Hell or High Water

The 1997 Red River Flood in Grand Forks

Jonathan Bertsch

December 1, 2010
Figure 1: Map of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks

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Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The 1996-1997 Winter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Government Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
April 18-21, 1997: The Flood Hits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
April 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
April 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
April 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
April 21: The River Crests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Response and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Grand Forks AFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Post-Mortem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Long-term Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Background Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Dramatis Personae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Discussion Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Introduction

On April 18, 1997, floodwaters overwhelmed the dikes protecting the small North Dakota
city of Grand Forks (Steiner 2006). Located on the banks of the Red River, Grand Forks
had just weathered one of the heaviest winters on record - three years’ worth of snow (100
inches) fell in just a few months. Two months earlier, Governor Ed Schaefer had declared a
flood alert, bringing in the National Guard to help Grand Forks citizens build dikes to hold
off the anticipated flood (Editorial 1997). Unfortunately for the town of 50,000, no amount
of preparations would spare the city. As the floodwaters poured in, 90% of the city found
itself underwater, and Grand Forks would stay that way for weeks (Johnson 1997).

The 1996-1997 Winter

The winter of 1996-1997 was especially harsh in the northern plains. Eight blizzards brought
massive amounts of snow and freezing rain to the Red River Valley: Andy, Betty, Christo-
pher, Doris, Elmo, Franzi, Gust, and Hannah, as named by the Grand Forks Herald (Shelby
2003, 6). Or, as Leon Osborne, Jr., head of the Regional Weather Information Center (RWIC)
at the University of North Dakota (UND), told the Herald in mid-December, “[w]e’ve al-
ready had a month of January weather, and January isn’t even here yet”(Shelby 2003, 4).
The eight blizzards alone are not the only contributors to the eventual flooding in April
1997, however. By November 1996, the moisture level in Grand Forks was already twice the
seasonal average due to heavy rains in the fall (Shelby 2003, 4). During that month, a cold
snap was followed by the first three blizzards (Shelby 2003, 4).

A “nominal spring” arrived in Grand Forks on March 5, 1997 following Blizzard Gust
(Shelby 2003, 13). The snow that had collected over the preceding months began melting
in the milder weather (Shelby 2003, 13). However, the melting snow could not be absorbed
into the ground as usual thanks to the rainy fall: it began collecting in large puddles all over

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Grand Forks (Shelby 2003, 13). All of these factors had hydrologists from numerous agencies
concerned about the potential flood that would follow the snow melt later in the spring.

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Government Agencies

The National Weather Service (NWS) had the lead on predicting flood levels. Taking data
from the North Central River Forecast Center (NCRFC) and the National Operational Hy-
drologic Remote Sensing Center, both located in Chanhassen, Minnesota, the NWS relied on
advanced technology to forecast river levels in the Red River Valley (Shelby 2003). President
Clinton twice declared North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota disaster areas during
the 1996-1997 winter.
At the state level, North Dakota had strong partnerships among private, non-profit, and
public sector agencies. The Office of Attorney General, Job Service North Dakota, Workers
Compensation Bureau, the North Dakota National Guard, the Secretary of State’s Office, and
the Information Technology Department all worked together during response and recovery
efforts (FEMA 2007, 2). During the flood, the Interagency Coordination Team worked to
fill voids in response and recovery needs through program assessment (FEMA 2007, 2).

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Preparations

In early February, FEMA and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) began an
advertising campaign to urge Red River Valley citizens to sign up for flood insurance (Shelby
2003, 8). FEMA began an emergency enrollment plan for local and county governments in
the Valley that would cut the sign-up time in half on February 5 (Shelby 2003, 8). However,
virtually no one from the Red River Valley had purchased flood insurance by the middle of
February (Shelby 2003, 8).

On February 13, the NWS issued an earlier-than-usual flood outlook for the Red River
Valley (Shelby 2003, 8). The outlook predicted a severe flood potential for the Red River
Valley due to above-normal soil saturation and the large snowpack left from the blizzards
that had hit (and would continue to hit) the Valley (Shelby 2003, 8-9). The outlook was
later criticized by residents of Grand Forks as being too “wordy and imprecise” (Shelby 2003,
9). Employees from NWS defended the first outlook, pointing to a glossary that had been
included, but even this index of definitions was packed with “eye-glazing verbiage” (Shelby
2003, 9). At an interagency flood coordination meeting held February 26 in Chanhassen,
the NCRFC informed the Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
that the first numerical flood outlook was going to be issued on the 28th (Shelby 2003, 9).

