1

"European history is whatever the historian wants it to be… There is

only one limiting factor. It must take place in or derive from the area
we call Europe. But as I am not sure what exactly that area is meant
to be, I am pretty well in a haze about the rest." 1

AJP Taylor's haze, on the face of it, is the natural reaction for the historian

when confronted with the issues of European history. Where does Europe

begin? Can it be defined? Does its influence on the globe distort the way we

view the rest of the world? The arguments that rage, in particular, around

Europe's legacy, mean that daunting as writing a history of Europe is, it still

is a vibrant area of historiographical study.

The recent launch of the single European currency brings the

question of the experiences of the peoples of Europe into sharper,

contemporary focus. Barely half a continent has formed an exclusive

economic club – but does this have the right to be presented as an event as

significant for the residents of Krakow as it is for those in Lyons, or Milan?

Failing to appreciate the fact that Europe can, according to some

definitions, have its heart in locations as diverse as "the suburbs of Warsaw

or in the depths of Lithuania, the dead centre of geographical Europe" 2

leads to difficulties when looking critically at the various histories of the

continent. Moreover, it can blind readers to the fact that while there may

be great differences in those experiences of the citizens of Europe, there is

also a lot of common ground between them.

1 AJP Taylor et al, 'What is European History?' in What is History Today?, ed Juliet Gardiner
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), p 143.
2 N Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997), p 14.
 2

The idea that the 'experiences' of Europeans are too diverse for a

history of Europe can and should be argued against for a number of

reasons, not least because the postmodern desire for discrete histories of

every ethnic and cultural group invalidates the notion that histories can be

written at all. Are we saying that human experiences of eating, sleeping,

family life, work, domesticity, leisure are so altered by the borders of nation

states that nothing coherent or unifying can be written of them?

In looking at these issues of whether a definitive history of Europe

can ever be reached, it is first necessary to examine the multiplicity of

ways in which Europe can be defined. Comparisons between the

approaches and the contents of various histories of Europe can reveal how

those definitions affect the writing of the continent's history. The vexed

question of whether there is such a thing as 'European peoples' is

important, not least because if there are such creatures then that suggests

that there should be histories written for them. The influence of

postmodernist thinking upon the practice and writing of history arguably

suggests that diversity can inhibit meaning. This is not necessarily the case:

the postmodern influence on history will be discussed, particularly in the

context of whether a 'meaningful' history implies the use of a 'narrative'.

Finally it is valuable to explore those areas of commonalty in European

experiences, those of war and Americanization of the continent in the

twentieth century, as well as the rise of capitalism before 1900. In this way

the practice of writing European History will be shown to be one which still

has a relevance, and one which can transcend such limiting notions as the

search for unity rather than the search for the past.
 3

Part I – Defining Europe

Defining what Europe is, as we have seen, a task to vex even the most of

brilliant of historians. Politicians, on the other hand, generally have less

reticence: "Oui, c'est l'Europe, depuis l'Atlantique jusqu'à l'Oural, c'est

l'Europe, c'est toute l'Europe, qui décidera du destin du monde." De 3

Gaulle, that most capricious of Europeans, here has defined Europe as most

scholars and thinkers conceive of it, stretching from the shores of Portugal

up to the Urals, deep in Russia.

The lack of a natural frontier on the Eurasian continent, between the

majority of the landmass and its Western peninsula, is only the beginning of

the debate over where the geographical boundaries of Europe can be

drawn. Other descriptions are available to us. The division of Europe into

Western and Eastern halves is well documented, and almost natural in the

minds of politicians, scholars and map-makers alike. This was particularly

acute when Europe became the one of the frozen battlegrounds of the Cold

War between the USA and the USSR.

The division of Europe need not be strictly an East/West affair. Europe

can be seen in terms of a North/South divide. Most notably this has been

espoused by Fernand Braudel who was able to see the history of the

Mediterranean as being unique enough from the remaining Northern parts

of Europe for it to warrant its own monumental history. Having suitably

4

established this, it then becomes logical that there should be competing

3 General Charles de Gaulle in a speech to the people of Strasbourg as reported in Le

Monde, 24 November 1959, p 4.
4 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II;
Vol I (France: 2nd Ser, 1966; London: Fontana Press, 1990).
 4

histories of Northern Europe, North Western Europe, even Scandinavian

Europe.

Recent work by historians from Eastern Europe has also challenged

conventions of what is traditionally considered to be the boundaries of that

part of the continent. The Czech novelist Milan Kundera was one of the first

intellectuals to argue for a recognition of a 'Third Europe', Central Europe.

