Mi History Ah

2007 History
Advanced Higher
Finalised Marking Instructions
 Scottish Qualifications Authority 2007
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These Marking Instructions have been prepared by Examination Teams for use by SQA Appointed
Markers when marking External Course Assessments. This publication must not be reproduced for
commercial or trade purposes.
Marking Part 1: The essays
To obtain a pass, there must be some reference to historiography, even be it ever so humble. If the candidate is
unable to show that they have referred to or quoted from historians, or considered historical schools of thought,
then they are not meeting the basic requirements of the marks scheme for a pass. Full guidance on the
intention of each essay, and possible format and relevant content of candidates’ answers is given in the detailed
marking instructions for each field.
The following descriptions provide guidance on the features of essays categorised as meriting the ranking
D, C, B, A, A+ and A++. Many essays will exhibit some but not all of the features listed, others will be
stronger in one area than another. Features of a C essay may well appear in an essay which overall merits a
B or A pass. With the exception of ‘Historical interpretations’, the criteria should NOT be thought of
as hurdles, all of which must be crossed before a grade boundary is reached. Markers should reward
what the candidate has tried to argue rather than penalise what may have been omitted. Remember, a
candidate’s arguments and evidence may differ substantially from the marks scheme, but the candidate
should still be given whatever credit they deserve.
D 10-12 marks
Candidates may show that they have little understanding of what the question is really asking them to do,
or then show little more than a basic knowledge and understanding of the main features of the issue.
The structure may be weak with a disorganised presentation of the arguments.
The answer will be more narrative and description rather than analysis.
It may be very brief and arguments will look thin, un-sustained and possibly inaccurate or irrelevant.
There will be no references to the interpretations of historians, or even recognition that their study has
shaped our thinking on the issues.
The introduction and conclusion may acknowledge the question, but without development.
C 13-14 marks
A structure that may be loose but will probably include an introduction and a conclusion.
A basic attempt has been made to answer the question by providing appropriate arguments, and supporting
those arguments with relevant factual knowledge; possibly not deep or sustained.
Some reference to historical interpretations can be seen; it may be fairly formulaic or ‘bolted on’.
Reasonable clarity and accuracy.
B 15-17 marks
It is probable that some essays will achieve the B-grade mark because they are of A-grade quality in one or
two ways but fall short of it in others.
The argument will be structured coherently and will come to a suitable conclusion.
There will be an impression of thoroughness; the candidate shows a grasp of the aims of the question and
tackles it with a fairly sustained analysis.
The approach will be relevant though there may be some irrelevant paragraphs.
There will be an awareness of historians’ work and some of their views on this issue.
There will be a good degree of clarity and accuracy.
A 18-19 marks
Clearly structured.
A thorough piece of work based on a fair quantity of relevant factual evidence.
The candidate has an assured and consistent control of the arguments and issues, and sees most of the
implications of the question and tackles them relevantly.
Contains some detailed analysis of relevant issues.
Shows an awareness of historians’ work and arguments, in some cases this permeates the answer.
Written clearly with a vocabulary appropriate to the topic.
It has a conclusion that arises logically from the evidence and arguments in the main body of the essay.
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A+ 20-22 marks
A well defined structure displaying a very confident grasp of the demands of the question.
A very thorough piece of work based on wide research.
The candidate has a very assured and consistent control of all the arguments and issues, and provides a
focussed approach to the question.
Shows a sound knowledge and understanding of historians’ work and arguments.
The conclusion gives a robust overview/synthesis and a qualitative judgement of factors.
A++ 23+ marks

Notably thorough and clearly based on a wide range of accurately explained factual information.
Thinks about various possible implications of the question, going beyond the most obvious ones.
Structured so that the argument convincingly builds and develops through the essay.
Uses detailed analysis effectively to advance the argument.
Engages with current historiography, which may be wide-ranging and often permeates the answer.
Written with fluency, sophistication and clarity.
Factors which do lead to an essay failing:
1. Total misunderstanding of the title. The essay is set as a particular title, and therefore there is a
particular issue to be addressed. An essay where the candidate has missed completely the point of
the question is almost certain to fail.
Similarly, a candidate may seem to ‘turn’ a question to fit a prepared response. While some aspects
may be able to be credited, the marker must be convinced that the response adequately and actively
addresses the question set for a pass to be awarded.
In a question which contains an isolated factor, this factor must receive due attention. A response
which ignores the isolated factor must fail.
2. Extreme brevity. A very short essay of around only 2-3 sides would have to be astonishingly well
argued to get a pass. It is highly unlikely that there will be sufficient depth and breadth of argument
to convince a marker it had covered enough of the markable criteria to pass.
3. Lack of historiography. The need for historiography in essays is clearly set out in the Grade
Descriptions in the Course Arrangements. Essays without recognition of different historical
interpretations must therefore fail. There is a fairly open definition of ‘historical interpretations’ as
the minimum expected pass standard. What is expected at Advanced Higher level is that there are
signs of the candidate’s reading, and therefore some awareness that there are different views
on an issue.
If a candidate were to introduce a new paragraph with a phrase such as ‘Naturally, other historians
have argued …’ or ‘There is another school of thought on this matter …’ that will suffice for meeting
the C standard. If they start (accurately) quoting historians by name or refer to particular schools of
thought, or give quotes from historians and changing views over time, that clearly takes the essay
into B and A territory on this aspect of the marking.
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Factors which are NOT in themselves fatal to the candidate’s chances:
1. Structure. This may be poor. However, it may still be that enough other insightful and relevant
aspects are explored in enough depth to persuade the marker that the candidate should be awarded a
pass at some level. A sense of structure often ‘appears’ during the essay so a candidate should not be
penalised or down-graded just because nothing much seems to have been laid out in the introduction.
2. Accuracy. Several minor inaccuracies, or indeed, a few fairly major ones, will not in themselves be
sufficient to fail a response. It may be that the marker becomes increasingly convinced that the
candidate is not in full control of their evidence, and that may deter the granting of an A pass, but it
does not automatically lead to a fail.
3. Relevance. While relevance is important, it is not the sole criterion on which a response is judged.
It is a question of degree; responses should be marked positively. A pass at the C level can be gained
by an essay with enough relevance to convince the marker of its overall virtue; an A pass can be
granted even despite the odd lapse or digression.
4. Thoroughness. This aspect of width of detail is clearly a major discriminating factor in determining
a grade. It is NOT a pass-fail factor. If a candidate misses out what a marker thinks is a key factor,
but comprehensively discusses a lot of other key factors, the A pass can still be awarded. While the
candidate may seem to be presenting a very ill-balanced and distorted view of the width of relevant
issues in the chosen title, that selectivity is the candidate’s privilege. Therefore the marker should
mark the essay for what argument it does contain and not for the degree to which it conforms to the
view of the marker.
Equally, in terms of depth of detail, many essays are a very good review, albeit sometimes
superficial, of a lot of the issues that are relevant. Candidates who follow this approach, which may
appear light on analysis or evidence, may still have done enough to merit a pass or even slightly
more.
5. Use of language. Candidates’ linguistic skills vary. Essays can often be clumsily expressed in fairly
poor English, but still contain many of the admirable criteria that merit high reward. Equally, there
can be fluent and stylish pieces that flatter to deceive when the marker gets beyond the language and
studies the other criteria.
6. Conclusion. This is an important aspect of the essay; it pulls it all together and shows the marker
how the candidate has marshalled their facts and arguments. A good conclusion is often decisive in
pulling the essay into the next higher marks band, and a weak conclusion will certainly hinder the
chances of getting an A. However, the lack of a conclusion in itself is not a factor leading to an
automatic fail.
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Marking Part 2: The source questions
The examination paper has 3 standardised stems on the source questions.
The ‘how fully’ question (12 marks)
The candidate should establish the view of the source and interpret what that view is, with an opportunity to
earn up to 3 marks by discriminatory thinking about which points of the source are relevant to the question. If
they select these points, by either quoting them, paraphrasing them or referring to them, then they must be
given credit.
The candidate can then earn the remaining marks by the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider
contextual recall that they provide in their overall interpretation of the source’s comprehensiveness.
There is no mandatory provenance comment for this question. Therefore there is no allocation of marks put
against it. However, candidates may still make some perfectly relevant and appropriate provenance comments
which help locate it within its historical context or help define the background and/or authorship of the writer
in a way that genuinely helps answer the set question. That should be rewarded but it has to be something
more precise and focused than the candidate offering a formulaic ‘the value of a secondary source is a modern
interpretation etc …’ Contextualised provenance comment is given credit under the ‘historiography’ marks
that are awarded. This style of marking is encouraged.
The ‘how useful’ question (12 marks)
The candidate may be awarded up to 3 marks for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of the
source. Candidates may offer this in slightly formulaic form at the lowest level but that will not necessarily
merit the full 3 marks.
The candidate can then earn marks (as in the ‘how fully’ question above), for establishing the view,
interpreting the sources and accurately supporting that evaluation with comment from the source.
A combination of provenance comment and interpretation can earn up to a maximum of 5 marks. The
candidate can earn the remaining marks from the quality and depth of the immediate and/or wider contextual
recall provided in the overall interpretation of the source’s value. Markers will award marks particularly in the
upper ranges for historiographical issues that the candidate raises.
The ‘two-source’ question (16 marks)
Candidates should apply the same techniques to the ‘two-source’ question, as they do to the other two.
One of the two sources may be a primary source. It is likely that the candidate will include provenance
comment. This should be rewarded in the same way as if the candidate has answered the question as a single-
source ‘how useful’ question. Marking of both sources will give the candidate a chance to earn ‘interpretation’
marks as in the section above.
The candidate can therefore possibly earn as many as 7 marks out of the 16 before earning the marks that come
from providing the wider contextual recall which will help to complete the process that is demanded by the
question, (this always asks them to consider the views in the two sources and weigh up their merits against
each other and a range of possible other views that may be supportable).
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Northern Britain from the Romans to AD 1000
Part 1
Each question is worth 25 marks
Question 1
How far does the range of evidence allow firm conclusions to be drawn on the nature of Iron Age
society in North Britain?
The candidate is expected to show some knowledge of the range of literary and archaeological (in the
widest sense) evidence for Iron Age society and come to a judgement about how far firm conclusions
can be drawn from it. The crucial question to consider is ‘How far…?’ Can we/can’t we draw firm
conclusions?
The candidate might be expected to use such evidence as:
• Iron Age society has been described as rural, tribal, hierarchical, familiar, Celtic language
speaking, pagan, heroic and non-literate with heterogeneous elements. The candidate will judge
how useful various kinds of evidence are in supporting these views.
• Rural – the literary evidence, which is Ptolemy’s “Map”, Tacitus, Herodian and Dio Cassius, was
all written by outsiders who never visited Britain. Ptolemy lived in Alexandria and the other three
in Rome. These three were fascinated by Britain, the remotest part of the Empire, lying across the
Ocean (the Channel), and regarded the inhabitants as barbarians. Ptolemy based his work on
reports of merchants and travellers and on a now lost work by Marinus of Tyre, who had used a
Flavian military map and the place names he gives are of Roman forts. Neither he nor the others
suggest any villages or towns in North Britain. Archaeological evidence confirms this, both by
digs and aerial photography. Broch villages are not villages in any real sense, nor are settlements
like Traprain Law in East Lothian. Archaeology reveals a pastoral/arable economy and pollen
analysis in particular shows the crops grown and how they changed over time.
• Tribal – Ptolemy names 16 tribes, (candidates may name some or all of them) Tacitus in The
Agricola adds one more, the Boresti, and makes frequent references to “tribes” and “tribal”. They
apparently meant distinct peoples with distinct tribal names, territories and leaders. Dio and
Herodian do not use those words often, contenting themselves naturally with “barbarians”. Dio
does describe the Caledonii and Maeatae as tribes. Archaeology is naturally (given a non-literate
society) silent on tribal names but does reveal patterns of settlement types, eg brochs in the North
West, including the Northern and Western Isles, hill forts in the Borders, open settlements and
souterrains in the East, crannogs more to the West than the East – reflecting in large part the
materials available but perhaps also tribal/cultural differences since a few examples of settlement
types occur in all areas, ie there is as much stone in the Borders as in broch country (vide all the
drystane dykes) but only a handful of brochs.
• Hierarchical – here the literary and archaeological evidence agree. Tacitus refers to “warriors”
and “many leaders” in describing Agricola’s campaigns in North Britain and in referring to Britain
generally uses words such as “nobleman”, “dependents” and “chiefs”. Calgacus was a man of
“outstanding valour and nobility”. Apart from the fact that he had to be to fit the plot of The
Agricola, Tacitus is quite clear that there was a warrior elite. Dio refers to two tribes, the
Caledonii and the Maeatae, as choosing the boldest men to be their leaders. Broch villages, a
cluster of small dwellings round a broch, strongly suggest a hierarchical society: building a broch
or a hill fort clearly involved a lot of labour and organisation, hence an element of coercion.
Archaeological finds of decorated swords and scabbards, such as the one from Mortonhall in
Edinburgh, a war trumpet, a carnyx from Deskford in Banff, decorated horse bits and terrets – all
suggest a warrior elite at the apex of society. Comparisons with what is known of Iron Age
society in Gaul, South Britain and Ireland all suggest a hierarchy: at the top chiefs/nobles/warriors;
then a free class of peasants, craftsmen and learned men; finally the unfree and slaves.
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• Familial – again the literary and archaeological evidence agree. The sheer size of brochs, round
houses, ring-ditch houses, crannogs, hill forts, wheel houses and duns suggests extended families,
several generations living together. The contemporary literary sources, though not referring
specifically to North Britain, refer to groups of men or brothers living with a number of women in
common.
• Celtic language speaking – despite persistent suggestions that the proto-Picts and Picts spoke a
non-Indo-European language, a non-Celtic language, scholars like Smyth have argued
convincingly that all the tribes identified in Ptolemy’s Map have Celtic names and must have
spoken a Celtic language, P or Q. The later inability of Scots from Dal Riata, an indigenous
people, to converse with Picts without an interpreter, suggests the Ptolemaic tribes may have had
their own tongues, but all were Celtic.
• Pagan – Christianity cannot have begun before about 30AD and there are no indications that it
reached North Britain before the late 2ndC AD at the very earliest, despite a comment by Tertullian
that places inaccessible to Rome had submitted to Christ. Iron Age North Britain was pagan:
people worshipped polytheistically in a religion firmly rooted in nature, in numinous places where
earth met sky or where there was water or groves in trees. There were votive offerings:
Archaeologists have recovered some of these valuable metal goods which were cast into sacred
pools. Analogously with what Caesar wrote about Gaul and Tacitus about Anglesey, there may
have been a priestly class of Druids.
• Heroic – the literary sources all describe a warrior society and finds of weapons, shields,
cauldrons, what appear to be chariot wheels (Tacitus refers to charioteers at Mons Graupius, but
there is a growing view that the battle probably never took place) and ornate horse bits, etc as well
as jewellery for men, do suggest a warrior elite. Tacitus, who must be taken with a pinch of salt
because he never visited Britain, had a stereotypical view of barbarians and sacrificed content to
style, describes the Britons who opposed Agricola in glowing terms; “famous warriors” wearing
the “decorations” they had earned. Certainly he put into the mouth of Calgacus a heroic speech!
• Non-literate – the literary sources make no claims for native literacy, no native inscriptions have
been found and finds of wax tablets as at Trimontuim by Curle are of Roman military origin.
There is, however, the famous find at Traprain Law of part of a shaped stone which has inscribed
on it A B C and the down stroke of D: perhaps the complete stone contained the whole Roam
alphabet: some one was teaching himself to read and write. Tacitus states that the Britons had
“drawn up treaties” before Mons Graupius but we need not take this literally!
• Heterogeneous elements – archaeology, both by digs and underwater investigation of crannogs,
reveals a wide variety of house types: brochs, possibly built by itinerant builders: duns, though
some archaeologists would say they were not a distinct type: hill forts: crannogs: round houses:
ring ditch houses, wheel houses not to mention souterrains for underground storage. Some
settlements were enclosed; others were not, especially in the East.
Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historians’ commentary to support their views.
These may include reference to:
• Colin Martin and especially Ian Morrison in Landscape with Lake Dwellings have written
extensively about underwater archaeology.
• David Wooliscroft: has made use of pollen analysis in his work on the Gask Frontier.
• Hanson: devotes the whole first Chapter of his Agricola and the Conquest of the North to sources
of evidence.
• St Joseph: (Dr JKS, not the husband of Mary) pioneered much of the aerial photography in North
Britain.
• Val Turner: in Ancient Shetland, Anna Ritchie: in Picts, Martin Carver: in Surviving in
Symbols, Campbell: in Saints and Sea Kings; all dilate on the techniques and value of different
archaeological techniques.
• Hartley: is an expert on Samian ware in Scotland, useful in dating the length of Roman/native
contact.
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Question 2
To what extent has the success of the Flavian invasion of North Britain been exaggerated?
The candidate is expected to come to a conclusion about the degree of exaggeration. This may be
done quite satisfactorily by looking at the invasion alone but a comparison with the two later invasions
may give added value.
• Outline of the chronology, aims, extent, nature and duration of the Flavian invasion.
• Criteria/yardstick for measuring success/failure related to above.
• Exaggerated by whom? Why?
• Archaeological evidence attests a Roman occupation in Flavian times but the only literary source
is Tacitus’ biography of his father-in-law, Governor Agricola, a work almost of hagiography.
• Recent work on the Gask frontier by Birgitta Hoffmann and David Wooliscroft has led to a
radical reappraisal of the date of the first Roman contact with North Britain and therefore also of
the credibility of the account in the Agricola.
• The work of Hoffman and Wooliscroft suggests peaceful contact six or seven years before the
arrival of Agricola in the Borders in the third campaign of his governorship and therefore casts
doubts on such dramatic episodes as the night attack on the Ninth Legion and the dramatic battle
of Mons Graupius. Agricola probably had a walkover and Tacitus was exaggerating outrageously.
• In any case, a highly trained large professional army of elements of four Legions, II Augusta, IX
Hispana, XX Valeria Victrix and II Adiutrix and an equal number of Auxilliaries was more than a
match for Celtic warriors used to cattle raiding and hit-and-run tactics.
• Marching, scouting, throwing up temporary camps, road and fort building were second nature to
the Roman Army.
• Even if a battle was fought at Mons Graupius, Tacitus himself wrote that the legionaries just
looked on.
• Possible comparison with Antonine and Severan success or lack of it.
• Classical sources: Tacitus, Pliny the Elder and Sallust on Flavian invasion: Scriptores Historiae
Augustae on the Antonine: Dio Cassius, Herodian and Scriptores Historiae Augustae on the
Severan.
• Birgitta Hoffmann and David Wooliscroft; reappraisal of Flavian invasion
• Hanson’s: Agricola and the Conquest of the North; see the assessment in Ch 7.
• Hanson and Maxwell’s The Antonine Wall; see Ch 10, “Success or Failure?”
• Internet; the Gask project; Flavian invasion; Hoffmann and Wooliscroft.
• Views of Breeze, Breeze and Dobson, Maxwell on success of the three invasions.
• Smyth: discusses success, concludes all three attempts at conquest were a failure, Ch1 of
Warlords and Holy Men.
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Question 3
Did conversion to Christianity make a profound difference to North Britain?

The candidate is expected to examine a number of areas which might include social, political,
religious, cultural and linguistic factors and come to a balanced conclusion about the scale of the
difference made by the conversion to Christianity of the peoples of North Britain. The answer may
embrace the conversion of the Vikings and Angles but that is not essential. This is not a question
about the process of conversion. It is a question about its effects on North Britain.
• All the peoples of North Britain, including the Angles and Vikings, were eventually converted to
Christianity; a unifying force.
• The old Pagan beliefs were abandoned, subsumed or went underground.
• Introduction of literacy, of numeracy, of a lingua franca, Latin, for the literate.
• Monotheism replaced polytheism; monogamy replaced polygamy.
• A moral code, the Ten Commandments, as well as Adomnan’s Law of the Innocents.
• North Britain was brought into the mainstream of Christian European art and civilisation; more
open to Continental, Irish and English influences.
• Literacy made possible the accumulation of knowledge about the past and the natural world, the
storage of texts through time and their transmission over greater distances.
• Writing was exploited by kings to legitimise and authorise claims to secular power and position,
eg King Lists and Senchus Fer nAlban.
• Columban monasteries had libraries, (monastic) schools and scriptoria, the first in North Britain.
• An outpouring of beautifully created parts of Bibles, Gospels, Psalters, King Lists, Sagas, Annals,
Lives of Saints, Poetry, books about the Holy Land and classical authors. The Book of Kells may
have been started in Iona or Eastern Pictland.
• Major stimulus to Art; boxes for Bibles; Reliquaries for bones of Saints; altar goods; sculpture;
book bindings decorated with precious metals and precious stones; St Andrew’s Sarcophagus,
which shows Byzantine and Coptic influences, ranks very highly among early medieaval
European Art; ecclesiastical buildings, monasteries, churches, chapels; Class II Pictish cross slabs
(Christian) are artistically a great advance on Class I symbol stones.
• Columba and his successors had a political role; influenced succession, strove to introduce a more
peaceful society in which there was no place for the aggression of petty kings.
• The differences made were not all positive: something of the feeling for the unknown, the
numinous, was lost to a belief system which claimed to explain all phenomena.
• Though from an artistic point of view Pictish carving reached greater heights, the end of symbol
carving was a great loss in itself and broke some sense of meaning unknown to us.
• All sorts of particular, local customs must have declined as society became more homogeneous.
• Christianity did not change people or society overnight: life for all was still Hobbesian: nasty,
brutish and short.
• Sally M. Foster’s: Picts, Gaels and Scots “the introduction of Christianity is likely to have been
the biggest force for change in the early historic period”. It provided ideological sanction and
legitimisation for the kings and nobility.
• Smyth: Warlords and Holy Men: Iona was the holiest place in Britain.
• Aitchison: Conversion of the Northern Picts, a process which began in 6thC, may have led to a
decline or the end of their raids on monasteries in Dal Riata.
• Martin Carver’s Surviving in Symbols discusses the Picts conversion to Christianity.
• Anna Ritchie: The Picts’ stone carving tradition reached its heights of technique and elaborate
design in a Christian context.
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Question 4
“The Picts have retained their aura of mystery mostly on account of their symbol stones.” How
valid is this view?
The candidate is expected to give some historical and geographical background and then to tackle the
alleged aura of mystery attached to the Picts, examining such areas as, eg their symbol stones,
language, kingship descent customs and apparent disappearance from the pages of history. An
important part of the answer would be a comparison with the other (indigenous) peoples in North
Britain, the Scots and the Britons. The word ‘mostly’ in the title requires the candidate to look at other
reasons for the alleged aura of mystery.
There are several areas where there is no aura of mystery at all:
• The Picts, like the other Celtic peoples of North Britain, were all descended in the main from the
original, indigenous inhabitants who go back to Mesolithic times, supplemented by incursions of
probably fairly small numbers of Celtic speaking peoples in pre-Roman times. The peoples were
not races but became, for a time, nations. Bede started a long running hare, still, extraordinarily,
with some life in it, that they came from Scythia!
• The Picts, the Scots of Dal Riata and the Britons of Strathclyde were all undoubtedly Celtic in so
far as a people are Celtic solely on account of their Celtic speech. There is no support nowadays
for the view that the Picts once spoke a non-Celtic, non-Indo European language. The Picts spoke
a P-Celtic language, the others a Q-Celtic one.
• The societies of the three peoples were rural, tribal (under a king overall), hierarchical, familial,
pagan before conversion to Christianity and then they all embraced the same faith obviously,
heroic and literate.
• They were all warrior/aristocratic societies with kingship at the top.
• The three kingdoms had sub-kingdoms or kindreds, no doubt reflecting earlier tribal divisions.
• When they became Christian they were all brought into the mainstream of European art and
civilisation.
• Kingship was not passed on from father to eldest son but from a fairly tight group of men
descended in the male line from previous kings. Bede’s claim the Picts, warriors, all men (having
mysteriously left their womenfolk) en route to what we now call Scotland, stopped off for a time
in Ireland and were given wives, only on condition that in future their kings would claim their
descent through their mothers, still has a few obstinate adherents but has been exploded by, eg
Smyth, who points out that mothers are never named in the Pictish king lists.
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There are some ways in which the Picts do differ from other peoples, but it is perhaps going too far to
talk of an “aura of mystery”:
• They did speak P-Celtic rather than Q-Celtic. No one knows why but it is presumably something
to do with developing north of two natural geographical boundaries: the in those days marshy,
flooded Forth-Clyde isthmus and the Highland massif. However, it is not a huge, profound or
mysterious difference.
• Their symbol stones are unique and no one has yet explained, and naturally in the nature of things
can never explain, the actual significance of the designs (which were also on metal) to those who
erected them, though there are a lot of obvious/fairly convincing theories: grave markers:
territorial markers: totems: marriages: abstract: commemorations. The artistic skill involved is of
a very high order but perhaps one can never explain explosions of artistic talent. The carvings
may have been by itinerant craftsmen, using patterns drawn on vellum or on their own skins. Note
Carver’s point that the Picts have left the most individual legacy of all the peoples of Scotland.
• The Picts did have distinctive styles in forts and dwelling houses, though not radically different
from elsewhere.
• Although the Pictish language has been identified as P-Celtic, no one has yet managed to translate
the few fragments which remain, though personal names are clear. The Picts were literate and
presumably, like the Scots whose Senchus fer nAlban has survived, had similar extensive records,
but none have survived – itself a bit of a puzzle unless when the kingdoms of the Scots and Picts
were combined there was a purge of Pictish records.
• The other peoples have no equivalent to the massive Pictish silver chains of authority.
• Apart from the meaning of their symbols the other puzzle about the Picts is what happened to
them. At first sight it does seem strange that a whole people can vanish from history, but what
happened to the Jutes, the Caledonii, the Maeatae, the Gododdin, and the Britons of Strathclyde?
The Angles and Saxons presumably came separately but in time were lumped together and then
both became subsumed in the English. The Danes in the Danelaw vanished. So did the Norsemen
in Scotland. All over Europe as nations developed separate peoples lost their identity and names.
• Leslie Alcock: “a typical north-west European barbarian society with wide connections and
parallels”.
• Sally M Foster: in Picts, Gaels and Scots emphasises the many similarities between the Picts and
the Scots of Dal Riata and debunks, eg matrilineal descent of kingship among the Picts.
• Smyth: in Warlords and Holy Men concluded that the Picts spoke a Celtic language, like their
native neighbours the Scots of Dal Riata, and were a Celtic people.
• Nick Aitchison: in The Picts and the Scots at War finds many similarities, eg the role of kings as
leaders in battle, naval warfare, fort building, arms and armour and mustering.
• Anna Ritchie: in Picts; “above all they were warriors and theirs was a heroic society … Their
high-kings could command to battle war-lords, each with his band of warriors, travelling by land
or water.”
• c.f. the Senchus fer nAlban, recording the military and naval service from each kindred of Dal
Riata.
• Campbell: no evidence that Scots of Dal Riata migrated there from Antrim; had always been part
of the Gaelic realm on both sides of the Irish Sea and spoke that language.
• Martin Carver: of all the peoples who made Scotland, none had such deep roots in the prehistory
of the land or left so individual a legacy.
Page 11
Question 5
Was the Viking impact on North Britain wholly destructive?
The candidate is expected to discuss the pros and cons of the impact of the Viking invasion,
particularly of the Northern and Western Isles and of Caithness, and to come to a balanced judgement
as to whether it was wholly destructive or had some good aspects.
• Sources should be treated with caution. The only literary sources were penned by monks who
naturally had an axe to grind. This is not to say that monasteries were not raided repeatedly, to the
point where some were abandoned.
• However, Christianity was not wiped out and by the end of the period the invaders were adopting
the religion of the subjugated; even before then the Vikings were not hostile to Christianity and
Churchmen per se; they were quite happy to bring Christ into their pantheon of Gods.
• The initial Viking impulse was a “quest for moveable wealth”, ie anything not nailed down,
including people and livestock.
• Such conduct was, to put it mildly, not unknown to the Scots of Dal Riata and the Picts, who, as
Nick Aitchison has pointed out in The Picts and Scots at War, had a highly organised warrior
class which fought and raided and stole people to enslave them. It was organised into war bands
and boat crews. The pagan Picts happily raided Dal Riata monasteries and some of the Christian
Dal Riata did the same! Thus the Vikings were not entering some Garden of Eden. The natives
were warlike peoples. Adomnan promulgated his Law of the Innocents to try and curb their worst
excesses.
• Raids on monasteries were bloody and destructive; the raiders were after the precious stones and
metals on shrines, reliquaries and on the mounts of book covers.
• The raiders let monasteries recover and then called again.
• Raids were timed to coincide with the great Church Festivals; more potential slaves were
available.
• Introduction of a new race and a new language.
• Excavations at Buckquoy show integration between the Viking settlers and the indigenous Picts.
• Studies of the folk tales of the Northern Isles demonstrate that their origins lie in pre-Norse tales
rather than in Scandinavian ones.
• The Viking place names Papar, Papil, Papay/Pabbay all incorporate Priest and indicate respect for
them and their survival.
• Many Vikings took Pictish wives; the “mother’s milk” theory is one explanation for the
conversion of the Vikings.
• The Viking impact on South Scotland was sporadic and transitory compared with that on the
North, where local social and administrative structure apparently disappeared.
• Pictland/the Kingdom of the Picts lost a large tract of territory in the North and West, weakening
it.
• A powerful independent Viking Earldom of Orkney evolved.
• The sea culture of the Western Isles may be a Viking legacy.
• The Viking settlements in the Isles, the maritime contacts and the commercial wealth created
vigorous communities with a distinctive and flourishing culture which would probably not have
developed without the stimulus of the Viking settlers.
• Some Gaelic legal and Scottish burgh law terms derive from the Vikings.
• Land denominations in Western Scotland, the ploughgate in the East, fencing the court to
constitute it, the birlaw/birleymen who kept good neighbourhood, the long hundred of six score
used for every commodity except money – all are Viking.
Page 12
• Barbara Crawford: Scandinavian Scotland, seminal work. Especially major and in some ways
beneficial impact on Northern and Western Isles.
• Ritchie and Breeze: in Invaders of Scotland they take a positive view of the impact.
• Smyth: huge impact, culture of Northern and Western North Britain became a part of the Old
Norse world.
• Ritchie: place names show huge impact.
• Val Turner: Ancient Scotland, good on Viking impact.
• Nick Aitchison: The Picts and the Scots at War has extensive references to Viking raids.
Page 13
Question 6
To what extent was North Britain still inhabited by a number of separate peoples by 1000AD?
The candidate is expected to analyse the question by considering how far the identity of Scots of Dal
Riata, Picts, Britons of Strathclyde, Angles in the Lothians and Borders and Vikings in the North and
West still existed at the end of the 10thC AD.
The candidate might use such evidence as:
• These people had to a large extent retained their languages: Norn was spoken in the Northern and
Western Isles and Caithness; Pictish must still have been spoken to some extent in the former
kingdom; Anglo-Saxon was spoken in the South-East; Cumbric was spoken by the Britons. The
Scots, except those at court, still spoke their own language. Latin was still, as it was when
introduced, the written lingua franca.
• There were three identifiable Celtic peoples, Picts, Scots and Britons and two from the Continent,
Angles and Vikings.
• However, four of these peoples had lost their separate political identity. The Vikings with, eg
their strong Earldom of Orkney, alone retained their political identity but the mid-9thC AD union
of the kingdom of the Scots and the Picts had endured and the Britons of Strathclyde had lost their
native British kings to members of the Scottish dynasty. In 1018 Malcolm overcame the land of
the Angles, Bernicia, as far as the Tweed in the East.
• Distinct cultural differences still remained. Viz: different languages as above; different dialects
within languages: different house styles – emergence of the black house in Western Isles
contrasted, eg with long houses in Northern Isles; different forms of land tenure, eg udal tenure
with its inalienable rights over family land in Northern Isles; different system of local government
and courts in Western Isles and Northern Isles – assemblies such as the bygdeting and the lagting
respectively.
• The peoples had lost, or were beginning to lose, any religious differences. The conversion of the
Vikings was underway; South West Scotland had seen Christianity since the sub-Roman period.
Columban monasticism had spread from the Scots to the Picts. The Angles had been converted.
The Synod of Whitby had decided the differences (not profound or doctrinal) between Columban
and Roman Christianity in favour of the latter. There were bishoprics in nearly all areas.
• Smyth: Warlords and Holy Men – gradual growth of a more united country. The King of the
Scots had fewer resources than the Anglo-Saxon kings and written government lagged behind its
southern counterpart but the Scottish monarchy was the most stable and successful one in the
British Isles and had made the best fist of uniting a kingdom despite surviving differences between
the five peoples.
• AAM Duncan: by 1000AD Scotland can begin to be described as a Celtic realm united by a
tradition of submission to one king for 150 years while the various peoples retained their identity
in some ways.
• AAM Duncan: the Kings of Scotland stamped political unity upon the four or five still disparate
peoples North of the Tweed and Solway.
Page 14
Northern Britain from the Romans to AD 1000
Part 2
Question 1
How fully does Source A explain the purposes for which Hadrian’s Wall was built? (12 marks)
The candidate may be awarded up to 3 marks for their ability to establish the views of the source and
accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source.
The remaining marks will be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context
recall, including historians’ views, which the candidate provides in their overall interpretation of the
source’s fullness in explaining/analysing the issue.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of Source A in terms of:
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments can earn credit. These may include:
• Based on years of archaeological investigation and study of visible remains.

• Remains of milecastles, turrets, the curtain wall, the ditch, the vallum, the military way and the
berm still visible.
• Castellation assumed.
• Monumental scale: monument to Hadrian.
• Lookout function.
Points from source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant views
• Access through wall limited but exists: purpose not to stop movement but to control it.
• Clearly delimits and demarcates Empire.
• Psychological impact must have been immense.
• Not heavily manned.
• No causeway at North gate of Milecastle.
Points from recall which support, develop and contextualise those in the source
• Wall nowhere exists to original height: height deduced from dimensions of ditch and from remains
of flights of steps giving access to wallhead at Milecastle.
• Remains of turret doorways found, also stone bases of ladders giving access to upper floor.
• Remains of roofing materials found.
• Milecastles have doors at either end of courtyard: easy to stop, search, question, disarm and tax
people.
Points from recall which offer wider contextualisation of the view in the source
• Must be original plan for wall; no military way, no vallum.

• Over time many turrets and some Milecastles went out of use.
• Width of gateways at some Milecastles was reduced by building up.
Page 15
• There is no debate about the purposes of the Wall: all historians/archaeologists, Birley, Breeze,
Breeze and Dobson, Salway, etc. agree on a range of purposes: those identified supra and;
• Base for patrols and for the army.
• Stop small scale raids.
• Slow down big raids.
• Stop smuggling.
• Keep the troops busy building and repairing it.
The candidate is therefore able to come to a conclusion, using a range of evidence, about the extent to
which a consideration of Source A is helpful in offering a full explanation of the purposes of
Hadrian’s Wall.
Marks
1-3 Vaguely written, merely re-describing the source; not answering the question or showing
understanding of the views in the source. The candidate may show minimal understanding of
immediate or wider context or any historical interpretations on the issue.
4-5 The candidate’s answer shows a limited understanding of the views in the source, and a weak
sense of context. Answer may lack clear structure with points made randomly, indicating little
grasp of significance, although in places the candidate’s interpretation may be fairly well-
written with some relevant points of explanation made. Candidate may offer relevant and
appropriate historical interpretations.
6-8 The candidate makes relevant and appropriate comments of interpretation, and the answer is
clearly written and sensibly structured. The explanation ranges over several relevant points and
shows an understanding of the views of the source, sets material in context, shows a good
factual grasp of topic and a reasonably developed analysis, which may include reference to
historical interpretations or specific historians’ views.
9-12 The candidate’s interpretation offers accurate, wide-ranging and convincing argument, showing
a clear understanding of the views of the source. There is a solid grasp of immediate and wider
context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Greater awareness and development of
historical interpretations and/or historians’ views will be credited highly.
Page 16
Question 2
How useful is Source B as evidence of the purposes of the Severan campaigns in North Britain?
(12 marks)
The candidate may be awarded up to 3 marks for the quality of their evaluation of the provenance of
the source.
recall, including historian’s views, which the candidate provides in their overall interpretation of the
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source B in understanding why
Severus embarked on his North British campaigns in terms of:
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments will earn credit. These may include reference to:
Primary source: Herodian, a Greek from Alexandria or Antioch, who nevertheless was a Roman
citizen and held public office in Rome after Severus’ death, wrote an eighty volume History of the
Roman Empire.
He is generally regarded as independent and unbiased, but writing a good story was high on his list of
priorities.
Points from source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant view
• The Emperor disliked the debauchery of his sons.

• Britain was being overrun, looted and destroyed by the barbarians.
• Reinforcements or the Emperor needed by the Governor of Britain.
• Severus had an (Agricolan) passion for military glory.
• Herodian, as Senator and Consul under Severus, was an insider.