On February 27, 1997, the hydrologists from the NCRFC in Chanhassen traveled to
Fargo, North Dakota for another interagency flood coordination meeting (Shelby 2003, 9).
This meeting also featured representatives from local governments along the Red River Val-
ley, FEMA, engineers and reconnaissance teams from the Army Corps of Engineers, local
National Weather Service (NWS) offices, the Small Business Association, National Flood
Insurance Plan (NFIP), plus the North Dakota congressional delegation of Senators Kent
Conrad and Byron Dorgan, and Representative Earl Pomeroy (Shelby 2003, 9). At this meet-
ing, NCRFC hydrologist Mike Anderson told the assembled group that the pending flood

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forecast, to be released the next day, would say that there would be a “flood of record or
greater ” all along the Red River Valley, taking care to emphasize “or greater” (Shelby 2003,
10). A flood of record in Fargo was 38 feet or more; in Grand Forks, 49 feet (Shelby 2003,
10). The last major flood in Grand Forks on record was the crest of 48.88 feet in 1979
(Shelby 2003, 10). To compare, flood stage in Grand Forks is considered to be 28 feet
(Shelby 2003, 10). The levees and dikes in Grand Forks could be fortified up to 52 feet
(Shelby 2003, 10).

Residents near the dikes, in the neighborhoods of Lincoln Drive, Riverside Park, and
Central Park, believed that the predicted crest of 49 feet would be manageable (Shelby 2003,
11). As a result, very few people bought the advertised flood insurance from NFIP. No waters
had ever seeped into their basements during past floods, while insurance agents informed
their customers that flood insurance was a waste of money (Shelby 2003, 11).

The Remote Sensing Center used two twin-engine aircraft to take readings of the gamma
radiation levels on the ground (Shelby 2003, 15). If there is a low amount of gamma radi-
ation being picked up by the aircraft’s sensors, then there is more moisture on the ground,
according to theory (Shelby 2003, 15). These aircraft also carried three-dimensional cameras
that could measure flood elevation on a virtual house-by-house basis (Shelby 2003, 15). In
Grand Forks, a river gauge housed just off of the Sorlie Bridge transmitted constant river
level information to the NCRFC, as well as hourly reports to pagers worn by Grand Forks
city officials (Shelby 2003, 15).

Even the best technology is useless if the data obtained is not analyzed and communicated
properly, as the residents of Grand Forks soon found out. Besides the aircraft flyovers and the
computerized river gauges, the NWS also relied on a network of some 11,000 “co-operative
observers” in the area: retirees and widows (Shelby 2003, 17). These observers were given
training materials and equipment from the NWS, with specific instructions on how to collect
the data NWS wanted (Shelby 2003, 17). An observer in a tiny town between the capital city

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of Bismarck and Devils Lake was completely snowed in for two weeks after Blizzard Elmo
(Shelby 2003, 17). As a result, she could not change the data tape on the rain gauge, requiring
two NWS meteorologists to travel to her home and change the tape for her (Shelby 2003,
17). They were stopped two miles from her home by hardened snowdrifts, some of them
sixteen feet high, and had to travel the rest of the way on foot (Shelby 2003, 17).

On March 14, 1997, the NWS released revised flood outlooks for every city on the Red
River–except Grand Forks (Shelby 2003, 18). Every other city was forecasted to see an
increase in crest predictions, but Grand Forks remained at 49 feet (Shelby 2003, 18). At
the RWIC, Leon Osborne analyzed current snow melt and river level data, comparing it to
data from the previous year’s winter (Shelby 2003, 18). Osborne predicted a crest of 52
feet–the upper limit of the Grand Forks dike system (Shelby 2003, 18). However, at a press
conference held in Washington, D.C. on March 18, NWS Director Dr. Elbert “Joe” Friday,
Jr. and Hydrologic Information Center chief Frank Richards told the assembled reporters
that the upper Midwest would see record flooding in the coming spring, but stuck to the
original crest prediction of 49 feet (Shelby 2003, 19-20). Another flood outlook ten days
later also predicted a 49-foot crest (Shelby 2003, 20). On March 30, NWS released a flood
warning, declaring a flood to be imminent (Shelby 2003, 20). The Red River was still going
to crest at 49 feet (Shelby 2003, 20).

On April 4, Blizzard Hannah roared into the Red River Valley from Utah, dumping snow
and freezing rain from South Dakota to Canada (Shelby 2003, 41). Bringing hurricane-force
winds with the snow and freezing rain, Hannah hampered NWS efforts to gather gamma
radiation levels from the aircraft flyovers, which were grounded in Chanhassen by the blizzard
(Shelby 2003, 42, 44). The Doppler radar used by the NCRFC was garbled during the
fusillade of precipitation, keeping Mike Anderson from updating his river model–and the
crest prediction (Shelby 2003, 42-43). As before, the incredible precipitation prevented the
co-operative observers from collecting the data NWS desperately needed (Shelby 2003, 43).

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Hannah froze flood preparations in Grand Forks for three days, while adding more water to
the already-swollen Red River (Shelby 2003, 43). South of Grand Forks, in Wahpeton, North
Dakota, the Red River crested at 19.44 feet (Shelby 2003, 43). In about ten to twelve days,
the crest would arrive in Grand Forks (Shelby 2003, 43). However, the Red River would
crest again in Wahpeton nine days later, sending another crest swell towards Grand Forks
(Shelby 2003, 43).