In an article The sequestrated West, or the tragedy of Central Europe in

1984, he argued that World War II had created a new Europe distinct from

both Western and Eastern Europe. Roughly comprising Poland, Hungary

and Czechoslovakia (as was) he argued that this Third Europe was a Europe

in miniature, "that part of Europe which is geographically in the centre,

culturally in the West and politically in the East." 5

The big question mark over any geographical definition of Europe has

always been whether Russia is to be excluded or included. For every

argument that suggests in terms of cultural inclination she is a necessary

part of Europe, there are others which point to her isolationist, imperialist

posture and the lack of commonalty in religious traditions between her

Orthodox Christianity, and the Catholicism of her neighbours. Most

definitions of Europe, as hinted at by de Gaulle, want to have it both ways,

accepting Russia but only up to a point. This ambivalence has often also

been shared by Russian intellectuals. Fyodor Dostoyevsky despised

Western Civilization, believing that Orthodox Russian nationalism was

destined to triumph over the decadent Western World. Says Ivan

5Quoted in Bronislaw Geremek, The Common Roots of Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1996), p 5.
 5

Karamazov, left unenlightened after all his attempts at improving himself

via Western education, "I want to take a trip to Europe, Alyosha… I know

it's a cemetery I shall be going to, but it's the dearest, dearest of

cemeteries, that's all…", neatly expressing Dostoyevsky's view of Europe. 6

Defining the very idea of Europe, the essence of its civilization, is just

as important as setting out its geographical borders. Despite what those

who believe in a very definite Central or Eastern or indeed Western Europe

might argue, at these regions' foundations, as most scholars agree, they

share the same bedrock: the legacy of Christianity and Graeco-Roman

culture that constitute the cornerstones of Western Civilization. There

certainly are changes in inference over how important certain currents of

cultural transmission might have been to different areas at different points.

It certainly is the case that some regions see themselves as possessing

qualities that are the polar opposite of those that the notion of Western

Civilization implies. But those two intertwined legacies are the alpha of

European culture, societies, language, politics, art, education.

'Europe' as an idea emerged from these roots, most particular from

the one that represented the Christian/Graeco-Roman currents best;

'Christendom'. Denis Hay argues that not only was Christendom's virtual

identity with the area of Europe one of the most important factors in the

latter's development through the course of the Middle Ages, but that their

congruency fostered a sense of cultural unity which cemented the

emergence of 'Europe', and the acceptance of the European peoples as

6Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, (London: Penguin, 1993 edn [1st pub
1880]), p 264.
 6

politically one. Of course it must be recognised that the idea of Europe was
7

one that was developed and driven by Europe's elite, a political and cultural

concept invented and experienced by them, especially in times of crisis and

confrontation, they the Europeans against the barbarian invaders. 8

These various questions of how to define Europe meant that the

debate over whether Europe was an intelligible field to study was only

really settled by the end of the 1950s. But with that question settled, the
9

proof that there is a demand for histories of Europe at the continental

rather than the regional level can be seen by the range of European

histories discussed below.

Part II – Comparing Historians' Approaches To Europe & European

History

Comparison of the relative merits of certain historians' approaches will

reveal that not only is the very definition of Europe still constantly being

refined and tested, but that meaningful histories of the continent can

emerge. The range of definitions of Europe discussed indicates the variety

of European histories available; from those that tell the story of the entire

continent, to those that look at Europe from a regional and cultural

viewpoint.

"It is the view of one pair of eyes, filtered by one brain, and translated

by one pen." At least that statement cannot be called into question in

10

7 Denis Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1957), p 120.
8 Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History, (London: Routledge, 1998), p xvii.
9 Hay, op cit, p ix.
10 Davies, op cit, p x.
 7

Norman Davies' impressive if controversial Europe: A History. He has set

out to turn some long-standing shibboleths of the writing of European

history on their head, the greatest of these being the idea that the history

of Europe can be written without far greater consideration of Eastern

Europe, the part of the continent that Davies feels has been unjustly

neglected for far too long.

The book is also novel in its presentation of the evidence that Davies

has gathered. In addition to the central narrative, which now gives equal if

not greater weighting to the events that occurred in the Eastern half of

Europe, he has assembled over 300 capsules of information on topics

ranging from democracy to the origin of 'Irish jokes', and littered them

throughout the text. This pointillist technique, as he describes it, is there to

illustrate some of the quirks, novelties and more humorous moments of

European history.