• He wrote an 80 volume History of Rome, of which the first 35 are lost.
• Described by Birley as careless, ignorant, deceitful, a self-conscious stylist who preferred a
rattling good yarn and adjusted the facts accordingly, but an insider.
• Adds to what Herodian wrote that other reasons for Severus’ campaign were the slackness of the
army through inactivity and his desire to subdue the whole of Britain.
• The only other literary source is Dio Cassius.
Page 17
Points from recall which offer wider contextualisation of the view in the source
• After the abandonment of the Antonine Wall c165AD, Hadrian’s Wall had been reoccupied,
refurbished and improved by the addition of a military way. There were still outpost forts north of
it, to the NW and NE, keeping surveillance over the tribes.
• Breeze has written that the letter from the Governor may have been engineered by Severus in
order to give him an excuse to remove his sons from Rome and subject them to military discipline.
• The Romans described North Britain at the time as being inhabited by two principal tribes, the
Caledonii and the Maeatae, the latter apparently lying north of the Forth and extending into
Strathearn and Strathmore: place names Dumyat Hill and Myot Hill.
• Governors had controlled them by treaty relationships which among other points apparently bound
them not to help each other against Rome.
• Subsidies were also paid as bribes.
• This system broke down and there apparently was warfare involving the Maeatae and the capture
of some Roman soldiers whose release had to be bought.
• Study of the inscriptions on forts on Hadrian’s Wall and its hinterland suggest Severus did not
initially intend to re-conquer North Britain but to repair and maintain the wall, so much so that
several classical authors attributed its construction to him
• David Breeze: places equal emphasis on the purposes described by Herodian and Dio and on the
background factors supra.
• Hanson: emphasises that Severus was a lover of glory who wanted to add a British victory to
those he had already achieved elsewhere in the Empire and desired territorial aggrandisement.
which a consideration of Source B is useful for understanding the purposes of the Severan campaign.
Marks
Page 18
Question 3
How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing views on the reasons why Dal Riata and
Pictland combined under a single kingship in 843AD? (16 marks)
Interpretation (Maximum 6 marks)
Candidates may be awarded up to 3 marks for their ability to establish the views of each source and
accurately support that evaluation with comment from the source
Contextual and Historical interpretations (Maximum 10 marks)
These 10 marks will be awarded for:
• the quality and depth of the contextual recall

• the quality and depth of the wider perspectives
• the range and quality of historians’ views
• provenance comment – if appropriate
The candidate considers the views in Sources C and D on the reasons for Dal Riata and Pictland
combining under a single kingship, and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms
of:
Source C
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. Accurate comment
on Aitchison will be credited as historiography.
• Dal Riata weak in natural resources

• Importance of links between Dal Riata and Ulster
• Seesaw in relations with Picts
• Importance of 843 and Kenneth MacAlpin
• Long peaceful process of cultural and political growing together
Points from recall which develop and contextualise those in the source
• As well as Scottish kings ruling Pictland before 843, some Pictish kings ruled Dal Riata
• Place name study shows gradual spread of Gaelic names eastwards into Pictland; presumably a
peaceful process
• Kenneth MacAlpin may have had a Pictish mother, which helped his political ambitions
• Dal Riata had a sophisticated mustering system for raising men to fight by land and sea
Page 19
Source D
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. Accurate comment
on Crawford will be credited as historiography
• Viking raids devastated Dal Riata

• Caused political upheavals
• Disrupted Dal Riata’s Irish links
• Initial increase in Pictish influence in Dal Riata
• Rather surprisingly, Dal Riata, not Pictland, emerged as the dominant partner in a united kingdom
• Viking raids were unpredictable and difficult to beat off

• Dal Riata had a very long sea coast
• Dal Riata’s cultural and possibly political links were with NE Ireland; the Irish Sea had been a
uniting factor; the mountains separating Dal Riata from Pictland were an obstacle.
• Despite loss of the Northern and Western Isles and part of Caithness, Pictland was the stronger
kingdom
• Viking pressure on Dal Riata put pressure on its people to move east.
Points which offer a more critical contextualisation of the view in the sources
• Viking raids weakened the Picts as well as the Scots

• It is stated in the Annals of Ulster that in 839 the Vikings slaughtered leading Picts at Fortriu, in
their heartland, weakening the kingdom
• Leaders of Dal Riata may have seen themselves as having a crusading role
• Smyth: argues that Kenneth MacAlpin must have military skill as leader of a war band and must
also have had some claim to the Pictish throne.
• Smyth, Crawford and Aitchison: all agree there were long-term forces at work as well as more
immediate ones c 843.
• Smyth: points out that a king ruling both kingdoms simultaneously was not uncommon; what
was different in and after 843 was that the kingship was kept firmly within one dynasty
• Duncan: emphasises the importance of the Viking factor
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the reasons why
the two kingdoms combined.
Page 20
Marks
1-4 Vaguely written, merely re-describing the sources, not answering the question or showing
understanding of the views in the sources. The candidate may show minimal understanding of
5-7 The candidate’s answer shows a limited understanding of the views in the sources, and a weak
sense of content. Answer may lack clear structure with points made randomly, indicating little
grasp of significance, although in places the candidate’s interpretation may be fairly well
clearly written and sensibly structured. The explanation ranges over several points and shows
an understanding of the views of the sources, sets material in context, shows a good factual
grasp of topic and a reasonably developed analysis, which may include reference to historical
interpretations or specific historians.
12-16 The candidate’s interpretation offers accurate, wide-ranging and convincing argument;
showing a clear understanding of the views of the sources and their value as interpretations on
the issue. There is a solid grasp of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of
relevant analysis. Greater awareness and development of historical interpretations and/or
historians’ views will be credited highly.
Page 21
Scottish Independence (1286-1329)
Part 1
Question 1
How accurate is the view that the Guardians of Scotland failed to govern the kingdom
successfully between 1286 and 1291?
The candidate is required to make a balanced judgement about the role of the Guardians between 1286
and 1291. The candidate’s response should consider both ‘failures’ and ‘successes’ of the Guardians
before arriving at a conclusion.
Relevant areas for discussion might include:
Failures of the Guardians
• The Turnberry Bond reveals continuing faction amongst the Scottish nobility.
• Bruce’s continued attempts to pursue his claim before 1291.
• Guardianship weakened by deaths of leading members before 1291, who were not replaced.
• Treaty of Birgham allowed Edward I to ‘reserve his rights’.
• Invitation to Edward I to intervene in the succession crisis can be viewed as naïve.
• Evasive reply to Edward I’s demands of overlordship might reveal weakness and lack of clarity
about the Guardians’ role.
• Failure to respond to the annexation of the Isle of Man and the appointment of Anthony Bek to
protect Edward’s interests in Scotland.
• Guardians allowed themselves to be reappointed by Edward I with the addition of English
Guardians.
• Failure to respond to Edward ‘going over the Guardians’ heads’ to take homage from the
contenders for the throne.
Successes of the Guardians
• Composition of the Guardianship reflected the social, geographical and political make-up of the
‘Community of the Realm’.
• Exclusion of the main claimants, Bruce and Balliol, in the event of the death of the Maid of
Norway.
• Successful prevention of civil war; Bruce’s ambitions thwarted in 1286 and 1290.
• Parliament held at Scone in 1290.
• Guardians represented continuity in political leadership following the death of Alexander III.
• Negotiation of the Treaty of Birgham to protect Scottish independence in 1289.
• Bishop Fraser’s letter to Edward I in 1290 may have been a plea by the Guardians to avoid civil
war.
• Evasion of Edward’s demands for overlordship in 1291.
• Geoffrey Barrow: has written extensively about this period and sees the Guardians as expressing
a growing sense of ‘national’ identity. He describes their composition as ‘politically astute and
constitutionally impeccable’, helping to preserve national unity.
• Alan Young: sees the Guardians as continuing Comyn dominance, at the expense of the Bruces
and thus increasing the risk of faction.
• Caroline Bingham: adheres to a more traditional view that sees the Guardians as weak in the face
of English pressure.
• Michael Penman: has argued that the main function of the Guardianship was to contain the
ambitions of the Bruces. He emphasises that divisions and lack of resolve amongst the nobility
played into the hands of Edward.
Page 22
Question 2
How far were the Scots themselves responsible for the outbreak of war between England and
Scotland in 1296?
The candidate is required to assess and evaluate the main factors that led to the outbreak of war
between England and Scotland in 1296, making judgements about the responsibility that the Scots
should take.
• Edward’s demands for military service in France

• King John’s renunciation of homage
• The treaty with France, 1295
• The increasing discontent of King John’s leading subjects; the ‘Council of 12’
• The humiliation of Balliol since 1292, including reference to:
− the court cases
− repeated demands for homage
• Edward’s determination to test his overlordship won at Norham in 1291
• The war seen at the beginning as a ‘jurisdictional dispute’ or punishment of a ‘contumacious
vassal’
• Scots more willing to fight as a result of Edward’s pre-occupations in France and Wales
• Some Scots, notably the Bruces, were prepared to take up arms against King John
• Geoffrey Barrow: has argued that John’s renunciation of homage is an accurate assessment of
the causes of war. He has sympathy for Balliol’s position, caught between an oppressive overlord
and a bellicose nobility, and emphasises the role of the nobility in creating the ‘Council of 12’.
• Maurice Powicke: believed that to lay the blame for the war at Edward’s door is to accept
Scottish propaganda, notably the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320.
• Fiona Watson: argues that the determination of Edward to press his lordship was the main cause
of war. She points out that the “breakdown of Anglo-French relations provided exactly the
catalyst the Scots needed in order to make their bid for freedom”.
• Alan Young: has argued that Edward I underestimated the determination of the Comyn-led
government to fight for Scottish independence. He regards Balliol as ‘fragile’.
• Michael Prestwich: has argued that Edward I’s gravest mistake in dealing with the Scots was to
push them so hard as to drive them into alliance with the French.
Page 23
Question 3
To what extent was Edward I’s failure to subdue Scotland between 1298 and 1307 due to his
own mistakes?
The candidate should evaluate the reasons for Edward I’s failure to subdue Scotland, with reference to
his own mistakes, but also considering other factors before arriving at a balanced conclusion.
Edward’s ‘mistakes’
• Failure to capitalise on military victory after Falkirk; failed campaigns after 1298
• Harshness of occupation increased resistance
• Lack of systematic attempts to impose taxation or government before 1305
• Inconsistency of policy – neither military nor political avenues thoroughly pursued
• Failure to realise the nature of Bruce’s threat before 1306
• Northern Scotland was never under effective English control
• Ordinance of 1305 alienated Bruce but did not generate enough support amongst other leading
nobles – reflected inconsistency in Edward’s thinking
• Appointed leaders in Scotland who were not equal to the task, eg Aymer de Valance
Other factors leading to Edward I’s failure in Scotland
• Continued leadership of the Scottish cause by the Guardians after Wallace’s resignation
• Continued military resistance by the Scots, eg the ambush at Roslin in 1303
• Heightened sense of national identity following Wallace’s rising
• Scimus Filii
• Impact of Baldred Bisset’s mission to Rome
• Surrender at Strathford did not mark the complete defeat of the Comyn faction, which had to be
accommodated in the Ordinance of 1305
• The speed and surprise of Bruce’s coup
• Nature of support for Bruce in the South West of Scotland in 1307
• Continued support of the Church for the ‘national’ cause
• Edward’s involvement in wars elsewhere.
• Geoffrey Barrow: has emphasised the continued existence of the Community of the Realm after
Wallace’s defeat as a main reason for Edward’s failure. He discusses Edward’s domestic
difficulties in England and war with France as factors limiting his ability to wage war on Scotland
and argues that Wallace’s rebellion increased the sense of national resistance, even after Falkirk.
He also argues that Edward’s harshness towards Scotland contributed to Scottish resistance and
his ultimate failure. He praises the skill and determination of Robert the Bruce.
• Fiona Watson: emphasises the inability of English officials to govern Scotland. She argues that
Scotland benefited from not having a strong centralised government which could be targeted by
the English. However, enough governmental ‘superstructure’ remained to co-ordinate resistance.
She emphasises the poor quality of Edwardian officials in Scotland. She argues that the
Ordinance of 1305 was far from lenient.
• HW Richardson: has argued that Edward I was a great tactician but a ‘pitiable strategist’.
• Michael Prestwich: argues that Edward I should not be judged too harshly for his failures in
Scotland as Bruce’s great victories lay in the future in 1307.
Page 24
Question 4
What factors best explain King Robert I’s defeat of his Scottish enemies by 1309?
The candidate is required to assess and evaluate the factors which contributed to King Robert I’s
victory over his Scottish enemies by 1309, making a judgement about the significance of each before
arriving at a balanced conclusion.
• The death of the leader of the Comyn faction at the Greyfriars Kirk in Dumfries in 1306
• Element of speed and surprise in declaring his own kingship at Scone; nature of his support at his
coronation
• Lessons learned at Methven – avoidance of pitched battle
• Careful garnering of support in the West, 1306-07
• Bruce’s ‘genius for guerrilla warfare’
• Successful campaigns in South West Scotland in 1307 – Glen Trool, Loudon Hill
• Death of Edward I left the English campaign in disarray in 1307; absence of a serious challenge
from England for several years
• Strategic skill in moving through the north-west to attack Buchan from the north
• Growing support in the wake of military success; support of leading churchmen and magnates
• Growing support as Bruce moved northwards
• Bruce’s policy of leniency towards defeated enemies, eg the Earl of Ross
• Defeat of the Comyns at Oldmeldrum
• The ‘Herschip of Buchan’
• Bruce’s tactics against castles
• The growth of Bruce hagiography – the only man capable of defeating the English
• Development of political support – the Parliament of St Andrews 1309
• Role of good fortune
• Geoffrey Barrow: emphasises Bruce’s military skill in winning the campaign. He argues that his
early victories laid the foundation for the development of a Bruce ‘myth’. He praises Bruce’s
strategy of clemency and leniency towards his former enemies, and argues that earlier military
failures and death of the Red Comyn fatally compromised Comyn political leadership. Barrow’s
view is widely shared amongst historians, however, recently:
• Michael Penman: has argued that Bruce was fortunate that the death of Edward I removed an
implacable foe.
• Colm MacNamee: argues that the English were weakened by ‘economic catastrophe’ and
factional disputes of ‘peculiar bitterness’ which allowed Bruce to move against his Scottish
enemies.
Page 25
Question 5
Does King Robert I’s government of Scotland between 1314 and 1329 deserve the praise that it
has been given?
The candidate should assess the success of Bruce’s government in terms of both its successes and
limitations, before arriving at a balanced conclusion.
The re-establishment of the machinery of government
• Holding of parliaments
• Examples of legislation; reform of the criminal law
• Appointment of Chancellor, Chamberlain, justiciars
• Role of the Chancery under Bernard de Linton
• Use of writs and breves
• Administration of justice
• Settlement of the succession issue in 1315, 1318 and 1326
• Creation of effective sheriffdoms in the west
• Settlement of the north under the Earl of Moray
• Effective relationship with the Scottish Church; appointment of bishops
• The Declaration of Arbroath; attempts to establish Bruce’s legitimacy
Factors limiting the success of Bruce’s government
• Evidence of continuing faction after Statute of Cambuskenneth

• The difficulty in subduing the west
• Bruce more concerned with establishing his own legitimacy than with government
• The De Soules Plot
• Reference to those who were never reconciled to Bruce, eg Earl Patrick of Dunbar, Bishop Cheyne
of Aberdeen
• Geoffrey Barrow: has written extensively in praise of Bruce’s government, which he sees as
restoring much of the machinery of administration which existed during the reign of Alexander III.
Many historians have agreed with this view.
• Norman Reid: has emphasised the continuity in legislation between the reign of Alexander III
and that of King Robert I.
• Fiona Watson: has argued that the main aim of Bruce’s ‘government’ was to secure his
legitimacy.
• Michael Penman: has argued that the De Soules Plot indicates the depth of unease at Bruce’s
rule.
Page 26
Question 6
How far was Scottish society changed by the Wars of Independence?
The candidate should assess the extent to which Scottish society was changed by the Wars of
Independence, before arriving at a balanced conclusion. The candidate may choose to interpret the
notion of ‘society’ in a number of ways, possibly including reference to social structure, loyalties and
identity. Governmental, administrative and ecclesiastical institutions may also be referred to.
Candidates may also examine economic developments as they affected Scottish society.
Changes in Scottish society:
• Composition of the nobility changed somewhat as a result of the Wars; elimination of Comyn
influence; promotion of Bruce allies such as Randolph, Keith and Hay.
• The effect of the ‘Herschip of Buchan’ and the Bruce campaign against Galloway.
• Greater importance of burgesses as witnessed by their representation in Bruce’s parliaments.
• Wallace’s rebellion emphasised the role of the peasantry in the Community of the Realm.
• Bruce’s attempts to encourage development of burghs, by granting of increased rights.
• Increased use of parliaments after the death of Alexander III and in the reign of Robert I.
• Attempts to revise and ‘update’ the criminal law during Bruce’s reign.
• ‘Anglicisation’ of some parts of the kingdom during the English occupation – especially Berwick
before its recapture by the Scots.
• Impact of Bruce’s and Wallace’s raids on the wealth of the country.
• War led to lawlessness in the border areas.
• Bruce’s reign saw the assertion of Scottish identity as being Celtic/Gaelic in nature.
Continuity in the nature of Scottish society:
• Despite the elimination of the Comyns, Bruce did not seek to create a ‘new’ ruling class.
• Feudal magnates continued to be drawn from both ‘Anglo-Norman’ and ‘native’ aristocracy.
• Feudal and dynastic loyalties remained paramount for many despite the development of a
‘national’ identity.
• Bruce’s government aimed to restore the kingdom to the condition it enjoyed under Alexander III.
This is seen in the continuation of some policies, eg the creation of new sheriffdoms in the west.
• Policy of developing burghs had been followed since at least the reign of David I.
• Geoffrey Barrow: has emphasised the continuities with the past that can be seen in Robert I’s
reign: in particular, he has noted his essentially conservative policy towards feudal landholders
and that his policy towards the west differed little from his immediate predecessors. He argues,
however, that the increased importance of parliament represents an important development in the
notion of the Community of the Realm. He argues that Bruce’s legislation represents sensible
‘modernisation’.
• Colm MacNamee: has described the enrichment of Scotland as a result of Bruce’s raids as being
temporary. He argues the war seriously damaged Scottish agriculture and increased dependence
on imported manufactures, and argues war led to lawlessness in the Borders.
• Norman Reid: emphasises the continuity of Bruce’s legislation in relation to that of Alexander
III.
Page 27
Scottish Independence (1286-1329)
Part 2
Question 1
How useful is Source A for understanding the claims of Robert Bruce and John Balliol to the
throne of Scotland during the ‘Great Cause’? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source A in understanding the
claims of Robert Bruce and John Balliol to the throne of Scotland during the ‘Great Cause’ in terms
of:
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance will earn credit. These may include:
• The Appeal was written by lords loyal to Robert Bruce.

• The Appeal may well be an attempt to subvert the approach made to Edward I by Bishop Fraser
on John Balliol’s behalf.
• Written in the context of the death of the Maid of Norway, leaving the succession unclear.
• The origin of the right of the Seven Earls is unclear; Bruce may not have even had that level of
support.
Points from the source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)
• Bruce viewed himself as the legitimate heir.

• Many others, including Bishop Fraser and John Comyn, supported Balliol’s claim.
• The assertion that the claim made on behalf of Balliol denied the right of the ‘Seven Earls’ to
appoint a new King.
• Bruce keen to win the support of King Edward I of England.
• Bruce’s main claim was ‘nearness of degree’.

• The claim that the Seven Earls had the right to choose the next king may be an admission of the
weakness of Bruce’s claim.
• Bruce would also claim that he had been promised the throne by Alexander II, should he die
childless.
• Balliol’s claim was based on seniority of line.
• The factional rivalry between Bruce and Balliol threatened to start civil war.
• Bruce had already shown his intent with the ‘Turnberry Bond’ and by approaching the Parliament
at Scone in 1290 with an armed retinue.
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Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of the view in the source
• The claims of Bruce and Balliol were not the only ones: Hastings, Florence of Holland and others.
• Balliol’s claim appears to have most support amongst the Community of the Realm.
• Edward I would be invited to judge the claims and would choose Balliol, using local law.
• Edward would demand overlordship as the ‘price’ of his intervention.
• GWS Barrow: argues that the Appeal of the Seven Earls is a weak claim, reflecting the general
weakness of Bruce’s position.
• Caroline Bingham: more inclined to accept the legitimacy of Bruce’s claim, argues the Seven
Earls were a ‘notional’ group.
• Alan Young: argues that Balliol was already seen as the candidate with the strongest claim by the
majority of the Community of the Realm.
• Michael Penman: argues that Balliol had the best claim and that the weakness of the Appeal of
the Seven Earls reflected Bruce’s desperation.
• Michael Prestwich: has argued that the Appeal is a reflection of the depth of the faction which
afflicted the Scottish nobility.
which a consideration of Source A is useful for understanding the claims of Robert Bruce and John
Balliol to the throne of Scotland during the ‘Great Cause’.
Marks
immediate or wider context. Candidate may make relevant and appropriate provenance
comments.
4-5 The candidate’s answer shows a limited understanding of the views in the source, and little if
any sense of context. Answer may lack clear structure with points made randomly, indicating
little grasp of significance, although in places the candidate’s interpretation may be fairly well-
written with some relevant points of explanation made. Candidate may make relevant and
appropriate provenance comments.
6-8 The candidate makes relevant and appropriate provenance comments and the interpretation is
historians’ views.
9-12 The candidate’s interpretation offers accurate, wide-ranging and convincing argument; showing
a clear understanding of the provenance of the source and the views in it. There is a solid grasp
of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Appropriate
reference to historians’ views will be credited highly.
Page 29
Question 2
How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing views on the career of William Wallace?
(16 marks)
Interpretation (maximum 6 marks)
Contextual and historical interpretations (maximum 10 marks)
• The quality and depth of the contextual recall

• The quality and depth of the wider perspectives
• The range and quality of historians’ views
• Provenance comment (if appropriate)
The candidate considers the views in Sources B and C on the career of William Wallace, and offers a
structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source B
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. Accurate comment
on GWS Barrow will be credited as historiography:
• Wallace made Guardian in the name of King John, and knighted.

• ‘Captain of the Scottish people’.
• Wallace in the position to issue orders to earls and barons.
• Made significant appointments, especially Lamberton to the See of St Andrews.
• Murray had been killed at Stirling Bridge, leaving Wallace in sole command: had Murray lived,
Wallace’s significance might have been less.
• Wallace never claimed to govern in his own right.
• As Guardian he also reopened trade with the continent (the Lubeck letter).
• Led raids on northern England; adopted methods of guerrilla warfare.
• Evidence of planning defence of Scotland seen by use of trained infantry at Falkirk.
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Source C
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. These may
include: accurate comment on Fisher will be credited as historiography:
• Wallace failed to end English occupation and return Scottish independence.

• By the time of Wallace’s death in 1305 Scotland had been reduced to the status of a ‘land’.
• Balliol had not been restored.
• Wallace would have been an opponent of Bruce had he lived.
• Wallace’s defeat at Falkirk ended his Guardianship.

• Wallace’s influence diminished rapidly after 1298, though he may have been involved in the
diplomatic mission to Rome in 1300, or in Paris.
• Led renewed guerrilla resistance after 1305.
• His arrest was probably due to betrayal by a Scottish lord.
• His trial was a ‘show trial’; Wallace denied he was a traitor as he had never sworn fealty to
Edward I.
Points from recall which offer wider contextualisation of the views in the sources
• Wallace significant because he was a commoner.

• Neither Stirling Bridge nor Falkirk was decisive.
• Bruce was present at the surrender of Irvine, which may have been designed to ‘buy time’ for
Wallace’s rebellion in 1297.
• Wallace inspired the resistance which continued after 1298.
• His role was more or less ignored by Bruce later on.
• Michael Penman: argues that Wallace may have been more successful had he been supported by
the Balliol-Comyn faction after Stirling Bridge. He has stated that the victory at Stirling Bridge
was as much a blow against the Bruces as it was against the English. He criticises Wallace’s
decision to fight at Falkirk.
• Fiona Watson: has argued that William Wallace’s campaigns showed the nobles what could be
achieved when ‘unorthodox’ tactics were used.
• Ranald Nicholson: has argued that whilst Wallce may have been ‘under the tutelage’ of Wishart
and the Stewart before the surrender at Irvine, he operated as a free agent after that. He argues
that Wallace’s tactics foreshadow those that would be used by Bruce in later years, and that
Wallace’s significance in promoting the ‘national’ cause outlasted his defeat.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the career of
William Wallace.
Page 31
Marks
1-4 Vaguely written, merely re-describing the sources; not answering the question or showing
clearly written and sensibly structured. The explanation ranges over several relevant points
and shows an understanding of the views of the sources, sets material in context, shows a good
12-16 The candidate’s interpretation offers accurate, wide-ranging and convincing argument,
showing a clear understanding of the views of the sources. There is a solid grasp of immediate
and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Greater awareness and
development of historical interpretations and/or historians’ views will be credited highly.
Page 32
Question 3
How fully does Source D illustrate the importance of the Scottish Church during the reign of
Robert the Bruce (1306-1329)? (12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source D as an adequate explanation of the importance
of the Scottish Church during the reign of Robert the Bruce (1306-1329) in terms of:
include:
• Bishop Lamberton was a consistent supporter of the ‘national cause’.

• Seen as a ‘patriot, free of faction’.
• Lamberton had sided with Bruce in the ‘Secret Band’ of 1304.
• He was captured by the English after Bruce’s coronation in 1306.
• Celebrated mass for King Robert.

• Recognised King Robert’s kingship.
• Swore fealty to King Robert.
• Lamberton had escaped from Berwick to be present at the coronation.

• Recognition of Bruce’s kingship important in the context of the sacrilegious murder of Comyn.
• Loyalty of senior churchmen vital to Bruce’s later success.
• Declaration of the Clergy.

• Church provided administrative support – Abbot Bernard and the Chancery.
• Bishop Wishart was a consistent supporter of Bruce; absolved him of the murder of Comyn.
• Vital in maintaining popular support, especially after Bruce’s excommunication.
• Declaration of Arbroath written under the supervision of Abbot Bernard.
• Church was a consistent supporter of independence as the ‘special daughter of Rome’.
Page 33
• Geoffrey Barrow sees the conversion of Lamberton to the ‘Bruce’ faction as a decisive turning
point in Bruce’s bid for the throne. He emphasises the role of churchmen in promoting the
‘national cause in the wars’, eg Abbot Bernard de Linton, “Scotland’s outstanding medieval
chancellor”, and argues that the Declaration of the Clergy was crucial in bolstering support for
Bruce in Scotland.
• R Nicholson: emphasises the role of churchmen as opinion formers on the side of the ‘national’
cause, and notes that whilst it may be difficult to argue that the church held an ‘institutional’ view
that most of its leading members supported ecclesiastical independence from England.
• Alan Young: holds the view that the pro-Comyn outlook of most bishops before the appointment
of Lamberton reflects their political dominance before 1306.
• Michael Penman: has shown that many leading churchmen, such as Bishop Henry Cheyne of
Aberdeen, were never loyal to the Bruce cause.
which a consideration of Source D is helpful in offering a full explanation of importance to the
Scottish Church during the reign of Robert the Bruce.
Marks
Page 34
The Renaissance in Italy in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries
Part 1
Question 1
How important a part did commercial activity play in the development of the Florentine
Renaissance in the first half of the fifteenth century?
This question invites candidates to explore the relationship between the economic development of
Florence and those developments which are collectively characterised as the early Renaissance
(c. 1400-50). There is some scope for the candidate to explore other factors which may have
contributed to the early Renaissance but the emphasis should be on economic and commercial
developments.
The candidate would be expected to use evidence such as:
• Commercial activity
− The growth of trade, especially the wool/textile industry
− Wealth accumulation as a result of trade
− Contemporary evidence of Florentine mercantile prosperity, eg the diary of Gregorio Dati
− The growth of banking and the great banking houses and especially the Medici
− The extent of international banking and trade
− Trade routes, especially into France and northern Europe
− Acquisitions through trade and their impact on artistic developments
• The economic, social and political significance of guilds and especially of the seven major guilds
− Guild control over Florentine life
− Guild rivalry and the arts, eg the niches at Orsanmichele (various artists including Donatello)
− The Arte della Lana and the competition for the cupola of the Duomo (Brunelleschi)
− The Arte del Calimala and the competition for the Baptistery doors (Brunelleschi)
− Por Santa Maria and the Foundlings hospital (Brunelleschi)
• The growth of artistic patronage and consumerism

− Contemporary views of the connection between wealth and investment in art/architecture, eg
Giovanni Rucellai
− The possible motives for such investment
− The passion for collecting, eg the Medici patronage of Vespasiano da Bisticci
− The emergence of conspicuous consumption/consumerism in Florence
− The preconditions for the growth of a luxury market in Renaissance Italy as applied toFlorence,
eg social mobility
• Alternate views emphasising the evolution of artistic styles/the influence of humanism

− Possible links between humanism and economic prosperity
Page 35
• Alison Brown: The Italian Renaissance, especially ‘Big Business Florence’. Emphasises the
‘new man’ factor.
• Richard Goldthwaite: The Renaissance Economy: The Preconditions for Luxury Consumption
• Richard Goldthwaite: The Building of Renaissance Florence: An Economic and Social History
• Gene Brucker: especially ‘The Economy’ in Renaissance Florence
• The recent emphasis placed on the emergence of consumerism in the Renaissance, eg Richard
Goldthwaite: Wealth and the Demand for Art in Italy
• Lisa Jardine: worldly goods:
• Evelyn Welch: Renaissance Shopping. Much recent work in this field is connected with the
collaborative academic project, The Material Renaissance.
• For a more traditional explanation, see George Holmes: Florence, Rome and the Origins of the
Renaissance
Page 36
Question 2
How justified is the view that artists working in the early sixteenth century enjoyed much
greater status and artistic independence than had been the case in 1400?
This essay invites candidates to consider the traditional view that the status of artists improved
between c. 1400 and c. 1530 in the light of recent work focusing on artist-patron relationships and on
the variety of workshops that existed at this time.
• Vasari’s Lives of the Artists as an important source of information about the status of particular
artists.
• The social origins of artists.
• The nature of workshops at the beginning of the period.
• Compulsory membership of trade guilds.
• The relationship between patron and artist as revealed by contracts and correspondence.
• Exemplification of fifteenth century artist-patron relationships, ie Gozzoli and Piero de Cosimo de
Medici.
• The changing artist-patron relationship by the sixteenth century.
• The remuneration of artists: comparisons with other manual workers.
• The humanistic rediscovery of Pliny’s account of the status of artists in antiquity.
• Alberti’s On Painting elevated the status of the artist.
• The limited circulation of On Painting.
• The emergence of the idea of individual genius, emphasised by Vasari.
• In the sixteenth century, Castiglione argued that the perfect courtier should be educated in painting
and drawing.
• Social prejudices against artists such as the fact that art involved manual work, artists were often
uneducated.
• The input of humanists.
• The renown of the most famous sixteenth century artists.
• Michelangelo’s inscription on his Pieta for St Peter’s ‘Angelus Bonarotus Florentinus Faciebat’.
• Leonardo, Michelangelo, Raphael and Titian as examples of artists whose work was much sought
by connoisseurs such as Isabella D’Este.
• The role and status of court artists such as Mantegna.
• The emergence of the forerunner of the early Academies in 1531.
• Even in 1530, most artists remained craftsmen.
Page 37
• The view suggested by the question is supported by Vasari’s Lives of the Artists. Vasari sedulously
advertised the enhanced respect accorded to artists by great men, eg Leonardo dying in the arms of
Francis I.
• Leon Batista Alberti: On Painting also did much to enhance the status of art and of artists. There
remain serious questions about how widely On Painting circulated.
• EH Gombrich: writing in The Story of Art, in 1950, describes the ‘liberation’ of the artist during the
Renaissance. (‘At last, the artist was free’) More recent work has suggested that this is an
oversimplification.
• Evelyn Welch: in Art in Renaissance Italy highlights the variety of different experiences which make
generalisation dangerous.
• Michael Baxandall: Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy examines the interaction
between artist and patron to produce what he describes as ‘a deposit of a social relationship’.
• Peter Burke: The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy examines the changing relationship
between artist and patron. Burke’s work is based on a detailed study of the social origins of 136 artists,
many of whom came from ‘artistic dynasties’. Burke argues that ‘given their social background,
Renaissance artists generally did more or less what they were told’.
• Francis Ames Lewis: The Intellectual Life of the Early Renaissance Artist.
• Annabel Thomas: The Painter’s Practice in Renaissance Tuscany is an examination of the
commissioning, production and marketing of paintings, based on the workshop of Neri di Bicci.
Page 38
Question 3
‘Princely government masked by a façade of Republican institutions.’ How far do you agree
with this view of Medicean rule in fifteenth century Florence?
This question asks candidates to discuss the nature of Medici rule in Florence between 1434 and 1494
and to consider the extent to which the Medici were essentially the signori of Florence. While there
may be some reference to the use of the arts/architecture as instruments of ‘princely magnificence’, the
candidate should use such evidence to establish the nature of Medicean rule.
Candidates would be expected to use evidence such as:
• ‘The façade of Republican institutions’

− the contemporary image of Florence as a Republic as seen in the work of Salutati and Bruni, etc
− rhetoric or principle; the debate about the meaning of liberty in 15th century Florence
− the oligarchic nature of the pre-Medicean Republic
− the system of government and the controls exercised by Brucker’s ‘patriciate’
− the importance of private interest, as well as the recognition of public welfare
• The attributes of ‘princely government’

− the authority and influence of the signori
− the limits of princely government, or despotism (PJ Jones)
• The rise of the Medici Party

− the emergence of a Medici party
− the Medici ascendancy represented the almost complete triumph of an unofficial government in
the private interest over constitutional government in the public interest (Kent)
− the inclusive nature of the Medici oligarchy: ‘a single party embraced the state’ (Kent)
• Florence under the Cosimo and Piero

− the manipulation of the ‘constitution’ by Cosimo: the use of emergency Balie and the Council
of 100; Hale describes this as ‘a quiet revolution’
− representation was narrowed after Cosimo returned to Florence in 1434 (Hale)
− the limits on Cosimo’s power and the acceptance by the ottimati of the Medici under Cosimo
(Pater Patriae)
− Cosimo’s interests coincided with those of the ruling elite
− the rigging of the taxation system to favour Medici supporters
− ‘in spite of the lip service still paid to the ideal of wide representation, the current had long been
set in the direction of taut oligarchic control’ (Hale)
− the indisputable Medici dominance of Florence’s foreign policy (Hale)
− Medici rule questioned 1464-69 but change was rejected by the ottimati because of the threat to
stability that this posed (Hale)
• The extent of Lorenzo’s influence

− the Pazzi conspiracy and the Council of Seventy, which further undermined Republican
institutions
− Cosimo and Lorenzo contrasted/compared
− the limits of Lorenzo’s influence
− even in the late fifteenth century, many government positions were filled by lot
− Lorenzo’s ambitions for his family, ie the quest for a cardinal’s hat for his son Giovanni
− Hale’s verdict: ‘the system was best described as pro-Medicean rather than Medicean tout
court’.
Page 39
• Philip Jones: Communes and Despots in Late Medieval Italy argues that the so-called city
republics were in fact far from democratic.
• Dale Kent: The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426-1434 gives detailed analysis of the
formation of a loyal ‘Medici Party’ which would help bring the Medici to power and sustain them
once they were the leading family of Florence.
• Rubinstein, Nicolai: The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) highlights the
differences between Cosimo’s and Lorenzo’s relationship with the republic.
• John Hale: Florence under the Medici. Emphasises the extent to which the Medici governed with
the consent of the ottimati, and is sceptical about Lorenzo’s desire to transform Florence into a
princely state.
• Judith Hook: Lorenzo de Medici: A Historical Biography was written by an academic, but a
fairly general view of Lorenzo’s life.
• Christopher Hibbert and Paul Strathearn tell the Medici story from a non-specialist point of
view.
• Anthony Molho: Cosimo de Medici: Pater Patriae or Padrino? examines the role of patronage in
politics. Power belonged to Cosimo ‘…not because of force, nor because of his control of the
electoral processes, but… because he had created a political machine which made it possible to
reward those who co-operated with him’.
• Gene Brucker: Civic Traditions in Premodern Italy considers the ways in which the Medici
immobilised their rivals and rewarded their friends, thereby undermining older, republican
institutions. Lorenzo ‘built a polity that retained its formal republican façade while enabling its
maestro to control the levers of power’.
Page 40
Question 4
How distinctive was the contribution made by the princely courts in Mantua and Urbino to the
development and dissemination of Renaissance culture?
The candidate is asked to assess the nature of the contribution of two of the most culturally significant
princely courts to the development and spread of Renaissance culture. In this context Renaissance
culture may embrace humanism and education, art and architecture, music and literature. Candidates
are expected to reach a conclusion about the extent to which the contribution of these courts was
distinctive. While some candidates may refer to other princely courts, this is not essential and the full
range of marks should be available to answers referring only to the identified courts at Mantua and
Urbino.
• Traditional approaches to the Renaissance tended to ignore the contributions of the courts.
• The concept of a princely court.
• The development of courtier culture.
• The concept of ‘magnificence’ which prevailed in the courts.
• The demands created by ideas of princely magnificence.
• Court consumerism.
• Court patronage of humanism as a means of extolling princely virtues.
• The search for recognition in Italy and through Europe.
The contribution of the Montefeltro Court at Urbino
• The ideal of the active and contemplative life embodied in the court of Frederico da Montefeltro.
• Imagery in the palace at Urbino ‘alludes to the civilising arts of peace made possible by the
prudent conduct of war’ (Cole).
• The significance of the palace at Urbino: ‘an eloquent symbol of Frederico da Montefeltro’s
peacetime ambitions’, as well as of his status and rank.
• The symbolic importance of Frederico’s studiolo.
• The chivalric culture of Urbino.
• Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier (Urbino) and its influence both within and beyond Italy.
• The dissemination of courtly ideals through the work of Raphael (born in Urbino).
The contribution of the Gonzaga court at Mantua
• Mantua was relatively small and poor when compared with Milan or Venice.
• Like the Montefeltri, the Gonzagas’ income depended on the income and titles gained as
condottieri.
• The Gonzagas’ ambition to make their mark diplomatically.
• The role of art and architecture in this ambition.
• The realisation of Alberti’s plans for rebuilding much of Mantua.
• The role of the court artist, exemplified by Mantegna at Mantua.
• The propaganda value of courtly art and the Camera Picta in Mantua.
• The use of the Camera Picta in Gonzaga-brokered diplomacy.
• Isabella D’Este’s patronage: collecting for pleasure and prestige.
• Her involvement in the details of commissioned paintings.
• Vasari’s identification of the differences between court art and the art of the Republics (Life of
Perugino). Wealth and status more easily achieved at court.
Page 41
• Alison Cole: Virtue and Magnificence: Art of the Italian Renaissance Courts relates
developments at key courts, including Mantua and Urbino, to the idea of Princely Magnificence.
She claims that it was in the smaller courts – including Mantua and Urbino – that the artist was
most likely to achieve a measure of status/independence.
• Lauro Martines: Power and Imagination considers the role of magnificence at court and its
impact on extravagance and excessive expenditure to enhance self-image.
• Peter Burke: The Italian Renaissance: Culture and Society in Italy considers music and literature
as well as the visual arts.
• M. Hollingsworth: Patronage in Renaissance Italy considers the patronage of Federigo da
Montefeltro.
• David Mateer (ed.): Courts, Patrons and Poets. The introductory chapter by Peter Elmer
identifies various aspects of court culture in Milan, Mantua and Urbino. ‘All three share similar
political and cultural traits… [such as awareness of] the political advantages to be gained through
patronage of the arts. But there are also subtle differences of emphasis which reflect the varying
extent to which the classical revival in art and letters penetrated the artistic sensibilities of
Renaissance Italians.’
Page 42
Question 5
How distinctive was the Venetian Renaissance?
This question requires candidates to identify the main characteristics of the Venetian Renaissance
(visual arts, architecture and humanism) and to evaluate the extent to which these were unique to
Venice. Comparisons with features of the Renaissance elsewhere may permeate answers but the main
focus of candidates’ answers should be on the Venetian experience.
• The influence of Venetian geography and history on the development of art:

− Byzantine influences, especially in church architecture
− The use of mosaic
− Islamic influences after 1453
− Other non-Italian cultural influences from Flanders and Germany (evident in the work of
Bellini)
− The extensive market for Venetian art within Italy
− The trade in art materials from the east, from southern Germany and from the eastern Adriatic
− Lack of classical heritage tinged Venetian use of classical themes with romanticism
− Use of oil painting as a response to the Venetian climate (fresco did not survive)
− Venetian landscape painting as a response to a nostalgic longing for the terraferma
− The alleged influence of the quality of light in Venice
− The wealthiest city in the world after c. 1500
• The influence of Venetian politics on the development of art:

− The myth of Venice and its politico-religious claims for the city
− The survival of Republican oligarchic government in Venice
− Art as propaganda for the Serenissima Republica
− The Republican government as a patron of the arts: the decoration of the Doge’s Palace
− The energies of artists were not diverted into exalting despotism
− Large scale patronage of the arts by scuole (confraternities), independent noblemen and
churches
− This encouraged diversity in Venice as Florentine art was restricted by the establishing of the
Medici Duchy
• The key characteristics of Venetian Renaissance art: [light, colour and subject matter (narrative
themes, eroticism, classical mythology)] as seen in the work of artists such as Bellini, Giorgione
and Titian:
− A relatively secular society inspired the romanticism of Giorgione and Titian
− Key characteristics of Venetian architecture, as seen in the work of architects such as Sansovino
• Venetian humanism and education:

− Venice lacked the long literary tradition of Florence and the intermingling of art and thought
found there
− In Venice, humanism only became popular in the late fifteenth century (George Holmes)
− Connections with the east meant that there was a greater interest in Greek manuscripts in
Venice
− The existence of the Aldine press after 1494 popularised the classics
− Theocritian literature inspired a love of landscape and classicism among the educated nobility
Page 43
The two best known studies of the artistic Renaissance in Venice are: John Steer: Venetian Art and
Peter Humfrey: Painting in Renaissance Venice.
• Steer argues that the Renaissance developed later in Venice, but that ‘what they, or more
specifically Giovanni Bellini, astonishingly achieved, as an independent Renaissance style which
‘rediscovered the world and man’ in a way parallel to, but different from, that of central Italy’.
• Humfrey: contrasts the art of the later fifteenth century Florentine Renaissance (cool colours,
sharp clear outlines) with the ‘warm, atmospheric radiance’ of Bellini’s Giobbe altarpiece (c.
1480), which succeeds in ‘evoking a transcendental world of the spirit’.
• George Holmes: Renaissance contains a useful chapter on the Venetian Renaissance.
• Mary Fortini Brown: Art and Life in Renaissance Venice considers Venetian art in its social
setting and the way in which Venetian society shaped Venetian art.
Page 44
Question 6
To what extent can the High Renaissance in Rome be attributed to papal patronage?
This question asks the candidate to evaluate the significance of the contribution of papal patronage to
the High Renaissance. Candidates should recognise the importance of papal patronage while
acknowledging that there were other factors involved, including patronage from senior cardinals, the
Curia, etc.
• The role of papal patronage:

− The presence of the Papacy in Rome, after the Schism
− The revival of the Papacy in the second half of the fifteenth century
− Julius II and Leo X enhanced the temporal powers of the Pope
− Church finances and borrowing
− Papal patronage of Michelangelo (Julius II); Raphael (Julius II); Bramante (Alexander VI,
Julius II and Leo X)
− Julius II’s desire to enhance the status of the Papacy by exploiting art and architecture as
propaganda
− Julius II’s plans for Rome, including St Peter’s
• Other factors, including the nature of pre-Counter Reformation society in Rome:

− The presence of vast wealth in Rome including the papal court
− The building of palaces as wealthy Romans and cardinals competed to live in the finest
buildings
− Cardinals as patrons
− The nature of secular patronage including work commissioned by Agostino Chigi
• The influence of classicism in Rome:

− The discovery of the Laocoon in 1506
− The development of ideas which had their origin in the fifteenth century, eg classical themes
already present in Alberti’s work
− The influence of neo-platonism
− The combining of classical and Christian ideas in the Sistine chapel ceiling (1508-12) and the
Vatican Stanze, ie the school of Athens
• The changing relationship between artist and wealthy patron, as exemplified by Michelangelo:
− Great artists were international figures whom the wealthy everywhere sought to commission
− The raised status of art
• Outside influences including:

− The High Renaissance in Rome owed much to developments in the previous century in Florence
− Developments elsewhere in Italy, eg the expulsion of the Medici
− The influence of artistic developments north of the Alps, eg in landscape
− The devastation of the sack of Rome effectively ended the Roman High Renaissance
Page 45
• George Holmes: Renaissance emphasises the importance of classical influences in Rome, as well
as role of the papacy.
• Peter Partridge: Renaissance Rome. By providing a portrait of Roman society in the sixteenth
century, Partridge sets the High Renaissance in its social context.
• Mary Holdsworth: Patronage in Renaissance Italy. Part 4 of this book examines the nature and
extent of papal patronage.
• Linda Murray: The High Renaissance and Mannerism. The approach of the art historian.
• Andrew Graham Dixon: Renaissance. Popular TV art historian who emphasises the importance
of patronage by Julius II and Leo X.
• Ingrid Rowland: The Culture of the High Renaissance. Ancients and moderns in sixteenth
century Rome.
• Christine Shaw: Julius II: The Warrior Pope. An academic study of Julius’ efforts to reassert
the temporal authority of the Papacy, this includes a chapter on Julius’ work as a patron.
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The Renaissance in Italy in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries
Part 2
Question 1
How useful is Source A for understanding the nature of the changes in Florentine art and
architecture between 1400 and 1450? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of the usefulness of Source A in understanding the nature
of the changes in Florentine art and architecture between 1400 and 1450 in terms of:
• Giorgio Vasari wrote the Lives of the Artists for his patron, Duke Cosimo I, over 100 years after
the early Florentine Renaissance had taken place.
• Vasari envisaged the artistic achievements of the last 250 years as leading to the triumph of
Leonardo, Raphael and Michelangelo.
• He wrote of three separate phases in artistic progress: that associated with Masaccio being the
second phase
• Vasari was deeply critical of medieval art, which he found flat and lifeless.
• Vasari was the first person to develop a vocabulary of critical appraisal.
• Written as a history of the development of art and to celebrate Florentine achievements.
Points from source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)
• Great artists often emerge at the same time

• The work of Brunelleschi et al finally dispelled the crude style of the middle ages
• Their work stimulated their successors
• Masaccio introduced naturalism into his paintings
• References to particular works by any of the named artists, eg the Foundlings Hospital and the
Old Sacristy at San Lorenzo; Masaccio’s Holy Trinity in Santa Maria Novella; Donatello’s
David.
• Explanation of achievements of these artists, eg perspective (Brunelleschi and Masaccio); revival
of classical symmetry in architecture (Brunelleschi); nude sculpture (Donatello); Masaccio’s
frescoes in the Brancacci chapel.
• Contrast with earlier work of Giotto, Duccio, etc.
• Ghiberti’s early work was still international gothic in style; contrast with later work on ‘gates of
paradise’.
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Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of the views in the source
• Vasari ignored the continuing vogue for the international gothic style.
• Vasari himself recognised the achievements of Cimabue and Giotto in his Lives.
• The achievements of all of these artists were recognised at the time.
• George Holmes: early fifteenth century art as highly innovative.

