V-D.
Arrests, Searches and Seizures directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
Art. III, Sec. 2 and 3
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3.
1. The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Preliminaries
1. Definition, Source and Construction of provision
a. Definition (search warrant)
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
personal property described therein and bring it before the
court. ( Section 1, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court)
b. Origin
The present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in
the 1935 Charter (Section 1 [3], Article III) which was
worded as “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” Said provision was in turn
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which provided that “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” (People vs. Andre Marti
[GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
c. Construction
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties
should be given a liberal construction or a strict
construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy
encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights
secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362;
State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the
proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that
statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search
warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28
Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs.
U. S., 14 Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
The Fourth Amendment’s policy against unreasonable
searches and seizures authorizes warrants to search for
contraband, fruits or instrumentalities of crime, or “any
property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a
criminal offense.” Upon proper showing, the warrant is to
issue “identifying the property and naming or describing
the person or place to be searched.” Probable cause for the
warrant must be presented, but there is nothing in the Rule
indicating that the officers must be entitled to arrest the
owner of the “place” to be searched before a search
warrant may issue and the “property” may be searched for
and seized. The Rule deals with warrants to search, and is
unrelated to arrests. Nor is there anything in the Fourth
Amendment indicating that absent probable cause to arrest
a third party, resort must be had to a subpoena. (Zurcher
vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978])
Searches and seizures, in a technical sense, are
independent of, rather than ancillary to, arrest and
arraignment (ALI, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, Commentary 491; Proposed Off. Draft 1975).
2. Court’s Function, as to Search and Seizure
a. Issuance of search warrants, and power to quash
warrants
It is undisputed that only judges have the power to issue
search warrants. (Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
[1990]) This function is exclusively judicial. Inherent in the
courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to
quash warrants already issued. In this connection, the
Supreme Court has ruled that the motion to quash should
be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a
criminal case has already been instituted in another court,
in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter.
(People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998]).
Because of the fundamental public interest in implementing
the criminal law, the search warrant, a heretofore effective
and constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool, should
not be suppressed on the basis of surmise and without solid
evidence supporting the change. Forbidding the warrant
and insisting on the subpoena instead when the custodian
of the object of the search is not then suspected of crime,
involves serious hazards to criminal investigation. (Zurcher
vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May 1978])
b. Determination of validity of search and seizure
What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable
search in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. (Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211, 216 [1989])
1. Purpose and Importance of the guaranty
a. Purpose
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against
unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give
remedy against such usurpations when attempted. (Adams
vs. New York, 192 U. S., 585.) But it does not prohibit the
Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches
made by a private person or under authority of state law.
(Weeks vs. United States, 232 U. S., 383; Burdeau vs.
McDowell, 256 U. S., 465.)
The house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress,
as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his
repose. (Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a,
91b, 195 [K. B.]) The overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic” meant that absent a warrant or
exigent circumstances, police could not enter a home to
make an arrest. An arrest warrant founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter
a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason
to believe the suspect is within. (Payton v. New York , 445
U. S. 573, 603-604 (1980])
b. Importance
As explained in People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citing
Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345): “It is deference to
one’s personality that lies at the core of this right but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one’s home, but
not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States,
385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is a man’s
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his
residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome
but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is
his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966],
Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]). In
the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search
and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly
characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a
`spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of
home and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards. (ibid, p. 74).”
!!! Case(s)
121. Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil 637 (1946)
2. To Whom Directed
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed. The modifications introduced
in the 1987 Constitution (RE: Sec. 2, Art. III; in relation to
the phraseology of the 1935 Constitution) relate to the
issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-
a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof.
The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable
search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed
with the State and did not shift to anyone else. (People vs.
Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
The constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one’s person, whether
citizen or alien, from interference by government, included
in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions.
There the state, however powerful, does not as such have
the access except under the circumstances above noted, for
in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble,
is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. (Villanueva v. Querubin, 48 SCRA 345 [1972]; Cf.
Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 [1886]).