In his lucid introduction, Davies acknowledges that the geographical

parameters of the East of Europe have always been open to debate. He

also makes it clear that in the absence of any universal political institutions,

it is cultural criteria that has defined European civilization, and Christianity

is the most important strand of this. With this in mind, Davies then goes on

to attack many of the failings of the way that European history is

traditionally presented. His first target is that of 'Eurocentrism'. Historians

writing in this tradition he argues have been guilty of regarding their

civilization as superior, and only looking for their own beauty. This is then

combined with a more trenchant attack on 'Western Civilization', something

 8

that Davies feels has clearly been a distorting factor. His core complaint

with the concept appears to be that it has not been rigorously applied to

the whole continent, and that Eastern Europe's contribution to European

history has been downplayed and devalued. Viewing European history

through the distorting lens of 'Western Civilization' can hide the East's

contribution; when Davies' asks whether or not Poland contributed to the

Renaissance, you know that the answer is going to be in the positive. He

again emphasises the fact that the East/West division only has the

appearance of permanency because of the events of the Twentieth century,

and that Western supremacy has not been true all the time, drawing a

favourable parallel between the Byzantine empire at the expense of

Charlemagne's. "Eastern Europe is no less European for being poor,

undeveloped or ruled by tyrants," he writes. The greater weighting on the

11

events of the East within the narrative does lead to new perspectives. For

example, the barbarian invasions become the 'drive to the west' by the

tribes of the Steppes. Davies leaves himself open to charges of indecision.

Russia is mentioned despite his reservation, but what of Turkey? Is there

not a case to be made of its European status?

Davies succeeds in balancing out the history of Europe – his work is

vital for redressing the gap in knowledge of Eastern Europe, and presenting

it in a different light from that of 'also ran' status. But to imply that

previous histories have not focused on the Eastern half of Europe because

of institutional scholarly prejudice alone is not enough. The fact that we do

not talk of an 'Eastern Civilization' is surely not just down to historians' bias.

11 Davies, op cit, p 28.

 9

Why didn't these Eastern countries go and get empires, and go on to rule

the world? It’s a question worth asking, that Davies seems not to want to

answer.

In comparison, JM Roberts' The Penguin History of Europe is a model

of scholarly restraint, covering the same extended time span as Davies

does, but in roughly half the number of pages. His approach is markedly

different from Davies' in its conventionality, reflected in the absence of

such tools as 'pointillist' capsules. He is perhaps less guilty of the charges

that Davies may wish to lay at the door of other historians working

obviously in the 'Western Civilization' tradition; he does counsel caution

about the meaning of Europe, arguing that Europeans have shared

different things at different times. And even his geographical definition of

Europe is broadly similar: up to the mountains of the Caucasus.

There are of course similarities in both of the books. By definition,

both are discussing the same events; it is their interpretations that differ.

Both open with a geographical discussion of Europe, looking at the features

and the resources that helped to shape the continent. Both show the

importance of Ancient Greece as the cradle of European Civilization

(although Roberts might go further and argue that it ergo was the cradle of

World Civilization.) Davies writes that, "enough has survived for that one

small East European country to be regularly acclaimed as 'the Mother of

Europe', 'the Source of the West', a vital ingredient if not the sole fountain-

head of Europe." while Roberts describes, "the onset of an era which we

can now recognise to have been of cardinal and enduring importance in

 10

shaping Europe and its future." Both suffer from what could be described
12

as a ‘telescoping effect' in their narratives. As they both race towards the

present day, and recounting near-contemporaneous events, an uneven

pace prevails.

But what of the differences between them? Tim Blanning, in a review

of both books highlighted what he felt to be Davies' weakest suit, his near

neglect of economics and the importance and effects upon Europe of the

Industrial Revolution. Roberts in contrast was praised for his chapter on

'The World's New Rich.' The balance given in both to the relative weighting
13

(and therefore implicit importance) of events in Eastern Europe is another

crucial difference. Both books' final sections deal with Europe in the age of

the Cold War, Roberts prefers to deliver the narrative from a mostly

Western view, the events in Eastern Europe being dealt with in a sub-

chapter. Davies, in contrast, is scrupulous in the equal space given to the

events in both West and East. Davies scores in his (slightly superficial)

record of some of the cultural changes of the last fifty years. Roberts makes

up for this shortcoming with a more nuanced discussion of both the causes

and roots of de-colonization, and the effect that that particular process had

on areas around the world such as the Middle East.

Most of all, Roberts is willing to defend himself against charges of

'Eurocentrism'. He does acknowledge some of the criticisms that Davies et

al have made. He recognises that Europeans have denigrated other

12 Davies, op cit, p 139; JM Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (London: Penguin,
1996), p 23.
13 Tim Blanning, 'Gibbon goes East', The Times Literary Supplement, 20 December 1996, p
3.
 11

civilizations and been prepared to make ill-considered judgements, such as

that of the Victorians about the Chinese. He agrees with the view that

Europeans did believe that they were 'better' than those that they

subjugated however ‘badly behaved’ they were as oppressors. But

'Eurocentrism' can be defended on the grounds that Europe's impact on the

history of the world, was for a period, greater than that of Asia, Africa and

the Americas. It was Europeans that took up the study of other cultures.