Ken Vein, Grand Forks’ city engineer, topped the public dike and levee system to 52 feet,
based on the NWS outlook of 47.5 to 49 feet (Shelby 2003, 46). Vein felt that the public
dikes would be more than adequate to protect Grand Forks from a 49-foot crest, but the city
did not have control over the privately-owned dikes in some of the neighborhoods downriver
(Shelby 2003, 46). If the private dikes were overtopped or were breached by a flood, then the
city-owned public dikes would be of no use–Grand Forks would flood anyway (Shelby 2003,
46).

Hannah prevented NWS from issuing its first operational forecast for ten days, on April 14
(Shelby 2003, 46). The blizzard froze river gauges, prevented co-op observers from gathering
their data, grounded the gamma flights, and garbled radar systems (Shelby 2003, 46). Even
though Hannah only added 2.66 inches to the Red River, this amount would have a huge
effect on the coming flood (Shelby 2003, 47). While the NWS still predicted a 49-foot crest,
Mike Anderson at the NCRFC asked the Army Corps of Engineers’ Flood Reconnaissance
Team of Richard Pomerleau and Terry Zien to take a look at the NWS data (Shelby 2003,
54). Pomerleau and Zien told Anderson, based on observations of the Red River in Grand
Forks, that they believed the crest was going to be much higher than 49 feet (Shelby 2003,
54). Anderson was wary of relying on anecdotal or subjective measures, putting his faith in
the NCRFC’s computer models (Shelby 2003, 54).

When the operational forecast was released on April 14, the crest prediction had been
increased by one foot, to 50 feet (Shelby 2003, 54). Ken Vein found that he had to add

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thousands of additional sandbags and more clay to the dikes and levees, for breathing room
(Shelby 2003, 57). Temperatures were increasing in mid-April, with highs in the fifties and
sixties (Shelby 2003, 57). Any remaining snow was quickly melting and flowing to the Red
River (Shelby 2003, 57). On April 16, the Red River was pushing nearly one million gallons
of water per second between the dikes in Grand Forks, where it normally pushed 19,275
gallons per second (Shelby 2003, 61). That same day, the University of North Dakota (with
a 1996 enrollment of 11,300 students1 ) cancelled classes for the remainder of the semester
(Shelby 2003, 62). Late on April 16, the Red River passed its historic crest of 48.88 feet
(Shelby 2003, 60).

April 17 saw the crest prediction revised upwards to 50.5 feet as computer models were
diverging from the observed rate of flow in the Red River (Shelby 2003, 64). The Grand Forks
Herald, the city’s only newspaper, admonished its readers to ignore the rumors of a higher
crest, which had sprung from a leak in an RWIC staff meeting weeks earlier (Shelby 2003, 64).
On Minnesota’s Red Lake River, which flows into the Red River, a large ice jam had formed
at Crookston, Minnesota, acting as a dam for floodwaters from Minnesota (Shelby 2003, 64).
When the jam would finally give way, a huge flood swell would inevitably follow (Shelby 2003,
64).

An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was formed in the basement of a police station,
where mayor Pat Owens kept tabs on the dikes thanks to a wearable camera system provided
by Grand Forks Air Force Base (Shelby 2003, 65). An airman, wearing a metal-framed
backpack with a camera and transmitter, could send live video from the dikes to the EOC
(Shelby 2003, 65). The EOC was soon jammed with representatives from state and local
agencies: the Corps of Engineers, city engineer Ken Vein, the county sheriff’s department,
health, the police, the National Guard, and the Air Force (Shelby 2003, 65). Thanks to
urging from Vein, city attorney Howard Swanson was able to requisition ninety North Dakota

1
UND Student Body Profile 1997-1998

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Department of Transportation (NDDOT) vehicles to aid in the flood fight (Shelby 2003, 65).
After a general radio broadcast asking for city residents to volunteer their bulldozers and
dump trucks, dozens of local farmers offered their tractors as well (Shelby 2003, 65).
In St. Paul, Minnesota, at the Army Corps of Engineers headquarters, a feasibility
study the Corps had done on the Red River was being evaluated by engineer Patrick Foley
(Shelby 2003, 69). When working with rivers, the Corps was not bound by observable facts;
many of their studies go into “what if?” territory (Shelby 2003, 69). The Corps had created
a rating curve to examine the effects of a ring dike around Grand Forks that would tighten
the Red River’s channel and raise flow rates and crest levels (Shelby 2003, 70). Since the
rating curve was for a proposed dike system and not based on observed data, the Corps
was reluctant to alert NWS about their findings (Shelby 2003, 70). Eventually, NWS was
alerted, but chose to increase the crest prediction to 50.5 feet as the Red River hit 50 feet
(Shelby 2003, 74).
Late on April 17, the Crookston ice jam broke, sending a surge of floodwaters towards
Grand Forks (Shelby 2003, 74). Crews from the USGS dropped gauges into the Red River
from the Sorlie Bridge to measure the flow of water in cubic feet per second (cfs). They were
astonished to find the river was flowing at 145,000 cfs, twice the flow of the last major flood
in 1979 (Shelby 2003, 77). By this point, the bridge was partially submerged (Shelby 2003,
77).