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful
searches and seizures, and its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that
it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies; as against such
authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of
his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to
the right of seizure by process duly served. (Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 US 465 [1921], 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048)
!!! Case(s)
122. People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57
(1991)
3. Who May Invoke the Right?
a. In general
Alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure
may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority.
(People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991])
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
(Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. [GR L-19550, 19 June
1967])
b. Corporations
Although, an officer of a corporation which is charged with
a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an
act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional
powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of
such corporation, a corporation is entitled to immunity,
under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association
of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct
legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives
no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can
only be proceeded against by due process of law, and is
protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful
discrimination. (Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
!!! Case(s)
123. Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323
(1971)
124. Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
125. Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547
(1978)
126. Wilson v. Layne, 98-0083, May 24, 1999
4. Valid warrant
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name
of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or
a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring
it before the court. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]; citing Section 95,
General Orders 58, as amended by section 6 of Act 2886)
Crime should exist first. In the issuance of search warrants,
the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak
of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these
stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its
face. (Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23
November 2001])
Conditions for a valid warrant
a) Existence of Probable Cause
1. Probable cause defined, construed
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
(People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262 [1998]; Burgos v. Chief of
Staff, AFP [GR 64261, 26 December 1984]) In the
determination of probable cause, the court must
necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to
justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. (Solid
Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 November
2001])
In applying the “probable cause” standard “by which a
particular decision to search is tested against the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness,” it is necessary
“to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion” and that in criminal investigations
a warrant to search for recoverable items is reasonable
“only when there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that they
will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.” The critical
element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the
property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the specific “things” to be searched
for and seized are located on the property to which entry is
sought. (Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31 May
1978])
2. Probable cause in issuance of warrants distinguished
from probable cause in preliminary investigation
While the power to issue search warrants upon showing
probable cause is a function which is exclusively judicial,
“the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation has been described as an executive function.”
(People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998]) The
proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant
before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary
investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are
proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not
bound by the other’s finding as regards the existence of a
crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the
other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should
issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an
information should be filed in court. (Solid Triangle Sales
Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 November 2001])
3. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
Notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and
regardless of the fact that the search yielded contraband,
the mere act of looking from side to side while holding
one’s abdomen, or of standing on a corner with one’s eyes
moving very fast, looking at every person who came near,
does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5
(a). Neither does putting something in one’s pocket,
handing over one’s baggage, riding a motorcycle, nor does
holding a bag on board a trisikad sanction State intrusion.
The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. Personal
knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria.
Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua, the Court declared
invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards
a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For the
exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, the Court
ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable
information alone is insufficient. In the following cases, the
search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because
of “suspicious” circumstances: People v. Tangliben (accused
was “acting suspiciously”), People v. Malmstedt (a bulge on
the accused’s waist), and People v. de Guzman (likewise a
bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-
fitting clothes). There is, however, another set of
jurisprudence that deems “reliable information” sufficient
to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this
class of cases belong People v. Maspil, Jr., People v. Bagista,
People v. Balingan, People v. Lising, People v. Montilla,
People v. Valdez, and People v. Gonzales. In these cases,
the arresting authorities were acting on information
regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or
suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the
accused has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases,
except the last two, come under some other exception to
the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr.
involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search of a
moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and Lising and Montilla
were consented searches. Nevertheless, the great majority
of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn,
more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule
113. Note the phrase “in his presence” therein, connoting
personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer.