However, "It is a simple fact that the practices of some other societies

encountered by Europeans were often just as cruel, barbaric and beastly as

those of the conquering European;" a view which is either deliberately

14

ignoring its inherent cultural relativism, or is some form of ironic apologia.

There are other histories, while not necessarily sharing this continent

wide focus, give equally important insights into the history of Europe.

Braudel's The Mediterranean, as mentioned earlier, is one such way that

Europe can looked at regionally. Here it is less the continent of Europe that

is the shared characteristic but rather that of the sea – it shared a common

destiny, the Turkish Mediterranean sharing the same rhythms as that of the

Christian one. It is perhaps the defining example of the Annales tradition,

the most complete flowering of the historiography offered by the radical

French historians of the 1920s, who first achieved notice in the eponymous

magazine.

Borrowing from geography amongst other academic disciplines, the

Annales school believed that the historian had to look at the landscape

14 Roberts, op cit, p 666.

 12

itself to uncover the personal forces which were the ones that shaped

man's destiny and future. This also meant a focus upon the slower rhythms

of social trends and cycles. The Mediterranean exemplifies this, featuring

an extended discussion of the climate, other ecology, boundaries of the sea

and the region before looking at the social and economic trends that these

conditions helped to facilitate. Stuart Clark, in his article on the Annales

historians, identifies these divisions clearly, and the structure is one that is

strictly followed by Braudel. The opening section is the historie de la longue

dureé, this environmental vision where the perspective of centuries is

required. Secondly, the broader movements of societies, economies and

political institutions (which could be in cycles of anything from five to fifty

years) are denoted conjunctures. And the short-term political history, the

'froth of history' involving individual actors is what sits atop this structure. 15

Braudel put it more elegantly: "[The] actions of a few princes and rich men,

the trivia of the past, bear[ing] little relation to the slow and powerful

march of history which is our subject." 16

Due to the startling nature of his work, Braudel has often been

criticised, not least for what could be described as a lack of interest in

humans, as opposed to his Annales colleagues Lucien Lefebvre and Mark

Bloch. The lack of linkage between the tripartite structure does question

whether Braudel was ever actually that interested in presenting a rounded

picture of human affairs. But The Mediterranean remains a bold attempt to

focus attention on one part of Europe, and show (in part) how the sea’s

destiny affected the continent’s.

15 Stuart Clark, 'The Annales Historians', in The Return of Grand Theory in The Human
Sciences, ed Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 177-199.
16 Braudel, op cit, p 18.
 13

A differing account of Europe's creation can be found from another

continental historian, this one Spanish. Josep Fontana's The Distorted Past:

A Reinterpretation of Europe highlights what could be called that of the

'barbarian' element in European history, the role played by that of the

outsider to challenge and – indirectly, sometimes inadvertently – to shape

Europe's past and future. What he describes as the "fabrication" of an

external enemy conceals the fact that the interests of Europe and her

émigrés are the same, preventing a consciousness of solidarity. Fontana

then goes on to argue for a dismantling of the linear view of history, which

he feels interprets all change as progress, and its replacement with a

"Multidimensional history [which] will be able to aspire to being legitimately

universal and will also restore to us the diversity of our own European

culture." Fontana's history here is of slightly less value, as it arguably

17

downplays other vital elements of European history in order to give the

idea of the struggle against 'invaders' of any sort priority. One might

suggest that the multidimensionality he aspires to remains precisely that

for him, an aspiration.

But Europe is nothing if not a cultural creation; a cultural history will

be of as much value as works that focus upon politics and the environment.

Peter Rietbergen's Europe: A Cultural History is precisely such a volume.

The cultural roots of the European elites' conception of Europe are

explored. He questions the age of the 'European concept': "the Europe that

now projects itself with such a pretence of historical inevitability is, indeed,

17Josep Fontana, The Distorted Past: A Reinterpretation of Europe, (Oxford: Blackwell,

1995), p
 14

only a recent creation; some would even say that this Europe is really a

creation of the late nineteenth century." 18

More importantly, he identifies that 'Europe' is made up of a number

of traditions which do constitute a coherent culture. These include the

nascent democracy of ancient Greece; the legal structures of classical

Rome; the moral value of Christianity; the tolerance that developed

through interregional/interconfessional contacts within the narrow confines

of Europe; the emergence of printing and hence the spread of cultural

diversity; and the emergence of industrial society where, in theory, 'chance'

was open to everyone. His approach leads to some insights less easily
19

gained from other histories, most notably that 'European' can be used as

an adjective – it implies a criterion for quality. While sometimes his

20

discussions of certain cultural topics border on the esoteric, others such as

those of the effect of travel and migration on European history are

genuinely revelatory.