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April 18-21, 1997: The Flood Hits

April 18

Early on April 17, the Lincoln Drive dike developed six massive lengthwise cracks, which
prompted civil defense sirens to sound and residents to begin evacuating as it was thought
the water seeping from the cracks was the start of the flood (Shelby 2003, 67). The EOC
took note, and tried to repair the cracks, but the city had finally exhausted its supply of
clay, forcing Ken Vein to send bulldozers in to dig soil, clay, and sand from the golf course
and soccer fields in the neighborhood (Shelby 2003, 67).

In the wee hours of April 18, around 1 a.m., Mayor Pat Owens was recalled to the EOC,
driving past water shooting up from storm drains (Shelby 2003, 79). After a short briefing,
she ordered volunteers to pull back from the dikes, but chose not to order an evacuation
(Shelby 2003, 79-80). Owens feared that if the dikes and levees held back the flood, an
evacuation would be costly and probably lead to the end of her political career (Shelby 2003,
79-80). Dikes began failing in downtown Grand Forks, as well as in the neighborhood of
Lincoln Drive (Shelby 2003, 80). At 4 a.m., the Lincoln Drive neighborhood was ordered
to evacuate as the cracks in the dike became more serious (Shelby 2003, 80-81). At 6 a.m.,
the Lincoln Drive dike was overtopped by the Red River (Shelby 2003, 80). The NWS
continued to update crest forecasts only incrementally, citing the lack of verifiable data
(Shelby 2003). Senator Kent Conrad called Mike Anderson, asking him for regular updates
on the crest prediction (Shelby 2003, 85). In the evening of April 18, homes in the Lincoln
Drive neighborhood were up to their roofs in flood water (Shelby 2003, 85).

April 19

The water treatment plant failed at 1:15 a.m., leaving no drinkable water in Grand Forks
(Shelby 2003, 89). Later, Mayor Owens ordered evacuations for all areas of Grand Forks east

13
of Washington Street (Shelby 2003, 89). At 6:00 a.m., the river gauge at the Sorlie Bridge
was completely submerged, and the data connection was severed. Its last reading was 52.89
feet (Shelby 2003, 89). A new EOC was established after the previous EOC was submerged
in four feet of water, where Jim Campbell, emergency manager, and Mayor Owens created a
new command hierarchy. Ken Vein, Campbell, and Howard Swanson became equal managers
(Shelby 2003, 90). Leon Osborne’s family evacuated to Larimore, save Osborne and his son
John, a sophomore at UND. The two Osbornes and RWIC staffer Bryan Hahn stayed in the
powerless, stuffy, and rancid RWIC, continuing its work where a staff of a dozen was usually
required (Shelby 2003, 90-91).

Downtown, the Security Building was soon consumed by fire as reporters shot footage
for TV and newspapers (Shelby 2003, 91-92). The water was so deep that fire engines were
unable to get close enough to combat the inferno (Shelby 2003, 93). The National Guard was
able to hoist the engines on flatbed trailers to get their engines running again, but the fire
hydrants had no pressure (Shelby 2003, 93-94). Firebombers from Minnesota’s Department
of Natural Resources were called in to drop water, but a rogue television news helicopter
pilot dominated the airspace over the fire, preventing the hastily-assembled firefighting fleet
from dropping their payloads for nearly ten minutes (Shelby 2003, 94-95).

April 20

Mayor Owens ordered a twenty-four-hour curfew on the morning of April 20 (Shelby 2003,
96). Owens and her family relocated to Grand Forks Air Force Base, which had opened
its gates to more than three thousand displaced residents (Shelby 2003, 97). At a press
conference, Owens told reporters and cameras that her home had been destroyed; she was
in the same “bucket” as her citizens (Shelby 2003, 97).

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Figure 2: Firefighters respond to a fire in the flooded downtown of Grand Forks that even-
tually destroyed eleven buildings (Picture Source)

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Figure 3: The damaged downtown buildings

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 Figure 4: Ninety percent of Grand Forks was underwater during the worst of the flood.

April 21: The River Crests

At 11 a.m., Monday, April 21, 1997, the Red River of the North crested at 54.11 feet in
Grand Forks, North Dakota (Shelby 2003, 101). The crest held for twenty-four hours before
the Red River finally began receding. It would be well into May before the Red River finally
2
fell below floodstage.

