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Ou, séance, touche de Nancy, ici (II)1
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104 Paragraph
to exist) and thus to decide (and /or not to decide). But 'to be or not to be' are
not possibilities which are present beforehand. Only existence, in that it is thrown
to the undecidability of the 'to be or not to be', decides about it as possible. (Une
pensée finie , 113, my emphasis)
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Ou, séance, touche de Nancy, ici 105
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106 Paragraph
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Ou, séance , touche de Nancy ; ici 107
It [the imperative] does not form part of 'performative' utterances which are
themselves the act they utter (and whose paradigm is 'I am speaking'). It isn't even
an utterance, Benveniste adds, since 'it does not serve to construct a proposition
having a personal verb'. 'It bears neither temporal marking nor personal reference.
It is a naked semanteme, used as a iussive form with a specific intonation' [...].
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108 Paragraph
('Orma tive' is thus not the title of a local phenomenon, that might
only be met with where the syncategoreme or surfaces in one or
another function. An or need not 'surface', explicitly used, named or
indeed thematised, in order to be effective and to determine the
structure of language or make it indeterminate. Language in general,
in so far as it is language, is categorical; it exposes decisions, which are
concerned with its possible entirety, and for the sake of this possibility,
it must infinitely suspend the decision about entirety. So language is
the condition of possibility or impossibility of a form, a law, of the
universality and universal communicability of language at all - and
both at the same time. That means however, that there is never one
ormative - ' orma tive' is as little one word and thus as little a word as are
'or', 'ou', 'o', or 'oder', for each decision opened by an 'or' is decision
for another 'or', that could mean, 'or no or', 'or without or'. The
structure of language withdraws itself therefore from every merely
conventionalist, every transcendentally normative or formative, ethic;
it requires - or means £IT£ - an eitic.)
(Once again, its speech is not oui, oui , but ou, ou, - it is not a speech
of affirmation. For in order to be affirmation, it has to be the affirmation
of affirmation and therefore the affirmation, as long as it is one, must
be in front of itself and not able to be overtaken by itself, it cannot fulfil,
perfect or perform itself, without standing back from itself and holding
back from itself, it is held apart from itself in a irreconcilable split into
'itself' and 'itself' and it can never erase, or master this distance through
which it opens its own possibility and never subsume it under the title
of 'affirmation'. The relationship of affirmation to itself - or the rela-
tionship of constitution to itself - cannot itself simply be one of
affirmation - or constitution. The gap between yes and yes cannot be
filled by any element, which itself has the structure of a yes. Affirmation
is their constitutive difference, which is a difference of open, never
ultimately resolvable distinguishing and decision, of the or and its
iteration and alteration, or it is the difference of the ormative.)
(In the word 'ormative' one also has to think of the Greek opļlTļ,
the start, launch and setting out.)
(The or in the 'word' ormative can be heard with an English as well
as with a French ear. And perhaps in addition with some others,
including a German one. (But here no language remains the same,
none is still either one or the other, none may be still called 'French'
or 'English' or 'German', for each language already listens to the others
and to the difference from itself in order to be one of the languages.)
(For language, an ear, listens to the 'or', to the 'oder' or the 'o. .r' in
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Ou, séance , touche de Nancy, ici 109
The mode of presentation of a limit in general cannot be the image in itself. The
image in itself presupposes the limit which presents it or in which it presents itself.
But the singular mode of presentation of a limit, is that this limit comes to be
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touched [...]. This is in fact the sense of the word sublimitas: what keeps itself just
under the limit, what touches it (limit being thought by height, as absolute
height). Sublime imagination touches the limit, and this touching makes it feel
'its own powerlessness' If the presentation is above all what takes place in the
order of sensible things - to present, is to make sensible - the sublime imagination
is always in the order of presentation, in that it is sensible. But this sensibility is
no longer that of the perception of a figure, and it is found, more precisely in the
feeling of itself that imagination has when it touches the limit. ( Une pensée finie ,
179; my italicizing of the ou. The ou and its touche in tout ce, toujours , trouve and
éprouve will not have gone unheard.)
The effort or the thrust is by definition a matter of limit. [. . .] The effort ceases
where the limit gives way [...]. The effort or the thrust carry the limit in themselves,
are structured by it. [. . .] What tenders itself, and tenses itself to extremes, is the
limit. [. . .] Stretched to the limit, the limit (the contour of the figure) is tensed
to breaking point, as they say, and it indeed breaks, dividing itself in that instant
into two edges, the edging of the figure, and its unlimited overflow [débord]. ( Une
pensée finie , 182)
The limit is thus limit only in that it traces itself. Its Being is trace [Zug]
but this trace is not the closed limit but its mere tracing, which does
not arrive at the limit as long as it is still this tracing of the limit - the
trace of the limit is also trace in so far as it is delay [ Verzug ] (mora). Its
delay is the limit in itself [an sich]. That means, the limit - and indeed
every limit is only itself in that it is in itself, in itself as limit, in that it
is thus alliminal , or, as Nancy writes, subliminal , it is in this sense sublime:
split from itself, it makes contact with itself as not-limit, and touches
itself thus as intact and untouchable, touches itself in its untouchability,
and thus doesn't touch itself. Distinguishing, the limit distinguishes
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Ou, séance , touche de Nancy ; ici 111
itself first from itself and is thus nothing other than the distinction, the
discretion, and in and for itself a discretum , the secretum 'in itself', 'for
itself' and 'for itself' as 'another'. (But what does 'for itself' as another
mean? How is this 'as' 'another' to be understood, if not as not simply
designating a different mode of being itself, through which the 'other'
might be assimilated to the limit, but an or: that leaves undecided,
whether it is still a question here of a 'self' or of 'another'? The limit
always lies this side or on the other side of the limit and of what it
distinguishes. The limit lies on the or.)