(People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003])
In fine, probable cause exists in the following instances: (a)
where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the
plastic bag carried by the accused; (People v. Claudio, 160
SCRA 646 [1988]) (b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was observed to be acting
suspiciously; (People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]) (c)
where the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier
received confidential reports that said accused would
transport a quantity of marijuana; (People v. Maspil, Jr., 188
SCRA 751 [1990]) (d) where Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs
and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused
Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline,
he failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so; (People v. Malmsteadt,
198 SCRA 401 [1991]) (f) where the moving vehicle was
stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration
agent or spy — one who participated in the drug smuggling
activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong —
that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country; (People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]) (g)
where the arresting officers had received a confidential
information that the accused, whose identity as a drug
distributor was established in a previous test-buy
operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and
probably carrying shabu with him; (People v. Saycon, 236
SCRA 325 [1994]) (h) where police officers received an
information that the accused, who was carrying a
suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila; (People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA
277 [1995]) and (i) where the appearance of the accused
and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the
description given by a civilian asset. (People v. Valdez, 304
SCRA 140 [1999])
!!! Case(s)
127. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
(1984)
128. Chandler v. Miller, April 15, 1997, D-96-
126
129. People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432)
(1999)
130. People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917,
February 19, 2001
131. Solid Triangle Sale v. Sheriff, G.R. No.
144309 November 23, 2001
132. People v. Salanguit, G.R. 133254, April
18, 2001
b) Personal determination by judge
1. In General
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and
his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to
Article III, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 constitution , and
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of
which prohibit the issuance of warrants except “upon
probable cause.” The determination of whether or not a
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment
after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed
to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
(Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February
1971]; Codal references modified to suit present
Constitution and Rules of Court)
2. Obscene Materials
The case of Pita vs. Court of Appeals, GR 80806, 5 October
1989, (1) The authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an
obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities must convince
the court that the materials sought to be seized are
“obscene”, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference and
action; (3) The judge must determine whether or not the
same are indeed “obscene:” the question is to be resolved
on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor’s sound
discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause
exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for; (5) The
proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to
appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed “obscene.” The Court states,
however, that “these do not foreclose, however, defenses
under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or remedies
against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the
Revised Penal code.”
!!! Case(s)
 133. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
134. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., vs. Fiscal Zabala,
153 SCRA 367 (1987)
135. People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 785 (1990)
136. Paderanga vs. Drilon, G.R. 96080, April
19, 1991
137. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1987)
138. Abdula v. Guiani. 326 SCRA 1 (2000)
c) Examination of witnesses
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court,
Section 5, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it
requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to
“personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce.” (Bache & Co. (Phil.)
Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971]; Codal
references modified to suit present Constitution and Rules
of Court) Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has
to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record.
(Roan v. Gonzales, GR 71410, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA
694)
Listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury,
and administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness; cannot be consider a personal examination. The
reading of the stenographic notes to the Judge did not
constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate and the rule; for by that manner the Judge did not
have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and
follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of
its training, was in the best position to conceive. These
were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-
important question of whether or not there was probable
cause. (Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27
February 1971])
Sufficiency of deposition or affidavit. The true test of
sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the
affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his
witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person
whom one considers to be reliable. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
(Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29
January 1937])
!!! Case(s)
139. Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil
68 (1938)
140. Yee Sue Kuy vs. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141,
(1940)
 141. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (1937)
142. Mata vs. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984)
d) Particularity of description
Purpose. A search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit
the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that “unreasonable searches and seizures”
may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed.
(Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896)
1. Description of Place
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
to be searched. (Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14
December 1989])
2. Description of items to be seized
While it is true that the property to be seized under a
warrant must be particularly described therein and no
other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description
is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. (In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389
[1932]) Where by the nature of the goods to be seized,
their description must be rather general, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. As a corollary, however, we
could not logically conclude that where the description of
those goods to be seized have been expressed technically,
all others of a similar nature but not bearing the exact
technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to
seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant
issued would be defeated by mere technicalities. (Yousef
Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859, 4 September
2001])
Tests. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe
the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People
vs. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant
officer may be guided in making the search and seizure
(idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 3,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the
description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is
when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. (Bache and Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835
[1971])
!!! Case(s)
143. Olaes vs. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
 144. Prudente vs. Judge Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69
(1989)
145. Chia vs. Coll. of Customs, 177 SCRA 755
(1989)
146. 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164
SCRA 655 (1988)
147. Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152
(1985)
148. PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
149. Yousef Al Ghoul vs. C.A, GR No.126859,
September 4, 2001
5. Objects of Seizure
Rule 126, Sec. 2
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall
be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed.
