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Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216:

When to Use Requests to Admit

By Gilbert C. Schumm

Introduction

This article will discuss when and how to use and respond to requests to admit facts and

the genuineness of documents in the aftermath of the recent case law that has dramatically

changed this litigation tool.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 request for admissions was first adopted in 1956 as

Supreme Court Rule 18 and the language of the rule has remained basically the same to the

present date. However, the case law interpreting the application of the Rule has evolved

significantly since the P.R.S. International, Inc. V Shred Pax Corporation case i and most recently
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with the Vision Point of Sale v. Haas case.

Since 216 requests are the only discovery tool that is self executing iii there is confusion

among practicing attorneys as to how to use and respond to 216 requests for admissions. A

lawyer’s failure to properly respond to such a request may result in sanctions, summary judgment

or default and drastically alter the course of litigation.

What is a 216 Request to Admit?

Historically there has been a debate as to whether requests to admit are discovery or not.

Requests to admit prior to P.R.S. International have been called quasi – discovery and it has been

argued that because of the unique nature of 216 requests they are not discovery iv .

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The Supreme Court in Bright v. Dicke v indicated that 216 requests were not discovery when the

court stated as follows at page 208: “The purpose of admissions is not to discover facts but rather

to establish some of the material facts in a case without the necessity of formal proof at trial.”

However, in 1995 the Supreme Court also amended SCR 201 to include requests for admission vi

with other discovery devises such as interrogatories, request to produce and depositions. The

argument for the position that request to admit are not discovery is that the requesting party must

answer the request under oath with 28 days or the request are deemed admitted without the

necessity of a 201(k) or a motion to compel. In other words, the 216 request is self-executing and

does not require court intervention for the request to ripen into admissions against the responding

party.

In the case of a request for admission of the genuineness of documents the subject

documents must already be in the possession of the requesting party such as contracts, deeds or

promissory notes and are attached as an exhibit to the request. An Admission by the responding

party to the genuineness of a document removes the necessity to lay a foundation at trial for the

admission of the document.

The benefit of using request to admit are 1) they narrow the issues at the pre-trial stage 2)

Admissions may provide information to the requesting party that will preclude the use of other

discovery such as interrogatories and depositions 3) 216 admissions allow the requesting party to

use the admission against the responding party and 4) they are inexpensive to use. (sorry, court

reporters)

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So, 216 requests are defined as a discovery device but as a practical matter they do not

“discover” anything. 216 requests are a valuable tool to narrow the issues in a case, avoid

wasting time laying a foundation for documents at trial, and reduce the cost of litigation.

What is a Proper Subject for Admissions?

216 requests must seek the admission of facts, not conclusions or opinions. If a

requesting party promulgates factual or legal conclusions they cannot be deemed to be admitted

even in the absence of an answer after the 28 days response period. Prior to P.R.S. International

“ultimate facts” or what a witness would testify about included in a 216 request were not

appropriate for admission by the responding party Zindrick v. Drake. vii However, P.R.S.

International supra changed that interpretation of Rule 216 dramatically. P.R.S. International

involved a breach of contract case where the defendant served the plaintiff with request to admit.

The request sought an admission that plaintiff never obtained required permits for installation of

certain machinery and never asked that the machinery be delivered at a specific place and time

and later refused delivery and requested that the machinery be sold to another party – all elements

or “ultimate facts” of cause of action for breach of contract. The appellate court, following

current precedent at the time viii held that “ultimate facts” were not a proper component of 216

requests and ruled against the defendant who propounded the requests.

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and for the first time held that “ultimate

facts” were a proper subject for 216 requests. This means that the current law in Illinois allows a

party to request admissions that go directly to the elements of a cause of action such as offer,

acceptance and consideration in a breach of contract case. Such admissions may, in turn, support

a motion for summary judgment in the early stages of litigation without the necessity of using

other discovery tools such as interrogatories and depositions.

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The most recent case impacting the use of 216 requests is the Vision Point of Sales, Inc.

v. Haas supra where the defendant sent 216 requests to plaintiff but neglected to file the 216

request with the Clerk. The plaintiff responded within the 28 day time period but prepared the

answer so that the attorney’s signature appeared at the end of the answer and the defendants

verification signature appeared on a separate page after the attorney signature. The defendant

filed a motion to strike the answer to the request on the basis that: 1) the party sign the last page,

not a separate verification; 2) Circuit Court Rule 3.1 requires that responses to request to admit

must be filed with the Clerk; and 3) the plaintiff failed to show “good cause” for an extension of

time to file an amended response pursuant to SCR 183.

The trial court granted the motion to strike and denied plaintiff’s request to file an

amended response. Later the trial court sua sponte vacated its prior ruling, granted plaintiff time

to file an amended response, and further found that good cause existed under Rule 183 for the

extension of time. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s extension of time to respond but

the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that a party’s failure to comply with a court order is

a separate issue as to whether a party has established “good cause” under Rule 183. This test is

stated in Vision Point, supra at page 13 as follows: “That is, the responding party cannot rely

upon the “mere absence of inconvenience or prejudice to the opposing party” (citation) or

mistake, inadvertence, or attorney neglect as the sole basis for a good-cause determination

(citation) but must, instead, assert some independent basis for allowing the untimely response.