2
City of Grand Forks website

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Response and Recovery

The rampaging Red River left massive damage in its wake. In a town of 52,000 people, only
1,000 households had purchased flood insurance before the dikes and levees were breached
(Shelby 2003, 111). An article published by the Applied Behavioral Science Review found
that 94% of Grand Forks residents knew about the flood insurance option, but chose not to
buy it, citing the months-old 49-foot crest prediction (Shelby 2003, 111). The Red River
flooded 2,200 square miles in North Dakota and Minnesota, or twice the area of Rhode Island
(FEMA 2007, 23).

FEMA brought in 311 twelve-by-sixty trailers for displaced residents to use until they
were able to move into their homes–if their homes had survived at all (Shelby 2003, 112).
FEMA’s largest trailer was used by the city’s government until their building in downtown
Grand Forks could be rebuilt (Shelby 2003, 112). In addition, FEMA would reimburse 100%
of the cleanup costs, as directed by President Clinton (Wald 1997). FEMA, in conjunction
with the State of North Dakota and the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
funded a $40 million buyout of 850 homes and other structures in high-risk flood areas
(FEMA 2010).

Since Grand Forks was declared a disaster area by President Clinton, the city’s residents
became eligible for two types of FEMA assistance (Siskos 2001, 74). Households that suffered
minimal damage could apply for a grant of up to $10,000, while displaced families received
rental assistance while waiting for their homes to be restored or bought out and destroyed
(Siskos 2001, 74). The buyout plan was not without controversy, however. Grand Forks
refused to issue building permits in the three neighborhoods nearest the river, among them
Lincoln Park (Siskos 2001, 74). Even homes that somehow escaped major damage in those
neighborhoods would be bought at fair market value and razed to make way for a public
park and the new dike line being laid out by the Corps of Engineers (Siskos 2001, 74).

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 Perhaps the most notable form of response came in the form of the “Angel Fund”. On
April 29, an anonymous donor pledged $2,000 for every evacuated family in Grand Forks,
with few strings attached (Shelby 2003, 136-138). Flying into Grand Forks on May 17, the
donor met with Grand Forks Mayor Pat Owens and East Grand Forks Mayor Lynn Strauss,
where she detailed her wishes for an anonymous gift with few restrictions on who received
the funds (Shelby 2003, 137). The money was quickly given out to about 11,000 victims
(N/A 1997). On June 2, People Magazine reported that the donor was none other than
Joan Kroc, the widow of McDonald’s founder Ray Kroc (1997). Kroc, with an estimated
fortune of $1.7 billion, was moved by the television images of the flood and of Mayor Owens
(Shelby 2003, 137) (N/A 1997).

Grand Forks Air Force Base

Chaplains Lonnie Barker and Gary Bertsch, stationed at Minot Air Force Base (AFB),
received a call to deploy to Grand Forks AFB at around 8:30 on April 19 3 . Once logistical
concerns were dealt with, Chaplains Barker and Bertsch arrived at Grand Forks AFB around
1:30 that afternoon (Bertsch 2010). Chaplain Bertsch noted that the situation at Grand
Forks AFB was one of “chaotic order”. Evacuees had been streaming to the base since the
flood began, requiring constant adaptations to the response plan. One of the early concerns
at Grand Forks AFB was the hospital and nursing home population of Grand Forks. Area
hospitals would take in evacuated patients and the elderly, but securing the arrangements
took time. Given North Dakota’s small and rural population, many area facilities could not
handle the sudden influx of evacuees. Grand Forks AFB converted two of its elementary
schools to temporary hospitals and nursing facilities as a result. Chaplain Bertsch’s main
duty was to serve as chaplain for one of these nursing facilities. Later, Air Force and Air
3
Interview with Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Bertsch, USAF. Unless otherwise noted, all references
to the response at Grand Forks AFB come from this interview.

19
National Guard helicopters were brought in to medevac critical patients to other hospitals.

Grand Forks AFB also converted its “tri-bay hangar”, a series of three interconnected
hangars used to house and maintain huge KC-135 tankers and B-52 heavy bombers, into a
massive emergency shelter for thousands of evacuees. To ease accountability, each evacuee
was assigned a cot number. Bertsch observed that even though military installations have
their own disaster plans for floods, fires, tornados, etc., the scope of this disaster was un-
precedented. Many of the solutions Grand Forks AFB implemented were borne of necessity,
time-critical constraints, and the needs of the flood’s victims. In the tri-bay, FEMA, the Red
Cross, and other response agencies set up disaster offices for evacuee use, along with huge
message boards where victims could leave messages for their families and friends. The base’s
water system was stressed by the sudden influx of evacuees, leading to a water shortage.
Water rationing was introduced: water could only be used for drinking, meaning none for
bathing or laundry. Portable toilets were set up outside the hangar. The base’s security
police force concentrated on the tri-bay and emergency hospitals, which had a calming effect
on the evacuees.