• Linda and Peter Murray: emphasise that there were two different innovative styles in painting
(international gothic and early Renaissance) in the early fifteenth century and that both were
influential in Florence.
• Frederick Hartt: argues that the ‘Renaissance style emerges most clearly in architecture; then in
sculpture’.
• Ernst Gombrich: highlights the earlier precedents for fifteenth century art, as well as influences
from outside Florence, ie northern Europe
which a consideration of the Source A is useful for understanding the nature of changes in Florentine
art and architecture between 1400 and 1450.
Marks
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Question 2
How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing views of the significance of the work of
humanists in the first half of the fifteenth century? (16 marks)

• provenance comment (if appropriate)
The candidate considers the views in Sources B and C of the significance of the work of humanists in
the first half of the fifteenth century and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms
of:
Source B
on Garin will be credited as historiography.
• Humanists recognised the historical dimension of classical texts.

• The humanist discovery of antiquity is the same as humanist discovery of man.
• The humanist was aware of the difference between antiquity and his own time.
• This recognition of the distinction between past and present encouraged humanists to accept
responsibility for shaping public life.
• Renaissance humanists as collectors of manuscripts and philologists.

• Renaissance humanists as historians.
• Possible references to humanists such as Salutati, Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini and Valla.
• Virgil and Aristotle were both studied in the Middle Ages but interpreted differently in the
Renaissance.
• Garin emphasised the importance of the philologists.
• Valla’s exposure of the Donation of Constantine illustrates the importance of the historical work
done by humanists.
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Source C
on Baron/Hankins will be credited as historiography.
Points from source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s):
• Baron emphasised the change that took place in humanism around 1402.
• At that time of crisis the introspective approach of scholars like Petrarch seemed inappropriate.
• Classical learning must serve the state.
• Leonardo Bruni created a new sort of scholarship which would serve the interests of Florentine
republicanism.
Points from recall which develop and contextualise those in the source:
• The crisis of 1402 and the reaction of Florentine patriots.

• Bruni’s Panegyric to the city of Florence.
• Bruni’s belief that Republican and liberty loving Florence had saved Italy from tyranny.
• Bruni’s belief that Florentine ‘liberty’ could be traced back to the Roman republic.
• Further exploration of Baron’s concept of civic humanism.
Points which offer wider contextualisation of the views in the sources:
• The limitations of Renaissance history.

• The historiographical debate about civic humanism.
• Criticisms of Baron’s work, eg dating of certain significant works and assumptions about the
nature of Florentine republicanism.
• Humanism stimulated an alleged revival of paganism.
• Bruni was a propagandist who also defended princely rule.
• The medieval antecedents of Renaissance humanism.
• Humanist ideas may have influenced the development of the visual arts.
• Burckhardt: tended to underplay the importance of the humanist scholars.

Critics of the Baron thesis, including:
• Hankins: Bruni was employed to produce political propaganda.
• Kristeller: emphasised the significance of rhetorical training to humanists.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the significance of
the work of humanists in the first half of the fifteenth century.
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Marks
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Question 3.
How fully does Source D illustrate the role and status of women in Renaissance Italy?
(12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source D as an adequate explanation of the role and
status of women in terms of:
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. These may include:
• Alberti was a leading humanist whose work on the family reflects new Renaissance values about the
immediate family.
• On the Family takes the form of a dialogue in which the nature of the family, and individual roles
within it, are discussed.
• Francesco Barbero published a similar treatise, On Wifely Duties.
• Men are more suited to the affairs of the world than women.
• Women’s nature makes them more suited to the domestic environment.
• A woman should be largely confined to the house.
• Women should look after domestic affairs and possessions.
Points from recall which support, develop and contextualise those in the source:
• Further exemplification from either Alberti or Barbero.

• Other primary evidence for the status of women, eg Gregorio Dati’s diary.
• Extent to which this challenged medieval views of women.
• Few Renaissance women exerted authority outside the home.
• Examples of those who did, eg Isabella d’Este, Alessandra Strozzi.
• Dowries and arranged marriages.
Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of the views in the source:
• The existence of a minority of powerful women who enjoyed high status and whose role was
independent of men.
• The extent to which the religious life gave women more control over their own lives.
• Some humanists accepted that women should be educated.
• Some female humanists such as Laura Cerata.
• The experience of peasant and urban working-class women.
• Much contemporary historiography explores ‘history from below’ and the experiences of working
class women.
• Something on sexual mores; the ideal of the purity of women.
• Courtesans.
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• Jacob Burckhardt: women experienced a Renaissance as well as men.

• Joan Kelly: refutation of Burckhardt’s argument. Argues that women’s lives became more
constrained during the Renaissance, in ‘Did Women have a Renaissance?’. Joan Kelly’s view
that women were disempowered by the Renaissance since their lives were privatised and removed
to the domestic sphere. Kelly’s criticism that bourgeois tracts such as this ‘constitute the extreme
in this denial of women’s independence’.
• Margaret King also argues that women’s roles were increasingly constrained.
• Samuel Cohn: Women in the Streets.
• Christine Klapisch-Zuber: Women, Family and Ritual in Renaissance Italy.
• Both Cohn and Klapisch-Zuber are exponents of ‘history from below’. They consider the
experience of ordinary women during the Renaissance.
which a consideration of Source D is helpful in offering a full explanation of the status and role of
women during the Renaissance.
Marks
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France in the Age of Louis XIV
Part 1
Question 1
How valid is the view that, in assessing Louis XIV’s effective control over his kingdom, ‘the
limitations rather than the strengths of monarchical power’ are apparent?
The aim of the essay is to examine critically the traditional view that Louis aimed at and achieved a
more centralised and bureaucratic form of government in France. Candidates should discuss the
difficulties faced by 17th century governments in implementing policies, and in particular should
examine different interpretations of the role of the intendants and the continuing importance of local
institutions and elite groups.
Candidate might be expected to use evidence such as:
• Reasons why Louis XIV would actively seek to extend royal control over central and provincial
institutions, eg reaction to Fronde disorder, control over local elites, fiscal efficiency, obligation to
his dynasty, duty as king to promote order and justice.
• Development of council system after 1661 to increase king’s personal control over central
government and supervise more effectively France’s local government institutions.
• Series of key ordinances promulgated without consulting the estates, reforming the legal and
judicial system; increased use by king of ‘reserved’ or ‘delegated justice’, special commissions,
police.
• Increased use of intendants as agents of royal will in the provinces: wide scope but limited powers
of their remit; need to avoid infringing rights of local elites, as reflected for example in Colbert’s
correspondence with intendants.
• Weakened role of provincial governors, increased royal control over provincial estates,
parliaments and town councils.
• Drive to impose order and justice in remote areas with lawless nobility, notably in Auvergne.
• But need to proceed delicately as co-operation of local elites still vital for functioning of
provincial affairs.
• Absolute monarchy for Louis did not mean he wished to destroy or override rights and privileges
of other institutions.
• Limited number of bureaucrats available to implement government policies; effect of venality,
family and local connections on how they did their job.
• Problems of distance and poor communications.
• Great variation in laws and customs within France complicated administrative reform.
• Semi-independence enjoyed by the French church, owner of much of French land.
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• Shennan: Louis simply wished to maximise his authority within the framework of the existing
order.
• Beik: king could only rule by making compromises with persisting power centres, with their own
independently derived sources of influence.
• Treasure: provincial governor turned into a decorative non-entity, kept at Versailles while
intendant did his work in the province. But claims for absolutism more advanced than means for
putting it into practice. Monarchy never able to break resistance of conservative elements standing
in way of radical reform.
• Miller: Louis and team sought to manage existing system, not change it. He stresses the tangle of
institutions and jurisdictions Louis never able to unravel. Centralisation meant too much business
for Versailles and slower decision making.
• Mettam: Louis took careful account of powerful vested interests. But in the provinces, ministerial
initiatives often savoured of arbitrary interference.
• Sturdy: crown had to come to terms with provincial institutions for without their co-operation
effective government would have been impossible. Louis handled the remaining powerful
provincial estates with a blend of negotiation, machination, division and coercion. Unrealistic to
suppose that 32 intendants alone could turn France into a centralised state. Louis’ government
lacked mechanisms capable of imposing policies effectively throughout the kingdom. By present
standards, Louis’ France was under-governed.
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Question 2
How successful was Louis XIV’s policy of promoting religious unity in his kingdom?
The candidate will be expected to discuss Louis’ policies towards religious non-conformity in France,
the extent to which groups targeted were reduced or eliminated, and by what measure this constituted
success.
The candidate might be expected to use evidence such as:
• Reasons why Louis sought to eliminate religious diversity in France: duty of king for spiritual
welfare of all subjects; pressure from Catholic hierarchy, influence of Jesuits; political dislike of
factions; anomalous position of Huguenot minority; impress Pope, Catholic Europe.
• Identification of groups targeted, classes and areas affected: Huguenots, strong in south and west,
Jansenists, devout intellectuals from upper class, Quietists, another fringe Catholic group.
• Huguenot position, already weakened over the century, first undermined by increasingly severe
restrictions, and then terminated by Edict of Fontainebleau.
• Delight of most Frenchmen at Revocation: but Catholic opinion divided over persecution; critics
like Fenelon, Vauban.
• Extent of Huguenot conversion in response to pressure; concerns of Catholic episcopate about
blasphemy. Too few priests in SW to cope with conversions. Camisards rebellion in the
Cevennes. Ultimate survival of much-reduced Huguenot minority in spite of Revocation.
• Effect of Huguenot exodus on French economy [much debated].
• Reasons for Louis’ suspicion and dislike of Jansenists: influence of Jesuits, alleged Fronde
associations, high moral tone, puritanicism of group, on-going controversy about their beliefs.
• Louis’ initiatives to get Pope to condemn Jansenists, inconsistent with support for Gallican
independence of Rome; treatment of Port-Royal.
• King’s Jansenist policy stimulated controversy within French church. Jansenist sympathisers
survived into 18th century as critics of French monarchy.
• Further turmoil within French church due to Louis’ attack on ultra-spiritual Quietists; Bossuet vs.
Fenelon.
• Louis succeeded in severely restricting religious diversity in France, but at great cost: in the
process provoked controversy and division that was harmful to the church and monarchy.
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• Louis’ biographer Bluche emphasises the positives in Louis’ Huguenot policy, in terms of public
opinion and France’s Catholic neighbours.
• Mousnier: Louis a tyrant in his treatment of Huguenots; his methods inhuman, an affront to the
dignity of man, and contrary to the spirit of Christianity.
• Campbell: issues faced by Louis XIV pre-dated his reign and reflected a longer-term problem.
Louis and Catholic Church failed to realise that Protestantism was a faith grounded on individual
consciences, and not dependent on pastors and churches. Edict of Fontainebleau was a bad
miscalculation: Protestants remained remarkably stalwart in their faith. A mistake for Louis to
encourage Jansenist persecution and side with Jesuits: later victory of Jansenists over Jesuits in
18th century undermined royal authority.
• Treasure: royal policies destroyed institutional Protestantism, but also their respect for authority
and the king, previously very marked. Destroyed an existing desire for rapprochement with
Rome. Individual faith could not be blotted out by loss of churches and pastors.
• Sturdy: comments on Louis’ ‘obsessive orthodoxy’, his tendency, encouraged by factions around
him, to attempt crude simplistic solutions to very complex religious controversies. Louis turned
Jansenism into a cause which attracted much sympathy and influenced the religious history of
France until the Revolution. Revocation of Edict of Nantes earned Louis fewer plaudits than
perhaps he had hoped. Outside France, Louis was pilloried as a tyrant. Louis’ solutions to
religious problems stored up serious difficulties for state and church.
• Ogg: triumph of orthodoxy not won cheaply; suppression of Huguenotism and Jansenism had
repercussions on French thought; loss of popular esteem for monarchy because of association
with Jesuits.
• Shennan: Louis was anxious to leave a kingdom united in doctrinal purity to facilitate his own
salvation. As anxious to prevent theological divisions as civil disturbance. But approach
insensitive. Jansenism continued to disturb the peace of church and state.
• Beik: Louis antagonised the ecclesiastical establishment by allowing Pope to dictate to French
church in anti-Jansenist Bulls; Louis came full circle from allying with the French church against
the Pope and the Jansenists to allying with the Pope against the Jansenists and the French church,
so antagonising many influential people who began to question king’s religious role.
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Question 3
Were Louis XIV’s wars “necessary for the defence of the French Kingdom”?
The aim of the question is to invite discussion of Louis’ motives for pursuing what has traditionally
been seen as an aggressive foreign policy. Louis’ overall attitude towards warfare should be
considered, along with the international context in which he operated, and individual conflicts
analysed to exemplify his aims and achievements.
• Security of France his chief concern, to be achieved through peaceful or warlike means.
• Louis saw warfare as an intrinsic part of the king’s role, the prime means by which ‘gloire’ could
be achieved. Foreign affairs was Louis’ main interest and concern.
• Inherited concerns about Habsburg threat and weakness of eastern frontier.
• Focus on building powerful army, stronger naval force.
• Enjoyed campaigning in person with his troops, especially sieges. Surrounded by nobles and
ministers who shared his views about the glory of war.
Warfare in defence of French security
• Seized opportunity to strengthen Eastern frontier in Devolution War: a task pushed through in
outcome of Dutch War and Reunions. Very significant advance of Eastern frontier in Spanish
Netherlands, Alsace, Lorraine. Debate over whether he envisaged a Rhine frontier.
• Development of idea of ‘linear frontier’. Focus on fortress-building under Vauban to make new
frontier secure.
• By 1690s, forced onto defensive by strong coalition, under William of Orange, that Louis had
largely provoked himself. Final war of Spanish Succession was one Louis had tried to avoid by
Partition Treaties; early 1700s saw France under great threat from Grand Alliance.
• From 1665, problem of Spanish Succession posed a looming threat to French security, but also an
opportunity for great advancement for Louis and France.
Warfare as aggressive and opportunistic
• Louis himself said to have confessed to loving war too much.

• Opportunity for aggression presented by growing weakness of Spain, compliance of Charles II,
readiness of German princes to be bought off.
• Seized opportunity of wife’s claim to Spanish inheritance to invade Spanish Netherlands in 1667.
• Attack on Dutch in 1672 seen abroad as unjustified aggression.
• Departure of William of Orange for England in 1688 presented Louis with an opportunity to attack
the Palatinate to bolster his Rhenish gains.
• Opportunistic aggression seen also in Chambres de Reunion of early 1680s, though then he
achieved his expansionist aims, eg taking Strasbourg, without triggering an immediate war.
Warfare as expression of Louis’ ego
• Dutch war was caused more by Louis’ desire for revenge on Dutch than by defensive or
expansionist motives.
• Reasons for Louis’ antipathy: Dutch unfaithful allies in 1668; trade rivals; Protestants, merchants,
republican.
• But also sound strategic reasons for weakening the Dutch.
• Dutch war consolidated Louis’ gains on Eastern frontier, especially Franche Comte, but failed to
defeat Dutch, turned William of Orange into implacable enemy.
• Louis failed to understand how violent and aggressive his defensive policies seemed to France’s
neighbours.
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• Hatton: a determined defensive strategy was a vital element of Louis’ foreign policy.
• Shennan: Louis’ chief concern to maintain the security of his state. Shared contemporary
concept of family honour and reputation which bound king to aim for a glorious inheritance for
his successors. But there was thin dividing line between defensive needs of a regime threatened
by powerful neighbours and the offensive posturing of a state determined to establish its security
on the soundest footing.
• Sturdy: rejects idea that Louis had a ‘master plan’ in foreign policy. His approach abounds in
inconsistencies, expressing a yearning for peace with an assiduous pursuit of warfare for its own
sake. Recent scholarship emphasises role of accident and unforeseen circumstances in shaping
Louis’ policies, rather than seeking all-embracing explanations like state-building or pursuit of
gloire. Louis had to keep adjusting his policies as the international context kept changing. Louis
was just one contestant in the rough house of European international relations.
• Briggs: refers to lurking sense of insecurity beneath ostentation of Louis’ reign, emerging as an
obsessive concern for the prestige of his dynasty. Frenetic aggressiveness towards France’s
neighbours made a calamitous impression on Europe. Most of his wars seem almost gratuitous.
• Sonnino: Dutch war in part outcome of Louis’ love of campaigning, and encouragement by
Louvois and Turenne, not because of Protestant republicanism or economic necessity, but
because Dutch seemed easy victims.
• Mousnier: Louis obliged by society he lived in to seek glory to assure his power: true glory
could only to be gained by victory in war. War was a necessity to his nobles. Also he followed
the policy of previous French governments, to secure all routes by which armies could invade.
External situation impelled Louis to policy of preventive war. Habsburg menace now took form
of Spanish Succession: Louis’ efforts to solve this problem explain a major part of his foreign
policy.
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Question 4
Which groups within French society benefited most under Louis XIV’s regime?
The aim of the essay is to examine social change in France during Louis’ reign and the extent to which
it was affected by government actions. Candidates will be expected to analyse the benefits and show
awareness of some of the disadvantages encountered by all the main social groups.
• French society strictly hierarchical: three estates whose positions regulated by law.
• A massively unequal society: 10% owned enough property to feed themselves adequately, 90%
did not.
• All classes experienced effects of the regime’s policies on the economy, and the stresses of years
of war, but effects not equally distributed. Demands of government fell most heavily on Third
Estate, but some able to take advantage of opportunities offered by needs of others.
Did the nobility benefit much under Louis’ regime?
• Traditional view – Louis, fearful of overmighty subjects, deliberately undermined noble power
and privilege; sidelined them politically, appointed bourgeois ministers and officials.
• Second Estate not a homogeneous class: many ranks and conditions within nobility. Robe nobles
recent arrivals in aristocracy; sword nobles included poor provincials of ancient line; court nobles
a group apart.
• Many under financial pressure: inflation had eaten into incomes from estates; career in army
involved heavy expenses; Versailles lifestyle ruinously expensive; spending trends there spread to
wider nobility. Many court nobles dependent on king’s generosity; many noblesse d’epee families
forced to marry with richer robe families.
• Investigation of tax exemption questioned noble status of many ancient but poor families, and
resulted in their exclusion from Second Estate, so number of French nobles declined.
• Saint Simon lamented ruination of nobility, loss of their status and power. In reality, Louis’
regime did little to undermine their dominant position in French society. Few took advantage of
concession, by abolishing derogeance, to trade without loss of status. Nobles kept tax exemptions
(except for dixieme and capitation late in reign) and retained dominance in church, army,
diplomatic service, provincial affairs.
• Robe nobility arguably benefited most from Louis’ patronage. Though political aspirations of
parlementaires snuffed out by Louis, road to advancement and riches wide open through service
to the crown. Small circle of families staffing government departments particularly prospered,
gaining titles of highest rank.
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Did the middle class benefit under Louis’ regime?
• A largely urban class: how they fared under Louis depended on range of factors, such as health of
local economy, exposure to taxation.
• Key element in urban government through guilds and town corporations, though latter
increasingly subject to government control.
• Growth of industry and commerce under Colbert benefited some, as did protectionist policies. But
depressed trading conditions meant fewer families now able to rise through commerce into upper
ranks of urban society.
• Louis’ wars offered opportunities for ship-owners in ports to make rich pickings by privateering.
• Ample scope for investing profits of trade in land or offices. Constant need of government for
loans made rentiers big profits. Tax-farming subjected to greater scrutiny under Colbert, and
could ruin as well as enrich.
• Wealth made possible elevation to noble status through office-holding, with its attendant
privileges. Louis also ennobled by letters patent a range of talented men, including doctors,
architects and engineers.
Did the peasantry benefit in any way under Louis’ regime?
• Louis professed to give his people’s welfare high priority, but in fact his policies impacted most
harshly on his poorer subjects.
• Farming, the work of most French people, given little attention by Louis’ government.
Techniques remained primitive and yields low, though subject to wide regional variation.
• Adverse climate conditions as much responsible for peasant problems as government’s fiscal
policies.
• Government very aware of need to maintain taxpayer’s ability to keep paying, hence Colbert’s
efforts to lessen taille demands, regularise collection. Intendants at the sharp end of managing tax
yield fairly and efficiently. But switch of emphasis to indirect taxes, intended to get revenue from
exempt class, also hit poorer sections hard and left them more at mercy of tax-farmers.
Increasingly heavy war taxation provoked revolts of 1675 and 1707.
• Mousnier: Louis initiated a profound change in French social hierarchy: to nobility of birth or
office he added a nobility of talent. Began to undermine foundations of the social order when he
made payment of 20 livres capitation a qualification for noble status. France began to change
from a society of orders to a society of classes.
• Goubert: Louis’ policies imposed a heavy cost on his subjects; a mishandled economy and
decades of war had ruinous social consequences.
• Briggs: decline of social mobility within bourgeoisie; majority of successful merchant families
dominating towns enjoyed their comfortable niche within elaborate social hierarchies there, and
increasingly blocked route to the top for others.
• Kettering: Versailles undermined great nobles’ regional power by reducing their client networks.
• Beik disagrees: stresses importance for nobility of maintaining regional influence through
network of personal connections. Suggests that, faced with choice of developing bourgeoisie or
taking advantage of it, king more likely to take latter course; co-opted much of wealth and
economic initiative through sale of office and involvement in royal finance.
• Labrousse model: compares static and stagnating rural sector with dynamic and flexible urban
economy. Meuvret challenged this model, highlighting importance of communications and cash-
flows if either sector to be stimulated.
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Question 5
Was the promotion of culture by Louis XIV’s government ‘mere propaganda’?
The question is suggesting that the main aim of government sponsorship of French culture was to
promote the image and authority of the king. Candidates should show familiarity with the wide range
of cultural activities sponsored by Louis’ government, and be able to make a balanced assessment of
both their purpose and cultural importance.
• Louis XIV’s reign an era of great cultural activity and development in France.
• Much of this was encouraged and funded by the government, particularly thanks to Colbert, and
reflected the high value they placed on arts and learning as a vital national activity.
• Emphasis was placed on training and establishing styles and standards, as much as on propaganda
purposes.
• But government fully realised the value of culture for projecting the desired image of Louis XIV
to France and the wider world.
• Colbert and cultural advisers like Perrault, Chapelain, Le Brun, devised a deliberate plan to
celebrate Louis’ image and achievements through statues, medals, triumphal arches, paintings,
tapestries. Classical style of ancient Rome adopted as most appropriate for the purpose.
• Colbert also aware of political benefits of patronage of learning, bringing prestige for Louis at
home and abroad. His agenda continued after his death by Louvois.
• Aware of importance of international cultural dimension: encouraged French artists and
intellectuals to travel abroad, welcomed foreign talent.
• Use of patronage to get Louis a good press: got Chaplain to give him list of writers and scholars,
both French and foreign, to receive grants in return for recording Louis’ virtues in print. How far
royal patronage distorted quality and value of the literature they created is a matter for debate, as
is use of censorship and state control of printing press.
• Deliberate creation of a number of Academies, partly to encourage and support development of
learning and the arts, partly so that government could control and direct these areas. Above all
reflected a concern for quality in arts and scholarship: not just about propaganda.
• Academies of Painting and Sculpture, Music and Dance obviously valuable in providing artists of
high quality to embellish court life. Art regarded as an intellectual exercise, young painters
trained in maths and science. Importance of musical leadership of Lully, developing also a French
style of opera.
• Academy of Architecture, given task of developing a distinctively French style instead of
prevailing Baroque, largely left alone to decide on matters of taste and style.
• Academy of Sciences, established by state, provided with laboratory, observatory, costs of
publication met by state; but left free to decide on its own rules and purposes, engage in
experimental learning, joint research. Provided valuable practical advice to government on range
of matters, produced an important new atlas of France. Not used for propaganda.
• Versailles the ultimate achievement of government sponsorship of the arts: stylistically, its
primary purpose propaganda for Louis, eg use of frescoes, bas reliefs, tapestries to celebrate
Louis’ victories, theme of Apollo in house and grounds to celebrate Sun King.
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• The older view that royal patronage created a golden age in the arts and encouraged ‘the French
genius’ will be compared with the more critical approach of some recent historians.
• Wilkinson: questions the quality of state-sponsored literature.
• Briggs: describes ‘soulless temples to the cult of monarchy’.
• Beik: refers to Chapelain’s ‘advertising campaign’ for the king.
• Burke: suggests Louis’ cultural propaganda campaign aimed at 3 audiences: Frenchmen,
foreigners, posterity. Sees Colbert’s death as a watershed in campaign to ‘fabricate’ Louis XIV’s
image, with Louvois adopting a more aggressive style of glorification.
• Treasure: also largely critical, particularly of Colbert’s management of culture: trying to create a
civil service of the arts to provide a running commentary on the glories of the reign; court a great
setting for established artists, but difficult place for new talent to emerge. Allows that while
Louis regarded it as an adornment of his kingship, his appreciation of literature was sincere.
• Sturdy: adopts a much more positive approach, seeing a vibrant encouragement of skills and
ideas, with France opening herself to enriching cultural influences from outside. Louis and his
advisers recognised the validity of cultural criticism. Control through academies not intended to
impose a crushing orthodoxy, but create circumstances where creative talent could flourish.
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Question 6
“The old idea that royal policies were mostly responsible must be rejected once and for all.”
How valid is this analysis of France’s economic and financial difficulties in the later years of
Louis XIV’s reign?
Candidates are being invited to identify the various causes of the economic crisis that afflicted France
towards the end of Louis’ reign, to assess whether it was in fact as widespread and chronic as has been
claimed, and to evaluate the extent to which it was caused by factors outwith government control.
Louis XIV’s government struggled to cope with ‘colossal economic problems’ (Wilkinson). His later
reign was ‘one long disaster’. Reasons for this in part the results of government policy, but also
included events beyond government control.
• Effect of prolonged warfare: France at war for 20 out of Louis’ last 27 years.
• Government forced to tax subjects ever more heavily: in spite of capitation and dixieme, widely
evaded by normally exempt classes, tax burden borne by a rural sector reeling from other
problems.
• Partial collapse of rural economy also caused by adverse climate events (severe winters 1693-94
and 1708-09), on top of which came great bovine epidemic of 1714: result was harvest failure,
famine, widespread economic and financial crisis.
• Rural sector already in difficulty for many reasons: declining production, financial demands of
landlord, church and state, pressure on wealthier peasants, so vital for survival of rest of
community, to sell up due to recurrent poor harvests, growing indebtedness.
• Lack of flexibility in French rural economy, incapable of adjusting to changing circumstances,
failure to adopt new agricultural techniques.
• Loss of much of Huguenot workforce and income after 1685 didn’t help, though effects hotly
debated.
• Government driven by financial straits to adopt measures like devaluing the currency and use of
paper money that further harmed the economy.
• Vocal critics of government emerged from 1690s – Fenelon, Boisguilbert, Vauban blamed
government policies.
• But falling population, industrial recession and depressed prices were a European phenomenon at
this time.
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• Colbert’s successors once heavily criticised for failure to manage economy better. Recent
historians value their efforts more highly, praising their abandonment of Colbert’s regulatory
approach: their willingness to consult merchants, to interfere less, to allow freer trade.
• Traditional view of this period sees economy in stagnation and recession, a situation aggravated
by government policies of tax and regulate, as well as loss of Huguenots.
• Wilkinson: claims the main reason France now a ‘great poorhouse’ was taxation for war.
Economic historians now however lay stress rather on long-term structural factors.
• Historians now debate whether there was such a thing as ‘the French economy’: suggest economy
very regionalised. Some areas bucked the trend, picking up from 1690s. Famine crises also very
localised.
• Maritime ports relatively unaffected by agricultural depression. Many thrived from privateering
during wars.
• Carriere’s research shows Marseilles not in decline, but picking up from 1690s.
• Markovitch: cloth industry in fact emerged from a profound depression in 1690’s; output
increased, stimulated by needs of military. Other industries producing war materials also
prospered.
• Campbell: therefore says care must be taken to avoid blaming the government for a decline that
cannot be clearly demonstrated.
• Briggs: blames natural factors for the sufferings of the French people, rather than the policies of
Louis XIV. He also points out that, far from being a ruined country in 1715, France’s recovery
was remarkably quick.
• Campbell agrees that the terrible subsistence crises had no lasting effects on the general economy,
helped to keep wages high, and that recovery after 1710 was swift.
Page 65
France in the Age of Louis XIV
Part 2
Question 1
How useful is Source A for understanding the religious basis of Louis XIV’s absolutism?
(12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
religious basis of Louis XIV’s absolutism in terms of:
• Jacques-Benigne Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, leading French cleric and principal contemporary
apologist for Divine Right Monarchy.
• Boussuet preached and wrote extensively on this theme, had the ear of the king and court, was a
key religious advisor to Louis.
• The king’s power comes from God.

• He is given his power for the public good; kings should remember this.
• Kings will be judged by God over how they have used their power.
• But no-one else has the authority to act against an evil king.
• God will bless a kingdom whose king rules wisely.
• This source sums up the main religious framework for absolute monarchy.
• Louis and most of his subjects subscribed unquestioningly to these views.
• The French church promoted these views not only at court but throughout the kingdom.
• King and church believed Divine Right Monarchy was justified by Scripture, was the way God
meant a kingdom to be ruled, and the only way it could prosper.
Page 66
Points which offer a wider contextualisation of the views in the source
• These ideas not new, original or exclusively French. Religious nature of kingship a theme since
medieval times. Coronation ceremony emphasised priestly aspect of kingship. Divine Right ideas
very common in 17th century European monarchies.
• But used under Louis to justify exclusive sovereignty for the king, over-riding other traditional
centres of power such as ‘sovereign courts’ like the parliaments.
• Last real challenge to such views of monarchy found in the literature of the Fronde rebellion early
in Louis XIV’s reign. After years of civil disorder, most French people prepared to accept
arguments for absolute monarchy.
• Dreadful contemporary example of fate of kingdoms where these views challenged – England,
where resistance to royal authority ended in civil war and regicide.
• Candidate might also discuss distinction in Divine Right thought between absolutism, despotism
and arbitrary rule.
• Treasure: Divine Right grounded in a political theory that evolved over centuries to meet the
needs of church and ruler in a partnership of mutual advantage.
• Sturdy: Divine Right posited an absolute monarch as a logical necessity. Louis’ stress on Divine
Right precluded any possibility of shared sovereignty. Bossuet and contemporaries asserted the
claims of absolute monarchy because they saw no acceptable alternative; otherwise there would be
chaos.
• Sturdy & Treasure: Jean Bodin’s writing crucial to development of Divine Right absolutism
theory, influenced by Wars of Religion; Bodin the point of departure for 17th century philosophers
like Bossuet.
• Dumont: religious nature of monarchy meant French kings had to follow certain rules of divine,
natural or fundamental law. Divine grace bestowed on king regarded with ‘awe’ by even rebels
and Protestants.
• Kossmann: Divine Right led to ‘constitutional’ and conservative absolutism, the opposite of un-
Christian despotism.
which a consideration of Source A is useful for understanding the religious basis of Louis XIV’s
absolutism.
Page 67
Marks
comments.
of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Greater
awareness and development of historical interpretations and/or historians’ views will be credited
highly.
Page 68
Question 2
How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing views on Colbert’s economic policies?
(16 marks)

• provenance comment (if appropriate).
The candidate considers the views in Sources B and C on Colbert’s economic policies, and offers a
Source B
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. Accurate
comment on Lough will be credited as historiography.
• Views Colbert’s policies and achievements very positively.

• Colbert had great economic ambitions, and ideas ahead of his time, but later realised.
• Lack of achievement not Colbert’s fault; can be blamed on other people and circumstances.
• Some areas of industry did benefit from Colbert’s encouragement, eg textiles.

• But middle class preferred to invest in land, rentes or offices, rather than commerce.
• Economic policy always came second with Louis XIV. Rival Louvois increasingly had Louis’
ear.
• Periods of severe economic downturn in Europe outwith Colbert’s control, as were adverse
climate events in France.
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Source C
Provenance: Appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. Accurate
comment on Sturdy will be credited as historiography.
• Colbert not a visionary or even a radical thinker; his economic ideas were typical of his time.
• His main aim was to serve the needs of the king and the state, rather than transform France’s
economy.
• His policies were limited and selective, not all-embracing.
• Colbert followed conventional 17th century mercantilist ideas in his development of French trade
and industry.
• He saw trade as a war of commerce between nations, hence his use of tariffs as ‘weapons’ to
attack Dutch commercial dominance.
• His primary concern was to provide Louis with the money required to fund royal policies.
• He had little interest in or understanding of agriculture.
Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of the views in the sources
• Candidates might discuss to what extent Colbert’s economic policies were successful within this
more limited view of his remit. They might point out that much of what Colbert did achieve failed
to survive his death.
• They might engage with the issue, not raised in Source B or C, that Colbert’s failure to achieve
more was partly his fault: eg historians have accused him of over-interference and over-regulation
that strangled commercial initiative; the warfare his policies helped to bring about brought many
of his schemes to a standstill.
• Colbert’s admirers: Lavisse – visionary proto-capitalist ahead of his time; Bluche – Colbert a
compendium of talents; Judge – his achievements ‘monumental’, his efforts ‘heroic’; Ogg – a
‘superman’, at his best in spheres of industry and commerce; Treasure – boldness of his
initiatives admirable, his vision grander than his master’s, with a more comprehensive idea of the
state’s potential, his economic imperialism commands respect for its vision and range.
• Those who take a balanced view: Shennan – wrong to describe Colbert’s views as radical.
Colbert a gifted official whose fundamental concern was to buttress the power and reputation of
Louis and his state, committed to preparing the state for war; Annales historians, like Goubert –
stress the very unfavourable context for economic development facing Colbert.
• Critics: Briggs – Colbert’s outlook basically conventional, guilty of misconceptions, lack of
judgement, some policies backfired badly; Wilkinson – ‘economic blindness’, his ‘bossy
authoritarianism counterproductive’.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on Colbert’s
economic policies.
Page 70
Marks
Page 71
Question 3
How fully does Source D explain how Louis XIV used court life to enhance royal authority?
(12 marks)
recall, including historians’ views, that the candidate provides in their overall interpretation of the
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source D as an adequate illustration of Louis’ use of
court life to enhance his authority in terms of:
Provenance : appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. These may include:
• famous French letter writer from second half of 17th century; a noblewoman who moved in the
highest social circles
• a loyal admirer of Louis XIV.
• Physical magnificence of court setting at Versailles.