2. For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.
6. Warrantless searches
Rule 126, Sec. 12
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
court; return and proceedings thereon. –
1. The officer must forthwith deliver the property
seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly
verified under oath.
2. Ten (10) days after issuance of the search
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no
return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
this Rule has been complied with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered
to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection
(a) hereof has been complied with.
3. The return on the search warrant shall be filed
and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions
of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of
court.
Id., Sec. 4
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall
reasonable searches and seizure. Verily, the rule is, the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body,
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue
of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure become
‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision.” This interdiction against
warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1)
search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate
if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests
in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners. (People vs. Chua Ho San
[GR 128222, 17 June 1999])
The following instances are not deemed “unreasonable”
even in the absence of a warrant: (1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); (2) Search of
evidence in “plain view”; (3) Search of a moving vehicle.
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity; (4) Consented warrantless
search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7)
Exigent and emergency circumstances. (People v. Bolasa,
378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 [1999])
a) Valid Waiver
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by
anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf (De
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 695). The consent must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. (68 Am Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, §135.)
Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. (68 Am
Jur 2d Searches and Seizures, §136.)
The Supreme Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the
validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But
in these cases, the police officers’ request to search
personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and
in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter
fully understood what was requested. In some instance, the
accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating
that he also understood the nature and consequences of
such request. (People vs. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432
[1999])
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. (Schneckloth vs.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218) In case of consented searches or
waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right, it must first appear, first, that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. ( People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 16 [1986]; citing
Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689 [1938]; 67 C. J.,
299)
Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the
defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence
will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)
the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
(United States vs. Tillman, 963 F. 2d 137; Florida vs. Royer,
460 U.S. 491; United States vs. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544.)
Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. (People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72,
91 [1997]; citing Aniog v. Commission on Elections, 237
SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994]) In any event, the failure to resist
or object to the execution of the warrant does not
constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as
Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of
the law. (Const. Lim., 8th ed., Vol. I, I, 630.) As the
constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law. (56 C. J., pp. 1180, 1181.)
!!! Case(s)
150. People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462
(1992)
151. People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679 (1998)
152. People vs. Ramos, G.R. 85401-02, June 4,
1990
153. People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994)
154. Veroy vs. Layague, 210 SCRA 97 (1992)
155. People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457 (1992)
156. Lopez vs. Comm. Of Customs, 68 SCRA
320 (1975)
157. Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136292, January 5, 2002
158. People vs. Asis, et. al., G.R. No. 142531,
October 15, 2002
159. People vs. Tudtud, et. al., G.R. No.
144037, September 26, 2003
b) Incident to lawful arrest
The most important exception to the necessity for a search
warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a
crime is being committed or after its commission. The right
to search includes in both instances that of searching the
person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed. (Agnello vs. United
States, 269 US 20.)
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is
found in his possession or in his control may be seized and
used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to
make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by
the officer upon reasonable grounds to have committed a
felony. (Carroll vs. United States, 267 US 132.)
While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may
be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or
implements used in the commission of the crime and which
search may extend to the area within his immediate control
where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence
he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The
process cannot be reversed. (People vs. Chua Ho San [GR
128222, 17 June 1999]; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals,
283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].)
A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person
of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate
control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to
commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and
destroy it. (People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April
2001]) When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest
itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, this Rule has been complied with and shall
of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in require that the property seized be delivered
a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the (a) hereof has been complied with.
clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, 3. The return on the search warrant shall be filed
therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the and kept by the custodian of the log book on
area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that search warrants who shall enter therein the
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain date of the return, the result, and other actions
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. There is of the judge.
no comparable justification, however, for routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of
occurs — or, for that matter, for searching through all the court.
