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Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," Foreign Affairs (Jan Feb 2010.

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Abstract: The article examines Chinese and Taiwanese relations and their impact on the United States. It
is noted that Taiwan and China have increased economic relations and have lost much of the military
tension that drove their relations for a considerable amount of time. The article states that Taiwan is
firmly in China's sphere of influence. Among other issues the article examines U.S. relations with Taiwan
and discusses the fact that the U.S. must decide if it wants Taiwan to be a bulwark against China.  

- As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling
into question the United States' deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve
both Taiwan's interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States' own (by
guarding against an expansionist China).

o Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach--
using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China--or follow an alternative liberal logic
that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political
ties between Taiwan and China.

- After Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political
entities;

o Taiwan was led by Chiang Kai-shek’s defeated nationalist party (the Kuomintang (KMT))
and Mao’s victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

- By 1972, when President Nixon visited China, 69% of UN favored China to Taiwan (severed
diplomatic ties with Taiwan)

o The U.S. had merely acknowledged Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, and was slow to recognize
the People’s Republic of china because of Washington’s historic ties with the KMT in
WWII and its conflict with China in the Korean War.

 But by 1979, U.S. had also recognized Beijing 

- In 1979 U.S. also enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, which ensured continued legal, commercial
and de facto diplomatic relations with Taiwan; Republicans would amend the act to include
promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to “resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion“ against the island.  

- LEE TENG-HUI comes to power in 1988; he had no interest in “retaking the mainland”; 1ST
DÉTENTE (EASING OF STRAINED RELATIONS)

o BUT 1st détente ended suddenly in 1995 when U.S. gave Lee a visa to visit his alma
mater

 Beijing saw the visa given to LEE as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to
refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders.

 Taiwan’s democratization was leading to popular pressure to push more for


independence
  Beijing reacted to Taiwan wanting independence by sending missiles into the
Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 96.

 U.S. sent aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area

 Beijing’s worst fears came true in 2000 when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen


Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
and he promised to seek recognition of Taiwan’s de facto independence

 Consequently cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan extremely


deteriorated b/w 1995-05 leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by
the U.S., China, and Taiwan.  

 U.S had to worry about its unlimited commitment to Taiwan damaging or


destroying its relationship with China

- 2nd détente began in 2005 with a speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands


for reunification

- Beijing was shifting its view because of a strategy that stressed regional and global influence
(came to see Taiwan as less of an urgent matter and more as low-key management issue).

- Taiwan elected Ma in 2008 and he promised, “no unification, no independence, no use of


force”

o Taiwan and China would go on to sign more than 2 dozen agreements (most involved


economic matters but had political implications too.

 Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan surged to 3k/day

 More than 270 flights authorized per week across the strait

- Important political fears that had restricted economic integration gone away and both China
and Taiwan began talking about the “total normalization” of economic and financial ties 

o Taiwan was allowed to partake in international organizations that did not only have an
economic focus  (like the World Health Org and a presence in the UN)

- Diplomatic truce: Beijing stopped seeking nations on Taiwan’s short list of diplomatic allies;

o 2009 Taiwan stopped its perpetual request for UN membership for the 1 st time in 17
yrs. 

- There are indications that this 2nd détente will last. Though both sides’ leaders’ terms will expire
in 2012, Hu’s successor is an advocate of cross-strait exchanges. As long as the DPP (Dem
Progressive Party) remains divided b/w extreme anti-détente and limited détente factions he
seems likely to be reelected.
- Taiwan and China previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today
both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level
contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues,
meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of
nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political
relationship between Taiwan and China. 

Finlandization: Term derives its name from Finland’s 1948 agreement w/ the Soviets under which
Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging
Soviet interests. In return Soviets agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect it’s democratic system.

- 1956-81 Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues
and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union.

- Finlandized state is different from a “puppet” because a Finland zed state make some
concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence

- Unlike a puppet Finlandized state calculates is long term interests (concessions are mainly driven
by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities
b/w the 2 sides.

- Because of proximity the superpower only needs to use vague threats (rather than display its
military muscle) to change the weaker neighbor’s policies.