• Wide range of activities designed to attract nobility to court and keep them there.
• Louis’ dignified and courteous demeanour setting the formal tone of the court.
• Eagerness of courtiers for king’s attention satisfied by a bow or a word.
• Interiors and grounds at Versailles carefully planned both to impress and convey image of order,
power, and grandeur.
• Use of trivial rewards and favours by king to keep courtiers attentive.
• Gambling for high stakes encouraged at court; many nobles were ruined and forced to seek king’s
financial support.
• Formal etiquette and ritual of court life used skilfully to enhance royal authority.
• This formality a recent development, perhaps due to influence of Habsburg queens, and a contrast
to courts of previous French kings.
• Candidates might also discuss the issue of whether Louis ‘domesticated’ the nobility at Versailles,
why he might want to, with what success.
• Importance of patronage for maintaining king’s authority: nobles seeking posts and pensions had
to be regularly present at court.
• But great majority of Second Estate never resident at Versailles.
• Impact of Versailles not confined to French: foreign visitors also massively impressed.
Page 72
Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historian’s commentary to support their views.
• Beik: Louis perfected court life to an unprecedented degree. No other monarch so successfully
combined hard work and socializing.
• Campbell: Louis’ genius lay in the art of kingship. Louis the very image of a king, a vital
element of his power.
• Levron: contrasts relative informality of the young king’s court with rigid ceremonial of court life
from 1680s on. For courtiers, court life expensive, exhausting, and full of tension. Later court
depressing and boring.
• Sturdy: social structure and values which court epitomised emphatically traditional.
• Levron: Louis successfully domesticated his nobles.
• Ogg: through his court, Louis completed the atrophy of the French nobility.
• Judge: Versailles misrepresented as a contrivance to demoralise the nobility.
• Campbell: court system one of mutual benefits, rather than triumph of king over nobility.
which a consideration of Source D is useful in offering a full explanation of Louis XIV’s use of court
life to enhance royal authority.
Marks
comments.
highly.
Page 73
Georgians and Jacobites: Scotland (1715-1800)
Part 1
Question 1
“Scotland suffered in the short term but benefited in the long term.” How accurate is this
assessment of the impact of the Union on trade?
The aim of this essay is to allow the candidate to come to a conclusion about the judgement given, by
weighing up the benefits of the Union for trade. The terms “short term” and “long term” are vague
and the candidate would not be expected to choose one specific date in making these distinctions. The
wording of the arrangements means that no candidate should be penalised for lack of evidence before
1715, though they would be rewarded for making good use of such evidence. The candidate’s
conclusion should be based on the evidence gathered for the essay.
The candidate might use evidence such as:
Points suggesting trade was not excessively depressed before the Union
• Bank of Scotland founded in 1695, to further trade.

• Scottish settlement in America well into the thousands before 1700.
• Scots already active in the tobacco trade.
Points suggesting trade was vulnerable and weak before the Union
• The Darien disaster.

• The threat embodied in the Aliens Act.
• The ‘lean years’ plunged Scotland into debt.
Points suggesting the Union was beneficial in the short term
• Created the biggest free trade zone in Europe.

• Provided naval protection.
• Made legal trade in American commodities possible.
• Lowland agriculture started to change in response to the English market.
• The Glasgow tobacco merchants began to take advantage at once.
Points suggesting the Union was damaging in the short term
• The vulnerable Scottish economy was at once in competition with the advanced English one.
• Too many of the richest consumers moved to London.
• Linen duties handicapped Scotland’s most important manufacture.
• Contemporaries certainly believed it was damaging as evidenced by riots and support for the
Fifteen.
• Note though, the point that some of these problems may have been caused more by the War of the
Spanish Succession than by the Union.
Page 74
Points suggesting the Union was beneficial to trade in the longer term
• Linen, which was the leading sector for industrialisation, benefited from the Union’s expanded
market.
• The ‘golden age’ of tobacco was made possible by the Union.
• Scots were excluded from the East India Company until the Union. After it they took advantage
of it in considerable numbers.
• Use of customs duties, sanctioned by Westminster, to protect the linen trade from foreign
competition.
• Note though, the point that changes made possible by the Union were not necessarily caused by
the Union.
These might include reference to:
• Devine: trade before the Union was more buoyant than the ‘lean years’ suggest. But also “a
survey of the decades after c. 1740 does suggest a clear beneficial effect in that period”.
• Whatley: “the short term effects were enormously varied and complex.” Also, the Union did not
automatically create prosperity: “everything had to be fought for, hard.”
• Lynch: is more cautious about the benefits, “which had begun to emerge only in the 1740s… were
dampened by overseas war between 1756 and 1763, and the transatlantic trade was thrown into
jeopardy in 1776.”
• Lenman: the expansion of the domestic market was important, of colonial markets much less so.
Page 75
Question 2
Were the divisions in the Kirk caused mainly by disagreements about patronage or by disputes
about doctrine?
The aim of this essay is for the candidate to examine the causes of the many divisions that took place
within the Kirk during the eighteenth century. The title allows actual schisms and also mere
arguments within the Kirk to be discussed. The two causes specified in the title should definitely be
considered, but the candidate could legitimately challenge the terms of the question and bring to bear
other causes such as clash of personalities, or social or regional differences. The essay should reach a
conclusion as the most important cause of the divisions.
Doctrinal disputes
• John Simson, teaching theology at Glasgow early in the century was forced out in 1729 by the
Kirk for his Arianism.
• The arguments between Moderates and Evangelicals in the General Assembly in the 1750s were
about doctrine.
• Thomas Gillespie’s Relief Church was distinguished by greater liberalism than the Kirk on matters
of doctrine.
• The split between New Lichts and Auld Lichts was to do with the extent to which doctrines, as set
out in the Westminster Confession, could be adapted as times changed.
• Evangelicals divided over the issue of salvation.
Disputes over patronage
• Always present since the Patronage Act of 1712.

• Ebenezer Erskine led his followers out of the Kirk on the issue of patronage in the 1740s.
• As many as 100,000 seceders by the 1770s.
• Some obviously corrupt abusers of patronage, eg Principal Hill of St Andrews.
Other disputes
• Islay’s patronage of the Moderate Hutcheson was partly a political move to strengthen the
Argathelian interest.
• Divisions often reveal a class struggle. Seceders – often artisans and tenant farmers – refused to
doff their hats to the laird. The Moderates were backed by wealthy landowners and Edinburgh
lawyers.
• The division between Burghers and Anti-Burghers concerned the taking of oaths to civil
authorities. To an extent this links to patronage: the Church as an instrument of social control.
• The massive protest from many presbyteries when “The Tragedy of Douglas” was first performed
showed how the theatre was very much a bone of contention.
Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historians' commentary to support their views.
• Lynch: on the obscurity and triviality of some of the disputes: “It was not so much a dialogue of
the deaf as a debate of the dumb.”
• Lenman: asserts that patronage was the key issue dividing Moderates and Evangelicals. He also
argues that the Moderates were dictatorial in their methods and their “towering conceit”.
• Boyd: “No excuse for a schism was deemed too insignificant.” In other words secession became
an easy option in the face of argument.
• Devine: on the interlinking of patronage and doctrinal issues.
• Bebbington’s: “A persistent phase of gloom was a sign of true religion” reminds us that some
divisions were temperamental.
• Brown: patronage was “the key issue”.
Page 76
Question 3
Why were there such great regional variations in the extent to which Scottish farmers benefited
from the ideas of the “improvers”?
The candidate is unlikely to dispute that there were regional variations. The aim of this essay is to
discuss the causes of these variations and come to a conclusion about the causes. The best essays will
probably pick up the word “great” in the title. Candidates who decided to write entirely about the
Lowlands because the Highlands have a separate section in the Arrangements should not be penalised
unduly, though there is nothing there, or in this question, to say that Lowland agriculture is to be
considered in isolation.
• A discussion of what ‘the ideas of the improvers’ were; crop rotations, greater use of root crops,
tree planting, improved drainage, use of new rent/lease systems, new machines, enclosure, etc.
This could lead onto points about their suitability for some soils, climates and locations and not for
others.
• The impact of the clan system on the Highlands before the ’45. Chiefs who stuck to the tacksman
system for reasons of tradition, social status and the desire to maximise their private armies,
inevitably produced a very different system of husbandry from those landowners who sought
market-led profits first and foremost.
• The accidental impact of particular improvers on their own estates. For example Whyte contrasts
Cockburn of Ormiston, in East Lothian, with Dundas of Dundas near South Queensferry. The
earliest improvers were driven by fashion and enthusiasm, not by economic pressures. As a result
their methods were by no means universally adopted.
• By contrast the north-east was particularly slow to adopt improving methods, not till the 1790s.
• The impact of geographical factors such as soil, terrain and climate. Burns famously struggled on
marginal land at Mossgiel. Landowners in East Lothian ploughed soil that was unimaginably
richer than the “lazy beds” of Harris, or the stony fields and sour bogs of Wigtownshire.
• Whatley insists that the Highlands should be thought of as two areas: the north-west and the
islands, with harsh climates and infertile soil, and the south and the east, where a higher proportion
of arable land led to developments similar to those in the Lowlands.
• The way in which market pressures forced farmers to become increasingly specialised as local
conditions dictated: dairy herds in Renfrew, sheep in the Borders and arable in Lothians.
• Use of the “Statistical Account” to chart and explain regional differences.

• Smout: argues that the great contrast between the Lothians and Wigtownshire was the attitude of
the landowners to their tenants.
• Whyte: argues that Smout’s classic work is unduly pessimistic about pre-improvement farming.
• Until the later twentieth century, historians, eg Handley, were far too inclined to accept
uncritically the biased comments of improvers.
• Whatley: is inclined to stress regional diversity.
Page 77
Question 4
“The turning point for the Jacobites was not the decision to retreat from Derby but the earlier
decision to march into England.” Assess this verdict on the failure of the 1745 Jacobite
rebellion.
The aim of this essay is for candidates to consider at what point the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 became
virtually certain to fail, as opposed to having some chance of success. The two decisions in the title
should certainly be considered, but other moments should be discussed, from the decision to start the
rebellion at all to the decisions immediately before and during Culloden that, according to Lord
George Murray at least, made the difference between victory and defeat. This evidence should be
used to come to a conclusion as to the validity of the quotations in the title. Candidates may dispute
the assumption behind the question and reject the concept “turning point”.
Reasons for thinking Derby was a turning point
• Before Derby numbers of supporters were growing: after it they fell away.
• The Jacobites had successfully dodged Wade.
• The decision to retreat ended all hope of a French invasion.
• Panic in London suggested the Hanoverian government was liable to collapse.
• There were other options than retreat, particularly seeking out support in Wales.
• After Derby all strategy went wrong; Carlisle could not be held; Inverness was a bad place to
spend the winter; Falkirk merely delayed the inevitable.
• After Derby, Charles Edward’s quarrel with Lord George Murray and the clan chiefs became far
worse.
Reasons for thinking the decision to march into England was a turning point
• After Prestonpans many more recruits came in. This could have continued if the Jacobites had
stayed in Edinburgh.
• Scotland could not be held once they went south; Edinburgh was soon recaptured after the
Jacobites left.
• The idea that many English Jacobites would join was wishful thinking.
• Consolidation in Scotland would allow a far stronger base to be created for a French landing.
• Substantial Hanoverian armies (in the event Wade’s and Cumberland’s) were bound to become
more threatening as the Jacobites marched south.
Reasons for thinking the rebellion was doomed from the start
• The lack of support from any great lords in Scotland, and of support of any sort in England.
• Charles’ refusal to become Protestant.
• The failure to bring the promised French troops.
• The probability that the French were only using Charles as a pawn and had no serious intention of
launching a major invasion.
• The unprofessional nature of the army that could be assembled, lacking training or equipment.
Reasons for thinking the rebellion still had a chance till the last
• The victory at Falkirk.

• Lord George Murray’s claim that Culloden could have been won.
• The precipitate haste with which Charles abandoned everything after Culloden.
Page 78
Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historians' commentary to support their views.
• Black: “The council meeting (at Derby) really signalled the end of the Forty-Five.”
• Duffy: “Prince Charles should have advanced from Derby, for that course offered a realistic
chance of success, as against the near certainty of destruction.”
• Lenman: regards the rebellion as doomed from the start and calls it “an abortive, French-
sponsored coup d’etat.”
• Devine: argues that the decline of Scottish support for the Stuarts before 1745, and the virtual
absence of support in England, “ended their last hopes of restoration”.
• Szechi: reckons that there were positive signs at Derby: “had the chieftains but known it, the
Jacobite army was poised to achieve at least a short term victory.”
• Lynch: “Neither defeat at Culloden nor a rout after it had been inevitable.”
Page 79
Question 5
To what extent was Scotland’s industrialisation during the later decades of the eighteenth
century caused by the actions of the government?
The aim of this essay is to analyse the causes of Scotland’s industrialisation and assess the importance
of the actions of the government, as opposed to the actions of private individuals, the workings of
geographical and economic causes, or the impact of non-economic variables such as education and
cultural aspirations. There should be a conclusion as to the extent of the importance of government
action. The expression ‘later decades’ is taken from the Arrangements; candidates may interpret this
to mean any decades after 1750.
Actions by the government
• Support for the linen industry by protection and subsidy.

• Army contracts, eg to Carron Iron Works, Richard Oswald, Sir Lawrence Dundas.
• Roads built for military purposes stimulated economic activity.
• Security for exports provided by the navy.
• Colonial opportunities for exports.
• At the very end of the century Thomas Telford was commissioned to begin his work in the
Highlands.
Other causes
• Lower labour costs than England.

• A growing domestic market from the third quarter of the century.
• An upward trend in wages increased demand.
• Improvements in banking facilities.
• The availability of coal made it possible to utilise steam power from the first (in notable contrast
to Ireland).
• The practical bent of the Scottish Enlightenment meant that the flowering of technical and
entrepreneurial talent was not accidental.
• Geographical advantages for trade with England and for outlets east and west.
• Scottish aristocrats were active in financing industry.
• A rapid and effective transfer of technology from England.
This might include reference to:
• Whatley: “Insufficient evidence has been paid to the role of the state in Scottish economic
development in the eighteenth century.”
• Devine: “The Central Lowlands were almost fashioned by nature for industrialisation.” “The cost
of labour was absolutely crucial.”
• Smout: the existing prosperity (tobacco, linen, cattle) made the very rapid industrialisation
possible, that and the existence of large numbers of men ready to exploit the new opportunities
“the prime economic asset of their country”.
• Lynch: particularly emphasises low costs and cheap labour.
Page 80
Question 6
To what extent were Scotland’s achievements in literature in the eighteenth century due to the
nature of the education system?
Scotland’s eminence in literature during this period is not in dispute. The aim of this essay is to
analyse the effect that her educational system had upon this. Candidates should take account of the
educational reforms that took place during the century, such that its impact was likely to have been
different in the 1780s from what it was in the 1720s, for example. Ideally the essay should consider
not only the writers but also the questions of readership and of the book trade. The word ‘literature’
can take in all sorts of writing, from academic tomes to satirical verse. The essay should come to a
relevant conclusion.
The candidate might use evidence such as
• Biographies of individual writers: (Fergusson, Macpherson and Burns are mentioned by name in
the syllabus). Their educational experiences could be discussed as factors affecting or not
affecting their literary eminence.
• Robert Fergusson went from the High School of Edinburgh to Dundee Grammar School (with a
bursary) to St Andrew’s.
• Macpherson grew up in Badenoch before going from a village school to Aberdeen University.
• Burns received a patchy education, largely at home.
• All other writers could legitimately be referred to. Almost all had a grounding at the Scottish
universities.
• The extent of literacy: estimates vary but it is usually agreed to have been one of the highest in
Europe.
• The existence of a substantial reading public: most towns had lending libraries; Edinburgh had
sixteen publishing houses by 1790; one estimate suggests that in the 1790s, 20,000 Scots
depended for their livelihood on writing and publishing. This reading public is clearly linked to
the expansion of the universities, whose student populations more than doubled during the
century, and which included a wide social mix.
Factors other than education could include
• The ending of the era when the Kirk could restrict and censor freedom of expression.
• The role of the Clubs in making literary pursuits fashionable.
• The impact of the Union. On the one hand it facilitated interchange with England, which clearly
affected some writers, eg Smollett. On the other hand it stimulated a determination to use
literature to preserve a separate Scottish identity, a determination of which Burns is only the most
famous example.
• According to Herman: Burns received “an education worthy of an English gentleman”.

Crawford: on the other hand, talks of “his life-long struggle to educate himself”.
• James Buchan: recently has emphasised the point that Scotland’s literary eminence was partly “a
belated reaction to a series of injuries to Scotland’s sense of itself in politics, in religion, in
morality”.
• Alexander Broadie: the pre-eminent fact was the number and quality of Scotland’s universities.
• Devine: stresses the inter-relationship of a range of causes, but lays emphasis on the change in the
nature and authority of the Kirk, which permitted and stimulated literary activity.
• Lenman: gives considerable space to the survival and revival of Gaelic poetry during this period.
He also calls the claims for exceptional Scots literacy “exaggerated hype”.
Page 81
Georgians and Jacobites: Scotland (1715-1800)
Part 2
Question 1
How fully does Source A explain the advantages held by the Jacobites in October 1715?
(12 marks)
The candidates may be awarded up to 3 marks for their ability to establish the views of the source and
The remaining marks will be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context;
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source A as an adequate explanation of the advantages
held by the Jacobites in 1715 in terms of:
on Inglis will be credited as historiography.
Points from the source which show that the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)
• The size of Mar’s army compared to Argyll’s.

• The separate rising in the Borders.
• The possibility of surrounding Argyll.
• The bold and well-planned crossing of the Forth.
• Mar had perhaps 10,000 men. Argyll had perhaps 3,000.

• This date of October is a month before Sheriffmuir. Mar’s advantage was much less on November
13th.
• The rising in the Borders included Scots, led by Lord Kenmuir and others, and English, led by
Thomas Forster and others.
• The small extent of the Border rising – perhaps 1,000 or less.
• The energy of Argyll, who took rapid control of Stirling and Edinburgh Castles, negating the
effects of crossing the Forth.
• The personality of Mar, who was inexperienced and temperamentally unsuitable for military
command.
• The considerable support that this Jacobite rebellion had in Scotland, compared to the others,
thanks to the unpopularity of the Union, and of George I.
• The complete absence of foreign help for the Jacobites; neither France nor Spain, thanks to the
Treaty of Utrecht.
• The failure of Bolingbroke, Ormonde or anyone else to mobilise any Jacobite support in southern
England.
• The fact that James Edward Stuart had not yet arrived in Scotland.
• The fact that Mackintosh was a leader of notable energy and enterprise.
• The failure of the government to spend money or energy on garrisoning or governing Scotland, so
that Argyll had to operate with very limited resources.
• What happened next (Sheriffmuir and Preston) appears to demonstrate the underlying weaknesses
of the Jacobites.
• On the other hand a detailed analysis of Sheriffmuir could support the interpretation that Argyll
got lucky.
Page 82
Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historian's commentary to support their views.
This could include reference to:
• Lenman: “Jacobites tended to be absurdly optimistic about the degree of committed support for
their cause in Britain.” And “failure was always the likeliest destiny of a rebellion”.
• Szechi: “The English half of the rebellion went off like a damp squib.” Conversely, “about 8% of
the adult male Scots population turned out for King James, compared with 2.5% for King
George”.
• Devine: emphasises hostility to the Union – “what was remarkable was the unanimity of all
parties on such a fundamental issue”.
• Lynch: “The extent of the disaffection from the Hanoverian regime was [in Scotland] almost
incalculable.”
• Duffy: “The rising remained incoherent and well nigh leaderless, and was characterised by groups
of men who hung about doing nothing in particular.”
which a consideration of Source A is helpful in offering a full explanation of the advantages held by
the Jacobites in October 1715.
Marks
immediate or wider context. Candidates may make relevant and appropriate provenance
comments.
highly.
Page 83
Question 2
How useful is Source B for understanding why the Highlands changed so much after the Forty-
Five? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source B in understanding why
the Highlands changed so much after the Forty-Five in terms of:
Source B
• Legislation passed in 1747. The context of “the year after Culloden” clearly identifies this as a
deliberately punitive measure.
• There will have been an element of panic and “crisis management” about this legislation. It was
accompanied, for example, by the banning of tartan, which was recognised to be unnecessary and
repealed thirty years later.
• The government, in pushing through this law, undoubtedly believed that it would change the
Highlands. The purpose was to effect change.
• The failure of the government to deal effectively with the Highlands up to this date may make the
historian cautious before believing that their analysis of the causes of the “inconveniences” is in
fact correct.
• On the other hand Scottish and Highland statesmen (notably Islay) were on hand to advise the
government as to ways of dealing with Highland affairs, so the analysis should not be dismissed
out of hand as one made by ignorant English MPs.
• The “multiplicity and extent” of heritable jurisdictions was seen as a major feature of the state of
the Highlands before the Forty-Five.
• The government wished to “render the Union more complete”. This is accentuated by the phrase
“that part of Great Britain called Scotland”.
• Heritable jurisdictions were completely abolished.
• They were replaced by law courts on the same pattern as the rest of Scotland.
Page 84
• Heritable jurisdictions had affected the Highlands a good deal before they were abolished. For
example, the powers of the chiefs made large populations desirable, since they conveyed status
and power, even if this stood in the way of economic modernisation.
• The Jacobite rebellions were only possible because the chiefs of Lochaber (notably Lochiel) could
still raise private armies.
• The famous letter of Mar to his factor telling him to burn the houses of those tenants who refused
to join the Fifteen is a good example of the way the system could work.
• On the other hand, the way that Argyll, most notably, was modernising his tenancies before the
Forty-Five suggests that the pressures of economics could already out-weigh legal and chieftainly
obligations.
• The loss of chieftainly authority is directly linked to the Clearances. It became more important for
estates to produce profits than followers.
• There are many other possible reasons why the Highlands changed after the Forty-Five to be
considered. For example:
− The punitive measures taken after Culloden
− The Act for the Pacification of the Highlands
− The completion of the network of roads and forts
− The impact of new agricultural strategies, notably sheep farming
− The kelp industry
− The work of the SSPCK
− The impact of individual landowners, such as MacDonell of Glengarry
− Rising demand for Highland products in southern markets
− Rising rents and the prospect of rising profits for landowners if they “modernised”
− The invention of a “romantic” Highlands, notably in the “Ossian” poems
• Devine: Clanship to Crofter’s War stresses economic pressures. In his The Scottish Nation he
emphasises the extent to which market pressures were causing the Highlands to change well
before the Forty-Five, particularly Argyll’s eviction of his Campbell tacksmen.
• Lenman: stresses the selfishness of the elites.
• Whatley: reminds readers to distinguish between the north and west Highlands, and the Hebrides,
on the one hand, and the southern and eastern Highlands on the other.
• Lynch: starts with population growth – though that was both a cause and an effect. He also writes
“the ‘Highlands’ as such did not exist”. In other words, the diversity is too great for
generalisation.
which Source B is useful for understanding why the Highlands changed so much after the Forty-Five.
Page 85
Marks
a clear understanding of the views of the source and their value as interpretations on the issue.
There is a solid grasp of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant
analysis. Greater awareness and development of historical interpretations and/or historians’
views will be credited highly.
Page 86
Question 3
How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing views on the methods used by Henry
Dundas to control Scottish politics? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources C and D on the methods used by Henry Dundas to
control Scottish politics, and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source C
on James Buchan will be credited as historiography.
Points from the source which show the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s):
• The small number of voters.

• The phrase “pocket borough” implies a corrupt system.
• Dundas’ control was “unprecedented”.
• Dundas arrogantly refused to recognise that there was a problem, claiming there were no abuses
and no hostile public opinion.
• Dundas controlled 36 out of 45 seats.
• Dundas was known by popular protesters as “Old Corruption”.

• The number of seats he controlled increased at each election.
• On burgh reform Dundas remarked that “it would be easier to reform Hell”.
• Dundas opposed reform in debate after debate in the Commons during the 1780s.
• Dundas’ claim that public opinion did not see abuses is undoubtedly wrong after 1780. The letters
of “Zeno”, the campaigning of liberal advocates in Edinburgh and growing demands from the
merchant classes all demonstrate this.
• There were anti-Dundas riots in 1792.
Page 87
Source D
on Bruce Lenman will be credited as historiography.
• The origin of Dundas’ government positions and power.

• “This was no despotism”
• His method was by mutual agreement, not improper pressure.
• “Enlightened manipulation”
• Offered both the benefits of Union and the attractions of a distinctive Scottish identity.
• Scotland received a disproportionately large share of patronage – by 1800 one-third of all

sinecures.
• The fact that demand for posts outstripped supply shows how Scots acquiesced in the system.
• Dundas’ key positions for dispensing patronage were Keeper of the Signet and President of the
Board of Control of the East India Company.
• Dundas sponsored the removal of the ban on Highland dress in 1784.
• The September Massacres in France (1792) and even more the outbreak of war in 1793 created
widespread revulsion at the idea of reform. Conservative opinion supported Dundas.
Points which offer wider contextualisation of the views in the sources
• Dundas’ Whig opponents and critics, eg Cockburn, admit his personal likeability.
• The sources do not deal with changing circumstances over time. The moves from peace to war,
the ascendancy of Pitt the Younger and the outbreak of the French Revolution all affected the
context within which Dundas operated.
• Traditional Whig-radical condemnations that began with his radical opponents in the 1790s and
were taken up by enthusiasts for democracy a century later. Modern historiography tries to avoid
imposing later values onto the eighteenth century.
• Devine: admits that Dundas’ crackdown on radicals was popular but has no doubt that it was
despotic. He emphasises the suspension of the Act against Wrongous [sic] Imprisonment and uses
the term “witch-hunt”.
• Lynch: supports the idea that the methods were about the subtle and mutually beneficial build-up
of networks of interest, not about mere corrupt use of sinecures. He also talks of his promotion of
a “new patriotism” in which loyalty to the Union and to the Empire could benefit the government
and its supporters alike.
• Fry: reminds us that Dundas’ methods depended on scrupulous attention to individuals; “no detail
was too trivial, no person too unimportant, to fit into his vast bank of information and machinery
of patronage”.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the methods used
by Henry Dundas to control Scottish politics.
Page 88
Marks
8-11 The candidate makes relevant and appropriate comments of interpretation and the answer is
Page 89
“The House Divided”: USA (1850-1865)
Part 1
Question 1
Have the economic differences between the North and the South in the ante-bellum period been
exaggerated?
The aim of this essay is to allow candidates to discuss the similarities and differences in the economic
systems of North and South in the periods before 1861, and to provide evidence to show that they had
as much in common as divided them.

Common features of economic development:
• Abundance of fertile land, timber, raw materials.
• Navigable rivers.
• Between 1800 and 1850, gross national product increased 7 fold whilst, per capita income
doubled.
• Population increase.
• Predominance of agriculture.
• Developments in transport, eg turnpike roads, canals, steamboats.
• Growth of railways.
• Development of the telegraph.
The North
• Industrialising.
• Some urban development but 80% lived in rural communities.
• Inequalities in wealth distribution.
• Greater industrial development.
• Greater railway mileage.
The South
• Cotton comprised 50% of US exports.
• Development of industry at, eg Tredegar Iron Works.
• Tariff of annoyance to the South.
• Few small towns in the South.
• South had 35% of US population but produced only 10% of manufactured output.
• Inequalities in wealth distribution.
• Beard: economic competition between a feudal South and an industrial North.

• McPherson: whole of USA witnessed a transport revolution. 5% of population owned about 70%
of taxable property. Both North and South viewed the west as the nation’s future.
• Miller: railroad expansion key to US prosperity.
• Potter: South was wedded to agri-business, commerce and a hard cash-crop monoculture
dedicated to increasing profit margins. The image of a gulf between industrial North and rural
South was untenable.
• Craven: Southerners displayed the same enterprising, pioneering resolve as their northern
counterparts.
Page 90
Question 2
Why did the issue of territorial expansion cause so much tension between the North and the
South between 1850 and 1858?
The aim of this essay is to enable candidates to discuss the issue of territorial expansion in the run-up
to the Civil War and to explain why this was such a contentious issue.
The candidate may use evidence such as:
• Extent of territorial expansion as a result of war with Mexico.

• Cuba/Filbustering (evidence of slave-power conspiracy).
• The Compromise of 1850.
• Organisation of Kansas and Nebraska into states of the Union.
• Issue of whether slavery should be allowed to expand into these areas despite the 1787 North-west
Ordinance/1820 Compromise/1850 Compromise.
• Dredd Scott decision of 1857.
• Political implications of territorial expansion in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
• Southern fear of becoming a permanent minority within the Federal Union.
• Perception by both sections that their opposite number did not represent the American dream.
• Collapse of the Whig Party and the rise of the Republican Party.
• Ideological differences between northern Republicans and supporters of Southern nationalism.
• Socio-economic differences.
• Impact of abolitionism.
• Beard: North driven by economic motives to serve the needs of business.

• Craven: territorial extension was perceived as vital to continuation of both sides.
• Randall: blundering generation of politicians.
• Potter: slavery was main cause of tension.
• Donald: politicians responded without policies of principles.
• Holt: alienation of many northern voters from both of the political parties in the early 1850s.
• Holden Reid: slavery was central to the sense of cultural divergence between the North and the
South. Rise of sectional northern party dedicated to restriction of slavery signalled an end to a
desire for compromise.
• Parish: rivalry between North and South exacerbated by imbalance in political power brought
about by territorial expansion.
Page 91
Question 3
How similar were the motives that encouraged soldiers from both North and South to fight?
The aim of the essay is to enable the candidate to evaluate the motives that soldiers on both sides had
for fighting for their respective sides and to assess the similarities and the differences among and
between them.
Common motives:
• Patriotism
• Ideological motives
• Desire for revenge as war continued
• After 1862 in the South and 1863 in the North, men were forced to fight
• Use of bounties to encourage recruitment
• Comradeship
• Fight for fellow soldiers
North:
• Defend Union
• Fight for a sentiment – the Union
• Uphold legacy of the American Revolution
• Prevent collapse of all that USA represented – experiment in democracy
• Secession viewed as a challenge to the foundation of law and order
• Punish treason
South:
• Defend states’ rights
• Defend liberty and self-government
• Southern nationalism
• Resist perceived northern tyranny
• Defend homeland against invader
• Fight for independence of the South
• Defend southern womanhood from northern depredation
• Defence of property and property rights
• Defence of slavery
Page 92
• McPherson: abolition of slavery became linked to preservation of the Union. Few fought to
achieve racial equality. Confederate soldiers tacitly supported defence of southern institutions.
Northern soldiers supported emancipation as this hurt the enemy.
• Reid Mitchell: northern soldiers were imbued with ideology. Men enlisted due to youthful high
spirits, community pressure and overpowering enthusiasm. As war continued anti-slavery
sentiment grew among Union soldiers. Soldiers’ ideology motivated them through the hellish
second half of the war. Loyalties to fellow soldiers were important.
• A Haughton: men filled with thoughts of excitement and the drama of war. Hope and expectation
of demonstrating courage and ability on the battlefield. In the North, patriotic sentiment was
based on pride of democratic system. In the South, many fought for independence and defence of
their own institutions and laws. Real affinity towards their community and section. Immediate
stimulus to fight was group loyalty to men on either side of the soldier.
• Bell Wiley: men attracted by rates of pay and prospect of promotion. Escape mundane existence.
Devotion of the masses to the Union, coupled with the leadership of Lincoln, whom they regarded
as their representative and champion, sustained the Northern cause during the bloody reverses of
1861-62. Southerners volunteered due to deep-seated hatred of the North, northern hostility to
local institutions, a desire for adventure and a sense of it being the right thing to do.
• Katcher: above all, the Confederate soldier was loyal to the South, saw the Northerner as an
invader and feared for home and family.
• Parish: combined forces of nationalism and democracy produced a massive increase in
commitment to the cause of one side or the other, which made this a people’s war. Huge response
of 1861 was the product of individual enthusiasm, state action and local initiative. Men joined due
to encouragement of family and friends, motivated by a mixture of patriotism, fear of being
thought a coward and anxiety that it would all be over before they could get involved.
• Susan-Mary Grant: political and ideological factors played a large part in sustaining the Civil
War soldiers’ will to fight.
Page 93
Question 4
How successful were the foreign policies of the North and the South in achieving their aims by
the end of 1863?
The aim of this essay is to allow the candidate to identify the foreign policies of both sides in the
period between 1861 and the end of 1863 and to explain to what extent these aims were achieved or
were unsuccessful and to offer an opinion as to the reasons for success or failure.
North:
• Maintain status quo
• Prevent recognition of the Confederacy
• Keep the conflict an American affair only
South:
• Win foreign recognition of the independence of the Confederacy
• Seek help – political, military and economic – from Europe
• Use and role of King Cotton
• Effect of blockade-running
Issues:
• Lincoln’s proclamation of a blockade undermined the argument that it was merely a large scale
rebellion
• Cotton embargo and how this was perceived in Europe
• Trent Affair
• Impact of early Confederate military successes on policy of foreign powers
• Impact of failure of Southern military strategy in the autumn of 1862 and the summer of 1863.
• Effect of Emancipation Proclamation and the Final EP
• European calculations of self-interest, eg Britain –defence of Canada; France – Napoleon III’s
involvement in Mexico.
• Setting of long-term precedents, eg Lincoln’s use of ‘paper blockade’ useful to Britain at a later
date.
• Actions of US representatives Charles Francis Adams and Confederate representatives Mason and
Slidell.
• The Erlanger loan.
• Owsley: Britain pursued policy for her own ends.
• Jordan/Platt: Britain was pro-Northern in outlook.
• Rowland: South created wrong type of pressure at wrong time and applied it in a wrong way.
• Crook: diplomatic considerations directed British policy.
• Graebner: key role of Seward in preventing foreign recognition.
• Boaz: South only needed to withhold cotton to force British/French intervention. US blockade
declaration allowed Britain to declare its neutrality and trade with both sides.
• Paludan: Seward waved the sword in 1861 as a diplomatic threat. Trent Affair scared both
Britain and the North and both sought to retain dialogue in preference to war.
• Holden Reid: South’s belief in power of King Cotton deluded her into believing foreign
intervention would come. France would not act unilaterally. She would only follow Britain’s
lead. Britain desired to avoid confrontation and this explains why the conflict did not spread.
• Thomas: role of C.F. Adams in London and W.L. Drayton in Paris ensured good US relations in
Europe. Emancipation introduced a moral dimension which could not be ignored. Confederacy’s
hopes depended on success of its armies. Lack of success prevented European recognition which
was essential if Southern armies were to succeed. It was a vicious diplomatic circle.
Page 94
Question 5
Assess the economic and social impact of the war on the North.
The aim of this essay is to allow candidates to assess the degree of change in the economy and society
of the North as a result of the experience of war. Candidates may choose to look briefly at the
structure of northern society and its economy in the ante-bellum period to enable a comparison to be
drawn with the same factors as a result of war.
NB an answer that concentrates on the ante-bellum period is not answering the question and should be
marked accordingly.
• Evidence of new economic activity

• Rise of new business classes and of ‘new money’
• Assessment of the view that the war retarded Northern economic progress
• Rise of big business in order to meet demands of the military
• Expansion of traditional industrial centres like Pittsburgh
• Development of new industries, eg canning industry associated with Swift and Armour
• Wartime of experience of Carnegie et al laid the foundations of American capitalism
• Increasing mechanisation in both agriculture and industry to meet domestic and military demands
• Use of railroad to supply/transport army, eg Union stock yards in Chicago
• Introduction of the new ‘greenback’ dollar
• Increased taxation to fund the war effort
• Idea of the military as a vehicle of social mobility
• Greater role accorded to women, eg Clara Barton
• Assessment of extent/permanence of the change
• Ashworth: war produced institutional changes that were beneficial to Northern capitalism.
• Parish: complaints of poorer classes having to fight war on behalf of the rich.
• Spiller, Clancey, Young and Mosley: North developed a stronger and more efficient financial
system.
• McPherson: war accelerated mechanisation of industry due to labour shortages. This led also to
great increase in female labour. Northern economy adapted quickly to demands of war.
• Dillard: war directed US capital into uneconomic financial areas, causing slow down in rate of
industrialisation.
Page 95
Question 6
How important was Grant’s leadership in securing Union victory in the Civil War?
The aim of this essay is to enable the candidate to evaluate the contribution that Grant’s leadership
made to the overall reasons for Northern victory in the Civil War.
NB an essay that does not refer to Grant’s leadership but instead is a list of factors contributing to
Northern victory is not answering the question and should be marked accordingly.
Grant:
• Exploitation of manpower and resources of the Union
• Strategy aimed at destroying the South’s will to continue the war
• Development of idea of total war
• Refusal of Grant to retreat after reverses, eg Cold Harbour and the Wilderness
• Subservience of General-in-Chief to Commander-in-Chief
• Development of modern command structure
North:
• Superiority of Union manpower
• Superiority of Union industrial base
• Leadership of Lincoln
• Strength of Northern political system to manage crises
South:
• Weaknesses within the Confederate government
• Issues of states’ rights
• Failure of King Cotton diplomacy to win foreign recognition
• Collapse of Confederate morale
• Increasing desertion from Confederate armies
• South as being too democratic
• Bankrupt treasury
• JFC Fuller: Grant was a symbol of the new order – war was total, encompassing physical,
morale, social, industrial and financial strength of the enemy.
• B Liddell Hart: use of surprise, rear offensive, out-flanking movements and alternative objectives
by Grant
• Tulloch: Grant carefully husbanded his human resources as they were not unlimited. This was a
war of rifles and trenches rather than set-piece battles and this was recognised by both North and
South. Civil War showed the shape of wars to come, ie democracies fighting total wars.
• Fuller: superior generalship of the North and Grant.
• Grant: need for General-in-Chief to be subservient to Commander-in-Chief.
• Current: God and the strongest battalions.
• T. Harry Williams: superior military leadership of the North.
• McPherson: chance and circumstance played role in deciding the outcome.
• McKittrick: central role of the Republican Party in uniting the North.
• Owsley: states’ rights and failure of King Cotton diplomacy.
• Donald: South too democratic.
• Potter: Davis as a political factor in Confederate defeat.
• Hesseltine: emergence of strong federal government driving the Union war effort.
Page 96
“The House Divided”: USA (1850-1865)
Part 2
Question 1
How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing views on the crisis that developed at Fort
Sumter in 1861? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources A and B on the crisis that developed in Fort Sumter in
1861 and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source A
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit.
• Lincoln’s instructions verbatim; Lincoln’s policy

• Nature of the evolving crisis
• Instructions to see if fort is still in Federal hands.

• To seek interview with Governor of South Carolina.
• Attempt will be made to re-supply the fort.
• No attempt will be made to reinforce the fort unless the attempt at re-supply is resisted.
Source B
on Holden Reid will be credited as historiography.
• Series of miscalculations and misfortunes characterise Fort Sumter episode.

• ‘Star of the West’ incident provoked the Confederates but did not re-supply the fort.
• Most important decisions had already been taken prior to Lincoln’s inauguration.
• Cause of war was an attack upon the fort.
Page 97
Points from recall which support, develop and contextualise those in the sources
• Reasons why South Carolina laid claim to the fort.

• Compromise arrangement over supply of fort till December 1860.
• Failure of mission to Fort Pickens in Florida.
• Refusal of Lincoln to accept compromise that favoured the South.
• Desire of Buchanan administration to avoid war.
• Abandonment of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson.
• Reasons for Confederate decision to fire on fort.
• Divisions within Lincoln’s Cabinet at first over issue.
• Impact of Lincoln’s inaugural address on situation.
• Craven: Lincoln’s policy was to engineer war.

• Potter: crisis was culmination of a general political crisis evident throughout the 1850s.
• Tulloch: Lincoln aware of need to retain support of middle Southern states that had not yet
declared for/against secession.
• Thomas: ‘Star of the West’ incident heated tempers without solving anything. Davis had believed
war was inevitable and although reluctant to fire the first shot, he could see no alternative course
of action.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the crisis at Fort
Sumter.
Marks
Page 98
Question 2
How useful is Source C in explaining the tensions between Lincoln and his generals up until
mid-summer 1862?
(12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source C in explaining the
tensions between Lincoln and his generals up until mid-summer 1862, in terms of:
Provenance:
• Letter from commander of Army of the Potomac to his Commander-in-Chief.

• Written after the failure of the Peninsula Campaign.
• Animosity between the professional soldier and his disdain for his Commander-in-Chief.
• McClellan was a War Democrat.
• Not a war to subjugate people.