Two earlier histories of Europe are worthy of attention for an attempt

to provide a coherent history of Europe. These histories are by DH

Lawrence, and some of the European history contained in the lectures

given by François Guizot at the Sorbonne in 1828. Lawrence was

commissioned by OUP to write a textbook aimed at adolescents. It may now

seem like 'bad history', its traditional framework avoiding any new

synthesis. But at the same time, it offers vivid portraits of historical

18. Rietbergen, op cit, p xxi.

19 Rietbergen, ibid, p xxiii.
20 Rietbergen, ibid, p 459.
 15

personages from Europe’s past. While the epilogue of 1925 is a bleak affair,

ruminating on the aftermath of the Great War, what has gone previously is

uplifting in tone. Lawrence's history was, "an attempt to give some

impression of the great surging movements which rose in the hearts of men

in Europe, sweeping human beings together into one great concerted

action, or sweeping them apart forever on the tides of opposition." 21

Guizot, returning to the Sorbonne in 1828, recognised diversity as

crucial to a concept of European history. In his first lecture on 'The History

of Civilization in Europe', he stated baldly that, "Modern Europe presents us

with examples of all systems, of all experiments of social organisation… not

withstanding their diversity, they all have a certain resemblance… which it

is impossible to mistake." He also saw within Europe's diversity her

22

superiority – progress according to the intentions of God. As with diversity,

Guizot was also one of the first to proclaim Eurocentrism.

In view of the obvious effects that Europe has had upon the rest of

the world, it perhaps becomes apposite to see what non-European views of

Europe say, and whether they concur with much of this 'Europe first'

attitude. Japanese intellectuals of the Meiji Restoration looked to Europe for

templates of how they could strengthen their own civilization in the face of

the nineteenth century challenge from the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi, in his

An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, showcased both the positive and

negative effects that a European-derived Western Culture would have on

21 DH Lawrence, Movements in European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921

[1981 edn]), p xxvi.
22 François Guizot, Historical Essays and Lectures; Edited and With an introduction by
Stanley Mellon, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), p 163.
 16

Japan. There is a trenchant critique of the havoc that the West is causing in

Japan. But he also argues that, despite the problems that he sees in

Europe, "Western Civilization is an incomparable means for both

strengthening our national polity and increasing the prestige of our imperial

line." Fukuzawa was here arguing for an adoption of the spirit of Western
23

Civilization rather than a wholesale absorption of its outer trappings, but for

our purposes shows a conception of a progressive conception of Europe

which agrees with certain European's claims of being the engine of

civilization.

Considering the importance of diversity in Europe, it is appropriate

that there are so many different approaches to its history. This diversity is

reflected in her peoples as well – but in amongst their differing identities,

can a 'European' identity be seen to exist?

Part III – Is There Such a Thing as 'European peoples'?

Such has been the pervasiveness of nationalism in the last 200 years that

very few people would consider their primary identification would be with

their continent rather than their nation. That testifies to its success – one of

"the most persuasive political forces ever", as it was recently described. 24

Taking Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation, that of the imagined

political community as inherently limited and sovereign, then it can

immediately be seen why there are problems in trying to apply such a

doctrine to something as broad as membership of a continental

23 Fukuzawa Yukichi, An Outline of A Theory of Civilization, tr D Dilworth and GC Hurst,

(Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973 [1st pub 1875]), p 28.
24 Professor RJ Evans, in his inaugural lecture as Oxford University's Regius Professor of
Modern History, Trinity Term 1998.
 17

community. And the "deep horizontal comradeship" that he describes as

25

being necessary for a nation to exist, must be hard to foster between

former enemy states. It is only now with the development of (democratic)

supra-national governmental institutions and bureaucracy that a European

identity may be possible. Economic integration, as Hobsbawm suggests,

means that supranational identities may be becoming logical choices. 26

There are certain similarities between the various European

nationalities which mean that the emergence of 'European peoples' is not

an impossibility. These include genetic and ethnic similarities between

Europeans, but there are also congruences in terms of language – most

European dialects are from the same Indo-European family of languages,

while the Latin influence on modern European languages is clear.

