
action.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The April 25, 2013
and July 3, 2013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. (1798)-021 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon, Davao Oriental is ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-021.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002]
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, petitioner, vs. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all
surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090
which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof.
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso,
filed a complaint[2] for reconveyance of two (2) parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of
deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua,
Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-
owners of the subject property having inherited the same from their parents, and that through
fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses
Bernabe and Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed for
the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being co-owners thereof.
When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the assessed
value of the subject property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe and
Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the property was lower than P20,000.00.
The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss
holding that since the subject matter of the action was beyond pecuniary estimation it was
properly within its jurisdiction.[3] Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration was denied,[4]
hence, she filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the motions to dismiss and at the
same time maintaining her position that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the
assessed value of the property was below P20,000.00.
The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the
complaint for reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the
appellate court, hence this petition.
Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par. (3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise
known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691 which
provides -
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, that in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court
delves upon the issues of "title, possession and interests" of each of the stakeholders over the
subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and relief prayed for in the complaint
coupled with the assessed value of the disputed property place the action within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.
In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19, par. (1), of the same law which
provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation: x x x
Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of
action which include the annulment of sale and other instruments of false conveyance incapable of
pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC.
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33,
par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases
capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1),
applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that
in civil cases involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property,
jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real
property involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property
does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and
where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending
parties over the contested property the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdictional
range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the
reliefs prayed for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC.
As can be readily gleaned from the records, the complaint was for "Reconveyance and/or
Recovery of Common Properties Illegally Disposed, with Annulment of Sales and other
Instruments of False Conveyance, with Damages, and Restraining Order." Private respondents
alleged therein that they were co-owners of the property along with their deceased brother
Antonio Copioso; and that in or about 1998, with fraud and machination, Antonio together with
the spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria made it appear in a public document entitled
Pagpapatunay ng Kusang Loob na Pagbabahagi that they were the co-owners of the subject
property and had divided the same equally between themselves to the exclusion of private
respondents. Subsequently, they sold the subdivided lots to the other defendants namely Dolores
Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Private respondents also sought payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation
expenses, attorney's fees plus appearance fees amounting to more or less P286,500.00. They
likewise applied for a TRO pending the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants from further alienating the common properties. They also prayed of the trial court to
order the cancellation, annulment and/or rescission of the four (4) deeds of absolute sale made in
favor of the buyers, and to order Lolita B. Copioso and the estate of Antonio Copioso to return the
price that the buyer-defendants had paid to them for the land sold.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title
to, possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to
annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or
bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the
instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title,
ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with the issue of annulment of sale and
reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the
parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when
necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 62090 as well as its 30 July 2001 Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took
effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding
the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals'
adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme
Court along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated —
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that
it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs.
Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-
20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to
the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do
so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case
for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction
such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety
xxx
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008
LIBRADA M. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
ERNEST S. AURE1, respondent.
FACTS
Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure
Lending alleged that they acquired the subject property from a Deed of Sale.
Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have
any legal right over the subject property.
MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds. Te
MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no showing
that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
RTC affirmed.
CA reversed the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY CONCILIATION
PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT.
HELD: NO
There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of
such barangay conciliation proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lending’s Complaint before
the MeTC.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412
of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement,
so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise
acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the
defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even
during the entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing
an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they
had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long
as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the
facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the
court -- after acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence.
x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended
to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the
issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of
ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8 May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Department Of Agrarian Reform vs. Trinidad Valley Realty & Devt. Corp. et al.
G.R. No. 173386, February 11, 2014
Facts: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et al. are the registered owners of a
parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. A portion
of this land was awarded by respondent, DAR to beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Trinidad opposed this move in the RTC and alleged that: DAR committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the valuation by Land Bank is not
just compensation, the register of deeds cannot cancel their title without a court order, and that
Land Bank together with the LRA and Register of deeds committed grave abuse of discretion when
they cooperated to commit the act. In its answer, DAR asserted that jurisdiction over all matters
concerning agrarian reform exclusively belongs to DAR and that the RTC’s jurisdiction in agrarian
reform matters is limited only to the determination of just compensation and prosecution of all
criminal offenses under RA 6657. The RTC ruled in favor of Trinidad claiming that it has
jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA set aside the lower court’s decision citing that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the said case hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Held: No. In view of Section 54 of RA 6657; the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
admitting the amended petition as it did not have jurisdiction over both the petition and amended
petition filed by Trinidad et al. which clearly provides that it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case. It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter of an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the
complaint and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in
the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Section 54 of RA 6657 leaves no room for doubt
that decisions, orders, awards or rulings of the DAR may be brought to the CA by certiorari and not
with the RTC through an ordinary action for cancellation of title. The findings of fact of the DAR
shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence. The Court likewise ruled in the
similar case of DAR v. Cuenca that "[a]ll controversies on the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in
nature." Given our ruling that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the instant case, we find no
necessity to address the other issues raised in the three consolidated petitions. The petition is
denied.
William Co a.k.a. Xu Quing He vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products
G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014
Facts: New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Ms. Elizabeth Uy, filed a criminal case
against Co for his alleged violation of BP Bilang 22. Due to the non-appearance of Ms. Uy and her
counsel in the first trial, the case was provisionally dismissed. Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion
to Revive the Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49,
granted the motion and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation,
Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the criminal cases. The cases were, thereafter, raffled
to the MeTC Branch 50 of Caloocan City. Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit. Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before
the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096 which was dismissed as per
Resolution dated February 13, 2006.There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. Before the MeTC Branch 50, Co filed a "Motion for
Permanent Dismissal" on. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same
issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge
Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order granting Co’s motion. When the court subsequently denied
Uy’s motion for reconsideration, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City.
Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling
and setting aside the Orders and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the
criminal cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed
the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer
for TRO/WPI.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the criminal cases against the petitioner, on the ground of denial of
his right to speedy trial, constitutes final dismissal of these cases.
Held: No. Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should
be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. We
disagree. Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right
or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded
in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. "While the Court recognizes the
accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we
cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the
right of the accused to speedy trial." Petition is denied.
Primanila Plans, Inc. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission
G.R. No. 193791, August 02, 2014
Facts: Primanila then operated as a pre-need company and maintained a business office in Makati
City. Based on its findings, the SEC declared that Primanila committed a flagrant violation of
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code (SRC), particularly
Section 16. It also breached the New Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans,
specifically Rule Nos. 3 and 15 thereof. The SEC then issued the subject cease and desist order in
order to prevent further violations and in order to protect the interest of its plan holders and the
public. Feeling aggrieved, Primanila filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that it was denied
due process as the order was released without any prior issuance by the SEC of a notice or formal
charge that could have allowed the company to defend itself. On June 5, 2008, the SEC issued its
Order13 denying Primanila’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The cease and desist
order issued on April 9, 2008 was then made permanent. Unyielding, Primanila appealed to the CA
via a petition for review. On March 9, 2010, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition
and affirming in toto the issuances of the SEC.
Issue: Whether Primanila was given due process notwithstanding the SEC’s immediate issuance of
the cease and desist order.
Held: Yes. Contrary to its stance, Primanila was accorded due process notwithstanding the SEC’s
immediate issuance of the cease and desist order on April 9, 2008. The authority of the SEC and
the manner by which it can issue cease and desist orders are provided in Section 64 of the SRC.
The law is clear on the point that a cease and desist order may be issued by the SEC motu proprio,
it being unnecessary that it results from a verified complaint from an aggrieved party. A prior
hearing is also not required whenever the Commission finds it appropriate to issue a cease and
desist order that aims to curtail fraud or grave or irreparable injury to investors. There is good
reason for this provision, as any delay in the restraint of acts that yield such results can only
generate further injury to the public that the SEC is obliged to protect. To equally protect
individuals and corporations from baseless and improvident issuances, the authority of the SEC
under this rule is nonetheless with defined limits. A cease and desist order may only be issued by
the Commission after proper investigation or verification, and upon showing that the acts sought
to be restrained could result in injury or fraud to the investing public. Without doubt, these
requisites were duly satisfied by the SEC prior to its issuance of the subject cease and desist order.
The SEC was not mandated to allow Primanila to participate in the investigation conducted by the
Commission prior to the cease and desist order’s issuance. Given the circumstances, it was
sufficient for the satisfaction of the demands of due process that the company was amply apprised
of the results of the SEC investigation, and then given the reasonable opportunity to present its
defense. Primanila was able to do this via its motion to reconsider and lift the cease and desist
order. After the CED filed its comment on the motion, Primanila was further given the chance to
explain its side to the SEC through the filing of its reply. “Trite to state, a formal trial or hearing is
not necessary to comply with the requirements of due process. Its essence is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s position.” Petition is denied.
People of the Philippines vs. Sukarno Junaide Y Agga
G.R. No. 193856, April 21, 2014
Facts: Junaide was caught in an entrapment operation for selling illegal drugs. Subsequently, the
police brought accused Junaide to the police station where SPO1 Mirasol marked the four sachets
seized from him and turned these over to the case investigator, SPO1 Federico Lindo, Jr. The latter
then turned over the seized items to the police crime laboratory. The sachet Junaide sold was
found to contain 0.0101 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; the other sachets
contained a total of 0.0235 gram. Accused Junaide, on the other hand, testified that he was napping
at home when sounds of commotion outside his house woke him up. As he took a look, he saw
people being chased and his neighbors getting arrested. Junaide left his house a little later to fetch
his nephew from school but while waiting for the boy, two armed men alighted from a white jeep
and handcuffed him. They frisked him but found nothing. They showed him a sachet of shabu and
said that they would use it as evidence against him. Junaide later identified the two men as SPO1
Roca and SPO1 Mirasol. Two neighbors claimed that they had seen the incident and corroborated
Junaide’s story. SPO1 Roca testified that he marked the plastic sachet of shabu that he bought with
his initials "RR" but when the supposed sachet was presented to him in court for identification, it
instead carried the marking "RR-1." This may be just a mistake but he denied having made a
mistake and admitted that the "RR-1" marking could have been made by just anybody.
Issue: Whether Junaide is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Held. No. In a prosecution for the sale and possession of the prohibited drugs known as shabu, the
State does not only carry the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense. It also bears the
obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State would not have proved the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And, to prove the corpus delicti, it is indispensable for the
prosecution to show that the dangerous drugs subject of the sale and examined in the police
laboratory are the same drugs presented in court as evidence. The first stage in the chain of
custody is the marking of the seized drugs or related items. Marking is the affixing of the initials or
other identifying signs on the seized items by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer. This must
be done in the presence of the accused shortly after arrest. SPO1 Roca may have truly marked the
item of shabu he seized from accused Sukarno as "RR" which he insisted he did. Someone else,
therefore, replaced the item by another one, now marked as "RR-1." Indeed, Roca has not ruled
out the possibility that the latter marking on the shabu item presented in court may have been
made by someone else. This leads the Court to conclude that there may have been switching of
evidence in the selling charge. Guilt in that charge has not, therefore, been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.