• No confiscation of property/territorial organisation of states.
• No forcible abolition of slavery.
• Military government confined to maintenance of law and order.
• Lincoln:
− Frustration of Lincoln at McClellan’s disregard for his orders
− Political differences between the two men
− Differences over purpose of the war – Lincoln’s war to preserve the Union; McClellan’s limited
view of defeat of Confederate forces
• Generals:
− Differences over the nature of the war – war between professional forces with no political
interference
− Actions of Generals Butler, Hunter and Fremont
• Other factors:
− Increasingly radical enactments by Congress, eg Second Confiscation Act, Militia Act
− Actions of blacks in freeing themselves
Page 99
• Tulloch: North paid dearly for the caution of McClellan. McClellan did not appreciate that in a
modern democracy war was politics.
• Dawson: McClellan was the personification of limited warfare. General mistakenly believed that
whenever the war ended, the nation could only be restored on the basis of the Union as it stood in
1860.
• Williams: in his dealings with the Lincoln administration, McClellan committed several bad
errors that showed he lacked the qualities of a supreme commander.
which a consideration of Source C is useful in explaining the tensions between Lincoln and his
generals up until mid-summer 1862.
Marks
comments.
highly.
Page 100
Question 3
How fully does Source D show the reasons for the high casualty rates experienced by both sides
during the Civil War? (12 marks)
The remaining marks will be awarded for the quality and depth of the immediate and wider context,
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source D as an adequate explanation of the reasons for
the high casualty rates experienced by both sides in the Civil War in terms of:
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance will earn credit. These may
include:
• Picture taken by one of the Civil War’s leading photographers.

• Brady often referred to as Mr Lincoln’s photographer.
• Photographs illustrated for the first time the reality of the horror of war.
• Outer trench
• Inner trench
• Wooden palisades
• Reinforced bunkers
• Use of sand bags
• Impact of artillery shelling visible in state of the house
• Improved firing power of rifles made close order infantry assaults almost suicidal
• Poor tactics of general staff
• Strong defence due to rifled muskets/artillery
• Wave attack formation
• Use of grape shot and canister
• Poor medical care
• Advanced across open countryside
• Poor maps of areas of operation
• Nature of the terrain, eg the Wilderness
• Incompetent generals/staff officers
• Difficulty of communication during battle
Page 101
• Arnold: Grant’s objective was to subdue a whole people and this could only be accomplished by
wasting enemy armies and breaking civilian morale.
• Grant: South had the advantage in that the North had to invade the South and use all means at its
disposal to force her back into the Union.
• Tulloch: Northern army unprepared for a civil war at first.
• Katcher: new firearms produced deadly results and the traditional cavalry charge was consigned
to history.
which a consideration of Source D gives a full explanation of the reasons for the high casualty rates
experienced by both sides in the Civil War.
Marks
comments.
highly.
Page 102
Japan: From Medieval to Modern State (1850’s-1920)
Part 1
Question 1
How prepared for change was Japanese society in 1850?
The aim of this essay is to investigate the status and situation in Japan at the start of this era of study
and to ascertain whether it was in a position receptive to change.
Areas suggesting Japan was prepared for change
• Japan had been independent for 200 years.

• Well-educated people with attitudes of discipline, loyalty and frugality.
• Japan had skills well fitted to respond to change as its peasants were skilful and adaptable
workers.
• The people of Japan shared a common language and culture.
• Society had clear divisions and hierarchies.
• Japan was self-sufficient except for settlements of Dutch traders in Nagasaki.
• Japan’s industry was not ruined by European competition.
• Diversification of peasants into activities like producing textiles.
• Tokugawa era had an extensive marketing system.
• Communication network well established. Japan had good roads, developing ports and a few
large settlements.
• There had been a sound system of government for 200 years headed by the Tokugawa family.
• Samurai officials in central government and in the domains were experienced in managing state
affairs.
Areas suggesting Japan was not prepared for change
• Economy dependent on rice.

• Tokugawa era had a highly developed agricultural system with peasants tied to the land – very
little industrial development.
• Bakufu carried out strict control over Daimyo.
• Brutality often used as a warning to others of the dangers of revolt.
• Tokugawa system essentially feudal; often seen as preventing progress.
• View among some historians that the Tokugawa control system was a regressive step as it halted
progress and the emergence of a more fluid class system.
• Tokugawa coalition proved effective in inhibiting political change.
• Macpherson: “A potential for modern economic growth existed.”

• Waswo: “Tokugawa economy created surpluses above subsistence needs that could be utilised as
a domestic source of capital for industrial development.”
• Pyle: “life was becoming increasingly complex and diverse in ways that made the Tokugawa
system less viable and satisfying.”
• Hane: “A role reversal seemed to have transpired” commenting on the feudal structure of
Tokugawa Japan.
• Jansen: “At the core of cultural development was the search for new and different forms of
knowledge and the search for ways to implement them.”
Page 103
Question 2
How significant were the educational reforms in the Meiji era?
The aim of this essay is to give details of the reforms that took place in Meiji Japan and to evaluate the
significance they had.
The extent of the changes
• Western works of literature translated into Japanese in early Meiji era.

• Details of Japan’s literate society and knowledge system (40% boys and 10% girls).
• Ministry of Education set up in 1871 which restructured primary, secondary and tertiary sectors
along western models.
• Government of compulsory elementary education of all took many years to achieve.
• Hostility from families unable or unwilling to contribute to school fees.
• Imperial Rescript on Education – 30th October 1890 and its role in directing schools to place more
emphasis on moral education.
• Discussion of the theory that education used as a means of indoctrination.
• Foreigners brought to Japan to help develop schools and colleges.
• Key figures of Motodo Eifu, who played an important role in shaping the direction of Japanese
education, Inoue Kowashi, who established a private academy, and Mori Arinori, who was
Minister of Education from 1885-89.
• Secondary schooling only for boys until equality in 1910.
The significance of the changes
• Education used as a vehicle to modernise Japan with a new ideal whilst still retaining an identity
with her cultural past.
• Education system was the primary agent in the cultural revolution.
• Japanese people more accessible to the new ideas and new techniques and it facilitated the
development of a national consciousness.
• A whole generation of youth in 1870s and 1880s saw innovation and foreignness becoming vogue
and the phrase of the time being ‘civilised and enlightened’, which in turn for many led to a
repulsion of Asian identity.
• Alienation of national norms gave impetus to institutional reform.
• Hane: “the children were taught they owed three great obligations, to their emperor, to their
parents and to their teachers.”
• Storry: “the progress of education moulded the people into a nation of patriots.”
• Beasley: “the Rescript was condemning the indiscriminate emulation of western ways.”
• Benson & Matsumura: “education it is said has been the chief tool in shaping national identity.”
• Hunter: “the prime objective of the [education] structure was the needs of the state and its main
goals were the provision of skills and patriotic morality among the many to produce a literate and
pliable workforce.”
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Question 3
To what extent was the role of the Emperor more symbolic than real?
The aim of this essay is to gather the details and viewpoints on the role of the Emperor and to make an
assessment as to whether they had real power or were just a figurehead.
Background:
• The Emperor system is the name given to the system whereby the Emperor wielded the highest
authority.
• The Emperor and his court prior to the Meiji Restoration resided at Kyoto.
• Emperor Komei died in 1867 of smallpox and his successor was just 15 years of age.
• The move towards a revival of traditional imperial authority was used to unite forces against the
Bakufu.
• The Shogun and its allies attempted to resist any realignment of power and failed.
• Shogun resigned to a life of obscurity.
Symbolic role as power with others:
• Authority lay with the clan leaders from Satsuma and Choshu who led the rebellion.
• Clan leaders from Hizen and Toza were less powerful.
• Edo castle became the Imperial Palace with the new Emperor’s reign known as the Meiji
[enlightened rule].
• April 1868, the Emperor proclaimed the five key principles of the Charter Oath – this policy
statement being shaped by Satsuma and Choshu leaders especially Kido Koin.
• Emperor modest and conscientious leader, decrees issued in name only.
• The Constitution of 1889 was a gift from the Emperor to his people yet it was shaped by Ito
Hirobumi with German support.
Power of the Emperor:
• The Emperor was used to unite the people and promote a national unity as the rapid changes were
taking place.
• The Emperor’s position was legally established by the Meiji Constitution, which declared his
inviolability and allowed him wide powers (on paper).
• The Emperor had the right to declare war, make peace, conclude treaties and adjourn the Diet.
• Jansen: “modernising elite had emerged; the power lay with this oligarchy”; “Restoration leaders
kept the court at the centre of national identity and that emphasis diffused amidst the population as
a means of control.”
• Storry: “The nominal head of the new government in Tokyo was a court noble but the real
controllers of power were men from much junior rank from the western clans.”
• Wall: “At first the new government made a show of being open; soon, however, power was
concentrated in the powers of the samurai from the western han.”
• Waswo: “impressive proclamations and edicts were issued in the Emperor’s name calling upon
people to support the building of schools, hospitals and factories and to render service to Japan.”
• Beasley: “The Emperor’s importance as a source of legitimacy for the Meiji leadership has never
been in doubt.” To the Meiji leaders he was “useful as a symbol and occasionally as a weapon of
last resort”.
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Question 4
How important a role did Korea play in shaping Japan’s foreign policy?
The candidate is being asked whether Korea was pivotal in Japan’s foreign policy or whether there
were other factors that shaped it.
• In the early Meiji era there were imperialistic designs on Korea which were revealed in Saigo’s
plans to launch a campaign against Korea.
• In 1876 Japan persuaded Korea to establish diplomatic relations and accept an unequal treaty
providing equal rights for Japanese in Korea which in turn saw Korea asking China to intervene,
thereafter both nations agreed to inform one another if they were to dispatch troops into Korea.
• Violation of this agreement led to the Sino-Japanese War which Japan won.
• The indemnity from China further financed military investment.
• The pivotal role of Korea in bringing about both the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese
War.
• Japan was successful against Russia in 1905 and was on the side of the Allies in World War One
and represented at Versailles thus the candidate will illustrate what shape foreign policy took away
from the Korean dimension.
• To meet the main foreign policy goal of parity and removal of western oppression Korea had to
wait.
• Japan made an alliance with United Kingdom in 1902 as both were alarmed by Russian policy,
especially as Japan feared Russia would move into Korea, which she saw as in her sphere of
influence.
• Details of the debate over Japan’s foreign policy and whether it was planned or responding to
opportunities and the role of Korea will be examined accordingly.
How important a role?
• Korea split the Meiji leadership when a decision to invade in October 1876 was overruled and
Saigo left the government.
• The Korean peninsula was Japan’s obvious means of access to the Asian mainland.
• Korea was an outpost of Japan’s line of defence and therefore does explain Japan’s unwillingness
to surrender her paramount political, commercial and industrial interests. Korea became a
protectorate in 1905 and this culminated the attempts from the late Tokugawa era to exert
influence there.
• Jansen & Rozman: “expedition against Korea was opposed.”

• Wall: after the acquisition of Korea, “Japan at one and the same time obtained the status of a great
power and began a policy of imperialism”.
• Hunter: “as Japan’s strengths grew so did her ambitions on the Asian mainland and her ability to
advance them.”
• Benson & Matsumura: “the European powers’ growing interest in Asia could scarcely be
overlooked and this encouraged Japan’s development of a more aggressive foreign policy.”
• Beasley: “by the 1890s Japan was economically and militarily strong enough to exert her
independence.”
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Question 5
How crucial was state intervention to Japan’s economic growth?

The aim of this essay is to examine the role of those involved in Japan’s economic growth and to
evaluate the degree to which intervention by the state was crucial.
State intervention:
• State leadership significant through taking over and developing new industries like shipbuilding,
mining, iron and steel production.
• Setting up of new textile mills.
• Government had to be creative as it could not pursue a protectionist policy.
• Short term loans from abroad alongside foreign expertise to train Japanese workers ensured
government always in control.
• A reliable bureaucracy to oversee economic development.
Entrepreneurs:
• Evolving when the government began to sell-off industries cheaply, eg cotton mills, glassworks
and cement works.
• Term Zaibatsu synonymous with entrepreneurs.
• Zaibatsu included – Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasud with some developing into large
corporations due to diversification.
• Scotsman Thomas Glover and his role in encouraging Japanese entrepreneurs.
• Zaibatsu were aided by opportunities of World War One.
• Some Zaibatsu concerned themselves with the welfare of their workforce as a means of getting
better productivity.
Others:
• Japan still dependent on traditional products for economic growth, eg raw silk exports to USA.
• Japan had an abundance of human labour.
• Importation of modern machines from abroad, especially for textiles.
• Establishment of the bank of Japan to develop commerce.
• Employing foreign skilled workers to train the Japanese until the point they were self-sufficient.
• Agriculture provided a surplus for investment.
• Macpherson: “The role of the government was crucial.”

• Waswo: “relying on one of the very few foreign loans it was willing to risk before the 1890s and
on British materials and engineering expertise the government oversaw construction of the
nation’s first railway line in 1870-72.”
• Pyle: “Zaibatsu and business leaders resisted government controls that were in any case
implemented in a helter-skelter fashion.”
• Hunter: “most [Zaibatsu] had their own bank which served as the major channel both for funding
existing Zaibatsu enterprises and for bringing new enterprises under the Zaibatsu aegis.”
• Hane: “None had monopolistic control in one area but the handful of Zaibatsu had a grip virtually
on the nation’s entire economic life.”
• Beasley: “the part the government played in initiating the industrialisation of Japan has been the
subject of much debate and controversy.”
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Question 6
How far would you agree that by 1920 living and working conditions for most Japanese were
better than they had been seventy years earlier?
The aim of this essay is to examine the situation of Japanese workers economically, politically and
socially reflecting whether the living and working conditions for most during the period studied were
any better.
Economically:
• Low levels of wages led to issues and strikes.

• Very long hours living in factory barracks which are often compared to prisons.
• Women and girls were vital to the textile industry where they caught tuberculosis and pleurisy.
• Hierarchy developed in heavy industry between skilled and unskilled workers who also believed
they should be paid more than textile workers. These differences led to resentment.
• In rural areas responsibility for public works fell to communities which saw local taxes growing
leaving little for the peasants.
Politically:
• Revision of the Peace Preservation Law to give thought police more power to root out left-wing
radicals in universities and newspapers.
• Discontent from below – Land Tax protests at Wakayama and Tottori Rice Riots of 1918.
• Diet only represented the rich and most of population still excluded from political rights.
• Increasing number of Japanese engaging in collective protest, including small groups of
suffragists.
• Japanese enlightenment was by no means democratic by 20th century.
Socially:
• City dwellers had high rents, expensive public transport and electricity.
• State Shintoism was reorganised to centralise local religious practises.
• Conscription Law seen as a blood tax.
• Loss of cultural traditions often in favour of new western ways of style, art or music.
• Wealthy sector of Japanese society benefited most from opportunities to sample western ways.
Positive aspects:
• Some Zaibatsu concerned themselves with the welfare of their workers.

• Funds were built up to support some workers in times of sickness and retirement.
• 1911 – Legislation to control factory conditions stopped the employment of children under 12, 12
hour limit for boys and girls up to age 15.
• Street lighting gas then electric to towns and cities.
• Trade unions slowly emerged although the government manipulated the workers by emphasising
loyalty.
• Most employees in Japan remained in the same firm until retirement; therefore stability of
employment was a feature.
• Skilled workers were offered incentives to stay with the firm.
• Family like relationships developed, especially in large textile firms, eg Kanebo Cotton Textile
Company, who offered crèche, company housing for married employees, funeral expenses, etc.
• The government sought to reward model villages and model headmen and develop new crops.
• Creation of agricultural co-operatives in 1900 – this meant farmers could form credit, consumer,
marketing and producers’ co-operatives. By 1913, 10,000 existed with a membership of
1,160,000.
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• Beasley: “the 1910s, though recognised to be a decade in which commerce and industry had a
more important place in Japanese life than they ever had before, were not years in which the
economy as a whole advanced to any remarkable degree.”
• Storry: “middle age and elderly were genuinely worried at the seeming frivolity and
individualism of the young.”
• Waswo: “the most powerful of the Japanese political and economic establishment were alarmed
by the popular unrest.”
• Hane: “In general the living conditions of the working class, rural and urban, did not improve
significantly.”
• Hane: “Efforts to organise unions to improve the plight of the workers met with resistance by big-
business leaders and the government.”
• Pyle: “contracts were signed with the girls’ parents, who received an advance that had to be paid
in full if the contract were not fulfilled. Girls were thus caught between obligations to family and
the severity of supervisors overseeing their work.”
Page 109
Japan: From Medieval to Modern State (1850s-1920)
Part 2
Question 1
How fully does Source A explain the events of July 1853 in Japan?
(12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source A, as an adequate explanation of the events of
July 1853 in terms of:
include: accurate comment on Buruma will be credited as historiography.
Points from source which show that the candidate has interpreted the significant view(s)
• The four black ships were led by Commodore Perry, an American.

• The ships fired cannons in contrast to the Japanese weapons of swords and muskets to demonstrate
an air of superiority over the weaker Japanese nation.
• Perry had no knowledge of the structure of Japanese society.
• The black ships were steam vessels which had the effect of astonishing the Japanese.
• Perry was authorised by his government, the Americans, to negotiate as he thought best and to
extort as much to the benefit of the Americans as possible.
• Perry’s visit was preceded by Commodore James Biddle in 1846 and a new determination to seek
superiority over Japan.
• Perry and the west were largely ignorant of Japanese society due to its isolation, except for a small
Dutch settlement.
• The belief prevailed that keeping concubines was the norm.

• Britain saw Japan as a potential colony.
• This age of imperialism saw the Europeans and Americans as having military superiority due to
technological advances, thus making Japan seem inferior.
• Perry asked that any shipwrecked American seamen be properly protected.
• Perry demanded that US vessels were able to obtain supplies in Japan, especially coal.
• The arrival of Perry and his ‘black ships’ alarmed the city of Edo for it could be easily blockaded
as most of its food supplies came in by sea.
• Perry was to return the following year.
• Japan knew more about America than America knew about Japan in 1853.
• After departure, the Bakufu debated the policy of opening Japan or resisting the demands.
Page 110
• Waswo: “a conventional starting point for the term modern Japan in the arrival of Commodore
Perry’s naval squadron in 1853.”
• Jansen: “Yoshida Shoin tried to persuade Perry to take him back to America with him for a period
of study.”
• Pyle: “the foreign intervention occurred abruptly, with a suddenness and intensity, surely
unexpected by most politically conscious Japanese.”
• Storry: “an American squadron under Commodore Perry presented what amounted to an
ultimatum to the shogunate.”
• Wall: “by now merchants in Europe and the United States had high hopes of profit from Japanese
trade”; “Japonisme had acquired a certain vogue abroad.”
which a consideration of Source A is helpful in offering a full explanation of the events in July 1853.
Marks
Page 111
Question 2
How useful is Source B as evidence of the role of the Iwakura mission in shaping and developing
Japanese government and society during the Meiji era? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source B in understanding the role
of the Iwakura mission in terms of:
Provenance:
• The author is Emperor, who was head of the enlightened rule era [Meiji] and came to accession in
1867.
• Something on his wider motives/intentions at that time.
• Date consistent with the year that the Iwakura mission departed to study the west.
• The mission is to be led by Iwakura who was trusted and honoured and therefore the mission had
an important pedigree.
• The aim of reforming to gain equal status is given and the role of the mission is to explore ways to
do this.
• Emperor illustrates his knowledge that Japan does have unique features and that a selection has to
take place for reform and change to occur.
• Iwakura mission members were Iwakura, Kido, Okubu, Ito and Yamagata.
• There were nearly fifty officials and fifty students who also travelled with them.
• The countries travelled to were USA, Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Germany.
• The results of the mission were published in a five-volume report published in 1878.
• The members of the Iwakura mission contributed greatly to the shape and direction of Japan, eg
Kido, who contributed to the drafting of the Charter Oath, Okubo, who was regarded as one of the
architects of the restoration, and Ito, who became Japan’s first Prime Minister.
• Western activity was to be critically evaluated and included governments, trade, finance, industry,
education and military force.
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Points from recall which may offer a wider contextualisation of the views in the source
• The Iwakura mission had a profound impression on Japanese as they witnessed the material and
cultural achievements of the west.
• Iwakura networking brought in foreign advisers to aid developments.
• The mission realised the importance of competition in exports and imports.
• The catch up vision motivated Japanese leaders and became, over time, a national consensus as the
west being fought not by swords but by trade and economics.
• Changes that did occur that were modelled upon western templates including legal, government
bureaucracy, commerce and trade and military.
• Benson & Matsumura: “they went to learn how best to mobilise the country’s political,
economic and social resources to meet the demands of a modern age.”
• Beasley: “the attitudes of the men who took part were profoundly influenced by their
experiences.”
• Pyle: “interest in western constitutionalism was further heightened by the Iwakura mission.”
• Wood: “western activity was to be critically evaluated and shaped to suit Japan.”
• Jansen & Rozman: “their search for institutions and procedures helped to initiate a selective
utilisation of foreign advisors and examples.”
• Hiromatsu: “task of these missions was to survey westernisation for adaptation to the Japanese
cause.”
which a consideration of Source B is useful for understanding the role of the Iwakura mission in
shaping Japanese government and society.
Marks
a clear understanding of the views of the source and their value as interpretations on the issue.
Page 113
Question 3
How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing interpretations on the reasons for Japan’s
victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources C and D on the reasons for victory in the Russo-
Japanese War and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source C
include: accurate comment on Waswo, a revisionist historian, will be credited as historiography.
• The Japanese were able to muster all their material strength

• The Japanese were able to muster all their spiritual strength
• Source infers that the people were united during the war.
• Army and navy had been built up since the previous war.
• Conscription had built up a reserve of Japanese youth to call upon.

• Japanese people were alarmed at the thought of Russian penetration into Korea and this
galvanised the support for war.
• A consequence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) was that the Japanese felt their shame had
been removed and they were able to unite and prepare to deal with Russia.
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Source D
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance will earn credit. Accurate
comment on Storry will be credited as historiography.
• It was a short war.

• Charismatic leaders – Nogi (military) and Togo (naval).
• Implies that Japan had international support.
Points from recall which develop and contextualise those in the source.
• The strategies deployed were skilful.

• The siege of Port Arthur was a great ordeal.
• The Japanese won a notable victory to possess Mukden.
• Japanese army had impressive discipline.
• Admiral Togo’s ships performed the vital role of winning and holding control of the seas,
allowing time to organise a steady flow of troops to the mainland.
• General Nogi controlled the Third Army and secured Port Arthur at a cost of 60,000 Japanese
troops, including his two sons.
• Nogi imposed an extremely high standard of discipline upon his troops, especially towards civilian
life or property.
• Japan had the reassurance of the 1902 alliance with Britain.
• Britain was where many Japanese warships had been built and its naval officers trained.
Points which offer wider contextualisation of the views in the sources
• Japan was benefiting from her long term planning.

• The indemnity (in gold) received from China was vital to military progress and increased her
position of strength.
• Japanese element of surprise with the torpedo attack on Russian fleet in Port Arthur.
• Russian Baltic fleet ill-equipped and badly commanded. Led to big defeat at Tsushima.
• Russian domestic problems on brink of 1905 revolution.
• Russian general staff underestimated Japan’s capability.
• Russian lines of communication were poor, at the end of the single track trans-Siberian Railway.
• Duus: “Japan did win the war with Russia and her position in the Far East was substantially
altered as a result.”
• Hane: referring to victory: “there is no question that the Russo-Japanese War established Japan as
a major military and political power. The goal set by the Meiji leaders in the middle of the
nineteenth century of ‘enriching and strengthening’ the nation was seemingly achieved at last”.
• Hunter: “Japan had for several years been building up her armed forces in anticipation of conflict
with Russia.”
• Benson & Matsumura: “it was a conflict in which the navy did spectacularly well”.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the reasons for
victory in the Russo-Japanese War.
Page 115
Marks
8-11 The candidate makes relevant and appropriate comments of interpretation and the answer is
Page 116
Germany: Versailles to the Outbreak of the Second World War.
Part 1
Question 1
How valid is the view that the Weimar Constitution was a bold but fundamentally flawed
experiment in democracy?
The question’s aim is to enable the candidate to review the above assessment of the Constitution and
to pass judgement. Candidates should be able to use their knowledge about key articles in the
Constitution and their understanding of historical debate on the issue.
The candidate may be expected to use evidence such as:
• Preamble: liberty, justice, peace, social progress

• Federal law: republic, political authority derived from people, delegation of powers, taxation, etc.
• Reichstag: franchise, duration, Chancellor, Reichsrat
• Head of state: President, election of, emergency powers of (especially through Article 48)
• Proportional representation – multi-party political system
• Referenda
• Fundamental rights and duties of Germans.
Contemporary views:
• Count Harry Kessler, “The Provisional Constitution was approved in Weimar yesterday. That
officially ends the revolution.”
• Hugo Preuss (1919), “One finds suspicion everywhere; Germans cannot shake off political
timidity and deference to the authoritarian state.”
• Walther Rathenau (1919), “Now we have a Republic. The problem is we have no Republicans.”
• Arthur Rosenberg (1936), “…animated by the principle of parliamentary democracy… a tool
which the German people might have used in a progressive manner for the promotion of
democracy and socialism…”
• Evans and Jenkins: “…far from revolutionary but, from a German viewpoint, it represented a
major break with the former imperial regime, which had always been far more authoritarian than
democratic…”
• Hite and Hinton: “the Constitution has been described, ironically, as both the most democratic in
the world and as a major reason why democracy failed in Germany.”
• S Lee: “Weimar Germany had all the necessary components for democracy. However, the all
important balance between them was potentially flawed.”
• P Bookbinder (1996): “a compromise… an attempt to combine the British and the continental
parliamentary system, the American presidential system and, to a lesser degree, the Soviet system
of workers’ councils.”
• KD Bracher (1970): “the Constitution did not preclude the erosion and abrogation of its substance
by constitutional means.” “…the possibility of a Presidential government without and even against
the will of parliament and of democratic public opinion.”
• M Burleigh (2000): on Article 48: “At the time few thought of the political misuse of this power.”
• RJ Evans (2003): “The Constitution was full of far-reaching declarations of principle… On the
basis of such principles, a whole raft of legislation was steered through the Reichstag.”
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• E Kolb (1998): “The provisions which made the President a kind of ‘ersatz emperor’ reflected the
mistrust that the fathers of the Constitution felt towards a fully parliamentary system on a
democratic party basis.”
• AJ Nicholls (1969): “The Constitution was not given the chance of becoming accepted as the basic
legal framework underlying the political and socio-economic life of the Republic. Instead, it was
used for a series of stop-gap solutions.”
• D Peukert (1987): “An attempt to get to grips with the basic structural problem confronting any
modern constitution; namely, how to accommodate mutually antagonistic social pressures,
organised special-interest groups and competing political ideologies and sets of values.”
• HA Turner (1996): “The Republic’s constitution bestowed upon the President’s office far greater
powers than those of (Europe’s) remaining monarchs. He had at his disposal sweeping emergency
powers.”
Page 118
Question 2
“A trauma whose influence affected the behaviour of Germans of all classes long afterwards.”
Discuss this view of the hyperinflation of 1923.
The aim of this question is to enable candidates to review and evaluate the nature and significance of
the Great Inflation of 1923. In doing so, they should be able to describe the winners and losers of this
period in terms both of individual experiences across the social spectrum and of social class.
‘Behaviour’ is open-ended, to include economic impact, social mobility (eg proletarianisation of layers
of the Mittelstand), political consequences, etc, and what Peukert labels ‘the inversion of values’.
The hyperinflation of 1923 as the ‘endgame’ of a decade-long process.

• Some brief overview of this process to help explain the impact, viz.
− Pre-1914: a phenomenon unfamiliar to Germans
− 1914-18: Imperial fiscal policy generated inflation
− 1919-21: the ‘benign’ inflation in the aftermath of defeat, enabling temporary economic
recovery
− 1922-23: growing monetary chaos; inflation from gallop to stampede
− 1923: “the year money went mad”; money lost its value, workers increasingly demanded
payment in kind, an economy of theft and barter
− 1924: stabilisation of the mark
• Some anecdotal evidence of the hyperinflation.
• The losers in this ‘flight from the mark’, eg the salaried layers of the middle class, those on fixed
incomes, eg bond holders, pensioners
− “there were winners too” (Erna von Pustau), eg entrepreneurs such as Hugo Stinnes,
speculators, some farmers, some mortgagees, those able to use cheap money to their
advantage
• Political consequences: the rise of political extremism on the right; the putchism and left-
communism of NSDAP and KPD; a growing fragmentation of ‘middle class’ political parties in
the altered social geography of post-inflation Germany.
• Some candidates, however, may argue that the rapid stabilisation that had impacted by 1924
limited the long term consequences of the hyperinflation, citing the failure of political extremism
in 1923 and the dog years that followed for the NSDAP and KPD.
• Other candidates may argue that the inflation fatally undermined Weimar and led to its collapse
nearly a decade later, focusing on the fundamental disaffection with the Republic that had begun
with Versailles and was accelerated by hyperinflation.
• Altered moral climate – altered ethos – poverty-induced crime.
Page 119
• Earlier analyses taking a ‘broad-brush’ approach to social impact as early as Stresemann (1927),
on “the reduction to the level of the proletariat” of Germany’s intellectual and professional middle
class. (In a sense, Stresemann was a beneficiary of the political crisis)
• AJP Taylor (1945): “It stripped the middle classes of their savings and made the industrial
magnates absolute dictators of German economic life.”
• Arthur Rosenberg (1936): “the victims… the lower middle classes, the wage and salary earners”
and “unexampled misery for the masses” reflected in public health statistics. The winners were
“speculating German financiers and industrialists”.
• Evans and Jenkins write that the pauperised and those “cheated of their savings… became more
prepared to listen to the firebrand orators of the extremist parties.”
• Alan Bullock (1952): “the inflation was to undermine German society in a way which war, nor
the revolution of 1918, nor the Treaty of Versailles had never done”
• Detlev Peukert (1987) counsels caution: “the social effects… are not easy to assess.” Thus, two
individuals from the same broad social class may be affected very differently. Richard J. Evans
(2003) writes in the same vein, reminding his readers that the same person might be a winner and
a loser. But unquestionably “a huge crime wave” hit Germany in 1923.
• The impact on something as notoriously vague as the “German psyche” is difficult to measure.
Piers Brendon (2000) writes with student-friendly gusto on the erosion of moral values. But
while night-life in Berlin was “weird”, the same decadence was hardly observable in Cottbus, a
hundred kilometres away.
• Mary Fulbrook (1991) argues that the “psychological shock” eroded democratic values and
instilled “a heightened fear of the possibility of economic instability”.
Page 120
Question 3
How effective was the Chancellorship of Heinrich Brüning?
The aim here is for candidates to assess the problems face by Brüning as Chancellor and to evaluate
his success/failure in dealing with these problems.
A review of the problems facing Chancellor Brüning: economic, political, and diplomatic.
• The chronology of the Great Depression, eg
Industrial Production (1913 = 100)

1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
100 114 99 82 66 74
Unemployment (in millions)

1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
1.8 3.1 4.5 5.6 4.8
• Isolationism – no white knights from USA to pump-prime German recovery.

• Global depression – crisis for German export industry.
• Beijing was ‘the first of the presidential chancellors’ – SPD frozen out from government. Brüning
(Centre Party) had conservative support but no working majority in Reichstag, so he had little
power of manoeuvre.
• Post-September 1930, election growth of extremism, of the KPD but particularly the Nazi Party.
• October 1931: The Harzburg Front – Hitler and rightist groups met with leading industrialists and
financiers seeking to replace Brüning.
• The former machine-gun officer was increasingly reliant on the patronage of the former Field
Marshall Hindenburg.
• In foreign affairs he had to steal the Nationalists’ clothes by robustly attacking the Treaty of
Versailles, especially reparations and over disarmament.
A review of the solutions attempted by Brüning:
• Deflationary fiscal policies – cutting government expenditure, increasing taxation, lower welfare
benefits.
• (only in 1932) embarks on the proto-Keynesian public works schemes.
• Plan to provide smallholdings to the unemployed in bankrupt East Prussian estates.
• Rule by presidential decree.
• Abandoned Stresemann’s conciliatory strategy for more assertive attitude towards the post-
Versailles settlement.
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Success/failure of these policies?
• Nicknamed ‘the Hunger Chancellor’.

• Sharp decline in real incomes.
• Alienated the SPD, the Republic’s largest party and its defender, in 1930.
• By calling unnecessary Reichstag elections opens the door for Nazi breakthrough, 1930.
• Rule by presidential decree created opportunity for cynical intrigues.
• Strong line on reparations; suspended by July 1931 (Hoover moratorium).
• Demanded parity for Germany at Geneva Disarmament Conference.
• Projected Austro-German customs union failed.
• Reasons for Brüning’s dismissal:
− His relationship with the President; client and patron
− Brüning’s failure to win the support of Hugenberg and the Nationalist Party
− Hindenburg’s anger at thus having to rely on socialist (SPD) and Catholic (Centre) support
− Brüning’s economic policies angered army leaders with access to the President
− Intrigue against the Chancellor within the ‘Court Camarilla’ of the president
Candidates might bring a range of appropriate historians’ commentary to support their views.
• Hite and Hinton: ‘a desperate improviser’.

• Evans and Jenkins: anti-socialist, monarchist but ‘a democrat at heart’.
• Stephen Lee: he ‘was well aware of the plans being made to undermine the Republic’.
• Ian Kershaw: refers to his poor judgement in 1930; ‘the decision to dissolve the Reichstag was
one of breath-taking irresponsibility’.
• Richard J Evans: Brüning fatally underestimated the potential of the Nazis; while his ‘instinctive
faith’ in Hindenburg’s political reliability was disastrous.
• Piers Brendon: an authoritarian lacking political finesse… Germany’s Herbert Hoover.
• Michael Burleigh: he was Chancellor ‘on sufferance’.
• AJP Taylor: he relied solely on Hindenburg, and this reliance was his undoing.
• Sir John Wheeler Bennett (1953): Brüning was ‘the prisoner of the industrialists, bankers and
great landowners. He obediently included in his emergency decrees all the demands made by the
big business interests.’ He threw away Stresemann’s legacy.
• Brüning’s Memoirs (1970): offered him the opportunity of a mea culpa, his strong medicine
beginning to work by the time of his enforced resignation, a determined patriot, need to ‘stick out
the last hundred yards’. In 1935, according to Harry Kessler, he was ‘very scathing’ about
Hindenburg, who by 1933 was unfit to be head of state.
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Question 4
How secure was Hitler’s grip on power by the end of 1934?
The candidate is being asked to assess the nature and strength of Hitler as Chancellor then as Führer
by the end of 23 months of Nazi rule, and to evaluate the degree of his control over Germany, its
people and its institutions.
• Factors leading towards Hitler strengthening his power

− Gleichschaltung: the phase of consolidated rule
− The Enabling Law
− The elimination of free trade unions and free collective bargaining
− The co-ordination of law and order under Gestapo and SS; the first concentration camps
− Night of the Long Knives, 30th June 1934; purging party malcontents: Ernst Röhm, Gregor
Strasser and the SA
− 30th June 1934 murder of von Schleicher: elimination of von Papen as potential counterweight.
• Wooing and winning the pillars of the regime

− Army: post 30th June 1934 and post 2nd August 1934
− Industrialists and financial sector
− Civil service and judiciary
• Death of President Hindenburg, 2nd August 1934 – Hitler became Führer.
• Propaganda: the burgeoning Hitler myth – ‘Triumph of Will’, post Nuremberg Rally of
September 1934.
• Early diplomatic successes: quitting Disarmament Conference and League of Nations.
• Continuing uncertainties of Hitler’s Chancellorship

− Brittleness of the economy; continuing high unemployment; currency and credit restrictions;
raw material supply
− Disaffected elements in society, eg in predominantly Catholic areas
− Propaganda failures; disenchantment of the peasantry and industrial workers with the notion
of ‘national renewal’
− Army leaders; some still doubtful… von Fritsch and von Blomberg finally relieved of duties
following November 1937
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• Hite and Hinton: on Hitler’s ‘elemental’ sense of ‘his mission in history’ and ‘the will of the
Führer as the revelation of the German people’s destiny’.
• Evans and Jenkins: ‘Economic recovery was the basis of Nazi success for Hitler recognised that
maximum support of the people was essential.’
• Geoff Layton’s tracing of the key factors explaining the establishment of the dictatorship.
• WS Allen (1965): after the initial dynamic and dramatic period of the ‘seizure of power’ there
emerged in places such as Northeim ‘mutual accommodation to make daily life tolerable’.
• Michael Burleigh: refers to ‘the black arts of co-ordination’ describing Nazi success in absorbing
existing German charities.
• Richard Evans: ‘Hitler’s government was lucky in its timing’, the beneficiary of the economic
recovery that had begun to show at the end of 1932.
• Norbert Frei (1987): emphasises how Nazi economic policies ‘were accompanied by a campaign
to influence opinion’. Propaganda was integral to economic and social policy.
• Ian Kershaw (2000): views 30th June and 2nd August 1934 as key dates; Hitler ‘was now
institutionally unchallengeable, backed by the ‘big battalions’, adored by much of the population.
He had secured total power…’
• Richard Gellately: ‘Wholesale terror was not needed… there was a latent social consensus
waiting to be mobilised.’ Localities like Dachau welcomed the establishment of concentration
camps.
• Richard Overy (2004): describes the symbiosis between Hitler and millions of Germans to whom
he appeared as a secular messiah, fulfilling their need for the advent of redemption… ‘Hitler’s cult
of personality was not something grafted on to a German political culture, but derived its appeal
from a wide, though by no means universal, expectation of a German redeemer.’
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Question 5
Assess the impact of Nazi economic policies, 1933-1939.
The candidate is being asked to gauge the success and failure of such measures across a period of time
which can be subdivided into: 1933-36 Schacht’s dominant role, and from 1936, Göring as
‘Plenipotentiary for the Implementation of the Four Year Plan’. The candidate will account for and
evaluate the tension between consumerisation and spending on re-armament while explaining ‘the
primacy of politics’.
• The legacy of Brüning
• His deflationary policies drastically cut the government deficit and lowered prices
• Winter Aid – had its origins on Brüning’s period of government
• Brüning’s strong line on reparations, suspended as early as July 1931 and finally cancelled
summer 1932
• The German economy at the time of the Machtergreifung (Seizure of Power) when ‘Germany had
all the features of a depressed economy’ (Evans and Jenkins).
• Collapse of export industries in depressed global economy
• Critical decline in industrial production and in national income
• Mass unemployment (4.8 million)
• Decline in real wages and real income, and resultant collapse in consumer production
• The priority for the Nazis of economic recovery
• Hjalmar Schacht, architect of recovery
• Schacht’s commitment to centralised economic management, corporate planning
• Fiscal policy – including deficit financing, MEFO bills and major revival of public investment
• Public works schemes
• Autarky
• Rearmament
• Impact of these earlier policies