Nancy's sentence about the limit (or Nancy's translation of Kant's
argument about the limit) is at the same time a sentence about
presentation: it is only in transition from 'self' to 'itself' and thus
presentation of its 'own' unpresentability, its im-presentation; it is a
sentence about identity - the identity of the limit, the identity, the
limit itself lies in this, in that it traces itself first as a limit, that it
distinguishes itself from itself as an unlimited thing, and only makes
contact with itself in this distinction, and so cannot possibly touch
itself. As it can be said of the Being of the limit, that it lies in its
trace - or its delay, so it can also be said that it lies in its contact or
non-contact (detachment). Only there, where the limit touches the
limit, only there where the limit comes up against a limit and thus stops
being a simple limit, only there therefore, where contact stops being a
contact and a contact , only there does the limit trace itself, only there
is it a limit and only there will a form, a presentation, be possible at
all. But what, once again, is a contact? or a push? a touche ?
Nancy continues his considerations - or better, he picks them up
once again with an ou bien encore - and indeed, as often, they are set
off in a parenthesis:
(Or else again : the effort is to touch the limit. The limit is the effort itself, and it
is the touching. The touching is of itself the limit: the limit of images and of
words, the contact - and with it, paradoxically, the impossibility of touching which
is inscribed in touching, because it is the limit. ( Une pensée finie , 182; the
italicisation of the toucher is Nancy s)
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112 Paragraph
comes up against itself at the limit. Limit of the limit, it is its own,
another limit. It comes up against itself, but in that way only comes
up against the limit to itself; it comes up against its own untouchability.
'Le toucher est de lui-même la limite (The touching is of itself the
limit) .' This sentence has two implications which are incompatible with
each other, which Nancy formulates thus: 'Touching more than other
[senses] only takes place in touching itself' and 'Touching does not
touch itself' ( Une pensée finie, 1 83) . The touching, from which the limit
and with it, presentation proceed, can thus not take place, (it has no
place, it doesn't happen and doesn't happen in a point of space which
is already given, not in an already constituted space, but itself, contact,
pushing, la touche opens a space, opens an occurrence and opens itself
as this happening. That does not mean that there isn't this contact. It
is given, indeed, and it is indeed the contact which gives. But the
structure of this giving and giving of itself, the structure of this
opening, this contact and this push - one might say, the 'subliminal'
condition of the marking-out of the transcendental schematism - is
such, that nothing is touched through it, nothing is opened, nothing
is given; none of all of that, which, in fact, as one thinks, already has
shape, limit, form as an object present at hand. The contact, in order
to make contact, must encounter something untouchable, it must come
upon itself as something untouchable. In order to be able to present
(itself) and to give (itself) a form, the limit must come up against ('itself'
as) the unbounded, the formless and the unpresentable. It gives (itself)
what it doesn't have and what is not acceptable (for it). And this
impossible gift, this impossible taking is the pre-gift and the pre-ac-
ceptance for every possibility of a gift or taking. It is the attranscenden-
tal or 'subliminal' condition of every communication, every
presentation and every form in general, and thus of perception, of
conception, of comprehension - and is at the same time withal that
which loosens every perception, every conception and every concept,
and opens on to what has not been taken, grasped, and conceived in
them. But if the limit is thought of as closed, as a given line, as form
in its pure ideality, then it is thought of as li-myth and not in its trace,
not in its contact, not in its untouchability. Only the theorem of the
untouchability, the alliminality, or subliminali ty of the limit breaks with
the myth of givenness and the giving of forms and with the implicit
but equally powerful myth of taking and perceiving these forms. The
traditions of empiricism and formalism, of rationalism and even
phenomenology come together in this twin myth. Nancy's analytic of
the limit, of the liminal and of the sublime, which certainly draws on
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Ou, séance, touche de Nancy, ici 113
the resources of its Hegelian dialectic, but is not prepared for the
sublation of the limit in the concept, opens up 'giving' to what is not
able to be given in it, opens up taking to what is not able to be taken
in it and thus opens up onto a distance which can become neither an
object of experience nor a 'thing itself', nor the immutable form of
our perception of it across time.