(citation)” The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plain language of Rule 183 makes good-cause

a prerequisite to the granting of an extension of time. The court discussed the nature of 216

requests in Vision Point, supra at page 10 as follows: “However, Black’s defines “discovery” as

“{c}ompulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of information that relates to the litigation, “ and

states that “ {t}he primary discovery devices are interrogatories, depositions, requests for

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admissions, and requests for production.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 498 (85h ed. 2004). This

definition of “discovery” corresponds with our discussion in P.R.S. (citation) wherein we stated

that requests to admit are useful “to separate the wheat from the chaff” with the purpose of

narrowing the actual contested issues in the case so that they might be clearly and succinctly

presented to the trier of fact. (citation) This concept is also consistent with our long-held belief

that discovery is to be “utilized to ‘illuminate the actual issues in the case’”

How to Use the Request to Admit

Any party to the litigation may file and serve on any other party requests to admit and or

requests to admit the genuineness of documents. The requests may be served as soon as a

responding party is required to appear pursuant to SCR 201(d) ix unlike interrogatories, there is

no limit to the number of requests that may be served on an opponent. Additionally, successive

requests may be served as the litigation progresses. If the request to admit is served within 28

days of trial the responding party may still need to answer the request because SCR 218(c)x gives

the trial court discretion to require a party to answer at the pre-trial conference.

The request to admit facts should be drafted to allow a yes or no answer and not contain

irrelevant, immaterial or conclusory language. The primary purpose for using a request to admit

facts is to nail down facts that are not in dispute and require the responding party to make those

admissions prior to trial. Requests to admit the genuineness of documents may be served at the

same time and in the same document as the request to admit facts. However, the requests to

admit the genuineness of documents does not seek admission of the facts within the document,

merely that the copy of the document attached to the request is genuine and therefore maybe

admissible without laying the foundation at a future court hearing. Once a document have been

admitted by the responding party as genuine it does not remove all objections to admissibility

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since the responding party doesn’t admit the genuineness of facts within the document which may

be irrelevant, immaterial or otherwise objectionable.

How to Respond to the Request

The responding party must be careful to admit, deny or object to each and every request.

Failure to respond within 28 days, under oath, signed by the party (not just the attorney) may

result in an unintended admission by the responding party. If the responding party wants to admit

a request, the party simply writes the word “admit” after the numbered request. If the party

wishes to deny a request, then the respondent must write the word “deny” after the appropriate

request supported by an affidavit. Finally, if the party wants to object to a request the responding

party must write “objection after the numbered request with an explanation as to the basis for the

objection. An objection must be based on “some or all of the requested admission are privileged

or irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part.” xi If an objection is

filed then the requesting party has the obligation to set a motion for a hearing on the objected

requests. If the court finds the objections are proper then the request should be stricken and listed

in a court order for clarity.

As a practice pointer, it would be wise to object to any request that is ambiguous or a

contains a compound question since the objection stays the 28 day deadline and allows the court

to decide whether a request is proper or not, protecting the interest of the responding party.

Conclusion

Supreme Court Rule 216 creates an elegant and inexpensive litigation tool. Properly

used, requests to admit will streamline the pre-trial process. However, the responding party to a

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request to admit must be very careful to meticulously follow the proper procedure to avoid an

unintended admission which can be used against the responding party on a summary judgment

motion or at trial.

Gilbert C. Schumm is a sole practitioner in Elk Grove Village, Illinois, concentrating in civil
litigation and juvenile law. He has been a practicing attorney since 1977 and has a law degree
from the John Marshall Law School and a B.S. degree from the University of Illinois at
Champaign. Mr. Schumm would like to acknowledge the technical assistance of Peggy J.
Schumm.

i
P.R.S. International, Inc. v Shred Pax Corporation, 184 Ill.2d 224,
703 N.E.2d 71, 234 Ill.Dec. 459
ii
Vision Point of Sale v. Haas, 226 Ill.2d 334, ___ N.E.2d __, Ill.
Dec___(2007)
iii
Gilbert C. Schumm, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216: How to Use
Requests to Admit 73 Ill. Bar J.338(Feb. 1985)
iv
Rediscovering the Truth: Requests for Admissions Are Not Discovery,
87 Ill Bar J 214 (April 1999)
v
166 Ill 2d 204, 652 NE2d 275(1995).
vi
134 Ill.2d R 201
vii
Zindrick v. Drake, 75 Ill.App.3d 702, 393 N.E.2d 1277, 30 Ill.Dec.930
(2d Dist. 1979)
viii
P.R.S. International, Inc. v Shred Pax Corporation, 292 Ill.App.3d
956, 686 N.E.2d 1214, 227 Ill.Dec.58 (3rd Dist. 1997)
ix
134 Ill.2d R 201(d)
x
134 Ill.2d R 218 (c)
xi
134 Ill.2d R 216(c)(2)

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