Europeans have always defined themselves against those who have

been different from them, in terms of ethnicity, race, and also religion. Yet

a European history which, for example, does not feature an Islamic threat

to Christendom, a Europe whose economy was unaided by the money lent

by Jewish financiers, does not exist. Europe was created in opposition to

what she did not recognise in herself; but she also relied upon these hostile

sources. For example it was only in the academic and religious institutions

of the Near East that the study of those Greek texts fundamental to

European identity prevented them from being lost forever.

25Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991 [2nd edn]), p 6.

26EJ Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth and Reality,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p 182.
 18

Even those defined as outsiders can still claim European identity. As

Elizabeth Tonkin et al point out, groups and individuals don't have one

identity, but potentially a wide variety of possible identities and affinities,

which only incompletely or partially overlap in space and/or time. Under 27

this conception therefore, one could happily be European, as well as being

a Londoner, Asian, English and British.

One final example should perhaps be remembered. There has been a

successful development of a continental identity, shared by peoples of

differing nationalities with European roots. That the United States of

America managed to create such a persuasive form of national identity

suggests that the creation of a European identity is also distinctly possible.

As in the American case, if stress was laid upon the shared experiences of

the various peoples of the continent, then this could lead to a new supra-

national identity.

Part IV– The Influence of Postmodernism on History

According to the dictionary, something that is 'meaningful' conveys

information, and is purposeful, significant and expressive. In

historiographical terms, there is an implicit value judgement within the

word. It suggests that the qualities of purpose, significance and expression

can only be achieved within a certain type of history. For our purposes let

us call it a 'narrative' history, wherein a series of events are recounted in a

chronologically continuous order, and then analysed for their causation and

their consequences. 28

27 Elizabeth Tonkin et al, (eds), History and Ethnicity, (London: Routledge, 1989), p 17.
28 Lawrence Stone, 'The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History', Past &
Present 58, 1979, defines narrative as the organisation of material in a chronological
 19

This has been the way in which traditional history, that of kings,

politicians, wars and diplomats has been presented. But the increasing

academic influence of the social sciences in the last 35 years, and that of

currents of postmodernist thinking over the last 15, have profoundly

affected this conception of history. For one, subjects that can be considered

as history have broadened immeasurably. While studying social and

economic history are hardly revolutionary concepts, they have become

more influential; as we slide towards an autonomous, anonymous mass

culture, understanding the 'pressures from below' has taken on a new

relevance. Moreover, we hardly bat at an eyelid at our ability to study

cultural history, the history of gender, Afro-Caribbean history and so on. But

at the same time, the increasing specialisation of historians has meant a

concomitant decline in the integration of their findings into ‘traditional’

narratives. Greater understanding is being reached; it is being achieved at

the cost of greater specialisation. Continuous narratives are being replaced

by discrete histories, limited by their often recherché subjects and lack of

linkages to the other discrete histories around them.

But postmodernism has posed a fundamental challenge to history

itself, in suggesting that it is not possible to do history at all, that history is

just one of many possible discourses, whose language does not relate to

anything but itself. Moreover, the work of textural deconstructionists such

as Barthes and Derrida have challenged the very idea of Rankean history

based on analysis of text based sources. Arguing that language changes its

sequential order, where the content is focused in a single coherent story with subplots,
where description rather than analysis is present, p 3.
 20

meaning every time it is read, and that everything is a text, this therefore

poses insurmountable problems for the historian. There can be nothing

outside of the text, and fact and fiction become indistinguishable. Hence,

history loses its validity as the search for the truth and merely becomes

another outpost of creative writing.

It is these two influences, those of the increase of discrete histories

and the attack on narrative and therefore history itself which can lead to

the question being posed as to whether ‘European peoples’’ experiences

are too diverse to lead to a history that is meaningful. For history is nothing

if it cannot reflect diversity, and the problem lies less in diversity

preventing the emergence of meaning, but in a failure to integrate diversity

into overarching frameworks, to show links and commonalties, and to tell a

good story of causes and consequences.

Fortunately help is at hand to plot a new way for history in the light of

these particular intellectual currents. Richard J Evans' In Defence of History

is an elegant yet trenchant attack on those postmodern critics of history,

which while recognising that postmodernist as well as other academic

concerns can have a valuable influence on history, argues that the lengths

gone to by postmodernists are problematic.