• Continuing balance of payment problems, increased imports not matched by exports, low
currency reserves
• Inflation curbed – abolition of free collective bargaining, high taxation, savings
• Regime rides out widespread grumbling, by 1936 ‘feel good factor’ present
• Leaders of big industry were again ‘masters in their house’ (Kershaw)
• The emergent ‘guns before butter’ debate
• Göring and the Four Year Plan
• Schacht is sidelined
• The ‘primacy of politics’
• Prioritisation of strategic sectors, eg metallurgy rather than farm produce
• Intensified curbs on inflation
• Autarky – raw materials and food
• Ersatz
• Impact of these later polices
• Bonding of state and industrial leadership, an emergent New Order?
• Increased exploitation of labour, including mobilisation of women; at odds with Nazi ideology
• Crisis in agriculture – including labour shortages
• On the Mittelstand – despite Nazi theories – small business and artisans increasingly squeezed,
eg unable to compete with larger firms in fixed price markets
• On the business community
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• Geoff Layton (2005): on the recovery in 1936, ‘It is difficult to believe that such a marked
turnaround would have been achieved without Nazi economic policy’. Layton asks, ‘Did
Germany have a war economy in peacetime?’
• Hite and Hinton: ‘Nazi economic policy was increasingly geared to the needs of war, and in this
Germany ultimately failed.’
• Evans and Jenkins’ overview is of the strains produced by competing demands on scarce
resources.
• Norbert Frei noted the contradiction between Nazi propaganda and ideology and reality in the
farming communities; ‘Peasant Teutons, supposedly so true to the soil, were rushing into the
metropolitan conurbations’.
• Lothar Gall (1998) notes the good fortune enjoyed by the Nazis in 1933: ‘the economic upswing
had already begun’. But ‘the measures taken to overcome the economic crisis were inextricably
linked to their policy of rearmament and their preparations for war’.
• Ian Kershaw notes how many Germans in the post-1945 trauma looked back to these middle
years as ‘the good times’. He notes the tension between consumer and rearmament spending in ‘a
crash programme which maximised autarkic potential to prepare Germany as rapidly as possible
for the confrontation which Hitler deemed inevitable’.
• Guido Knopp (1996) points up the ‘primacy of politics’; ‘Economic problems were for Hitler
problems of will power and Göring was the only man credited with a strong enough will’.
• Marxist interpretations may be found in the writings of Tim Mason and Mihaly Vajda. Mason
argued that ‘the needs of the economy were determined by political decisions, principally by
decisions in foreign policy’. Vajda developed the ‘Masonic’ line arguing that ‘monopoly
capitalist circles’ surrendered hegemony to the Nazis, ‘whose popularity had even increased since
1933 as a result of their success in economic policy’.
• Richard Overy argues that the origins of the Nazi command economy lay in policies pursued by
Walter Rathenau in the Great War; ‘the coming of the dictatorship in Germany strengthened the
hand of the central apparatus for economic planning and policy’. Schacht was ‘committed to the
firm hand of the state’.
• Ray Stokes (2004): ‘It is clear that (after 1933) companies were willing to go to great lengths to
please the new regime in order to secure or gain markets, access to foreign exchange and/or raw
materials; industry in Germany played an essential role in preparing the Third Reich for war.’
• Tim Kirk (2006): mining and heavy industry stood to gain most from rapid rearmament and
Nazism’s ‘expansionist objectives’ at the expense of consumerism. He talks of mittelstand’s
‘thwarted expectations’
• Adam Tooze (2006) downplays work creation and motorisation policies. Instead it was
rearmament which from the outset propelled Nazi economic recovery. He argues that the
majority of the ‘volksproduckte’ (standardised simplified version of consumer basics) were
failures.
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Question 6
“Whilst active resistance to Nazism was only a minority affair, dissent and non-conformity
towards the regime was widespread.” How accurate is this assessment of the nature of
opposition in Germany, 1933-1939?
The question is making a claim to be challenged or supported. In doing so the candidate ought to
define the nature and extent of active resistance and explain the nature of dissent and non-conformity
in terms of individuals, peer groups, social class, belief systems and the like.
• A review of factors making dissent and resistance difficult:

− Police state – Gestapo and SS; network of informers, including Blockwartführers
− Concentration camps; arbitrary imprisonment
− Lack of free speech, eg captive press
− Monolithic state
− Traditional respect for authority.
• Reasons for resistance and dissent.
• Active resistance:
− Political – KPD and SPD
− Army officers
− Individuals, eg Georg Elser
• Dissent:
− Peculiar features of church organisations; belief systems and organisational structure
− Roman Catholic Church
− Confessional church
− Jehovah’s Witnesses and other sects
• Non-conformity:
− Youth
− Homosexuals, lesbians
− Cultural aspects; jazz, literature, art
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• Early historiography such as Wheeler-Bennett (1953) focused on individuals within the

Reichswehr such as Beck and von Fritsch, see also Christian resisters such as Bonhoeffer and
Neimoller.
• Later historians have focused on ‘history from below’. The peculiar features of a wide range of
behavioural and attitudinal dissent and non-conformity are ably synthesised by recent textbook
historians such as Evans and Jenkins, Hite and Hinton and Geoff Layton. Layton, for
example, provides a succinct summary of Martyn Housden’s ‘levels of action’, with its eight
levels of action ranging from ‘personal mental protection’ to ‘revolution against the whole Hitler
state’.
• Evans and Jenkins emphasise that opposition never existed ‘as one unified movement’.
‘Fragmented, often along class lines, it lacked organisation and had no acknowledged leadership.’
• Defining ‘non-conformity and dissent’ can be problematic. As Richard J Evans has noted, there
has been a ‘tendency to expand the concept of resistance until it covers everything short of
positive enthusiasm for the regime’. In addition, dissenting behaviour might focus on one aspect
of the regime’s behaviour, for example its euthanasia policies, while the same person might
support the Nazi’s expansionist foreign policy such as the Anschlüss.
• Richard Overy describes the chasm separating revolutionary from reformist socialists, whereby
political resistance was enfeebled. He notes that any notion of organised ‘working class
resistance’ was a chimera, on account of factors such as social heterogeneity, political
fragmentation and regional diversity. Workforce opposition was thus often ‘subdued and
fragmentary’, and often left to ‘franc tireurs’ such as the remarkable Georg Elser, a man until
recently hidden from history.
• Ian Kershaw stresses the extent to which acts of resistance took place within a context of broad
support for the Nazi regime. He notes an ‘underlying consensus’, ‘an emotional concordance
with fundamental aspects of National Socialist ideology’.
• Neil Gregor (2000) notes: ‘Manifestations of dissent on single issues could exist alongside
fundamental support for the regime as a whole.’
Page 128
Germany: Versailles to the Outbreak of the Second World War.
Part 2
Question 1
How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing views on the nature of the German
Revolution of 1918-1919? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources A and B on the nature and peculiar features of the
German Revolution of 1918-19, and offers a structured evaluation of how much the two perspectives
reveal in terms of:
Source A
include: recognition of the author’s left wing view
• An episode in the naval base in Wilhelmshaven, part of the mutinies of 1918-19 in the German
North Sea ports
• January 1919 was a crisis point in the revolution
• Author sees the seamen as ‘class-conscious’ revolutionaries determined to end capitalist war (viz,
the Great War of 1914-18).
• ‘Icarus’ claims the men have a millenarian vision of international socialism.
• Part of the phenomenon of ‘the revolution from below’ from autumn 1918 driven by left-wing
agitation in the armed forces and cities.
• Revolutionary leadership came from the likes of the Spartakusbund, especially in Berlin, from
Marxist-syndicalist shop stewards in some factories and from (in Marxist terms) centrist USPD
(Independent Socialist) leaders.
• January 1919 – Spartakist Revolt. Thermidor of the revolution – suppression – role of Freikorps.
• In part such chiliasm was inspired by events in Russia; October 1917 Revolution with the German
councils partly mirroring the example of Soviets in Russia.
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• AJ Ryder; pioneering English language study of 1918-19: “The very fact that power was seized
by workers’ and soldiers’ councils, and that the Reichstag was ignored, shows that the
constitutional reforms (the so-called ‘Revolution from above’) had made no impact on the
ordinary person.”
• The former KPD deputy, Arthur Rosenberg, writing in 1936 claims that the numerically strong
forces of the provisional government “were able without much difficulty to crush the sailors”, and
that real power then lay in the hands of the Freikorps.
• The contemporary observer Harry Kessler had little hope for the revolutionary romanticism and
utopianism of people like ‘Icarus’. He saw the revolution as “simply the consequence of the old
political structure crumbling away… too rotten to withstand outside pressure”, ie of the Great
War.
• There is consensus among many historians that the ‘revolution from below’ as described in
Source A owed more to war-weariness than to class-conscious action.
Source B
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance will earn credit. Accurate comment
on RJ Evans will receive credit under historiography.
• Ebert, SPD leader, emerged as the key politician of 1918-19, becoming the Republic’s first
President.
• “…wanted parliamentary democracy” and speedily organised parliamentary elections.
• Ebert’s concern to out-manoeuvre the supporters of “soviet-style” workers’ and soldiers’ councils.
• “…many ordinary electors”, supporters of the three democratic parties (SPD, Centre and left-
liberal democrats of the DDP) saw Russian Bolshevism as a “threat”.
• Ebert: reformist socialist who “hated revolution like sin”.

• Ebert and his close political allies in the Majority SPD party sought to steer Germany away from
the councils towards a parliamentary democracy, thereby forestalling the more radical and
revolutionary elements in the German labour movement.
• Ebert and the Majority SPD leaders were worried that any deepening of the German Revolution
might anger the victorious Allies and lead to a full-scale invasion of Germany. At that time the
spectre of Bolshevism haunted Europe.
• Ebert-Groener telephone ‘Pact’ of 10th November 1918. The army leadership agreed to crush
‘Bolshevism’ in Germany, thereby preserving the new republic but at the price of securing the
army’s independent status.
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• Wheeler Bennett (1953): the Ebert-Groener deal “gave the Supreme Command exactly what it
wanted… protection against any interference” by politicians, while Ebert “was not averse to being
rid of the councils”.
• Radical/Marxist historiography sees Ebert as the revolution’s grave digger. As Ledebour (USPD)
put it, “Ebert had smuggled himself into the revolution in order to destroy it”. Trotsky viewed the
new Germany as “only the old regime minus the dynasty”.
• A more recent radical historian, Richard J Evans, is more objective in his analysis. Ebert was “a
typical pragmatist of the second generation of Social Democratic leaders”. His Marxism was
peripheral, instead “he concentrated his efforts on the day to day improvements of working class
life” from a set of deeply patriotic beliefs. He feared the collapse of a defeated Germany into
chaos.
• Paul Bookbinder (1996): “Ebert saw Germany’s defeat as an opportunity for real political and
economic reform, but he was opposed to radical transformation.”
• Arthur Rosenberg (1936): a frontal attack by the armed forces on what he calls “the socialist
proletariat” was impossible. Instead, “an attempt must be made to mobilise the conservative wing
of the Majority Socialists against the Independents, the Spartakists and the Councils as a whole”.
Thereby, Germany “would be made safe for the middle classes”.
• Eberhard Kolb (1998): stresses the spontaneous nature of the revolution from below, in part
made possible by the “paralysis of the will to maintain order”. “It was not a question of a
centrally planned campaign of subversive action by revolutionary elements, but a spontaneous
outbreak by the war-weary people, who hoped this way to force their rulers to make peace.”
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the nature and
extent of the German Revolution of 1918-19.
Marks
5-7 The candidate’s answer shows a limited understanding of the views in the sources, and little if
showing a clear understanding of the provenance of the source and the views in it. There is a
solid grasp of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis.
Greater awareness and development of historical interpretations and/or historians’ views will
be credited highly.
Page 131
Question 2
How fully does Source C explain the Nazi’s emergence as a major political force?
(12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source C as an adequate explanation of the emergence
of the Nazis as a major force in terms of:
on HW Koch will receive credit under historiography.
• Impact of the economic slump

• Reference to the September 1930 elections
• Those areas where the Nazis gained votes
• Gregor Strasser – position – his new election strategy
• Before 1928 – NSDAP’s ‘blanket effort’ covering all constituencies
• Post-1928 focus on key ‘marginals’
• ‘the Depression’ – major structural problems in the Weimar economy before October 1929; the
biggest withdrawal of foreign investment only comes towards end of 1930.
• Index of industrial production: was reflected in surge in unemployment from already high base
(1928 – 1.4 million)
1913 1928 1929 1930 1932

100 113 114 99 66
• ‘the election returns’ – September 1930 – Extremist gains (KPD 54 to 77 seats; Nazis 12 to 107) at
the expense of the democratic Right. The first major challenge to the bourgeois democratic status
quo of the Republic since 1919.
• NSDAP have leapt credibility gap – no longer a fringe regional grouping.
• Gregor Strasser – put the ‘socialist’ into ‘National Socialist’, populist politician of considerable
ability much feared by Hitler; victim of the Night of the Long Knives.
• NSDAP before 1928. In appearance rooted in the fringes of German political life, but in essence
Hitler and his inner circle had since 1924 rebranded and retooled the party. This enabled the Nazi
party to exploit the Depression far more effectively than it and those of its ilk had handled the
inflation crisis of 1922-23.
• The NSDAP put a huge effort into its election campaign that autumn, with Hitler in the vanguard.
Page 132
• AJP Taylor once observed “Only the Great Depression put wind in Hitler’s sails”.
• As early as 1936, Arthur Rosenberg noted how the number of votes cast rose from 31 million in
1928 to 35 million in September 1930, claiming that 75% of these new voters voted Nazi. The
Party’s most striking successes came in areas of rural distress where it had already begun to do
well before 1929.
• William Carr (1969) has noted how in September 1930 “two out of every five Germans voted for
parties bitterly opposed to the principles on which the Republic was created”.
• The source’s author, HW Koch, emphasises how Hitler warned his opponents against comparing
him with themselves: “the NSDAP was not a parliamentary party and would never be one”.
• This messianic self-image of Hitler and its significance is commented on by his biographer Ian
Kershaw: “the NSDAP came to function increasingly as a ‘super-interest’ party”. In thus
projecting himself and the Nazi movement, Hitler tapped into the burgeoning “national mood” far
more effectively than his rivals. Kershaw and others before him effectively demolish the old
Marxist or neo-Marxist analysis of the Nazis as the voice of the German “petit bourgeoisie”.
• WS Allen’s pioneering study of the Nazi seizure of power in Northeim, Hanover describes the
entry of the Nazis into Northeim’s political life in 1929; “To the average Northeimer the Nazis
appeared vigorous, dedicated and young.” In the September 1930 election, of the 805 ‘new’
voters, 3 in 4 voted Nazi.
• Richard J Evans explains the Nazis’ gains in terms of their ability to appeal to “deep-seated
anxieties in many parts of the electorate” and to their ability to win the votes of young first-time
voters. They did “particularly well” among women at a time when women voters were larger in
numbers than male.
• The Nazis did particularly well in Protestant North Germany but had little appeal in constituencies
where the Communist and SPD parties were entrenched. Evans encapsulates them in September
1930 as “a catch-all party of social protest” projecting an image of dynamic action and creating a
“cult of leadership” around Hitler.
which a consideration of Source C offers an adequate explanation of the emergence of the Nazis as a
major force.
Page 133
Marks
Page 134
Question 3
How useful is Source D as evidence of the implementation of Nazi racial policies?

(12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source D in providing an adequate
understanding of the nature of Nazi racial policies in terms of:
Provenance: appropriate and relevant points may be given credit. These may include:
• Minutes of meeting convened by Göring in the immediate aftermath of Kristallnacht, 8/9th

November 1938.
• Authorship: Göring and Goebbels both ‘AlteKampfer’ (old Nazis) and members of Hitler’s inner
circle.
• Göring in charge of economic policy and implementation of 4-year plan.
• Goebbels Minister of Propaganda: key role in Kristallnacht.
• Göring impatient for action: time for “competent agencies” to act

• “…elimination of the Jew” from the German economy
• Goebbels notes the arson of 8/9th November
• Goebbels’ impatience to have damaged synagogues razed
• Goebbels also uses the ‘e-word’… “eliminated” from public life
• Rail travel – segregated transport proposed
• “It is still possible today…” (Goebbels) – Nazi anti-Semitism 1933-38 had increasingly
marginalised and threatened Jews in Germany, from the boycott of Jewish businesses, 1st April
1933 to the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935.
• Göring and Goebbels – “working towards the Führer” – outbidding each other in their radical
posturing.
• No mention in the source of Hitler, but 11 weeks later, 30th January 1939, the Führer spoke in
public of “the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe”.
• Anschluss of mid-March 1938 saw the beginning of forced emigration of Jews, first in Austria
(Eichmann’s remit), then from January 1939 the Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration run
by Eichmann and Heydrich.
• Ensuing decree for the Exclusion of Jews from German Economic Life interlinked to the regime’s
Four Year Plan.
• April 1939: suspension of measures to protect Jewish tenants; ghettoisation.
• Nazi treatment of other ethnic minorities (eg black children born in 1924).
• Euthanasia policies before 1939
Page 135
• Overviews and schools of historical thought on this issue, ie Structuralists/Intentionalists

attitude towards racial policy.
• Geoff Layton: contextualises Goebbels’ role. He had hoped that the anti-Semitic actions might
compensate for his disreputable affair with the Czech actress, Lida Baarova.
• Burleigh and Wippermann (1991): “In line with their ceaseless redrawing of the parameters of
what was possible, it was from now on a question of the total expropriation and plundering of the
Jewish minority.”
• Daniel Goldhagen (1996): “…to destroy a community’s institutions is psychologically almost the
same… as destroying its people… Kirstallnacht was a proto-genocidal assault.”
• Hite and Hinton: “…the lack of formal restraint and the institutional Social Darwinism, with
rivals vying to work towards the Führer led to a process of cumulative radicalisation.”
• Ian Kershaw: “None of this had the ring of actions being taken against Hitler’s will, or in
opposition to his intentions.” Kershaw links in Kristallnacht and immediately subsequent events
such as the 12th November meeting with Hitler having been “at the epicentre of an international
crisis” (culminating in the Munich agreement). The episode seems to have “re-emphasised the
presumed links in Hitler’s mind between the power of the Jews and war”.
• Guido Knopp: Göring in convening the 12th November Conference thereby addressed one of
Hitler’s wishes that “the Jewish question must be approached in a systematic manner”.
• Richard Overy: “By the mid-1930s the racial priorities of the regime came to define the nature of
state oppression in Germany.”
which a consideration of Source D is useful for understanding Nazi racial policies.
Marks
context and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Greater awareness and development of
Page 136
South Africa (1910-1984)
Part 1
Question 1
How justified is the claim that the poor-white problem was “the most pressing social issue in
Afrikaner politics” between 1910 and 1939?
This essay invites candidates to evaluate the significance of ‘poor-whiteism’ as a pressing social issue
for Afrikaner politicians in the period 1910 to 1939. The quotation is from Giliomee.
The nature of the problem

• The problem of the poor Whites was recognised before 1910.
• Initially a rural problem: many subsistence farmers (bywoners or tenants) were unable to make the
transition to market oriented farming.
• Natural disasters such as rinderpest had exacerbated problems.
• Displacement caused by the Boer War and the British scorched earth policy meant many went to
the towns.
• Urbanisation was chaotic and traumatic; by 1936, 50% of Afrikaners lived in towns.
• Poor educational standards: in 1917, 20% white children were not in school.
• 1926 Commission reported these Whites were in direct competition with the ‘natives’.
• Some of the worst slums in the world in Johannesburg and other Rand towns.
• 1932 Carnegie Report analysed the problem using modern sociological methods.
• Loyalty of these Afrikaner poor was up for grabs.
The response of Afrikaner politicians

• All (Smuts, Hertzog and Malan) agreed on the need for superior education but disagreed on other
issues.
• Smuts did not accept that government intervention could solve poverty.
• Hertzog’s concern for poor was an affirmation of the Calvinist principle that man had the right to a
decent living.
• Hertzog broke with the SAP because of its capitalist policies.
• DF Malan: Afrikaners’ struggle for survival was central to Malan’s view of life.
• His most crucial concern was the reintegration of the poor Afrikaners.
• According to Malan, the ‘native question’ was at the heart of the poor-white issue.
• Malan believed that segregation was essential to avoid direct black-white competition.
• In the 1930s Malan and Verwoerd attacked the UP for its alleged failure to tackle the problem of
the poor Whites and demanded more radical solutions.
Page 137
Government action and the poor whiteism
• 1911: Mines & Works Act; 1922: apprenticeships confined to Whites; 1923: urban segregation
intensified.
• Despite this legislation. Smuts seen as fatalistic about existence of poor Whites.
• 1913, 1914 and 1922: white underclass nearly brought the South African state to its knees.
• General de Wet’s rebellion (WWI) received support from poor whites.
• After 1914, bywoners and poor voted for Hertzog.
• Afrikaner press played on anti-capitalist sentiment: Smuts identified with capitalists.
• Hertzog’s legislation, eg civilised labour policy of 1924-25, of the mid 1920s introduced stability
in the system of industrial relations and brought greater security to white workers.
• The ‘civilised labour’ policy did nothing to alleviate rural poverty.
• 1912-26: spending on white education doubled.
• The Depression prompted intervention on an unprecedented scale.
• Despite government action, large numbers of poor Whites persisted; the 1932 Carnegie report
highlighted the extent of the problem.
• Malan’s PNP appealed to these poor Whites.
• Fusion government after 1934 continued to tackle problem of poor Whites.
• The UP’s Slums Act (1934) ended racially integrated slums: Whites were rehoused but Blacks
were moved to new townships away from cities.
• The problem of the poor Whites was tackled at the expense of black Africans.
Candidates may consider other possible social issues such as:

• The position of the ‘natives’ (this is closely linked to solving the problem of the poor Whites).
• Relations between the two white ethnic groups.
• Giliomee, in The Afrikaners, especially chapter 10, “Wretched folk, ready for any mischief”,
examines the economic impact of the civilised labour policy.
• Beinart: Smuts did not do enough to help poor Whites; other Afrikaner politicians “saw both the
potential of harnessing, and the danger of ignoring, this group”.
• Davies: between 1924 and 1932 Hertzog’s job reservation policies transferred about 8000 jobs
from black to white hands.
• Davenport: Fusion government tackled the problem of poor Whites very successfully; new
opportunities in state organisations such as police, prison service, and – above all – the railways.
“By these means and with the help of the boom, the government had as good as eliminated the
poor White problem by 1939.”
• Guelke and Giliomee: emphasise the appeal of extremist Afrikaner nationalist organisations to
poor urban Whites.
• Main areas of debate: the extent to which the problem of the poor whites had been solved by 1939.
(See Davenport for a positive view; Giliomee for a more conservative view). The extent to which
the issue of poor-whiteism gave rise to the racist attitudes embedded in apartheid.
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Question 2
‘A decade of renewal and radicalisation.’ How accurately does this describe African resistance
in the 1940s?
This essay invites candidates to evaluate the significance of a range of developments that took place
within the African resistance movements in the 1940s, and to consider the extent to which these had
produced a ‘renewed’ and ‘more radical’ movement by the end of the decade.
The nature of African resistance movements before 1940

• Developments in the ANC
• The ICU
• Relations with the CPSA
• Rural resistance
• The AAC
The developments of the 1940s and their significance, including:

• The changes prompted by the war and the existence of the Atlantic Charter
• The revival of the ANC under Xuma
• Dubow: “The new mass politics… centred on the industrial Transvaal.”
• Women accorded full membership of the ANC
• The formation of the ANC Youth League (1944) and the growth of Africanism
• The growth of Union activity during the war, including the African Mineworkers Union
(leadership from the ANC and the Communist Party)
• Organised local resistance, including the Alexandra Bus boycotts (1940-44)
• The African Mine workers strike (1946); 100,000 involved
• The Doctors’ Pact between ANC and SAIC
• The CYL’s Programme of Action adopted by the ANC
• Cato Manor riots
• Rent boycotts and growth of squatter camps on the Rand
Limitations to what had been achieved

• ANC remained aloof from local and popular movements and did little to enhance its standing with
ordinary workers (Dubow)
• ANC did not trust squatters’ movements making co-operation difficult
• Provincial divisions within ANC
• ANC remained wary of identifying too closely with working class militancy, ie the mineworkers
• ANC suspicious of CP and vice versa
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• Much of the literature is overtly pro-ANC, eg Pampallis and Meli.

• Mandela remains a major, but partial, source.
• Dubow: Programme of Action “marked a militant departure from previous ANC documents” and
set the stage for the campaigns of the 1950s. Congress was in the throes of transition to a radical
mass nationalist movement but it was neither organisationally nor ideologically unified. But in
contrast to the dormant and fractious decade of the 1930s, the 1940s “pulsated with political
energy”.
• Worden: the attitude of the CYL “marked a sharp break with the deferential policies of the past”.
• Guelke: the CYL sowed the seeds which led later to the creation of a mass movement.
• Barber: “African political activity was transformed between 1939 and 1948.” However, there
remained many hurdles to overcome, such as opposition from the white state, internal divisions,
organisation, finance and communications. He also stresses the fact that from 1946 onwards,
Africans looked to the UN to provide them with a platform for their grievances.
• The Marxist Dale McKinley sees the 1940s as a decade of defeat for the black working class and
for the labour movement. Both the ANC and CPSA were “petit bourgeois” and “stuck in an
outmoded and failed politics of accommodation”. The 1949 Programme of Action did not
emphasise the importance of organising black workers enough.
Some candidates may have access to the following, although they are currently out of print:
• Peter Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa. Argues that the CYL encouraged
an assertive African nationalism and did not aim to promote class struggle, hence their limited
contacts with TUs. At the same time, American, Christian and liberal influences survived.
• Tom Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. Emphasise the closer relationship
between the CP and CYL, as part of a realignment of African politics.
• Gail Gerhart: Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology. Gerhart stresses the
Africanist viewpoint and Lembede’s influence in the CYL; the importance he attached to a clearly
articulate nation building (Africanist) philosophy.
• Lembede argued that Africans were, by right of indigenous origins and preponderant numbers, the
nation, and the only nation to rule South Africa.
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Question 3
How important a part did the recommendations of the Sauer Report play in the National Party
victory in the 1948 election?
This essay invites the candidate to consider the range of factors which contributed to the NP victory in
1948, and evaluate the importance of the publicity given to the Sauer Report and the apartheid slogan
which it spawned.
NP appeal, including the Sauer Report:

• The Sauer Report (1946) proposed apartheid as the solution to the apparent problems of the day.
• Sauer promised controls over African urbanisation, increased segregation and the abolition of
white representatives of Africans in parliament.
• Sauer promised to reverse the war time trend towards desegregation.
• Apartheid guaranteed white supremacy but in other ways it embraced a range of different
interpretations.
• The ambiguity of apartheid was its electoral strength (Worden).
• As in 1929, the Black peril emerged as an important factor in the election.
• Apartheid was the basis of Malan’s campaign in 1948.
• Sauer’s message was “putting the Kaffir in his place” and “getting our country back”.
• 1934-48 there had been a conscious effort to win power by mobilising Afrikaners across divisions
of class and region.
• The role of the FAK, the Broederbond and Christian National Education in this.
• The creation of Afrikaner Trade Unions, winning Afrikaner workers away from the Labour Party.
• The role of Afrikaner capitalism in creating an ethnic identity.
Social and economic changes were accelerated by war:

• Pass laws were relaxed.
• The state appeared to be incapable of dealing with black protest and strikes.
• White farmers were forced to pay higher wages because of a shortage of seasonal workers.
• Black trade unions were increasingly effective.
• 1946 African mineworkers’ strike.
The weaknesses of the UP:

• Smuts’ decision to support Britain in WW2 had split his power base.
• In the 1943 election the NP became the official opposition.
• Smuts accepted the permanency of African urbanisation.
• The government’s Fagan Commission Report also accepted African urbanisation.
• The Fagan Report defended Smuts’ wartime policies and offered no remedies.
• Smuts was 78 in 1948 and increasingly out of touch.
• His likely successor, Hofmeyr, was regarded as dangerously liberal.
• Farmers opposed Smuts’ food price control policy.
The campaign:
• The NP campaigned for apartheid.
• The vagaries of the electoral system favoured the NP
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• O’Meara: by 1948 the UP was in difficulties on all the major political issues of the day.
• Clark and Worger: emphasise the way in which the proposals of the Sauer Report were sold to
the electorate as “an idealised vision of white rule that eliminated African resistance”.
• Giliomee: claims that there are “serious problems” with the argument that the ideology of
apartheid clinched electoral victory. He emphasises the NPs demands for SA national
independence, its promotion of Afrikaner business interests, its championing of Afrikaner culture.
“Apart from ‘putting the kaffir in his place’, 1948 also meant to the Afrikaners – particularly the
professionals, educators and civil servants – ‘getting our country back’ or ‘feeling at home again
in our country’.”
• More recently, Giliomee has written that in 1948: “Unlike the UP, with its liberal wing led by
Hofmeyr, the NP spoke in one voice in promising to keep SA white.”
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Question 4
How significant was the ANC/PAC split that took place in 1959?
This essay requires candidates to evaluate the short term and long term significance of the PAC/ANC
split.
The origins of the split:

• Division at a meeting of the Transvaal Congress in Transvaal in 1958.
• The formal constitution of the ANC in April 1959.
• Sobukwe’s call for “government of the Africans, by the Africans and for the Africans”.
• The rejection of multiracialism.
• The leadership of the new organisation.
• Well positioned to capitalise on weaknesses of the ANC.
• Many Africanists came from Transvaal and the Free State, where racial policies were at their most
harsh.
The differences between Africanist and multiracialist viewpoints:

• The origins and history of ANC multiracialism.
• The Africanism of Lembede and Mda.
• The theory of Africanism.
• Whites and communists seen as foreign minority groups.
The rejection of the Freedom Charter:

• Africanist objections to the Freedom Charter of 1955.
• Objections to the Congress Alliance and ANC links with the (White) Congress of Democrats and
the SAIC.
• Opposition to communist links with ANC.
• Claims that the Freedom Charter violated the principles of African nationalism.
PAC rejection of ANC policies in the later 1950s:

• PAC statements and pledges reflected dissatisfaction with ANC policies – and failures – in the
1950s.
The impact of the Treason Trial on the standing of the ANC:

• The Treason Trial discredited the ANC.
• The Treason Trial involved much of the leadership of the ANC and left ANC affairs in the hands
of less calibre individuals.
• PAC split indicates weakness in ANC structure and organisation.
The wider context:

• The All African People’s Congress (Accra) December 1958 and the successes of African
nationalism elsewhere.
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The immediate consequences, including Sharpeville:
• Over 20,000 members by 1960: about as many as the ANC, possibly.
• PAC strength was in areas not penetrated by ANC.
• Sharpeville.
• Sharpeville led to the subsequent banning of both the PAC and the ANC.
• More confrontational approach than ANC.
• PAC accrued much of the credit for the government’s declaration of a state of emergency.
The longer term consequences:

• Gained some international respect in the Cold War because it was avowedly anti-communist.
• Lacked organisational strength in exile.
• Some useful diplomatic lobbying, ie the PAC achieved the expulsion of SA from the UN.
• Long term consequences limited by PAC weaknesses.
• Gail Gerhart: Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology (1978) explored the
development of African nationalism and identifies the common themes which link the CYL to the
PAC and to Black Consciousness. Gerhart emphasises the difficulties facing the ANC in the late
1950s.
• Meli: The PAC clung to Lembede’s early ideas which he later rejected. He accuses Gail Gerhart
of the same mistake. Predictably, Meli is very critical of the split.
• Tom Lodge: identifies three PAC weaknesses, which undermined their chances of competing on
equal terms with the ANC:
1. Main unifier was negative – opposition to ANC
2. Indifference to effective organisation: too reliant on mass spontaneity
3. PAC leaders from less privileged backgrounds than ANC leaders. This contributed to
further weaknesses in exile
• See also: B. Pogrund: How Can Man Die Better? Sobukwe and Apartheid.
Page 144
Question 5.
Did white South Africans contribute anything worthwhile to the struggle against apartheid?
The question asks candidates to evaluate the contribution made by white South Africans in the struggle
against apartheid (1948-84) and to reach a conclusion about its overall worth. While candidates are likely
to recognise that rapid economic growth meant that increasing numbers of white South Africans supported
the NP and apartheid at least until the 1970s, they should also be able to identify both individuals and
groups whose contribution to the struggle against apartheid cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some
candidates may show awareness of the efforts of individuals from their autobiographies, ie Naught for Your
Comfort by Trevor Huddleston and In no Uncertain Terms by Helen Suzman.
Evidence which suggests that white South Africans contributed little to the struggle against
apartheid:
• Long tradition of racial segregation in South Africa

• Divisions within the ranks of those who did not accept NP policies
• The ideology of the United Party and its half-hearted stand against NP legislation
• Between 1961 and 1974 there was only 1 Progressive MP
• Even the Progressive Party stood for a qualified non-racial vote until 1978
• The GNP rose by 30% in real terms between 1961 and 1966
• Growing electoral support for the National Party and its policies
• In 1966 the NP won 58% of the votes cast in the general election
• Before 1961, most opposition was orchestrated by the ANC /PAC
• The Rivonia Trial focused the eyes of the world on black opposition to apartheid
• By the mid 1970s black majority rule in Angola and Mozambique emphasised black opposition both
inside and outside SA
• Suspected links with communism increased fears of African nationalism
Evidence which suggests that some white South Africans made a contribution to the struggle against
apartheid:
• The contribution of individuals (for example, Trevor Huddleston, Helen Suzman, Bram Fischer,
Donald Woods, Joe Slovo)
• The Torch Commando, the Black Sash and FEDSAW in the 1950s
• The role of the Congress of Democrats in preparing for the Congress of the People
• The main newspapers retained a remarkable degree of freedom and were able to criticise NP policies
openly
• The contribution of the Christian churches, and especially the Anglican Church
• By 1968 the SA Council of Churches had labelled apartheid as a ‘pseudo gospel in conflict with
Christian principles’.
• The role of writers, eg Nadine Gordimer’s World of Strangers (1958) and Elsa Joubert’s The Long
Journey of Poppie Nongena (1978).
• In 1974 Andre Brink was the first Afrikaans writer to be banned
• The role of academics, eg Marxists who explained apartheid in purely economic terms
• Capitalist dissatisfaction with the restrictions of apartheid by 1979
• The formation of the non-racial FOSATU in 1979 and of the UDF in 1983
• The close co-operation between the banned Communist Party and the ANC in exile
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Candidates may bring a range of appropriate historians’ commentary to support their views. These
may include reference to the generally dismissive way in which recent historians of the apartheid era
have viewed white opposition to apartheid, eg:
• Omer-Cooper: under the colourless leadership of Strauss and his successors, the UP – many of whose
members shared the race attitudes of the Nationalists − failed to produce a convincing alternative to
apartheid.
• Nigel Worden: by 1958 “apartheid clearly appealed to an increasing majority of the white electorate”.
• Clark and Worger: the United Party never seriously challenged the concept of white supremacy.
• Basil Davidson: “At the very time when relations between whites and non-whites approached
exploding point, the whites remained almost exclusively occupied in a private feud of their own.”
• William Beinart, however, is more positive. “A minority white opposition survived and developed
…individual editors… were at times prepared to test the limits of government control.”
• Various other historians have highlighted the importance of the English language press, and in
particular of the Rand Daily Mail which was an outspoken critic of apartheid. Elaine Potter described
it as “the real opposition in the South African political system”. Giliomee also points out that English
language newspapers and English clergy “used their considerable freedom to point out injustices
frequently and persistently”, while Davenport claims that “leaders of opinion (were) able to wrestle
with moral issues… to an extent unknown in Nazi Germany or the USSR”.
• In questioning the Marxist interpretation of apartheid, Merle Lipton’s work has drawn attention to the
evolving interests of South Africa’s capitalist leaders and their (perhaps incidental) contribution to the
undermining of apartheid. “By the end of the 1970s apartheid labour policies… conflicted with
(capitalists’) interests and this had dynamic implications for the whole system.”
• The main specialist work on white opposition to apartheid is Joshua Lazerson’s Against the Tide:
Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid which is out of print. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the
focus of the book, Lazerson draws attention to the minority who actively strove to swim “against the
tide” and who worked to maintain contacts and friendships across the racial divide created by
apartheid.
Page 146
Question 6
How significant a part did the Cold War play in determining the response of Western powers to
apartheid in South Africa?
This question invites the candidate to assess a range of factors, including the Cold War, which helped
to determine the West’s response to apartheid. Some candidates may choose to distinguish between
the policies of western governments, and the attitudes of large numbers of people in those countries
who campaigned for embargoes and sports boycotts, etc.
The Cold War as a factor:

• South African foreign propaganda was well tuned to Cold War fears.
• Verwoerd’s anti-communist stance played to Cold War fears.
• Failure of arms embargoes related to Cold War.
• Evidence of ANC links with communists.
• Role of Thatcher and Reagan after 1979.
• Developments in the front-line states.
• USSR and East Germany did provide aid to Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.
• China supported Mugabe’s ZANU.
• Soviet armed Cuban troops sent to Angola.
• But the west knew that Soviet trade with Southern Africa was not significant.
• Strategic importance of the Cape route.
Economic motives as a factor:

• Mineral deposits including gold, platinum, chromium, manganese and vanadium.
• Attractive investment proposition.
• Role of Britain as a major investor.
• Growth of trade with US: overtook Britain as SA’s principal trading partner in 1978.
• Growth of European investment.
• Profitable subsidiaries of US companies such as GM, Mobil.
• Indirect investments in the form of bank loans, shares in gold-mining, etc.
‘Liberal’ economic argument:

• Economic growth would undermine apartheid (associated with Oppenheimer).
• Introduction of codes of practice as levers for reform.
The role of Britain:

• Historic links
• Huge investments in SA
• Britain distracted by Rhodesia from 1965-80
• Thatcher’s commitment to free enterprise
• ‘kith and kin’ arguments
The role of the USA:

• Sullivan principles (1977) and their impact
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Popular disaffection with government policy:
• The anti-apartheid movement
• Support for boycotts and embargos
• ‘Institutionalised hypocrisy’ (Anthony Sampson)
Changing policy in the early 1980s:

• The Thatcher and Reagan years: British and US governments ignored anti-apartheid lobby.
• ‘Constructive engagement’: encouraging SA to reform apartheid while avoiding contacts with
anti-apartheid organisations.
• Reagan was personally ill-informed about the situation in South Africa.
• Leonard Thompson: “South African foreign propaganda was well-tuned to the Cold War fears
and prejudices of Europeans and Americans…” Thompson accepts that the USSR and its allies
did supply arms to the black liberation movements in southern Africa but claims that “southern
Africa never had a high priority on the Soviet agenda”.
• T Davenport: argues that SA may have overplayed her hand, in emphasising the importance to
the west of her mineral reserves (especially chrome, manganese and platinum, all used in
armaments production) and of her strategic significance as guardian of the Cape route. “The more
SA traded on her advantages, the more her trading partners resolved to find alternative sources of
supply.”
• RW Johnson (1977): How long will South Africa Survive? Emphasised the importance of
economic factors affecting western policies towards SA. Johnson challenged liberal views that
apartheid was on the verge of collapse and argued that SA was too important to the capitalist west
to be allowed to go the way of the Congo, Mozambique or Angola. Johnson examined a range of
international factors and considered not just their political significance but their economic impact.
He argued that the international environment would play a critical role in determining SA’s future,
and recognised that there were certain circumstances in which western attitudes might change in
order to safeguard western interests.
• James Barber: South Africa: Foreign Policy emphasises the importance of economic factors –
both in terms of profits and supplies of raw materials. “Western businessmen were not slow to
voice their fears about a possible interruption of supplies.” However, Barber also claims that
when the Carter administration promised “Unequivocal and concrete support for the majority rule
in South Africa… the characteristic pluralism of the US government ensured that there were those
in the administration who were more concerned with East/West rivalry than human rights in
southern Africa”.
Page 148
South Africa (1910-1984)
Part 2
Question 1
How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing views on labour migrancy in South Africa,
c. 1910-1948? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources A and B, on labour migrancy in South Africa, c. 1910-
48, and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source A:
• Chamber of Mines represented those using migrant labour.

• Biased viewpoint as mine owners benefited from migrant labour.
• War time demand for labour threatened to undermine migrant labour/low wages.
• War had intensified black drift to towns.
• Source provides justification for migrant labour.

• The use of migrant labour enabled mines to obtain unskilled labour at cheap rates.
• Reserves provided an additional means of subsistence to supplement wages.
• Without migrancy, workers would have settled on the Rand, this escalating wages.
• Migrant labour used extensively on the Rand and in Kimberley.

• Miners lived in compounds; returned to families in reserves once a year.
• 1936: 447,000 Africans (out of population of 3.4 million) working outside the reserves.
• Migrant workers were overwhelmingly male.
• By 1951, white miners earned nearly 15 times the wages earned by black workers.
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Source B
on William Beinart will be credited under historiography.
• Both the mines and African communities themselves favoured labour migrancy in the early years
of the twentieth century.
• Many Africans preferred migrancy to moving to the towns.
• Both mine owners and Africans wanted reserved areas.
• For mine owners this guaranteed a continuing supply of migrant labour.
• For rural Africans and chiefs, reserves represented a way of preserving African culture and
identity.
• Labour migrancy had long been established in African society.