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself. (Chimel v. California; 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 23 June !!! Case(s)
1969)
160. Chimel vs. California, 395 U. S. 752
Rule 126, Section 12, Rules of Court (1964)
161. People vs. de la Cruz, G.R. 83988, April
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to 18, 1990
court; return and proceedings thereon. – 162. People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645
(1991)
1. The officer must forthwith deliver the property 163. People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401
seized to the judge who issued the warrant, (1991)
together with a true inventory thereof duly 164. People v. Cuenco, G.R. 126277,
verified under oath. November 16, 1988
2. Ten (10) days after issuance of the search 165. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the 558 (1998)
return has been made, and if none, shall 166. People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220
summon the person to whom the warrant was (1990)
issued and require him to explain why no 167. People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592
return was made. If the return has been made, (2000)
 168. People vs. Estrella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40,
January 21, 2003
169. People vs. Libnao, et al., G.R. No.
136860, January 20, 2003
c) Plain view doctrine
1. Elements
Under the “plain view doctrine,” unlawful objects within
the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented in evidence. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27
January 1993]; citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234,
19 L.Ed. 2d 1067 [1968]) For this doctrine to apply, there
must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of
the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27
January 1993]; citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
433,29 L. Ed. 2d 564 [1971]) The elements of plain-view are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search. (People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079
[1999])
2. When object is in plain view
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. (Harris v. United States, supra) In
the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
(Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra) The object must be
open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Roan
v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]) It is clear that an
object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed
to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a
closed container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if
the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is
such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. (Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744, 751 [1981]) It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27
January 1993])
3. Plain-view objects as evidence
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not
constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what
was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure
of the object was legal on the basis of the “plain view”
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence.
(People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]) Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search
(Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited
by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202
[1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726
[1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
4. Limitations to plain-view
The “plain view” doctrine may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The “plain view” doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What
the ‘plain view’ cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification —
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification
is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges. The “plain view” doctrine
neither justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
“plain view” of the object. (People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27
January 1993])
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been
executed, the “plain view doctrine” can no longer provide
any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found.
As has been explained that “What the ‘plain view’ cases
have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification –whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused —
and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only
where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.” (People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April
2001] citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433,29 L.
Ed. 2d 564 [1971])
!!! Case(s)
170. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
171. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296,
September 25, 2000
172. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 [1987]
173. People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442,
July 20, 2001
d) Enforcement of fishing, customs and immigration laws
1. Fishing and customs laws
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search
warrant must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search
warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected (Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28,
1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil.
770, 774; Carroll vs. U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice
Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300). The same
exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels
breaching our fishery laws: They are usually equipped with
powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships
of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. (Roldan vs. Arca [GR
L-25434, 25 July 1975])
2. Immigration laws
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects,
physical searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of
the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers
are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
procedures. (People vs. Johnson [GR 138881, 18 December
2000])
!!! Case(s)
175. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 320 (1975)
176. Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517
(1996)
177. People v. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)
178. People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881,
December 18, 2000
179. People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670,
October 23, 2003)
180. Bureau of Customs v. Ogarlo, 329 SCRA
289 (2000)
e) “Stop and frisk”
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken. (Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968])
While probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop
and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer. (Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR
123595, 12 December 1997])
To what extent is the search allowed? Outer clothing, how
about the thing???
What is the purpose of the Stop and frisk rule: for the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection
For the safety and self-preservation
!!! Case(s)
181. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
182. People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
183. Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
113447, October 7, 1997
184. Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA
159 (1997)
185. Florida v. J.L., 98-1993, March 28, 2000
f) Search of moving vehicles
1. Rationale
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production
and taken possession of our highways in battalions, until
the slower, animal- drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to
standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity
for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful
commission of crime a disguising means of silent approach
and swift escape unknown in the history of the world
before their advent. The question of their police control
and reasonable search on highways or other public places is
a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in
so-called “bootlegging’ or ‘rum running,’ which is itself is no
small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in
homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
especially guards from search and seizure without process.
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to
facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape,
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge.
Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search
of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other
public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in
its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in
view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
(People v. Case [320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R.,
686]) Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles — automobiles, trucks, etc. — without
need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a
judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (People v.
Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994])
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity. (Padilla vs. CA, et al., 269
SCRA 402 [1997]; citing United States vs. Rem, 984 F 2d
806; United States vs. McCoy, 977 F 2d 706; United States
vs. Rusher, 966 F 2d 868; United States vs. Parker, 928 F 2d
365.) Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have
over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant
could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one
place to another with impunity. A warrantless search of a
moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. (Asuncion vs. CA, et al., 302 SCRA
490 (1999); People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991])
Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for
the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at
borders or “constructive borders” like checkpoints near the
boundary lines of the State. (Almedia-Sanchez vs. United
States, 37 L.ed. 2d 596; Carrol vs. United States, 267 U.S.
132)
2. Manner of search
In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles,
however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that
is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their
occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual
inspection. (People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994])
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense. (People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 [1992];
Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 [1990]).
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the “stop-
and-search” without warrant at military or police
checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se
(People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494 [1993]; Valmonte vs. de
Villa, 178 SCRA 211 [1989]), for as long as it is warranted by
the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists (People vs. Escaño, 323 SCRA 754
[2000], citing U.S. vs. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543). A
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it
may involve an extensive search. Routine inspections are
not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the following
instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light
therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check
is conducted in a fixed area.
The physical intrusion of a part of the body of an agent into
the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth
Amendment (United States vs. Pierre, 932 F. 2d 377 cited in
Hermann, Search and Seizure Checklists, 1994 ed., p. 246).
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected
to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender
or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining
to a crime in the vehicle to be searched (Obra, et al. vs. CA,
et al., 317 SCRA 594 [1999]; People vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63
[1992]).
3. Existence of probable cause
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give
the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within
the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. (People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991])
The Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct
without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving
vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a
package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the
Narcotics Command (”Narcom”) of the Philippine National
Police (”PNP”) had received a confidential report from
informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province,
had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the
Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because
of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present
his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received
confidential information that a woman having the same
physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana; (5) the accused who were riding a
jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had
earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6)
where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the
basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by
a deep penetration agent or spy. (Caballes vs. Court of
Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002])
!!! Case(s)
186. People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995)
187. Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
125959, February 1, 1999
188. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
189. People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86
(1980)
190. Whren v. United States, 95-5841,
January 10, 1996
191. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 00-00262, May 29,
2001
g) Emergency circumstances
As there was general chaos and disorder at that time …
[that] the courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein
were deserted … [and that] the military operatives … had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed, the case falls under one of the exceptions to
the prohibition against a warrantless search. (People vs. de
Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994])
!!! Case(s)
192. People vs. De Gracia 233 SCRA 716
(1994)
h) Checkpoints
1. Minimal interference
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the
motoring public. First, the potential interference with
legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using these highways
are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain
knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not
be stopped elsewhere. Second checkpoint operations both
appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which
established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence,
reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The
location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in
the field, but by officials responsible for making overall
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials
will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since
field officers may stop only those cars passing the
checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing
stops of individuals them there was in the case of roving-
patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is
unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial review. (U.S. v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 49 L Ed. 2d 1116 [1976])
2. Exercise of police power
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public
security. At the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community. (Valmonte vs. de
Villa, [GR 83988, 29 September 1989]) Under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized
government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety
of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this
proposition is, that when the situation clears and such
grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely
no reason to remain. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint
stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist’s right to
“free passage without interruption”, but it cannot be
denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required
to answer a brief question or two. (Valmonte vs. de Villa,
[GR 83988, 24 May1989])
3. Extent
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of
the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
(Valmonte vs. de Villa, [GR 83988, 24 May 1989])
!!! Case(s)
193. Gen. De Villa vs. Valmonte G.R. No.
83988 (May 24, 1990)
194. Aniag vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
195. People v. Usana, 323 SCRA 754 (2000)
i) Inspection of buildings
Administrative searches are significant intrusions upon the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such
searches when authorized and conducted without a
warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the
Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that
the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other
cases for upholding these warrantless searches are
insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the
Fourth Amendment’s protections. Contrary to the
assumption of Frank v. Maryland, Fourth Amendment
interests are not merely “peripheral” where municipal fire,
health, and housing inspection programs are involved
whose purpose is to determine the existence of physical
conditions not complying with local ordinances. (Camara vs.
Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco
[387 US 523, 5 June 1967])
!!! Case(s)
196. Camara vs. Municipal Court, 387 U. S.
523 (1967)
7. Arrests with warrant
a. Probable cause defined
Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. (People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999];
citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United
States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917]; People v. Bati, 189
SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and
People v. Ramos 186 SCRA 184 [1990]) Thus, the term
probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. (People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72, 85-86 [1997])
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. (1 Bernas
87) In People v. Montilla, (285 SCRA 703 [1998]) the Court
acknowledged that “the evidentiary measure for the
propriety of filing criminal charges, and correlatively, for
effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and
liberalized.”
b. Probable cause distinguished from prima facie evidence
The confusing concepts of “prima facie evidence” and
“probable cause” were clarified and set aright by the 1985
amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule
112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
“engender as well founded belief” as to the fact of the
commission of the crime and the respondent’s probable
guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is,
that the investigating fiscal “finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial,” or where “a probable cause exists.” It
should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to
effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized. (People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703, 720-721
[1998])
c. Reliable information as basis for probable cause
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a
great degree of consistency, is that “reliable information”
alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that
the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.” Thus, notwithstanding
tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact
that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking
from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, or of
standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving very fast,
looking at every person who came near, does not justify a
warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither does
putting something in one’s pocket, handing over one’s
baggage, riding a motorcycle, nor does holding a bag on
board a trisikad sanction State intrusion. The same rule
applies to crossing the street per se. (People vs. Tudtud [GR
144037, 26 September 2003])
d. Personal determination by judge
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (Soliven
vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 398)
First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause
by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which
is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor
passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on
one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be
no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge
cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Obviously and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that
there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and
hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to
legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.
This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of
the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the
burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to the latter not only the information and his
bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of
the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the His
Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records
of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend
to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine
the complete records of every case all the time simply for
the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in
turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally
determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in
his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or
the report of the investigating officer.” (Ho vs. People, 280
SCRA 365)
The question whether “probable cause” exists or not must
depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge or
magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that
particular facts must exist in each particular case. It simply
means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge
or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that
the particular person has committed the crime, but that
there is probable cause for believing that the person whose
arrest is sought committed the crime charged. No rule can
be laid down which will govern the discretion of the court in
this matter. If he decides, upon the proof presented, that
probable cause exists, no objection can be made upon
constitutional grounds against the issuance of the warrant.
His conclusion as to whether “probable cause” existed or
not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfied that “probable
cause” exists from the facts stated in the complaint, made
upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his
conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for
arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such
witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the
warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie
evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed
“probable cause” for believing that the person against
whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged.
There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the
conclusion that “probable cause” exists from the statement
of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any other person
whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the
opinion of the judge or magistrate. (US vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil.
1, 41-42)
Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for
valid arrests and searches without warrant than for the
issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting
person must have actually witnessed the crime being
committed or attempted by the person sought to be
arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the
crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge
simply determines personally from testimonies of witnesses
that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused. (People vs. Tudtud [GR
144037, 26 September 2003])
8. Warrantless arrests
The Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless
arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in
flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in
hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners). (People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA
432, 444 [1999]; and the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.)