To feed the evacuees, the Air Force provided mobile field kitchens. Additionally, the
Salvation Army brought in a mobile disaster relief kitchen, which was a semi-truck whose
trailer was converted into a kitchen and serving line. Military Meals Ready-to-Eat (MREs)
were also distributed. Local businesses and restaurants, rather than losing large amounts
of their stored foods, donated meals to the evacuees. Bertsch recalled having steak from
Bonanza and cheese biscuits from Red Lobster one evening. By the fourth or fifth day of the
flood, Bertsch said, donations from across the state and around the country began pouring
into Grand Forks as news of the flood’s impact reached American televisions.

Besides providing spiritual support to the evacuees, Bertsch met with the Bishop of the
Eastern North Dakota Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to discuss how
area churches could help in the evacuation. Many churches and their parishoners opened

20
their doors and homes to evacuees who couldn’t get to Grand Forks AFB. On a larger
scale, personnel from Grand Forks AFB filled nearly a million sandbags, and provided first
responders, fire trucks, and heavy lift equipment to shore up levees and dikes. At the height
of the evacuation, about 3,500 people were housed at Grand Forks AFB. Chaplain Bertsch,
seeing the situation with the evacuees at Grand Forks AFB, observed that local, state, and
federal agencies worked well together, with few “turf battles” that he could see.

President Clinton’s Visit

On April 22, President Clinton arrived at Grand Forks AFB to tour the flood damage and
outline a federal relief program Clinton compared to the Marshall Plan (Wald 1997, A20).
Clinton said he would go to Congress for an additional $200 million, bringing the total federal
financial bill to $488 million (Wald 1997, A20). Additionally, FEMA would reimburse 100
percent of the immediate emergency cleanup cost, rather than the customary 75 percent
(Wald 1997, A20). Clinton noted that no amount of federal dollars would ease the shock of
the flood, only help get families and businesses back on their feet (Wald 1997, A20).

Chaplain Bertsch felt that while President Clinton’s visit was necessary to show federal
support for the flood relief efforts, his visit also disrupted those efforts. The press conference
President Clinton held took place in one of the tri-bay hangars, which required all evacuees
housed there to be moved out for security reasons. Bertsch observed that this disruption hit
the elderly much harder than the other evacuees. The elderly are used to a set routine, which
had already been disrupted by the flood. The move to a new shelter further complicated
their adaptation. While President Clinton was on base, all activity ground to a halt for
security purposes.

The visit also had unintended psychological effects on the evacuees and responders, ac-
cording to Bertsch. Hoping to make the tri-bay and surrounding area presentable for the
press conference, a truck was brought in to hose down the tarmac with several thousand

21
gallons of water. For the evacuees already facing a major water shortage that eliminated
showers and laundry, seeing water used in such a way stung. However, Bertsch believed that
the water used was non-potable.

22
Post-Mortem

Long-term Recovery

The resilience of Grand Forks residents cannot be underestimated when attempting to mea-
sure the long-term recovery in the Red River Valley. Harris Peterson, who ran a grain
processing plant on the northern outskirts of Grand Forks, noted that his business was de-
pendent on the harvest from area farmers, admitting that this season would be rough on his
business (Lopez 1997). Peterson, however, was more concerned for the business owners in
the ruined downtown area, which was devastated by the Security Building fire (Lopez 1997).

The building that housed the offices of the Grand Forks Herald was one of those destroyed
in the Security Building fire (Houston 1997, 15). The paper’s last pre-flood print run of 38,000
issues on April 18, 1997 carried the headline “Flood Hits Home” (Houston 1997, 15). The
April 19 issue (“Broken Dikes, Shattered Hopes”) stopped at 9,500 issues when water began
seeping into the Herald ’s basement, where the printing presses were stored (Houston 1997,
15). Relocating to the University of North Dakota’s student union, the employees of the
Herald purchased the eight remaining laptops in the student store to meet publisher Mike
Maidenberg’s decree that there would be an issue every day “come hell or high water”
(Houston 1997, 15).

Eventually, the Herald set up ad-hoc offices in one of Manvel, North Dakota’s public
schools (Houston 1997, 15). Using dedicated phone lines to transmit issues for printing in
Saint Paul, Minnesota, and unprecedented support from Knight-Ridder for Herald employ-
ees, the Grand Forks Herald published an issue every day during the flood (Houston 1997,
15). Besides reporting on relief efforts and providing information on the numerous agencies
involved in the flood fighting efforts, the Herald served as a “message board” for displaced
residents who wished to let friends and families know where they were staying, and that
they were in good health (Houston 1997, 15). In August of 1998, the Grand Forks Herald

23
opened its new office building, on the site of its old building that was destroyed in the Secu-
rity Building fire (FEMA 2010). The facade features a clock tower that rises to 97 feet - a
reminder of the April 1997 flood that nearly destroyed the city’s newspaper (Johnson 1998,
A15).