Defending his craft in the face of the postmodernist hordes, Evans

writes:

"The language of historical documents is never transparent, and

historians have long been aware that they cannot simply gaze
through it to the historical reality behind. Historians know, historians
 21
have always known that we can only see the past 'through a glass,
darkly'. It did not take the advent of postmodernism to point this out.
What postmodernism has done is to push such familiar arguments
about the transparency or opacity of historical texts and sources out
to a set of binary opposites and polarized extremes." 29

He argues that, although historians cannot impose a single meaning

on a text, this does not mean that any meaning is possible. "We are limited

by the words it contains, words which are not, contrary to what the

postmodernists suggest, capable of an infinity of meaning." Historical 30

language has always detailed varying levels of certainty, while historical

sources are not necessarily the same as literary texts. Hence some

postmodern critiques tumble – the tools of literary analysis are not useful

when dealing with a set of statistics for example. The postmodern attack on

sequential time (implied in a continuous narrative) as a construct –

"Historical time is a recent and highly artificial invention of Western

Civilization." he quotes Frank Ankersmit as saying – is dealt with by pointing

out that the very existence of postmodern concepts is contrary to the

notion that there are no time periods. Once postmodernism's principles

31

are applied to itself, he implies, many of its arguments collapse under the

weight of their own contradictions.

Evans then goes on to enunciate what he believes historical narrative

should be about. He argues that it seldom consists of a single, linear strand.

It should consist of a mass of subjective, local narratives (or indeed

'discrete' or 'diverse' narratives.) This does not necessarily mean that these

local narratives are claiming universal validity, but neither do master-

29 Richard J Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta, 1997), p 104.
30 Evans, ibid, p 106.
31 Evans, ibid, p 141. Frank Ankersmit, History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall of
Metaphor, (Berkley, 1994), p 33-4.
 22

narratives have to be oppressive in their scope. "History has always been

seen by historians as a destroyer of myths more than a creator of them." 32

Narratives can also reflect the uneven nature of historical time; Evans takes

Braudel as an example of this. But ultimately Evans is pessimistic about

how successful this process of binding local narratives into a larger

framework might be. Citing the example of the 60 volume Fischer

Europäische Geschichte, which presents comparative studies of broad

aspects of 'European history' rather than any 'history of Europe', Evans'

writes, "There can be no definitive history any more." Any synthesis of

historical knowledge becomes avowedly personal, as in Davies' Europe,

whose argument intends to provoke as much as inform. 33

Is this last judgement fair? To an extent, but to judge from earlier

criteria, an avowedly personal narrative can still be meaningful if it is

expressive, conveys information and is significant; on these terms Davies

succeeds. And if diverse and differing personal narratives are being

created, then our picture of what constitutes the past can only become

more detailed and vivid, as long as it is recognised that discrete histories

are the start, not the end of any historical process. Far better for attempts

at this sort of multidisclipinary ‘many narratives’ history, which can

incorporate a wide range of experiences, rather than a writing framework

for doing history. A Marxist framework for history, for example, merely sees

diverse experiences as having the same root causes somewhere within the

resolution of productive relations.

32 Evans, op cit, p 151.

33 Evans, ibid, p 175-6.
 23

When dealing with obviously diverse histories such as those found in

Europe, it is apposite to remember that histories will not just 'emerge' from

the intellectual morass. Historians will create European history from any

process of 'emergence'. But in short the quasi-postmodern notion that

diverse experiences do not allow for the emergence of meaningful histories

is wrong. It is diversity and the various accounts of those diversities that

allow for a better, deeper and more complete understanding of what the

past is.

Part V – Experiences Which Are Common to All Peoples of Europe

The celebration of diversity in experiences of the peoples of Europe should

not blind us to the idea that there are certain experiences that all peoples,

nationalities in Europe have been through. This does not mean that all

European peoples lived through these 'experiences' – historical events,

social, political, economic and cultural trends – in the same way, at the

same time, that they were caused by the same factors and that they had

similar consequences for everyone. It is merely recognising the fact that

they can be said to have an existence which transcends national

boundaries.

At one level some experiences will be shared by most European

peoples. Those experiences which constitute human relations – familial life,

friendships, marriage, the idea of romantic love, sex, violence and so on –

while hard to validate historically, can be safely assumed to be fairly

common to the mass of European peoples. Naturally there will be

differences in the way that these variety of human relations are

 24

experienced. One could possibly argue that familial life in the

Mediterranean has a different tenor to that of Northern Europe for a

number of reasons, but the fundamental experience remains the same.

Experiences which could be said to be equally pervasive are those

that can be defined as a trend of some form or other. One could argue that

most European peoples have been touched at one point by the effects of

the demographic fact of population increases, and the presence of

‘invaders’, ‘barbarians’ or their modern equivalents. The experience of

literacy has provided the means of accessing a shared culture. Most

Europeans live in a world which is a product of the spread and influence of

religion of whatever denomination; thus they can be said to have shared

some religious experience, even if it is merely participating in a culture

which at some point has been shaped by religion.