- Finlandization poses a threat to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War which holds that
concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow’s want to expand

- Helsinki accords: 1969, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference b/w Communist bloc
and West that produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and
freedoms

o Although it had a negative connotation, Finlandization is not necessarily a negative


term  

- Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s

- Both are:         

o Small but internally sovereign states that are geographically close to a superpower that
shares cultural and historical ties. 

o Sense of independence is balanced by sense of the need to accommodate superpowers’


interests

o The evolving views of its leaders and its people focus on seeking security through
integration rather than confrontation
o Although it’s still early, Taipei is moving towards Finlandization

- If Taiwan does have Finlandization, then Taiwan would be a neutral power rather than a
strategic U.S. ally (Taiwan would be neutral to calm Beijing’s fears of Taiwan becoming an
obstacle to China in the region. In return Beijing would back down on its military threats, give
Taipei expanded participation in international organizations and give Taipei favorable economic
and social benefits

2 ways to see China’s changed policy towards Taiwan:

- Beijing is motivated by nationalism.

o The 2nd détente is merely a tactical shift intended to force Taiwan into reunification
through indirect means

o Many Western analysts have rejected this view

- Geostrategic view: Taiwan presents a potential strategic threat to China (it could serve as a
base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could limit Beijing’s
ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia. 

o From this perspective, Beijing’s core goal is to preserve its dominance in its immediate
offshore region.

o Taiwan represents an obstacle if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced
U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and state with close economic and
political ties to China.

o According to this view, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan, but simply
wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout (which would have Taiwan as
neutral)

o Taiwan is seen as a means to an end in this view; through the 2 nd détente China intends
to achieve its strategic objective through Taiwan’s Finlandization.

- China’s recent behavior confirms the geostrategic view

- In 1995 at the end of the 1st détente Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, Chen-shen Yen wrote a
paper praising the logic of Finlandization

- Ma’s pursuit of “total normalization” has had steady and rising popularity since he came to office
in Taiwan

- Just as Finland was able to get a non-militarized alternative to the Cold War, Taiwan could play
that role in the U.S.-China “cold war in Asia”

- Taiwan could play a larger role in China’s liberalization if it was to become a Finlandized part of
the region; with Taiwan as a political challenge, Beijing will have to improve its governance
(democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption).
o Taiwan’s progress toward Finlandization depends on whether Ma can show the
tangible benefits of the strategy to the Taiwanese population.

o He’ll have to secure an even greater voice for Taiwan, ability to negotiate its own free-
trade agreements, and have some of the more than 1000 Chinese missiles aimed at the
Taiwan remove verifiably. 

- Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the
island were invaded or achieved de jure independence. Such an accord, which both sides are
seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large
power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy.

o Costs that Taiwan would have if Finlandization occurred: keep anticommunism activism
on the island, and distance itself from the U.S. military

- MOST POLICIES IN TAIWAN CONCERNS HOW TO PURSUE INTEGRATION WITH CHINA, NOT
WHETHER TO DO SO.  

- Finlandization of Taiwan will pose major challenges to current U.S. policy

- There are 2 views to what U.S. should do if Taiwan continues to move closer to China.

o Allow the changes to occur so that Taiwan does not become a “strategic liability” to the
U.S.

o Rearm Taiwan so that Taiwan is not “so defenseless that it fells that it has to do
everything that China says”

o Neither seems to accept Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan

- The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues--from climate
change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation.

- Before the current détente, Taiwan had similar ideology to the U.S., but recently Taiwan and
China have thought strategically and tactically and have created a disjuncture with the U.S.

- The U.S. has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in
Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end

- U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted strategically and diplomatically)

o Official contracts with Taiwan will require consultation with Beijing

o The U.S. and its allies will have to have battle plans that exclude Taiwan

o Most importantly, U.S. will have to significantly reduce its arms sales to Taiwan
- In 1982 the U.S. had pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan (a promise
that has been conspicuously broken

- In the past sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much
on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value

- The U.S. could reinforce the détente by holding back planned sales of weapons, thereby
signaling China that their territorial integrity is being respected, which could lead to verifiable
force reductions by China.

o  More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to


international relations--specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic
interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of
power.

o Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on
the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to
this historic shift. 

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