After the flood, Grand Forks lost 3,000 residents, but those 3,000 were soon replaced,
and the city added another 6,000 by early 2006 (Steiner 2006). Unemployment in Grand
Forks averaged 3.5% in 2005, and ranked twenty-eighth in Forbes’ Best Smaller Metros that
year (Steiner 2006). Christopher Steiner argues that it is also because of its educational
achievement: 89% of Grand Forks residents have a high school diploma, while 64% have
at least some post-secondary education (2006). In 1999, Amazon.com opened a 300-person
call center in Grand Forks, also because of the educational achievement (Steiner 2006).
Also in 1999, a Danish wind turbine blade manufacturer opened a small factory in Grand
Forks, which expanded to 300 employees and 150,000 square feet of factory floor by 2006
(Steiner 2006). Cirrus Design, a small aircraft manufacturer, decided to keep one of its plants
in Grand Forks, with plans for dynamic growth well into the next decade (Steiner 2006).
Customers who purchase one of Cirrus’ planes are trained by the School of Aerospace Sciences
at UND (Steiner 2006).

Lessons Learned

NWS methodologies for predicting river crests, while nearly flawless in the past, did not allow
for conjecture, or indeed for taking actual river flow, precipitation rates, and other data, into
consideration. The Army Corps of Engineers, which works in the realm of conjecture and
“what if?”, chose not to share its own predictions or experiments with the NWS, believing
the NWS to be uninterested in their data.

The NWS may very well have been correct in clinging to the 49-foot crest prediction, had
Blizzard Hannah not brought freezing rain and snow to the Red River Valley on April 4, 1997

24
(Shelby 2003). Also, the NWS had been producing flood outlooks in the Red River Valley
in the same fashion for many years (Shelby 2003, 38). Computer systems could not model a
winter where record precipitation had fallen (Shelby 2003, 38). The computers could create
a flood outlook based on average precipitation, or no precipitation at all (Shelby 2003, 38).
The outlooks could be used as a baseline for forecasters, but were only a rough estimate of
what could be expected, not a precise forecast (Shelby 2003, 38). The NWS was aware of
the system’s limitations, but it could not effectively communicate the differences between a
forecast and an outlook to the general public (Shelby 2003, 38-39). The public took outlooks
and forecasts as one and the same, unaware that the forecasts were precise measurements
based on a rough outlook (Shelby 2003, 39).
Further compounding the communications breakdown was the leak of the RWIC’s 52-foot
prediction to Grand Forks residents in mid-March (Shelby 2003, 38). One of the attendees at
an RWIC meeting in mid-March had leaked the 52-foot prediction, intended to be kept secret
so as to avoid a turf battle with NWS (Shelby 2003, 19), to family and friends (Shelby 2003,
38). Residents called the RWIC asking if they should buy flood insurance (Shelby 2003,
38). While Osborne and his staff advised them to do so, Osborne’s own insurance agent
discouraged him from doing the same–citing the 49-foot crest prediction issued by NWS
(Shelby 2003, 38).
In 2007, construction was completed on a $409 million flood protection system that was al-
ready being studied by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers when the flood hit (of Grand Forks
2007). Among the new protection systems is a permanent floodwall, the first of its kind in
the United States (FEMA 2010). The floodwall, which incorporates design features used
in Europe, stands twenty feet high, made of concrete reinforced with aluminum stop logs
(FEMA 2010). North Dakota is one of three states that can manage its own federal recovery
programs (FEMA 2007, 2).

25
Figure 5: The new Grand Forks floodwall (Picture Source)

26
Background Material
Dramatis Personae
Federal Government
William J. “Bill” Clinton
President of the United States

James Lee Witt

Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

Kent Conrad
Senator (D-North Dakota)

Byron Dorgan
Senator (D-North Dakota)

Earl Pomeroy
North Dakota Representative (D-At Large)

Dr. Elbert “Joe” Friday

Director, National Weather Service

Frank Richards
Hyrdologic Information Center

Mike Anderson
Hydrologist, National Weather Service

Richard Pomerleau and Terry Zien

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Flood Reconnaissance Team

Patrick Foley
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Gary Bertsch and Lonnie Barker

Protestant Chaplains, 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, ND

27
State of North Dakota
Ed Schaefer
Governor

Pat Owens
Mayor of Grand Forks

Ken Vein
Grand Forks city engineer

Howard Swanson
Grand Forks city attorney

Leon Osborne, Jr.

Director, University of North Dakota Regional Weather Information Center

Mike Maidenberg
Publisher, Grand Forks Herald

28
Timeline
1996 4
November
16-17: Blizzard “Andy” produces 12 inches of snow in the Red River region.

December
16-18: Blizzard “Betty” dumps more than eight inches of snow, five days before the official
start of winter.

20: Blizzard “Christopher” creates an additional four inches of snow.

1997
January
9-11: Bringing more than eight inches of snow and wind chills 80 degrees below zero, blizzard
“Doris” hits Grand Forks.

11: Governor Ed Schaefer activates the North Dakota National Guard to clear roadways.

12: President Bill Clinton declares North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota a fed-
eral disaster area.