The question of the possibility of form at all, and thus the question
of presentation is then answered in this way, that everything presents
itself - and its limit - at the limit. The limit can however only present
or offer 'itself' such that while it attracts 'itself' it draws 'itself' as
'another' and relates to another. The tracing of the limit is thus not, a
is said, autoreferential. It is also not referential. It is - and this is wh
it is at the same time contact and detachment - -ferential. Only
ference - and more precisely as ferance - can the tracing of the lim
be transference (that is transition into 'itself') as well as ofference (mere
offering and imminence) and therefore difference (that is taking apar
and bringing together), without reducing itself to one of these move
ments. If Nancy characterizes as offrande [offering] the structure of the
tracing of limits, and thus the structure of presentation or of form a
all, then he does it at first to stress the difference with Kant's concep
of sacrifice from which he starts in 'L'Offrande sublime' and then to
underline the trace of its unimpeachable imminence, its forthcoming,
its pre-positionality. He writes:
It should be said that the totality [. . .] is offered to the feeling of the sublime, or is
offered in the sublime, to feeling. [. . .] The offering offers, carries forward and puts
in front of (etymologically, the of-fering is not very different from the ob-ject),
but it does not install in presence. What is offered stays on a limit, suspended at
the edge of a reception, of an acceptance. [. . .] Sacrifice is inoperative there. The
imagination is not 'sacrificed', it is what it is: the open of the schema. - The
offering is sublime presentation: it withdraws or it suspends the values and powers
of the present. What takes place is not a coming-into-presence nor a gift. It is
rather one or other, or the one and the other, but given up.[. . .] It is a proposition,
and as such, expounded/ exposed. ( Une pensée finie , 185-6; my emphases of the or)5
If the drawing of the limit, the à la limite of the limit is at the same
time contact and non-contact, contact, which is still not yet making
contact, non-contact, which is still contact or is already moving into
contact, and if that is then limit, where contact and non-contact make
contact and to do not make contact, thus make contact or do not make
contact; and if then (as Nancy hints in his phrase 'L'un ou l'autre ou
l'un et l'autre' [one or the other, or one and the other]) the possibility
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114 Paragraph
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Ou, séance, touche de Nancy, ici 115
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[. . .] presence is never given, but always offered, or presented, which means, offered
to our decision to receive it or not.
And the 'here' is doubled straightaway: it is here or there. There , the there will come
at the end of the text, and it will be doubled in its turn: 'there, but beyonď. Here
or there: already the two foci of the text, already the ellipse. It is quite there. ( Une
pensée finie , 287)
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Ou, séance, touche de Nancy, ici 117
two foci, and thus first really marks the ellipse, the eclipse of the centre,
the a priori falling away of that which could determine the real place
or the real time of a here or a there. The or, the or'iginary duplicator
is an ellipse, which blows apart every unity, even before it can form
itself, which opens every circle, and makes every return impossible.
Nancy continues:
A few years later, at the end of another text [Nancy is speaking here of 'Signature,
Evénement, Contexte' from Marges] - Derrida will write that he signs 'here.
Where? There'. Here takes itself out of its own place and there perforates its own
place (in performing it). The whole of Derrida's text, all his work, is al-
tered/quenched from perforating/performing itself. He has, he is an inexhaustible
thirst, a drunken bout of extravasation, of offering himself where he isn't, of
forbidding himself where he is. (Une pensée finie , 287)
But let us take another example, and first: 'here or there'. An ellipsis of place, the
ellipsis of two foci neither of which can centre the text or localize the writing
which has been discerned [. . . ] In the 'here or there', it is the suspension, the
hesitation, the beating of the or which really count; this or which never says where
writing is. Nor when nor wherefore. 'Here or there' is without definite place, and
it is also 'sometimes, at moments from time to time' and therefore 'by chance, by
accident, fortuitous'. Writing only lets itself be discerned by chance. (Une pensée
finie , 289)
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The tension, the hesitation, the beating of the or is what counts in the
turn of phrase 'here or there'. And thus not only in this phrase, but in
every possible turn of phrase in language or in writing, in which it
tries to determine itself and its place. When the or makes entry, the here
and its now are already over with, and it only finds itself postponed,
reshaped and altered again in the there and its then. Or is the ellipse
which permits no this to remain the same. And as even the or is still
such a this , it also doesn't remain what it is. Or is its own, its
expropriating ellipse/ellipsis. In that it places itself, it loses itself - its
place and its word. Or as little as any other word is merely an element
of language; it opens language onto language, it refers from somewhere
else to language and is in this sense, speechless. A word without
language. In a language without word. It is the writing which allows
itself to be made out only through a chance , as Nancy writes with
Derrida - so only through another or. And through another again
different. Or that is the chance of language: its breakdown and its
possibility. The possibility of its ellipsis, of its eclipse. In it, our topics
and utopias are defined as ou-topian.
ÇOr. - While I was writing this, and after I have almost written it all,
I read the following passage near the end of a novel by Donald
Barthelme, entitled Paradise. It is about what three or four women,
(who are almost all called
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Ou, séance , touche de Nancy ; ici 119
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