• Traditionally women worked in the fields so migrant labour fitted traditional patterns.
• The character of migrant labour changed as pass laws made restrictions greater.
• Many Africans wanted reserves but did not want the other restrictions that went with them.
Points which offer wider and more critical contextualisation of the view in the sources
• Migrancy originally arose out of the dynamics of African society.

• Patriarchal control in African societies reinforced the migrant labour system.
• Africans influenced the way in which African society developed in the twentieth century:
migrancy was not just imposed by white/colonial society.
• White supremacists supported labour migrancy; these views were entrenched in the Stallard
Commission’s report (advocating residential segregation).
• Liberals favoured labour migrancy for cultural reason; native less likely to be contaminated by
alien ways.
• Marxist – revisionist arguments of Harold Wolpe. 1913 Land Act entrenched migrant labour by
establishing native reserves.
• Historians working on the history of African societies, eg Belinda Bozzoli and William Beinart;
Shula Marks. Women were keen to defend ‘their’ world in the reserves (Bozzoli).
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on labour migrancy in
South Africa between 1910-48.
Page 150
Marks
Page 151
Question 2
How useful is Source C as evidence of the impact of the Defiance Campaign? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source C in understanding the
impact of the Defiance Campaign in terms of:
Provenance: appropriate and relevant comments on provenance will earn credit. These may
include:
• This is part of the well-known ‘no easy walk to freedom speech’ delivered to the ANC Transvaal
branch. Mandela acknowledges that he borrowed the line from Nehru.
• Mandela wrote this speech but it was read for him because he had been banned as a result of the
Defiance Campaign.
• By 1953 the NP had reasserted its control and the Defiance Campaign had been brought to an end.
• This is a defiant speech, calling for further mass action against the government.
• Defiance represented co-operation between the ANC and the SAIC.

• The Defiance Campaign had mobilised the masses politically.
• It had proved an effective way of putting pressure on the government.
• Defiance had threatened state security.
• It had overcome apathy and aroused a spirit of militancy and determination.
• In six months over 8,000 protestors were jailed.

• Most defiance took place in the Eastern Cape, where political awareness was already highly
developed.
• Defiance was predominantly an urban movement.
• Riots towards the end of 1952 were condemned by the ANC.
• ANC membership expanded rapidly; ANC sources suggest 100,000.
• Defiance also set a precedent for co-operation with Indians, coloureds and Whites.
• Luthuli replaced Moroka as ANC President.
• Defiance highlighted organisational deficiencies (Dubow).

• The ANC failed to mobilise support in the rural areas.
• The government reasserted control through banning leaders and newspapers.
• New stringent laws strengthened the position of the government.
• Mandela’s banning was extended until 1961.
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• Mandela: Long Walk to Freedom

• Saul Dubow: The ANC
• Francis Meli: South Africa Belongs to us! A History of the ANC
• Historiographical debate about the nature of the ANC in the 1950s, highlighted in Worden: was
the ANC now a mass based movement (Pamapallis; O’Meara) or was it still elitist and out of
touch? (Fine and Davis; Feit)
• The ANC failed to link up with rural discontent (Colin Bundy).
• Tom Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. Argues that rural peasant protests were
more successful in the 1950s.
• Barber: Defiance gained widespread international attention.
Failure demonstrated that there was no constitutional route to liberation.
which a consideration of Source C is useful for understanding the impact of the Defiance Campaign.
Marks
comments.
highly.
Page 153
Question 3
How fully does Source D explain the reasons why the National Party implemented the policy of
separate development after 1959? (12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source D as an adequate explanation of the reasons
why the NP implemented the policy of separate development after 1959 in terms of:
on Nigel Worden will be credited under historiography.
• The 1959 legislation created 8 homelands based on ethnicity.

• The powers of the co-opted chiefs were extended.
• The NP referred to the Bantustans as ‘historic homelands’.
• Ethnic homeland loyalties were intended to replace national political aspirations.
• The prime reason for introducing these changes was political, not economic.
• Verwoerd recognised that economic independence would have threatened stability.
• Approximately 3.5 million people were ‘resettled’ to the homelands.

• Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei were subsequently granted nominal independence.
• Homeland citizenship was imposed on all Africans; citizens of the ‘independent’ homelands lost
their SA nationality.
• The African Liberation movement always rejected the government’s homelands policy.
• Origin of homelands can be traced back to the Native Land Act of 1913.
• The NP only gradually developed its ideas about the future of the homelands.
• Verwoerd rejected the Tomlinson Commission’s 1955 proposals for massive state funding to
make the reserves economically viable.
• The development of the homelands coincided with the move towards independence in other parts
of Africa.
• Alarmed by increased radicalism, the NP was attempting to stem the flood of Africans entering the
cities.
• Bantustans envisaged as an alternative to black nationalism.
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• Nigel Worden’s work represents a synthesis of modern historiographical interpretations. Here,

for instance, the quotation is from Giliomee: “The changing political function of the homelands.”
It is unlikely that exam candidates would know this unless they have written a dissertation on this
topic.
• Critics of the NP’s ‘homeland policy’ attacked it as genocide.
• The communist journalist Brian Bunting (1964) described the Bantustans as SA’s attempt to
create ‘colonies’.
• Dedorah Posel described separate development as “apartheid’s second – and more doctrinaire –
phase”.
• Davenport argues that Verwoerd’s new vision was a response to decolonisation elsewhere in
Africa.
• Giliomee argues that Verwoerd played the demographic card to win support when he was
campaigning to become PM. He also argues that if the Tomlinson proposals had formed part of an
over-arching scheme of federal government and regional development then a homelands policy
might have attracted African support.
which a consideration of Source D is helpful in offering a full explanation of the reasons why the NP
implemented the policy of separate development after 1959.
Marks
comments.
highly.
Page 155
Soviet Russia (1917-1953)
Part 1
Question 1
Why were so few Russians prepared to defend Tsarism in February 1917?
The aim of this question is to allow the candidate to give an account and analysis of the immediate
war-time background, and events surrounding the February Revolution and the factors which caused
the failure of autocracy. Candidates might consider the variety of influences which were brought to
bear at this time – from the existing power structure itself to outside and even revolutionary factors.
This may lead to a discussion of the social, economic and political factors.
• The failure of autocracy – the nature of Tsarism by 1917 and actions of the Tsar; an evaluation of
his strengths and weaknesses, including his role in the war, the effect of the Tsarina’s rule and
influence of Rasputin.
• An awareness of the range of disillusioned groups, diverse in motivation and coming from both
upper and lower strata of society: the role of the elites and the palace coup – Yusupov.
• The Duma, maintaining power thereby highlighting ‘entrenched autocracy’. The role of the
Guchkov Conspiracy.
• Economic change and its impact – the economic situation, the demand for bread, the pressures of
modernising Russia as seen by the strikes, Putilov and others, but the key was reform of the
situation, not the abandonment of autocracy.
• The food shortages, queuing and inflation exacerbated by the war.
• The move to the political and popular revolution with reference to the immediate events of 25th
February and International Women’s Day as evidence of discontent – economic and political.
• The failure to support Tsarism might have seemed spontaneous and the revolution uncoordinated
but it quickly changed in a few days to a more politicised protest, showing the underlying
problems.
• Initiated by workers and the reserve troops in the capital alone to show that only certain sectors of
society were participating.
• The role of the army joining the rioters from 25th February onwards – the failure of the Tsar to
retain loyalty. The role of some generals.
• Justifying the lack of political drive, candidates may discuss the notion of the leaderless revolt, the
lack of Bolshevik or any other direction at that time but might discuss Lenin and Trotsky – their
writings and influence and noting that although the major leaders were abroad, no political party
organised the revolution, political influence was part of the failure of many to support Tsarism.
• The development of opposition parties as evidence of discontent.
Candidates may evaluate the relative merits of each explanation and show how these may or may not
be reflected in the actual detail of the failure of autocracy and the Tsar:
• Peter Kenez: “there was not to be found anywhere in the country any groups of the population…
which were ready to put up a fight for the old regime.”
• RB McKean: “the Great War acted as the spark which set the combustible of mass discontent
alight.”
• Shapiro: “the only solution lay on the complete democratisation of the system of government.”
• Pipes: “Rebellions happen, revolutions are made.”
• Trotsky: “Nicholas II inherited from his ancestors not only a giant empire, but also a revolution.”
• Asa Briggs: the Tsarina “was unable to appease mounting discontent with the Imperial
Government”.
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Question 2
What were the most significant factors which led to the emergence of a one-party dictatorship
between 1917 and 1921?
The aim of this essay is to enable the candidate to consider the reasons for the actions taken in
political, economical and social spheres, and consider their relative importance. The main aim was to
stay in power and this was achieved because of the weakness of opposition, the use of terror and class
warfare to distract workers and peasants. They also granted concessions to urban workers and
peasants and easily attacked or manipulated the political opposition.
Ideology:
• The ideology of Bolshevism, eg ‘What is to be done’, ‘April Theses’, ‘State & Revolution’, ‘War
& Revolution’: to promote development of socialism harsh measures and strong leadership
required for the dictatorship of the proletariat.
• Building on the February Revolution; sweeping away ‘pillars of Tsarism’.
• Rejecting liberal democracy as represented by Provisional Government and would-be Constituent
Assembly in favour of proletarian democracy, through Soviets and party leadership.
• Need for democratic centralism c.f. directory and path to Stalin.
Practical considerations – precarious situation of the Bolsheviks:
• Provinces – plundering houses, violence, looting burzhui.
• War with Germany, politics in Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – not a duty to fight the capitalist
imperialists, ending of WWI symbolic of the working class revolution; in reality Bolshevik
support needed to be extended beyond the cities, the army was not fit to fight, but territory lost
would be regained in the international proletarian revolution.
• Fear of breakdown of whole apparatus of government; failure of world revolutions to materialise.
• Hence the building of forces of terror and the wiping out of opposition were vital to ensure the
survival of the revolution/the Bolsheviks. Creation of a one-party state, justified ideologically to
avoid the counter-revolution.
Politics:
• Closing down the opposition press.
• Removal of freedoms granted by the Provisional Government (the ‘instrument of the bourgeoisie’)
the beginning of dictatorship
• Destruction of the Constituent Assembly – moment of democracy lost. Opposition too weak.
Significant demand for co-operation between parties; threat of railwaymen’s union, post and
telegraph workers to cut off communication; hence Lenin agreed to talks but engineered their
collapse and made an alliance of sorts with SRs to claim he represented the peasantry (land issue).
• Control imposed over the Soviets – compromise from the beginning, ie “all power to the Soviets”
denied by setting up the Sovnarkom; intention to centre power in the hands of the Bolsheviks
alone.
• Destruction of other political parties: Kadets, SRs and Mensheviks; the adulation of a single
leader.
• Establishment of central control – pyramid of power; Politburo at the top, to eliminate opposition,
to maintain the revolution, but tight-knit group in Moscow.
• Party control over the state, the party the vanguard of the revolution hence development of
bureaucracy (Soviet constitution), the large-scale use of terror, red terror and Cheka.
• Legal system abolished – replaced by revolutionary justice, arbitrary and violent.
• Even some Bolsheviks becoming disillusioned about democratic centralism as the source of
Bolshevik discipline.
• Fears of Lenin himself in his Testament – mirroring French Revolution and path laid for Stalin
rather than the state withering away.
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Economics:
• 1917 Land Decree – abolishing private ownership or simply recognising what was?
• The impact of the Civil War on the party: change in membership, more peasant-based after 1919
purge, self-interest rather than Marxism, loss of proletarian base, developed role of Politburo and
status of Central Committee.
Socially:
• Abolition of titles; use of egalitarian ‘comrade’.
• Socialist press encouraging class warfare – ‘parasites’ and ‘bloodsuckers’.
• Class warfare encouraged: burzhui beaten, robbed, arrested. State licensed and encouraged
people to attack middle class houses ‘to loot the looters’.
• Civil servants on strike so purged, juniors promoted, third-rate but obedient.
• Religion: reduction in power.
• Pipes: Lenin the source and architect of all sufferings since 1917.
• Bulgakov/Shiskin: see the Bolsheviks as ‘destructive demagogues’.
• Igritskii: restructuring mobilising a self-seeking careerist ‘lumpenproletariat’ which ultimately
created an evil totalitarianism even more terroristic than its Nazi counterpart.
• Kowalsi: “they lost whatever legitimacy they had in October and clung to power by dictatorial
means”; “by 1921… the foundations of what we now term Stalinism appear to have been firmly
laid.” Cohen disputes this.
• Figes states ‘drunken mobs went on the rampage… sailors and soldiers went round the well-to-do
districts robbing apartments and killing people for sport’.
• Maxim Gorky: ‘a pogrom of greed, hatred and violence’.
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Question 3
How successful was Lenin’s foreign policy 1917-1924?
Candidates might discuss the makers of foreign policy: People’s Commissar – Trotsky (to 1918) and
GV Chicherin (to 1930) with Politburo and Lenin and the main issues and policies they considered:
Aims:
• Primary aim was survival of the Bolshevik Party and regime
• World revolution as predicted by Marx should happen
• Comintern established and would bring this about
Methods:
• Use of propaganda
• Principles of open diplomacy, peace, disarmament, and self-determination of nations
• Unscrupulous – when regime weak advocates peace and disarmament and the Soviets build up their
strength, when collective security seems appropriate they turn to that policy.
• Expediency dominates over ideology – that in Soviet eyes fascism and democracy are two different
forms of the enemy – capitalism.
Phases – an evaluation of:
October 1917 – March 1918

• Provocative as possible. Decree on peace, publication of Tsarist secret treaties, repudiation of all legal
ties with other nations made by Tsarist regime.
• No thought of ‘having’ foreign diplomatic relationship, rather issuing declarations and closing the door
on the West.
• Expectation of world revolution, hence the odd approach to Brest-Litovsk – wasting time meant
savage treaty.
March 1918 − 1921

• Civil War – hence limited foreign affairs (apart from stance towards foreign interventionists)
• Comintern – established Third International – some signs of success:
− Bela Kun in Hungary
− A Soviet government in Bavaria
− Spartakists in Berlin
− Red Army’s proximity to Warsaw in 1920 (but highlights weaknesses)
• End of Civil War – Soviet power not strong – separated by a wall of hostile states – Finland, Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania. All communist insurrections crushed.
• Russia excluded from Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations; not recognised as major power.
• Narkomindel aimed to secure normal diplomatic relations with as many states as possible.
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1921 − 1924
• The developing relationship between the Soviet regime and Weimar Germany, established in early
1921.
• Failure of the World Economic Conference at Genoa in 1922 resulted in the Treaty of Rapallo.
• Further secret military agreements were signed leading to German-Soviet training bases (aerial,
armoured and chemical warfare) on Soviet soil.
• By 1922 abandonment of idealistic concepts of open diplomacy and disarmament.
• Attempting still to encourage revolution in other countries, eg Comintern attempts in Germany in 1921
and 1923 unsuccessful; result was Locarno and Germany’s joining League of Nations (but still Treaty
of Berlin in 1926).
• But the Soviets had some limited success – by 1924 there was formal recognition by the new Labour
government of Ramsay MacDonald in Great Britain (a trade agreement of 1921 was extended) and
most other nations, although the Soviets gave the impression that the capitalist world was on the point
of launching another attack on the workers’ state.
• Geoffrey Parker (in Zubok and Pleshakov): “Utopian ideals gave way to a ruthless and cynical
interpretation of the realpolitik tradition.”
• JN Westwood: “…the Comintern did little good for the red cause. It failed to make revolutions,
and its machinations gained support for right-wing governments and fascist movements abroad.”
• Richard Sakwa: “…the interplay between national interest and the idea of communism…
stamped by dualism, torn between defensive concerns and the thoroughly expansive theory of
communism.” “Lenin’s foreign policy in general was marked by a pragmatism that was to
become the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy.”
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Question 4
How important were policy issues in Stalin’s rise to power?
Here it is expected that the candidate might review the different reasons for Stalin’s rise to power and
to place the significance of the issues of policy that divided the potential candidates, and how Stalin
handled them, in its wider context. Besides policy issues, key themes might be personalities, the
mechanics of power and pragmatism.
Candidates would be expected to show a knowledge and understanding of some of the following
aspects of the topic:
The opponents:
• The contenders for power in the 1920s including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev and Bukharin.
• Stalin’s use of contenders, eg Zinoviev (sidelining Comintern) and Kamenev, plus the roles of
other key figures including Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.
• The qualities and deficiencies of each both in terms of their practical and ideological appeal,
constituencies of support as well as the ideological differences.
The struggle between Trotsky and Stalin:

• Trotsky the intellectual who lacked any real power base and should highlight this for example by
considering his action/inaction over the Georgian issue.
• The differing policies and their appeal.
• NEP.
• Trotsky’s idea of ‘Permanent Revolution’ compared to ‘Socialism in One Country’.
• Lenin’s Testament.
• The ‘Lessons of October’ (1924).
• Factionalism and infighting.
Stalin’s ‘strengths’ and growing role in the Party and State machinery:
• As administrator (Commissar for Nationalities).
• Pragmatist/opportunist (Lenin’s death, producing the cult of Lenin and Stalin’s self-adopted role
as Lenin’s disciple).
• Patron (as General Secretary, Lenin Enrolment).
• The creator of the mass Party by 1925.
• Control of Party organisation and Party membership, the Orgburo and Secretariat.
• Manipulating situations to his own benefit (eg during the ‘war scare’ of 1927).
• His determination and ruthlessness.
• There may be discussion of schools of thought, eg the structuralist or intentionalist approach, party
history, ideological approach and/or revisionists.
• Deutscher: Trotsky’s inability to recognise this ‘wilful, sly but shabby and inarticulate man’ as
his rival.
• Deutscher: Stalin always followed the majority viewpoint.
• Ward: ‘socialism in one country’ appealed to most people.
• Conquest: Stalin simply outmanoeuvred his colleagues.
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Question 5
How successful were the Five-Year Plans, 1928-1941?
Known as the ‘Great Turn’, historians talk of this as the second revolution from above. The aim of
this question is to allow candidates to discuss the various claims as to what the aims and intentions of
the plans were; then move on to analyse the impact of the Plans literally as economic policies but also
to allow them to discuss the features as they impacted on Soviet society socially and politically; to
transform the Soviet Union into an industrial superpower based on a system of central planning.
The following points may be considered covering intentions and impact:
Organisation:
• Gosplan – state planning organisation working out production needs, top down method of
management.
• Party via government set priorities for plans and targets.
• People’s Commissariat worked out detail – 4 main areas: heavy industry, light industry, timber
and food.
• Private industry, starved of supplies, collapsed.
• Workers control receded, TUs told not to interfere, focus on productivity.
• Senior party officials appointed and dismissed planners, often done for political not economic
reasons.
Features:
• Stalin and Supreme Economic Council; Vesenkha

• Heavy industry – coal, iron, steel – to become self-sufficient-autarky and safe if West attacked.
• Consumer industries downgraded and citizens sacrificed standard of living for long term
objectives.
• Plans declared achieved one year ahead of time – better than West, psychologically beneficial.
• New centres; Magnitogorsk, Kuznetz – most east of Urals.
• ‘Gigantomania’: Dnieprostroi Dam, Moscow Metro and Volga Canal.
• Foreign involvement – eg Ford-designed cars in Gorky.
Five Year Plans – details on:
• First: October 1928 – December 1932

• Second: January 1933 – December 1937
• Third: January 1938 – June 1941
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Socially & Ideologically:
Urban workers
• Carried forward by spirit of cultural revolution, a crusade; belief they would be better off
• Young approved of attack on ‘bourgeois specialists’, tired of old managers
• Aim to create ‘red specialists’ to some extent successful training schemes
• Good workers exceeded targets – rewarded higher pay, better working conditions, housing,
celebrated in newspapers and on work notice boards
• 10 million women in workforce, dominate medicine and teaching. Less well paid and not able to
reach the top, eg 4 women head doctors in hospitals with 50-60% in the profession female.
• Quicksand society (Moshe Lewin): peasants forced off land by collectivisation; poor discipline
and punctuality, resentful, high rate of absenteeism: solution – dismissal, eviction from factory-
owned homes, loss of benefits, imprisonment for damage or leaving job without permission;
‘social engineering’ aspects
• Skilled workers were at a premium so competition for them meant bonuses introduced;
egalitarianism in wages abandoned by 1931
• Untrained, clumsy workers – damage to expensive imported machinery; not maintained; training
not always good
• Intimidation and terror used
• 1938 onwards – labour books and internal passports
• 1940: absenteeism became a crime, 2 offences = imprisonment; no striking
• Forced labour: 300,000 prisoners working on Baltic-White Sea canal; all those sentenced to 3
years sent to labour camps.
Propaganda:
Shock-brigade campaigns (eg Dams), socialist competition, Stakhanovite movement, recordmania,
names – Ogorodnikov, Chernysh, Bogatyrenka, Tischenko
Managers:
Do anything to achieve;‘it is necessary not to work well but to account well’ – pressures of targets,
increased labour norms, wage incentives and balancing books
Urban standards of living

• Never improved – in Leningrad and Moscow, 1929-33, meat, milk and fruit consumption declined
by two-thirds, shortages of water, shops and catering facilities, queues.
• Cities and towns growing at a rate of 200,000 per month, result in overcrowding and substandard
accommodation
• Frontier town, dirt and squalor, little control – crime and violence
• Some improvement where industrial enterprises bring in their own food
Overall:
Success because: But:

Substantial growth Unrealistic targets
Impressive achievements Use of bribery and corruption
USSR transformed industrially Major shortages
Prepared for World War 2 Poor quality of some products
Ill-organised – at some points chaotic,
unbalanced
Living conditions abysmal
Shortage of essential commodities
Page 163
• Kotkin: that “USSR afforded the means to acquire a niche, as well as a sense of pride in a society
that did seem to be qualitatively different”.
• Alec Nove: that the phoney superlatives may have existed but we must remember that thousands
(many young) did participate in the “great construction projects of socialism” and were willing to
sacrifice, to accept hardship as comrades. Sees Stalinism as effective.
• Robert Conquest: Harvest of Sorrow highlights the human cost in industry.
• S. Fitzpatrick: states that there was pressure from party membership and the plans were
supported by some – not just an instrument of Stalin’s dictatorship.
• Trotsky: criticised bureaucracy but not so much the plans.
• Roy Medvedev: acknowledges the economic achievement but does cite the cost as a “black
shadow”.
Page 164
Question 6
What were the main issues which influenced Soviet foreign policy in the post-war period, 1945-
1953?
It is the aim of this question to allow candidates to assess the main factors which determined foreign
policy for the USSR in the post-war period. A consideration of ideology, leadership and influences on
these might be expected alongside the main events in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.
Candidates might consider the following
• Domestic issues and economic recovery are too important, at the end of WWII the Soviet people
were exhausted – war coming after 1930s industrialisation.
• Foreign policy used to maintain/return to control domestically via terror and propaganda.
• The extent to which Stalin made foreign policy – the consensus is that he did. And what were
Stalin’s real motives – either:
• A revolutionary and conscious continuer of Lenin’s policies ie world revolution.
• Believing in ‘socialism in one country’ therefore ignoring revolutions in other countries and
so betraying the revolution, actions based on own security and containment of others.
• Aggressive Russian imperialism.
• The notion of the ‘2 camps’ usually linked to Zhdanov (1947 speech) but in concept belongs to
Stalin – capitalist/socialist rivalry.
• Polarity of views/ideologies: Soviet Russia had always found it difficult to establish friendly
relations with any other state.
• ‘Correlation of forces’ – it has been thought that capitalism was on the verge of collapse in the
1930s, hence the underestimation of Nazism. Russia had been isolated by 4 unfriendly powers –
Britain, France, Germany and Japan. Now that post-1945 Germany and Japan eliminated, Britain
and France weak, borders USSR pushed west, balance better for USSR… but USA was now
centre stage and they had the atomic bomb; by mid 1950s correlation of forces more in favour of
socialism.
• Intentions – USSR perception of the intention of the capitalist world was crucial to its foreign
policy, so, in 1945 distrusting America and Britain, by 1946 warning of ‘accidents’ and by 1947
two camps perception now openly centre of policy.
• Stalin’s personality – paranoia and surrounded by men who shared his viewpoint and ideology –
Marxism – Leninism led the leadership to assume capitalist hostility, and Moscow seems to be
trying to combine the usual balance of power diplomacy with world revolution – Cominform and
diplomats.
• Yalta aim to create a sphere of influence in eastern Europe – though some still contend world
domination. Potsdam – aim for security for USSR and most objectives achieved, but simplistic to
say a defensive reaction to American economic imperialism 1948, but you can see the point of
that claim.
• Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech – does tend to reinforce this belief, but Stalin’s reply in Pravda is
confident, guarded, but not aiming for conflict at all costs.
• Stalin issued instruction in political tactics to French and Italian Communist parties but this was
not aimed at armed revolution but rather Communist participation, and aimed to control east
Europe through Cominform, established by 1947.
• 1948-49: Cominform propaganda campaign against the Marshall Plan, because massive
American aid to Europe might threaten Soviet influence.
• 1948: Czech coup not his plan but seen by the west as expansionism.
• Berlin crisis: fear of resurgent and powerful Germany still dominant force on Soviet thinking,
hence creation of East German state in 1949.
• Worldwide: influence in the Straits, support in Middle East for Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, to oust
British and French, so also in recognising Israel, China and Korea.
Page 165
• Evan Mawdsley: “…fear of the outside made Moscow take extraordinary measures to guarantee
its security; those measure themselves fanned the fears outside”.
• Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov: in the first book written by historians schooled in
the Soviet system but with exposure to the west; “…learned that, along with ‘hard power’ of
spheres of influence, bombs and missiles, there was the ‘soft power’ of fear and suspicion,
distorted perceptions that had driven both sides…”; also contend that Stalin’s aim was to build the
Soviet Empire.
• Richard Sakwa: “As long as Stalin hoped to maintain elements of the wartime coalition he
tolerated some national autonomy in eastern Europe.”
Page 166
Soviet Russia (1917-1953)
Part 2
Question 1
How useful is Source A for understanding events surrounding the October Revolution?
(12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
events surrounding the October Revolution in terms of:
• Kerensky: background – lawyer, radical politics in his youth, did not favour Marxism or terrorism
• Great skills as an orator and Service rates him highly; fevered speeches popular with women
• Ideal link between Provisional Government and Soviet, as he was liked by all; ‘saviour of the
fatherland’ became Prime Minister
• His authority to comment at that time; his role in those circumstances
• 1965 – his memoirs
• View of the establishment ‘we were all quite sure’ that this was nothing, reinforced by the fact that
they had all gone home for a rest, albeit after a lengthy meeting to the early hours of the morning.
• Recognition by Kerensky that he was in trouble due to telephone lines being cut and no contact
with outside world from Winter Palace.
• No sense of a mass uprising; rather ‘Lenin’s plot’, diminishing it further from the coup d’etat
theory.
• That this was simply a way of surrendering to the Germans and the people would not want to do
that.
• That the troops were not a major problem, although he was driving out to meet with them,
showing negotiation expected.
• And that Moscow and St Petersburg were together, as all parts of government – Kerensky,
Konovalov, Kishkin.
Page 167
• Konovalov, liberal Russian factory owner and political figure; as Kerensky’s deputy, he played a
significant supporting role in the Provisional Government.
• Kishkin as a member of the Kadet Party was doubly hated by the soldiers at both front and rear
(Trotsky gives detailed account of the chaos and conflict in debates).
• Discussion of the coup d’etat versus popular uprising debate would be relevant: for some it was a
coup d’etat as Lenin and his ‘evil minority’ took over.
• Workers did not expect the Bolsheviks to run the state on their own.
• There was an ambiguity of support. Workers seemed Bolshevik in mood, but it was apparent that
they were only supporting them if certain conditions were to be met… as the source alludes to in
the idea of peace.
• The Constituent Assembly elections revealed the popularity of the Bolsheviks, gaining 24% of the
votes and the SRs gaining 53%.
Points from recall which offer a more critical contextualisation of the view in the source
• Kerensky – Robert Service states that he was the real master of modern politics but he faced a
range of problems in August 1917, pressures becoming too much.
• The demands of the liberals in the Provisional Government.
• Economic difficulties in getting grain to the cities.
• Rising crime (robbery) in cities.
• Control in the country going with land seizures and violence.
• The ‘peasant’ army was disillusioned: failures at the front and Bolshevik supporting peace.
• Kornilov coup and his reaction; he had appointed him.
• This was therefore a popular uprising and Kerensky is (disastrously) underestimating the extent of
support.
• The coalition and status quo could no longer be tolerated.
• There were various moods and whether real hatred or revolution underpinned it or not there was
nothing to stop it.
• C Read and R Service: state that Lenin was a key figure, much of the revolution presented as a
coup but there was independent action at local level.
• R Pipes: states that it was a coup d’etat.
• O Figes: notes that “amidst a social revolution centred the popular realisation of Soviet power”.
• Berkman: has it that it was “truly popular and profoundly democratic”.
• Stephen Smith: as a revisionist sees the active role of the lower ranks in pushing forward the
revolution and Sheila Fitzpatrick takes this further by suggesting that the workers, peasants and
soldiers created the revolution.
which a consideration of Source A is useful for understanding the events surrounding the October
Revolution.
Page 168
Marks
comments.
6-8 The candidate makes relevant and appropriate provenance comments, and the intepretation is
highly.
Page 169
Question 2
How fully does Source B explain the outcome of the Civil War? (12 marks)
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source B as an adequate explanation of the outcome of
the Civil War in terms of:
• reference to September 1919 – a source written before the outcome of the Civil War was known
and therefore significant in its comments
• Gajda – the general commanding the Czech legions who continued to serve Kolchak after his own
men had left Russia
• as a Czech perhaps more detached in his evaluation of the situation
• Western armies failed because of policy and propaganda which did not suggest democracy would
be the outcome.
• An anti-democratic spirit and inflaming racial hatred, referring to national minorities and anti-
Semitism.
• Difficulties at the front, with the Whites having problems maintaining a cohesive front line force,
given the variety of people involved – conscripts, workmen, peasants, colonists.
• Internal complications continue – the fact that many of these problems were occurring in areas not
known for Bolshevism.
• Motives for rising nothing to do with Bolshevism – more anti-Whites and their leadership.
• The town and country question, that the problems were more about the issues of land not being
dealt with, and arbitrary acts could be a reference to grain requisitioning.
• Admiral Kolchak and Omsk government reactionary Rightists, pro-monarchists or supporters of

military dictatorship, controlled extensive area in Siberia.
• September 1919; Allies evacuate Archangel, 1920 Kolchak captured in January, executed by
Bolsheviks.
• Gajda highlights the limitations of Kolchak’s regime, for promising liberation from Bolshevik
tyranny it was supported, but by failing to offer any democratic administration and economic and
social reform it lost support. Authoritarian Bolshevik rule was replaced by an equally arbitrary
and corrupt one: corporal punishment, shooting without trial, arrests, deportations and
imprisonment of people not connected to Bolshevism. Hence it alienated all parts of society.
• Local matters – internal government, law is replaced by ‘prikazi’, which alters with the changes of
commandants or heads of garrisons.
Page 170
• Town versus country – no government can have authority unless the peasants consider it its
authority. And the refusal to guarantee peasants land was secure cost the Whites the support of
the vast majority of the Russian population. The failings here are not just in Siberia but are typical
of all the White movements. Denikin and the Volunteer Army became linked with brutality,
looting peasant property and return of landlords.
• Nationalities – the White Great Russian nationalism caused problems, as did anti-Semitism, which
was pandemic, although less so in Siberia because there were few Jewish people in that area. In
1919 Denikin’s Volunteer Army going through Ukraine towards Moscow was responsible for
extensive pogroms.
• White Generals’ refusal to contemplate any autonomy to various national minorities as Denikin
stated to Ukrainians; the restoration of a united (and centralised) Russian state was the aim.
Poland’s independence was grudgingly accepted. Kolchak’s refusal to recognise Finland’s
independence cost Yudenich the support vital to the success of the planned assault on Petrograd in
autumn 1919.
• Highlights the political failure of the White leadership to win the confidence of the majority of the
people – this became a mainstream point of view. Paul Miliukov, Kadet leader, noted that the
state of mind of the people was paramount to success and the reactionary policies of the Whites
simply did not win over the hearts and minds of the people.
Points from recall which offer a more critical contextualisation of the view in the source
• Kolchak’s base at Omsk – officers living in brothels in a haze of cocaine and vodka
• Bolsheviks found it difficult to appease the peasants, but did so at Eighth Party Congress (but still
there was resentment).
• Foreign intervention was half-hearted.
• Role of the Greens and the insurgents.
• Bolshevik propaganda, Trotsky’s leadership, training and loyalty of Red Army and unity of
purpose.
• Geographical factors: Bolshevik control of the heartland; central, with all resources.
• G Swain: “…the Civil War became a war between Red Bolsheviks and the White Generals.”
• Evan Mawdsley: “…foreign intervention was often half-hearted and militarily ineffective”.
• W Bruce Lincoln: “Kolchak drew his main support from the British, the armourers and the
financiers of his government… Here at last was a commander who spoke of legality, order,
freedom, and firm democratic foundations and did not consign capitalists to the purgatory of world
revolution.”
which a consideration of Source B is helpful in offering a full explanation of the outcome of the Civil
War.
Page 171
Marks
Page 172
Question 3
How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing views on the nature of the Stalinist state?
(16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources C and D on the nature of the Stalinist state, and offers a
Source C
on Robert Service will receive marks under historiography.
• Highlights the 1936 constitution and involvement of all figures. But this masks authority in
Stalin’s hands.
• Contrast of the persecutor and the liberator – civic rights, equality for all, expansive benefits.
• Awareness that disbelief at the time was not unfounded.
• Stalin did oversee all, Constitution stated – freedom of speech, religious toleration, republics
secede from the USSR.
• It did establish equal rights for women.
• Universal free health care, bread, milk and rent all state subsidised.
• Universal primary and secondary education, comprehensive tertiary education.
• Socialist culture promoted and subsidised by the state, eg Union of Soviet Writers.
• Transport subsidies, youth associations and holidays, no crime.
• This is the time of the Purges: Kirov, those ‘against’ the party, the army, the secret police.
Page 173
Source D
on Sheila Fitzpatrick will receive marks under historiography.
• That the lives of the ordinary people were little improved, unpopular in the towns and even more
so in the villages.
• That the NKVD retained these reports, so the ‘little man’ is open to speaking out, unafraid of
reprisals in the 1930s.
• That the economy post-NEP was not as good, and people went hungry.
• That the Stalin cult was not as successful as thought and he was unfavourably compared to Lenin.
• Lives – after Shakhty Trial removal of ‘bourgeois class’; social security not available in the
countryside – peasantry become second class citizens; urban conditions with population rising
from 29 million in 1929 to 40 million in 1933; overcrowding and poor sanitation.
• Economy – explanation of the privations of collectivism; conditions in industry Stakhanovite
approach negative impact.
• Cult – Stalingrad, ‘Stalin is the Lenin of today’, Vozhd (boss), posters in all roles peasant and
worker.
• Hunger – 1932-33 widespread famine – Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Caucasus region – 4 million deaths.
Points which offer a more critical contextualisation of the views in the sources
• Education expanded but state dominated views in texts; practical not academic slant and
‘bourgeois specialist’ teachers replaced by ‘red specialists’. Young Pioneers and Komsomol; the
developing youth culture responding positively to propaganda, eg Pavik Morosov; Stalin’s
creation of a generation which believed in the Soviet state. Only party members attended
university.
• Arts – membership of RAPP to fight deviations in literature; fate of Pasternak, Mandelstam,
Eisenstein. Films had to be ‘useful’ and familiar. Propaganda, development of ‘socialist realism’.
• Women, from the relative liberation of the 1920s, with divorce more available and advancement in
professions (doctors and lawyers), to May 1936 and the family code, which was a ‘great retreat’ to
family and motherhood. Abortion banned.
• Religion – by end 1930, 80% of village churches closed. 1 in 40 churches functioning end of
1930s but half of population still believers.
• Law – control of justiciary, police state, NKVD, Article 58, Gulag system.
• Purges and Terror.
• 1935 orders an official history to be written and in 1938 the ‘History of the All-Union Communist
Party’ was published, known as the ‘Short Course’.
Page 174
• J Arch Getty: “The Great Terror of the 1930s in the Soviet Union was one of the most horrible
cases of political violence in modern history.”
• Piers Brendon: “Stalin was personally responsible for initiating the regime in the Soviet Union.”
• Richard Sakwa: stated that the Purges and Show Trials were “masterminded by Stalin
personally”.
• Beryl Williams: stated that it was a macho world for all the talk of equality.
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the nature of the
Stalinist state.
Marks
Page 175
The Spanish Civil War (1931-1939)
Part 1
Question 1
How effective were Azaña’s attempts to reform the Army between 1931 and 1933?
The candidate is expected to evaluate the Army Reforms of the Republican Government of Azaña
between 1931 and 1933 and to draw conclusions to the extent to which they were successful in
relation to the problems of the period.
Background:
• The extent of the problem and its historical roots.

• The imperial role of the army and its connection to the monarchy and right.
• The ‘Disaster’ of 1898 and the army’s inward focus afterwards.
Main issues:
Possible Areas: Reform: Effectiveness:

Huge cost – 40% of budget Reduction of Officer Corps Angered enemies, created
paid malcontents, no real
sign of budget cuts being
effective.
Closing of Academies Short-term reduction in costs;
anger of, amongst others, Franco.
Questionable loyalty and need Reserved academy places for Long-term solutions which made
for ‘republicanisation’ of officer NCOs. Attempt to improve little difference in 31-33 period.
corps military education.
Recruitment and Promotion
Law.
Access to promotion through
ranks to officer posts.
Annulled promotions. Angered those reduced (Franco)
and made limited difference.
Powerful position in society. Recruitment and Promotion Long-term solutions which made
Law. little difference in 31-33 period.
Symbolic and arguably necessary
Dissolved Supreme Military but the army continued to be used
Council. for ‘civil’ order throughout period.
Abolition of post of Captain
General.
Azaña’s rhetoric showed Allowed the Right to present the

willingness to challenge Republic as anti-army.
army. “No-one speaks
for the army, nor does
the army itself speak.”
Page 176
• Shlomo Ben-Ami: “…it was the style… rather than the content of the reforms which was
revolutionary.”
• Esenwein and Shubert: “The retirement law was undoubtedly a success.” “All the governments
of the Republic… used the military to retain public order.” (law enforcement not ‘civilianised’)
“Military men continued to dominate police posts.” “…the army was in the forefront of internal
and civil disputes.”
• Thomas: “Azaña’s reforms did not succeed… in cutting the military budget, training was not
improved, and preparation for combat neglected.”
• Carr: “… his reforms failed in their main purpose: the depoliticisation of the army.” “(Army
Generals) resented the reforms… because of the vindictive spirit with which they perceived those
reforms to be inspired.”
Page 177
Question 2
To what extent was Gil Robles the main reason for the success of the Popular Front in 1936?
The candidate is expected to assess the role of Robles in contributing to the downfall of his own
administration during the Bienio Negro and in ensuring the victory of the Popular Front in 1936. The
candidate should do so by making comparisons with other factors as well as highlighting the policies
of Robles’ administration.
• The regressive nature of Robles’ anti-reform legislation.