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. (Concurring Opinion of Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban in People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668,
720 [1999]) As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is
settled that “reliable information” alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. (People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19
February 2001])
Rule 113, Sec. 5
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Art. 125, Revised Penal Code
Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the
next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their
equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the
cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
Rebellion as Continuing Offense
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable
cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously the
absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder
acts but really in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of
the situation that involves the very survival of society and
its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing
and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which
(are) of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection,
most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their
persons and detaining them while any of these contigencies
continues cannot be less justified. (Umil vs. Ramos [GR
81567, 9 July 1990])
!!! Case(s)
197. Umil vs. Ramos, G. R. 81567, July 9, 1990
Committed in the Presence of Police Officers
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view
of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (People
vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991])
!!! Case(s)
198. People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 (1991)
199. People V. Doria, 301 SCRA 668) (1999)
200. People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001,
March 14, 2001
201. People v. De Guzman, GR No. 117952-
53, February 14, 2001
Personal Knowledge of the Offense
In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person,
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such fact or as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
(People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999])
!!! Case(s)
202. People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 (1993)
203. People v. Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357 (1997)
204. People v. Baula, G.R. No. 132671,
November 15, 2000
205. People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267,
July 10, 2001
Time of Arrest
1. Hot Pursuit
Paragraph (b) of Section 5 is otherwise known as the
doctrine of “hot pursuit” arrests. This doctrine is based on
the rule that an arrest can be made without warrant when
an offense has just been committed and the arresting
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that a crime has just
been committed. It is not necessary that the arresting
officers have direct knowledge of the crime. But they must
have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its
commission. (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668)
2. “Has just been committed”
It is not sufficient that a crime was indeed committed but it
is required that the said crime has just been committed.
The proximity of time of commission of the crime must be
close to the time of the arrest. Otherwise, the arrest is
illegal. (Pineda, Ernesto L., The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, 2003 Edition, 161.)
!!! Case(s)
206. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791
(1992)
207. Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 586
(1992)
208. People v. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980,
August 30. 2001
Marked Money
The discovery of the marked money on [a person] did not
mean he was caught [in fragrante delicto]. The marked
money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact
alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless
search and seizure. (People vs. Enrile [GR 74189, 26 May
1993])
!!! Case(s)
209. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
Lack of Urgency
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is
required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize
the person, house, papers or effects of any individual.
When one was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
about to be committed or had just been committed, there
is no justification for the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not
be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant.
Warrantless arrests cannot be resorted to when police
officers have ample opportunity to secure a warrant of
arrest.
Applications made during weekends and holidays. The
Supreme Court’s Circular 19, dated 14 August 1987, which
reads “3. Applications filed after office hours, during
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken
cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such
cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under
oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is
urgent” merely provides for a guideline, departure from
which would not necessarily affect the validity of an
otherwise valid search warrant. (Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR
82870, 14 December 1989])
!!! Case(s)
210. People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May
4, 2001
211. People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402
(1988)
Effect of Entry of Plea
By pleading “not guilty” at their arraignment, the accused
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in their arrest, for the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.
(People vs. Plana [GR 128285, 27 November 2001])
!!! Case(s)
212. People v. Plana G.R. No. 128285,
November 27, 2001
Validity of Conviction
The illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error. (People vs. De
Guzman, 224 SCRA 93, 100 [1993]). The warrantless arrest,
even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellants
and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point
to their culpability. (People vs. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701, 710
[1994]; People vs. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614, 626 [1993])
!!! Case(s)
213. People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April
10, 2001
_________________________________________________
_____________________________
Search warrant; requirements for validity. The validity of
the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized. On the first requisite, a
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination.  Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On the last requirement, a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community.  A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness. People of
the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y Baludda. G.R. No. 176066,
August 11, 2010.
Rules of Court, Rule 126
Rule 126, Search and Seizure
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an
order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall
be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:
a. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime
was committed.
b. For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of
personal property:
a. Subject of the offense;
b. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of
the offense; or
 c. Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the
judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
(5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search.
— The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed
search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house
or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in
presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room,
or any other premise shall be made except in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must
direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit
asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant
shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it
shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer
seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises
in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to
court; return and proceedings thereon. —
 a. The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and
to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a resolved by the court that issued the search warrant.
true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
b. Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the
the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)
been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to
explain why no return was made. If the return has
been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section
11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered to him.
The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof
has been complied with.
c. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and
kept by the custodian of the log book on search
warrants who shall enter therein the date of the
return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of

court.(11a)

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person

lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof
in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
(12a)

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to

suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained
thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court
where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action