The example of religion also indicates some of the limits of these

cultural trends. For example, the growth of secular thought in the last 200

years, the disestablishment of the church from the state in certain

countries, and the way in which more and more people view themselves as

atheist rather than religious, all show that the twentieth century in

particular has meant that what was once assumed to be an experience for

all is not necessarily so. Take invasion as an example of an experience that

one might assume all European peoples had been subjected to at some

point, especially in this century. Britain however, withstood the threat of

invasion and extended occupation.

 25

Before the advent of the twentieth century, it can be said that all

European peoples at some point experienced the rise and emergence of

capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that 'Europe' is a convenient

shorthand for the what is the central zone of the world economy, which has

developed from what he terms the 'long sixteenth century'. It is his

contention that modern European history is the story of the genesis and

functioning of a particular historical system which originated in Europe and

now covers the world. 34

But it is perhaps the experiences of the twentieth century which are

most clearly common to all European peoples. The obvious one is that of

war. The calamitous effects of the two world wars that had Europe as their

cockpit were clear enough. Even those that stayed out of the fighting were

affected, as the recent controversies over the extent of Switzerland's

neutrality during World War II have shown. Civil war is another facet of the

murderous experience that all European countries have had the horror of

seeing this century. The means of war changed, with opposing

governments viewing rapid destruction of enemy populations as the

quickest way to ensure success. The populations of other countries were

viewed as totally expendable, a gruesome irony considering that the actual

business of war became reserved for those members of a technologically

advanced military elite.

In particular it is possible to see World War II as the bloody resolution

of the three ideologies that were competing for global dominance at the

34 Wallerstein in Taylor et al, op cit, p 146.

 26

time. The idea of this conflict as a struggle to the bitter end between

Fascism, Communism and Liberal Democracy is one that has been

advanced by Michael Howard and, more recently, Mark Mazower. 35

After 1945, one could forgive most Europeans for asking where the

peace dividend was. Their continent yet again became divided, this time

between the competing spheres of two superpowers. But Europeans have

benefited from the other side of war; the evolution of modernity. For

example, most Europeans drive on roads which were built by machines

which have the same caterpillar tracks as the tanks which once ranged

across the same land.

The role and presence of Americans on European soil during World

War II and since, helped the process of cultural transference that most

Europeans have wittingly or unwittingly experienced in the later part of the

twentieth century, that of the Americanization of Europe. The Americans

played a major role in the political and economic reconstruction and the

securing of Europe, most overtly through the tools of the European

Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) and later the creation of NATO. The

scope and scale of cultural transmission which also took place across the

Atlantic was staggering. Food, TV, movies, music and fashion were all

exported to Europe as the brand new thing.

One other experience could be described as being common to all

European peoples. If, as suggested earlier, there has been no creation of a

35Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p
119; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, (London: Allen Lane,
1998), p x-xii.
 27

European identity, then this suggests that every European has experienced

the process being defined under a particular nationality. (Which in turn

leads to the idea that the only meaningful history of Europe would be a

history of the emergence of European nationalisms.) But for such diverse

peoples, it is those global experiences and cultural processes which seem

to provide seemingly the greatest unity for 'European peoples'.

Part VI – Concluding Remarks

Has the haze lifted? Would AJP Taylor be any happier in looking at European

history now? One would suspect so, if he bore in mind that diversity is the

key to understanding Europe and European history. It is in the diversity of

experiences, as well as those that are common, that the history of the

peoples of Europe lies. Diversity does not prevent the emergence of any

meaningful history of Europe, for diversity is meaningful, and has to be an

essential part of any European history.

But it is a diversity built upon shared foundations, and whatever

interpretation is made, whatever route is taken through nearly five

millennia of history, those shared foundations will need to be stressed.

Europe may stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Arctic Circle to

the Sahara, may be responsible for all of the world's glories and all of her

ills, but its civilization came from the a single cradle.

Diversity is everywhere in Europe. Diverse are the definitions that she

can apply to herself and the challenges that they pose in recognising her
 28

borders. Diverse are the historians and their approaches to the task of

writing European history. So diverse are the European peoples that a single

European identity may never be created. And diverse are the reactions to

even common shared experiences.

At times this diversity can be problematic: "This panoply of national

cultures, histories and values does make it hard for Europeans to act

cohesively and subjectively in moments of crisis," writes Mazower. But it is

36

not problematic enough to prevent the emergence of a meaningful history

of Europe. Postmodernist currents in history should not be allowed to turn

diverse experiences into discrete ones, and then proclaim that there is no

need for them to be integrated into a narrative. There is, and there will

always be a demand for histories that tell the story of Europe, even if it is in

the guise of the "story of 'Europes'".

36 Mazower, op cit, p 409.