• The failure of Jiminez (the ‘White Bolshevik’) to secure reasonable reform.
• The dangerous rhetoric of Robles.
• Reactions to FNTT strikes:
− banning on grounds of harvest being ‘sacred’
− suspension of El Obrera de la Tierra
− suspension of strike meetings
• However…
− field inspectors were ordered to prevent discrimination in hiring
− government urged arbitration boards to quickly agree favourable contracts for workers
− government strengthened legislation forcing landowners to hire local labour
− wages established as high as Azaña era
• The brutal reaction to the Asturias Rising:

− Azaña, Companys, Caballero imprisoned (with others)
− Government of Catalonia disbanded
− statute of autonomy suspended
− martial law
− hundreds of municipal governments unseated
• However…
− Cortes not disbanded
− no right wing coup
− Socialist Party and TUs not proscribed
• Effect on left such as:

− short-term devastation
− new unity
− creation of common enemy
• Declaration of Catalan State on announcement of CEDA delegates:

− return of Prieto to support of Republic (against Caballero’s extremes)
− left did not repeat the folly of 1933 – united at polls
• Other factors:
− unity of the left under Azaña and Prieto
− role of Socialists in forming opposition
− willingness of extreme left to co-operate
− straightforward programme, acceptable to all of Left
− economic difficulties
− divisions within the Right
Page 178
• Thomas: “Political feelings were… worsened beyond cure (during Bienio Negro).” “Where lay
the difference between Dollfuss and Gil Robles? Gil Robles did nothing to make it clear.”
• Preston: “…little doubt that the Catalan crisis was manipulated by Robles to provoke the Left.”
“CEDA (under Robles) were driving the Socialists to play with the idea of a revolutionary
rising…” “The left and centre left closed ranks on the basis of a programme of amnesty for
prisoners, basic social and educational reform and trade union freedom.”
• Brenan: Asturias “first battle of the Civil War”. (Left united against CEDA)
Page 179
Question 3
Was the United Kingdom neutral or pro-Nationalist during the Spanish Civil War?
The candidate is required to assess British foreign policy towards Spain during the Spanish Civil War
and to draw conclusions on its motivation through contextualisation. The candidate may also
comment on other individuals or factors within the United Kingdom, and their actions and motives.
Evidence suggesting that the United Kingdom tried to be neutral during the Civil War following
a policy of appeasement as it related to Spain:
• Chamberlain discouraged Blum from helping Republic

• Motives of individuals such as Chamberlain, Eden, Halifax
• Nyon conference and non-intervention
• Extent to which Britain was aware of Fascist intervention
• Antipathy to Soviet Union
• Economic state
• Militarily unready
• Naval patrol
• International Brigades (NB question does not merely refer to British government)
• Attitude of British Chiefs of Staff; “the alternative to Franco is rule from Moscow”
The Labour Party originally supported the government’s non-intervention policy. However, when it
became clear that Hitler and Mussolini were determined to help the Nationalists win the war, Labour
leaders began to call for Britain to supply the Popular Front with military aid. Some members of the
party joined the International Brigades and fought for the Republicans in Spain. (At the Labour
Conference) the block vote system ensured that the motion against non-intervention was defeated by
3,029,000 to 51,000 votes.
Evidence suggesting a possible pro-Nationalist stance:
• Britain’s ‘appeasement’ policy was nothing more than hypocrisy; regarded by Nehru as “the
supreme farce of our time”.
• Chamberlain’s controversial decision to send Sir Robert Hodgson to Burgos to be the British
government’s link with the Nationalist government in 1937.
• When Blum began to argue for an end to the country’s non-intervention policy, Chamberlain and
the Foreign Office joined with the right-wing press in France to bring him down.
• It has been claimed that the British secret service was involved in the military rebellion in Madrid
by Segismundo Casado. Soon afterwards, on 27th February 1939, the British government
recognised General Francisco Franco as the new ruler of Spain.
• Preston: “Both sides were denied aid though the Republic had a legal right.” “…a quiet glee that
they may turn Hitler and Mussolini against the European left.” “Inclined by their considerable
commercial interests to be… anything but sympathetic to the Republic.”
• Thomas: (Eden) “British interests would be best served by a stalemate.” “Negrin talked… to
Eden who said British public opinion did not want Franco to win.”
• Alpert: “Britain was an insular society for whom abroad was very far away.”
• Carr: “The British stationed at Gibraltar were nationalist sympathisers to a man.”
Page 180
Question 4
Was Franco’s emergence as leader of the Nationalist forces mainly due to good fortune?
The candidate is required to analyse Franco’s rise to power, making comparisons of events and actions
to evaluate the extent to which Franco’s skill was responsible for his success, the extent to which good
fortune favoured him and the role played by others. The candidate will concentrate on the period
between the outbreak of the war in 1936 to the consolidation of power and dissolution of the Junta of
Generals in January 1938, but may also refer to earlier significant examples.
Personal skills and experience: Fortunate events:
• Head of Military Academy in • Deaths of Sotelo, Sanjurjo, Primo

Zaragoza. de Rivera and evidence of their
prominence.
• Control over crucial Army of • Key military failures and

Africa inspired loyalty, which successes: Alcazar, Madrid,
would be crucial. Guernica.
• Position at start of conflict – one • Military blunders not being ‘fatal’:

of many generals. Alcazar, Brunete.
• Manipulation of the Jap.
• Utilisation of Falange ideology −

‘The Absent One’.
• Unification of right and Franco’s

role.
• Diplomacy in negotiations with

Foreign Powers (democracies and
Axis).
• Argued that delayed military

victory was deliberate to ensure
complete political control.
• Thomas: “Franco’s achievements in the Civil War were considerable.” “Franco and his minister
of war showed themselves clever diplomats.” “There were almost as many potential fissures in
the Nationalist side as there were in the Republican.”
• Beevor: “(Franco) had no effective rival and the very nature of the Nationalist movement begged
a single, disciplined command.”
• Preston: “With his major political rivals all dead, Franco was free to control… the political
direction of the Nationalists.” “Franco (was) profligate with the lives of his troops – questionable
strategic wisdom.”
Page 181
Question 5
“Largo Caballero, the Prime Minister, left Madrid (in November 1936) convinced that it would
fall to the enemy within a week.”
What factors best explain why the Nationalists failed to take Madrid until 1939?
The candidate is required to compare and evaluate the main reasons Madrid was not captured in a
shorter timescale as predicted.
• Role of General Emilio Mola for Nationalists and Generals Jose Miaja and Rojo and Soviet
Generals Emilo Klémer and Pozas for the Republic.
• Government departure allowed the Communist Party to assume the lead in defending Madrid.
• Decision to liberate the Alcazar allowed the delivery of Soviet aid and also the formation of the
International Brigades.
• Connected battles such as Guadalajara (north-east of Madrid). Victory due partly to weather and
poor Italian troops.
• Eleventh International Brigade was vital.
• Role of Russian tanks and aircraft in stemming the Nationalist advance.
• Arrival of the first International Brigade units to reach the front line.
• Popular defence – women and children helped with food, communications and medical supplies.
• Prominent Communists such as Dolores Ibirruri, ‘La Pasionaria’, rallied the defenders with
ringing oratory: “It is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.” “It is better to be the
widow of a hero than the wife of a coward.”
• Luck in finding Nationalist battle plan in pocket of dead Italian soldier.
• Heywood: “…the brutality and cynicism with which the Communists imposed discipline and built
up the Popular Army contributed to the disillusionment of many on the Republican side.”
• Preston: “If the communists had been able to find some way to harness the revolutionary spirit…
instead of simply crushing it, they may have won.” “The Republican force as a whole suffered
from its internal political divisions despite the Popular Army’s discipline.”
• Thomas: “(locally) militias of sorts existed since 1934 under the guise of athletics associations.”
“(Early in the defence)… these (Russian) tanks… were shown to be effective. One Russian tank
was said to have destroyed eleven Italian ones.” “…(Republican Russian) tanks made little
impact… partly because the Spaniards now manning them were baffled by their complexity…”
“…new Russian fighters showed their superiority in dispersing a squadron of Fiat fighters which
escorted some Junkers 52.” “Much of the organisation of the resistance, emanating from (Maia’s)
headquarters… derived less from Maia than from the Russian General Goriev.” “…it does seem
that Voronov was the inspiration behind the artillery” “the Republican army had checked Varela
before the arrival of the (12th) Brigade… The bravery and experience of the Brigades was,
however, crucial.”
• Payne: “In Madrid… the revolt never had much chance of success. The organised revolutionary
groups were so large compared to the military…” “In Madrid… the revolt was uncoordinated in
the extreme.” “…recent reassignments had broken up whatever unity there had been earlier.”
“…the police… accepted the bent of the population and fought valiantly for the leftist authorities.”
• Bolloten: “…far fewer generals on active service supported the rebellion than remained with the
government.”
Page 182
Question 6
What were the most significant social and political consequences of Franco’s victory?
This essay requires the candidate to assess the post-war period and to evaluate the effect of the
Nationalists’ victory on Spain’s political position, nationally and internationally and on the people of
Spain.
The political system that arose from Franco’s victory:
• Main result was the return to dictatorship and strict social control.
Primary effects:
• Military courts in place until 1943.
• Secret Police system along with official party – FET y de las JONS intelligence brigade.
• Documentary evidence used to persecute individuals connected to TUs.
• 26,000 political prisoners by mid-40s.
• Re-establishment of the power of the church, army and landowners.
• Repression of opposition in Basque area and, particularly, in Catalonia.
• ‘Return’ of monarchy.
Secondary effects:
• Social welfare linked to regime loyalty – power of party official.
• Bribery and corruption rife.
But…
• Spanish neutrality in WWII.
• Eventual recognition by all major powers.
• US support in return for military (air) presence.
Social implications:
• Repressive systems of education, employment, policing, courts.
• Widespread killings.
• Franco’s maintaining of polarisation.
• Increased regional divisions, eg still witnessed between Catalonia and Madrid. Also growth of
ETA.
• Oppression of women.
But…
• Eventual economic growth through US funds and tourism.
• Ellwood: “Plurality and diversity were replaced in every sphere.” “…acts of individual cruelty,
however brutal, were easily surpassed by the collective cruelty [of the dictatorship].” “Even
children who had participated in union organised picnics… were listed.”
• Preston: “…until Franco’s death, Spain was governed as if it were a country occupied by a
victorious foreign army.” “Wages were slashed, strikes treated as sabotage… The CNT and UGT
were crushed. Travel and search for jobs were controlled.” “Every effort was made to maintain
the division between the victors and the vanquished.”
• Carr/Fusi: “His [Franco’s] aim was to ‘destroy the nineteenth century’; that is, parliamentary
liberalism.” “The secret of Franco’s power lay in his manipulation of the political families (and
for this purpose we must include the Falange, the army and… the church).” “His early
governments were… paralysed by the mutual mistrust of soldiers and civilians.”
Page 183
The Spanish Civil War (1931-1939)
Part 2
Question 1
How much do Sources A and B reveal about differing views on the motives behind Azaña’s
reforms of the Church between 1931 and 1933? (16 marks)

The candidate considers the views in Sources A and B on the motives behind Azaña’s Church
Reforms and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source A:
on Hugh Thomas will be credited as historiography.
• A strong statistical argument concerning the damaging effect of the vast costs in maintaining the
Catholic Church in Spain as a state-subsidised institution.
• Also gives strong evidence of the declining relevance of the church for many Spaniards.
• Azaña’s comment that Spain has “ceased to be Catholic” perhaps hints at more malicious
motivation.
• Church was considerably expensive for a government which spent 40% of its limited budget to the
army.
• Parishes were disproportionately ‘staffed’, especially in the south where the majority of priests
served the Latifundias, while the poor often went hungry.
• A belief by many braceros that the church now served the upper class only.
• Growth of alternative ideologies since the 19thC – anarchism, etc.
Page 184
Source B
on Paul Preston will be credited as historiography.
• Belief that reforms motivated by attempts to create ‘new Spain’.

• Church part of an oppressive ‘front’ also assisted by Latifundias and army.
• ‘Progressive leaders’ facing old ‘powers’.
• Attacks not on religion but privilege.
• Azaña guilty of dangerous rhetoric which may illustrate anti-clericalism (“All the convents in
Madrid are not worth the life of one Republican”).
• Some reforms ‘fit’ Preston’s description:
− attempt to separate church and state in constitution
− removal of stipends
− limitation of church’s right to wealth
• But others may show malice and were anti-liberal:
− disbanding of orders
− illegalising teaching by churchmen
• Preston: “Article 26… provoked the first major conflict of the Republic”.
• Thomas: “the Spanish working class were maddened by (priests’) hypocrisy on poverty
teachings” “Every nunnery… held (by working classes) to be a conspiracy against democracy”
Azaña had been distressed by own education.
• Malefakis: the day of the great church estates had (already) long since passed.
• Alpert: Vatican considered the Spanish Church “unnecessarily backward”.
• Brenan: “In 1912 it was said that the Jesuits controlled ‘without exaggeration one third of the
capital wealth of Spain’.” “The children in convent schools were taught that if they associated
with Liberals they went to hell!” “[According to the Catholic Church] liberty of conscience, of
education, of meeting (were all) heretical to believe in.”
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the motives behind
Azaña’s reform of the church.
Page 185
Marks
Page 186
Question 2
How fully does Source C explain the reasons for the military rising in July 1936? (12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source C as an adequate explanation of the reasons for
the military rising in terms of:
on Peter Anderson will be credited as historiography.
• Army, church and Latifundias united in opposition to Republic.

• Society polarised – left sought to crush uprising.
• Many other factors contributed:

− army’s reaction to reforms
− army’s anger at regionalist legislation
− Azaña’s rhetoric angering the right
− Bieno Negro’s attacks on Left
− inclusion of CEDA in cabinet
− claims by right wing press of ‘anarchy’
− impossibility of agrarian reform without angering Latifundias
− growing militancy of left
− assassination of Sotelo
• Thomas: “The Spanish Republic failed because it came to be rejected by… both Left and Right…
estranged many who, at first, with whatever reluctance, contemplated collaboration.” “The
country was constructed upon quarrels.” “A liberal historian is tempted to blame individuals;
Azaña, for his excessive pride… Robles, for vacillation… Caballero and Sotelo for incendiary
speeches… Lerroux was indolent and corrupt.”
• Malefakis: “The Right intensified the polarisation of society… and contributed to the conditions
that would eventually erupt in the Spanish Civil War.”
• Preston: “Ultimately, the war was to grow out of the efforts of the progressive leaders of the
Republic to carry out reform against… the most powerful sections of society.” “Given the
apparent determination of the working class to introduce major reforms and of the oligarchy to
resist them, the failure of the legalist tactics could not but lead to a resurgence of the
‘catastrophist’ Right and the imposition of a corporative state by force of arms.”
• Esenwein and Shubert: “What prompted the military rising was not the Republic’s failure but…
the possibility that it would succeed.”
• Ellwood: “Calvo Sotelo’s murder… hand(ed) to its enemies… the justification for its
destruction.”
Page 187
which a consideration of Source C is helpful in offering a full explanation of the reasons for the
military rising in July 1936.
Marks
comments.
of immediate and wider context, and well developed levels of relevant analysis. Appropriate
reference to historians’ views will be credited highly.
Page 188
Question 3
How useful is Source D for understanding the influence of the Communist Party on the Republic
during the Spanish Civil War? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source D in providing an adequate
explanation of the influence of the Communist Party of the Republic in terms of:
Provenance:
• Largo Caballero, Minister of Labour 1931-33, figurehead for Socialist Left in 1930s.
• Seduced by communists by compliments of being ‘Spanish Lenin’.
• Largo Caballero became head of the UGT and controlled its newspaper, Claridad. In this position
he called for the radicalisation of the PSOE. This included “the conquest of political power by the
working class by whatever means possible”.
• During the early stages of the Spanish Civil War, he was critical of the Popular Front government
led by José Giral. Even Largo Caballero’s opponents agreed that he was a dynamic leader and in
September 1936 he was chosen to replace Giral as prime minister. He also took over the
important role of war minister.
• After taking power he concentrated on winning the war and did not pursue his policy of social
revolution. In an effort to gain the support of foreign governments, he announced that his
administration was “not fighting for socialism but for democracy and constitutional rule”.
• He introduced changes that upset the left in Spain. This included conscription, the reintroduction
of ranks and insignia into the militia, and the abolition of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. He also
established a new police force, the National Republican Guard.
• He resisted pressure from the Communist Party to promote its members to senior posts in the
government. He also refused their demands to suppress the Worker’s Party (POUM) in May
1937.
• He had the support of union members (more than Prieto).
• He served as Minister of Labour and formulated agrarian policies which called for the distribution
of land to landless labourers. This increased the support for the PSOE in rural communities. By
1935 the PSOE had increased its membership to 75,000.
• Prime Minister from 4th September 1936 to 17th May 1937.
• Comment clearly spoken when PM of regime during the war.
• Caballero refers to the Soviet Ambassador who he clearly believes is attempting to exert pressure
on the Spanish government to allow a level of control by Stalin.
• It also shows divisions within the left, created by Communist interference, as can be witnessed by
Caballero’s attack on Alvarez del Vayo, originally a follower of Caballero who moved
increasingly towards the Communists.
Page 189
Candidate shows detailed knowledge and understanding of Caballero’s role in the development of
relations with other parties, especially the communists and
• This was typical of the divisions within the left.

• Stalin’s real international aim was to secure the help of the western democracies against the fascist
countries. Ironically, therefore, his instructions were to ensure that the Spanish regime appeared
as a liberal bourgeois regime and avoided any image of a revolutionary state.
• This was despised by many in the left and especially by the anarchists.
• Stalin’s aid also came at a price and although the precise nature of the Ambassador’s demands are
not clear here:
− Thomas states that they wished the removal of General Asensio in addition to other demands.
• Eventually Spanish bullion would be transferred to Moscow showing the nature of Soviet support.
• Recent accounts, however, argue that there is only a small ‘accountancy gap’ involved, if any.
• The communists had helped Caballero to power but he had become increasingly disenchanted.
• Many also argue that communist ‘order’ did help war effort and that there is little actual evidence
that Republican cause was damaged by it.
• Communists can also be credited with strong involvement in defence of Madrid.
• Guadalajara, Brunete and prominent communists such as La Pasionaria were crucial in increasing
popular support rather than destroying it.
• Other issues such as the levels of Communist aid, personal enmity between Prieto and Caballero
are not mentioned.
• The fundamental differences between Anarchist, Socialist and Communist doctrine could also be
explored.
• It is questionable, amidst collectivism, POUM militias, etc as to whether this was one defence of
the regime at all or a collection of self-interested stances.
• The hatred between Communists and Anarchists eventually boiled over in the May events of 1937.
• Thomas: “Caballero even suspected that Kleber (leader of the International Brigades)… wished to
stage a communist coup d’etat in Madrid.” “They [Prieto and Negrín] hated the POUM and the
anarchists as much as the Communists did.”
• Orwell: “A government which sends boys of fifteen to the front and keeps the biggest men and
the newest weapons in the rear is manifestly more afraid of the revolution than of the Fascists.”
• Preston: “The Republic’s most dramatic difficulty… was born of the contradictory ambitions of
the various component groups of the Popular Front.” “The Republican government in Madrid and
the Generalitat in Catalonia theoretically ran the country but effective authority had passed, albeit
briefly, to the anarcho-syndicalist workers in Barcelona and to the UGT in Madrid.”
which a consideration of Source D is useful in understanding the influence of the Communist Party on
the Republic during the Civil War.
Page 190
Marks
Page 191
Britain At War and Peace (1939-1951)
Part 1
Question 1
How important was the North-South divide in explaining social and economic inequality in
Britain by 1939?
The aim of the essay is to enable the candidate to discuss the state of British society on the eve of war
within the context of social and economic equality, and specifically whether the North-South divide
was the primary cause of this inequality. Whilst there may be some scope for the candidate offering a
panoramic view of the ‘30s in general terms, the main focus of the essay should be on the latter part of
the decade and the degree to which society was still polarised by 1939.
• The concept of the North-South divide and whether the legacy of industrial decline and
subsequent high unemployment in traditional industries contributed significantly more to
inequality than other more generalised factors. Candidates would be expected to refer to the
decline of traditional industries in the north, and the emergence of new ‘sunrise’ industries in the
Midlands and South, and the extent to which the wage structure and security of employment
offered by these industries made a significant social gap inevitable.
• Class divisions and how they were exemplified by lifestyles and opportunities in areas such as
education, leisure and diet.
• The disparity between the classes in access to affordable healthcare.
• General living standards with particular reference to housing.
• The contrast between the lifestyle of the long-term unemployed and those with more secure
employment.
• Issues of gender inequality such as the marriage bar.
• Mowatt: emphasising the class divide and in particular the North-South divide as a cause of
division.
• Orwell: equally emphatic on class divisions.
• Mackay: a more positive approach to the hungry ‘30s, which questions the very nature of the
extent of inequality and its duration.
Historiographically there is not much disagreement on the fundamental premise of this essay title but
there may be differences of emphasis.
Page 192
Question 2
How important was the role of the British army in Allied victory in the Second World War?
It is anticipated that this question will be treated by most candidates as an isolated factor essay rather
than one which focuses exclusively on the role of the British army. Candidates should therefore be
given credit where they expand the question to include reference to other theatres of war which were
instrumental in ensuring allied victory. Nevertheless, the candidate will be expected to assess the
contribution of the British army in the following terms:
• Background detail on the army; its size, composition/training since conscription in May 1939, the
BEF, Dunkirk, the role of its generals.
• The contribution of the army to the defeat of the Italians and Germans in North Africa by May
1943.
• The impact of the invasion of Italy and the subsequent German counter-attack.
• The part played by the army in the Far East campaigns against the Japanese.
• The ultimate contribution of the army to the Normandy landings and subsequent defeat of
Germany.
• Statistical detail on its contribution; death rates.
• The candidate may also make reference to other branches of the British military who made
significant contributions to the defeat of the Germans such as:
− Bomber Command’s part in reducing Germany’s military capacity and denting her civilian
morale
− The role of the Navy in defeating the U-Boat menace in the Atlantic as well as supplying
Russia
− Fighter Command’s victory in the Battle of Britain
− the vital role played by the Red Army in the east and the USA’s contribution both
in a military and financial sense to ultimate victory.
• The candidate must be careful not to focus too much on the parts played by the USA and Soviet
Union since this question focuses on the British contribution.
• Michael Gannon: acclaims the British army for taking the fight to the Axis powers in the early
days of the war.
• Correlli Barnett: stresses the importance of the navy.
• John Keegan: overall survey of the war; places only limited emphasis on British military
contribution.
• Richard Overy: sees the part played by Bomber Command in a domestic context as being vital;
emphasises the role of the Red Army.
• Max Hastings: focuses more on the role of the air force than the land forces.
Page 193
Question 3
Assess the impact of the war on British agriculture and industry by 1945.
This essay specifically relates to the two industries and should not be answered in the context of the
impact of the war on the whole economy. Although primarily descriptive in nature, there is ample
scope in a good essay for an analysis of the positive and negative effects related to each industry.
• A detailed analysis of government policies on import and export controls.

• Fiscal policies and the use of excess profits tax.
• An analysis of the degree of government regulation and control of industrial location, allocation of
manpower, demand and supply management and products produced.
• The role of conscription, especially that of women into the workplace.
• The impact on export trade and the trade deficit by 1945.
• The significant increase in agricultural production brought about by food shortages through the U-
boat campaign and increased mechanisation.
• The impact of the Land Army on working relations.
• Price controls and agricultural wages.
• Agriculture as a reserved occupation.
• In historiographical terms the main critic of Britain’s economic performance is Correlli Barnett
in his Audit of War, where low productivity, poor worker/management relations and outdated
machinery and work practices are savaged.
• More balanced accounts of the explanations of industrial performance are likely to be obtained
from Tiratsoo, Fielding, Milward, Thoms and most recently Floud and McCloskey.
• These commentators are more likely to stress the factors affecting industrial performance which
were outwith human control, eg war-weariness through exhausting shift-working, lack of materials
and the general ill-preparedness of industry for such an examination.
Page 194
Question 4
“It was not Churchill who lost the 1945 election; it was the ghost of Neville Chamberlain.”
(Harold Macmillan)
How accurate is this view of the causes of Conservative electoral defeat in the 1945 election?
The candidate would be expected to give an analysis of Tory electoral defeat in 1945 in the context of
the failings of the Chamberlain national government both in the immediate pre-war period and in the
phase of the Phoney war. However, a more general view would also be expected and indeed required
for top marks.
• The failed policy of appeasement and its association with Chamberlain.

• The hungry thirties and working class resentment at the Tory dominated governments of the time,
leading to the ‘never again’ sentiments of the electorate.
• Government lethargy during the Phoney war.
• Wider issues such as the notion of a People’s Peace delivering widely anticipated social reform
which Labour seemed more likely to bring about.
• Tory failure to embrace the Beveridge Report.
• A swing to the left in general in British politics as witnessed by the by-election successes of the
Commonwealth Party during the war and the proliferation of left wing daily newspapers.
• Mistakes made in the election campaign itself.
• The alleged influence of ABCA on the forces vote.
• The peculiarities of the British electoral system.
• The general impact of the war on the voters’ perceptions of Labour and the whole concept of state
interventionism and demand management.
Historiographically, the emphasis will be on the relative degree of importance attributed to each of
these causes.
• Addison stresses the ‘never again’ argument as a primary cause of Tory defeat.
• Pelling, Morgan, Mackay and Adelman give more credence to the growing strength of
conviction in social reform and the ability of the Labour Party to deliver.
• Pelling also focuses on the peculiarities of the first-past-the-post system as a reason for Labour
victory in a number of constituencies, whilst contemporary politicians like Butler and Macmillan
were more willing to subscribe to the ghost of Chamberlain theory.
Page 195
Question 5
To what extent did the domestic policies of the Labour governments (1945 − 1951) fulfil the
hopes of their supporters?
The candidate is expected to answer this question in terms of the degree to which Labour fulfilled the
hopes of all its supporters, including the electorate, the PLP, the trade union movement and the left
wing press. A starting point might be to define what the particular hopes of each group were,
particularly the electorate’s desire for a New Jerusalem and the left wing for a socialist state. A
quality answer will assess all these factors and offer a judgement on the extent of fulfilment, while a
poorer answer might be largely narrative in its treatment of Labour policies.
The candidate may be expected to include evidence such as:
• An appraisal of what the various interest groups wanted from a Labour government.
• An appraisal of Labour domestic policies such as nationalisation.
• An examination of the principles and workings of the welfare state as system of universal and
comprehensive services, and the degree to which this found acceptance with the public.
• The development of the NHS.
• The extent to which there was a redistribution of wealth within the country.
• The extension of educational provision.
• Provision of quality, affordable council housing, and the disappointment felt at Labour’s record on
this issue by 1951.
An analysis of the pro- and anti-socialist schools of thought on Labour’s achievements,

including:
Anti:
• A benefit system based on flat-rated insurance payments was hardly socialist in nature. Some
even saw it as a stealth tax on the least well off.
• The principle of universal benefits might aid those most well off who didn’t require them.
• The NHS did not eliminate private medicine nor discourage its usage in NHS hospitals.
• Little was done to promote education equality through the Butler Act, which set up socially
divisive systems and allowed public schools to flourish.
Pro:
• Labour went beyond even Beveridge’s idea on welfare.
• Bevan built an NHS system from scratch, despite the formidable opposition of the BMA.
• Universality meant an end to the hated means test.
• Some attempt at public ownership of the commanding heights of the economy was made.
• Public housing given higher priority than private.
• There was an element of redistributive taxation.
Page 196
The candidate would be expected to build on this evidence by examining the extent to which the
principles of Labour’s reforms and their execution in practice satisfied their supporters. Such
evidence could include:
• The degree to which the electorate accepted the welfare reforms as implemented.
• The electorate’s disenchantment with the continuation of rationing and other austerity measures
and their intolerance of the perceived bureaucracy of state control.
• The disenchantment of the left wing with the lack of progress on points of principle relating to
socialist measures as evidenced above.
• Disquiet about the degree to which economic decision making was being influenced by the USA.
• Confusion in the Parliamentary Labour Party by 1951 over the future direction of the party in
power and the split over Gaitskell’s budget of that year.
• The ultimate verdict of the electorate in the elections of 1950-51 as an indictment of Labour’s
policies.
• Supporters of the Labour notion of socialism like Kenneth Morgan and those like Addison see
the post-war years as a fundamental turning point.
• Support would come from Pugh, Adelman and others like Jefferys and Hennessey.
• Left wing historians like Fielding see a betrayal of principles as would Tomlinson
• Barnett’s critique of the entire edifice of the welfare state.
Page 197
Question 6
Was the process of decolonisation between 1945 and 1951 an inevitable result of the Second
World War?
The candidate would be expected to review the extent of decolonisation that had taken place by 1951,
setting it within the context of imperial decline, and offering an appreciation of the factors at work in
hastening decolonisation and a degree of analysis of whether the war was the primary agent in
bringing about this process or merely an accelerating agent.
• An analysis of the extent to which the process of decolonisation was underway before the war.
• Reference to specific examples of decolonisation, in particular India and Pakistan independence
(1947) but also Transjordan (1946), Burma and Ceylon (1948), Palestine (1948) and Libya (1951).
• Pressure from anti-colonial movements during and after the war.
• An analysis of the cost of the war and Britain’s additional military and financial obligations as a
reason for decolonisation.
• Britain’s retreat from her status as an imperial power in the Middle East and the reasons for that.
• The pressure placed on Britain by the superpowers to decolonise and in particular the desire of the
USA to gain access to British colonial markets.
• The attitude of the Labour party to the issue of decolonisation.
• Influence of other decolonising nations such as the French and Dutch.
• Britain’s concept of ‘an informal empire’, post 1947.
• In historiographical terms the writers likely to feature are Jefferys, Morgan, Pearce and
Tomlinson who are all generally agreed on the importance of the war as a precipitating factor.
• John Darwin cites the changing economic relationship brought about by the war, between Britain
and her colonies/dominions as a vital reason for their desire to extend economic independence to a
full political one. He refers to ‘the convulsive moment in Asia’ in 1947-48 as a fundamental
harbinger of change.
• Roger Lewis is more specific and attributes the process to specific decisions taken by the Attlee
government of 1947-1948 [Others blur the focus and describe a more gradual and spasmodic
process.]
• W David McIntyre sees the abandonment of Palestine as “the more decisive and traumatic
episode in the Attlee phase of decolonisation”.
• Reynolds suggests that “the war had undermined the foundations of British power in some of its
dependencies.”
• John Gallagher traces the decline right back to the aftermath of the Great War.
• Barnett produces the most savage critique of global overstretch and the pursuit of the illusion of
power as a primary cause of British imperial decline in the post-war period.
Page 198
Britain At War and Peace (1939-1951)
Part 2
Question 1
How fully does Source A explain the reasons for Britain’s lack of preparedness for war in 1939?
(12 marks)
The candidate offers a structured evaluation of Source A as an adequate explanation of Britain’s lack
of preparedness for war in 1939 in terms of:
on Robert Mackay will receive marks under historiography.
• Positive comment made on the effective use of resources in certain areas given the prevailing
difficulties at the time.
• Negative comment on the failings of foreign and defence policies in preparation for a major war.
• Government blamed for consistently thinking that war could be avoided and therefore need not be
prepared for in the fullest sense.
• The idea of a failed policy of appeasement being doggedly pursued.

• Inability of Chamberlain to woo the Soviet Union.
• Ideological opposition to preparing the country for total war in the vain hope it would never
happen.
• Evidence on the muddled thinking in defence policy.
Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of those in the source:
• Specific recall evidence on the state of the three branches of the armed forces in 1939.
• A critique of Chamberlain’s economic policy and in particular his unwillingness to countenance
state intervention in the economy or to set up specific war-related ministries under one overall
economic supremo.
• Chamberlain’s unwillingness to cooperate with the trade union movement in relation to economic
planning.
• The partial state of readiness of the civil defence system and in particular air raid shelter provision.
• Paul Addison on economic preparedness [that this was the single most important area of neglect].
• CL Mowatt and Michael Howard on military preparedness, but offer differing emphases on the
extent to which the armed forces were prepared for the conflict.
• Stuart Hylton and Nick Tiratsoo on civil defence [neither historian giving much credit to the
government for adequately defending the public against bombing].
• RC Parker and others on diplomatic efforts pre-1939.
Page 199
which a consideration of Source A is helpful in offering a full explanation of Britain’s lack of
preparedness for war in 1939.
Marks
Page 200
Question 2
How useful is Source B as evidence of the success of the Allied bombing campaign against
Germany during the Second World War? (12 marks)
the source.
source’s value.
The candidate offers a structured consideration of the usefulness of Source B in understanding the
effectiveness of the bombing campaign in terms of:
• Source by a prominent Nazi figure of the time.

• As Minister of Armaments and War Production, he was in a unique position to judge the impact of
the Allied bombing campaign on industrial production.
• There may well be a significant element of bias and self-justification in the source.
• Denial that the bombing campaign had lowered civilian morale; may even have served to enhance
it.
• Supposition that the loss of production through bombing may have been compensated for by
increased productivity elsewhere.
• Recognition that providing adequate anti-aircraft cover caused shortage of soldiers and electronic
equipment that may have been better deployed elsewhere.
• Little evidence that the bombing had any major impact on German morale.
• Evidence suggests that German industry was not seriously affected by the bombing campaign.
• Evidence to suggest that the Allied bombing campaign did force the Nazi regime to relocate troops
and resources away from the Eastern Front as was intended.
Points from recall which offer a wider contextualisation of those in the source:
• An analysis of the extent to which the bombing campaign did prove effective in destroying the
German industrial complex.
• An assessment of the extent of British resources utilised in this campaign [anywhere between 7-
20% of British war capacity] and the number of aircrew killed, balanced against the positive
outcomes of the bombing campaign.
• An assessment of the political dimension to the bombing campaign as it related to the Soviets.
• An assessment of the moral dimension with particular reference to Dresden and other such raids.
Page 201
• Max Hastings: largely supportive of the bombing campaign.

• Richard Overy: a positive opinion on the merits of the bombing campaign.
• Detlef Siebert: morally and strategically questionable.
• Dr John Buckley: not worth the resources and manpower invested in the campaign.
• Robin Neillands: moral condemnation of the whole campaign, especially after 1944.
which a consideration of Source B is useful for evaluating the effectiveness of the Allied bombing of
Germany.
Marks
shows an understanding of the views of the sources, sets material in context, shows a good
a clear understanding of the views of the source and its value as interpretations on the issue.
Page 202
Question 3
How much do Sources C and D reveal about differing views on whether the war was a unifying
experience for the British people? (16 marks)
accurately support that evaluation with comment from the sources.

The candidate considers the views in Sources C and D on the extent to which the war was a unifying
experience, and offers a structured evaluation of the two perspectives in terms of:
Source C
• A contemporary, authentic view from an eyewitness and participant.

• Obvious limitations of a single person’s point of view.
• Source author recognises the tremendous personal and psychological hardships endured by many
people during the war.
• Source author typifies the ‘spirit of the Blitz’ mentality in suggesting that such hardships would
not get people down and that people would continue to support the war effort in every way they
could.
• Source author indicates that this spirit should be preserved to remind posterity of the united war
efforts of the British people.
• Source typifies the attitude of many during the war as seen in personal journals and diaries.
• Argument that British society was never more united than in this its ‘finest hour’.
• Evidence to suggest a communal spirit of self-sacrifice and pulling together to defeat Nazism.
• Evidence of equality of suffering and commonly shared hardship through bombing, rationing and
the blackout as well as conscription.
Page 203
Source D
Provenance: accurate and relevant comments on provenance can earn credit. These may include:
• A memo from the then Home Secretary, Anderson to the PM alerting him to incidences of
criminal behaviour.
• Memo outlines the incidences of looting which were taking place during the Blitz and particularly
during the blackout.
• Memo suggests these are widespread and difficult for the police to cope with.
• Suggests that private property is being looted, further adding to the physical and emotional
hardships of bomb victims.
• Practice causing sufficient alarm to have the Home Secretary warned by a number of sources of its
potential harm to morale.
• Candidate may choose to further illustrate the breakdown of law and order during the war by
citing further statistics of criminality and lawlessness such as youth crime, the number of deserters
at loose in the capital and the fact that often the looting was carried out by people in positions of
authority such as ARP wardens.
• The candidate may make reference to organised crime and how it flourished during the war
through the black market and the opportunities afforded by the blackout.
Points which offer wider contextualisation of the views in the sources:
• Evidence of further disunity in society as epitomised by the resentment felt by the working class at
the lack of appropriate deep shelters available in the cities and the fact that the wealthy had access
to fortified basement shelters in hotels like the Dorchester.
• Evidence of disunity in the workplace as shown by the number of days lost in the war to strikes
even though they were technically illegal.
• Resentment at the iniquities of the rationing system and the ability of the better off to manipulate
the black market for their advantage.
• Significant evidence that many city dwellers were unable to cope with incessant bombing and left
cities each night for rural safety.
• Anger at those who were able to avoid conscription whether military or industrial because of
privilege.
• Evidence of racial unrest in east end of London during war.
• Richard Titmuss’ original postulation of this theory of domestic unity

• AJP Taylor’s views that bombing “cemented national unity”
• David Thompson’s view of a “resolute and united people”
• Marwick’s qualified acceptance of the extent of national unity.
• Andrew Roberts’ vociferous defence of it in late 1990s
• Calder’s seminal work People’s War which challenged the unity idea.
• Tom Harrison catalogued the terrors and miseries of ordinary people
• HL Smith examined the huge disparities in class experience, a theme built on by Tiratsoo
• Clive Ponting’s bitter and cynical look at the myth of the Blitz.
Page 204
which a consideration of the two sources is helpful in offering a full perspective on the degree of
national unity during the war.
Marks
and shows an understanding of the views of the source, sets material in context, shows a good
[END OF MARKING INSTRUCTIONS]
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2007 History

Finalised Marking Instructions

 Scottish Qualifications Authority 2007

A++ 23+ marks

Factors which do lead to an essay failing:

The examination paper has 3 standardised stems on the source questions.

The ‘how fully’ question (12 marks)

The ‘how useful’ question (12 marks)

The ‘two-source’ question (16 marks)

The candidate might be expected to use such evidence as:

The candidate might be expected to use such evidence as:

Did conversion to Christianity make a profound difference to North Britain?

The candidate might be expected to use such evidence as:

There are several areas where there is no aura of mystery at all:

Was the Viking impact on North Britain wholly destructive?

The candidate might be expected to use such evidence as:

The candidate might use such evidence as:

The candidate offers a structured consideration of Source A in terms of:

• Based on years of archaeological investigation and study of visible remains.

• Must be original plan for wall; no military way, no vallum.

• The Emperor disliked the debauchery of his sons.

• Herodian, as Senator and Consul under Severus, was an insider.

Interpretation (Maximum 6 marks)

Contextual and Historical interpretations (Maximum 10 marks)

These 10 marks will be awarded for:

• the quality and depth of the contextual recall

• Dal Riata weak in natural resources

• Viking raids devastated Dal Riata

• Viking raids were unpredictable and difficult to beat off

• Viking raids weakened the Picts as well as the Scots

Relevant areas for discussion might include:

• Edward’s demands for military service in France

Relevant areas for discussion might include:

Other factors leading to Edward I’s failure in Scotland

Relevant areas for discussion might include:

Relevant areas for discussion might include:

The re-establishment of the machinery of government

Factors limiting the success of Bruce’s government

• Evidence of continuing faction after Statute of Cambuskenneth

How far was Scottish society changed by the Wars of Independence?

Changes in Scottish society:

Continuity in the nature of Scottish society:

• The Appeal was written by lords loyal to Robert Bruce.

• Bruce viewed himself as the legitimate heir.

• Bruce’s main claim was ‘nearness of degree’.

Interpretation (maximum 6 marks)

Contextual and historical interpretations (maximum 10 marks)

These 10 marks will be awarded for:

• The quality and depth of the contextual recall

• Wallace made Guardian in the name of King John, and knighted.

• Wallace failed to end English occupation and return Scottish independence.

• Wallace’s defeat at Falkirk ended his Guardianship.

• Wallace significant because he was a commoner.

• Bishop Lamberton was a consistent supporter of the ‘national cause’.

• Celebrated mass for King Robert.

• Lamberton had escaped from Berwick to be present at the coronation.

• Declaration of the Clergy.

The candidate would be expected to use evidence such as:

• The growth of artistic patronage and consumerism

• Alternate views emphasising the evolution of artistic styles/the influence of humanism

The candidate would be expected to use evidence such as:

Candidates would be expected to use evidence such as:

• ‘The façade of Republican institutions’