14-16: Blizzard “Elmo” prompts the closure of all Minnesota public schools due to ex-
tremely cold temperatures.

22-23: Blizzard “Franzi” brings eight inches of snow to the region.

February
28: The National Weather Service (NWS) predicts the Red River will crest at 47.5 to 49 feet
in Grand Forks. This crest could be higher than the previous record of 48.81 feet set in 1979.

March
4: Blizzard “Gust” brings additional snow.

April
3: Preparations begin in Grand Forks with sandbagging and levee construction.

4: Blizzard “Hannah”, the eighth snow storm of the season, brings six inches of snow and
freezing rain. 300,000 valley residents lose power as a result.

The Red River reaches flood stage at 28 feet.

4
Timeline taken from the City of Grand Forks website

29
7: The Red River reaches 38.27 feet.

President Clinton declares North Dakota a disaster area for the second time.

8: The North Dakota National Guard is activated by Governor Schaefer for flood prepa-
ration and blizzard recovery.

11: The Red River is predicted to crest during the week of April 20-27.

In East Grand Forks, Minnesota, levee walking begins.

14: The Red River reaches 44.43 feet in Grand Forks.

The NWS crest prediction is raised to 50 feet.

15: The Point Bridge in East Grand Forks is closed.

16: The record crest of 48.88 feet, set in 1979, is surpassed.

17: The Red River reaches 50.96 feet.

The NWS crest prediction increases to 50.5 feet.

30
April 18: Boils appear in the levee near the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Grand Forks.
The first evacuations are ordered in Lincoln Park.

Evacuations are ordered in the Riverside and Central Park neighborhoods.

The NWS predicts a 53 foot crest on April 18 or 19.

The Point neighborhood in East Grand Forks, MN is evacuated when its levee is breached.

The NWS revises its crest prediction once more, to 54 feet on April 19.

The Red River hits 52.62 feet in Grand Forks, rising 18 inches in 18 hours.

The last link between East Grand Forks and Grand Forks is severed when an earthen levee
near the Kennedy Bridge fails.

April 19: The Red River reaches 52.89 feet.

In downtown Grand Forks, the water is already four feet deep.

The Grand Forks water treatment facility fails under the rising water.

All areas east of Washington Street are ordered to evacuate.

All classes at the University of North Dakota are cancelled for the rest of the semester.

All areas east of Columbia Road are ordered to evacuate.

A fire starts in the Security Building in downtown Grand Forks. Stymied by flood waters,
firefighters are unable to reach the fire quickly and resort to chemical drops. 11 buildings
over three city blocks are destroyed, including the Grand Forks Herald building.

April 20: Grand Forks Mayor Pat Owens orders a 24-hour curfew in mandatory evacu-
ation zones.

The Red River continues to rise, reaching 53.99 feet.

31
April 21: The Red River of the North crests at 54.35 feet in Grand Forks.

Classes for the remainder of the year are cancelled in Grand Forks and East Grand Forks.

22: President Bill Clinton tours the flooded areas of Grand Forks and East Grand Forks
by helicopter.

23: The Red River begins to recede.

May
19: The Red River falls below flood stage to 27.77 feet.

32
Discussion Questions
• Could the city of Grand Forks have done more to prepare for the flood, or did they do
the best they could in the face of a five-hundred-year flood?

• Was the National Weather Service at fault? Or does the National Weather Service
need new methodologies for predicting river crests?

• Was Leon Osborne, Jr. correct in keeping his own crest predictions internal to the
Regional Weather Information Center?

• Only 1,000 households purchased flood insurance before the flood hit Grand Forks. Is
this an example of disaster myths taking the place of good common sense?

33
Bibliography

Bertsch, Jonathan. 2010. “Interview with Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Bertsch,
USAF.” November 15.
Editorial. 1997. “No Ordinary Disaster.” The New York Times April 24:A28.
FEMA. 2007. “North Dakota Response to the 1997 Disasters.” 1997 Disasters 10 Years
Later p. 44.
FEMA. 2010. “Grand Forks 1997 Flood Recovery: Milestones 1997 - 2007.” Grand Forks
1997 Flood Recovery: Information 1997 - 2007 August 11. http://www.fema.gov/
hazard/archive/grandforks/milestones.shtm.
Houston, Frank. 1997. “Hell and High Water.” Columbia Journalism Review
July/August:14–15.
Johnson, Dirk. 1997. “Flooding Crests in Ravaged City; Residents Face Weeks of Anxiety.”
The New York Times April 22:A1, A12.
Johnson, Dirk. 1998. “Under Water, to Under Construction.” The New York Times March
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Lopez, Steve. 1997. “The City That Wouldn’t Drown.” Time 49(18):52–54.
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Siskos, Catherine. 2001. “After the Flood.” Kiplinger’s Personal Finance Magazine April:70–
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Steiner, Christopher. 2006. “River Revival.” Forbes Asia May 22:68–70.
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